

Massey, Douglas S.; Constant, Amelie

Working Paper

Latinos in the Northeastern United States: Trends and Patterns

GLO Discussion Paper, No. 60

Provided in Cooperation with:

Global Labor Organization (GLO)

Suggested Citation: Massey, Douglas S.; Constant, Amelie (2017) : Latinos in the Northeastern United States: Trends and Patterns, GLO Discussion Paper, No. 60, Global Labor Organization (GLO), Maastricht

This Version is available at:

<https://hdl.handle.net/10419/157234>

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:

Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.

Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.

Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.

Terms of use:

Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal and scholarly purposes.

You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public.

If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence.

Latinos in the Northeastern United States: Trends and Patterns*

Douglas S. Massey
dmassey@Princeton.edu

Amelie Constant
ameliec@Princeton.edu

Office of Population Research
Princeton University

March 2017

* Paper prepared for the American Bar Foundation (ABF), the [Future of Latinos in the United States: Law, Opportunity and Mobility](#) project. Presented as white paper at the Yale Law School and the Northeast Roundtable.

Of the estimated 56.6 million Latinos living in the United States in 2015, around 14.0% were located in the Northeast, which the U.S. Census Bureau defines to include the states of Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and Vermont. The share of Latinos living in the West and South were 40.2% and 36.6%, respectively, and the share living in the Midwest was 9.2%, making the Northeast's 7.7 million Latinos the third largest regional population.

Although their numbers may not be the largest, northeastern Latinos are by far the most diverse with respect to their national and regional origins. Whereas Mexicans dominate Latinos in the other three regions—comprising 74.8% of those in the Midwest, 61.0% of those in the South, and 81.7% of those in the West—they comprise only 12.1% of Latinos in the Northeast, compared with a figure of 34.9% for Puerto Ricans, 3.3% for Cubans, 17.4% for Dominicans, 10.3% for Central Americans, and 15.9% for South Americans, leaving 6.1% in the residual Other Latino category. When Simpson's Diversity index is calculated using these categories the result is 78.9 for Latinos in the Northeast (on a 0 to 100 scale), compared with values of 42.5 for Latinos in the Midwest, 59.7 for those in the South, and 81.7 for those in the West.

In this report we draw on census and survey data to analyze trends in the size and composition of the Latino population in the Northeast, beginning with an assessment of the demographic dynamics by which this population was created and a description of its current social and demographic composition. We then consider rates of citizenship, voter registration, and voting to assess potential barriers to electoral participation within specific origin groups and the population as a whole, and then move on to describe trends in socioeconomic characteristics for Latinos in general and within for specific origin groups. We complete our empirical analysis by assessing the spatial position of Latinos in the Northeast, focusing on levels of residential

segregation, spatial isolation, and poverty concentration within metropolitan areas and conclude by summarizing our findings and using them to judge the prospects for Latino integration and social mobility in the Northeast today.

DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS

Figure 1 shows trends in the size of the Latino population in the Northeast using Decennial Census data from 1970 through 2010 and American Community Survey data for 2015 (using on three-year average estimates for 2014-2016). In 1970, the Latino population of the Northeast was relatively small, standing only at around 1.9 million persons in that year. In the ensuing decades, however, the population grew rapidly, expanding nearly 40% during the 1970s to reach 2.6 million in 1980 and growing by 37% over the next decade to reach a total of 3.6 million persons in 1990. During the economic boom of the 1990s the population surged by 45% to reach 5.2 million persons in 2000 but the expansion slowed to 33% during the first decade of the 20th century, which encompassed the dot-com bust at the beginning and the Great Recession at the end of the decade. From a figure just under 7 million persons 2010, the population rose by 10% over the next five years to peak at around 7.7 million in 2015.

As shown in Figure 2, this demographic growth was accompanied by a steady increase in the Latino percentage, which climbed from 3.8% of the region's population in 1970 to 10.3% in 2015. The sharpest increases occurred during the 1970s and 1990s. Latino population growth was not spread evenly throughout the region, however, but concentrated in certain key states. Figure 3 shows the number of Latinos by state in the Northeast in 2015. Very clearly the region is dominated by New York's 3.7 million Latinos, followed by New Jersey's Latino population of 1.8 million. Thus 71% of the region's Latinos live in just two states.

Despite the predominance of Latinos living in these two states, we also find significant Latino populations in Massachusetts (759,000), Pennsylvania (665,000), and Connecticut (554,000). Although Rhode Island's Latino population is just 152,000, the entire state houses just a little more than a million people, making Latinos a significant share of its population nonetheless. In contrast, Latinos living in the remaining states of New England number in the tens of thousands, with figures of 45,000 in New Hampshire (mostly in the Boston suburbs), 21,000 in Maine, and 11,500 in Vermont.

Across the region, Latinos have always been heavily concentrated in metropolitan areas. As shown in Figure 4, in 1970 only 3.8% lived in non-metropolitan areas in 1970 and as of 2015 the figure stood at just 1.6%. Within metropolitan areas, however, there has been a substantial shift from city to suburban residence. In 1970, 76.0% of all Latinos lived within central cities and just 16.7% occupied suburbs; but in subsequent decades, the share of suburban dwellers steadily increased, especially after the year 2000. By 2015 the balance between suburbs and cities was approaching parity, with 40% in the former and 43% in the latter.

Figure 5 displays trends in basic demographic characteristics among Latinos in the Northeast. The gender balance has remained stable, suggesting that successive waves of immigrants were not dominated by men and included roughly proportional share of women. Whereas 52% of the population was female in 1970 in 2015 the figure was 51%, only a slight shift toward a more masculine sex ratio. As in other segments of the U.S. population, over time the percent married fell, going from 38.1% in 1970 to 29.3% in 2015 while the share separated or divorced rose from 5.4% to 9.6% and the percent single rose from 53.5% to 58.4%. From 1970 to 2015 the mean age of Latinos rose from 24.7 to 32.9 years and births per woman dropped

from 3.0 to 1.5, indicating below-replacement fertility at present. Such a low level of fertility is not surprising given the increase in mean age and the rising share unmarried.

A significant portion of Latinos in the Northeast trace their origins to the Caribbean—far more than in other census regions. Historically the Caribbean region was settled as a plantation economy dependent on slave labor imported from Africa, and a large share of the region's population is of African descent. Unlike the United States, however, race in the Caribbean is not perceived as black-white dichotomy but as more of a continuum. Although there are small Afro-origin pockets people living in Mexico, Central America, and South America, the most common heritage in these nations is a blend of European and Indigenous ancestry known in Spanish as *mestizaje* (with the exception of Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile where European origins tend to dominate). People of mixed European-Indigenous origins typically identify themselves as *mestizos*.

Given the very different histories of racial formation of race in Latin America and the United States, Latinos often have a hard time placing themselves into U.S. racial categories, which historically have been categorical rather than continuous and dominated by a black-white binary or at least a white-nonwhite dichotomy. In either case, race was defined by a one-drop rule in which any nonwhite blood rendered a person nonwhite. This conceptualization is at odds with the more fluid perceptions of race that prevail in the Caribbean, and when asked to identify themselves racially on censuses and surveys, Latinos often write in a term indicating racially mixed origins rather than selecting into the fixed categories of white, black, Asian, and American Indian (Denton and Massey 1989).

For many years the Census Bureau simply recoded these responses as “white,” but in 1990 it let them stand and grouped them into a mixed or other race category. As shown in Figure

6, this change in coding practices produced a huge increase in the share self-identifying as being of racially mixed origins, with the percentage rising from 3.9% in 1980 to 43.8% in 1990 (with another 8.6% identifying as black and less than one percent as Asian).

As of 2015, 40.5% of Latinos in the Northeast identified as racially mixed, 6.2% reported themselves as black, and another 0.6% said they were Asian. The fact that a large plurality of Latinos in the Northeast identify as nonwhite is important, given that the recent National Academy of Sciences report on immigrant integration noted strong evidence of skin color discrimination in critical venues such as markets for housing, labor, and credit. Thus the report identified race one of the most important barriers to the integration of first and second generation immigrants in the nation today (Waters and Pineau 2015).

