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Persistent Stochastic Shocks in a New Keynesian Model with Uncertainty

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Persistent Stochastic Shocks in a New Keynesian Model with Uncertainty*

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Abstract

Both from theoretical and practical viewpoints, I argue that the New Keynesian model’s forward-looking IS curve should be derived by quadratic approximation. This leaves uncertainty in the basic three-equation model. After adding exogenous AR(1) processes, I examine the results by numerical simulation. First, I derive a reduced-form solution for the nominal rate of interest which describes the equilibrium behavior under optimal discretion. Focusing on the persistence parameter, the equilibrium will be simulated and compared to the model version containing the certainty equivalence. In a next step, impulse response functions show the adjustments over time after a cost shock. As a result, accounting for uncertainty can lead to lower interest rates of roughly 25 basis points compared to the case without uncertainty.

JEL Codes: E12, E17, E43, E47, E52.

Keywords: Impulse Response, New Keynesian Model, Persistent Stochastic Shocks, Quadratic Approximation, Simulation, Uncertainty.

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1 Introduction

The objective of this paper is to examine a dynamic general equilibrium condition out of a basic three-equation New Keynesian model (NKM), augmented with stochastic terms and non-linearity. More precisely, the additive terms behave like persistent stochastic shocks and are modeled as an exogenous first-order autoregressive process. In line with the literature (see, among others, the textbooks by Gali 2015 and Walsh 2010), cost shock and demand shock are utilized for the New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC) and the forward-looking IS curve respectively. Non-linearity enters the model through a second-order Taylor approximation regarding the IS curve. Bauer and Neuenkirch (2015) were the first to derive such a framework and found empirical evidence that central banks indeed take the resulting uncertainty into account. Moreover, their paper provides strong arguments that linear macroeconomic models are a shortcoming in the scientific literature.

The method chosen in order to extend the IS curve completes the approach of including quadratic approximation in all derived equations. First, in the analytical part, demand and supply side (including monopolistic competition and price rigidity) will yield the NKPC, where firms use second-order approximation when setting the prices. Second, from the households’ Euler equation follows the forward-looking IS curve which differs fundamentally from standard approaches. Third, the central bank’s optimization under discretion ends in a (standard) targeting rule originating in a (quadratic) welfare optimization concerning output gap and inflation rate.

The main contribution of this paper is to analyze how the economy evolves after shocks and to what extent persistence plays a role. After adding AR(1) processes to the derived equations, conditional expectations and variances can be substituted by solving forward. Next, parameter values are selected for the resulting equilibrium condition (or instrument rule) with the focus on persistence and shock strength. A numerical simulation analyzes differences to the basic model. Finally, to examine the adjustment of macro variables in the medium term, impulse responses are carried out and contrasted to the linear counterpart.\footnote{To keep the framework easily understandable, government, investments, money supply, and labor markets are omitted. Consequently, neither money holdings nor working hours (or leisure time) will enter the households’ utility function.}

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 derives a basic version of the NKM augmented with a quadratic IS curve. Section 3 expands this model with shocks and discusses the resulting equilibrium condition. Section 4
carries out the numerical simulation of both the equilibrium condition and the more dynamic view of an impulse response analysis. Section 5 concludes.

2 New Keynesian Model with Uncertainty

2.1 New Keynesian Phillips Curve

For deriving the NKPC, two optimization problems concerning private households and firms are employed, leading to aggregated demand and supply. Furthermore, price rigidity is modeled through the method introduced by Calvo (1983). The time index $t$ is only used from the Calvo Pricing section onwards, where it is needed to make a distinction between the different periods.

Demand and Supply Side

Consumers. On the demand side, the representative consumer can choose from a variety of goods $C_\xi$ which results in an aggregate consumption of $C$. Usually, the CES function is used to model monopolistic competition, one of the two market frictions incorporated into the NKPC:

$$
C = \left( \int_0^1 C_\xi^{\frac{\varepsilon-1}{\varepsilon}} d\xi \right)^{\frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon-1}}.
$$

Here, $\xi \in [0, 1]$ can be viewed as a continuum of firms from 0 to 100%. The exponent is a measure for the substitutability between the goods $C_\xi$, where $\varepsilon$ represents the elasticity of substitution.

A Hicksian-like optimization by means of the Lagrangian function helps to solve for the demand curve:

$$
\mathcal{L}(C_\xi, \lambda) = \int_0^1 P_\xi \cdot C_\xi \, d\xi - \lambda \left( \left( \int_0^1 C_\xi^{\frac{\varepsilon-1}{\varepsilon}} d\xi \right)^{\frac{1}{\varepsilon-1}} - C \right).
$$

Since firms have pricing power, the representative consumer takes prices $P_\xi$ as given. Minimizing expenditures $\int P_\xi C_\xi$ with the constraint of a certain consumption

\footnote{Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) developed this approach. However, they used a discrete sum and no integral but received the same results.}
level $C$ requires the following first-order conditions:\footnote{Note that $\tau$ denotes a continuum of derivatives.}

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial C_\tau} = P_\tau - \lambda C_\tau^{-\frac{1}{\epsilon}} \left( \int_0^1 C_{\xi}^{\frac{1}{\epsilon-1}} \, d\xi \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\epsilon}} = 0. \quad (3)$$

Differentiating with respect to $\lambda$ provides the constraint, Eq. (1). Rearranging\footnote{See Appendix A.1 for the missing steps in this paragraph.} condition (3) and defining $\lambda \equiv P^5$ as the aggregated price level yields

$$C_\tau = \left( \frac{P}{P_\tau} \right)^\epsilon C, \quad (4)$$

the demand for good $i$. Substituting this in Eq. (1) and rearranging gives the formula

$$P = \left( \int_0^1 P_\xi^{1-\epsilon} \, d\xi \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\epsilon}}, \quad (5)$$

which describes the aggregated price level. The lack of investment and governmental spendings in this model leads to $Y_\tau = C_\tau$. Each firms’ production $Y_\tau$ will be consumed completely by private households and hence $Y = C$.

**Firms.** Each firm takes the aggregated demand function and the aggregated price level $P$ as given since any single firm is too small to directly influence other prices or productions. It chooses its own price $P_\tau$ and faces the typical (real) profit maximization problem

$$\max_{P_\tau, Y_\tau} \left\{ \frac{P_\tau Y_\tau}{P} - K(Y_\tau) \right\} \quad (6)$$

with the cost function $K(.)$. Using Eq. (4), the first-order condition is straightforward and leads\footnote{See Appendix A.2 for the missing steps.} to

$$P^*_\tau = \left( \frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon - 1} \right) K'(Y_\tau) \cdot P, \quad (7)$$

an important result that states that the optimal price $P^*_\tau$ equals the nominal marginal costs and a mark-up bigger than one for all $\epsilon > 1$. Log-linearizing\footnote{Note that lower case letters denote the log value of a variable in capital letters minus their long-run log value, e.g. $y = \ln(Y) - \ln(Y_{ss})$.} and using that the long-run marginal costs equal the multiplicative inverse of the firms’
mark-up ($K_{ss} = 1 - \varepsilon^{-1}$) yields

$$p^*_\tau - p = \gamma y_\tau, \tag{8}$$

where $\gamma$ is a parameter for the long-run cost elasticity and therefore log deviations of marginal costs from their long-run trend are assumed to be linear.\(^8\) Inserting the log-version of Eq.(4) gives

$$p^*_\tau - p = \left(\frac{\gamma}{1 + \gamma \varepsilon}\right) y. \tag{9}$$

Making use of $\hat{y}$, the GDP growth rate around the steady state, as an approximation for $y$ and using $\alpha_\gamma \in [0, 1]$ as a summarizing parameter, Eq.(9) yields

$$p^*_\tau - p = \alpha_\gamma \hat{y}, \tag{10}$$

a description of the steady state output growth rate, depending on price growth and microeconomic behavior. The next section introduces a non-optimal price setting scheme which replicates the actual observed economic patterns.\(^9\)

**Calvo Pricing**

Nominal rigidities as the second market friction in the basic NKM are implemented through the assumption that the firms’ infrequent price adjustment follows an exogenous Poisson process,\(^10\) where all firms have a constant probability ($\phi$) to be unable to update their price in each period with $\phi \in [0, 1]$ (i.e., $\phi = 0$ in the absence of price rigidity). It is crucial that price setters do not know how long the nominal price will remain in place. Only the expected value is known due to probabilities that are all equal and constant for all firms and periods. This implies a probability of $\phi^j$ for having the same price in $j$ periods as today and so the average expected duration between price changes will be $1/(1 - \phi)$.\(^11\)

From now on, the time index $t$ will be used, as more than one period is being

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\(^8\)See Appendix A.3 for the missing steps.

\(^9\)See the survey by Taylor (1999), that came to abundant evidence. See also Gali (2015, 7–8) for a literature overview.

\(^10\)Calvo (1983) originally wrote his article in continuous time. However, using discrete periods immensely helps the clearness and is more realistic with regard to how firms actually operate. Moreover, Calvo (1983, 396–397) shows the equivalence of both approaches.

\(^11\)See Appendix A.4 for proof.
considered. Simultaneously, the firm index \( \tau \) is no longer important since it is sufficient to calculate with a share of firms \( \phi \) (or \( 1 - \phi \)). Hence, \( p^*_\tau \equiv p^*_t \) and \( p \equiv p_t \). When \( x_t \) is the price that firms will set in period \( t \) (provided they are able to do so), the following will apply:

\[
x_t = \frac{p_t - \phi p_{t-1}}{1 - \phi} \Rightarrow E_t x_{t+1} = \frac{E_t p_{t+1} - \phi p_t}{1 - \phi}.
\]

(11)

Firms will act on the probability of not being able to adjust prices in future periods. In consequence, they try to set a price \( x_t \) that is not necessarily the optimal price \( p^*_t \), derived in the previous section. Also, in the presence of price rigidities, \( x_t \neq p^*_t \) generally holds.

