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Platform Stickiness in a Spatial Voting Model

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Abstract

The spatial voting approach is extended to account for the existence of a loyalty effect driving the choice of parties’ platforms during elections. There emerges a non-linear relationship between these variable, whereby a party sticking to its historical heritage may lose to a rival more keen to approach the position of the median voter, whose pivotal role is also investigated.

Keywords: elections, politics,

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1 Introduction

After Downs’s (1957) pioneering work, a very large stream of literature has investigated spatial voting models to study parties’ strategic behaviour and predict the outcome of elections. The spatial approach has been extended in several directions, to account for, e.g., stochastic voting (Anderson, Kats and Thisse 1994; Adams, 1999; Patty, 2005; Schofield, 2006); parties’ (or candidates’) incomplete information or bounded rationality (Kollman, Miller and Page, 1992; Page, Kollman and Miller, 1993; Kollman, Miller and Page, 1997); multidimensional platforms with valence issues (Ansolabehere and Snyder, 2000); the existence of majority-rule equilibria in spatial voting games (Bartholdi, Narasimhan and Tovey, 1991).\footnote{Relevant contributions adopting a spatial approach to investigate other aspects of electoral competition are virtually uncountable. See, e.g., Weber (1992), Adams (1999), McKelvey and Patty (2006) and Huck, Knoblauch and Muller (2006).}

The aim of the present paper is to extend the spatial approach in order to investigate the bearings of parties’ traditional platforms, as inherited from history, on their strategies and ultimately on the outcome of electoral competition. When I refer to the presence of traditional platforms, I mean what follows. Any given party may take from its past history some essential features conditioning its views on relevant policy issues, such as monetary and fiscal policy, welfare, foreign policy, etc., so much so that they end up shaping to a large extent the choice of such a party’s platform during the elections. This aspect, which to the best of my knowledge has been overlooked thus far, may in fact play a relevant role, as it can be easily ascertained on the basis of casual observation.

For instance, this clearly appears to be the case if one looks at the political
elections held in Italy in April 2006, with particular regard to behaviour of
the center-left during the last two weeks of the electoral campaign, when Mr
Romano Prodi’s public speeches and declarations were increasingly stressing
the need to increase taxation (or introduce new taxes) on large patrimonies
and high incomes so as to make the distribution of income in Italy less unfair.
How much large and high these were supposed to be, remained a vague
concept until the new government produced the new fiscal law. Yet, these
declaration of intents produced the effect (predictable but clearly - and quite
strangely indeed - unforeseen by the center-left itself) of decreasing their
margin of consensus over the center-right coalition to such an extent that the
outcome of the elections was pretty tight, being determined by a few thousand
votes only. It is a widely accepted interpretation that such declarations were
dictated not by a risk-loving attitude but rather from the will (or need) to
satisfy some essential (or tradition-driven) requirements of the communist
components of the coalition led by Mr Prodi.

To model this issue, I propose an extension of the standard two-party
spatial voting approach to explicitly account for the presence of a loyalty
effect in the objective function of each party, in addition to the extent of
electoral consensus. The main results of the ensuing analysis can be sum-
marised as follows. If the loyalty effect is low enough, both parties choose
the median voter’s preferred platform; as a consequence, the outcome of the
elections is indeterminate. Otherwise, the outcome of the elections is deter-
mined by a non-trivial interplay between the loyalty effect and the parties’
locations around the median voter. This interplay also entails that, when-
ever at least one party locates apart from the median voter, the latter will
be pivotal, unlike what happens in the usual approach where both parties
locate in correspondence of the median voter’s preferred platform.

2 The model

Examine the following two-party electoral competition game. Parties 1 and
2 choose their respective electoral (or political) platforms in \([0, 1]\), with
\(x_1 \in [0, 1/2]\) and \(x_2 \in [1/2, 1]\). The unit interval defines the support of the
distribution of voters’ electoral preferences, which I assume to be uniform.
for the sake of simplicity I also assume that all voters indeed vote (either for
party 1 or for party 2), so that the total amount of votes is equal to one.
The generic voter, located at point \(m \in [0, 1]\), votes for the party (or the
candidate) whose political platform \(x_i\) maximises:

\[
U = s - t (m - x_i)^2,
\]

where \(s > 0\) is the gross value that any individual associates with the fact
itself of voting, while parameter \(t > 0\) measures the disutility of voting for
a party whose platform differs from the voter’s ideal one.\(^2\)

The voter who is indifferent between candidate 1 and candidate 2 is identified by the following
condition:

\[
s - t (\tilde{m} - x_1)^2 = s - t (\tilde{m} - x_2)^2\]

which can be solved to find location \(\tilde{m}\):

\[
\tilde{m} = \frac{x_1 + x_2}{2}
\]

