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Macroeconomic Determinants of International Migration to the UK

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Abstract

This paper examines the determinants of long-term international migration to the UK; we explore the extent to which migration is driven by macroeconomic variables (GDP per capita, unemployment rate) as well as law and policy (the existence of “free movement” rights for EEA nationals). We find a very large impact from free movement within the EEA. We also find that macroeconomic variables – UK GDP growth and GDP at origin – are significant drivers of migration flows; evidence for the impact of the unemployment rate in countries of origin, or of the exchange rate, however, is weak. We conclude that, while future migration flows will be driven by a number of factors, macroeconomic and otherwise, Brexit and the end of free movement will result in a large fall in immigration from EEA countries to the UK.

Keywords: Brexit, EU, Immigration, UK

JEL Codes: F22, J61, J68

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1 Introduction

This paper examines the determinants of long-term international migration to the UK; we explore the extent to which migration is driven by macroeconomic variables (GDP per capita, unemployment rate) as well as law and policy (the existence of “free movement” rights for EEA nationals). We focus on international migration as measured in the International Passenger Survey (IPS), which is the main source for the Long-Term International Migration (LTIM) series published by the Office for National Statistics (ONS). LTIM is in turn the official measure of immigration to the UK, both for statistical purposes and for the government’s target of reducing (net) immigration to the “tens of thousands”¹.

The use of the IPS has been much criticised by UK media and policymakers in recent years (for instance, House of Commons (2013)) because of its alleged unreliability, discussed in detail below. However, given its key role in the public and policy debate, it is clearly important to examine whether it is possible to use IPS data to produce meaningful analyses of the determinants of migration flows. In particular, there is a vigorous political debate about whether Brexit will in fact make a significant contribution to reducing migration, and in particular to hitting the government’s target, as some argue (Migration Watch (2016)) or whether in fact immigration is driven primarily by economic conditions, and largely unaffected by policy change (European Union Committee (2017)).

Our analysis suggests that there are indeed serious issues with the use of the IPS for the analysis of migration flows, particularly at a country level. The relatively small sample sizes for long-term migrants, the discretionary nature of responses to the sur-

¹Home Secretary, HC Deb, 23 November 2010, col 169. URL: [goo.gl/tck4H0](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/214440/101123_hcdeb_169.pdf)

vey and various methodological changes (with associated revisions) over recent years all introduce a considerable amount of noise and potential bias into the data. This is clearly problematic from both a statistical perspective (given the use of the LTIM figures for population estimates and projections) and from a policy one (since the official government target for migration uses the net LTIM figure). Given the centrality of immigration to the UK policy debate, both in the context of Brexit and beyond, improvement (including much greater use of administrative data) is urgently required, as the UK Statistics Authority has recently argued (UK Statistics Authority (2013a), UK Statistics Authority (2013b); UK Statistics Authority (2016)).

Nevertheless, even given the data limitations, our analysis does produce meaningful results, consistent both with theory and previous work. In particular:

- We find a very large impact from free movement within the EEA. Consistent with our previous work using National Insurance number data (Portes and Forte (2017)), we find that countries whose citizens have free movement rights see a roughly six-fold increase in migration flows to the UK;
- We find that macroeconomic variables – in particular UK GDP per capita and employment rate differential with country of origin – are significant drivers of migration flows; evidence for the impact the unemployment rate in countries of origin, or of the exchange rate, however, is weak.

We conclude that, as we argued previously (Portes and Forte (2017)), while future migration flows will be driven by a number of factors, macroeconomic and otherwise, Brexit and the end of free movement will result in a large fall in immigration from EEA

countries to the UK. As our earlier analysis showed, this is likely to have significant negative impacts on the UK economy overall (in both GDP and GDP per capita terms), while exerting only a very modest upward pressure on wages at the lower end of the labour market.

The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents the International Passenger Survey and descriptive statistics for the 2000-2015 data; Section 3 presents a theoretical model of international migration as well as our specification and estimator of choice; in Section 4 we discuss our findings in relationship with the international literature; Section 5 details briefly the necessity for improved immigration statistics; Section 6 concludes and recapitulates the article.

2 Data: The International Passenger Survey

There is no one source of data on immigration to the UK. The Labour Force Survey (LFS) and the Annual Population Survey (APS) give information on the size, demographics and labour market characteristics of the migrant population; the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) and, more recently, the UK Household Longitudinal Study (Understanding Society) can be employed to analyse the dynamics of a broader range of socio-economic characteristics of the immigrant sub-sample over time; the Census gives much more detailed data on the resident population, but only once every decade; and National Insurance Number (NINo) registrations have been used as proxies for migrant inflows.

However, the Long Term International Migration (LTIM) estimates (Office for National Statistics (2017)) are by far the most widely used as a measure of immigration, emigration, and net migration; LTIM is in turn largely based on the IPS. The IPS

has been conducted by the ONS since 1961 to obtain information regarding incoming (outgoing) travellers at their point of arrival (departure). The survey covers most important British airports and seaports, for a total coverage of around 95% of British international passenger traffic, and identifies long-term migrants based on their declared intention to change country of residence for at least a year (in line with United Nations conventions).