To reveal the mechanics behind the staggered price setting, it is convenient to verbally treat \( p_t \) and \( x_t \) as level variables. Strictly speaking, the firms set price growth paths in the following optimization problem rather than maximizing a discounted profit as the difference between revenue and costs.\(^\text{12}\) In the present way, the optimal reset price, determined by the discounted sum of future profits, is derived through a quadratic approximation of the per-period deviation from maximum-possible profit with \( \beta \in [0, 1] \), the discount factor over an infinite planning horizon. Therefore, firms minimize their loss function, the discounted deviations from \( p^*_t \) over all \( t \):

\[
\min_{x_t} \left\{ E_t \left[ k \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \beta^j \phi^j (x_t - p^*_t + j)^2 \right] \right\}.
\]

(12)

The parameter \( k > 0 \) enters the loss function multiplicatively and indicates all exogenous factors that will influence the costs of not setting the optimal price in each period.\(^\text{13}\) The first-order condition is

\[
\frac{\partial}{\partial x_t} = E_t \left[ 2k \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} (\beta \phi)^j (x_t - p^*_t + j) \right] = 0.
\]

(13)

After rearranging\(^\text{14}\) and expressing \( x \) through \( p \) with Eq. (11), it follows

\[
p_t - \phi p_{t-1} = \beta \phi (E_t p_{t+1} - \phi p_t) + (1 - \phi)(1 - \beta \phi)p^*_t,
\]

(14)

---

\(^\text{12}\)See Walsh (2010, 241–242) for the use of level variables in Calvo pricing.

\(^\text{13}\)Note that it can also come up as an additive term or any other positive monotonic transformation and does not alter the results.

\(^\text{14}\)See Appendix A.5 for the missing steps.
that only contains parameters and variants of the variable \( p \). Expressing \( p \) through \( \pi \) as well as isolating \((p^*_t - p_t)\) and replacing it with the result from last section, Eq.(10), gives

\[
\pi_t = \beta E_t \pi_{t+1} + \frac{\alpha_s(1 - \phi)(1 - \beta \phi)}{\phi} \hat{y}_t .
\] (15)

In a final step, a summarizing parameter \( \kappa > 0 \) for all parameters, multiplied with \( \hat{y}_t \), will be defined to end up in the NKPC:

\[
\pi_t = \beta E_t \pi_{t+1} + \kappa \hat{y}_t .
\] (16)

Both the expected inflation rate \( E_t \pi_{t+1} \) and the GDP growth rate around the steady state \( \hat{y}_t \) (or output gap) have a positive impact on \( \pi_t \) since \( \beta, \kappa > 0 \). Moreover, the slope of the NKPC (\( \kappa \)), depends on all four parameters (\( \beta, \gamma, \varepsilon, \) and \( \phi \)) of this section.\(^{16}\)

### 2.2 The Quadratic IS Curve

The objective is to derive an Euler equation via maximizing utility with a dynamic budget constraint. Initially, it is not necessary to formulate an explicit utility function. On the contrary, the general marginal utility gives a better insight into the intertemporal mechanics. Only one specific assumption will be made, namely not considering money, working hours or any other possible utility-gainer. It solely relies on consumption and thus households maximize their intertemporal discounted utility

\[
\max_{C_t} \left\{ E_t \sum_{s=t}^{\infty} \beta^{s-t} U(C_s) \right\} .
\] (17)

Taking an intertemporal budget contraint with prices and the interest rate \( i_t \) into account, the maximization problem leads\(^{17}\) to the Euler equation

\[
U'(C_t) = \beta(1 + i_t) \frac{P_t}{E_t[P_{t+1}]} E_t[U'(C_{t+1})] ,
\] (18)

\[ p_t - P_{t-1} = \ln P_t - \ln P_{ss} - (\ln P_{t-1} - \ln P_{ss}) = \ln \left( \frac{P_t}{P_{t-1}} \right) = \ln(1 + \pi_t) \approx \pi_t . \]

\(^{15}\)See Appendix A.6 for a more detailed analysis of \( \kappa \). Depending on the exact model, the slope of the NKPC can have a slightly different meaning, e.g. Walsh (2010, 336) uses a measure for the firm’s real marginal costs instead of the output gap.

\(^{16}\)See Appendix A.7 for the missing steps.
revealing the intertemporal relationship of the marginal utility out of consumption. Marginal utility in period $t$ equals the counterpart in $t+1$, corrected by discount factor, nominal interest rate, and the ratio of current and expected future price level. Assuming $i_t$ rises, marginal utility in $t$ would also rise relative to period $t+1$. Given the diminishing marginal utility property and therefore concavity, consumption will be higher in the future.\textsuperscript{18}

One convenient formulation for such a function is $U(C_t) = (1 - \sigma)^{-1} \cdot (C_t^{1-\sigma} - 1)$ with $\sigma > 0$ implying $1/\sigma$ as the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES). Substituting this in the Euler equation gives

$$Y_t^{-\sigma} = \beta(1 + i_t) \frac{P_t}{E_t[P_{t+1}]} E_t[Y_{t+1}^{-\sigma}],$$

(19)

when recalling the market clearing condition $Y = C$. The long-run real interest rate enters the equation through $\beta$ since it equals $1/\beta - 1$.\textsuperscript{19}

**Quadratic Approximation.** Eq.(19) can be prepared for quadratic approximation when inserting $1/(1 + r)$ for $\beta$, treating $t$-measurable variables as constants for the conditional expectation, rearranging, and taking logs:

$$\ln \left( \frac{1 + r}{1 + i_t} \right) = \ln E_t \left[ \left( \frac{Y_{t+1}}{Y_t} \right)^{-\sigma} \right] - \ln E_t \left[ \frac{P_{t+1}}{P_t} \right].$$

(20)

Ignoring Jensen’s inequality is equivalent to first-order Taylor series expansions of both logarithm and exponential function. Hence, the right side of Eq.(20) can be written as\textsuperscript{20}

$$\approx E_t \left[ \ln \left( \left( \frac{Y_{t+1}}{Y_t} \right)^{-\sigma} \right) \right] - E_t \left[ \ln \left( \frac{P_{t+1}}{P_t} \right) \right].$$

(21)

and thereby be expressed in growth rates:\textsuperscript{21}

$$E_t[-\sigma \ln(1 + \tilde{y}_{t+1})] - E_t[\ln(1 + \pi_{t+1})].$$

(22)

Instead of linearizing, the logarithm will be represented by a second-degree poly-

\textsuperscript{18}Note that present consumption could also increase because of the income effect.

\textsuperscript{19}The relation follows from the steady state Euler equation. See Galí (2015, 132) for a more complex definition of the long-term real interest rate.

\textsuperscript{20}See Appendix A.9 for the missing steps.

\textsuperscript{21}Note that the use of the actual GDP growth rate $\tilde{y}_{t+1}$ in Eq.(22) is merely for clarity. See Appendix A.10 and in particular Eq.(A35.3) for the relationship between $\hat{y}_{t+1}$ and $\tilde{y}_{t+1}$. 

8
nominal\textsuperscript{22} and only at this point the approximation steps in concerning output and price level:

\[
\approx E_t \left[ -\sigma \left( \widetilde{y}_{t+1} - \frac{1}{2} \widetilde{y}_{t+1}^2 \right) \right] - E_t \left[ \pi_{t+1} - \frac{1}{2} \pi_{t+1}^2 \right] \tag{23.1}
\]

\[
= -\sigma E_t \widetilde{y}_{t+1} + \frac{\sigma}{2} E_t \widetilde{y}_{t+1}^2 - E_t \pi_{t+1} + \frac{1}{2} E_t \pi_{t+1}^2 \tag{23.2}
\]

\[
= \sigma \widetilde{y}_t - \sigma E_t \widetilde{y}_{t+1} + \frac{\sigma}{2} E_t \widetilde{y}_{t+1}^2 - E_t \pi_{t+1} + \frac{1}{2} E_t \pi_{t+1}^2. \tag{23.3}
\]

Bringing together the linearized form of the left side in Eq.(20) yields the quadratic IS curve:

\[
\hat{y}_t = E_t \widetilde{y}_{t+1} - \frac{1}{\sigma} (i_t - r - E_t \pi_{t+1}) - \frac{1}{2\sigma} E_t \pi_{t+1}^2 - \frac{1}{2} E_t \widetilde{y}_{t+1}^2. \tag{24}
\]

Referring to the original graphical IS relation (in the $\hat{y}/i$–space), the curve shifts to the right if the long-term real interest rate $r$, the output gap expectations $E_t \widetilde{y}_{t+1}$ or the inflation expectations $E_t \pi_{t+1}$ rise. However, the slope will rise and the curve becomes flatter if the intertemporal elasticity of substitution $(1/\sigma)$ rises. The second-order terms have a negative effect on $\hat{y}_t$. However, Eq.(24) is not in reduced-form since the last term still contains $\hat{y}_t$. The formula for the conditional variance,\textsuperscript{23} can be utilized to show the second moments’ influence in detail:

\[
\hat{y}_t = E_t \widetilde{y}_{t+1} - \frac{1}{\sigma} (i_t - r - E_t \pi_{t+1}) - \frac{1}{2\sigma} E_t \pi_{t+1}^2 - \frac{1}{2} E_t \widetilde{y}_{t+1}^2 - \frac{1}{2\sigma} (E_t \pi_{t+1})^2 - \frac{1}{2} (E_t \widetilde{y}_{t+1})^2. \tag{25}
\]

In a first step, looking only at the variances\textsuperscript{24} and solving for the interest rate yields

\[
i_t = -\sigma \hat{y}_t + r + E_t \pi_{t+1} + \sigma E_t \widetilde{y}_{t+1} - \frac{1}{2} V a r_t \pi_{t+1} - \frac{\sigma}{2} V a r_t \widetilde{y}_{t+1} - \ldots, \tag{26}
\]

which states that uncertainty would shift the curve to the left compared to the original IS curve. Considering the second moment, there are two additional effects,

\textsuperscript{22}See Appendix A.11 for more detail.

