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## Welfare Cost of the Real Estate Transfer Tax

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Thiess Buettner

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# Welfare Cost of the Real Estate Transfer Tax

## Abstract

This paper considers the welfare implications of a tax on real estate transfers. A theoretical analysis shows how the discouragement of mutually beneficial transactions as well as tax-sheltering activities give rise to a welfare loss that can be estimated comprehensively from the empirical elasticity of the tax base. In the absence of tax planning, the elasticity of the tax base is determined by the hazard rate to deter transactions at the margin. With tax planning, the elasticity of the tax base is also driven by the “technology” of tax sheltering. Empirical evidence on the deadweight loss is obtained from the analysis of real estate transfer taxes in Germany. After a constitutional reform has granted the German states the right to set the local rate of the real estate transfer tax, over the last ten years many states have made use of this discretion and have increased the tax rate - some of them repeatedly. Based on the empirical estimate of the revenue effect of these tax increases, the paper shows that the German experience points to a substantial welfare cost of real estate transfer taxation. The preferred estimate suggests that each additional Euro of revenues raised is associated with an increase of the deadweight loss of about 67 cents.

JEL-Codes: H200, H260, R380.

Keywords: real estate transfer tax, marginal cost of funds, tax rate elasticity of the tax base, tax avoidance.

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# 1 Introduction

Many governments in the world levy taxes on the transfer of real estate with the tax base being the sale price of the property. In the US, for instance, state real estate transfer taxes range from 0% in Texas to 2% in Delaware (Kopczuk and Munroe, 2015). In addition, municipalities and school districts also impose transfer taxes such that the total tax burden in the US is often higher.<sup>1</sup> Also many European countries impose high real estate transfer taxes with top rates of about 5% in France, 6% in the Netherlands, 6-7% in Spain, 5% in Germany and 4% in the UK (*cf.* RWI, 2012, pp.61).

In the English speaking world, real estate transfer taxes are sometimes called “stamp duties”, highlighting the fact that there are some administrative advantages associated with these taxes. Since the transfer of ownership requires a change in an official registry or cadaster, information on real estate transactions is directly available. This facilitates enforcement. Since real estate transactions are recorded locally in various countries, these taxes are often levied by state and local governments. However, taxing real estate transfers is not always straightforward. If property is owned by corporations or partnerships, for instance, the transfer of ownership may take place at the level of the corporation or partnership. Whether or not there is taxable transfer hinges on the specific details of the tax law, which needs to define what the value of the property is, whether transfers within a company group are taxable *etc.* In many cases, therefore, transfer taxation is complex and gives rise to tax planning.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>In Pennsylvania, for instance, the state tax is 1%, but the total transfer tax varies from 2% to 4% (City of Pittsburgh) or 5% (City of Reading), *cf.* National Conference of State Legislatures, Sept. 2012.

<sup>2</sup>In the US, in order to prevent tax avoidance, some states impose transfer taxes also on controlling-interest real estate transfers (*e.g.*, Eberle and Holderness, 2013). The German real estate transfer tax is known to be subject to substantial tax avoidance activities. For residential transactions buyers avoid paying real estate transfer taxes on structures. Various exemptions exist for mergers & acquisitions and for indirect ownership through holding entities. In Germany, the recent past has seen various attempts to curb tax planning possibilities. Until recently, the tax liability could be avoided in the case of transactions between

Besides complexity and tax planning, taxing real estate transfers affects the market for real estate and exerts further distortions. Market transactions are typically characterized with benefits for both buyer and seller. Obviously, the tax drives a wedge between the cost of buying real estate and the price charged by the owner. As a consequence, the real estate market does not work efficiently and mutually beneficial real estate transactions may be deterred (Mirrlees *et al.*, 2011).<sup>3</sup>

The economic literature provides various studies on the effects of real estate transfer taxes mainly on household mobility. Lundborg and Skedinger (1999) utilize a search model of the housing market to show that from a theoretical perspective transfer taxes create lock-in effects and result in lower search effort, matching rates, and welfare. Dachis, Duranton and Turner (2012) explore the empirical effects of the introduction of the Land Transfer Tax in Toronto on the housing market and find that the number of sales and the pre-tax housing prices declined substantially as a result of the tax. They calculate the associated welfare loss with 12.5% of tax revenue. Hilber and Lyytikainen (2012) consider the UK real estate transfer tax and find that it significantly distorts mobility decisions. Davidoff and Leigh (2013) explore the effect of stamp duties among Australia's states and territories, and find that they exert significant effects on housing prices and sales, even though the latter effect is somewhat weaker compared to the other studies. Besley, Needs and Surivo (2014), consider a temporary suspension of the UK stamp duty by lifting the lower threshold for taxable

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corporations and partnerships by setting up holding structures. The arrangement is known as the RETT (Real Estate Transfer) Tax Blocker. Recent law changes aim at limiting the effectiveness of this tax shield.

