Marattin, Luigi; Salotti, Simone

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A Note on Productivity and Per Capita GDP Growth: the Role of the Forgotten Factors

Luigi Marattin\textsuperscript{±} \hspace{1cm} Simone Salotti\textsuperscript{±}
(University of Bologna) \hspace{1cm} (University of Siena)

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PRELIMINARY VERSION°

Abstract

Average hourly productivity has often been used to draw conclusions on long run per capita GDP growth, based on the assumption of full utilization of labour resources. In this paper, we argue that a failure to recognize the potentially significant wedges among the two variables – even in the long run - can be misleading. By applying both time series and panel cointegration techniques on data on 19 OECD countries, we fail to reject the hypothesis of absence of a long run common stochastic trend among the two variables in the period 1980-2005. Furthermore, we apply a simple decomposition of GDP growth into five variables, included some related to the supply-side and demographics, so to verify the single contributions to income growth and variance over our period of interest. We conclude that variables that have been so far absent in the growth literature have indeed a non-negligible role in explaining the dynamics of long run per capita GDP growth. In particular, these “forgotten factors” (that we identify with the employment and the activity rates and a demographic ratio) matter more in better performing economies, where we also highlight that productivity has been less important in determining GDP growth than in relatively bad performers.

JEL classification: 040, O47, E01

Keywords: growth accounting, productivity, panel cointegration.

\textsuperscript{±} luigi.marattin@unibo.it Department of Economics – University of Bologna – Strada Maggiore 45 – 40125 – Bologna (Italy) – Tel: +39 – 051-2092606

\textsuperscript{°} salotti@unisi.it Department of Economics – University of Siena – P.za San Francesco 7 – 53100 – Siena (Italy)

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1. Introduction

Can we legitimately use average productivity as a proxy for long-run GDP growth? Growth theory and empirical applications have widely used the two variables interchangeably. In this paper we perform an empirical checking of this practice, using annual data from 1980 to 2005 for a sample of 19 OECD countries. We employ a double-step methodology: first we perform a cointegration analysis – both at time series and at panel levels – in order to check the long run properties of the two variables and verify the existence of a common stochastic trend. Subsequently, as supporting evidence, we carry out a simple and straightforward quantitative exercise: we decompose per capita GDP growth into five variables, including some supply side and demographic factors, so to be able to identify and quantify the ex-post contribution of each of them to per capita income growth.

Figure 1 shows the values of real capita GDP and hourly productivity growth rates for the economies under investigation over the period 1980-2005:

Figure 1: GDP and productivity growth

Source: WDI and OECD, own computations.
Clearly, there are pronounced similarities between the two series, yet there is no perfect matching. The aim of this paper is to look deeper into the wedge between the two variables highlighted by Figure1. Our findings suggest that those (supply side and demographic) factors usually thought of as irrelevant for long-run GDP growth might actually play a more significant role than it is often assumed. Our tests fail to reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration between hourly productivity and real per capita GDP in our data set, confirming that the role of demographic and labour supply factors can not be treated as simple statistical noise over the long run. Particularly, we find that in better-performing economies the relative weight of other-than-productivity factors on GDP growth is higher than in countries that experienced lower growth rates. This is confirmed by the cointegration tests run at the time series level, which confirm the absence of a common long-run stochastic trend between GDP and productivity in better performing economies, while rejecting the null in most of the economies whose 25 years GDP growth is below the median. These results might therefore trigger a renewed interest in the determinants of long-run growth and in the growth-enhancing policies.

The reason why the factors we focus on are usually neglected, and various measures of aggregate labour productivity have traditionally been identified as the unique approximations of long run per capita income, has anyway deep roots in economic analysis. In the Solow (1956) model, the diminishing returns hypothesis renders long-run output growth depending exclusively on technological progress, empirically measured by the so-called Solow residual. The empirical validity of this theory has been subsequently checked in a variety of growth accounting exercises. Young (1995) seems to downplay the role of pure technological progress in the rapid growth of newly industrialized East Asian countries in the Nineties, finding that the “growth miracle” of those years was almost entirely due to increasing labour force participation and improved labour quality. On the other hand, Hsieh (2002), examining the same episodes, finds a larger role for technological progress by considering factor returns instead of quantities in growth accounting. Similar exercises have been performed for the analysis of US exceptional growth rates in the mid-Nineties (Oliner and Sichel 2000, Jorgenson and Stiroh 2000, Whelan 2000), but were mainly targeted to the identification of which part of technological progress played the largest role in enhancing growth.