\textsuperscript{23}The following applies for a random variable $z$:

\[
V a r_t z_{t+1} = E_t z_{t+1}^2 - (E_t z_{t+1})^2 \iff E_t z_{t+1}^2 = (E_t z_{t+1})^2 + V a r_t z_{t+1}.
\]

\textsuperscript{24}Note that $V a r_t (\hat{y}_{t+1}) \approx V a r_t (\hat{y}_{t+1} - \hat{y}_t) = V a r_t \hat{y}_{t+1}$ because $\hat{y}_t$ is $t$-measurable and constants (in period $t$) do not affect $V a r_t$.  

namely expected output gap growth affects the slope and also a variation of the curve’s shape. That is because the last term of Eq.(25) contains \( \hat{y}_t \) and \( \hat{y}_t^2 \):

\[
-\frac{1}{2}(E_t\hat{y}_{t+1} - \hat{y}_t)^2 = -\frac{1}{2}(E_t\hat{y}_{t+1})^2 + E_t\hat{y}_{t+1} \cdot \hat{y}_t - \frac{1}{2}\hat{y}_t^2.
\]  

(27)

Inserting everything in Eq.(26) gives

\[
i_t = -\frac{\sigma}{2}\hat{y}_t^2 + (\sigma E_t\hat{y}_{t+1} - \sigma)\hat{y}_t + r + E_t\hat{\pi}_{t+1} + \sigma E_t\hat{y}_{t+1} - \frac{1}{2}Var_t\hat{\pi}_{t+1} - \frac{\sigma}{2}Var_t\hat{y}_{t+1} - \frac{1}{2}(E_t\hat{\pi}_{t+1})^2 - \frac{\sigma}{2}(E_t\hat{y}_{t+1})^2.
\]  

(28)

Larger values for \( E_t\hat{y}_{t+1} \) result in a (slightly) flatter IS curve and vice versa. Figure 1 illustrates the shift, the different slope, and the quadratic form.

**Figure 1:** 1. Shift of the locus and a change in the slope (for \( E_t\hat{y}_{t+1} > 0 \)). 2. The quadratic form.

In the quadratic IS formula, \( \sigma \) is the only parameter besides \( r \). When examining the effects of a variation in \( \sigma \) on the derived curve, it is useful to recapitulate the meaning of \( 1/\sigma \). The IES measures the strength of the relationship between \( i_t \) and \( \hat{y}_{t+1}/\hat{y}_t \) (also \( y_{t+1}/y_t \) and \( C_{t+1}/C_t \)). A positive IES implies a positive relationship. Also, if \( i_t \) rises, there is a negative effect on \( \hat{y}_t \) due to the substitution effect. If the
IES increases (decreases) the relationship gets stronger (weaker) and the IS curve’s slope should be flatter (steeper). Hence, increasing $\sigma$ should lead to a steeper IS curve. The effect is indeed a more concave and steeper curve. Additionally, it shifts to the left (right) if the uncertainty is relatively high (low) in comparison to the expected values.

2.3 Targeting Rule under Discretion

The central bank takes NKPC and IS curve as given and wants to optimally set the interest rate for period $t$. Therefore, the central bank’s targeting rule will be derived by minimizing the discounted loss function over all periods\(^{25}\)

$$
\min_{\pi_t, \hat{y}_t} \left\{ E_t \left[ \sum_{s=t}^{\infty} \beta^{s-t} \left( (\pi_s - \pi^*)^2 + \delta \hat{y}_s^2 \right) \right] \right\}
$$

resulting in the standard targeting rule under discretion:\(^{26}\)

$$
\delta \hat{y}_t = -\kappa \pi_t \iff \hat{y}_t = -\frac{\kappa}{\delta} \pi_t.
$$

Every difference between the inflation rate and the central bank’s target $\pi^*$ results in a loss.\(^{27}\) Also, every output gap leads to a loss but is reduced by a weighting factor $\delta$, normally smaller than one. Squaring ensures that higher deviations yield disproportionately higher losses and the optimized variables will not vanish in the derivatives. Moreover, it makes the loss function symmetrical.\(^{28}\)

Although the optimal interest rate is not explicitly given, all relationships between the macroeconomic variables are derived. The process is as follows: the nominal interest rate has an effect on the output gap (IS curve), which in consequence affects the inflation rate (NKPC). Furthermore, Eq.(30), the “leaning against the wind” condition, implies a countercyclical monetary policy, that is, to stabilize prices and eventually contract the economy. The degree of this contraction increases in $\kappa$ and decreases in $\delta$, the weight on output stabilization.

Finally, (16), (25), and (30) can lead to a forward-looking Taylor type rule (with

\(^{25}\)The loss function can be derived by a second order approximation of the households’ welfare loss, first introduced by Rotemberg and Woodford (1999, 54–61). It can also be found in the textbooks by Galí (2015), Walsh (2010), and Woodford (2003b).

\(^{26}\)See Appendix A.12 for the missing steps.

\(^{27}\)Note that $\pi^* = 0$ as it does not change the essential findings.

\(^{28}\)See Nobay and Peel (2003, 661) for an asymmetric loss function (Linex form) that becomes quadratic in a special case.
uncertainty added). Plugging (30) into (16) gives

$$\frac{-\delta}{\kappa} \hat{y}_t = \beta E_t \pi_{t+1} + \kappa \hat{y}_t \quad \Leftrightarrow \quad \hat{y}_t = \frac{-\kappa}{\delta + \kappa^2} \cdot \beta E_t \pi_{t+1},$$

(31)

which can be utilized for (25):

$$i_t = r + \left(1 + \frac{\beta \kappa \sigma}{\delta + \kappa^2}\right) E_t \pi_{t+1} + \sigma E_t \hat{y}_{t+1} - \frac{1}{2} \operatorname{Var}_t \pi_{t+1} - \frac{\sigma}{2} \operatorname{Var}_t \hat{y}_{t+1}
\hspace{1cm}- \frac{1}{2} (E_t \pi_{t+1})^2 - \frac{\sigma}{2} (E_t \hat{y}_{t+1} - \hat{y}_t)^2.$$

(32)

When examining the coefficients on first and second moments, the parameters $\beta$, $\delta$, $\kappa$, and $\sigma$ have to be taken into account. Larger values for $\beta$ and $\kappa^{29}$ increase the weight on expected inflation, whereas larger values for $\sigma$ increase the weight on expected inflation, as well as expectation and uncertainty concerning the output gap growth. Following Bauer and Neuenkirch (2015), the squared expected inflation rate and the squared expected output gap growth rate should not be overinterpreted here, as it takes very small values for advanced economies.

The difference to conventionally derived Taylor rules ultimately lies in the negative variance term that Bauer and Neuenkirch (2015, 15–17) empirically confirmed for uncertainty in future inflation rates where central banks lower the interest rate for higher values of $\operatorname{Var}_t \pi_{t+1}$. Branch (2014, 1042–1044) also adds variances in an empirical model for a Taylor rule. He estimates negative coefficients with a more significant (and more negative) value for the coefficient on the inflation variance.

The NKPC, the IS curve, and the targeting rule were all derived by second-order approximations. However, this implements uncertainty only in the IS curve since $P_{t+1}$ and $Y_{t+1}$ are non-$t$-measurable. Thus, besides the IS’ quadratic terms, all derivations follow standard approaches.

3 Persistent Shocks and Equilibrium Condition

This section adds stochastic terms to the derived curves and solves these forward to a reduced form solution for the nominal interest rate.

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29 The increasing relationship holds for $\delta = 0.25$ (independent of $\beta$ and $\sigma$) if $\kappa < 0.5$, which can be assumed (see Appendix A.15).
3.1 Adding Persistent Stochastic Shocks

Given the possibility that unforeseen events might interrupt the normal economic process (e.g., inventions, cold winters, higher oil prices, wars), stochastic shocks can be added to the existing relationships. The realistic feature of a certain duration of the event that will dwindle over time can be modelled by means of stationary AR(1) processes:

\[ e_t = \mu e_{t-1} + \zeta_t, \]  
\[ u_t = \nu u_{t-1} + \eta_t. \]  

(33.1)  
(33.2)

The coefficients on the shocks in period \((t - 1)\), \(\mu, \nu \in [0, 1]\), declare the percentage impact of shocks that carries over to the subsequent period. Additional assumptions are normally distributed error terms with an expected value equal to zero, that is, \(\zeta_t \sim N(0, \sigma^2_e)\) and \(\eta_t \sim N(0, \sigma^2_u)\), which are also serially uncorrelated.

