

Sa'ar, Amalya

Article

Palestinian women in the Israeli workforce and the idea of economic citizenship

economic sociology_the european electronic newsletter

Provided in Cooperation with:

Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies (MPIfG), Cologne

Suggested Citation: Sa'ar, Amalya (2015) : Palestinian women in the Israeli workforce and the idea of economic citizenship, economic sociology_the european electronic newsletter, ISSN 1871-3351, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies (MPIfG), Cologne, Vol. 16, Iss. 2, pp. 14-20

This Version is available at:

<https://hdl.handle.net/10419/156050>

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:

Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.

Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.

Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.

Terms of use:

Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal and scholarly purposes.

You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public.

If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence.

Palestinian Women in the Israeli Workforce and the Idea of Economic Citizenship

By Amalya Sa'ar

Department of Anthropology (in the making), University of Haifa, Saaram@soc.haifa.ac.il

*Israel is a multi-cultural, heterogeneous state. Human and cultural diversity is an inseparable part of our personal and professional lives, and a tremendous advantage for the workforce and the economy. Therefore, the Ministry of Economy ... operates to create unique training programs for employers who want to incorporate diversity and equal opportunities ... Most of us know by now the value of a workforce that evaluates workers according to their skills and capacities, rather than their culture, religion, or nationality. There is a clear economic advantage in making work places diverse ... I have no doubt that the profitability of gender diversity is true to every population that is presently excluded from the workforce. Such exclusion is illegal and unprofitable. It hurts the economy, the society, and the [excluded] population itself – and in that case we all lose ... If we can create a substantive change in the workforce regarding excluded populations, for example the promotion and integration of Arab women, whose labor force participation is only 22%, and who work for a minimum wage even when they have academic degrees ... we will all become winners. This is to all of us, as a society and as individuals; each person who remains outside the workforce is costing us more. It is our collective interest to integrate all the populations into the workforce. (Naftaly Bennet, Minister of the Economy, *The Marker* 22.10.2013)*

The idea that diversity is good for the economy has become very popular in Israel over the past decade or so and women – particularly minority women – feature as its most likely embodiments. This concept, which has migrated to Israel from Western capitalistic societies, appears at odds with the local public atmosphere of heightened ethno-nationalism and the recent deluge of legal and administrative activity that aims to curb the rights of the Palestinian citizens and non-Jewish migrants. Nevertheless, these two trends co-occur on the ground, collapsing together imported ideas of utilitarian individualism and local traditions of primordial collectivism. Among other things, diversity introduces a new twist to local ideas of civil entitlement. The new focus on self-sufficiency as a right and an obliga-

tion of all citizens, irrespective of national, class, or ethnic background, brings economic terminology into a discourse on citizenship whose ideological nucleus is quite differently oriented.

This paper looks at the implications for Palestinian-Israeli women of the newly emerging discourse of diversity and the concomitant emergence of the idea of economic citizenship – the linking of civil entitlement and civil contribution to economic productivity. I will argue that the recent mainstreaming of concerns with the workforce participation of Palestinian-Israeli women is a paradoxical effect of the neoliberal turn, as the idea that the market is the best mediator of morality, social justice, and identity infiltrates the hegemonic ethno-national-cum-patriarchal logic of belonging. The state, which now officially endorses the promotion of Arab women's labor force participation, aims to do so by encouraging private employers to hire them. At the same time, it is directly involved in at least two developments – reducing the public sector and promoting laws that restrict the rights of the Palestinian citizens – which are straightforwardly counter-effective. Thus the sudden official interest in the economic wellbeing of Arab women does not overturn the long-standing exclusion of the Palestinian citizens. That remains as solid and consistent as before, but is repackaged in a rhetoric of inclusion through economic participation. Palestinian women, whose vulnerability under Arab patriarchy is conveniently used to deny their vulnerability under Israeli ethno-nationalism, serve this particularly well. The effort to modernize them through integrating them into the workforce appears the easiest way to create de-politicized Palestinian citizens, eager to assimilate into Israeli society by sharing the language of economic rationality and profit maximization, while leaving intact the ethnic structure that continues to block their full membership in the polity.