\(^2\)The use of a linear disutility function would not entail any significant change in the
qualitative conclusions of the model.
entailing that the amount of voters located in \((x_1, x_2)\) will split evenly. Using the above expression, one may define the amount of votes \(v_i\) accruing to each party, as follows:

\[
v_1 = \frac{x_1 + x_2}{2}; \quad v_2 = 1 - \frac{x_1 + x_2}{2}.
\] (4)

So far, the setup closely replicate Down’s (1957). Should \(v_i\) define the objective function of party \(i\), the voting paradox would obtain. Instead, I will pose that party (or candidate) \(i\)’s objective function is defined by:

\[
O_i = v_i - b_i (\mu_i - x_i)^2,
\] (5)

where:

- \(\mu_i \in [0, 1]\), with \(\mu_1 < \mu_2\), \(\mu_1 \in [0, 1/2]\) and \(\mu_2 \in [1/2, 1]\), is the platform that ideally party \(i\) would adopt if there were no incentive at all to capture the preferences of voters located far away from \(\mu_i\). An intuitive interpretation of \(\mu_i\) is that it may represent a traditional platform that party \(i\) has inherited from its previous history;

- \(b_i (\mu_i - x_i)^2\), with \(b_i \geq 0\), is the cost (either real or psychological) associated with departing from the ideal/historical platform \(\mu_i\). This cost component describes the loyalty effect felt by party \(i\) to its historical heritage, such loyalty becoming stronger as parameter \(b_i\) increases.

\(\)A similar cost function has been used in the economic model describing product location or differentiation in the Hotelling (1929) vein, to describe a taxation rule that a policy maker could adopt as a remedy to the excess differentiation caused by firms’ profits incentives. To this regard, see Lambertini (1997).\(\)
The noncooperative one-shot game takes place under imperfect, symmetric and complete information. Party $i$ must choose its electoral platform $x_i$ in order to maximise $O_i$. Using (3), the objective functions can be rewritten as follows:

$$
O_1 = \frac{x_1 + x_2}{2} - b_1 (\mu_1 - x_1)^2; \quad (6)
$$
$$
O_2 = 1 - \frac{x_1 + x_2}{2} - b_2 (\mu_2 - x_2)^2,
$$

and the associated first order conditions are:

$$
\frac{\partial O_1}{\partial x_1} = \frac{1 + 4b_1 (\mu_1 - x_1)}{2} = 0; \quad (7)
$$
$$
\frac{\partial O_2}{\partial x_2} = \frac{4b_2 (\mu_2 - x_2) - 1}{2} = 0,
$$

yielding the Nash equilibrium platforms:

$$
x_1^* = \mu_1 + \frac{1}{4b_1}; \quad x_2^* = \mu_2 - \frac{1}{4b_2}. \quad (8)
$$

Given that $x_1^* \leq 1/2 \leq x_2^*$ by assumption, this requires:

$$
b_1 \geq \frac{1}{2 (1 - 2\mu_1)} \triangleq \bar{b}_1; \quad b_2 \geq \frac{1}{2 (2\mu_2 - 1)} \triangleq \bar{b}_2. \quad (9)
$$

It is easily checked that conditions $x_1^* > 0$ and $x_2^* < 1$ are met for all $\mu_1 \in [0, 1/2]$ and $\mu_2 \in [1/2, 1]$. By looking at (8), one can immediately state:

**Lemma 1** $x_i^* \in [\mu_1, \mu_2]$, with $\partial x_1^*/\partial b_1 < 0$ and $\partial x_2^*/\partial b_2 > 0$.

In words, the above Lemma states that both parties find it optimal to abandon their traditional platforms and relocate towards the median voter, the more so the lower is the (psychological or real) cost associated to relocation. Consequently, the degree of differentiation between the two electoral platforms is decreasing in both $b_i$’s. Lemma 1 implies a relevant corollary:
Corollary 2 If $b_i \leq \overline{b}_i$, $i = 1, 2$, then $x_i^* = 1/2$.

This means that if party $i$'s cost of relocating away from the traditional is sufficiently low, then this party will indeed choose the platform preferred by the median voter. Given that, in general, $b_i$ is not symmetric across parties/candidates, this may well hold for one but not for the other.

Given that if $b_i \leq \overline{b}_i$ for both $i$, then both parties choose the platform preferred by the median voter, Corollary 2 has the following straightforward implication:

**Proposition 3** The condition \( \{b_1 \leq \overline{b}_1, b_2 \leq \overline{b}_2\} \) is necessary and sufficient to make the outcome of the elections undetermined.