The IPS does not account for passengers who change their mind about the length of stay against their declared intentions, the so-called ‘migrant switchers’ (although efforts are made to include their impact by imputing the importance of the phenomenon using immigrants’ responses on their personal history). Moreover, it does not capture immigrants crossing the Northern Ireland-EIRE border (Office for National Statistics (2015a)), nor asylum-seekers. LTIM figures are the results of adjustments to include estimates of ‘switchers’, asylum seekers and migrants from the Republic of Ireland. On average, around 700000-800000 contacts take place every year, over 362 days from 6am to 10pm. In recent years, the number of individuals recorded as long-term migrants has been ranging between 4000 and 5000 per annum² (1 in 160-200 contacts at selected borders), of which around 3000 immigrants and 1500-2000 emigrants.

Eight-stage weighting and seasonal adjustment are used to obtain nationally representative statistics from the total number of IPS contacts; the number of long-term immigrants are then obtained by further analysing the migration sub-sample of the resulting total. That is, flow central values and confidence intervals are the results of weighting applied to the entire IPS sample, plus specific weighting applied to the 5000 interviews with migrants. The survey methodology underwent significant changes

²For comparison, 335500 interviews were used to produce Overseas Travel and Tourism estimates in 2015 (Office for National Statistics (2016d)).

in 2009 in order to increase the statistical robustness for estimates of the number of immigrants entering through airports other than Heathrow: while this caused minor discontinuities between 2008 and 2009 immigration estimates, the magnitude of the disruption is “no cause for concern” according to the ONS (Office for National Statistics (2015a)).

Of more significant concern is the review of the 2001-2011 estimates that was conducted by comparing IPS data with information from the 2011 Census. The published follow-up document concludes that the IPS “missed a substantial amount of immigration of EU8 citizens that occurred between 2004 and 2008, prior to IPS improvements in 2009” and it “underestimated the migration of children” (Office for National Statistics (2014)); the number of working-age women is found to be severely under-reported as well. This led the ONS to provide updated long-term international migration series for the decade ending in 2011, with yearly corrections reaching 67000 immigrants mostly relating to migration from the European Union. However, this update was only conducted for *net* migration, and at a high level of geographical aggregation, not for inflows or outflows, nor at a country level. Office for National Statistics (2014, p. 56) states: “Users who wish to see a more detailed breakdown of inflows and outflows [...] by variables such as reason for migration, age and sex, citizenship and country of birth should continue to use the existing LTIM and IPS 1, 2 and 3 series tables, *but should bear in mind the caveat that the headline net migration estimates have now been revised [...]*” (italics added).³

³Note that this is not an isolated case: IPS estimates and methodology have historically been subject to multiple revisions, a practice that inevitably hinders the credibility of the source for research and policy use. For example, in addition to the 2009 discontinuity and the 2011 Census revision, another discontinuity between 1998 and 1999 measures resulted from changes to the measurement of migration to and from the Republic of Ireland (Office for National Statistics (2015b)).

In previous work (Portes and Forte (2017)), we used National Insurance number registrations (by country and quarter) as a measure of migrant inflows. Annex A sets out the key differences between the two data sources. For this study, we construct a similar dataset using the IPS. Data for the dependent flow variable come from publicly available ‘International Passenger Survey 4.06, country of birth by citizenship’ (Office for National Statistics (2016b)) spreadsheets, which report yearly inflows by country and relative confidence intervals.

The years covered from our sample go from 2000 to 2015, since flows by year and




Figure 1: Frequency of origin-year inflows, by magnitude

country of origin are unavailable for earlier years; the datasets include information for all the countries in the world, as well as a great number of dependent territories. Unsurprisingly, therefore, a large number of observations are zero, as shown in Figure 1.

Table 1 shows the total IPS inflows in the period we analyse, divided in 4-year periods, for selected regions and countries.

The flows are the same that the ONS provides to the OECD for the International Migration Database (this is verifiable through OECD.stat⁴ for years after 2000 – although the OECD data do not include confidence intervals) and they are included in datasets used in previous research, such as the dataset of Ortega and Peri (2013). Tellingly, Ortega and Peri prefer to mirror⁵ data points or employ any other source of flow magnitude rather than IPS/OECD.stat when considering UK inflows. In fact, they do not make use of IPS inflow estimates at all.

The economic indicators composing the rest of our dataset are extracted from the World Development Indicators (WDI, World Bank (2017)) and Penn World Tables v8.0 (Feenstra et al. (2015)), as opposed to the NiGEM data we employed in Portes and Forte (2017). We obtain GDP per capita, unemployment rate, population and nominal exchange rate from WDI; the consumer price indices used to scale the exchange rate by relative purchasing power parity come instead from the Penn Tables⁶. The reason for not using NiGEM data is that IPS only registers yearly inflows, so quarterly series readily available from NiGEM are not necessary, and making use of the WDI and Penn Tables allows for a much broader sample as NiGEM only includes full information for a selected few countries.

⁴Available at stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=MIG

⁵‘Mirroring’ is the act of doubling country of origin’s emigration data as country of destination’s immigration data (or vice versa). It is mostly used when one of the two countries’ data are considered unreliable.

⁶Consistently with Keita (2016), we define $RealExchRate = \frac{CPI_{uk}}{CPI_{origin}} \frac{ExchRate_{GBP-USD}}{ExchRate_{origin-USD}}$.