The Idea of Economic Citizenship and the Diversity Paradox

Economic citizenship (for example, Kessler-Harris 2003; Moghadam 2011), the idea that economic self-sufficiency is an important means and measure of civil entitlement, has come into use in different ideological circles simulta-

neously and has subsequently assumed diverse and even contradictory meanings. While neo-conservatives frame economic self-sufficiency as a pre-condition for civil entitlement, radical feminists perceive gainful employment as a basic human right, and business philanthropists use it to mean commitment to social solidarity across economic sectors.

Unlike places like the United States, where an economic perspective on citizenship makes cultural and historical sense, in Israel such a perspective merits some attention, considering the centrality of primordial, collective affiliations in local platforms of citizenship. In Israel, until recently, economic productivity has played almost no role in local mythologies of contribution. Instead, the most important determinant of Israeli citizenship has been national belonging, followed by contribution to the Jewish collective (Peled 2008). This principle sets very clear limits to the entitlements of Palestinians living inside the Green Line, who were granted formal citizenship and a range of individual rights – the Israeli constitution includes a combination of republican and liberal principles – but whose exclusion from the national collective has denied them access to collective rights as basic as land, water, or environmental development, and has long subjected them to discrimination. Still, over the past decade or so, the logic of economic self-sufficiency and the idea that the economic benefits of diversity may suspend the preference for ethnic homogeneity, at least in the workforce, has permeated the Israeli discourses of inclusion, creating interesting ideological mixtures. For example, the speaker cited above, who dubs the integration of Arab women into the workforce a national mission, is the leader of the right-wing Jewish Home party, which is actively pushing forward laws designed to bolster the Jewish character of the state, with direct repercussions for the freedoms and civil rights of the Palestinian citizens.

Despite its captivating presence, then, economic citizenship does not replace existing ideas of civic inclusion, which continue to give primacy to collective, ethno-national affiliation. It does, however, bring into the liberal-democratic component of Israeli citizenship a growing utilitarian emphasis. This shift entails new opportunities for some minority members, including academically educated Palestinian women or Palestinian business entrepreneurs. However, since the turn to the market indisputably involves widening social-class gaps, it ultimately stands to have adverse implications for the majority of Palestinian citizens, women and men, who remain entrenched in the lowermost echelons of Israeli society.

The Labor Force Participation of Palestinian Women Citizens of the State

Palestinians who are Israeli citizens are estimated to number about 1,450,000, or 20 percent of the total population. This group includes several religious categories: Muslims (82 percent), Christians (10 percent), and Druzes (8 percent), and further sub-cultural categories (fellahi, urban, and Bedouins), who nevertheless share important characteristics, most notably language and national identification. As citizens they are entitled to some important measures of state protection, social benefits, and civil rights, yet they suffer from multiple forms of discrimination and marginalization (Kretzmer 1987; Ghanem 2001). They also fare consistently poorly on health, economic wellbeing, educational attainments, poverty rates and other social indicators (Gharrah 2011).

The Palestinian regions inside Israel are grossly underdeveloped compared with Jewish populated regions. Massive confiscation of lands following the establishment of the state in 1948 changed the Palestinians who remained from subsistence agriculturalists to proletarians (Rosenfeld 1978). The ethnically-split character of the national economy then blocked the full integration of those who became citizens into the Jewish-dominated workforce and channeled the bulk of employment opportunities to the Palestinian enclave (Khattab 2002). The cessation of agriculture and the intensification of economic activities in the small and rapidly crowding Palestinian locales instigated the urbanization of these rural communities. However, inadequate infrastructure and planning has left the process largely stalled (Khamaisi 2004).