<sup>3</sup>Real estate transfer taxes may also be regarded as some kind of Tobin (1978) tax, with the aim to reduce volatility and the likelihood of bubbles by deterring speculation. Mirrlees *et al.*, 2011 argue that empirical research has not established a clear link between speculation and volatility. Fu *et al.* (2013) show that raising transaction cost drives out informed speculators more than noise speculators from the market such that volatility might even increase. With transfer taxes, market volatility and speculation can also create difficulties for the public sector as revenues from these taxes may be highly cyclical. See Honohan, P. (2009), for a discussion of the role of the transfer tax in the strong fiscal backlash of the financial and economic crisis 2008 in Ireland. Thoene (2005) provides a discussion of the cyclicalities of the German real estate transfer tax. Lutz, Molloy, and Shan (2011) explore the effects of the housing crisis on transfer tax revenues by US state and local governments.

transaction in an attempt to stimulate the economy and find sizable responses in prices and transactions. Kopczuk and Munroe (2015) explore the effect of notches in real estate transfer taxes imposed by New York and New Jersey. They find that a substantial amount of transactions is eliminated at the thresholds. Fritzsche and Vandrei (2016) explore effects of increases in the real estate transfer taxes in Germany on transactions, finding evidence for some temporary shifting as well as a negative impact on transactions in the long-run. Petkova and Weichenrieder (2016) find that the German real estate transfer tax exerts asymmetric effects on family homes and apartments: tax increases are found to depress only the number of transactions for family homes. Price effects are found for apartments.

Whereas the literature focuses on household mobility, the current paper aims at exploring the welfare cost in a more general way both from a theoretical and an empirical perspective. It provides a theoretical analysis showing that the discouragement of mutually beneficial transactions as well as tax planning activities give rise to a welfare loss that can be estimated comprehensively from the empirical elasticity of the tax base. Even though the model is stylized, the basic mechanisms apply to all sorts of real estate transfers, regardless of whether they take place in the context of family homes, office buildings, or commercial land. The empirical testing ground is the German federation, where real estate transfer taxes have gained importance as a revenue source. This is the consequence of a constitutional reform of the German federation in 2006 which aimed at an overhaul of the relationship between the federal and the state governments, removing elements of joint policies and also strengthening the competencies of the states.<sup>4</sup> As part of this reform, the states obtained the right to set the rate of the real estate transfer tax – while keeping the federal real estate transfer tax law unchanged. This triggered a wave of tax increases. Since 2007 most states have made use of this discretion and have increased the tax rate. Until 2015, the end of the observation period of the empirical analysis, no less than 25

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<sup>4</sup>See Auel (2008) for a discussion of the reform.

increases of the tax rate took place. In 2010, the median statutory tax rate moved up and has now reached a level of 5% relative to 3.5% before the reform.

The theoretical analysis identifies discouraged transactions as well as intensified tax planning as key determinants of deadweight loss. In the absence of tax planning, the elasticity of the tax base varies with the likelihood to find a buyer evaluated at the current tax burden. With tax planning, the elasticity of the tax base is also driven by the cost of tax planning and the share of sales that is deemed to be taxable. The empirical results indicate that the marginal deadweight loss associated with the real estate transfer tax is substantial. Accordingly, each additional Euro of revenues raised is associated with a an increase in the deadweight loss of about 67 cents.

The paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides a stylized theoretical model that explains how revenue and welfare effects of the transfer tax are related. Section 3 provides information on the data and describes the empirical methodology. Section 4 has the results. Section 5 concludes.

## 2 Theoretical Framework

Suppose there are  $N$  lots of land in a jurisdiction. For simplicity, lot sizes are identical and have value  $v$  for the owner. There is a continuum of potential buyers with willingness to pay  $w = \omega + \epsilon$ , where  $\omega$  reflects a common component of the willingness to pay and  $\epsilon$  is a random component with density  $f(\epsilon)$  and mean zero. The latter component captures the idiosyncratic assessment by each potential buyer. With respect to residential land use this could reflect, for instance, the varying distance to the work place. With respect to commercial land use it may reflect the varying distance to the customers. A successful transaction requires that a buyer has a willingness to pay exceeding the value of the prop-

erty. In the absence of taxes, this requires  $w > v$ . This implies that there is a minimum level of  $\epsilon$  at which a transaction takes place

$$\underline{\epsilon} = v - \omega, \tag{1}$$

and the probability that a transaction takes place is  $1 - F(\underline{\epsilon})$ .

Imposing transfer taxes means that the buyer has to pay not only the purchase price  $v$  but also transfer taxes determined by the tax rate and the price of the real estate. In presence of a tax sheltering technology the tax burden may be reduced. In this case, however, the cost of tax sheltering needs to be covered as well. To simplify the exposition, the following subsection provides an analysis with the number of real estate transfers as the single behavioral margin. In a subsequent section, tax sheltering is introduced.

## 2.1 Transactions under Taxation

If taxation cannot be avoided, the buyer has to pay the price for the property plus the transfer tax.<sup>5</sup> A successful transaction requires  $w > v + \tau v$ , where  $\tau$  is the ad-valorem tax-rate. Hence the minimum level of  $\epsilon$  at which a transaction takes place is

$$\bar{\epsilon} = v + \tau v - \omega, \tag{2}$$

and the probability that a transaction takes place is  $1 - F(\bar{\epsilon})$ . The tax wedge  $\tau v$  raises the minimum level of the willingness to pay at which a mutually beneficial transaction is possible. As a consequence, real estate transactions are deterred. The tax base  $B$  is the

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<sup>5</sup>In the highly stylized setting it does not matter whether the buyer or the seller is remitting the tax.



total value of transactions and total revenues from the tax are

$$T(\tau) = \tau B = \tau N v [1 - F(\bar{\epsilon})].$$

The assessment of the welfare cost of the transfer tax distinguishes three types of potential transactions. Those that take place regardless of taxation, those that do not take place even in the absence of taxation, and those that are impeded by taxation. The gain from any possible transaction is determined by the difference between the value of the estate for the buyer  $\omega + \epsilon$  and its price, *i.e.*  $v + \tau v$  or  $v$ , depending on whether a tax is imposed or not.