	2000-2003	2004-2007	2008-2011	2012-2015
European Union	243.8	507.3	572.3	775.9
A2	8.3	16.6	40.5	135.9
A8	24.9	291.7	259.4	250.9
Rest of EU	210.6	199	272.4	389.1
Other Europe	15.4	26.6	24.8	37
Asia	382.4	635.6	771.1	586.6
China	89.3	69.4	113	168.7
India	57	209.2	241.4	148.1
Rest of Asia	236.1	357	416.7	269.8
North America	94.2	86.6	88.5	113.3
United States	59.7	59.6	52.4	66.8
Canada	22	15.1	26.5	30.2
Rest of North America	12.5	11.9	9.6	16.3
South America	14.7	21	23.9	24.1
Brazil	4.8	10.3	10.9	14.3
Oceania	136.4	110	59.7	72.8
Australia	94.6	67.5	44.9	58

Table 1: Migratory inflows by selected region and 4-year period (000's)

VARIABLES	N	Mean	St. Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Origin-to-UK Migration	3,984	1.847	7.439	0	109.8
UK GDP per capita (2010 \$)	3,984	38,887	1,664	35,250	41,188
Origin GDP per capita (2010\$)	2,991	12,914	18,804	194.2	145,221
Origin Unemployment Rate (%)	2,595	8.678	6.178	0.100	38.60
Real Exchange Rate	2,407	0.255	0.394	1.04e-05	4.668
Free Movement	3,984	0.0921	0.289	0	1

Table 2: Summary statistics for main variables

Given the short time span of the panel and the presence of a significant portion of zeros among inflows (which could be “genuine”, reflecting zero flows; the result of sampling error; or downward rounding: it is not possible to distinguish these different explanations), we decided against using the Chudik and Pesaran (2015) Dynamic Common Correlated Effects (DCCE) estimator we make use of in Portes and Forte (2017). In fact, DCCE requires long panels to avoid suffering from severe time-series bias; moreover, one would want the dependent variable to be the logarithm of the inflow, which is not defined when the inflow is zero. These considerations pushed us to resort to a different estimator, which we present in the following section after introducing a theoretical model of migration.

3 Theory ⁷

First, note the migration flow m from an origin country o to destination $d \in D_o \equiv \mathbf{D}/\{o\}$ (where \mathbf{D} is the set of all countries) at time t can be defined as

$$m_{odt} = p_{odt}s_{ot} \tag{1}$$

where p_{odt} , the share of the total population s_{ot} emigrating to d , should approximately equal to the probability π_{odt} that an inhabitant i of country o decides to transfer to country d (by the law of large numbers, Ortega and Peri (2013)).

Let the utility U_{iodt} of an individual i who migrates from his origin country o to d at time t be the result of three main components: ω_{odt} , deterministic component of utility, function of observable characteristics; c_{odt} , the unobserved cost of emigrating in economic and non-economic terms; ϵ_{iodt} , a stochastic error component allowed to vary over individuals and time:

$$U_{iodt} = \omega_{odt} - c_{odt} + \epsilon_{iodt} \equiv V_{odt} + \epsilon_{iodt} \tag{2}$$

where V_{odt} indicates the sum of the non-stochastic parts and $V_{od} = x'_{od}\beta$. Assumptions on the distribution of the stochastic component divide migration models roughly in two categories, one initiated by Grogger and Hanson (2011) and Beine et al. (2011), the latter by Ortega and Peri (2013). We here describe the differences, and then develop the Ortega and Peri (2013) method more extensively for estimation.

⁷This section draws from Beine et al. (2015) and Ortega and Peri (2013).

3.1 Grogger and Hanson (2011) and Beine et al. (2011)

Earlier papers in the international migration literature assumed ϵ_{iodt} to follow an i.i.d. Extreme Value Type-1 (EVT-1) distribution *à la* McFadden (1974), due to the tractability of the specification. In fact, the expected probability of emigration to d becomes

$$E(p_{odt}) = \frac{e^{V_{odt}}}{e^{V_{oot}} + \sum_{\delta \in D_o} e_{o\delta t}^V} \quad (3)$$

and the expected emigration flow

$$E(m_{odt}) = \left[\frac{e^{V_{odt}}}{e^{V_{oot}} + \sum_{\delta \in D_o} e_{o\delta t}^V} \right] s_{ot} \equiv \left[\frac{e^{\omega_{odt} - c_{odt}}}{e^{\omega_{oot} - c_{oot}} + \sum_{\delta \in D_o} e^{\omega_{o\delta t} - c_{o\delta t}}} \right] s_{ot} \quad (4)$$

which, assuming $\omega_{odt} = \omega_{dt}$, can be rewritten in gravity form as

$$E(m_{odt}) = \phi_{odt} \frac{\theta_{dt}}{\Omega_{ot}} s_{ot} \quad (5)$$

where $\phi_{odt} \equiv e^{-c_{odt}}$; $\theta_{dt} \equiv e^{\omega_{dt}}$; $\Omega_{ot} \equiv e^{\omega_{oot} - c_{oot}} + \sum_{\delta \in D_o} e^{\omega_{o\delta t} - c_{o\delta t}}$. Introducing an error term η_{odt} such that $E(\eta_{odt}) = 1$,

$$m_{odt} = \phi_{odt} \frac{\theta_{dt}}{\Omega_{ot}} s_{ot} \eta_{odt} \quad (6)$$