The workforce participation of Palestinian-Israeli women is estimated at about 22.5 percent (King et al. 2009). This exceedingly low rate, as against an estimated 71 percent of Jewish-Israeli women, is effectively even lower, considering that it reflects an average figure with regard to a very diverse population. For example, whereas Christians account for only 10 percent of Palestinian-Israelis, they comprise a third of all employed women. By contrast, among the Negev Bedouins, only 3 percent of the women are registered as employed and their average wage is 55 percent of the average wage of women employees in Israel. Employed women tend to concentrate in the Palestinian ethnic enclave (Semyonov, Lewin-Epstein and Brahm 1999; Khattab 2002), where they may find employment in the public sector (social services, the Arab education system, the local municipalities) or with private employers. Outside

this sector they are employed in several branches: at one end are menial workers in agriculture, textiles, or cleaning. Such jobs, besides being backbreaking, are typically seasonal and poorly paid. A middleman is generally involved, often a male relative of the employees, who takes a cut from their wages. The pay is per day, usually below the legal minimum wage, and does not cover sick days, vacation, and pension (Zahalka and Schwartz 2008; Nathan 2010; Sa'ar n.d.). Further along the job continuum, professional women (and men) are employed in hospitals and pharmaceutical firms, and less skilled women can find jobs also in customer service call centers and in retail (Marantz, Kalev, and Lewin-Epstein 2013), areas where they come in direct contact with a mixed Arabic- and Hebrew-speaking clientele.

For women, employment in the Palestinian enclave has complex implications. The possibility to work close to home is critical to many, given the pressure to 'be home for the children'. Another important advantage is that working in an Arabic-speaking environment they do not need to speak fluent Hebrew and are presumably shielded from racist treatment, particularly if they are veiled. However, employment in the Palestinian private sector has some clear disadvantages. As several reports (Zahalka and Schwartz 2008; Conur-Atias and Kolobov 2008; Kayan 2014) now confirm, and my own ethnographic data reaffirm (Sa'ar 2011, n.d.), women in this labor market are subject to low pay – lower than the legal minimum wage, educational mismatch, involuntary part-time employment, and generally weak enforcement of protective labor laws. And overall, while women's opting for employment close to home has some advantages, their overwhelming restriction to the enclave economy is mostly by default rather than by free choice.

Development through the Market – the New Logic of Exclusionary Integration

In the past decade or so, Israeli government officials have shown a growing interest in increasing the rates of labor force participation of female Palestinian citizens. Notably, the actual steps taken to accomplish this goal are very different from the policies that were implemented 50-odd years earlier to facilitate the workforce participation of women from the Jewish majority group. Back in the early decades of the state, Israel had a strong, centralist welfare state, which was used primarily to absorb and socialize masses of Jewish immigrants and to curtail competition from cheap Palestinian labor by subsidizing the added costs of social benefits for Jewish workers. The state wel-

fare system was also pertinent in integrating Jewish women into paid employment by providing mothers with supportive infrastructure, tax benefits, and a shorter working day, and by creating large numbers of public-sector jobs for women. For Palestinian citizens, men and women, the benefits were much more limited, although they increased over the years, as has the access of Palestinian women to employment in the social services sector (Rosenhek 1999). Overall, the impact of the welfare system on Palestinian citizens has remained limited compared with its impact on Jews, in terms of both poverty reduction and employment. Nevertheless, despite its limitations, it has been a significant factor in their household economies. Since the 1980s, though, the Israeli welfare system has been shrinking steadily, a process which has had a negative impact on Jewish and Palestinian citizens alike. So, in a sense, Palestinian citizens are no longer alone in their relative estrangement from state welfare, and like growing numbers of Jewish citizens, they are now increasingly turning to the market for solutions. A growing private Palestinian-Israeli sector is now expected to solve the double problem of limited job selection and insufficient social services, which are increasingly offered in privatized or semi-privatized forms.

One of the corollaries of the shrinking welfare state and a concomitant rise in the number of professionals is the development of a dynamic field of educational, social, legal, and health services, which are offered in public, private, non-profit, or mixed formats. A wide range of "professional entrepreneurs" – therapists, educators, legal consultants, medical doctors and other professionals – are opening private institutions, clinics, and services within the Palestinian economic enclave, and these provide jobs for women, ranging from professionals to "pink-collar" assistants, caretakers, and menial workers. A parallel employment niche for women is, of course, retail, which is growing rapidly with the exponential growth of consumer capitalism. These developments are seen positively by the state, which aims to enhance them by offering (limited) incentives for businesses in the form of funds, loans, business hothouses, or an industrial park. State officials appointed to enhance "the Arab sector" – a common euphemism among Hebrew speakers for Palestinian citizens – propagate the idea of development-through-the-market as the ideal solution for Arab women's employment. Also, the state has become actively involved in a wide range of social economy projects that bring together agents from three main sectors: the state and municipal apparatuses, the business community, and grassroots social-change organizations.

