

Karp, Larry; Zhang, Jiangfeng

Working Paper

Controlling a stock pollutant with endogenous investment and asymmetric information

Nota di Lavoro, No. 95.2001

Provided in Cooperation with:

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Suggested Citation: Karp, Larry; Zhang, Jiangfeng (2001) : Controlling a stock pollutant with endogenous investment and asymmetric information, Nota di Lavoro, No. 95.2001, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milano

This Version is available at:

<https://hdl.handle.net/10419/155258>

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:

Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.

Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.

Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.

Terms of use:

Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal and scholarly purposes.

You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public.

If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence.



Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

Controlling a Stock Pollutant with Endogenous Investment and Asymmetric Information

Larry Karp* and Jiangfeng Zhang*

NOTA DI LAVORO 95.2001

DECEMBER 2001

CLIM – Climate Change Modelling and Policy

*Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics,
University of California.

This paper can be downloaded without charge at:

The Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Note di Lavoro Series Index:
http://www.feem.it/web/activ/_activ.html

Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection:
<http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=XXXXXX>

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
Corso Magenta, 63, 20123 Milano, tel. +39/02/52036934 – fax +39/02/52036946
E-mail: letter@feem.it
C.F. 97080600154

SUMMARY

Non-strategic firms with rational expectations make investment and emissions decisions. The investment rule depends on firms' beliefs about future emissions policies. We compare emissions taxes and quotas when the (strategic) regulator and (nonstrategic) firms have asymmetric information about abatement costs, and all agents use Markov Perfect decision rules. Emissions taxes create a secondary distortion at the investment stage, unless a particular condition holds; emissions quotas do not create a secondary distortion. We solve a linear-quadratic model calibrated to represent the problem of controlling green-house gases. The endogeneity of investment favors taxes, and it increases abatement.

Keywords: Pollution control, investment, uncertainty, rational expectations, choice of instruments

JEL: C61, D8, H21, Q28

CONTENTS

1.	Introduction	1
2.	The basics	3
3.	The game	5
	3.1 The firm's emission and investment responses	5
	3.2 The regulator's problem	7
	3.3 The equilibrium	8
4.	Finding the Markov perfect equilibrium	9
	4.1 The time-consistency problem	9
	4.2 An auxiliary control problem	10
	4.3 Social optimality of the Markov perfect rules	12
5.	The linear-quadratic model	14
	5.1 Regulated emissions and investment	15
	5.2 A limiting case: flow externality	16
6.	An application to global warming	18
	6.1 Model calibration	19
	6.2 Numerical results	22
7.	Conclusions	27
8.	Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1	28
9.	Appendix B: Calibration details	30
	References	32

1 Introduction

The possible relation between carbon stocks and global warming has led to a renewed interest in the problem of controlling emissions when there is asymmetric information about abatement costs. If environmental damages are related to the stock of pollution, as with global warming, the *regulator's* problem is dynamic. Most of the current literature on this dynamic problem assumes that nonstrategic *firms* solve a succession of static problems. If, however, a firm's abatement costs depend on the stock of abatement capital, the firm makes a dynamic investment decision as well as the static emissions decision. We study the regulatory problem with asymmetric information when firms invest in abatement capital. Nonstrategic firms and the regulator solve coupled dynamic problems.

For a variety of pollution problems, capital costs comprise a large part of total abatement costs (Vogan [28]) and investment in abatement capital depends on the regulatory environment. In these cases, the endogeneity of investment is an important aspect of the regulatory problem. Several recent papers (Buonanno et al. [2], Goulder and Mathai [5], Goulder and Schneider [6], and Nordhaus [24]) assume that the regulator can choose emissions and also induce firms to provide the first-best level of investment, e.g. by means of an investment tax/subsidy.

We consider the situation where the regulator has a single policy, either an emissions tax or a quota. This assumption is consistent with many regulations and proposals that involve an emissions policy but ignore endogenous investment (e.g., the Kyoto Protocol). In virtually any real-world problem, the regulator is likely to have fewer instruments than targets. Our model is an example of this general disparity between the number of instruments and targets, and therefore is empirically relevant. The restriction enables us to compare our results to those of previous papers that study the asymmetric information, stock pollutant problem in the absence of investment in abatement capital (Hoel and Karp [7] [8], Karp and Zhang [13], and Newell and Pizer [21]). We identify a previously unrecognized difference between taxes and quantity restrictions, and we provide a simple means of solving the regulatory problem when a certain condition holds. We now describe the problem in more detail.