However, the ultimate factor allowing the indistinct use of per-capita GDP and productivity growth rates is the full employment assumption1; switching from theory to the real world, this amounts to assuming that employed, labour force, active population and total population coincide. Alternatively, 

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1 The exogenous growth models allow an increase in labour force to be a growth-enhancing measure but fail to further disentangle the demographic contribution.
given the focus on growth rates rather than levels, it means that they are assumed to be constant over time. Our contribution aims at challenging this assumption from an empirical point of view, using annual data for 19 OECD countries from 1980 to 2005; although these supply-side variables do show less volatility over time, we argue that they still can play a non-negligible role in explaining long run growth, and therefore should not be completely forgotten in favour of an exclusive focus on average productivity.

While our results call for a more complete and structural analysis capable of accounting for the interactions and the determinants of the factors under consideration, we believe that they can per se constitute a meaningful contribution to a better understanding and identification of policies aimed at increasing long-run GDP growth.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the main idea of the paper, applying our proposed GDP growth decomposition so to highlight the role of the “forgotten factors”. Section 3 analyses the long-run relationship between per capita GDP and hourly productivity in the search for a common stochastic trend using both panel and time series cointegration techniques. Section 4 expands on these results by analyzing each variable of our proposed decomposition. Section 5 concludes.

2. GDP decomposition: the forgotten factors

The main idea of our paper is captured by the decomposition of per-capita income \( \left( \frac{Y}{N} \right) \) at time \( t \) into the components of the following identity:

\[
\left( \frac{Y}{N} \right)_t = \left( \frac{Y}{h} \right)_t \cdot \left( \frac{h}{L} \right)_t \cdot \left( \frac{L}{LF} \right)_t \cdot \left( \frac{LF}{TAP} \right)_t \cdot \left( \frac{TAP}{N} \right)_t
\]

(1)

where:
\( Y = GDP \)
\( N = \) total population
\( h = \) total hours worked
\( L = \) number of employees
\( LF = \) labour force (employed and unemployed)
In other words, equation (1) states that we can decompose the level of per-capita income into the product of five variables: hourly productivity \( \left( \frac{Y}{h} \right) \), hours worked per employee \( \left( \frac{h}{L} \right) \), employment rate \( \left( \frac{L}{LF} \right) \), activity rate \( \left( \frac{TF}{TAP} \right) \) and a demographic ratio \( \left( \frac{TAP}{N} \right) \).

To the best of our knowledge, a similar strategy has only been attempted by Piacentini and Sulis (2000), who, however, limit their analysis to a two-terms decomposition:

\[
\frac{Y}{N} = \frac{Y}{L} \frac{L}{N}
\] (2)

Therefore, they focus their attention on average productivity and a wide measure of employment (employed over total population), which does not allow to fully capture the role of demographic factors. With respect to their analysis, we carry out a more detailed exercise along two dimensions: first, we consider hourly productivity rather than average, so to take into account the role of the hours worked. Second, we further decompose the employment measure into the product of three ratios (“proper” employment rate, activity rate and the demographic ratio), in order to emphasize meaningful issues related to the labour supply and the demographic structure.