At the outset of this report, we noted the unusually diverse regional origins of Latinos in the Northeast; but this diversity has not always prevailed. Figure 7 shows the shift in Latino origins from 1970 to 2015. As can readily be seen, in 1970 the population was dominated overwhelmingly by Puerto Ricans, who comprised around two thirds of the total. In that year, they were followed by Cubans at 11.2% and no other group reached double-digits. South Americans made up 8.8% of the population, Dominicans 3.9%, Central Americans 3.4%, and Mexicans only 1.7%, with the residual Other Latino category comprising 5.5%.

Over the next 45 years, however, the Cuban and Puerto Rican shares declined as other origins rose, with the Cuban share falling from 11.2% to 3.3% and Puerto Rican share dropping from 65.5% to 34.9%. In contrast, Mexicans grew from 1.7% to 12.1% of the Latino population, Dominicans rose from 3.9% to 17.4%, Central Americans from 3.4% to 10.3%, and South Americans from 8.8% to 15.9%, leaving 6.3% grouped together as Other Latinos.

Figure 8 suggests the dynamics underlying these shifts by plotting the percentage of foreign born Latinos who arrived in the five years prior to each census or survey. This tabulation does not include Puerto Ricans, who are U.S. citizens by birth and thus considered to be internal migrants by the Census Bureau. However, we know that the period of mass emigration from island to mainland was from 1940 to 1970, and few relative arrived in later years (Acosta-Belen and Santiago 2006). As a result, the percentage of recently arrived island-born Puerto Ricans declined in the decades after 1970, as did percentage of recently arrived Cubans, whose main era of immigration into the region was during the 1960s. As shown in Figure 8, the percentage of recently arrived Cuban immigrants was already low at 16.0% in 1970 and by 1980 it had fallen to 3.8%. Most Cuban immigration after 1970 was directed to Florida, not the Northeast.

In contrast, the share of recently arrived Dominicans, South Americans, and Central Americans rose sharply from 1970 to 1980, with the percentage of new immigrants among Dominicans rising from 17.1% to 39.9%, that for Central Americans increasing from 11.8% to 29.1%, and that for South Americans growing from 19.3% to 29.6%. The percentage of recently arrived foreigners remained elevated for each of these through 1990 but then began steadily to decline. The era of mass Mexican immigration began in the 1980s, with the percentage of recently arrived Mexicans going from 6.8% in 1980 to 21.8% in 1990 and then peaking at 23.2% in 2000 before falling to 5.2% in 2015.

Thus Dominican, Central American, and South American immigration into the Northeast surged during the 1970s and 1980s while Mexican immigrants swelled during the 1980s and 1990s. The pattern of arrival for Other Latinos paralleled that of Mexicans but the surge was considerably weaker. The total percentage foreign born among Latinos is shown by origin group in Figure 9 and is consistent with these observations. Indeed, the share of foreigners rose to

100% in 1990 for Dominicans, Central Americans, and South Americans, suggesting that the arrival of new immigrants overwhelmed the small communities in place as of 1970. The percentage foreign born among Cubans, meanwhile, was already quite high at 73.4% in 1970 and still remained high at 73.8% in 1980 but thereafter it fell steadily to reach 36.9% in 2015.

As expected from our earlier analysis of recent arrivals, the percentage foreign born among Mexicans and Other Latinos peaked much later and never reached the heights observed for the other groups. Thus the share of foreign-born Mexicans reached its maximum of 57.2% only in 2000, the same year at which the share of foreigners among Other Latinos peaked at just 40.2%. The fact that the Mexican and Other Latino foreign percentages peak well below the maxima observed for Dominicans, Central Americans, and South Americans suggest that a significant share of the former two groups did not arrive from abroad, but were internal migrants from other areas of Latino residence in the United States. This inflow likely included not only immigrants who had earlier arrived in traditional areas of Mexican settlement, but also native born persons of Mexican origin.

As a result, whereas in 2015 the Dominican, Central American, and South American populations were still dominated by first generation immigrants (with respective foreign percentages of 57.0%, 61.1%, and 63.0%), Mexicans and Other Latinos were dominated by native born group members, with foreign percentages of just 43.4% and 29.1%, even though their entry into the Northeast occurred later. In order to consider the generational composition, we turn to tabulations of the Latino population by place of birth and parentage. Unfortunately, the question on parental birthplace was eliminated from the U.S. Census after 1970, making it impossible to distinguish second from third or higher generation immigrants using U.S. Census

data. In response to recommendations made by several panels of the National Academy of Sciences, the question was added to the March Current Population Survey beginning in 1996.

Although clearly improving our ability to chart the progress of Latinos across the generations, the CPS sample is too small to derive group-specific estimates by region; but as shown in Figure 10 it does yield stable estimates for the northeastern Latino population as a whole (excluding Puerto Ricans who as noted earlier are considered by the Census Bureau to be native born). The left-hand column shows that in 1970 non-Puerto Rican Latinos in the Northeast were predominantly immigrants, with a foreign born percentage of 55.8%. By 2000, however, the share of foreigners had dropped to 46.4% and the second generation had risen to 37.7%, with 15.6% in the 2.5 generation (those having one foreign-born and one native parent). According to the latest data, in 2015 the first generation had dropped to 36.7% while the 2.0 and 2.5 generations together comprised 57.6% of the population and a small third generation was beginning to emerge at 4.1% of the non-Puerto Rican Latino population.

Figure 11 shows the percent of Latinos who reported speaking Spanish at home. This tabulation includes Puerto Ricans since language usage is not necessarily tied to citizenship or place of birth. In keeping with the surge of immigration during the 1970s, the percentage speaking Spanish at home increased sharply for Dominicans, Central Americans, and South Americans between 1970 and 1980, with the share for Dominicans rising from 46.6 to 97.0% that for Central Americans going from 26.3% to 90%, and that for South Americans increasing from 34.4% to 83.7%. Given their recent arrival, the share speaking Spanish in these groups remained quite high in subsequent years, still standing at 81.9% among Dominicans, 77.7% among Central Americans, and 78.6% among South Americans in 2015.

The share of Cubans and Puerto Ricans speaking Spanish at home also increased sharply between 1970 and 1980, going from 46.6% to 81.9% among the former and from 34.4% to 86.4% among the latter. Unlike Dominicans, Central Americans, and South Americans, however, the percentage speaking Spanish at home dropped steadily thereafter among Puerto Ricans and Cubans, reaching respective values of 57.2% and 53.4% in 2015. This more rapid decline likely reflects the fact that most immigrants in these groups arrived prior to 1970 and thus had already spent considerable time in the United States. As a result, Puerto Ricans and Cubans moved steadily toward the use of English over the period under observation, and if the same pattern holds for Dominicans, Central Americans, and South Americans they can be expected to follow suit in future years.

Corresponding to their later history of immigration, the share of Mexicans and Other Latinos speaking Spanish at home peaks much later compared with other Latino origin groups, with Mexicans reaching their maximum at 68.6% and Other Latinos at 67.5% only in the year 2000. These lower maximum levels of Spanish usage at home is consistent with our earlier interpretation that many members of these groups entered the region not from abroad, but from other regions in the United States and that in addition to well-established immigrants, the arrivals also likely included significant numbers of second generation immigrants as well.

TRENDS IN CITIZENSHIP AND ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION

Thanks to an act of Congress in 1900, Puerto Ricans are considered to be U.S. citizens by birth. Ironically, however, they cannot vote in congressional or presidential elections while living on the island, though they become immediately eligible to vote upon arrival on the mainland. Immigrants from elsewhere in Latin America, however, face a series of daunting barriers to electoral participation. The first step on the path to citizenship and thus eligibility for voting

rights is the attainment of legal permanent residence, which is difficult for those holding non-immigrant visas and close to impossible for those lacking legal documentation.