Adding Eq.(33.1) to the NKPC, Eq.(16), can be described as a cost shock, a cost-push shock or an inflation shock and adding Eq.(33.2) to the IS curve, Eq.(25), indicates a taste shock, a demand shock or fluctuations in the flexible-price equilibrium output level (Walsh 2010, 352):

\[ \pi_t = \beta E_t \pi_{t+1} + \kappa \hat{y}_t + e_t, \]  
\[ \hat{y}_t = E_t \hat{y}_{t+1} - \frac{1}{\sigma} (i_t - r - E_t \pi_{t+1}) - \frac{1}{2\sigma} E_t \pi_{t+1}^2 - \frac{1}{2} E_t \hat{y}_{t+1}^2 + u_t. \]  

(34.1)  
(34.2)

3.2 Equilibrium Condition

A standard approach is chosen to substitute expectations through forward solving. Inserting the targeting rule (30) into the stochastic NKPC yields

\[ \pi_t = \beta E_t \pi_{t+1} - \frac{\kappa^2}{\delta} \pi_t + e_t \iff \pi_t = \frac{\beta \delta}{\delta + \kappa^2} E_t \pi_{t+1} + \frac{\delta}{\delta + \kappa^2} e_t. \]  

(35)

Devising the same formula for \(t + 1\) and substituting \(\pi_{t+1}\) gives

\[ \pi_t = \frac{\beta \delta}{\delta + \kappa^2} E_t \left[ \frac{\beta \delta}{\delta + \kappa^2} E_{t+1} [\pi_{t+2}] + \frac{\delta}{\delta + \kappa^2} e_{t+1} \right] + \frac{\delta}{\delta + \kappa^2} e_t. \]  

(36)

\[ ^{30}\text{For instance Clarida et al (2000, 170) are also assuming a stationary AR(1) process in the context of a NKM.} \]

\[ ^{31}\text{See Galí (2015, 128) for a further discussion of cost shocks, the type that is will be most important throughout the remainder of the paper.} \]
With $E_t[E_{t+n}[^\pi]] = E_t[^\pi]$ and $E_t[^e_{t+n}] = \mu^n e_t$, future expectations and shocks will leave the equation:

$$\pi_t = \left(\frac{\beta \delta}{\delta + \kappa^2}\right)^2 E_t[^\pi_{t+2}] + \beta \delta \mu \frac{\delta}{\delta + \kappa^2} e_t + \frac{\delta}{\delta + \kappa^2} e_t. \tag{37}$$

After $(n - 1)$ iterations, the equation converts to

$$\pi_t = \left(\frac{\beta \delta}{\delta + \kappa^2}\right)^n E_t[^\pi_{t+n}] + \frac{\delta}{\delta + \kappa^2} e_t \sum_{j=0}^{n-1} \left(\frac{\beta \delta \mu}{\delta + \kappa^2}\right)^j. \tag{38}$$

Developing $n$ towards infinity and making use of the formula for the infinite geometric series leaves parameters and the cost shock only:

$$\pi_t = \frac{\delta}{\delta + \kappa^2} e_t \cdot \frac{\delta + \kappa^2}{\delta + \kappa^2 - \beta \delta \mu}. \tag{39}$$

Rearranging and setting $\theta = (\kappa^2 + (1 - \beta \mu) \delta)^{-1}$ as auxiliary parameter results in the equilibrium conditions$^{32}$ for $\pi_t$ and $\hat{y}_t$:

$$\pi_t = \frac{\delta}{\kappa^2 + (1 - \beta \mu) \delta} \cdot e_t = \delta \theta e_t \tag{40.1}$$

and

$$\hat{y}_t = \frac{-\kappa}{\kappa^2 + (1 - \beta \mu) \delta} \cdot e_t = -\kappa \theta e_t. \tag{40.2}$$

Determine the expectation values$^{33}$ analogously:

$$E_t[^\pi_{t+1}] = \delta \theta E_t[^e_{t+1}] = \delta \mu \theta e_t \tag{41.1}$$

and

$$E_t[\hat{y}_{t+1}] = -\kappa \theta E_t[^e_{t+1}] = -\kappa \mu \theta e_t. \tag{41.2}$$

**Solution without Uncertainty**

In a first step, I solve for the target interest rate

$$i_t = r - \sigma \hat{y}_t + \sigma E_t[^\hat{y}_{t+1}] + E_t[^\pi_{t+1}] + \sigma u_t, \tag{42}$$

which can be rewritten with the equilibrium conditions (40.2), (41.1), and (41.2):

$^{32}$See also Clarida et al (1999, 1680) for a comparison of these results to those under commitment.

$^{33}$$E_t[^e_{t+1}] = E_t [\mu e_t + \zeta_{t+1}] = \mu E_t[e_t] + E_{t}[^\zeta_{t+1}] + \mu e_t$. 

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\[ i_t = r + \sigma \kappa \theta e_t - \sigma \kappa \mu \theta e_t + \delta \mu \theta e_t + \sigma u_t. \] (43)

Simplifying results in

\[ i_t = r + ((1 - \mu)\sigma \kappa + \mu \delta) \theta e_t + \sigma u_t \] (44)

and finally setting \( \alpha_\mu > 0 \) as a summarizing parameter gives

\[ i_t = r + \alpha_\mu e_t + \sigma u_t, \] (45)

a reduced-form solution for the nominal interest rate that describes the equilibrium behavior under optimal discretion. The central bank’s optimized interest rate in period \( t \) can be expressed through the long-run real interest rate and both shocks which are weighted by a composition of parameters. Since these coefficients are positive, larger shocks correspond to higher interest rates.\(^{34}\) Galí (2015, 133–134) refers to this equation type as instrument rule. In contrast to targeting rules (see Eq. (30), “practical guides for monetary policy”), Eq. (45) is not easy to implement.\(^{35}\) It requires real-time observation of variations in the cost-push shock and the knowledge of the model’s parameters, including the efficient interest rate \( r \).

**Model with Uncertainty**

After including the second order terms however, Eq.(45) will be examined in a theoretical way in order to understand how shocks and persistence correspond to \( i_t \) in the equilibrium.

Basically, the further procedure is solving the IS curve for the interest rate and replacing all variables with shocks. The difference to standard approaches are the quadratic terms, thus lower interest rates should be expected. To start with the expected value of the squared inflation (\( E_t \pi_{t+1}^2 \)), Eq.(40.1) in period \( t + 1 \) gives

\[ \pi_{t+1} = \delta \theta e_{t+1} = \delta \theta (\mu e_t + \zeta_{t+1}), \] (46)

by using the former shock definition with persistence and a normally distributed

\(^{34}\)See also Walsh (2010, 364) for a more detailed discussion.

\(^{35}\)The paper by Svensson and Woodford (2005) discusses the “targeting” vs. “instrument” topic in more detail.
error term. Therefore,

\[ E_t \pi_{t+1}^2 = E_t \left[ (\delta\theta)^2 (\mu e_t + \zeta_{t+1})^2 \right] = (\delta\theta)^2 E_t \left[ \mu^2 e_t^2 + 2\mu e_t \zeta_{t+1} + \zeta_{t+1}^2 \right], \tag{47} \]

where the middle term equals zero, since \( e_t \) can be treated as a constant in \( E_t \) and \( E_t \zeta_{t+1} = 0 \). Inserting the variance, again with Eq.(23), yields

\[ (\delta\theta \mu)^2 e_t^2 + (\delta\theta)^2 \left( \text{Var}_t \zeta_{t+1} + (E_t \zeta_{t+1})^2 \right). \tag{48} \]

The variance is defined as \( \sigma_e^2 \) and hence,

\[ E_t \pi_{t+1}^2 = (\delta\theta)^2 \left( \mu^2 e_t^2 + \sigma_e^2 \right). \tag{49} \]

Doing the same for the expected value of the squared output growth rate, \( E_t \tilde{y}_{t+1} = E_t(\tilde{y}_{t+1} - \hat{y}_t)^2 \), Eq.(40.2) in period \( t+1 \) gives

\[ \mathbf{\tilde{y}}_{t+1} = -\kappa \theta e_{t+1} = -\kappa \theta (\mu e_t + \zeta_{t+1}) \tag{50} \]

and therefore,

\[ E_t(\tilde{y}_{t+1} - \hat{y}_t)^2 = (\kappa \theta)^2 \left( (1 - \mu)^2 e_t^2 + \sigma_e^2 \right). \tag{51} \]

The equilibrium condition under uncertainty is now

\[ i_t = r + \alpha_e e_t - \frac{1}{2} \left( (1 - \mu)^2 \sigma \kappa^2 + \mu^2 \sigma^2 \right) \theta^2 e_t^2 + \left( \sigma \kappa^2 + \sigma^2 \right) \theta^2 \sigma_e^2 + \sigma u_t \tag{52} \]

and finally setting \( \alpha_e > 0 \) and \( \alpha_\sigma > 0 \) as summarizing parameters gives

\[ i_t = r + \alpha_e e_t - \frac{1}{2} \left( \alpha_e e_t^2 + \alpha_\sigma \sigma_e^2 \right) + \sigma u_t, \tag{53} \]

a reduced-form solution for the nominal interest rate that describes the equilibrium behavior under uncertainty.\(^{37}\)

\(^{36}\)Note that the output gap can also be replaced by the inflation rate with the standard targeting rule (30) to obtain the same results. See Appendix A.14 for the missing steps.

\(^{37}\)Going one step further, \( e_t \) and \( u_t \) could be replaced by the error terms:

\[ i_t = r + \alpha_\mu \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \mu^k \zeta_{t-k} - \frac{1}{2} \left( \alpha_e \left( \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \mu^k \zeta_{t-k} \right)^2 + \alpha_\sigma \sigma_e^2 \right) + \sigma \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \nu^k \eta_{t-k}. \]

This visualizes the past (known) shocks that are discounted by \( \mu \) and \( \nu \).
(1999), a negative term and an additional parameter ($\sigma_2^2$) enters the condition. The term entails a generally lower interest rate level. Moreover, a larger cost shock variance also corresponds to lower values for $i_t$, an essential result.  

4 Numerical Simulation

Table 1 shows the baseline (BL) values and the overall range used when taking all simulations into account. Every value is assumed to be obtained on a quarter-yearly basis. In order to cover even extreme scenarios, $e_t$ initially ranges from $-0.5\%$ to $2.5\%$.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>BL Calibration</th>
<th>Applied Range</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\beta$</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>Discount factor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\kappa$</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.01 - 0.25</td>
<td>Slope of the NKPC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma$</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5 - 5</td>
<td>Reciprocal value of the IES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\delta$</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>Weight on output fluctuations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\mu$</td>
<td>0.6 - 0.8</td>
<td>0.6 - 0.85</td>
<td>Cost shock persistence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_e^2$</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.00005 - 0.0005</td>
<td>Cost shock variance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$e_t$</td>
<td>-0.005 - 0.025</td>
<td>-0.005 - 0.025</td>
<td>Cost shock</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$u_t$</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Demand shock</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.1 Equilibrium Condition

In the baseline calibration, as shown in Table 1, $\beta = 0.99$, $\kappa = 0.04$, $\sigma = 1$, $\delta = 0.25$, $\sigma_e^2 = 0.0001$, $\mu$ reaches from 0.6 to 0.8 and $e_t$ from $-0.5\%$ to $2\%$. Since $\nu$ and $\sigma_u^2$ play no role when the central bank acts under discretion, $u_t$ is assumed to be zero. The optimal interest rate would react one-to-one and there would be no gain of further insights.