Since the 1990s and increasingly in the 2000s, Israel started to fill up with programs, operated jointly by government offices and non-governmental organizations, with heavy financial support from philanthropists from Israel and the international community, which aim to improve the economic situation of groups on the social and geographical periphery, with particular, though not exclusive, emphasis on women. The projects commonly target women from specific populations, notably Arab, Jewish ultraorthodox, migrants from Ethiopia or the former USSR, as well as Mizrahi women from poor neighborhoods. Far fewer projects target men (primarily Jewish ultraorthodox, Arab, or new immigrants) and young people. The overarching aim of most projects is to improve the economic situation of members of these groups by giving them occupational training, either specific or general, to boost their self-confidence and increase their overall ability to make their way into the workforce.

The projects typically bring together actors from diverse locations along the state–civil society and center–periphery continuums. At the grassroots end, the partners are usually non-governmental organizations identified with women's rights, minority rights, and social-change activism. Alternatively, they may be less ideological non-profit organizations, with previous experience in education, women's health and the like, who have redirected some or most of their activity to the economic empowerment of women. At the more established end, the projects involve professionals and officials from state ministries and local municipalities who, as a corollary of privatization, are now being requested to outsource many of their activities and therefore seek to engage in cross-sectoral partnerships. On the financial side, most projects combine state money, funding from the local business community, international development money (for example from the EU), and money from the large Zionist foundations, which function as semi-private extensions of the state.

Hence the field of social economy creates interesting encounters between actors from the hegemonic establishment (the state and the Zionist business community) and their structural opponents – members of civil society organizations who traditionally seek to criticize and subvert this hegemony. It is interesting, in this respect, to note the rationale used to justify the involvement of Zionist donors in this field. Since the establishment of Israel, large Zionist foundations have played a major role in the development and operation of the state's social and economic infrastructure. Actors such as the Jewish Agency, the Joint

Distribution Committee (JDC), the Jewish National Fund, the Rothschild Foundation, the Rashi Foundation, and others have been heavily involved in the development of new communities around the country. The longstanding outsourcing of state responsibilities to such bodies, which are explicitly committed to enhance Jewish and Zionist goals, and which as private bodies are not bound by the criteria of universal redistribution, has been strongly criticized as an institutional form of state discrimination (Kretzmer 1987). However, in their more recent involvement in social economy initiatives, the same foundations have made explicit efforts to include Palestinians, as part of a redefinition of their role to strengthen Israeli democracy by reducing all forms of social inequalities.

Other quintessentially Zionist actors who are increasingly showing interest in social entrepreneurship are business magnates. Several millionaires, newly wealthy from the high-tech, financial, and industrial sectors, have established foundations, sometimes forming attached non-profit organizations (NPOs) or channeling the funds directly to existing NPOs, to combat poverty and social inequalities by promoting education, employment, and wellbeing on the periphery. As I show in more detail elsewhere (Sa'ar n.d.), these tycoons characteristically see themselves as working for the national good. They typically have a sense of obvious entitlement to talk directly to policy- and decision-makers inside the state system, as well as among Zionist donors, offering generous matching funds if the government agrees to invest in enterprises they deem important.

The endorsement of Israeli-Palestinian women's economic interest by the state and its large business partners is, of course, ironic. As mentioned in the introduction, the idea of inclusion through economic contribution (economic citizenship) has developed amid frantic initiatives to reinforce the Jewish character of the state. Concomitantly, the framing of the economic wellbeing of the Palestinian citizens as a national, all-Israeli interest occurs in an odd coincidence with their exact counter-framing as untrustworthy outsiders. Also, the shrinking of the welfare state is happening precisely when the system has finally started to yield some tangible benefits for Palestinian citizens. As far as women are concerned, the enthusiastic shift towards privatization, which incidentally strikes a chord also among many Palestinians, has had mixed results. On one hand, it does indeed open up new employment opportunities, which women appear to be keen to seize. Women I interviewed and spoke to as part of my ethnographic study of the social economy field (Sa'ar 2011) consistently ex-