This form allows us to easily observe a consequence of assuming an EVT-1-distributed individual parameter, the Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). Observe in fact that, since the cost of not migrating is zero, we have $\phi_{oot} \equiv e^{-c_{oot}} = e^0 = 1, \forall t$: it follows that

$$E\left(\frac{m_{odt}}{m_{oot}}\right) = \frac{\phi_{odt}}{1} \frac{\theta_{dt}}{\theta_{ot}} \quad (7)$$

which depends only on the attractiveness of the origin and a single considered altern-

ative d , not on its entire set D_o : this implies that a change in the attractiveness of alternative destinations should not alter the ratio of leavers to d over stayers.

However, the IIA seems implausible in the context of international migration. Bertoli and Fernández-Huertas Moraga (2013) (drawing from Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003)) argue that, since the migration decision is taken considering the whole set of possible destinations, changes in the attractiveness of country δ influence the decisions over the set \mathbf{D} of all individuals i ; in addition, differences between individuals over the deterministic component are also likely (for instance, labour market characteristics might make a country more attractive to high skill migrants but less attractive to low skill ones) and they will introduce unaccounted-for correlation among flows. They generalise equation (5) to

$$E(m_{odt}) = \phi_{odt}^{1/\tau} \frac{\theta_{dt}^{1/\tau}}{\Omega_{odt}} s_{ot} \quad (8)$$

where Ω can now vary across destinations and $\tau \equiv 1 - \rho$ is the dissimilarity parameter, with ρ indicating the degree of correlation across stochastic utilities attached to different destinations. This leads to a generalised analogue of (7)

$$E\left(\frac{m_{odt}}{m_{oot}}\right) = \frac{\phi_{odt}^{1/\tau}}{1} \frac{\theta_{dt}^{1/\tau}}{\theta_{ot}} \frac{\Omega_{oot}}{\Omega_{odt}} \quad (9)$$

which shows IIA is not imposed.

3.2 Ortega and Peri (2013)

By contrast, Ortega and Peri (2013) opt for a model that starts by assuming the decision of not migrating is associated with random utility $\epsilon_{ioot} \sim$ i.i.d. EVT-1, while the stochastic component of the decision to migrate is $\epsilon_{iodt} \sim$ i.i.d. EVT-1 plus an individual random effect ζ_i that is allowed to be correlated within destinations. This

is consistent with a particular case of the McFadden (1978) nested-logit model where, for each country $\psi \in \mathbf{D}$, the first nest is ψ and the second nest is the set of all other countries $\mathbf{D}/\{\psi\}$. This allows to define non-emigration probability similarly to equation (3)

$$p_{oot} = \frac{e^{V_{oot}}}{e^{V_{oot}} + [\sum_{\delta \in D_o} e^{V_{o\delta t}/\tau}]^\tau} \quad (10)$$

whereas probability of emigrating to d can be written as

$$p_{odt} = p_{oD_o t} p_{odt|D_o} = \frac{[\sum_{\delta \in D_o} e^{V_{o\delta t}/\tau}]^\tau}{e^{V_{oot}} + [\sum_{\delta \in D_o} e^{V_{o\delta t}/\tau}]^\tau} \frac{e^{V_{odt}/\tau}}{\sum_{\delta \in D_o} e^{V_{o\delta t}/\tau}} \quad (11)$$

(cf. equation (4) in Bertoli and Fernández-Huertas Moraga (2013)) where $p_{oD_o t}$ is the probability of migrating and $p_{odt|D_o}$ is the probability of choosing d given the intention to migrate⁸ since the nest opposing o is D_o . The resulting expected migration flow can be easily obtained multiplying equation (11) by s_{ot} .

This model does not entail IIA: in fact,

$$\frac{p_{odt}}{p_{oot}} = \frac{e^{V_{odt}/\tau}}{e^{V_{oot}}} \frac{[\sum_{\delta \in D_o} e^{V_{o\delta t}/\tau}]^\tau}{\sum_{\delta \in D_o} e^{V_{o\delta t}/\tau}} \quad (12)$$

which depends on all alternative destinations⁹. Recall now that $p_{odt} \rightarrow \pi_{odt}$ by the law of large numbers: therefore

$$p_{odt} \equiv \frac{m_{odt}}{\sum_{\delta \in D_o} m_{o\delta}} \simeq \pi_{odt} \quad (13)$$

⁸Note that $\tau = 1$ leads back to the simple logit model of equation (3) both for emigration and non-migration.

⁹Preference over two destinations $d, q \in D_o$ depends instead only on their relative attractiveness (as was the case with the logit model)

$$\frac{p_{odt}}{p_{oot}} = \frac{e^{V_{odt}}}{e^{V_{oqt}}}$$

where again we can add an error η_{odt} with $E(\eta_{odt}) = 1$ to account for the approximation above, obtaining¹⁰

$$m_{odt} = m_{oot} \frac{e^{V_{odt}/\tau}}{e^{V_{oot}}} \left[\sum_{\delta \in D_o} e^{V_{o\delta t}/\tau} \right]^{\tau-1} \eta_{odt} \quad (14)$$

which is the product of an origin-specific part, $m_{oot} \frac{e^{V_{odt}/\tau}}{e^{V_{oot}}}$, and a nest-specific part, $[\sum_{\delta \in D_o} e^{V_{o\delta t}/\tau}]^{\tau-1}$.