Permanent resident visas are allocated primarily to those having family ties to people already living in the United States and secondarily by the nation's labor market needs, though for some groups such as Cubans refugee status has played an important role. Although visas to spouses, minor children, and parents of U.S. citizens are not numerically limited, those granted to spouses and minor children of legal permanent residents, brothers and sisters of U.S. citizens, and people entering as labor migrants are capped and waiting times can be very long for many countries. For undocumented migrants there are few pathways to legal status. Under current law, those present in the United States without authorization must return home and wait ten years before becoming eligible to apply for a permanent resident visa.

Once such a legal residence visa is obtained, most categories of immigrants must wait five more years before being eligible to apply for naturalization. Applicants must also pay a \$640 filing fee and those under the age of 75 must also pay an \$85 biometric fee, bringing the total cost to \$725. Since most field offices of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services are backlogged with citizenship applications, the act of filing is generally followed by a long wait for an interview, currently around a year in the New York. After the interview candidates must then pass an English language exam and a civics test before they can be sworn in as U.S. citizens. Upon receipt of citizenship, the final step toward electoral participation is registering to vote, the ease of which varies by state.

Figure 12 shows trends in the rate of citizenship among non-Puerto Rican Latinos in the Northeast from 1970 to 2015. In 1970 the share of citizens was quite low for all groups, ranging from 17.5% for Mexicans to 32.6% for Central Americans, with other groups clustering tightly

around 24% and 25%. Dominicans, Central Americans, and South Americans remained at low levels through 1980, after which the percentage of citizens steadily rose to reach 75.0% for Dominicans, 61.9% for Central Americans, and 71.7% for South Americans in 2015. Among Cubans, who generally arrived in the 1960s, the increase was more rapid with the percentage of citizens rising from around 24% in 1970 to 62.3% in 1980 and then climbing slowly to peak at 91.1% in 2015.

Trends for Mexicans and Other Latinos are quite distinct, with the rate of citizenship shooting upward from 25% or below in 1970 to 86% in 1980. Such a sharp increase likely does not come from naturalization, but from the arrival of U.S. citizens and well-established permanent residents from elsewhere in the United States as internal migrants. In contrast to the case for Dominicans, Central Americans, and South Americans, large populations of Mexicans and Other Latinos lived in the United States well before 1970. These populations include the descendants of Spanish settlers who arrived in the Southwest before Mexican independence and settled in states such as Arizona, Colorado, and New Mexico as well the descendants of the great waves of Mexican immigrants who arrived during the period 1900-1929.

This interpretation is consistent with the drop in the percentage of citizens in both groups between 1980 and 2000 as waves of new immigrants from abroad came into the populations, with the share falling to 50.7% for Mexicans and 74.8% for Other Latinos. This sequence of events suggests that the earliest arrivals in these groups were internal migrants, who were only later followed by new immigrants. After 2000 the share of citizens rose once again to plateau at 66.1% for Mexicans and 86.9% for Other Latinos in 2015. As of that date, a majority of members in all groups were U.S. citizens, either by birth or naturalization, with the share ranging from 61.9% among Central Americans to 91.1% among Cubans.

Figure 13 draws upon data from the American National Election Survey to show trends in registration among those eligible to vote in presidential election years from 1996 to 2012 (U.S. citizens aged 18 and older). These data reveal a diversity of levels in 1996 that evolve toward a narrower range of registration rates by 2010. The share registered to vote began at a high level among Cubans in 1996 (82.2%), remained roughly at that level in 2000 and then began a steady decline to 62.2% in 2012. Mexicans had the lowest level of registration at 50% in 1996, but it rose to 64.3% in 2000 and then declined slowly to around 55% in 2008 where it basically remained through 2012. Puerto Ricans showed the least change over time, with the share rising from 54.2% in 1996 to 60% in 2012.

Central and South Americans (tabulated together in the ANES survey) fell from 56.9% in 1996 to 49.7% in 2000 and then rose in subsequent years to reach 63.7% in 2012. Dominicans display the most variable pattern over time. From 1996 to 2012 the share registered to vote dropped from 67.1% to 55.4% before shooting back up to 81.3% in 2004 and then falling once again to around 57% in 2008 before finishing at 68.9% in 2012. As already noted, over time the range in registration rates among Latino origin groups narrowed from 50% to 82% in 1996 to 55% to 69% in 2012.

Of course, this narrower range still leaves considerable room for improvement in securing the eligibility to vote in U.S. elections. Figure 14 indicates that registration is likely the greatest barrier to electoral participation by Latino citizens, as it shows voting rates among those registered to be quite high in all groups. Although there was some between-group variation in voting rates over time, in the 2012 election voting rates fell into the range of 85% to 90% across all groups, ranging roughly from 85% to 90% in 2012. In general, then rates of Latino electoral participation in the Northeast are thus low first because many are not citizens, and second

because those who are citizens do not register to vote at high rates, not because those who are registered don't vote.

SOCIOECONOMIC TRENDS

Perhaps the most important determinant of socioeconomic status in the United States today is education, and Figure 15 shows trends in educational attainment among all Latinos in the northeast from 1970 to 2015. In 1970, when the population was dominated by island-born Puerto Ricans, education levels were quite low. In that year, 68.6% of Latinos reported having less than a high school education and only 19.9% said they were high school graduates. Just 5.5% had been to college and the same percentage reported that they had graduated from college or university.

The principal trend observed after 1970 is a steady decline in the share of Latinos having less than a high school education and the rise of percentage within other educational categories. As can be seen, the share without a high school diploma fell sharply and steadily from 1970 onwards, reaching 32.3% in 2010 and 29.6% in 2015. Over the same 45-year period, the percentage of high school graduates rose to 27.8%, the share with some college increased to 23.1%, and the percent holding a college degree reached 19.4%.

The foregoing trends for Latinos as a whole conceal considerable diversity in educational attainment between groups and over time, however. Figure 16 illustrates this heterogeneity by plotting trends in the percentage of college graduates by origin from 1970 to 2015. Over this period, Cubans experienced the greatest growth, with the percent college educated rising from 10.4% to 37.4% along a fairly steady trajectory. Also following a steady growth trajectory were Dominicans and Puerto Ricans, although they progressed at a slower rate and from a much lower

base. Thus the share of college graduates went from 2.4% to 16.6% for Dominicans and from 2.4% to 15% for Puerto Ricans between 1970 and 2015.

Although their trajectories over time were different, Mexicans and Central Americans ended up at roughly the same point as Dominicans and Puerto Ricans in 2015. Central American college graduates fell from 11.6% of the population in 1970 to 7.5% in 1990, reflecting the large-scale immigration of less educated group members from abroad. Thereafter the share of college graduates rose steadily to reach 14.8% in 2015. The share of Mexican college graduates, meanwhile, dropped from 19.3% in 1970 to around 12% in 1980 before rising back up to 19.8% in 1990 and then falling back to 15% in 2000. By 2015, however, the percentage had risen slowly back up to 17.3%.

South Americans evinced a slight dip in the share of college graduates during the 1970s, with the percentage falling from 13.2% in 1970 to 11.6% in 1980. Thereafter it began a steady rise that accelerated after 2000 to reach 27% in 2015. Other Latinos display the most irregular time trend of all origin groups, falling from 19.3% in 1970 to around 12% in 1980 then rising back up to 19.8% before falling again to 15.1% in 2000. Thereafter, the percentage turned sharply upward to peak at 32.8% in 2000 before declining slightly to a value of 30.2% in 2015.

At present, therefore, college educated Latinos in the Northeast appear to be clustered within two broad classes: one better educated group composed of Cubans, South Americans, and Other Latinos with college graduate shares ranging from 27% to 37% and another less educated group composed of Dominicans, Central Americans, Mexicans, and Puerto Ricans with percentages ranging from 15%-17%. Whatever their relative standing, there is obviously considerable room for greater educational attainment across all Latino origins.