1. If  $\epsilon > \bar{\epsilon}$  the transaction takes place in spite of taxation.
2. If  $\epsilon < \underline{\epsilon}$ , the transaction would not occur even in the absence of taxation.
3. If  $\bar{\epsilon} > \epsilon > \underline{\epsilon}$ , the transaction is impeded by the tax.

In the first case, while the gain of the buyer is reduced by the tax, the tax payments constitute a transfer from the private to the public sector that is the basic purpose of taxation and should not count as a welfare loss, at least if the government is assumed to operate in the interest of the tax payer. Thus, no welfare loss arises in this case. Also in the second case no welfare loss arises. It relates to potential transactions that do not take place as they would not generate a gain even under zero taxation. In the third case, however, there is a welfare loss, as transactions are impeded.

To formalize the welfare loss, it is useful to evaluate the gains of transfers over the entire preference distribution. If the tax rate is  $\tau$ , the total private gain from transactions is

$$V(\tau) = N \int_{\bar{\epsilon}}^{\infty} (\epsilon + \omega - v - \tau v) f(\epsilon) d\epsilon.$$

In the absences of taxes the gain from transactions is

$$V(0) = N \int_{\underline{\epsilon}}^{\infty} (\omega + \epsilon - v) f(\epsilon) d\epsilon.$$

Subtracting the former from the latter and taking account of the tax revenue  $DWL(\tau) = V(0) - V(\tau) - T(\tau)$  gives the deadweight loss from taxation

$$DWL(\tau) = N \int_{\underline{\epsilon}}^{\bar{\epsilon}} (\omega + \epsilon - v) f(\epsilon) d\epsilon,$$

which is an expression that sums over all transactions which fall into the third category of potential transactions discussed above.

Rather than considering the total welfare loss, the following analysis aims at exploring the marginal welfare effect of taxation. If the tax rate is increased, the deadweight loss increases by

$$\frac{\partial DWL}{\partial \tau} = N\tau v^2 f(\bar{\epsilon}).$$

If the tax rate is increased, also tax revenue changes. Formally,

$$\frac{\partial T}{\partial \tau} = \frac{T}{\tau} - N\tau v^2 f(\bar{\epsilon}).$$

The marginal cost of funds (MCF) associated with the transfer tax is determined by the increase of the deadweight loss and the revenue effect

$$MCF = 1 + \frac{\partial DWL}{\partial \tau} \left[ \frac{\partial T}{\partial \tau} \right]^{-1} = \frac{1}{1 - \eta}, \quad \text{with} \quad \eta = \frac{\tau v f(\bar{\epsilon})}{1 - F(\bar{\epsilon})}.$$

Using the above definition of the tax base it can be shown that  $\eta$  is the elasticity of the tax base. With  $\eta$  close to zero, the MCF tends to unity – as with a lump-sum tax. If  $\eta$  is close to unity, the marginal cost of funds becomes infinitely large. In this case, the tax

rate is at a level that generates maximum revenues.  $\eta$  varies proportionally with a hazard rate determined by the density of the willingness to pay at the margin relative to the probability that the willingness to pay exceeds the property price inclusive of tax. This is intuitive, since this hazard rate captures the likelihood to deter transactions at the margin conditional on the probability of a profitable “match” between buyer and seller. Hence, the deadweight cost of the real estate transfer tax is large if the relative risk of deterring transactions is large. Note that the intuition for the deadweight loss is similar to the effect of transfer taxes on household mobility. As has been noted in the literature, transfer taxes reduce the likelihood to find a successful match on the housing market (*e.g.*, Lundborg and Skedinger, 1999, Ommeren and von Leuvensteijn, 2005).

## 2.2 Taxation and Tax Sheltering

While the theoretical analysis above has focused on a single behavioral margin, *i.e.* the discouragement of real estate transactions, it is well known that the empirical tax base elasticity would capture responses at all possible margins (Feldstein, 1996). This suggests that the elasticity of the tax base is also affected by tax avoidance. To introduce tax avoidance in the above analysis, I follow Slemrod and Gillitzer (2014), and allow for some “tax-sheltering technology”. More specifically, I assume that a share  $s$  of the tax payment  $\tau v$  can be avoided by sheltering at cost  $\kappa(v, s)$ , with  $\kappa_s(v, s) > 0$  and  $\kappa_{ss}(v, s) > 0$ . To simplify matters, I assume

$$\kappa(v, s) = \frac{1}{4\sigma} s^2 v, \quad \sigma > 0,$$

where parameter  $\sigma$  reflects whether avoiding the tax is easy or difficult. If  $\sigma$  is large, tax avoidance is easy and the cost of tax sheltering is low, *ceteris paribus*.