Figure 2 shows the results for the model with uncertainty with a variety of persistence and cost shock combinations. The interest takes values from $-1.1\%$ to $3.8\%$. The equation in its static form does not directly contain $\nu$ and $\sigma_u^2$. This is due to the simplified targeting rule and the resulting assumption that $\breve{y}$ and $\pi$ can be represented only through cost shocks.

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\[38\] The equation in its static form does not directly contain $\nu$ and $\sigma_u^2$. This is due to the simplified targeting rule and the resulting assumption that $\breve{y}$ and $\pi$ can be represented only through cost shocks.

\[39\] See Appendix A.15 for parameter discussion and literature review.
Figure 2: Corresponding interest rate in the equilibrium condition. Horizontal axes: Persistence \( \mu \) and cost shock \( e_t \). Vertical axis: Interest rate \( i_t \).

To 10.2%. It is assumed that negative interest rates are possible and that the zero lower bound does not represent an obstacle. Central banks can indeed raise a tax on deposits made by commercial banks.\(^{40}\) When the model calibrates negative values for \( i_t \), it could also be interpreted as an unconventional policy (i.e., quantitative easing) by the monetary authorities.\(^{41}\) The lowest interest rates occur hand in hand with highly persistent negative cost shocks, a fairly extreme scenario since the only major developed country to have faced deflationary tendencies over a prolonged period of time is Japan. But even in the latter case, the negative cost shocks were closer to zero. As expected, the highest values come with large cost shocks. For a low persistence, regardless of the shocks, the resulting interest rate varies very little.

Model Comparison

To isolate the partial effect of the parameters, the interest rate differences after subtracting the values with (see Figure 2) and without uncertainty are shown. Due to small interest rate differences, the vertical axis in the following diagrams is scaled in basis points (100 basis points = one percentage point).

Figure 3 gives a broad overview on the effect of uncertainty. There is a significant

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\(^{40}\) The concise paper by Bassetto (2004) derives a framework in which the central bank commits to negative nominal interest rates and discusses the equilibrium condition in such a situation.

\(^{41}\) The Wu-Xia shadow rate does exactly that (see Wu and Xia (2016)) and is negative since mid 2009 for the federal funds rate.
Figure 3: Differences between both cases (with and without uncertainty) in the equilibrium condition. Horizontal axes: Persistence $\mu$ and cost shock $e_t$. Vertical axis: Difference of interest rate $i_t$ in basis points.

Figure 4: Differences between both cases (with and without uncertainty) in the equilibrium condition ($\mu = 0.8$). Horizontal axis: Cost shock $e_t$. Vertical axis: Difference of interest rate $i_t$ in basis points.

amount of persistence/shock combinations that support the estimations by Bauer and Neuenkirch (2015). In particular, highly persistent shocks affect the interest rate outcome in the equilibrium behavior. In this case, the interest rate difference reaches from 10 to 60 basis points. Figure 4 can be understood as a cross section of Figure 3 with $\mu = 0.8$, a realistic assumption when reviewing the literature such as Smets and Wouters (2003). It reveals, as one of the main findings from a theoretical
point of view, that accounting for uncertainty results in lower policy rates, even during tranquil times. A black line is drawn at 25 basis points to show the empirical conclusion by Bauer and Neuenkirch (2015, 21).42

4.2 Impulse Response Analysis

First, I examine the macro variables’ short- and medium-term adjustments in the newly derived framework. In a subsequent step, the latter will be compared to the basic NKM.

Figure 5: Dynamic responses to a cost shock by 100 basis points. Horizontal axes: Timeline in quarters. Vertical axes: Responses of $i_t, e_t, \pi_t, E_t\pi_{t+1}, \hat{y}_t,$ and $E_t\hat{y}_{t+1}$ for $\mu \in \{0.6, 0.7, 0.8\}$ in basis points.

Figure 5 shows the adjustment over time to the steady state in the baseline case (see Table 1). The dashed lines comprise the scenarios of (relatively) high and low

42Note that Bauer and Neuenkirch (2015) have no assumption regarding the level of shock persistence.
persistent shocks. Here, the upper (lower) course corresponds to the high (low) persistence for the nominal interest rate, the shock strength, and the (expected) inflation rate. The opposite is the case with regard to the (expected) output gap. All values adjust normally but with quantitative differences when varying the level of persistence. In the median case, the nominal interest rate has to be raised by almost 2.5% and should then adjust to the steady state (depending on the real interest rate) in a sluggish manner. Inflation rate and output gap follow their respective expectation values. The inflation rate is initially ranged between 2.5% and 5%, and on the other hand, the output gap starts at around −0.5%.

Model Comparison

Similar to Section 4.1 the following graphics show the “gap” in $i_t$ when accounting for uncertainty.

![Flat vs. Steep NKPC](image)

![Low vs. High IES](image)

![High vs. Low Shock Persistence](image)

![High vs. Low Shock Variance](image)

**Figure 6:** Comparing dynamic responses to a cost shock by 100 basis points with $\mu = 0.75$. Horizontal axes: Timeline in quarters. Vertical axes: Difference of interest rate $i_t$ (with and without uncertainty) in basis points.

Figure 6 compares the NKM with and without uncertainty and shows the resulting differences of the nominal interest rate in each case. In addition, different scenarios are positioned opposite each other: Slope of the NKPC with 0.01 (black dotted) and 0.25 (dashed), IES with 0.5 (black dotted) and 5 (dashed), shock persistence with 0.85 (black dotted) and 0.6 (dashed), shock variance with 0.0005 (black
dotted) and 0.00005 (dashed). Both latter cases play a very important role with a difference up to 30 and 40 basis points respectively. Also, with a very flat Phillips curve (in contrast to a steep NKPC) an effect comes to light (around 10 basis points). Comparable effects can be observed in the different IES cases but variations in the elasticity hardly play a role. The examples show that there is no obligatory difference but (highly) persistent shocks and increasing uncertainty in particular can make a distinction between the model with and without uncertainty.

5 Conclusion

First, the paper derived a reduced-form solution for the nominal rate of interest out of a three-equation New Keynesian model with persistent stochastic shocks. Since these shocks behave like an AR(1) process and the central bank’s standard targeting rule is applied, this equation describes the equilibrium behavior of the nominal interest rate under optimal discretion. Secondly, the extended model with a quadratically approximated IS curve (therefore with uncertainty) was simulated with the focus on persistence parameters and compared to the model containing the certainty equivalence. In a next step, impulse response analysis is used to examine the adjustment over time. The results give important insights into how the equilibrium behaves when confronted with a wide range of parameter values:

(i) Interest rates are generally lower when accounting for uncertainty. (ii) This difference increases with higher persistencies and higher cost shocks (positive or negative). (iii) A steeper NKPC decreases the effect of uncertainty. (iv) Over time, the impact on the nominal interest rate decreases and the adjustment highly depends on the degree of persistence. (v) Finally, and most importantly, the essential result of Bauer and Neuenkirch (2015) can be confirmed from a theoretical point of view. Under sensible assumptions, accounting for uncertainty leads to lower interest rates of roughly 25 basis points.

This paper leaves some open avenues for future research. First, a targeting rule derived under commitment could be taken into account to be further built upon. Second, due to the negative interest rate in the equilibrium and because of the more prominent role of unconventional monetary policy in recent years, the model could include a zero lower bound while incorporating this kind of policy. Third, calibrating the shock variance and the underlying distribution, which is essential for the resulting uncertainty, can also be considered as a further topic.
References


Appendix

A.1 Consumers – Calculation Steps

\( \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial C} \) can be obtained by using the chain rule:

\[ P - \lambda \frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon - 1} \left( \int_0^1 C^\frac{\epsilon - 1}{\epsilon} d\xi \right)^\frac{\epsilon - 1}{\epsilon} \cdot \frac{\epsilon - 1}{\epsilon} C = 0 \]  
\[ \Rightarrow \quad P - \lambda \left( \int_0^1 C^\frac{\epsilon - 1}{\epsilon} d\xi \right)^\frac{\epsilon - 1}{\epsilon} = 0. \]  
\[ \text{(A1.1)} \]

First, exponentiate the integral with \( \epsilon \) and \( 1/\epsilon \) for rearranging the first-order condition. Then insert \( C \) from the constraint. It follows that

\[ P = \lambda \left( \frac{C}{C} \right)^{\frac{1}{\epsilon}} \quad \Rightarrow \quad P = \lambda \left( \frac{C}{C} \right)^{\frac{1}{\epsilon}} \]  
\[ \Rightarrow \quad \frac{P}{\lambda} = \left( \frac{C}{C} \right)^{-\frac{1}{\epsilon}} \quad \Rightarrow \quad \left( \frac{P}{\lambda} \right)^{-\epsilon} = C. \]  
\[ \text{(A2.1)} \]