Figure 17 considers trends in Latino labor force participation by plotting the labor force status of males from 1970 to 2015. The data reveal that male employment rates fell steadily from 1970 to 2000, going from 85.5% in the former year to 65.3% in the latter year, with an especially sharp dip between 1990 and 2000. Thereafter it rose back up but not enough to offset the earlier decline, climbing back up only to 74.5% by 2015. The mirror image of the foregoing trend is the percentage of males not in the labor force, which rose from 11.1% to 16.6% during the period 1970 to 1990, then surged to 29.4% in 2000 before falling back to 18.4% in 2010 and rising slightly to 20.6% in 2015. Over the same period, the male unemployment rate for Latinos rose from 3.4% in 1970 to 7.5% in 1990 and then dipped to 5.4% before peaking at 8.8% in 2010 and falling back to 4.9% in 2015.

Figure 18 presents trends in female labor force status of Latinas over the same period of time, and here the clear story is the steady rise in labor force participation and corresponding drop in the share of women outside the labor force. The share of women outside the labor force fell sharply from 59.2% to 40.6% between 1970 and 1990, leveled off during the ensuing decade and then dropped further to reach 30.4% in 2010, where it essentially remained in 2015. The share of women employed correspondingly rose from 38.2% to 52.9% between 1970 and 1990, plateaued during the 1990s, rose further during the 2000s to reach 61.5% in 2010 and increased still more thereafter to peak at 64.4% in 2015. As more women entered the labor force, the unemployment rate generally increased, going from 2.6% in 1970 to 6.5% in 1990, before falling to 5.8% in 2000 and then spiking at 8.2% in 2010 and then declining to 5.1% in 2015.

Figure 19 considers intergroup variation in male unemployment rates over time for the different Latino origin groups. The series reveals an increase in unemployment for all groups during the stagflation years of the 1970s, with the Mexican rate rising from 1.4% to 6.1%. The

corresponding increases for other groups were 2.5% to 4.3% for Cubans, 2.2% to 5.2% for South Americans, 3.3% to 5.5% for Central Americans, 3.0% to 7.3% for Puerto Ricans, 4.2% to 8.2% for Dominicans, and 2.2% to 6% for Other Latinos.

Although the Reagan Era economic boom lowered unemployment rates during the 1980s, it ultimately gave way to a recession in 1990, which drove the male unemployment rate to 12.4% for Dominicans, 8% for Puerto Ricans, 6% for South Americans, and 5% for Cubans. However, not all groups suffered to the same extent from the 1990 recession. From 1980 to 1990 unemployment rates held steady or fell slightly for Mexicans, Central Americans, and Other Latinos; and between 1990 and 2000 the rate for Mexicans and Other Latinos continued to fall (to 5.5% and 4.4%, respectively) while the rate for Central Americans went up along with that for Cubans (both reaching 6%). Also falling between 1990 and 2000 were the unemployment rates for South Americans (from 5.9% to 3.3%), Puerto Ricans (from 8% to 6%) and Dominicans (from 12.4% to 6%).

The years 2008 and 2009 coincided with the Great Recession, which brought the national unemployment rate to 10% in October of 2009. As indicated by the figure, its effects were still very much in evidence in 2010, with all groups showing a clear increase in unemployment relative to 2000. Hit hardest were Central Americans whose unemployment rate rose from 3.3% to 9.2%. Also hard hit were Cubans, Dominicans, and Puerto Ricans, whose rates climbed from levels around 6% to new peaks in 2010 of 12.1%, 10.7% and 9.4%, respectively. Less affected were Mexicans (whose rate grew from 5.2% to 6.1%), South Americans (whose rate rose from 4.4% to 7.7%), and Other Latinos (whose rate climbed from 6% to 7.5%). By 2015 male unemployment had come down for all groups and came to be clustered in a narrow range from

3.3% (for Mexicans) to 6.1% (for Dominicans). This was still greater than the range of 1.4% to 4.2% that prevailed in 1970, however.

Looking at trends in male unemployment over the entire period, Caribbean Latinos appear to have been more affected by recessionary times with notable spikes for Dominicans and Puerto Ricans in 1990 and for Dominicans, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans in 2010. Turning to labor force trends for females, since the principal shift over time for Latinas in general was the great increase in labor force participation, Figure 20 shows trends in female employment for women of different Latino origins between 1970 and 2015. Very clearly the rise in labor force participation prevailed across all groups and the range of participation rates narrowed significantly over time. In 1970 the female employment rate ranged from a low of 29.4% for Puerto Ricans to a high of 63.3% for Central Americans. By 2015, however, the rates had not only risen narrowed to a range from 56.5% for Mexicans to 73.4% for Cubans. The employment rate for Puerto Rican women rose steadily over the period from 29.4% to 61.4%. In contrast, the rate for Dominicans fell from 52.6% to levels below 50% during the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, before climbing back to 50% in 2000 and rising to 66.7% by 2015. For Cuban women the rate began at roughly 50% and rose to 67.4% by 1990 before stalling and then resuming its rise in 2000 to finish 2015 with a rate of 73.4%.

After experiencing rising rates of employment from 1970 to 1990, Mexicans and Other Latinas displayed declines during the 1990s. Although the Mexican female employment rate rose from 42.0% to 63.5% between 1970 and 1990 it fell to 50% in 2000, the edged back up to 56.5% in 2000 where it remained 2015, well below its peak in 1990. The rate for Other Latinas likewise rose from around 50% in 1970 to 61.5% in 1990 and then dropped to 50% in 2000 before rising back up to 63.8% in 2015. In contrast to this volatility, Central American female employment

rates remained fairly stable over time, beginning at 63.3% in 1970 and ending at 64.8 in 2015.

Among South American women, however, the rate rose from 50% in 1970 to 60% in 1990 stalled during the ensuing decade and then rose again after 2000 to reach 70.7% in 2015.

Considering labor market trends in general, male unemployment rates appear to be more affected by economic cycles (spiking during recessionary period in 1990 and 2010) than female employment rates (which did not decline during these two periods). Employment is not simply a matter of holding a job, of course. There are many different kinds of jobs that confer different levels of status and prestige. Figure 21 therefore looks at trends in occupational status using Hauser-Warren SEI scores. The highest observed SEI values are generally in the 60s and 70s for people working as professionals, managers, and skilled technical workers; crafts workers skilled laborers generally score in the 40s or 50s; sales and clerical workers tend to be in the 30s; and unskilled service workers and laborers display scores in the 10s or 20s.

In 1970 Caribbean Latinos clearly held the lowest status jobs, with Dominicans displaying an average SEI score of 23.2, Puerto Ricans a score of 26.0 and Cubans a score of 28.6. Over the next 45 years, however, scores for the three Caribbean origin groups increased monotonically, with Dominicans rising from 23.2 to 28.5, Puerto Ricans going from 26.0 to 33.1, and Cubans leading the way upward with status scores climbing from 28.6 to 39.7, with the latter figure constituting the score in 2015 among all Latino origins.

For their part, Mexicans, Central Americans, South Americans, and Other Latinos displayed scores in the 30s circa 1970, with values ranging from 30.2 for Central Americans to 34.3 for Mexicans and South Americans and Other Latinos falling in-between at 30.8. As new immigrants arrived and added to these populations, however, status scores generally fell, with Mexicans and Central Americans dropping from SEI values in the 30s to a score of 27.4 in

2000 and South Americans falling from 30.8 to 28.7 over the same period. The status scores of Mexicans and Central Americans rose somewhat thereafter, but as of 2015 their respective scores of 29.2 and 28.5 remained below their 1970s levels. In contrast, status scores for South Americans begin rising in 1980 and continued upward steadily to peak at 32.7 in 2015.

The occupational status scores for the Other Latinos displayed an inconsistent trend over time, rising from 1970 to 1990, falling over the next decade then increasing sharply between 2000 and 2010 to peak at 36.8 before dropping slightly to 35.8 in 2015. As of that year, Latinos seem to have sorted themselves into three status groups, with higher status scores between 35 and 40 for Cubans and Other Latinos, middle values around 33 for Puerto Ricans and South Americans, and low scores between 28 and 30 for Dominicans, Mexicans, and Central Americans. Judging from these figures, as of yet relatively few Latinos in the Northeast hold high status professional, managerial, or technical occupations.