The buyer minimizes the cost of a transaction after taxes and tax planning activities by choosing to avoid the share  $s^*$  of possible tax payments

$$s^* = \arg \min_s \left[ v + v\tau(1-s) + \frac{1}{4\sigma}s^2v \right] = 2\sigma\tau.$$

A successful transaction requires that the willingness to pay exceeds the cost of buying the real estate inclusive of taxes and the cost of sheltering  $w > v + v\tau(1-s^*) + \frac{1}{4\sigma}(s^*)^2v$ . Inserting the optimal reduction of the taxable base  $s^*$ , this condition can be simplified to  $w > v + \tau v(1 - \sigma\tau)$ , where the right-hand side captures the effective cost of buying the property. Hence, the minimum level of  $\epsilon$  at which a transaction takes place is

$$\bar{\epsilon} = v + \tau v(1 - \sigma\tau) - \omega. \quad (3)$$

Taking account of tax sheltering, tax revenue is

$$T(\tau, \sigma) = \tau N v (1 - 2\sigma\tau) [1 - F(\bar{\epsilon})].$$

The revenue effect of a tax-rate increase is

$$\frac{\partial T}{\partial \tau} = \frac{T}{\tau} \left[ 1 - \frac{2\sigma\tau}{1 - 2\sigma\tau} \right] - \tau N v^2 (1 - 2\sigma\tau)^2 f(\bar{\epsilon}).$$

As above, the deadweight loss from the tax can be computed by summing up the total value of transactions without taxation and deducting the total value under taxation and the tax revenue. Formally  $DWL(\tau, \sigma) = V(0) - V(\tau, \sigma) - T(\tau, \sigma)$ , where  $V(0)$  is defined as above and

$$V(\tau, \sigma) = N \int_{\bar{\epsilon}}^{\infty} (\epsilon + \omega - v) f(\epsilon) d\epsilon - N v \tau (1 - \sigma\tau) [1 - F(\bar{\epsilon})].$$

Hence

$$DWL(\tau, \sigma) = N \int_{\underline{\epsilon}}^{\bar{\bar{\epsilon}}} (\epsilon + \omega - v) f(\epsilon) d\epsilon + N \underbrace{v\tau^2\sigma}_{\kappa} [1 - F(\bar{\bar{\epsilon}})].$$

This expression indicates that tax planning has two effects on the deadweight loss. The first term captures the deterrence of transactions. Since tax planning lowers the minimum level of the willingness to pay at which a mutually beneficial transaction can occur, this term is smaller than above. The second term identifies the cost of tax sheltering  $\kappa$  as the second source of deadweight loss.

As above, I focus not on the total welfare cost but consider by how much the deadweight loss increases relative to the revenue gain, if the tax rate is increased.

$$\frac{\partial DWL}{\partial \tau} = N\tau v^2 (1 - 2\sigma\tau)^2 f(\bar{\bar{\epsilon}}) + Nv2\sigma\tau [1 - F(\bar{\bar{\epsilon}})].$$

Taking account of the revenue effect, I compute the marginal cost of funds

$$MCF = 1 + \frac{\partial DWL}{\partial \tau} \left[ \frac{\partial T}{\partial \tau} \right]^{-1} = \frac{1}{1 - \tilde{\eta}}, \quad \text{with} \quad \tilde{\eta} = \frac{2\sigma\tau}{1 - 2\sigma\tau} + \frac{(1 - 2\sigma\tau)\tau v f(\bar{\bar{\epsilon}})}{1 - F(\bar{\bar{\epsilon}})}.$$

In this enhanced version of the model, which takes account of tax sheltering, the elasticity of the tax base  $\tilde{\eta}$  consists of two components. The first captures the rate at which higher tax rates cause an increase in (unproductive) tax-sheltering activities. Since the optimum degree of tax planning, characterized by  $s^* = 2\sigma\tau$ , depends on the tax rate, this component increases with the tax rate. The second factor driving the tax-base elasticity is, as above, the discouragement of real estate transactions, which is also increasing in the tax rate. Note that the hazard rate of deterring transactions at the margin is weighted here with the effective tax rate  $(1 - s^*)\tau v$ . Which of the two factors is more important depends also on the “technology” of tax sheltering. If  $\sigma$  is small, only a small fraction of the tax base  $s$  is avoided, and it is mainly the discouragement of transactions that matters. If  $\sigma$  is large, tax avoidance is the main driver of the elasticity of the tax base.

### 3 Data and Empirical Methodology

To quantify the marginal cost of funds associated with the German real estate transfer tax, the empirical analysis utilizes annual information on revenues from this tax at state level from 2002 until 2015. (For descriptive statistics see Table A-1 in the Appendix.) This period includes the time-period after the German federal reform of 2006. One element of this reform is the devolution of the right to set the rate of the real estate transfer tax to the German states, starting in 2007. This triggered a wave of tax increases, as many states have made use of this discretion and have increased their tax rate. Figure 1 reports the development of the tax rate distribution over time. As the figure shows, in 2007, immediately after the reform, tax rates started to increase. In 2010, the median tax rate moved up and has now reached a level of 5% relative to 3.5% before the reform.