Each of the factors in (1) yields different pieces of information about the structure of the economy and the scope of policy intervention. Hourly productivity is informative about the efficiency level of the employed resources, depending on the capital/labour ratio in the short run, and a variety of factors in the long run - commonly regrouped under the definition “total factor productivity” - such as technology, public and social infrastructure, human capital and knowledge accumulation, social capital, property rights protection, political stability, research and development. Average hours worked provide information on households' labour supply. The employment rate indicates the economy's capability to generate a level of aggregate demand such that a given number of individuals can actually have a job; in this regard, an important role is played by labour market features such as centralization of industrial relations, flexibility, trade unions strength and regulation. The activity rate tells us how many persons out of the total active population are willing to supply labour services on the legal job market. This measure is likely to be affected by many relevant factors: the labour tax burden and the level of children care services (which may discourage the supply of labour in families where one component is already part of the work force), the presence of long-term unemployment (which takes discouraged people out of the work force), the presence of a black market, and even some residual cultural factors.
which tend to privilege domestic work. Finally, the demographic ratio can be affected by policy considerations if we think about immigration regulatory regimes, an issue that is much debated in these years in developed countries, or fertility and birth incentive issues.

Standard growth models assume \( \left( \frac{L}{LF} \right) = \left( \frac{LF}{TAP} \right) = \left( \frac{TAP}{N} \right) = k \) (with \( k \) being a constant \( \epsilon [0, 1] \)) which is precisely the reason why constant returns to scale aggregate production functions are allowed to use the terms "output per worker" and "output per capita" as synonyms. By using the decomposition in equation (1) we can make the following remarks.

1) The emphasis on productivity growth as ultimate determinant of long-run growth is still justified: no other increase in any of the components on the RHS of (1) is able to determine \textit{per se} a rise in per-capita income. In fact, proceeding from right to left, an increase in the numerator is also a decrease in the denominator of the term next to the left, thereby offsetting the positive effect. Thus, an increase in the effectiveness of labour supply (i.e. productivity) is the only necessary and sufficient condition for per-capita growth.

2) Nevertheless, the relationship between productivity and per-capita output can be "wedged" by the employment rate, the activity rate and the demographic ratio. That is, a sustained growth in productivity can result in a less than proportionate per-capita income growth according to the dynamics of the other factors in (1).

To see this formally, let us turn to growth rates, leading (1) one period forward, taking logs and then subtracting the values of the preceding period, so to obtain:

\[
\log \left( \frac{Y}{N} \right)_{t+1} - \log \left( \frac{Y}{N} \right)_t = \left[ \log \left( \frac{Y}{h} \right)_{t+1} - \log \left( \frac{Y}{h} \right)_t \right] + \left[ \log \left( \frac{h}{L} \right)_{t+1} - \log \left( \frac{h}{L} \right)_t \right] + \left[ \log \left( \frac{L}{LF} \right)_{t+1} - \log \left( \frac{L}{LF} \right)_t \right] + \\
+ \left[ \log \left( \frac{LF}{TAP} \right)_{t+1} - \log \left( \frac{LF}{TAP} \right)_t \right] + \left[ \log \left( \frac{TAP}{N} \right)_{t+1} - \log \left( \frac{TAP}{N} \right)_t \right]
\]

(3)

The economic interpretation of equation (3) is straightforward: per-capita GDP growth can be seen as the algebraic sum of growth in hourly productivity, in the intensive and the extensive margins, in the activity ratio and in active population. This relation does not allow any full counterfactual reasoning, as the partial derivative with respect to \( h, L, LF, TAP \) is zero and nothing can be said without a theory accounting for the determinants of each of the above ratios; however, it is informative about how much of productivity growth is “eaten up” by growth in other factors and about the magnitude of each contribution to per capita income growth.
Before applying equation (3) to our dataset, in the following section we check the existence of cointegration between GDP and hourly productivity. We do so because, if the indistinct use of per capita GDP and hourly productivity is to be justified, we should at least be able to detect the presence of a common stochastic trend in the data over the long run.

3. Data and cointegration analysis

The main source of our data are the World Development Indicators produced by the World Bank. In particular, we use purchasing power parity GDP expressed in US dollars and we calculate the various ratios of equation (1) with the following series: the age dependency ratio (dependents to working-age population), labour force (total), population (total, ages 0-14, 15-64, 65 and above) and unemployment (total, percentage of labour force). We integrate these series with the OECD average annual hours actually worked per worker, available from the OECD Labour Database.