Now, provided \( \{b_1 > \overline{b}_1, b_2 > \overline{b}_2\} \), then plugging expressions (8) into (4) one obtains the explicit electoral outcome in terms of vote shares, for all $x_1^* < 1/2 < x_2^*$:

\[
\begin{align*}
  v_1^* &= \frac{b_2 [1 + 4b_1 (\mu_1 + \mu_2)] - b_1}{8b_1 b_2}; \quad (10) \\
  v_2^* &= \frac{b_1 - b_2 [1 + 4b_1 (\mu_1 + \mu_2 - 2)]}{8b_1 b_2}. \quad (11)
\end{align*}
\]

To begin with, one has to look at the non-negativity requirements for expressions (10-11). First, consider $v_1^* \geq 0$:

\[
v_1^* \geq 0 \iff b_2 + b_1 [4b_2 (\mu_1 + \mu_2) - 1] \geq 0. \quad (12)
\]

This is surely true for all $b_2 \geq 1/ [4 (\mu_1 + \mu_2)]$, with $1/ [4 (\mu_1 + \mu_2)] < \overline{b}_2$ for all admissible values of $\mu_1$ and $\mu_2$. Secondly, take $v_2^* \geq 0$:

\[
v_2^* \geq 0 \iff b_1 - b_2 [1 + 4b_1 (\mu_1 + \mu_2 - 2)] \geq 0 \quad (13)
\]
which is surely true for all \( b_1 \geq 1 / [4 (2 - \mu_1 - \mu_2)] \), with \( 1 / [4 (2 - \mu_1 - \mu_2)] < \bar{b}_1 \) for all admissible values of \( \mu_1 \) and \( \mu_2 \). Hence, \( v_i^* > 0 \) and consequently \( v_j^* < 1 \) for all \( b_j < \bar{b}_j, i \neq j, i, j = 1, 2 \). Accordingly:

**Lemma 4** \( \{ b_1 > \bar{b}_1, b_2 > \bar{b}_2 \} \) suffices to ensure \( \{ v_1^* \in (0, 1), v_2^* \in (0, 1) \} \).

It is worth noting that the above Lemma essentially rules out unanimity (in favour of either party) as long as \( x_i^* \neq 1/2, i = 1, 2 \). The next step consists in establishing the condition(s) on the basis of which party 1 wins (i.e., \( v_1^* > 1/2 \) or, equivalently, \( v_1^* > v_2^* \)) iff:

\[
 b_2 - b_1 [1 + 4b_2 (1 - \mu_1 - \mu_2)] > 0. \tag{14}
\]

Therefore, we have three alternative cases:

**Case I:** If \( \mu_2 = 1 - \mu_1 \), then we have

\[
 \text{sign} \{ v_1^* - 1/2 \} = \text{sign} \{ v_1^* - v_2^* \} = \text{sign} \{ b_2 - b_1 \}. \tag{15}
\]

This amounts to saying that, if historical platforms are symmetric around the median voter, then party 1 (respectively, 2) wins for all \( b_1 < b_2 \) (resp., \( b_2 < b_1 \)).

**Case II:** If \( \mu_2 > 1 - \mu_1 \) and \( b_2 \geq 1 / [4 (\mu_1 + \mu_2 - 1)] \), then \( v_1^* > 1/2 \) for all admissible values of \( b_1 \).

**Case III:** If either (i) \( 1 < \mu_1 + \mu_2 \) and \( b_2 < 1 / [4 (\mu_1 + \mu_2 - 1)] \) (which is necessary to ensure that \( 1 + 4b_2 (1 - \mu_1 - \mu_2) > 0 \)), or (ii) \( 1 \geq \mu_1 + \mu_2 \) (which suffices to ensure that \( 1 + 4b_2 (1 - \mu_1 - \mu_2) > 0 \) for all \( b_2 > 0 \)), then \( v_1^* > 1/2 \) for all

\[
 b_1 < \frac{b_2}{1 + 4b_2 (1 - \mu_1 - \mu_2)} \triangleq \hat{b}_1. \tag{16}
\]
and conversely if the opposite inequality holds. Note that condition (16) is non linear w.r.t. $b_2$ for all $\mu_2 \neq 1 - \mu_1$. In the special case where $\mu_2 = 1 - \mu_1$, (16) trivially reduces to $b_1 < b_2$.

Of course, in view of the symmetry of the model, similar conclusions would hold, *mutatis mutandis*, if one examined the condition $v_2^* > 1/2$. Observe that Case II describes a situation where $\mu_1 > 1 - \mu_2$, which amounts to saying that party 1’s historical platform is closer to the extreme left than party 2’s one is to the extreme right. In light of this, intuitively, it appears that there exists a critical threshold of $b_2$ above which party 1 is the winner irrespective of how painful may be for party 1 itself to choose any $x_1^* \neq \mu_1$.