As a consequence, starting in 2007 the (unweighed) mean of the tax rate increases from the base rate of 3.5% in 2006 to 5.2% in 2015. This amounts to an increase by 43%. Some states have been particularly active and raised the tax repeatedly. Few states have refused the general trend towards higher tax rates and in 2015 still charge the base rate of 3.5%. Annual revenues of the tax have increased substantially. In the time period from 2002 to 2015, revenues from the real estate transfer tax have increased in per capita terms by 57%. Given that the average tax rate has increased by 43% in the same time period, this revenue gain does not seem extraordinary strong. This is also indicated by the aggregate tax-revenue development relative to the population size (see Figure 1). In the same time period, (nominal) GDP per capita has increased on average by 40 percent (see Table A-2 in the Appendix), unemployment dropped substantially, and given the extremely loose monetary policy since 2012, real estate prices have increased relative to the GDP deflator. All this would justify even stronger revenue growth.<sup>6</sup>


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<sup>6</sup>Fritzsche and Vandrei (2016) also report a positive trend in the number of transactions.

Figure 1: Real Estate Transfer Taxes in Germany (2002-2015)



Note: The figure shows location measures for the real estate transfer tax among the German states. The vertical axis measures the statutory tax rate.



Note: The figure shows the average tax rate for the real estate transfer tax among the German states (right axis) and the sum of the revenues relative to population size.

To determine the revenue effects of tax rate increases against the various other trends and developments in the German economy, the empirical analysis of the revenue effects of the states' tax increases utilizes a multivariate model for revenue developments at state level. Formally, the basic specification is:

$$\log Rev_{i,t} = \beta_1 \tau_{i,t} + \beta_2 X_{i,t} + \alpha_i + \gamma_t + u_{i,t},$$

where the dependent variable is the log of tax revenue and  $\beta_1$  is the semi-elasticity of tax revenue with respect to the tax rate.  $\alpha_i$  is a state-specific and  $\gamma_t$  a time-specific fixed effect.  $X_{i,t}$  is a vector of control variables and  $u_{i,t}$  is an unobserved disturbance. Basically, this is a diff-in-diff specification that compares revenue developments before and after a tax-rate increase in state  $i$  in year  $t$ . However, rather than employing a dummy variable to capture the period after reform, the specification employs the tax rate directly. Thus, the specification takes account of differences in the scale of the policy shock.

The estimation approach considers tax increases basically as exogenous events. This is justified by the constitutional reform which is a major shock to the fiscal constitution in Germany, as it introduced a right to set the local real estate transfer tax rate for the German states. However, since states have used their new discretion differently, the question arises what has been driving these decisions. Krause and Potrafke (2016) associate the differential responses to the reform with political partisanship. They show that shifts in state majorities associated with state elections triggered changes in the real estate transfer tax rates. Besides political shocks potential drivers could be revenue stress or different trends in the tax base due to population growth or decline. As these may exert confounding effects on tax revenue, it is important to include corresponding control variables. Also neighborhood effects may matter. More specifically, with mobility, a higher tax rate in neighboring states could result in a positive or negative fiscal externality. To test whether transactions are distorted also across space, I add a control variable which captures the



average tax rate in neighboring states.<sup>7</sup>

As the tax rate increases are announced in the year before the reform, it seems likely that transactions are moved forward in order to be taxed before the reform. This would suggest that the revenues might increase before the reform, and that revenues are temporarily depressed after the reform. However, as the revenue data refers to the year of tax collection which may differ from the year of the taxable transfer, sales before the reform may be included in the revenue data also after the tax reform. Thus the empirical response of revenues to the reform may well show up with a time lag. To test for transitory effects around the reform, I augment the specification with indicators of the tax-rate change in the first year of a reform and before. Formally

$$\log Rev_{i,t} = \beta_{1,1}\Delta\tau_{i,t+1} + \beta_{1,2}\Delta\tau_{i,t} + \beta_{1,3}\tau_{i,t} + \beta_2 X_{i,t} + \alpha_i + \gamma_t + u_{i,t}.$$

With pre-reform effects in revenues, I might find that  $\beta_{1,1} > 0$  or  $\beta_{1,2} > 0$ , depending on the lag in tax collection.  $\beta_{1,3}$  would capture the long-term revenue gain from a tax increase. To check for robustness, also a specification with binary indicators of upcoming or current tax reforms is tested, as well as richer specifications that allow for further temporary effects in the first years after the reform.

## 4 Results

The regression results are provided by Table 1.<sup>8</sup> Column (1) shows the results for a basic regression with the tax rate and fixed time- and state-effects. The tax rate shows a significant positive effect pointing to a semi-elasticity of tax revenues of 0.127. This point

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<sup>7</sup>For a similar approach in the context of local business taxation see Buettner (2003).

<sup>8</sup>For the descriptive statistics, see Tables A-1 to A-3 in the Appendix.

estimate suggests that an increase in the tax rate by 1 percentage point is associated with a revenue increase of 12.7%. Given a mean tax rate of 0.04 in the period of investigation, this amounts to a tax-revenue elasticity of 0.51. Accordingly, tax revenues increase less than proportionally with the tax rate.