In each period the representative firm observes a cost shock that is private information. If this cost shock is serially correlated, the regulator learns something about its current value by observing past behavior. The firm knows the current value of the cost shock and therefore is better informed than the regulator. Both types of agents obtain information over time. We assume that the regulator conditions the current emissions policy only on payoff-relevant in-

formation: aggregate capital and pollution stocks and (the regulator's) beliefs about the cost shock. The regulator cannot make binding commitments regarding future policies; that is, we restrict policies to be Markov Perfect. Firms have rational expectations; they take the current emissions policy as given and they understand how the regulator chooses future policies. The non-atomic representative firm is not able to affect the economy-wide variables that determine future policies. The firm therefore behaves non-strategically (but not myopically), and uses Markov policies.

The regulator understands that future emissions policies affect the current shadow value of abatement capital and thus affect current investment. Therefore, the regulator might want to commit to future policies as a means of affecting current investment. This incentive is the source of the familiar time-consistency problem. Our setting has the usual ingredients that lead to this problem: the regulator has a second-best instrument (the emissions tax or quota) and he wants to influence forward-looking agents. If the private level of investment is socially optimal, then the regulator has no desire to alter it. In that case, there is no time-consistency problem. If however, the regulator's emissions policy creates a secondary distortion at the investment stage, the time-consistency problem does arise. In that case, the Markov restriction is binding and we need to solve an equilibrium problem (a dynamic game between the regulator and non-strategic firms) rather than a relatively simple dynamic optimization problem. In other words, the type of problem that we need to solve – an equilibrium problem or an optimization problem – depends on whether the Markov Perfect emissions policy (the tax or quota) causes a secondary distortion in investment.

We show that the time-consistency problem does not arise when the regulator uses an emissions quota. It does arise when the regulator uses a tax, unless the primitive functions satisfy a separability condition.

This result is useful for two reasons. First, when the separability condition holds, we can solve the dynamic game by solving a much simpler dynamic optimization problem that combines elements of the regulator's and the firms' optimization problems. The separability condition holds for an important special case that has been used to study the problem of regulation of a stock pollutant under asymmetric information. We generalize this special case by including endogenous investment. Second, under plausible circumstances the separability condition does not hold. In these cases, an emissions tax creates a secondary investment distortion, whereas the emissions quota does not. Thus, we have identified a difference between taxes and

quotas that has previously been unnoticed.

We apply our results to global warming model in which the separability condition holds. In addition to confirming the robustness of previous results, we show that the endogeneity of investment encourages stricter abatement, and that it favors the use of taxes over quotas. Optimal abatement levels in our model are similar to levels proposed by the Kyoto Protocol.

The next two sections describe the problem. We then establish the time-consistency results described above, and we show how to solve the game by solving a control problem. We apply this method to a linear-quadratic model, which we then specialize in order to study the problem of greenhouse gasses. We review previous comparisons of taxes and quotas in this linear-quadratic setting, and then discuss how these results change when investment is endogenous.

2 The Basics

The stock of pollutant at the beginning of period t is S_{t-1} and the flow of emissions in period t is x_t . The fraction $0 \leq \Delta \leq 1$ of the pollutant stock lasts into the next period, so the growth equation for S_t is:

$$S_t = \Delta S_{t-1} + x_t. \quad (1)$$

The period t stock-related environmental damage equals $D_t = D(S_{t-1})$, with $D' > 0$, $D'' > 0$.

We normalize the number of representative firms to unity. In this section we make no distinction between the firm's and the aggregate levels of emissions and investment. Investment in period t becomes available in the subsequent period. The representative firm's benefit from emissions is a function of emissions, x_t , abatement capital K_{t-1} , and a random cost shock θ_t : $B_t = B(K_{t-1}, \theta_t, x_t)$.