Beyond status and prestige, probably the most important resource an occupation confers is income, and Figure 22 show trends in average household income for all Latinos in the Northeast from 1970 to 2015 in constant 2015 dollars. The top line shows mean income and the bottom line shows median income. Mean incomes tend to be pulled upward by outlying high income households within income distributions that are highly unequal whereas median incomes more accurately reflect the incomes earned by typical households. As shown in the figure, mean and median Latino incomes fell in parallel during the stagflation years of the 1970s, with the mean income dropping from \$52,000 to \$44,000 from 1970 to 1980 and the median income falling from \$43,000 to \$35,000.

Although both mean and median incomes rose over the course of the Reagan Era boom of the 1980s, they did so at different rates, reflecting an increase in income inequality. While the

mean income rose from \$44,000 to \$58,000 (a 33% increase), the median income rose only from \$35,000 to \$45,000 (a 29% increase). From 1990 to 2015 the lines continued to depart from one another at a growing rate as median income stagnated to remain at levels below \$50,000 while mean incomes rose to \$72,000. As income inequality rose in the nation generally, therefore, it also rose among Latinos.

To provide a look at the income enjoyed by typical members of different Latino origin groups, Figure 23 shows trends in median income from 1970 to 2015. Although all groups experienced a decline in median income from 1970 to 1980, the drop was smallest for Cubans who fell only from \$59,000 to \$55,000. Among Central Americans, however, median income plummeted from \$60,000 to \$40,000 while the Mexican median fell from \$64,000 to \$43,000. The median for Other Latinos likewise dropped sharply from \$68,000 to \$45,000, and that for South Americans dropped from \$60,000 to \$45,000.

After 1980 median incomes gradually moved upward for Puerto Ricans and South Americans, with the former peaking at \$44,000 in 2015 and the latter peaking at \$62,000 in 2010 before dropping slightly to \$61,000 in 2015. Although median incomes rebounded to around \$52,000 in 1990 for Central Americans and Mexicans, thereafter the rebound stalled and both medians slid back down, finishing at \$50,000 for the former origin group and \$44,000 for the latter. After rising to \$41,000 in 2000, median income for Dominicans stagnated and by 2015 had dropped back to \$40,000. Other Latinos and Cubans displayed jagged patterns of change over time but finished ahead of where they stood in 1970, with Cubans at \$80,000 and Other Latinos at \$62,000. At present, then, Latino origin groups appear to break down roughly into three income strata, with Cubans at the top, Other Latinos and South Americans in the middle, and Puerto Ricans, Dominicans, Mexicans, and Central Americans at the bottom.

Figure 24 turns circumstances at the bottom of the income distribution by examining trends in poverty across origin groups. Given what we just learned about trends in median income, it is not surprising to find that Dominicans, Puerto Ricans, and Mexicans display the highest rates of poverty in 2015 at around 25% or 26%, with Central Americans and Other Latinos lying in-between at 18% to 19%. South Americans and Cubans, meanwhile display the lowest rates at around 12% or 13%. Poverty increased for all groups during the 1970s and fell or leveled out during the 1980s. Thereafter poverty rates fell steadily for Dominicans, Puerto Ricans, and South Americans but rose for Mexicans and Central Americans. After rising during the 1990s, Cuban poverty rates fell from 2000 onward.

Socioeconomic status is not only indexed by occupational status and income, but in very important ways is also determined by wealth; and the principal source of wealth for the average American household is home equity. This asset cannot be accumulated without home ownership, of course, so Figure 25 presents ownership rates for the different Latino origin groups. From 1970 to 2000 home ownership rates generally increased for Cubans, Dominicans, Puerto Ricans, and South Americans and fell or stagnated for Mexicans, Central Americans, and Other Latinos before recovering somewhat by 2010.

Cubans led the way in home ownership, with their rate rising from 21.9% to almost 60% in 2010 before dropping back to 55.8% in 2015. The home ownership rate also rose substantially for Puerto Ricans, but from a much lower base, going from 14.2% in 1970 to 36.9% in 2015. The Dominican increase was much slower and began much later, with the ownership rate falling slightly from 14.2% over the subsequent two decades before taking off in 1990 and rising to 27.6% in 2015. South American home ownership also got a late start, stagnating at around 30%

during the 1970s, rising slowly from 1980 to 2000 before increasing rapidly to reach 47.2% in 2010 and finally edging up to 47.9% in 2015.

In contrast, ownership rates for Mexicans fell from a high of 57.3% in 1970 and bottomed out at 24.0% in 2000 before rising up to 30% in 2010 and then dropping back to 27.6% in 2015. Central Americans likewise fell sharply during the 1970s, going from 34.7% to 25.6% over the decade and remaining stuck roughly at that level through 2000 before rising up to 40% in 2010 and sliding down to 39% in 2015. Other Latinos dropped from a 52.1% ownership rate in 1970 to a low of 32.6% in 2000 before rising sharply to 55.1% in 2010 and then falling back to 45.8% in 2015. As of 2015, among Latino origin groups only Cubans displayed a majority of homeowners.

Although ownership is the first step to building wealth, home value is a second key component of home equity and Figure 26 shows average home values for Latinos from 1970 to 2015 in constant dollars. As with income, mean home values rise more rapidly than median home values and the two series increasingly diverge over time. While the mean home value rose from \$140,000 in 1970 to \$349,000 in 2015, the median home value went only from \$137,000 to \$250,000. Thus inequality with respect to income seemingly translates directly into inequality in home values.

Figure 27 shows median home values by year for each origin group. In 1970 the various groups were relatively close together and grouped into two clusters, one at around \$183,000 and another at around \$137,000. Home values fell during the 1970s, rose sharply during the 1980s, fell down somewhat during the 1990s and then rose sharply again during the 2000s to peak in 2010 only to decline again in 2015. Over the course of these peaks and valleys the range of home

values across groups in ways consistent with the intergroup income differentials already documented.

At the top were Cubans, who in 2010 reached a peak home value of \$402,000, followed in that year by South Americans at \$380,000, Other Latinos at \$353,000, Central Americans and Dominicans at \$326,000, and Mexicans and Puerto Ricans at \$250,000. In the wake of the housing crash, however, values declined for all groups by 2015, with the exception of Other Latinos whose home value remained constant. Given the combination of ownership rates and home values, the potential for wealth creation in recent decades clearly has been greatest for Cubans, South Americans, and Other Latinos and least for Puerto Ricans, Dominicans, and Mexicans.

TRENDS IN LATINO SEGREGATION AND ISOLATION

There are 15 metropolitan areas in the Northeast with more than 50,000 Latino residents and they account for 72% of the region's Latino population. For purposes of economy in analyzing trends and patterns with respect to residential circumstances, however, we focus on key metropolitan areas: Boston, Providence, New York, and Philadelphia, which together contain about half of the region's Latinos. To represent conditions in metropolitan areas as a whole, we use the average across all 15 areas.

Segregation had been called the linchpin of America's system of racial stratification (Pettigrew 1979) and has been shown to be a critical factor in the replication of disadvantage over time (Massey and Denton 1993; Sharkey 2013). It is most commonly measured using the index of dissimilarity, which assesses segregation as the degree to which two groups are unevenly distributed across neighborhoods in an urban area (Massey and Denton 1988). Index

values below 30 are generally considered to be “low” and those above 60 are seen as “high,” with values in-between labeled “moderate.”

Figure 28 shows trends in Latino white-segregation in our four principal metropolitan areas as well as the 15-area average from 1970 to 2010 (from Rugh and Massey 2014). As can clearly be seen, over time segregation levels appear to have converged on values near the lower boundary of the high range and since 1980 Latino-white dissimilarity has shown little or no sign of declining. As of 2010, the dissimilarity index stood at 63.1 in New York, 62.0 in Boston, 60.1 in Providence, and 58.8 in Philadelphia, with an average across all 15 metropolitan areas of 56.5. Although not as high as black-white segregation in the region or elsewhere in the United States, these levels are high compared with Latino segregation levels in other regions and with Asians throughout the nation.