Specification (2) adds controls for unemployment and population size. These controls might capture differences in economic conditions that exert confounding effects. Though both controls are found to have significant effects, the estimated parameter for the tax rate is not much different. Other potentially confounding effects might be associated with GDP per capita as indicator of economic activities and with public debt as a potential driver of tax policy. However, according to specification (3) both variables do not show significant effects. Specification (4) uses the log of the tax rate rather than the tax rate. In this specification, which shows a slightly better fit than (3), the slope coefficient directly reveals the elasticity of the tax base. Specification (5) tests whether non-linearities in the influence of the control variables exert effect on the slope parameter. This specification includes cubic polynomials for the unemployment rate, population size, GDP per capita, and public debt per capita. However, the slope parameter for the tax rate is not much affected.

Evaluating the point estimates of the slope parameters at the mean tax rate, I obtain estimates of the elasticity of tax revenues for all specifications. The estimates are provided in Table 2. Even if the elasticity implied by specification (4) is slightly larger than the elasticities implied by the other specifications, the 95% confidence interval [.304 , .832] indicates that not only a zero elasticity but also a unit elasticity can be rejected. This implies that the deadweight loss associated with raising this tax is not negligible.

Formally, the specification (4) suggests that the elasticity of the tax base  $\hat{\eta}$  is about .4 or larger. The literature on the taxable income elasticities (*e.g.*, Giertz, Saez, Slemrod,

Table 1: Results: Basic Specifications

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Tax rate	12.697*** (2.571)	13.260*** (2.576)	12.325*** (2.630)		
Tax rate (logs)				0.569 *** (0.124)	0.544 *** (0.130)
Unemployment rate		-0.033 ** (0.013)	-0.040 ** (0.015)	-0.039 ** (0.015)	
Population size (logs)		2.734 *** (0.824)	3.076 *** (0.980)	3.082 *** (0.964)	
GDP (logs)			-0.338 (0.533)	-0.337 (0.506)	
Public debt (logs)			0.051 (0.046)	0.044 (0.044)	
2003	-0.006 (0.028)	0.029 (0.026)	0.0368 (0.030)	0.036 (0.029)	0.052 (0.036)
2004	-0.042 (0.027)	-0.002 (0.027)	0.009 (0.042)	0.009 (0.041)	0.036 (0.045)
2005	0.003 (0.025)	0.086 *** (0.039)	0.109 * (0.062)	0.109 * (0.060)	0.132 * (0.073)
2006	0.289 *** (0.044)	0.330 *** (0.053)	0.353 *** (0.083)	0.354 *** (0.080)	0.387 *** (0.085)
2007	0.412 *** (0.054)	0.393 *** (0.056)	0.416 *** (0.107)	0.417 *** (0.103)	0.462 *** (0.103)
2008	0.210 *** (0.038)	0.152 *** (0.042)	0.172 (0.106)	0.175 (0.103)	0.230 (0.104)
2009	0.024 (0.041)	-0.022 (0.048)	-0.013 (0.098)	-0.011 (0.095)	0.038 (0.097)
2010	0.057 (0.045)	0.002 (0.041)	0.023 (0.114)	0.023 (0.109)	0.092 (0.111)
2011	0.247 *** (0.037)	0.179 *** (0.049)	0.211 (0.138)	0.206 (0.133)	0.292 * (0.140)
2012	0.329 *** (0.033)	0.263 *** (0.057)	0.305 * (0.154)	0.295 * (0.149)	0.393 ** (0.152)
2013	0.437 *** (0.034)	0.384 *** (0.060)	0.437 ** (0.171)	0.427 ** (0.166)	0.539 *** (0.176)
2014	0.520 *** (0.028)	0.470 *** (0.059)	0.536 *** (0.179)	0.530 *** (0.172)	0.655 *** (0.186)
2015	0.660 *** (0.044)	0.587 *** (0.084)	0.665 *** (0.207)	0.665 *** (0.200)	0.807 *** (0.214)
Observ.	224	224	224	224	224
R <sup>2</sup>	0.900	0.910	0.911	0.912	0.922

Notes: The sample in each year refers to all 16 German states. The period of observations is 2002-2015. The dependent variable is the log of tax revenues from the real estate transfer tax. Specification (5) employs cubic polynomials for the unemployment rate, population size, GDP per capita, and public debt per capita. All specifications include state-fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered by state. Asterisks denote significance at the 1% (\*\*\*), 5% (\*\*), and 10% (\*) levels.

Table 2: Implied Elasticity of Tax Revenues in Basic Specification

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Elasticity	0.503*** (0.102)	0.526*** (0.102)	0.489*** (0.104)	0.569*** (0.124)	0.544*** (0.130)

Notes: Point estimates of the tax-revenue elasticity evaluated at the sample mean of the tax rate, based on parameter estimates of Table 1. For specifications (1)-(3) standard errors in parentheses are obtained using the Delta-Method. Standard errors in case of (4) and (5) are the robust standard errors from Table 1. Asterisks denote significance at the 1% (\*\*\*), 5% (\*\*), and 10% (\*) levels.

2012) finds tax base elasticities ranging from 0.12 to 0.4, in the long-run. Given these estimates, the real estate transfer tax is a rather distortive tax. The estimate implies that the marginal cost of funds with this tax about 1.67. Accordingly, each Euro of additional funds raised through a higher real estate transfer tax is associated with a cost of 1.67 Euro and an increase of the deadweight loss by 67 cents.