Using this dataset, we look for a cointegrating relationship among per capita GDP and hourly productivity. The use of cointegration tests to verify a steady long run relationship between any two economic variable is common in the empirical literature: it has been used when investigating the link between consumption spending and disposable income (Davidson et al 1978), public debt and GDP (Kremers 1989) and actual holding of the purchasing power parity condition. (Baillie and Selover 1987, Corbae and Ouliaris 1988). Here, we first run the test over the whole sample using panel cointegration techniques (subsection 3.1); then we do the same for each time series at the national level, to verify whether the existence of a common trend can be found in a specific sub-sample of countries featured by the same performances (subsection 3.2).

3.1. Panel cointegration tests

Our first step is to apply panel unit root test to check the order of integration of the two series. In order to ensure the robustness of the results, we carry out three different tests: the first two were proposed – respectively - by Levin et al. (2002) (LLC) and Hadri (2000) (H) and test the existence of a common root in the panel; the third one was built by Im et al. (2003) (IPS), and allows the existence of heterogeneous individual roots. All tests are carried out in two different model specifications: one assuming an individual intercept and the other with an individual intercept and a time trend. Results are reported in Table 1:
Looking at the LLC and the IPS tests, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of non-stationarity at conventional significance levels for both Y/N and Y/H (in three of the four different specifications). The Hadri test seems to over-reject the null hypothesis of stationarity (especially in the case of Y/H). However, due to the results of the other tests, it can be concluded that the two variables of interest appear to be integrated of order 1 in our dataset (this is also confirmed by the results of the tests for the first differences of the two series). Among the variables that appear to be integrated of the same order, it is necessary to look for a cointegrating relationship. We accomplish this task by implementing the methodology proposed by Pedroni (1999). Table 2 reports the relevant statistics:

The first three rows report within-dimension-based tests (panel v, panel ρ and the non-parametric panel PP test), while the last two lines show parametric between-dimension-based statistics (group ρ and group t), which are just the group mean approach extensions of the within-based ones. The group ρ
test is particularly important, as it has been proven to have the best power among the Pedroni statistics (Gutierrez, 2003). Finally, we choose to use the non-weighted statistics – instead of weighted – because of their better performances in small samples. The majority of the tests point to the non-rejection of the null hypothesis in a pretty robust fashion: only the panel $v$ statistics, in the specification with an individual intercept, indicate the presence of a cointegrating relationship. Thus, we conclude that there is no evidence of a cointegrating relationship between the two variables of interest.

3.2 Time series cointegration tests

While the previous subsection confirms the absence of a well-defined cointegrating relationship at panel level, in this subsection we perform the same test on single countries’ time series by using the well-known Johansen cointegration test. Our objective is to verify whether the existence of a common stochastic trend between GDP and productivity – ruled out at the panel level – can indeed be found in any particular subset of countries. Table 3 reports the results country by country:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>test</th>
<th>null</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Max.eig.</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>0.003** 0.598</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Max.eig.</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>0.004** 0.586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Max.eig.</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>0.041* 0.270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Max.eig.</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>0.009** 0.932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Max.eig.</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>0.000** 0.736</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Max.eig.</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>0.000** 0.464</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Max.eig.</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>0.222 0.166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Max.eig.</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>0.110 0.450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Max.eig.</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>0.125 0.970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Max.eig.</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>0.006** 0.087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Max.eig.</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>0.006** 0.532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Max.eig.</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>0.355 0.622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>Max.eig.</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>0.022* 0.202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Max.eig.</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>0.059</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9
Based on the above statistics, there is evidence in favour of the existence of a cointegrating relationship in 11 countries (Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Sweden, USA), whereas the tests indicate no cointegration in the remaining 8 (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherland, Norway, Portugal, Spain, UK). In the next section we further investigate the panel and time series cointegration results.