This can be rewritten as

$$\begin{aligned} m_{odt} &= \exp \left[\ln m_{oot} + \ln e^{V_{odt}/\tau} - \ln e^{V_{oot}} + (\tau - 1) \left(\sum_{\delta \in D_o} e^{V_{o\delta t}/\tau} \right) \right] \eta_{odt} \equiv \\ &\equiv \exp \left[\Gamma_{oot} + \frac{V_{odt}}{\tau} + \Delta_{oD_{ot}} \right] \eta_{odt} \end{aligned} \quad (15)$$

where $\Gamma_{oot} \equiv (\ln m_{oot} - V_{oot})$ and $\Delta_{oD_{ot}} \equiv (\tau - 1) (\sum_{\delta \in D_o} e^{V_{o\delta t}/\tau})$. Then if, as is traditionally assumed and mentioned at the beginning, $V_{od} = x'_{od}\beta$,

$$m_{odt} = \exp \left[\Gamma_{oot} + x'_{od} \frac{\beta}{\tau} + \Delta_{oD_{ot}} \right] \eta_{odt} \quad (16)$$

which is convenient to estimate.

Schmidheiny and Brühlhart (2011) find, building on Guimarães et al. (2003), that in the cross-sectional case a nested logit model and a Poisson model yield identical parameter estimates¹¹, as the log-likelihood functions of the two functional forms are identical up to a constant: this result simplifies the estimation process considerably.

However, note that the coefficients estimated from (16) will capture β/τ rather than β ,

¹⁰This is the same as equation (5) of Bertoli and Fernández-Huertas Moraga (2015), in multiplicative terms and with a less generic treatment of nests.

¹¹Although the “two models differ starkly in terms of their implied predictions” (Schmidheiny and Brühlhart (2011, p. 214)).

the true vector of elasticities, and that β and τ are not separately identifiable. Therefore, since $\tau \in [0, 1]$, the absolute value of $\widehat{\beta/\tau}$ should be interpreted as an upper bound of the absolute value of $\hat{\beta}$, as claimed in Bertoli and Fernández-Huertas Moraga (2013), rather than exact elasticities¹².

The estimator that, given the nature of the dependent variable (weakly positive flows, with many zeros in the dataset) and the results of Schmidheiny and Brülhart (2011), seems to suit our analysis best is the Panel Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (Panel PPML) estimator presented in Westerlund and Wilhelmsson (2011), a panel data analogue of the PPML estimator proposed by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006). These estimators have become particularly popular in international trade research (cf. Egger et al. (2011); Ebell (2016)) and, more recently, migration (Bertoli and Fernández-Huertas Moraga (2015); Keita (2016)) as they avoid log-linearisation by estimating the model in multiplicative form. This avoids the need to deal with the zeros by adjusting them to a small positive quantity (Ortega and Peri (2013) follow this procedure, but it has been proved to bias the coefficients – cf. Westerlund and Wilhelmsson (2011); Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2011); Burger et al. (2009)); by dropping them, which may also lead to bias (Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2011)), or by resorting to selection models (Beine et al. (2011)) which complicate estimation significantly.

There is no need to assume that the data are Poisson distributed. One major assumption imposed is $E[y|x] \propto V[y|x]$ (Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006, p. 645)), but heteroskedastic errors can be accommodated – Westerlund and Wilhelmsson (2011) propose bootstrapping, Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) opt instead for heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. We opt for clustering standard errors at the country level, as

¹²One could, where possible, calculate boundaries for the estimated coefficients, as done in Bertoli and Fernández-Huertas Moraga (2015) following the procedure outlined in Schmidheiny and Brülhart (2011) for cross-sectional data: we do not attempt the exercise here as it is not the main purpose of the paper.

it seems the most appropriate choice given the nature of the data.

Our specification incorporates the following independent variables: UK and Origin GDP per capita, Origin Unemployment Rate, Origin Population, Real UK/Origin exchange rate¹³ and a Free Movement dummy variable (the set of which should gauge – albeit imperfectly, as any set of variables – individual costs and potential gains from migration) plus a set of dummies that varies among specifications:

$$\begin{aligned}
 Inflow_{ot} = \exp & \left[\beta_1 GDPpc_{ot} + \beta_2 GDPpc_{ot}^2 + \beta_3 UKGDPpc_t + \beta_4 UnempRate_{ot} + \right. \\
 & \left. + \beta_5 ExchangeRate_{ot} + \beta_6 Population_{ot} + \beta_7 FreeMovement_{ot} + \gamma_1 \xi_i + \gamma_2 \phi_t \right] \eta_{odt}
 \end{aligned} \tag{17}$$

In the estimation process, we start by only including origin FE ξ_i , which in the case of single-destination studies like ours are equal to the origin-destination dyadic FE employed by multiple-destination studies, and, in a second moment, year FE ϕ_t , the counterpart to destination-year FE. Origin FE account for all the time-invariant characteristics that influence the migratory decision over the origin-UK dyad: colonial ties, official language, geographical variables (distance, contiguity, access to sea...); year FE account for global effects that affect the entire set of observed countries contemporaneously. Again, given that ours is a single-destination analysis, it is obviously impossible to include origin-year FE, which should be included in multiple destination studies.