We can think of the function $B(\cdot)$ as a restricted profit function in which input and output prices are suppressed. Alternatively, we can interpret $B(\cdot)$ as the amount of abatement costs that the firm avoids. For the latter interpretation, define x_t^b as the Business-as-Usual (BAU) level of emissions, i.e. the level of emissions under the status quo. Define $a_t = x_t^b - x_t$ as the level of abatement, i.e. the reduction in emissions due to a new regulatory policy. The additional abatement costs associated with the new regulations are $A_t = A(K_{t-1}, \theta_t, a_t)$. If x_t^b is a function of (K_{t-1}, θ_t) , we can rewrite the abatement cost function as $A(K_{t-1}, \theta_t, a_t) = B(K_{t-1}, \theta_t, x_t)$, with $A_a(\cdot) = -B_x(\cdot)$: marginal abatement costs equal the negative of the marginal benefit of emissions.

The benefit function is increasing and concave in x and K and increasing in θ ($B_K > 0$, $B_\theta > 0$, $B_x > 0$, $B_{KK} < 0$, $B_{xx} < 0$). More abatement capital decreases the marginal cost of abatement and therefore lowers the marginal benefit of pollution, so $B_{xK} < 0$. A higher cost shock increases the marginal benefits of abatement capital and pollution: $B_{K\theta} \geq 0$, $B_{x\theta} \geq 0$.

At time t only the firm knows the value of the random cost shock θ_t ; there is persistent asymmetric information. All agents know the stochastic process for the cost shock, which we assume is $AR(1)$:

$$\theta_t = \rho\theta_{t-1} + \mu_t, \quad \mu_t \sim iid(0, \sigma_\mu^2), \quad \forall t \geq 1, \quad (2)$$

with $-1 < \rho < 1$. The sequence $\{\mu_t\}$ ($t \geq 1$) is generated by an i.i.d. random process with zero mean and common variance σ_μ^2 . At time 0 the regulator has a subjective prior for the initial cost shock θ_0 , with mean $\bar{\theta}_0$ and variance σ_0^2 ; θ_0 and μ_t ($\forall t \geq 1$) are independent. At time $t \geq 1$ his variance for the current shock is σ_μ^2 provided that he has learned the value of the previous shock.¹

The representative firm invests in abatement capital to reduce future abatement costs, i.e. to increase future benefits from pollution. The flow of investment in period t is I_t . The fraction of abatement capital that lasts into the next period is $0 \leq \delta \leq 1$, so the growth equation for K_t is:

$$K_t = \delta K_{t-1} + I_t. \quad (3)$$

The cost of investment, $C_t = C(I_t, K_{t-1})$, is increasing and convex in I_t . This convexity means that abatement capital does not adjust instantaneously. A greater degree of convexity implies that capital adjusts more slowly.

The endogeneity of the investment decision means that the marginal abatement cost function, $-B_x(\cdot)$, changes endogenously. Slower adjustment of abatement capital means that it is optimal to adjust emissions more slowly.

¹This (possible) change in the regulator's variance, between the initial and all subsequent periods, makes the agents' decision problems nonstationary. This non-stationarity is uninteresting because it vanishes after the first period. A more exact notation for the value functions and policy rules below would include an indicator function identifying whether we are in the first or in a subsequent period. We do not include such a function because it clutters the notation without adding anything of substance.

3 The Game

In this section it is helpful to distinguish between the representative firm's level of capital and the aggregate level of capital. We denote the former by k and the latter by k^A . Where there is no danger of confusion, we denote both using K . Since we normalize the number of representative firms to 1, $k^A = k = K$. The representative firm understands that it controls k , and that this variable affects its payoff directly, via the function $B(\cdot)$. This firm takes the aggregate level of capital k^A as exogenous; k^A has no direct effect on the firm's payoff. However, in a Markov Perfect equilibrium, where the regulator conditions policies on payoff-relevant information, k^A affects the firm's beliefs about future policies.

In order to avoid a proliferation of notation, we do not distinguish between the firm's level of emissions and the aggregate level of emissions. However, it is important to bear in mind that the firm treat aggregate emissions, and therefore the aggregate pollution stock, as exogenous.