4. Exploring the “wedge”: GDP decomposition

In section 3 we have established the absence of cointegration between per capita GDP and hourly productivity at panel level, while there is evidence of cointegration in a specific subset of countries. This result calls for further investigation. In this section we attempt to answer the following questions: (i) if productivity and GDP do not share – in general – the same stochastic trend, what is the quantitative impact of the other factors creating the wedge between the two? (ii) if evidence of cointegration can be found in a given subset of countries, what is the common feature they share, and are the quantitative results of the GDP decomposition in line with that? (iii) are the results on the relative importance of decomposing factor confirmed by the analysis of time series volatility? Subsection 4.1 is concerned with (i) and (ii), whereas subsection 4.2 looks at (iii). Finally, in subsection 4.3 we verify the intensity of convergence of each variable.
4.1. Growth rate decomposition

In this subsection we investigate how much of the per-capita income growth in the period 1980-2005 is explained by growth in each factor of the RHS of equation (3).

Table 4 reports the 25-year growth rates country-by-country:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>$g_{YN}$</th>
<th>$g_{Y/H}$</th>
<th>$g_{H/L}$</th>
<th>$g_{LF/L}$</th>
<th>$g_{LF/TAP}$</th>
<th>$g_{TAP/N}$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>61.38%</td>
<td>58.46%</td>
<td>-8.70%</td>
<td>0.68%</td>
<td>4.63%</td>
<td>6.31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>53.03%</td>
<td>42.40%</td>
<td>-8.90%</td>
<td>5.27%</td>
<td>7.37%</td>
<td>6.87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>28.89%</td>
<td>26.24%</td>
<td>-5.92%</td>
<td>0.62%</td>
<td>5.64%</td>
<td>2.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>26.01%</td>
<td>27.27%</td>
<td>-4.63%</td>
<td>-1.34%</td>
<td>2.92%</td>
<td>1.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>25.31%</td>
<td>21.95%</td>
<td>-1.72%</td>
<td>4.06%</td>
<td>0.62%</td>
<td>0.42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>24.98%</td>
<td>20.13%</td>
<td>-5.84%</td>
<td>0.92%</td>
<td>5.88%</td>
<td>3.89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>22.95%</td>
<td>17.20%</td>
<td>-6.84%</td>
<td>2.80%</td>
<td>11.05%</td>
<td>-1.26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>22.80%</td>
<td>28.23%</td>
<td>-3.21%</td>
<td>-1.72%</td>
<td>0.14%</td>
<td>-0.65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>21.57%</td>
<td>18.48%</td>
<td>-0.36%</td>
<td>0.93%</td>
<td>2.13%</td>
<td>0.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>21.21%</td>
<td>18.18%</td>
<td>-2.32%</td>
<td>-0.97%</td>
<td>4.32%</td>
<td>2.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>21.08%</td>
<td>26.54%</td>
<td>-7.73%</td>
<td>-1.08%</td>
<td>4.02%</td>
<td>-0.67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>20.95%</td>
<td>17.57%</td>
<td>-1.64%</td>
<td>0.46%</td>
<td>3.08%</td>
<td>1.48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>20.55%</td>
<td>21.42%</td>
<td>-6.02%</td>
<td>1.97%</td>
<td>3.89%</td>
<td>-0.71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>20.48%</td>
<td>22.08%</td>
<td>-1.13%</td>
<td>-0.01%</td>
<td>-1.36%</td>
<td>0.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>19.27%</td>
<td>21.37%</td>
<td>2.51%</td>
<td>-2.51%</td>
<td>-2.93%</td>
<td>0.84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>18.17%</td>
<td>15.20%</td>
<td>-1.81%</td>
<td>0.33%</td>
<td>3.57%</td>
<td>0.87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>17.03%</td>
<td>14.76%</td>
<td>-0.95%</td>
<td>-0.05%</td>
<td>2.14%</td>
<td>1.13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>17.02%</td>
<td>26.15%</td>
<td>-7.50%</td>
<td>-1.75%</td>
<td>-0.93%</td>
<td>1.04%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>12.87%</td>
<td>10.51%</td>
<td>-0.75%</td>
<td>0.24%</td>
<td>1.96%</td>
<td>0.91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEAN</td>
<td>25.03%</td>
<td>23.90%</td>
<td>-3.87%</td>
<td>0.47%</td>
<td>3.06%</td>
<td>1.47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDIAN</td>
<td>21.21%</td>
<td>21.42%</td>
<td>-3.21%</td>
<td>0.33%</td>
<td>3.08%</td>
<td>0.91%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A visual inspection of Table 4 confirms that, while productivity dynamics is no doubt leading GDP growth, the two growth rates do not always match perfectly. As a general trend, we can notice that the decrease in hours worked is approximately offset by the increase in the activity ratio, whereas the increase in employment ratio and demography accounts for the positive differential between GDP and hourly productivity growth rates. In some cases, this differential is remarkable: in Japan and France a sharp decline in hours worked (almost 8%) made GDP grow substantially less than productivity; on the other hand, in Ireland (one of the most successful experiences) and Netherlands, active population and labour force growth are responsible for a noteworthy positive differential.