4 Results and Discussion

In this section, we report the results obtained from estimating the specified model both via FE Panel PPML and linear FE, for comparison. As detailed above and shown

¹³An increase (decrease) in the Real Exchange Rate variable is associated with an appreciation (depreciation) of the British Pound against Origin currency.

below in Table 4, the log-linear specification entails a reduction in the sample as zero flows are excluded: in our case, 39.4% of utilisable data points (879 of 2229) are not considered, which partially explains the differences between coefficients in columns (1) and (3), (2) and (4).

The results show a significant relationship between the magnitude of yearly immigration inflows and British macroeconomic indicators: a 1% increase in UK GDP per capita is associated with an increase in inflows of around 3-3.6%, depending on the inclusion of year FE. This coefficient is much higher than that found by Ortega and Peri (2013), who in their preferred specification estimate the impact of lagged destination GDP per capita at 0.63%; however, restricting their analysis to only European countries yields 1.82%¹⁴. Similarly, Mayda (2010, p. 1263) finds that “a 10% percent increase in the host country’s per worker GDP implies a 20% increase in the emigration¹⁵ rate”, while more recently Keita (2016) estimates an impact of up to 2%. Our estimate therefore, while somewhat higher, is not implausibly so, particularly given that the UK’s flexible labour market might be expected to make migration flows more responsive to economic factors than average.

By contrast, the evidence of exchange rate impacts is rather weaker: although the coefficient is positive, we do not find significant impacts. This contrasts with our past research (Portes and Forte (2017), where the coefficient was 0.45) and with the cross-country results in Keita (2016), who finds a baseline result of around 0.76.

¹⁴In addition, applying FE PPML to estimate Ortega and Peri (2013)’s specification over the European subsample of their dataset yields a coefficient of 2.87 for lagged destination GDP, consistently with our analysis. Output is available upon request, but modifying slightly specification (10) from the authors’ [freely available Stata do-file](#) should be straightforward.

¹⁵‘Emigration’ as Mayda considers the increase from the country of origin’s point of view.

VARIABLES	(1) Linear FE	(2)	(3)	(4) PPML FE
UK GDP per capita	2.148** (1.004)	2.571 (1.711)	3.644*** (1.185)	2.997* (1.652)
Origin GDP per capita	-1.061 (1.543)	-1.077 (1.555)	5.935** (2.309)	5.711*** (2.174)
Origin GDP per capita Squared	0.0852 (0.100)	0.0843 (0.103)	-0.336** (0.153)	-0.315** (0.141)
Origin Unemployment Rate	0.330* (0.177)	0.313* (0.178)	0.288 (0.228)	0.355* (0.211)
Origin Population	0.198 (0.422)	0.145 (0.511)	-1.017 (0.937)	-0.989 (1.073)
Free Movement Dummy	1.353** (0.529)	1.343** (0.533)	1.919*** (0.318)	1.907*** (0.341)
Real Exchange Rate	0.0871 (0.103)	0.0914 (0.105)	0.205 (0.187)	0.187 (0.205)
Observations	1,350	1,350	2,229	2,229
(Pseudo) R ²	0.062	0.071	(0.73)	(0.74)
Number of countries	138	138	155	155
Year FE	No	Yes	No	Yes

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses clustered at country level. All specifications include a constant.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 3: Regression estimates

As for push factors, origin GDP per capita and its square (included to control for a potentially non-linear relationship of GDP per capita and emigration) are found to be significantly connected to inflows: a 1% increase in Origin GDP is associated with a 5.7-5.9% increase in migration, although the positive effect falls at the rate of 0.32-0.33% as GDP increases. The result can be interpreted as consistent with several explanations for inverse-U-shaped migration patterns presented in Clemens (2014), e.g. credit constraints (our sample comprises a significant number of developing countries), inequality and demographic transition. As an illustration of the magnitudes of these

impacts, the coefficients of $GDPpc_{origin}$ and $GDPpc_{origin}^2$ in column (4) imply that, for the year 2008, an increase in GDPpc from Indian levels (\$1157) to Romanian levels (\$8873) would be associated with a 257.6% increase in immigration to the UK from that country; conversely, an increase from Romanian GDPpc to French GDPpc (\$41548) would be associated with a fall in immigration of around 54%. Fluctuations in unemployment in the source country also appear to have an (albeit less defined) impact on the decision to migrate, suggesting any impact of origin country economic conditions appears both through the labour market and wider macroeconomic conditions. Our estimate implies that a 1% increase in the unemployment rate in the home country reflects into an increase in immigration of around 0.35%, although the impact is only significant at the 10% level.