To obtain Eq.(5), solve Eq.(4) for \( C \) and insert the result for all firms in the constraint, Eq.(1):

\[ C = \left( \int_0^1 \left( \frac{P}{\lambda} \right)^{-\epsilon} C d\xi \right)^\frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon - 1} \quad \Rightarrow \quad C = \left( \frac{1}{P} \right)^{-\epsilon} C \left( \int_0^1 P_1^{1-\epsilon} d\xi \right)^\frac{1}{\epsilon - 1} \]  
\[ \Rightarrow \quad P^{-\epsilon} = \left( \int_0^1 P_1^{1-\epsilon} d\xi \right)^\frac{1}{\epsilon - 1} \quad \Rightarrow \quad P = \left( \int_0^1 P_1^{1-\epsilon} d\xi \right)^\frac{1}{\epsilon - 1}. \]  
\[ \text{(A3.1)} \]

A.2 Firms – Calculation Steps

Eq.(6) can be written in more detail. Using Eq.(4) with \( Y \) and rearranging leads to

\[ \max_{\lambda} \left\{ \left( \frac{P}{\lambda} \right)^{1-\epsilon} Y - K \left( \frac{P}{\lambda} \right)^{-\epsilon} Y \right\}. \]  
\[ \text{(A4)} \]

The first-order condition is now straightforward, using the chain rule:

\[ \frac{\partial}{\partial P} = (1 - \epsilon) \left( \frac{P}{\lambda} \right)^{-\epsilon} \cdot Y - K'(Y) \cdot (-\epsilon) \left( \frac{P}{\lambda} \right)^{-\epsilon - 1} \cdot Y = 0. \]  
\[ \text{(A5)} \]
Simplifying and denoting the optimal price with $P^*_\tau$ yields

$$
(\varepsilon - 1) \left( \frac{P^*_\tau}{P} \right)^{-\varepsilon} = K'(Y_\tau) \cdot \varepsilon \left( \frac{P^*_\tau}{P} \right)^{-\varepsilon - 1} \quad (A6.1)
$$

$$
\Leftrightarrow \quad 1 = \left( \frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon - 1} \right) K'(Y_\tau) \left( \frac{P^*_\tau}{P} \right)^{-1} \quad (A6.2)
$$

$$
\Leftrightarrow \quad P^*_\tau = \left( \frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon - 1} \right) K'(Y_\tau) \cdot P. \quad (A6.3)
$$

However, perfect substitutes let the monopolistic structure vanish and show the typical polypolistic result:

$$
\lim_{\varepsilon \to \infty} \left( \frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon - 1} \right) K'(Y_\tau) \cdot P = K'(Y_\tau) \cdot P = P^*_\tau, \quad (A7)
$$

Now, with a cost function in real terms of quantities $Y_\tau$ defined as

$$
K(Y_\tau) = \frac{c_{\text{var}}}{\gamma + 1} Y^{\gamma + 1}_\tau + c_{\text{fix}}, \quad (A8)
$$

where $c_{\text{fix}}$ are the fix costs, $c_{\text{var}}$ is a measure for the variable costs and $\gamma$ represents the elasticity of marginal costs, Eq.(7) becomes a micro-funded AS curve that takes the form of a power function:

$$
P^*_\tau = \left( \frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon - 1} \right) c_{\text{var}} Y^{\gamma}_\tau \cdot P. \quad (A9)
$$

### A.3 Log-Linearization

It is convenient to use log-linearized variables instead of level variables to be able to solve the model analytically. Also, some interpretations of the results, in terms of elasticity and growth rates, become quite useful. So both Eq.(4) and Eq.(A9) can be approximated through log-linearization around the steady state. Thus, the approximation becomes more precise with smaller growth rates, that is exactly what the steady state can offer. But first some preparation is necessary. Let $Z$ be a state variable that can change over time and $Z_{ss}$ its long-term value. When defining

$$
z \equiv \ln Z - \ln Z_{ss}, \quad (A10)
$$

$z$ becomes a good approximation of $\hat{z}$, the growth rate around the steady state. Also, a first-order Taylor approximation “in reverse” shows the relationship between
\[ \hat{z} \approx \ln(1 + \hat{z}) = \ln\left(1 + \frac{Z - Z_{ss}}{Z_{ss}}\right) = \ln Z - \ln Z_{ss}. \quad (A11) \]

Furthermore, in the steady state, long-term values for individual variables are by definition the same as for those on aggregated level, thus \( Z_{\tau ss} = Z_{ss} \). The state would otherwise include endogenous forces. And finally, the long-run marginal costs equal the multiplicative inverse of the firms’ mark-up:\(^{43}\)

\[ c_{\text{var}} Y_{ss}^\gamma = \frac{\varepsilon - 1}{\varepsilon}. \quad (A12) \]

An explanation for that would be the long-run version of Eq.(A9) and hence \( P_{\tau ss} = P_{ss} \). Now this can be applied to the previous results. First, Eq.(4), the AD curve will be log-linearized. Taking logs, expanding with the log long-term values, and using (A10) gives

\[ \ln Y_\tau = \ln Y + \varepsilon(\ln P - \ln P_\tau) \]
\[ \Leftrightarrow \ln Y_\tau - \ln Y = -\varepsilon(\ln P_\tau - \ln P) \quad (A13.1) \]
\[ \Leftrightarrow \ln Y_\tau - \ln Y_{ss} - (\ln Y - \ln Y_{ss}) = -\varepsilon(\ln P_\tau - \ln P_{ss} - (\ln P - \ln P_{ss})) \quad (A13.2) \]
\[ \Leftrightarrow y_\tau - y = -\varepsilon(p_\tau - p) \quad (A13.3) \]
\[ \Leftrightarrow y_\tau = -\varepsilon p_\tau + \varepsilon p + y, \quad (A13.4) \]

a linearized AD curve in terms of growth rates with the slope of \(-1/\varepsilon\). A higher elasticity of substitution would result in a flatter curve, so a change in the firm’s price growth \( p_\tau \) would have a stronger effect on production growth \( y_\tau \).

Next, with the use of (A12), the AS curve type Eq.(A9), can be rewritten in a similar way:

\[ \ln P^*_\tau = \ln \left(\frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon - 1}\right) + \ln c_{\text{var}} + \gamma \ln Y_\tau + \ln P \quad (A14.1) \]
\[ \Leftrightarrow \ln P^*_\tau - \ln P = \ln \left(\frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon - 1}\right) + \ln c_{\text{var}} + \gamma (\ln Y_\tau - \ln Y_{ss} + \ln Y_{ss}) \quad (A14.2) \]
\[ \Leftrightarrow p^*_\tau - p = \gamma y_\tau + \ln \left(\frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon - 1}\right) + \ln c_{\text{var}} + \gamma \ln Y_{ss} \quad (A14.3) \]
\[ \Leftrightarrow p^*_\tau - p = \gamma y_\tau + \ln (c_{\text{var}} Y_{ss}^\gamma) - \ln \left(\frac{\varepsilon - 1}{\varepsilon}\right) \quad (A14.4) \]

\(^{43}\)Other authors simply define this property, see e.g. (Galí 2015, 57).
\[ p_r^* - p = \gamma y_r + \ln \left( \frac{c_{\text{var}} Y_{ss}^\gamma}{(\varepsilon - 1)/\varepsilon} \right). \]  

(A14.5)

The latter expression shows the assumption that the log deviations of marginal costs from their long-run trend values are linear in the amount of \( \gamma \). When the firm’s optimized price growth \( p_r^* \) is equal to the aggregated price growth \( p \), then there is no growth in the firm’s production.

Having log-linearized both demand and supply side, Figure A1 sums up.

![Graphical results of households’ and firms’ static optimization.](image)

**Figure A1:** Graphical results of households’ and firms’ static optimization.

Finally, inserting (A13.5) in (A14.5) combines all the results and gives

\[ p_r^* - p = \gamma (-\varepsilon p_r^* + \varepsilon p + y) \]  

(A15.1)

\[ \Leftrightarrow \quad p_r^* - p = -\gamma \varepsilon (p_r^* - p) + \gamma y \]  

(A15.2)

\[ \Leftrightarrow \quad (1 + \gamma \varepsilon)(p_r^* - p) = \gamma y \]  

(A15.3)

\[ \Leftrightarrow \quad p_r^* - p = \left( \frac{\gamma}{1 + \gamma \varepsilon} \right) y. \]  

(A15.4)
A.4 Expected Duration of Resetting the Price (Calvo)

\[ 1 \cdot (1 - \phi) + 2 \cdot \phi(1 - \phi) + 3 \cdot \phi^2(1 - \phi) + \ldots = \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} (j + 1) \cdot \phi^j (1 - \phi) \]

\[ = (1 - \phi) \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} (\phi^{j+1})' = (1 - \phi) \left( \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \phi^{j+1} \right)' = (1 - \phi) \left( \phi \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \phi^j \right)' \]

\[ = (1 - \phi) \left( \frac{\phi}{1-\phi} \right)' = (1 - \phi) \cdot \frac{(1-\phi)+\phi}{(1-\phi)^2} = \frac{1}{1-\phi}. \quad (A16) \]

A higher share of firms unable to reset their price (in a certain period) increases the expected duration.