Figure 2 orders countries growth rates over the period 1980-2005, helping us to individuate meaningful subsamples:
Median growth rate is 21.21% (Greece); we can thus distinguish between nine relatively good performers (high-growth countries: Korea, Ireland, Portugal, Norway, UK, Spain, Netherlands, Finland, USA) and nine relatively bad performers (low-growth countries: Japan, Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Sweden, Canada, Italy, France, New Zealand). Searching for interesting common patterns, a useful piece of information is provided, after having divided countries according to relative growth performances, by computing for each group a variable capturing the relative weight of each of the RHS component of equation (3) in determining the 25-year GDP growth:

\[ m_i = \frac{g_i}{g_{Y/N}} \]  

(4)

where \( i \) indicates each of the factor on the RHS of equation (1) and \( g_i \) the corresponding growth rate over the 2005-1980 time span. Table 5 shows the average values of this weight variable for countries above and below the median growth rate (“HIGH” and “LOW”) and for the total sample:
We can observe that, while the negative role of hours worked is similar in the two groups, the relative weight of other components is different: in countries below the median growth rate, hourly productivity has grown even more than real per-capita income, with a less pronounced role for the remaining factors. In better-performing economies, on the other hand, the role played by growth in employment rate, activity rate and (to a lesser extent) active population ratio is non-negligible.

This result can be combined with the statistical analysis of section 3. We found no evidence of time series cointegration in 8 countries, which correspond almost perfectly to the group of good performers (with the only exception of Italy). Conversely, we found evidence of cointegration in 11 countries, which can approximately\(^2\) be identified with the sub-sample of bad performers.

Thus, it seems that economies which performed relatively good in the period 2005-1980 are characterized by a non-negligible role of the “forgotten factors”: in those countries we do not find evidence of cointegration between GDP and productivity even at the time-series level, and the quantitative weight of the “wedge” (i.e. the “forgotten factors”) in our growth accounting exercise is large. On the other hand, in relatively bad performer economies, there is evidence of cointegration among hourly productivity and per capita GDP, and the forgotten factors seem to play a more negligible role.

**4.2. Variance decomposition**

We turn now to the examination of the variance of the series. The logarithmic version of equation (1) is a summation, thus we can decompose the variance of real per capita GDP as follows:

\[
\sigma^2_{Y/N} = \sigma^2_{Y/H} + \sigma^2_{H/N} + \sigma^2_{N/LF} + \sigma^2_{LF/TAP} + \sigma^2_{TAP/N} + W_t
\]  

(4)

where the term \(W_t\) indicates the sum of the covariances:

\(^2\) 8 countries out of 11 belong to the bad-performers group.
\[ W_i = 2 \sum_{ij} \sigma_{ij} \quad \text{with } i \neq j \]  

(5)

In a five-terms equation like the one we use, the analysis of the covariances would be complicated and hard to interpret, so we limit ourselves to the decomposition of \( \sigma_{Y/N}^2 \) into the five direct effects, by building the following weight variable:

\[ q_i = \frac{\sigma_i^2}{\sigma_{Y/N}^2} \]  

(6)

where \( i \) indicates each of the factors on the RHS of (1).