pressed a desire to be employed. Besides a much needed extra income, they expected that a paying job would give them an opportunity for self-fulfillment and personal growth, and would make them better role models as mothers. On the other hand, women working in the Palestinian-Israeli private sector operate in a precarious work sphere. Although presumably shielded from racist treatment and enjoying the proximity to their homes, preliminary reports on women's employment by private Arab employers (Diab 2008; Kayan 2014), as well as my own interviews, reveal widespread labor-rights violations, including extremely low-pay (well below the legal minimum wage), frequent and arbitrary redundancies, part-time positions, often no more than 4–5 hours a day, with wages in accordance with that, expectations that they will do overtime with no additional pay, and other things. Sexist attitudes and outright sexual harassment also appear to be widespread, although evidence at this point is anecdotal. Such violations are licensed by weak enforcement of protective labor laws, and a general atmosphere among many employers that their female employees are working primarily to "help" their husbands or as a form of pastime, while their primary responsibilities remain in the home sphere.

While it appears that we are facing a growth in women's labor force participation, it is not yet clear whether Palestinian-Israeli women are about to make an economic breakthrough, or whether their increased labor force participation will entail improved personal status within the household. On the optimistic side, there are signs that some women, primarily those with an academic education, are indeed enjoying improved work–life quality. The number of dual-earner families is on the rise (Stier 2013), as is the number of women who are employed in the social services sector (Shalev and Lazarus 2013), where they enjoy a good social status and less professional mismatch. Civil society organizations are another sector in which academic women can now find interesting jobs, rise to managerial positions, and combine work in an Arabic-speaking environment with frequent contacts with Jewish and international colleagues. There also appears to be a growing number of jobs for professional women in the medical and paramedical branches, and there are some indications of state initiatives to introduce affirmative action for Palestinian women in the higher education system and in career positions in state-sponsored projects. That said, it is important to bear in mind that the returns to education in many of the positions in these and similar sectors are still significantly lower compared with the Jewish-dominated public and private sectors (King et al. 2009).

On a more cautious note, when bearing in mind that most women are not highly educated, findings from around the world show that rising labor force participation among low-skilled minority women tends to intensify their labor, since they are unable to hire aid to alleviate their domestic work when they join the workforce. Not only does it not guarantee an increase in their personal autonomy or social standing, but it often puts them in a double bind, as relatives start making demands on their new earnings, push them to take out more loans against these earnings, and exert similar pressures that prevent the women from leveraging their additional income (for example, Kabeer 1994; Karim 2011). Such perils are particularly likely when the integration of women into paid employment is done through privatization and without protective intervention by the state.

Civic Inclusion through Economic Contribution – Paradoxes of Nationalistic Neoliberalism

The idea of economic citizenship is spreading rapidly around the world. In Israel, as elsewhere, a growing emphasis on independent earnings, in the dual sense of a personal right and a social obligation, now provides a discursive meeting ground for actors from very different subject positions and ideological backgrounds. The common discourse that ensues is, of course, fraught with paradoxes and contradictions. It seems to collapse together ideas about entitlement, social justice, social solidarity, and human and minority rights, which are grounded in historically opposed worldviews. In the case presented here, the contradictions are accentuated because the wellbeing of the Palestinian citizens is reframed as an Israeli interest, and the Zionist ethos of developing the homeland of the Jews is taking on a new "diversity" undertone that puts non-Jews – moreover, the quintessential Palestinian Others – right at the center of its manifesto, alongside new immigrants, Jewish single-moms, and ultraorthodox Jews. Within this discursive shift, the more specific focus on Palestinian women operates as a mitigating factor. As women, they embody the fragile and defeated component of the national Other, thus facilitating the benevolence of the Jewish state and the Jewish philanthropic apparatus. The "Orientalist" imagining of them as hapless victims of their patriarchal culture, moreover, fits perfectly into the discursive gymnastics that is needed in order to accommodate the deeply contradictory project of a Jewish and a democratic state. And so, the Israeli version of economic citizenship, which embeds the possibility of personal inclusion within an

ever-deepening orientation of collective exclusion, reflects a particular, nationalistic version of neoliberalism.