Based on the logarithmic specification of Table 1, Table 3 provides results of specifications with various extensions. Column (6) reports results of a specification that includes a spatial lag of the tax rate. As the coefficient proves insignificant, there is no indication of spatial effects, *i.e.* I cannot reject the hypothesis, that fiscal externalities are absent. Column (7) allows for transitory revenue effects in the year before the reform and in the first year, when a higher tax rate is implemented. This specification uses binary indicators for reform years. According to the results, the tax effect is found to be similar as above, and the dummies do not point at temporary revenue gains or losses around implementation. Column (8) takes into account the size of the tax-rate changes. The forward indicator of the tax-rate change in the next year shows a positive effect. The indicator of the tax-rate change in the reform period shows a negative effect. This is in accordance with an anticipation effect on revenues. But the effects are imprecisely estimated, and the joint test is significant only at a probability level of 11%. Columns (9) and (10) extend the specification with higher

Table 3: Results: Spatial and Time Effects

	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Tax rate (logs)	0.568 *** (0.124)	0.594 *** (0.122)	0.681 *** (0.112)	0.566 *** (0.129)	0.658 *** (0.173)
Tax rate (logs), spatial lag	-0.021 (0.125)				
Diff Tax rate (logs), forward			0.147 (0.116)	0.138 (0.116)	0.146 (0.122)
Diff Tax rate (logs)			-0.134 (0.105)	-0.033 (0.116)	-0.115 (0.115)
Diff Tax rate (logs), lag				0.214 ** (0.115)	0.145 (0.091)
Diff Tax rate (logs), 2nd.lag					-0.146 (0.131)
Reform year, forward		0.019 (0.025)			
Reform year		-0.002 (0.017)			
Unemployment rate	-0.040 ** (0.015)	-0.039 ** (0.015)	-0.037 ** (0.016)	-0.039 ** (0.016)	-0.037 ** (0.015)
Population size (logs)	3.100 *** (0.967)	3.096 *** (0.997)	3.055 *** (0.981)	3.076 *** (1.013)	2.984 *** (0.951)
GDP (logs)	-0.338 (0.508)	-0.326 (0.518)	-0.295 (0.502)	-0.292 (0.528)	-0.289 (0.517)
Public debt (logs)	0.043 (0.045)	0.032 (0.046)	0.013 (0.047)	0.026 (0.049)	0.017 (0.049)
Observ.	224	224	224	224	224
R <sup>2</sup>	0.912	0.912	0.913	0.915	0.915

Notes: The sample in each year refers to all 16 German states. The period of observations is 2002-2015. The dependent variable is the log of tax revenues from the real estate transfer tax. All specifications include state- and time-fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered by state. Asterisks denote significance at the 1% (\*\*\*), 5% (\*\*), and 10% (\*) levels.

order lags of the tax-rate change at the reform. As coefficients vary between positive and negative signs, the results point at some revenues fluctuations around the reform. However, these effects are mainly insignificant and the tax-revenue elasticity estimate is not much affected.

## 5 Summary and Conclusion

The paper has explored the welfare cost of the real estate transfer tax from a theoretical as well as an empirical perspective. The theoretical analysis shows how the discouragement of mutually beneficial transactions as well as tax-sheltering activities give rise to a welfare loss that can be estimated comprehensively from the empirical elasticity of the tax base. In the absence of tax planning, the elasticity of the tax base is determined by the hazard rate to deter transactions at the margin. With tax planning, the elasticity of the tax base is also driven by the “technology” of tax sheltering and the associated cost that determines the share of transactions that is avoided.

In order to provide empirical evidence on the welfare cost of real estate transfer taxation, the paper has used the German federation as empirical testing ground, where real estate transfer taxes have recently gained importance as a revenue source. As part of a constitutional reform, the German states obtained the right to increase the local rate of the real estate transfer tax – while keeping the federal real estate transfer tax law unchanged. This has triggered a wave of tax increases. In the time period from 2007 to 2015 among the 16 German states, no less than 25 tax increases occurred. Initially, the tax rate was 3.5% on the sales price. As a consequence of the reform, the median statutory tax rate has moved up and reached a level of 5% in 2013.

The empirical analysis has explored the revenue effects of these tax increases by comparing

revenues before and after each increase. Not surprisingly, the results indicate that revenues have increased – but generally much less than proportionally. On average, an increase of the tax rate by 1 percent is found to result in a revenue gain of about 0.6 percent. Based on this estimate for the elasticity of tax revenues, the associated deadweight loss is rather large. Each additional Euro of revenues raised is associated with an increase of the deadweight loss of about 67 cents.

This finding indicates that the constitutional reform in 2006 has assigned a rather costly tax instruments to the German states. The fact, that the states have nevertheless utilized this tax instrument so heavily in the recent past, may suggest that they are under substantial revenue stress. An alternative explanation is that the states' tax policies disregard or underestimate the economic cost of taxation. This may well be the case, since redistribution among German states provides a fiscal incentive to raise the tax rate. The system of fiscal equalization redistributes tax revenues from states with high to states with low tax-capacity. Since the system does not refer to actual revenues but to standardized tax revenues calculated at an average tax-rate, the additional revenues that result from imposing a higher tax rate to real-estate transfers do not result in a higher tax-capacity. But the adverse impact on the tax base, which reflects the deadweight loss from taxation, depresses the tax capacity of the state. Hence, a state that raises the tax rate tends to receive more equalization grants or has to provide lower contributions to other states.