Table 6 reports GDP variance and the \( q_i \)'s according to the growth-performance criterion:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/variance</th>
<th>( q_{Y/H} )</th>
<th>( q_{H/N} )</th>
<th>( q_{N/FL} )</th>
<th>( q_{FL/TAP} )</th>
<th>( q_{TAP/N} )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>88.65%</td>
<td>3.54%</td>
<td>2.78%</td>
<td>4.28%</td>
<td>0.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>97.75%</td>
<td>4.59%</td>
<td>2.52%</td>
<td>4.04%</td>
<td>0.79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>110.03%</td>
<td>5.94%</td>
<td>2.41%</td>
<td>3.50%</td>
<td>0.63%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This result is harder to comment, for the above-mentioned reason: we can not tell the whole story since we chose not to take covariances into account (that is the reason why the \( q_i \)'s do not sum up to 100%). However, there is also a bright side for that: by ignoring the cross-effects (which might be cumbersome to interpret economically), we can focus on the directly-interpretable percentage of GDP variance attributable to the variation in the underlying factors. Table 6 shows that – although in this case the differential in demographic factors' quotas is negligible – the role played by hourly productivity is again lighter (i.e. lower than in the whole sample) in better-performing economies, whereas its variance is even higher than GDP variance in relatively bad performers.

4.3. Convergence analysis

A complementary and further piece of evidence supporting our findings can be given by verifying the convergence among countries in our sample. The convergence is tested by running the following regression, based on the technique firstly used by Baumol (1986):

\[ X_{2005} - X_{1980} = \alpha + \beta X_{1980} \]  

(7)
with the sign of coefficient $\beta$ indicating convergence (if negative) or divergence (if positive) of the variable $X_i$ which in each of the regressions take the form of one of the variables in equation (1). Table 7 shows the results of the six different regressions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Y/N</th>
<th>Y/H</th>
<th>H/L</th>
<th>L/LF</th>
<th>LF/TAP</th>
<th>TAP/N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\beta$ coefficient</td>
<td>-0.394**</td>
<td>-0.298**</td>
<td>-0.240*</td>
<td>-0.561**</td>
<td>-0.447**</td>
<td>-0.664**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard error</td>
<td>0.096</td>
<td>0.084</td>
<td>0.110</td>
<td>0.120</td>
<td>0.098</td>
<td>0.100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>t-statistic</td>
<td>(-4.07)</td>
<td>(-3.53)</td>
<td>(-2.17)</td>
<td>(-4.68)</td>
<td>(-4.54)</td>
<td>(-6.63)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*, ** significant at 5 and 1% respectively

Over the period 1980-2005, we can observe convergence for all the variables under consideration. A particular feature is noteworthy: the intensity of per capita income convergence (-0.394) is much higher than the corresponding value for hourly productivity convergence (-0.298). We interpret this result as a further confirmation of the role played by the remaining factors: the higher intensity of convergence in employment rate, activity rate and total active population helped to fill the gap between intensities in GDP and productivity convergence processes.

5. Conclusions

The assumption of full utilization of resources have so far made possible to use interchangeably real per capita GDP and (a measure of) average productivity. In this paper we implemented an empirical test of this assumption on a panel of 19 OECD countries using annual data for hourly productivity, hours worked per employee, employment and activity rates and active population over total population for the period 1980-2005. We first verified the long-run properties of GDP and productivity by performing a number of cointegration tests; then, we investigated more adequately the wedge between these two variables, by applying a GDP decomposition capable of disentangling income growth into five variables, included some supply side and demographic factors. We concluded that the indistinct use of GDP and productivity is not always fully justifiable, as we were not able to find cointegration at panel level and our GDP decomposition analysis indicates that the role of other factors is far from being negligible. Particularly, along both dimensions of analysis, we were able to distinguish two groups of countries characterized by different features. In better-performing economies we do not find evidence in favour of the existence of a cointegrating relationship, and we also find that the relative
weight of productivity in explaining growth is lower than in countries with a worse 25 year growth rate, thus unveiling a non negligible role of the three supply side and demographic variables, that we labelled as the “forgotten factors”. Our finding suggests that these factors played a larger role than it is usually assigned to them by standard theory, and that growth models aiming at explaining the long run growth dynamics should take them into proper account.
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Tendenze Recenti per le Aree Europee in Ritardo di Sviluppo,” *Rivista Economica del Mezzogiorno*, 1, Marzo.