The regulator always uses taxes or always uses quotas. The period t policy is the tax p_t or the quota x_t . At time t the regulator knows the aggregate capital stock k_{t-1}^A , the pollution stock S_{t-1} and (as we explain below), the lagged cost shock θ_{t-1} . These are the payoff-relevant variables for the regulator. In a Markov Perfect rational expectations equilibrium, the representative firm takes the current level of the regulatory policy (at time t) as given; it understands that the policy at time $\tau > t$ will be a function of $(k_{\tau-1}^A, S_{\tau-1}, \theta_{\tau-1})$. Since the firm takes these conditioning variables to be exogenous, it treats future policies as exogenous. This firm chooses investment I_t under both policies, and it chooses the level of emissions if the regulator uses a tax.

In view of the timing conventions in the model, the regulator's current (tax or quota) policy influences the firm's current emission, but not the current level of investment. Investment depends on the firm's beliefs about *future* policies.

3.1 The Firm's Emission and Investment Responses

The firm wants to maximize the expectation of the present value of the stream of cost saving from polluting (B) minus investment cost (C) minus pollution tax payments (under taxes). The constant discount factor is β , and we use the superscripts T and Q to distinguish functions and variables under taxes and quotas.

Taxes. The firm's value function under taxes, $V^T(k_{t-1}, \theta_t, p_t; S_{t-1}, k_{t-1}^A)$, solves the dy-

namic programming equation (DPE)

$$V^T(k_{t-1}, \theta_t, p_t; S_{t-1}, k_{t-1}^A) = \max_{x_t, I_t} \{B(k_{t-1}, \theta_t, x_t) - p_t x_t - C(I_t, k_{t-1}) \\ + \beta E_t [V^T(k_t, \theta_{t+1}, p_{t+1}; S_t, k_t^A)]\},$$

subject to the equation of motion for the cost shock (2), the capital stock (3), and the pollution stock (1). The firm's expectation at t of θ_{t+1} and p_{t+1} is conditioned on the payoff-relevant variables $(k_{t-1}^A, \theta_t, S_{t-1})$.

We assume that optimal decisions are interior. The optimal level of emissions solves a static problem with the following first-order condition

$$B_x(k_{t-1}, \theta_t, x_t) - p_t = 0. \quad (4)$$

Solving for x , we obtain the optimal emission response

$$x_t^* = \chi(k_{t-1}, \theta_t, p_t) \equiv \chi_t. \quad (5)$$

The optimal level of investment equates the marginal cost of investment and the discounted shadow value of abatement capital. Setting $k^A = k = K$, the stochastic Euler equation is²

$$\beta E_t \{B_K(K_t, \theta_{t+1}, \chi_{t+1}) - C_K(I_{t+1}, K_t) + \delta C_I(I_{t+1}, K_t)\} - C_I(I_t, K_{t-1}) = 0. \quad (6)$$

This second-order difference equation has two boundary conditions, the current abatement capital K_{t-1} , and the transversality condition

$$\lim_{T \rightarrow \infty} E_t \{\beta^{T-t} C_I(I_T, K_{T-1}) K_T\} = 0. \quad (7)$$

Quotas. Firms are homogeneous and quotas are not bankable. Thus, under a quota policy, there is no incentive to trade permits. We assume that the quota level is binding with probability 1.³ The firm solves the DPE

$$V^Q(k_{t-1}, \theta_t, x_t; S_{t-1}, k_{t-1}^A) = \max_{I_t} \{B(k_{t-1}, \theta_t, x_t) - C(I_t, k_{t-1}) \\ + \beta E_t V^Q(k_t, \theta_{t+1}, x_{t+1}; S_t, k_t^A)\}.$$

²For all of the control problems, we merely write the Euler equation since the derivations are standard. The first order condition of the DPE with respect to I_t provides one equation. In this first order condition, the firm's expectation of p_{t+1} is independent of its investment. This independence reflects the fact that the firm is unable to affect aggregate capital or pollution stock, and therefore cannot affect values of the variables that affect future regulation. We differentiate the DPE with respect to k_{t-1} , using the envelope theorem, to obtain a second equation. Combining these two equations gives the stochastic Euler equation.