A.5 Calvo Pricing – Calculation Steps

Dividing the first-order condition by \(2k\), using the fact that \(x_t\) is \(t\)-measurable, and expanding the sum gives

\[ \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} (\beta \phi)^j x_t - \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} (\beta \phi)^j E_t p^*_t = 0. \quad (A17) \]

Excluding \(x_t\) from the sum, using the formula for an infinite geometric series, and multiplying by \((1 - \beta \phi)\) gives

\[ x_t = (1 - \beta \phi) \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} (\beta \phi)^j E_t p^*_t. \quad (A18) \]

Again, using \(t\)-measurability \((E_t p^*_t = p^*_t)\) and excluding the first summand provides a sum from \(j = 1\) to infinity that can be substituted in a subsequent step:

\[ x_t = (1 - \beta \phi) \left[ \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} (\beta \phi)^j E_t p^*_t + p^*_t \right]. \quad (A19) \]

Furthermore, Eq.(A18) can be rewritten for \(t + 1\) (since firms optimize in each period),

\[ E_t x_{t+1} = (1 - \beta \phi) \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} (\beta \phi)^j E_t p^*_t \quad (A20.1) \]

\[ \Leftrightarrow \beta \phi E_t x_{t+1} = (1 - \beta \phi) \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} (\beta \phi)^j E_t p^*_t, \quad (A20.2) \]
for eliminating the sum in (A19):

\[ x_t = \beta \phi E_t x_{t+1} + (1 - \beta \phi) p_t^*. \]  

(A21)

Inserting condition (11) leads to the expression

\[ \frac{p_t - \phi p_{t-1}}{1 - \phi} = \beta \phi \frac{E_t p_{t+1} - \phi p_t}{1 - \phi} + (1 - \beta \phi) p_t^* \]  

(A22.1)

\[ \Leftrightarrow \quad p_t - \phi p_{t-1} = \beta \phi (E_t p_{t+1} - \phi p_t) + (1 - \phi)(1 - \beta \phi) p_t^*, \]  

(A22.2)

that only contains parameters and variants of the variable \( p \). Then, with the definition of (A10) and first-order Taylor expansion, the inflation rate \( \pi \) can be expressed through differences of \( p \). In the same way, the conditional expectation value for period \( t + 1 \) can be expressed with

\[ E_t p_{t+1} - p_t \approx E_t \pi_{t+1}. \]  

(A23)

Since this approximation is sufficiently exact for small values of \( \pi \), an equality sign will be used for all following calculations. Now (A22.2) can be rearranged to insert approximations \( \pi \) and Eq.(A23):

\[ \phi(p_t - p_{t-1}) = \beta \phi (E_t p_{t+1} - \phi p_t) + (1 - \phi)(1 - \beta \phi) p_t^* - (1 - \phi) p_t \]  

(A24.1)

\[ \Leftrightarrow \quad \pi_t = \beta E_t \pi_{t+1} + \frac{(1 - \phi)(1 - \beta \phi)}{\phi} p_t^* - \frac{1 - \phi}{\phi} p_t + \beta (1 - \phi) p_t. \]  

(A24.2)

A.6 Examining the NKPC’s Slope

The parameters defining \( \kappa \) determine the influence of \( \hat{y}_t \) on \( \pi_t \) in the NKPC, where the term influence accounts for both scenarios, an inflationary and a recessionary gap. The following applies: \( \epsilon > 1 \) (elasticity of substitution), \( \gamma > 0 \) (cost parameter, i.e. the slope of marginal costs’ log deviations from their long-run trend values), \( 0 < \beta < 1 \) (discount parameter, i.e. time preference), and \( 0 < \phi < 1 \) (share of sticky prices). Recalling \( \kappa = \gamma(1 - \phi)(1 - \beta \phi)/(1 + \epsilon \gamma)\phi > 0 \), the partial derivatives are

\[ \frac{\partial \kappa}{\partial \epsilon} = -\frac{\gamma}{1 + \epsilon \gamma} \kappa < 0 \]  

(A25.1)

\[ \frac{\partial \kappa}{\partial \gamma} = \frac{1}{1 + \epsilon \gamma} \kappa > 0 \]  

(A25.2)
\[ \frac{\partial \kappa}{\partial \beta} = -\frac{\phi}{1 - \beta \phi} \kappa < 0 \]  
(A25.3)

\[ \frac{\partial \kappa}{\partial \phi} = -\frac{1 - \beta \phi^2}{1 - \beta \phi} \kappa < 0. \]  
(A25.4)

Higher values for \( \varepsilon, \beta, \) and \( \phi \) have a negative impact on the NKPC’s slope, whereas higher values for \( \gamma \) have a positive impact.

Competitive markets, product variety, and substitutes (large \( \varepsilon \)) slow down inflation but monopolies (small \( \varepsilon \)) favor price increases. High production costs (large \( \gamma \)) will be passed on through price increases by the firms. Due to the importance of future losses (large \( \beta \)), firms choose a price path \((x_t)\) with higher deviations from the optimal price path \((p_t^*)\). \( \beta \) also has an effect through the expected inflation term \((E_t \pi_{t+1})\). A high importance attached to the future (large \( \beta \)) results in a higher impact of \( E_t \pi_{t+1} \) on today’s inflation. In addition, the influence of changes in \( \beta \) through expectations is larger than through the output gap since \( \frac{\partial \kappa}{\partial \beta} \in ]-1, 0[ \) (with (A25.3)):

\[ 0 > \frac{\gamma(\phi - 1)}{1 + \varepsilon \gamma} > \lim_{\varepsilon \to 1, \phi \to 0} \frac{\gamma(\phi - 1)}{1 + \varepsilon \gamma} = \frac{-\gamma}{1 + \gamma} > \lim_{\gamma \to \infty} \frac{-\gamma}{1 + \gamma} = -1. \]  
(A26)

When a small number of firms have the possibility to adjust the price in period \( t \) (large \( \phi \)), there is only a small chance to belong to this share. For this reason, firms choose a price path \((x_t)\) with higher deviations from the optimal price path \((p_t^*)\).

### A.7 Intertemporal Optimization – Calculation Steps

The optimization problem has the constraint

\[ C_t \cdot P_t + B_{t+1} = W_t + (1 + i_{t-1}) \cdot B_t, \]  
(A27)

where \( W \) is the nominal wage and \( B \) the amount of bonds. The latter provides the link between two periods. Depending on the definition of the interest rate, the period can vary. Here it has been chosen in a way so that the interest from period \( t \) enters the Euler condition. The Lagrangian combines objective function and budget constraint:

\[ \mathcal{L} = E_t \left[ \sum_{s=t}^{\infty} \beta^{s-t} U(C_s) - \lambda_s (C_s P_s + B_{s+1} - W_s - (1 + i_{s-1}) B_s) \right]. \]  
(A28)
Here, the control variable is $s$, while $t$ always designates the starting period. Let $W$ be exogenous, then the households’ first-order conditions are

$$\frac{\partial L}{\partial C_t} = U'(C_t) - \lambda_t P_t = 0 \quad (A29.1)$$
$$\frac{\partial L}{\partial C_{t+1}} = \beta E_t[U'(C_{t+1})] - \lambda_{t+1} E_t[P_{t+1}] = 0 \quad (A29.2)$$
$$\frac{\partial L}{\partial B_{t+1}} = -\lambda_t + \lambda_{t+1}(1 + i_t) = 0, \quad (A29.3)$$

Differentiating with respect to $C_{t+1}$ is possible because of linearity and Fatou’s lemma regarding the conditional expectation. Inserting (A29.1) and (A29.2) in (A29.3) yields

$$\beta E_t[U'(C_{t+1})]/E_t[P_{t+1}](1+i_t) \iff U'(C_t) = \beta \cdot (1+i_t) \cdot P_t/E_t[P_{t+1}] E_t[U'(C_{t+1})]. \quad (A30)$$

### A.8 Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitution in Eq. (19)

The IES is defined as the percentage change of the intertemporal consumption ratio $(C_{t+1}/C_t)$ to a one percentage increase of the accumulation factor $(1+i_t)$. The latter corresponds to the interest rate’s increase of one percentage point for small values of $i_t$. Plugging the marginal utility in the Euler equation, solving for the consumption ratio, and setting $Y = C$ gives $1/\sigma$ as the elasticity:

$$\frac{Y_{t+1}}{Y_t} = (1 + i_t)^{-\sigma} \left( \beta \cdot \frac{P_t}{E_t[P_{t+1}]} \right)^{-\sigma}. \quad (A31)$$

### A.9 Jensen’s Inequality – Calculation Steps

$f(EX) \geq E[f(X)]$ holds for concave functions, i.e. the logarithm and Jensen’s inequality still holds for the conditional expected value. Since the function’s curvature is sufficiently small, the accuracy is comparable to log-linearization for small growth rates. Moreover, the exactness increases for larger values because of $(\ln(x))'' \to 0$ for increasing $x$. However, resulting values will always be underestimated.

$$\ln E_t \left[ \frac{Z_{t+1}}{Z_t} \right] = \ln E_t \left[ \exp \left( \ln \left( \frac{Z_{t+1}}{Z_t} \right) \right) \right] \approx \ln E_t \left[ 1 + \ln \left( \frac{Z_{t+1}}{Z_t} \right) \right] \quad (A32.1)$$
$$= \ln \left( 1 + E_t \left[ \ln \left( \frac{Z_{t+1}}{Z_t} \right) \right] \right) \approx E_t \left[ \ln \left( \frac{Z_{t+1}}{Z_t} \right) \right]. \quad (A32.2)$$
A.10 Growth Rates in Period $t$

$$z_t = \ln Z_t - \ln Z_{ss} = \ln Z_t - \ln Z_{t-1} + \ln Z_{t-1} - \ln Z_{ss}$$

$$= \ln(1 + \tilde{z}_t) + \ln(1 + \tilde{z}_{t-1}) = \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \ln(1 + \tilde{z}_{t-s}) = \ln \left( \prod_{s=0}^{\infty} (1 + \tilde{z}_{t-s}) \right).$$

$$\Rightarrow \quad \hat{z}_t = \prod_{s=0}^{\infty} (1 + \tilde{z}_{t-s}) - 1,$$

(A33)

that is, with regard to GDP, the current output gap is the product of all GDP growth rates to date. The result shows that the iterated version of the output gap accounts for a cumulative growth. Thus

$$\ln(1 + \hat{y}_t) = \ln(1 + \tilde{y}_t) + \ln(1 + \hat{y}_{t-1})$$

(A34.1)

$$\Leftrightarrow \quad 1 + \hat{y}_t = (1 + \tilde{y}_t)(1 + \hat{y}_{t-1})$$

(A34.2)

$$\Rightarrow \quad \hat{y}_t \approx \tilde{y}_t + \hat{y}_{t-1},$$

(A34.3)

and

$$\ln(1 + \tilde{y}_{t+1}) = \ln(1 + \tilde{y}_{t+1}) + \ln(1 + \hat{y}_t)$$

(A35.1)

$$\Leftrightarrow \quad 1 + \tilde{y}_{t+1} = (1 + \tilde{y}_{t+1})(1 + \hat{y}_t)$$

(A35.2)

$$\Rightarrow \quad \tilde{y}_{t+1} \approx \tilde{y}_{t+1} + \hat{y}_t,$$

(A35.3)

so the current GDP growth rate can be approximated through the “gap” between the output gaps of current and previous periods.