Another common index of segregation is the P* isolation index, which gives the percentage of Latinos in the neighborhood of the average Latino resident in an urban area (Massey and Denton 1988). Unlike the dissimilarity index, it is strongly affected by a group’s percentage of the metropolitan population. Other things equal, higher minority percentages mathematically translate into higher levels of minority spatial isolation. Thus if the percentage of Latinos rises under conditions of relatively constant and rather high segregation (as has been true for Latinos in the Northeast since 1980) then we would expect to observe increasing levels of spatial isolation over time, and this is exactly what we see in Figure 29. From 1970 to 2010, the isolation index rose from 32.8 to 47.3 in New York, with increases of 15.8 to 27.7 in Philadelphia, 6.7 to 28.7 in Boston, and 2.5 to 32.6 in Providence. The 15-area average nearly tripled, rising from a value of 11.1 in 1970 to one of 31.0 in 2015.

In addition to isolation and unevenness, researchers have identified indices for three other geographic dimensions of residential segregation: clustering, centralization, and concentration (Massey and Denton 1988). Clustering measures the degree to which Latino neighborhoods are located adjacent to one another in residential space; centralization captures the degree to which Latinos are distributed in and around the geographic center of a metropolitan area; and concentration refers to the relative amount of physical space occupied by Latinos. Minority groups that display high index values across at least four these five dimensions were labeled hypersegregated by Massey and Denton (1989), and as of 2010 Massey and Tannen (2015) found that African Americans in 21 metropolitan areas remained hypersegregated, including six in the Northeast: Boston, Harford, New York, Philadelphia, Rochester, and Syracuse. However, in 2010 only two northeastern metropolitan areas satisfied the criteria for Latino hypersegregation: Reading, PA and Springfield, MA. Nonetheless Latino segregation in the Northeast persists at high levels and spatial isolation is rising.

Segregation is important because of how it interacts with a group's rate of poverty to concentrate disadvantage spatially (Massey 1990; Quillian 2012). When combined with relatively high levels of Latino segregation, elevated rates of Latino poverty inevitably generate high concentrations of neighborhood poverty for Latino communities. The spatial concentration of poverty is measured using P* isolation computed to indicate the percentage poor in the neighborhood of the average poor Latino—in essence assessing class rather than racial isolation. Exposure to spatially concentrated disadvantage has increasingly been found to have powerful negative effects on a range of critical outcomes (Sampson 2012) and to play a powerful role in limiting social and spatial mobility (Sharkey 2013; Massey and Brodmann 2014; Rothwell and Massey 2015).

Indices of Latino poverty concentration are presented in Figure 30 for the four metropolitan areas along with the 15-metro area average. The spatial isolation of poor Latinos in the Northeast changed relatively little in the 1980s but rose sharply during the 1990s and then increased again in the 1990s to peak at high levels in 2000 before declining in 2010. In general P* indices of poverty concentration between 20 and 40 are considered to be “high” and those above 40 are considered “extreme.” By these criteria, Latino poverty concentration had risen to extreme levels by 2000 in Philadelphia (45.7), Providence (43.6), and New York (40.4). In Boston, the average Latino lived in a neighborhood that was “only” 35.2% poor, and across all 15 metropolitan areas poverty concentration stood at 32.9.

By 2010, however, only Latinos in Philadelphia continued to live under conditions of extreme poverty concentration, with an index value of 40.7. Exposure to neighborhood disadvantage nonetheless remained quite high in Providence (36.9), New York (33.3), and Boston (32.4), though the regional average did fall to an index value of 27.2. This value nevertheless remains well within the high range of neighborhood poverty, and all four areas as well as the 15-metro average have persisted in this range or higher since 1990.

Although in practical terms we cannot present trends in segregation, isolation, and poverty concentration for all metropolitan areas, we can present these indices for all 15 areas in 2010 to indicate current neighborhood conditions. As shown in Figure 31, segregation levels at that date were notably high (above 60) in Boston, New York, Newark, Providence, and Springfield, and were lowest (below 50) in Nassau-Suffolk, Rochester, and Wilmington, DE. Dissimilarity indices in the remaining seven metropolitan areas ranged from 50 to 60—i.e. in the upper half of the moderate range, still a relatively high degree of segregation.

As noted above, the P* isolation index is influenced by the minority percentage. Across all 15 metropolitan areas the average percentage of Latinos was 10.3% in 2010; but the highest shares were observed in New York and Newark (both around 28% Latino), but relatively high values also prevailed in Philadelphia (18%), Bridgeport (17%), and New Haven (15%). The coincidence of a high Latino percentage and a high Latino-white dissimilarity index will perforce yield higher levels Latino spatial isolation, with the degree of isolation rising as both measures increase. Thus it is not surprising that we observe the highest levels of Latino isolation in New York, Springfield, and Newark, where the corresponding isolation indices stood at 47.3, 42.1, and 39.1. Although Boston and Providence display high levels of Latino-white segregation, their relatively lower Latino percentages yield lower levels of spatial isolation (with respective indices of 28.7 and 32.6). The lowest levels of spatial isolation are observed in Rochester and Wilmington, with respective dissimilarity indices of 38.9 and 44.6 and Latino percentages of 6% and 15%, yielding isolation indices of just 16.2 and 14.9.

Figure 31 also shows the concentration of Latino poverty in 2010. At this date only one metropolitan area (Nassau-Suffolk) displayed a low level of poverty concentration (with an index value of 13.9), whereas two areas displayed extreme poverty concentrations: Philadelphia with an index of 40.7 and Springfield with an index value of 43.4. Several other metropolitan areas (Hartford, Providence, and Rochester) displayed near-extreme levels of poverty concentration with index values in the upper portion of the high range (index values of 35 to 40). Only one metropolitan area (Wilmington) displayed an index in the lower reaches of the high range (20-25). As a rule, then, Latinos in the Northeast thus experience high, very high, or extreme concentrations of poverty, putting them at a distinct disadvantage in American society.

Thus high and borderline high levels of segregation persist in most northeastern metropolitan areas, and as Latino populations have grown over time this persistence has produced rising levels of spatial isolation. Moreover, in combination with high levels of poverty the persistent segregation of Latinos has generated very high or extreme concentrations of urban poverty. Recent work suggests that residential segregation is predicted by low levels of minority income, minority concentration within central cities, higher shares of foreign born, older metropolitan housing stocks, rising levels of anti-Latino prejudice, and restrictive density zoning suburbs (Rugh and Massey 2014). Across the 15 metropolitan areas, we found relatively little variation in the median age of the housing stock, the restrictiveness of suburban density zoning, or the degree of anti-Latino prejudice across (using Rugh and Massey's indicators), making them poor candidates to explain much variation in overall levels of segregation.

We observed greater variance across metropolitan areas with respect to Latino income levels, the share of Latinos living in suburbs, the percentage of foreign born Latinos, and the share of Latinos who were of black or mixed race. We therefore considered the influence of these variables on segregation levels in greater depth using simple regression methods. Figure 32 demonstrates the effect of income on segregation by plotting Latino-white dissimilarity indices by quintile of the household income distribution (taken from Intrator, Tannen, and Massey 2016). These indices measure the segregation of Latinos within each income quintile relative to all whites irrespective of income.

In the lowest quintile, Latinos are very highly segregated from whites, with dissimilarity values of 76.8 in Philadelphia, 72.1 in Boston, 71.3 in Providence, and 68.9 in New York, and an overall average of 71.3. In general, dissimilarity levels remain in the high range through the third quintile. The average dissimilarity falls to 55.6 in the fourth quintile and to 48.1 in the top

quintile, at which point Latino-white segregation sands at 51.8 in Philadelphia and Boston and 40.4 in New York. With an index of 60.2 even high-income Latinos in Providence remain highly segregated, and in no metropolitan area does the segregation of Latinos in the top quintile fall into the low range of segregation (with a dissimilarity index of 30 or below).