³Costello and Karp [3] consider a static model (without trade in quotas) in which quotas may be binding with probability less than 1. Karp and Zhang [13] show how the dynamic problem (when quotas are binding with probability 1) can be modified to account for heterogenous cost shocks and trade in permits.

Again, the firm's beliefs about the quota in the next period depend on $(k_{t-1}^A, \theta_t, S_{t-1})$.

The optimal level of investment solves the stochastic Euler equation

$$\beta E_t \{B_K(K_t, \theta_{t+1}, x_{t+1}) - C_K(I_{t+1}, K_t) + \delta C_I(I_{t+1}, K_t)\} - C_I(I_t, K_{t-1}) = 0, \quad (8)$$

and the transversality condition (7).

The investment rule Under either taxes or quotas, the representative firm's investment rule at time t is a function of $(k_{t-1}, \theta_t; S_{t-1}, k_{t-1}^A)$. When there is no danger of confusion, we write the investment rule as $I^j(K_{t-1}, \theta_t, S_{t-1})$, $j = T, Q$ (for tax or quota). Under both taxes and quotas, the current level of investment depends on beliefs about future policy levels, but it does not depend on the current policy level.

3.2 The Regulator's Problem

The regulator's payoff equals the payoff to the representative firm net of taxes, minus environmental damages. The regulator maximizes the expectation of the present discounted value of the flow of the payoff, i.e. the expectation of

$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t (B(K_{t-1}, \theta_t, x_t) - C(I_t, K_{t-1}) - D(S_{t-1})).$$

His policy (always a tax or always a quota) can be a function of (only) payoff-relevant variables: the current stocks of pollution and capital, and the regulator's current information about the cost shock. Under taxes the regulator knows that equation (5) determines emissions. Under either policy, he knows that investment is given by $I^j(K_{t-1}, \theta_t, S_{t-1})$, $j = T, Q$.

The regulator takes as given the investment rule and (under taxes) the emissions rule. At time t the regulator observes the aggregate stocks S_{t-1}, K_{t-1} . The past cost shock provides information about the current shock if and only if $\rho \neq 0$. Under taxes, the regulator learns the previous cost by observing the response to the previous tax (via equation (5)). Provided that $B_{K\theta} \neq 0$ the regulator who uses quotas can learn the previous cost shock by observing the level of investment in the previous period, i.e. by inverting the investment function $I^Q(\cdot)$. From equation (8), $B_{K\theta} \neq 0$ means that current investment depends on beliefs about future cost shocks. When $\rho \neq 0$ these beliefs – and therefore current investment – depend on the current cost shock.

If $B_{K\theta} \neq 0$, as we hereafter assume, taxes and quotas provide the same information about the previous cost shock, and thus about the current cost shock. Neither policy has an informa-

tional advantage. Of course, using observed emissions (under taxes) to infer the past cost shock requires only that the regulator solve the first order condition of a static problem. Using observed investment (under quotas) to infer the past cost shock requires that the regulator knows the function $I^Q(K_{t-1}, \theta_t, S_{t-1})$; that requires the solution of the entire equilibrium. Thus, although both policies have the same informational content (unless $\rho \neq 0$ and $B_{K\theta} = 0$), this information is easier to extract under taxes.

The regulator's decision rule is a function $z^i(K_{t-1}, \theta_t, S_{t-1}), j = T, Q$ that determines the current tax ($j = T$) or quota ($j = Q$) as a function of his current information, given his beliefs about the firm's decision rules.

3.3 The Equilibrium

Both the regulator and the representative firm solve stochastic control problems; the exact problem that one agent solves depends on the solution to the other agent's problem. The rational expectations equilibrium investment rule for the firm depends on the regulator's policy rule, and that policy rule depends on the equilibrium investment rule. The investment and the regulatory decision rules generate a random sequence of pollution and capital stocks. Agents have rational expectations about these random variables.

An equilibrium consists of a (possibly non-unique) pair of decision rules $I^{j*}(K_{t-1}, \theta_t, S_{t-1})$ and $z^{j*}(K_{t-1}, \theta_t, S_{t-1})$ for $j = T, Q$ that are mutually consistent; the superscript “*” indicates equilibrium functions. Hereafter we refer to $I^{j*}(K_{t-1}, \theta_t, S_{t-1})$, and $z^{j*}(K_{t-1}, \theta_t, S_{t-1})$ as Markov Perfect policy rules.