In Case III, it is necessary to check whether inequality (16) is compatible with (9), i.e., the sign of $\hat{b}_1 - \bar{b}_1$, as long as $1 + 4b_2 (1 - \mu_1 - \mu_2) > 0$:

$$\hat{b}_1 - \bar{b}_1 = \frac{1 + 2b_2 (2\mu_2 - 1)}{2 (1 - 2\mu_1) [1 + 4b_2 (1 - \mu_1 - \mu_2)]} \geq 0 \text{ for all } b_2 \geq \bar{b}_2. \quad (17)$$

This immediately entails:

**Lemma 5** The sign of $b_1 - \hat{b}_1$ reveals the outcome of the elections outside the region $\{b_1 \leq \bar{b}_1, b_2 \leq \bar{b}_2\}$.

Having established this, I may now proceed to characterise the electoral outcome in the non trivial cases where at least one party’s platform differs from the median voter’s. When $1 + 4b_2 (1 - \mu_1 - \mu_2) > 0$, the overall picture of the equilibrium outcome is represented by Figure 1, where:

- in regions $A$ and $F$, platforms are $x_1^* = x_2^* = 1/2$ everywhere; therefore, the outcome of the elections is undetermined;

- in region $B$, party 1 wins, with platforms $x_1^* = 1/2$, $x_2^* > 1/2$;
• in region $C$, party 1 wins with platforms $x_1^* < 1/2 < x_2^*$;

• in region $D$, party 2 wins, with platforms $x_1^* < 1/2 < x_2^*$;

• in region $E$, party 2 wins, with platforms $x_1^* < 1/2$, $x_2^* = 1/2$.

**Figure 1**

Figure 1 is drawn for $\mu_2 \neq 1 - \mu_1$. If instead $\mu_2 = 1 - \mu_1$, (16) coincides with the $45^\circ$ line and therefore the graph becomes fully symmetric.

Accordingly, I may sum up the forgoing discussion in:
Theorem 6 Consider the range \( \{ b_1 > \overline{b}_1, b_2 > \overline{b}_2 \} \). In this parameter region, the outcome of the elections can be characterised as follows:

- Take \( 1 + 4b_2 (1 - \mu_1 - \mu_2) < 0 \). If so, then party 1 wins the elections for all \( b_1 \geq \overline{b}_1 \).

- Take \( 1 + 4b_2 (1 - \mu_1 - \mu_2) > 0 \). For all \( b_1 \in [\overline{b}_1, \widehat{b}_1) \), party 1 wins the elections; for all \( b_1 > \widehat{b}_1 \), party 2 wins; for \( b_1 = \widehat{b}_1 \), the indifferent (median) voter is pivotal.

In order to complete the picture, it is now worth discussing briefly the relationship between \( b_2 \) and \( \widehat{b}_1 \), in the parameter range where \( 1 + 4b_2 (1 - \mu_1 - \mu_2) > 0 \). This is easily done by observing that

\[
b_2 > \widehat{b}_1 \iff 1 > \frac{1}{1 + 4b_2 (1 - \mu_1 - \mu_2)},
\]

which is always true in the relevant parameter range.

To conclude the analysis, the particular case where \( b_1 = b_2 \) can be investigated closely. Here, we have

\[
\text{sign} \{ v_1^* - 1/2 \} = \text{sign} \{ v_1^* - v_2^* \} = \text{sign} \{ \mu_1 + \mu_2 - 1 \} \tag{19}
\]

implying:

\[
v_1^* > v_2^* \iff \mu_1 > 1 - \mu_2 \tag{20}
\]

and conversely. Hence, we have:

Corollary 7 If \( b_1 = b_2 \), then the party whose traditional platform is closest to the median voter wins the elections.
3 Concluding remarks

I have investigated the role of political parties’ loyalty to their historical heritage, the choice of their political platforms and ultimately the outcome of elections. The foregoing analysis has highlighted that, unless the weight attached to history is low enough, the outcome of elections is determinate and driven by a party’s capability of adjusting its own electoral platform to the political preferences of the voters located around the median one. That is, being characterised by either (i) a less compelling historical heritage, or (ii) a traditional platform closer to the position of the median voter than the rival, entails per se no warranty of victory. Depending on the relative weight of these two factors, the winner may well be a party that, judging from its history, is farther away from the median voter but can approach him/her during the elections at a relatively lower cost than the rival, or, conversely, a party that suffers from a relatively higher stickiness with respect to its tradition but is lucky enough to find itself closer to the median voter precisely thanks to such historical tradition.
References