A.11 Second-Order Taylor Approximation

The Taylor series (in $\mathbb{R}$) helps in finding a polynomial to substitute a certain function $f(x)$ (i.e. exponential, logarithm, etc.) around a point $x_0$. The generalized formula of the degree $n$ in the compact sigma notation is

$$Taylor(n) = \sum_{j=0}^{n} \frac{f^{(j)}(x_0)}{j!} (x - x_0)^j,$$

(A36)

where $f^{(j)}$ denotes the $j$th derivative with $f^{(0)} = f$ as a special case. Thereby, larger values for $n$ give better approximations of the original function $f(x)$. In
\[ f(x) = \ln(1 + x) \text{ and } n = 2. \] Formula (A36) simplifies to

\[ Taylor(2) = \ln(1 + x_0) + \frac{1}{1 + x_0}(x - x_0) - \frac{1}{2(1 + x_0)^2}(x - x_0)^2. \] (A37)

The result in (23.1) appears with \( x_0 = 0 \) and \( \tilde{y}_{t+1} \) (\( \pi_{t+1} \) respectively) as the argument of the function:

\[ \ln(1 + \tilde{y}_{t+1}) \approx \tilde{y}_{t+1} - \frac{1}{2} \tilde{y}_{t+1}^2. \] (A38)

A.12 Standard Targeting Rule – Calculation Steps

The Lagrangian has to be differentiated with respect to \( \hat{\gamma}_t, \pi_t, \) and \( i_t \), since the central bank sets the nominal interest rate:

\[ \mathcal{L}(\pi_t, \hat{\gamma}_t, i_t) = E_t \left[ \sum_{s=t}^{\infty} \beta^{s-t} \left( \pi_s^2 + \delta \tilde{y}_s^2 \right) - \chi_s (\pi_s - \beta \tau_{s+1} - \kappa \hat{\gamma}_s) \right. \]
\[ \left. - \psi_s \left( \hat{\gamma}_s - \tilde{y}_{s+1} + \frac{1}{\sigma} (i_s - r - \tau_{s+1}) + \frac{1}{2\sigma} \tau_{s+1}^2 + \frac{1}{2} \tilde{y}_{s+1}^2 \right) \right]. \] (A39)

First-order conditions:

\[ \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial \pi_t} = 2\pi_t - \chi_t = 0 \] (A40.1)
\[ \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial \hat{\gamma}_t} = 2\delta \hat{\gamma}_t + \chi_t \kappa - \psi_t (1 + \hat{\gamma}_t - E_t \tilde{y}_{t+1}) = 0 \] (A40.2)
\[ \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial i_t} = - \frac{\psi_t}{\sigma} \] (A40.3)

Condition (A40.2) follows with Eq.(27). From condition (A40.3) follows that \( \psi_t = 0 \), hence the minimized loss will not change if the IS curve shifts, as the central bank can counteract it one by one through resetting the nominal interest rate. Combining (A40.1) and (A40.2), the standard targeting rule under discretion arises.

A.13 Optimal Interest Rate for Positive Inflation Targets

When the Lagrangian attaining the “leaning against the wind” condition, is extended with \( \pi^* \) (as in (29), the loss function), the standard targeting rule changes
to

\[ \pi_t - \pi^* = -\delta \frac{\kappa}{\kappa} \hat{y}_t, \]  

(A41)

whereby the optimal output gap,

\[ \hat{y}_t = -\frac{\beta \kappa}{\delta + \kappa^2} E_t \pi_{t+1} + \frac{\pi^* \kappa}{\delta + \kappa^2}, \]  

(A42)

comprises an additional term. After inserting in the IS curve, the interest rule also has an additional (negative) term. This would lead to a generally lower interest level.

### A.14 Equilibrium Condition – Calculation Steps

Eq.(51) and Eq.(52) in more detail:

\[ E_t (\hat{y}_{t+1} - \hat{y}_t)^2 = E_t \left[ ((-\kappa \theta)(e_t + \zeta_{t+1}) - (-\kappa \theta)e_t)^2 \right] \]  

(A43.1)

\[ = E_t \left[ ((-\kappa \theta)^2 (\mu e_t + \zeta_{t+1} - e_t)^2 \right] \]  

(A43.2)

\[ = (-\kappa \theta)^2 E_t \left[ ((\mu - 1)e_t + \zeta_{t+1})^2 \right] \]  

(A43.3)

\[ = ((-\kappa \theta)(\mu - 1))^2 e_t^2 + (-\kappa \theta)^2 (Var \bar{\zeta}_{t+1} + (E_t \zeta_{t+1})^2) \]  

(A43.4)

\[ = \kappa^2 \theta^2 (\mu - 1)^2 e_t^2 + \kappa^2 \theta^2 \sigma_e^2 \]  

(A43.5)

\[ = (\kappa \theta)^2 ((1 - \mu)^2 e_t^2 + \sigma_e^2) \]  

(A43.6)

and

\[ i_t = r + \alpha_\mu e_t - \frac{1}{2} ((\delta \theta)^2 \mu^2 e_t^2 + (\delta \theta)^2 \sigma_e^2 + \sigma \kappa^2 (1 - \mu)^2 e_t^2 + \sigma \kappa^2 \sigma_e^2) + \sigma u_t \]  

(A44.1)

\[ = r + \alpha_\mu e_t - \frac{1}{2} ((\delta \theta)^2 \mu^2 e_t^2 + (\delta \theta)^2 \sigma_e^2 + \sigma \kappa^2 (1 - \mu)^2 e_t^2 + \sigma \kappa^2 \sigma_e^2) \]  

(A44.2)

\[ + \sigma u_t \]  

\[ = r + \alpha_\mu e_t - \frac{1}{2} ((1 - \mu)^2 \sigma \kappa^2 + \mu^2 \delta^2) \theta^2 e_t^2 + (\sigma \kappa^2 + \delta^2) \theta^2 \sigma_e^2 + \sigma u_t. \]  

(A44.3)

### A.15 Parameter Discussion

Eq.(45) includes all parameters of the model.\(^{44}\) This subsection gives a brief overview over possible values, which are used to graphically depict the equilibrium conditions.

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\(^{44}\)Note that variances \(\sigma_e^2\) and \(\sigma_u^2\) are only indirectly included.
The discount parameter $\beta$ is typically close to 1. Galí (2015, 67) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1997, 321) set $\beta$ equal to 0.99 (quarterly), whereas Jensen (2002, 939) uses this under an annual interpretation. Walsh (2010, 362) also sets it to 0.99. Galí and Gertler (1999, 207) estimate a value of 0.988. To keep the framework close to the actual interest setting of the central bank, all calculations are carried out quarterly and $\beta$ will be set to 0.99.

The slope of the NKPC $\kappa$ takes values close to zero and usually lower than 1. Roberts (1995, 982) estimates in his original NKPC article $\kappa \approx 0.3$. On a quarterly basis, Walsh (2010, 362) sets 0.05, Galí and Gertler (1999, 13) estimate 0.02, and McCallum and Nelson (2004, 47) suggest 0.01 – 0.05. Jensen (2002, 939) calibrates an annual value of 0.142, whereas Clarida et al (2000, 170) set 0.3 (yearly) and give a range of 0.05 to 1.22 in the literature. In the baseline simulation, $\kappa$ is set to 0.04.45

Woodford (2003a, 165) states that a value of 1 is customary in the RBC literature for $\sigma$, the multiplicative inverse of the IES (see, e.g. Clarida et al (2000, 170), Galí (2015, 67), Yun (1996, 359)). A slightly larger value (1.5) is set by Jensen (2002, 939), and Smets and Wouters (2003, 1143) estimates 1.4. An insightful metadata study by Havranek et al (2015) estimates a mean IES of 0.5 ($\sigma = 2$) across all countries. However, they report that higher developed countries have a higher IES (lower $\sigma$). Therefore, $\sigma$ will be set to 1.

The weight on output fluctuations $\delta$ is set to 0.25 in almost all the literature (see, e.g. Walsh (2010, 362), 939), McCallum and Nelson (2004, 47), Jensen (2002, 939)). The latter reports values from 0.05 to 0.33 in other papers. Thus, $\delta = 0.25$ will also be assumend for the simulation.

Walsh (2003, 275) allows values up to 0.7 for $\mu$, the cost shock persistence. Clarida et al (2000, 170) set 0.27 (yearly) and Galí and Rabanal (2004, 48) estimate 0.95. Generally, Smets and Wouters (2003, 1142–1143) estimate persistencies of 0.8 and higher, which is confirmed by Smets and Wouters (2007). Thus, $\mu$ will be treated as a variable in the range of 0.6 – 0.85. The smallest value 0.6 implies 0.1296 on an annual basis.

For the standard deviation of a cost shock, Sims (2011, 17) sets 0.01 ($\sigma_e^2 = 0.0001$), Jensen (2002, 939) sets 0.015 ($\sigma_e^2 = 0.000225$), and Galí and Rabanal (2004, 48) estimate 0.011 ($\sigma_e^2 = 0.000121$). McCallum and Nelson (2004, 47) set an annualized standard deviation of 0.02 ($\sigma_e^2 = 0.0004$). The conservative value of 0.0001 will be taken for the simulation.

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45Note that this implies $\kappa = 0.16$ on a yearly basis.
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