Figure 33 shows segregation levels in cities and suburbs of the four metropolitan areas as well as the 15-area averages. In Boston, Latino segregation is *greater* in the suburbs than the central city, so suburbanization is of little help in promoting integration in that metropolitan area. In the other areas, Latino segregation is anywhere from 12 to 23 lower in suburbs than in central cities, but on average the reduction in segregation through suburbanization is modest at around 11 points. Figure 34 continues our analysis by assessing the degree to which foreign versus native birth influences the segregation of Latinos. Once again Boston stands out in that segregation is higher for natives than foreigners. In other metropolitan areas segregation is lower among natives than among the foreign born, but the differential is rather small and on average across the 15 metropolitan areas it is miniscule at just 0.7 points.

Finally, Figure 35 shows the degree of segregation from whites for black, racially mixed, and white Latinos. Although we observe a small drop moving from black to mixed race Latinos, the decline is far greater when we move to consider the segregation of white Latinos. Compared to white Latinos, segregation levels are around 10 to 20 points greater for racially mixed Latinos, and 20 to 30 point greater for black Latinos.

How these factors play out relative to one another in producing Latino segregation is impossible to determine in the absence of a multivariate analysis, which cannot be done on a dataset with only 15 observations. In order to gain some purchase on the degree to which each of the foregoing factors underlies variation in Latino segregation across metropolitan areas, we

created simple scatterplots and computed zero order correlations between the observed level of Latino-white segregation and the percent nonwhite (black plus mixed), the percent residing in suburbs, the percent foreign born, and the Latino-white income ratio. Our results are summarized in Figure 36.

Among these variables, the share of foreign born and the Latino-white income ratio had trivial associations with the degree of Latino segregation. The extent of Latino suburbanization had a significant effect with an r^2 of 0.337; but the largest effect was for the percent nonwhite, which carried an r^2 of 0.524. Given the limited number of cases and the inability to control simultaneously for confounding variables, the results are only suggestive. Nonetheless, we know that Caribbean Latinos have long displayed higher levels of residential segregation than other Latino origin groups and this fact has kept Latino segregation high in the Northeast relative to other regions (Massey and Bitterman 1985; Denton and Massey 1989). Here, the fact that more than half the variation in Latino segregation is explained by one single variable suggests that the relatively large share of black and racially mixed Latinos in the Northeast may indeed play a significant role in determining their social and spatial position in society.

CONCLUSION

In this report, we have charted the growth and development of the Latino population of the northeastern United States from 1970 to the present. Within this region, what began as a relatively small population dominated by Puerto Ricans and concentrated in New York and a few other cities has evolved into a much larger, more diverse, and more geographically dispersed population. From 1970 to 2015, Latinos in the Northeast grew from 1.9 million to 7.7 million persons and rose from 3.8% to 10.5% of the regional population. Although 71% of all Latinos still live in New York or New Jersey, a significant share of Latinos now live also in

Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Connecticut, and Rhode Island. Moreover, in New York and New Jersey, Latinos have spread outward to occupy new destinations both within and between metropolitan areas.

Over the course of the decades, the Latino population has increasingly suburbanized to the point where roughly equal numbers of Latinos live in cities and suburbs, though the overwhelming majority continue to reside in metropolitan areas. Whereas Puerto Ricans and Cubans together constituted more than three-quarters of all northeastern Latinos in 1970 (at 66% and 11% of the total, respectively), by 2015 these two groups only constituted 38% of the total (at 35% and 3). During the 1970s and 1980s, Puerto Ricans and Cubans were joined by new immigrants arriving from the Dominican Republic, Central America, and South America, and during the 1980s and 1990s by persons of Mexican and Other Latino origins. Unlike the former three groups, however, arrivals in the latter two groups included not just immigrants coming directly from abroad, but also contained many established immigrants and native born Latinos arriving from elsewhere in the United States.

These migratory trends have produced by far the most diverse Latino population of all regions in the United States and the only regional population *not* dominated by Mexicans. Indeed, no Latino origin group constitutes a majority in the Northeast, although Caribbean Latinos together constitute 56% of the regional total. The relatively large share of Caribbean Latinos is, in turn, associated with a relatively large share of Latinos who self-identify as black or nonwhite, with about 6% reporting themselves in the former category and 41% in the later as of 2015. As the population's composition has changed, its demographic characteristics have also steadily evolved. Although the sex ratio has remained steady, the mean age has risen, the percent married has fallen, and childbearing has dropped to below-replacement levels.

Over the period from 1970 to 2015, migration has generally been the most important contributor to Latino population dynamics in the northeast; and as the share of immigrants has risen, the percentage speaking Spanish at home and the percent foreign born naturally increased before falling in later years as the number of new arrivals dropped and the share of native born Latinos increased. Since 2000 the percentage of Latinos holding U.S. citizenship has increased across all groups and in 2015 stood at 91% for Cubans, 87% for Other Latinos, 75% for Dominicans, 72% for South Americans, 66% for Mexicans, and 62% for Central Americans.

Thus Latinos in the Northeast are not only predominantly documented, the large majority are U.S. citizens. According to data from the Center for Migration Studies (2017), only around 23% of Latinos in the Northeast are undocumented. Although the estimated share of undocumented among foreign born Mexicans in the region is 79% and 57% of Central American immigrants are estimated to lack authorization, immigrants in these groups constitute a small share of the overall Latino population in the Northeast. Although the relatively high rates of citizenship observed among Latinos in the Northeast suggest considerable potential for electoral participation, actual participation rates are lowered by rates of voter registration (ranging from 55% among Mexicans to 69% among Cubans). Among those registered, however, voting rates were quite high, ranging from 85% to 89% in 2012.

Although education levels were pushed downward by the arrival of immigrants from Central America, South America, and the Dominican Republic during the 1970s and 1980s, and by Mexican and Other Latino immigrants during the 1980s and 1990s, since 2000 the percentage college educated has risen in all groups. Nonetheless, a wide gap persists between Cubans (37%), Other Latinos (30%), and South Americans (27%) on the one hand, and Dominicans, Puerto Ricans, Mexicans, and Central Americans on the other hand (with the percentage of

college graduates among the latter groups ranging just from 15% to 17%). Corresponding to these educational differentials, Cubans, South Americans, and Other Latinos generally occupy higher status occupations than other Latinos, but even among these groups average status levels remain modest, only reaching into the range of sales and clerical.

Whereas male employment rates generally dropped from 1970 to 2000 and only partially recovered thereafter, female employment rates steadily rose from 1970 through 2015. In general, male rates of employment among Latino groups have been more sensitive to cyclical variations in unemployment than rates of female employment, with Puerto Rican and Dominican males being particular vulnerable during the recession of 1990, and Cuban and Central American males joining the ranks of the vulnerable during the Great Recession of 2008-2010.

As in the United States generally, income inequality increased among Latinos over time, with mean incomes rising much faster than median incomes and intergroup inequality with respect to income increasing. As of 2015, Cubans displaying a median income of around \$80,000 while the median for Other Latinos and South Americans was \$62,000 and the remaining groups earned median incomes of \$50,000 or less. Consistent with these data, poverty rates are generally highest for Dominicans, Puerto Ricans, and Mexicans (at around 26% or 27%) and lowest for Cubans and South Americans (at 12% or 13%), with Central Americans and Other Latinos falling in-between at 20% and 18%, respectively. With respect to home ownership rates we observe a similar ordering in terms of relative advantage, with Cubans at the top (56%), Other Latinos and South Americans in the middle (48% and 46%, respectively), and the remaining clustering groups at the bottom, with rates ranging from 28% among Dominicans and Mexicans to 37% and 39% for Puerto Ricans and Central Americans. Home values follow a similar ordering across groups.