Perhaps the most important and interesting result is that the coefficient associated with Free Movement that emerges from the analysis of IPS data is almost identical to that found in Portes and Forte (2017), despite the considerable differences between the IPS and NINo data, as detailed in Annex A. The existence of free movement between the UK and a source country is associated with a rise in immigration flows from that country to the UK of between 570-580%¹⁶; this compares to a range of 483-489% found in our analysis of NINo data. This suggests that, while the two series are very different, they are both capturing a very large and consistent positive impact on measured migration flows from free movement.

As we noted before, the impact of free movement on immigration flows is much higher than the impact of trade liberalisation (tariff reductions or membership of a

¹⁶This is calculated as $Percentage\ Change = 100 [\exp(\beta_7) - 1]$; the usual approximation centred around $\ln(1+\epsilon) \simeq 1+\epsilon$ is only valid for very small ϵ and starts failing quite significantly for coefficients higher than 0.1.

free trade area) on trade volumes found in the trade literature, reflecting the fact that “absent free movement, barriers to labour mobility between countries are much higher than trade barriers” (Portes and Forte (2017, p. S33)). Although we do not present forecasts in this paper, our analysis here reaffirms and strengthens our earlier conclusion that free movement led to a large rise in migration flows from other EU countries to the UK; Brexit, and the associated end of free movement, is therefore likely to lead to a very substantial reduction in such flows.

For the reasons set out in Portes (2016), this is likely to be the case even if the UK adopts a relatively liberal approach to some categories of EU migrants (either by skill level or by sector); and is likely to affect medium and high skilled migration as well as low-skilled or low-paid migration. The negative economic consequences for the UK could be large.

5 Improving immigration statistics

We are encouraged by the fact that our analysis of IPS data are consistent with both theory and our previous work using National Insurance number data. However, this does not negate the broader point that improvements to UK immigration data are long overdue. Greater international mobility, particularly short-term migration of uncertain duration, means that survey responses are inherently likely to be inaccurate; this compounds the already existing problem that any sample survey based on passengers will only pick up a relatively small number of immigrants and emigrants, since most passengers are tourists or business visitors. Hence, while the IPS gives a reasonably reliable assessment of the overall balance between high-level immigration and emigration, granular analysis is very difficult. If the Government still stands by its aim of reducing net immigration to the tens of thousands, it might prefer doing so using a

source that does not have a standard error in the order of the tens of thousands.

Alternative sources of migration flows (APS, NINo registrations) have been used to support the findings of the IPS and maintain its credibility through changes and revisions, but the rising availability of administrative data presents a great opportunity for a shift in their importance. The ONS (Office for National Statistics ([2016a](#))) has attempted to reconcile administrative data with the IPS data (although not with the APS), using data from the HMRC and the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP), linked via National Insurance Numbers; but so far this was a one-off exercise and has not fed into ongoing work. While previously access to large administrative datasets was difficult for both legal and practical reasons, advances in technology and the passage of the Digital Economy Bill mean that such barriers are much less of a constraint. As the UK Statistics Authority puts it (UK Statistics Authority ([2017](#))):

There are a range of migration-related datasets available across different Government departments, including those from HMRC, DWP, ONS and the Home Office. The key to a comprehensive picture lies in bringing these datasets together.

Equally important is enabling access to administrative data for independent external analysis. There is huge academic as well as policy interest in immigration; however, research is heavily constrained – as this paper and our earlier one show – by the lack of reliable, detailed disaggregated data. Enabling such access would benefit policy, research and the UK’s highly charged immigration debate.

6 Conclusion

This paper contributes to the British debate on immigration by presenting evidence on the factors that shape migratory inflows to the UK. It is akin to Portes and Forte (2017) in this purpose, but it expands the state of knowledge by making use of flows based on the International Passenger Survey rather than on National Insurance Registrations, thus directly shedding light on the comparability (or lack thereof) of the two sources.

First, our brief analysis of the IPS methodology and history puts on display the major weakness of the survey, which has been highlighted in the policy debate: a small sample, which causes large statistical uncertainty and is ill-suited to capture increasingly more complex migration patterns. Since the LTIM (of which the IPS is a principal component) nevertheless remains the official source for migration statistics, we analyse the impact of both macroeconomic indicators and policy variables on migration using a theoretically-consistent Poisson estimator.

The results are in line with theory and the existing literature: we find large impacts of push (Origin GDP) and pull (UK GDP) factors, and tentative evidence of the impact of Origin unemployment rate fluctuations. The large (compared to multiple-destination analyses) impacts associated with some of the drivers may reflect the flexibility of the UK labour markets. Interestingly, the six-fold increase in IPS inflows associated with switching to Free Movement is quantitatively similar to the increase in NINos we found in earlier research, suggesting our earlier conclusion that ending free movement will result in a substantial fall in migration is robust to the use of different data sources.

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Annexes

A National Insurance Registrations and IPS: a Comparison

Since we made use of National Insurance Number registrations¹⁷ in previous research as a measure of high-frequency migration flows, it is sensible to focus on the similarities and differences this source presents with IPS. Registering for a NINo is voluntary; however, it is necessary for any non-British citizen who wishes to regularly work or claim benefits. As set out in our earlier paper, there a number of reasons why migrant flows as measured using NINos will differ from inflows in the IPS:

- Sampling and other errors in the IPS, as noted in Section 2;
- NINo registrants who are not long-term migrants for the purposes of the IPS (that is, they do not intend to stay for more than 12 months);
- Immigrants recorded in the IPS who do not register for a NINO (because they do not intend to work or claim benefits, or they work solely in the “black economy”)

In addition, there is no obligation to report leaving the country or to deregister with DWP or HMRC; it is thus impossible to know how many of those migrants who have registered for a NINos subsequently left the country (and if so when). However, longitudinal administrative data held by DWP and HMRC (on tax and NI contributions and benefits claimed) could in principle provide considerable information on this.