In Israel, the offering of economic solutions to problems of social inequalities and social exclusion entails an interesting spillover of liberal discourse into the management of ethno-national antagonisms. This "infiltration of market-driven truths and calculations into the domain of politics" (Ong 2006, 4) reflects a larger transformation of the liberal into the neoliberal. However, it does not necessarily mean that the normative logic of ethno-national exclusion is about to disappear. Rather, in a fashion similar to other political settings, for example in several Asian countries (Ibid.), the neoliberal logic in Israel is incorporated as an exception to the dominant ethno-national logic, which remains as blatant as ever.

One way to accommodate Palestinian citizens within the new logic of economic citizenship is by reclassifying them as bearers of "diversity," to tone down their framing as the quintessential, non-assimilating Other. It is interesting to note, in this respect, that the call to improve the labor force participation of Palestinian Israeli women started from below, through the demands of feminist and minority rights activists that the state intervene to provide more jobs, develop supportive infrastructure such as daycare and public transportation, and ensure the enforcement of labor laws. In a somewhat extraordinary development, this activism appears to have had significant success, as similar rhetoric is now heard at the very top of the political-economic pyramid. In the process, however, the idea of diversity-as-a-democratic-right has been transformed into diversity-as-economically-profitable. Thus coopted, diversity as a ticket to economic citizenship conveniently whitewashes ethno-national discrimination. It shifts the responsibility for a life without poverty from the state to women, pretending that they are freely operating in the politically-neutral zone of "the market."

Summing up, the recent institutional concern with the workforce participation of Palestinian-Israeli women in the name of diversity should be considered with deep suspicion. The idea of diversity as "good for the economy" is misleading, its democratic appeal notwithstanding. Uncontrolled economic privatization is bad for most women, particularly those whose skills, education, ethnicity, and social capital entrap them on the precarious lower slopes of the economy. In the particular case of Palestinian-Israelis, the doubtful benefits of economic privatization are exacerbated by the orchestrated efforts to restrict their

political rights and to de-legitimize their citizenship as a whole. Within this unbridled campaign, the sudden paternalistic concern with the wellbeing of Palestinian women is perfectly understandable; it represents the possibility of tamed, individualized Palestinians, who may be integrated into the state and the dominant Jewish society at minimal political and economic cost, and without shaking the ethnic status quo.

Amalia Sa'ar is a Cultural anthropologist. She is a senior lecturer and head of the Anthropology Department (in the making), at the University of Haifa, and Director of the Center for the Research of Peace Education. She has done research with Palestinian citizens of Israel, focusing on gender constructions and politics, and with low-income women in Israel who enroll in economic empowerment schemes. Her fields of expertise include feminist theory, urban anthropology, action research, and generational relations among feminists. Her work has been published in various academic journals, and Sa'ar's book *The Quest for Inclusion: Economic Citizenship of Low-Income Women* is forthcoming in Berghahn Books.

References

- Conur-Atias, Ety/Tatiana Kolobov, 2008: *Place of Residence and Income Level 2005. Information on Equality and Social Justice in Israel*. Adva Center (Hebrew).
<http://www.adva.org/uploaded/mekom%20megurim%20veramat%20sachar%202005.pdf>
- Diab, Umayma, 2008: Employment of Arab women in Israel. In: Ya'ara Buksbaum/Michal Dagan/Umayma Diab/Dorit Avramovitch, 2009: *Women Workers in a Precarious Employment Market*. Haifa: Mahut Centre (Hebrew).
- Ghanem, Asad, 2001: *The Palestinian-Arab Minority in Israel, 1948-2000: A Political Study*. New York: State University of New York Press.
- Gharrah, Ramsees (ed.), 2011: *Arab Society in Israel (5): Population, Society, Economy*. Jerusalem: Van Leer Institute. (Hebrew)
- Kabeer, Naila, 1994: *Reversed Realities: Gender Hierarchies in Development Thought*. London, New York: Verso.
- Karim, Lamia, 2011: *Microfinance and Its Discontents: Women in Debt in Bangladesh*. Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press.
- Kayan Feminist Organization, 2014: *Labor Rights Violations of Palestinian Women who Work for Private Employers in the Palestinian Society in Israel*. Haifa: Kayan Feminist Organization.
- Alice Kessler-Harris, 2003: In pursuit of Economic Citizenship. In: *Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State and Society* 10(2), (Summer): 157-175.