In general then, socioeconomic status is greatest for Cubans, followed by Other Latinos and South Americans and on some indicators Central Americans, with Dominicans, Mexicans, and Puerto Ricans falling at the lower end of the class continuum. When it comes to the spatial position of Latinos, however, socioeconomic status plays a small role in determining the degree of residential segregation and spatial isolation they experience. As of 2010, segregation levels remained very high among those occupying the bottom three income quintiles of the income distribution and only fell into the moderate range in the top two quintiles. Overall, relatively high levels of segregation persisted for Latinos in the northeast through 2010, with the average level of Latino-white dissimilarity standing at around 57 in that year but with values in excess of 60 observed in Boston, New York, Newark, Providence, and Springfield and a pattern of hypersegregation prevailing in the latter area.

Given persistent and relatively high levels of residential segregation, the increase in the percentage of Latinos has inevitably led to an increase in the degree of spatial isolation experienced by Latinos in northeastern metropolitan areas. Likewise, the combination of high levels of segregation and high rates of poverty has produced elevated concentrations of poverty throughout the region, with extreme levels observed in Philadelphia and Springfield and near-extreme levels in Hartford, Providence, and Rochester. Inter-metropolitan variation in segregation is very strongly and significantly related the percentage of Latinos who self-identify as nonwhite, suggesting that race is a key factor in determining the relative standing of Latinos in the Northeast.

The relative standing of Latinos with respect to non-Hispanic whites in 2015 is summarized in Figure 37, which shows Latino-to-white ratios for key indicators of socioeconomic status and reveals Latinos to lag behind whites on every dimension save one.

Thus compared with whites, male unemployment in 2015 was 34% greater for Latinos while female employment was 11% lower. Likewise the median Latino income was only 62% of median white income and the share of homeowners is only 49% of that observed among whites. Only with respect to home value did Latinos fare well in comparison to whites, with a median value some 14% above that of whites in 2015. This small difference in average home value is not enough to offset the huge differential in home ownership thereby putting Latinos at a clear disadvantage in attempting to build wealth through accumulation of home equity.

In its report on the integration of immigrants in the United States, the National Academy of Sciences identified legal status and race as the two factors most important in determining the prospects for socioeconomic mobility and integration within U.S. society (Waters and Pineau 2015). Whereas in other regions dominated by Mexicans (and to a lesser extent Central Americans) Latinos display a rather high percentage undocumented and legal status plays a large role in determining socioeconomic status, in the Northeast race appears to be relatively more important than legal status. Although legal status may constitute a significant barrier for the advancement of Mexicans and Central Americans in the region, Puerto Ricans are all citizens, and Dominicans, South Americans, Cubans, and Other Latinos are overwhelmingly either legal resident aliens or U.S. citizens. In short, race looms large in determining outcomes among Latinos in the Northeast, given that a majority trace their origins to the Caribbean and are of partial African ancestry. Unfortunately skin color stratification continues to operate as a powerful force in determining the social and spatial status of Latinos in the northeastern United States.

REFERENCES

- Acosta-Belen, Edna, and Carlos E. Santiago. 2006. *Puerto Ricans in the United States: A Contemporary Portrait*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Center for Migration Studies. 2017. *State-Level Unauthorized Population and Eligible-to-Naturalize Estimates*. New York: Center for Migration Studies. Accessed on 3/22/17 at <http://data.cmsny.org/>.
- Denton, Nancy A., and Douglas S. Massey. 1989. "'Racial Identity among Caribbean Hispanics: The Effect of Double Minority Status on Residential Segregation.'" *American Sociological Review* 54:790-808.
- Intrator, Jake, Jonathan Tannen, and Douglas S. Massey. 2016. "Segregation by Race and Income in the United States 1970-2010." *Social Science Research* 60:445-60.
- Massey, Douglas S. 1990. "American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass." *American Journal of Sociology* 95:1153-88.
- Massey, Douglas S., and Brooks Bitterman. 1985. "Explaining the Paradox of Puerto Rican Segregation." *Social Forces* 64:306-331.
- Massey, Douglas S., and Stefanie Brodmann. 2014. *Spheres of Influence: The Social Ecology of Racial and Class Inequality*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Massey, Douglas S., and Nancy A. Denton. 1988. "The Dimensions of Residential Segregation." *Social Forces* 67:281-315.
- _____. 1989. "Hypersegregation in U.S. Metropolitan Areas: Black and Hispanic
- _____. 1993. *American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

- Massey, Douglas S., and Jonathan Tannen. 2015. "A Research Note on Trends in Black Hypersegregation." *Demography* 52:1025-1034.
- Pettigrew, Thomas. 1979. "Racial Change and Social Policy." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 441:114-31.
- Quillian, Lincoln. 2012. "Segregation and Poverty Concentration: The Role of Three Segregations." *American Sociological Review* 77: 354-379, 2012
- Rothwell, Jonathan, and Douglas S. Massey. 2015. "Geographic Effects on Intergenerational Income Mobility." *Economic Geography* 91(1): 83-106.
- Rugh, Jacob S., and Douglas S. Massey. 2014. "Segregation in Post-Civil Rights America: Stalled Integration or End of the Segregated Century?" *The DuBois Review: Social Science Research on Race* 11:202-232
- Sampson, Robert J. 2012. *Great American City: Chicago and the Enduring Neighborhood Effect*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Sharkey, Patrick. 2013. *Stuck in Place: Urban Neighborhoods and the End of Progress Toward Racial Equality*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Waters, Mary C. and Marisa G. Pineau. 2015. *The Integration of Immigrants into American Society*. Washington, DC: National Academies Press.

FIGURES







Figure 2. Latino Percentage in the Northeast 1970-2010










Figure 6. Racial Identity of Latinos in the Northeast 1970-2015




Figure 7. Regional Origins of Latinos in the Northeast 1970-2015





Figure 8. Percentage of foreign born Latino subgroups in the Northeast who arrived in prior five years 1970-2015



**Figure 9. Percent Foreign Born among Latino subgroups in the Northeast
1970-2015**




Figure 10. Generational composition of Latinos in the Northeast 1970-2015




Figure 11. Percent of Latino subgroups in the Northeast speaking Spanish at home 1970-2015





Figure 12. Percent U.S. Citizens among Latino subgroups in the Northeast 1970-2015






Figure 14. Percent of registered Latino subgroup voters in the Northeast who voted during presidential election years 1996-2012




Figure 15. Educational attainment of Latinos in the Northeast 1970-2015




Figure 16. Percent of college graduates among Latino subgroups in the Northeast 1970-2015





Figure 17. Labor force status of Latino males in the Northeast 1970-2015






Figure 19. Male unemployment rates for Latino subgroups in the Northeast 1970-2015





Figure 20. Female employment rate for Latino subgroups in the Northeast 1970-2010







Figure 22. Average income of Latinos in the Northeast 1970-2015






Figure 24. Poverty rates for Latino subgroups in the Northeast 1970-2015






Figure 25. Percent of homeowners among Latino subgroups in Northeast 1970-2015



**Figure 26. Average value of homes owned by Latinos in the Northeast
1970-2015**



**Figure 27. Median home value for Latino subgroups in the Northeast
1970-2015**




Figure 28. Latino-white segregation in selected northeastern metropolitan areas and average segregation across 15 areas 1970-2010





Figure 29. Spatial isolation of Latinos in four northeastern metropolitan areas and average isolation across 15 areas 1970-2010






Figure 31. Levels of Latino segregation, isolation, and poverty concentration in 15 metropolitan areas 2010




Figure 32. Latino-white segregation by quintile of household income




Figure 33. Latino segregation in cities and suburbs of selected metropolitan area and average across 15 areas




Figure 34. Segregation for native and foreign born Latinos in metropolitan areas and averages across 15 areas




Figure 35. Latino segregation by self-reported race in selected metropolitan areas and average segregation levels in 15 areas




Figure 36. Effect of Selected variables on the level of Latino-white segregation across northeastern metropolitan areas.




Figure 37. Ratio of Latino to white socioeconomic status on key indicators in 2015