Notwithstanding those differences, NINo registrations and IPS inflows appear to move together: the correlation coefficient between origin-year NINo registrations and IPS inflows for the broader dataset (i.e. not limited to the estimation sample) is 0.76,

¹⁷By NINo registrations we refer to the stock of released NINos divided by country of worker provenance and quarter of release. These figures are available through [Stat-Xplore](#), the online gateway to DWP’s publicly accessible statistics.

with NINo registrations considerably exceeding IPS inflows (suggesting that the number of short-term migrants considerably outweighs any failure by migrants to register) as shown in Figure A below. A more correct counterpart to the registration series, the series generated by summing estimated short-term migration (STIM, 1- to 12-month residence) and LTIM, is broadly consistent with the picture painted by NINOs. Unfortunately, the STIM + LTIM series is created ad-hoc for comparison with NINo data and should be considered with caution, since STIM and LTIM estimates are prepared on a different basis¹⁸.




Figure A.1: Comparison of sources (from Office for National Statistics (2016c))

¹⁸STIM flows are “based on journeys, not people” (Office for National Statistics (2016c)) as they are extrapolated from interviewees’ responses about their past travels to the UK, unlike LTIM numbers that are based on future intentions. Moreover, the survey nature of IPS makes it so that the same individual could be counted as short-term immigrant multiple times over a year or be double-counted as long- and short-term immigrant, with clear implications on totals.

The aforementioned issues do not take away from some clear advantages of quantifying immigration using NINOs: first, there is negligible (if at all) uncertainty about the number of registrations that the DWP makes, as all records come from a unique administrative source; second, applying for a NINo requires booking an appointment, showing up at an assigned JobCentre Plus and potentially waiting weeks to obtain the code, so it does not seem unfair to assume that it is a better indicator of immigration than an intention-based discretionary survey upon arrival. As we discuss in Section 5, we believe NINo registrations are a thorough base that can be supplemented with more administrative information to obtain a superior and more faceted source for both short- and long-term immigration statistics.

B List of countries analysed

The IPS publishes yearly inflows and outflows (measured in thousands passengers) for 240 entities (countries and territories overseas). The WDI and Penn Tables only include the information necessary to our analysis for a wide but limited sample of countries. The countries included in the estimation sample are the following:

- Albania
- Algeria
- Angola
- Argentina
- Armenia
- Australia
- Austria
- Bahamas
- Bahrain
- Bangladesh
- Barbados
- Belgium
- Belize
- Benin
- Bhutan
- Bolivia
- Bosnia and Herzegovina
- Botswana
- Brazil
- Brunei
- Bulgaria
- Burkina
- Burma
- Burundi
- Cambodia
- Cameroon
- Canada
- Cape Verde
- Central African Republic
- Chad
- Chile
- China
- Colombia
- Comoros
- Congo

- D R of Congo
- Costa Rica
- Croatia
- Cyprus
- Czech Republic
- Denmark
- Dominican Republic
- Ecuador
- Egypt
- El Salvador
- Equatorial Guinea
- Estonia
- Ethiopia
- Fiji
- Finland
- France
- Gabon
- Gambia
- Georgia
- Germany
- Ghana
- Greece
- Guatemala
- Guinea
- Guinea Bissau
- Haiti
- Honduras
- Hong Kong
- Hungary
- Iceland
- India
- Indonesia
- Iran
- Iraq
- Ireland
- Israel
- Italy
- Ivory Coast
- Jamaica
- Japan
- Jordan
- Kazakhstan
- Kenya
- Kuwait
- Kyrgyzstan
- Laos
- Latvia
- Lebanon
- Lesotho
- Liberia
- Lithuania
- Luxembourg
- Macao
- Macedonia
- Madagascar
- Malawi
- Malaysia
- Maldives
- Mali
- Malta
- Mauritania
- Mauritius
- Mexico
- Moldova
- Mongolia
- Montenegro
- Morocco
- Mozambique
- Namibia
- Nepal
- Netherlands
- New Zealand
- Nicaragua
- Niger
- Nigeria
- Norway
- Oman
- Pakistan
- Panama
- Paraguay
- Peru
- Philippines
- Poland
- Portugal
- Qatar
- Romania
- Russia
- Rwanda
- Saudi Arabia
- Senegal
- Sierra Leone
- Singapore
- Slovakia
- Slovenia
- South Africa
- South Korea
- Spain
- Sri Lanka
- Sudan
- Suriname
- Swaziland
- Sweden
- Switzerland
- Tanzania

- Thailand
- Togo
- Trinidad and Tobago
- Tunisia
- Turkey
- Uganda
- Ukraine
- United Arab Emirates
- United States
- Uruguay
- Venezuela
- Vietnam
- Yemen
- Yugoslavia
- Zambia
- Zimbabwe