- Khamaisi, Rasem**, 2004: *Barriers to the Planning of Arab Localities in Israel*. Jerusalem: Floersheimer Institute for Policy Studies.
- Khattab, Nabil**, 2002: Ethnicity and Female Labour Market Participation: A New Look at the Palestinian Enclave in Israel. In: *Work, Employment and Society* 16(1):91-110.
- King, Judith/Deniz Neon/Abraham Wolde-Tsadick/Jack Habib**, 2009: *Employment of Arab Women aged 18-64*. Jerusalem: Myers-JDC-Brookdale Institute. (Hebrew)
<http://brookdale.jdc.org.il/?CategoryID=192&ArticleID=39>.
- Kretzmer, David**, 1987: *The Legal Status of the Arabs in Israel*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Marantz, Erez A./Alexandra Kalev/Noah Lewin-Epstein**, 2013: Israeli-Palestinian Women in the Retail Industry: Social Boundaries and Job Search Techniques. In: Nabil Khattab/ Sami Miaari (eds), *Palestinians in the Israeli Labour Market: A Multi-Disciplinary Approach*. Palgrave Macmillan, 131-152.
- Moghadam, Valentine M.**, 2011: Toward economic citizenship: The Middle East and North Africa. In: Valentine M. Moghadam/Suzanne Franzway/Mary Margaret Fonow (eds), *Making Globalization Work for Women*. NY: State University of New York Press.
- Nathan, Gilad**, 2010: *Issues Regarding the Employment of Foreign Workers in Agriculture*. Jerusalem: Israeli Knesset: The Center of Research and Information. (Hebrew)
<http://www.knesset.gov.il/mmm/data/pdf/m02477.pdf>
- Ong, Aihwa**, 2006: *Neoliberalism as Exception: Mutations in Citizenship and Sovereignty*. Durham and London: Duke University Press.
- Peled, Yoav**, 2008: The evolution of Israeli citizenship: An overview. In: *Citizenship Studies* 12(3): 335-345.
- Rosenfeld, Henry**, 1978: The Class Situation of the Arab National Minority in Israel. In: *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 20(3): 374-407.
- Rosenhek, Zeev**, 1999: The exclusionary logic of the welfare state: Palestinian citizens in the Israeli welfare state. In: *International Sociology* 14(2): 195-215.
- Sa'ar, Amalia**, 2011: *Palestinian-Israeli Women's Employment: The Mystery of their Absence and the Way to their Integration into the Formal Labor Force*. Research Report on the Atida Project for Economic Empowerment and Placement of Women with Twelve Years of Education or More. (July). (Hebrew).
- Sa'ar, Amalia**, not defined: *The Quest for Inclusion: Economic Citizenship of Low-Income Women*. (Book manuscript currently under review for publication)
- Shalev, Michael/Amit Lazarus**, 2013: The Welfare State as an Employer: An Unacknowledged Avenue of Opportunity for Palestinian Women in Israel. In: Nabil Khattab/Sami Miaari (eds), *Palestinians in the Israeli Labour Market: A Multi-Disciplinary Approach*. Palgrave Macmillan, 153-183.
- Semyonov, Moshe/Noah Lewin-Epstein/Iris Brahm**, 1999: Changing Labour Force Participation and Occupational Status: Arab Women in the Israeli Labour Force. In: *Work, Employment and Society* 13(1): 117-31.
- Stier, Haya**, 2013: Changing Earnings Composition in Israeli-Palestinian Households: The Emergence of the Dual-Earner Family. In: Nabil Khattab/Sami Miaari (eds), *Palestinians in the Israeli Labour Market: A Multi-Disciplinary Approach*. Palgrave Macmillan, 111-130.
- Zahalka, Asma Agbarieh/Michal Schwartz**, 2008: *Arab Women in Israel: Obstacles to Emancipation*. Workers Advice Center Maan.
http://www.wacmaan.org.il/en/article_44/arab_women_in_israel_obstacles_to_emancipation