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Table A-1: Descriptive Statistics

Year	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Tax rate				
2002	.035	0	.035	.035
2003	.035	0	.035	.035
2004	.035	0	.035	.035
2005	.035	0	.035	.035
2006	.035	0	.035	.035
2007	.0356	.0025	.035	.045
2008	.0356	.0025	.035	.045
2009	.0363	.0034	.035	.045
2010	.0377	.0050	.035	.050
2011	.0399	.0053	.035	.050
2012	.0452	.0056	.035	.050
2013	.0475	.0055	.035	.055
2014	.0499	.0075	.035	.065
2015	.0523	.0094	.035	.065
all	.0396		.035	.065
Tax revenues (in Euro per capita)				
2002	53.305	19.848	23.605	81.646
2003	53.591	21.093	21.889	97.987
2004	51.841	20.387	20.780	93.026
2005	53.761	21.021	24.959	104.336
2006	74.069	37.010	30.479	160.799
2007	85.395	47.359	38.221	194.785
2008	67.957	31.647	33.618	146.170
2009	58.174	30.462	22.547	151.690
2010	62.098	32.940	25.154	150.502
2011	76.699	37.897	32.843	176.706
2012	89.020	41.178	39.700	181.193
2013	102.349	47.812	48.239	216.674
2014	114.721	52.224	50.037	231.316
2015	137.112	66.928	57.791	275.467

The sample in each year refers to all 16 German states. The tax rates are obtained from the official announcements of the state governments. Revenue data are from the annual statistics used by the Bundesrat to determine states' fiscal capacity. 2015 uses preliminary data. The population data is obtained from the German Federal Statistical Office. It refers to the end of the year.

Table A-2: Descriptive Statistics, contd.

Year	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
GDP (in Euro per capita)				
2002	25935	85150	170467	486189
2003	26159	85021	173379	486388
2004	26739	85589	177514	495420
2005	27167	87376	179960	505866
2006	28222	87914	186186	510466
2007	29542	89738	198476	524830
2008	30216	90587	205934	537942
2009	29006	83549	201647	515798
2010	30433	86269	212379	531594
2011	31923	88139	222698	543589
2012	32765	90561	225901	558678
2013	33694	94349	234548	587184
2014	34623	96771	240196	601516
2015	35773	99572	249088	617294
Unemployment				
2002	12.9	5.21	6.1	20.9
2003	13.9	5.25	6.9	21.8
2004	14.0	5.21	6.9	22.1
2005	15.2	4.67	7.8	22.1
2006	13.8	4.61	7.1	20.8
2007	11.7	4.26	5.5	18.1
2008	10.3	3.74	4.6	16.1
2009	10.5	3.40	5.5	16.4
2010	9.87	3.08	5.1	15.8
2011	9.31	3.08	4.3	15.5
2012	8.84	2.91	4.2	14.5
2013	8.81	2.67	4.4	13.9
2014	8.48	2.48	4.3	13.2
2015	8.08	2.29	4.1	12.6

Notes: The sample in each year refers to all 16 German states. The GDP figures are obtained from the Regional Accounts of the German Statistical Offices at federal and state level based on ESA 2010. They refer to current prices. The unemployment rates are taken from the Federal Employment Service. They refer to annual averages of registered unemployed related to total civil-sector work force. It is expressed in percent.

Table A-3: Descriptive Statistics, contd.

Year	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Public Debt (in Euro per capita)				
2002	5716	3247	1479	13464
2003	6160	3589	1552	14505
2004	6671	3935	1637	16003
2005	7118	4262	1709	17012
2006	7575	4602	1852	18564
2007	7836	4919	1848	20148
2008	7932	5089	1820	21578
2009	8003	5372	1766	23084
2010	8397	5671	1649	24256
2011	8781	6116	1542	26714
2012	9019	6421	1367	28086
2013	9243	6741	1218	29539
2014	9384	6950	991	30170
2015	9408	7140	776	31045
Population				
2002	5145344	4798787	660569	1.80e+07
2003	5154671	4821935	660722	1.81e+07
2004	5157372	4835541	662731	1.81e+07
2005	5156154	4842903	662451	1.81e+07
2006	5154251	4849194	662734	1.81e+07
2007	5148247	4850591	664258	1.80e+07
2008	5141293	4850728	662940	1.80e+07
2009	5132914	4848091	661793	1.80e+07
2010	5116366	4835161	660083	1.79e+07
2011	5109420	4832352	659561	1.79e+07
2012	5078522	4810355	656398	1.77e+07
2013	5056284	4796158	655062	1.76e+07
2014	5036605	4782798	654581	1.75e+07
2015	5057814	4805622	658002	1.76e+07

Notes: The sample in each year refers to all 16 German states. The public debt figure refers to the state and includes regular debt (*Kreditmarktschulden im Kernhaushalt*) at the beginning of the year. Population refers to the beginning of the year. Data is obtained from the Regional Accounts of the German Statistical Offices at federal and state level based on ESA 2010.