Modern computational methods make it possible to (approximately) solve these kinds of dynamic equilibrium problems, i.e. to find a fixed point in function space. (See, for example, Judd [11], Marimon and Scott [17], Miranda and Fackler [19].) These fixed point problems are not trivial, especially when the state space has more than one dimension – it has three in our problem.⁴

⁴If the functions $B(\cdot)$, $C(\cdot)$, and $D(\cdot)$ are linear-quadratic, we know that there exist linear equilibrium decision rules. In that case, the original equilibrium problem requires finding coefficients of linear decision rules that solve a fixed point problem. Our earlier work (Karp and Zhang [14], Zhang [31]) solves this problem with the help of the Schur decomposition. The implementation (as opposed to the description) of the algorithm is complicated, and the algorithm leads only to an approximate solution. We abandoned this direct approach of solving the equilibrium problem when we discovered the simpler and more general approach described in the next section.

4 Finding the Markov Perfect Equilibrium

In many cases, the type of model described in the previous section must be solved as an equilibrium problem rather than as an optimization problem. The next subsection explains why this complication might arise. Using an auxiliary control problem in which the regulator has two policy instruments, we then identify conditions under which the model *can* be solved as a straightforward optimization problem.

4.1 The Time-Consistency Problem

In general, the regulator might want to announce a rule that would determine future levels of the tax or quota. The purpose of such an announcement would be to alter the firm's investment rule – as distinct from altering a stock that appears as an argument of the investment rule. The inability to make binding commitments, and the Markov assumption, exclude this possibility. In a rational expectations equilibrium, current investment depends on beliefs about future policies, and these beliefs depend on the pollution stock. By choice of the current quota or tax level, the regulator affects the future pollution stock, which can affect future investment. Under our assumptions, the only means by which the regulator can influence future levels of investment is by influencing the future level of the pollution stock.

Consider a simpler problem without asymmetric information, where a representative firm with rational expectations makes investment decisions. The firm's optimal decisions depend on its beliefs about future regulations, and the regulator wants to influence the firm's decisions. If the regulator has a first best policy (defined as one that does not cause secondary distortions), he can induce the firm to select exactly the decisions that the regulator would have used, had he been in a position to choose them directly. In that case, the regulatory problem can be solved as standard optimization problem. If, however, the regulator has only a second-best policy, the familiar time-consistency problem arises. (See Xie [30] for a recent discussion of this problem, and references.) The Markov restriction is binding in this setting, so finding the equilibrium requires solving an equilibrium problem rather than a standard optimization problem.

The presence of asymmetric information in our model leads to the possibility of time-inconsistency of the optimal emissions tax or quota. We know from the literature on principal-agent problems that with asymmetric information, non-linear policies are generally superior to either the linear tax or the quota: neither the linear tax nor the quota is typically the information-

constrained first best policy. We showed above that the firm's investment depends on its beliefs about future policies. Since the regulator has two targets, (emissions and investment) and only one instrument (which is typically inferior to some non-linear policy), it appears that the regulator *might* want to use future emissions taxes or quotas to influence the firm's current investment decision. In that case, the information-constrained first best tax or quota would be time-inconsistent: the ability to make commitments about future taxes or quotas would enable the regulator to achieve a higher payoff than under the Markov restriction. If this were the case, we would not be able to obtain a Markov Perfect equilibrium merely by solving a dynamic optimization problem, but would instead have to solve the equilibrium problem described in the previous section.

4.2 An Auxiliary Control Problem

This subsection describes an auxiliary control problem that helps identify conditions under which the Markov Perfect equilibrium can be obtained by solving an optimization problem. In this control problem, in each period the regulator sets an emissions tax or quota using the same information as in the game; later in the same period he observes the current cost shock and then chooses investment directly. (In contrast, in the game the regulator chooses only an emissions policy.) The ability to control current investment directly, knowing the current cost shock, eliminates any incentive to use future emissions policies to control current investment.

In this setting, it does not matter whether the regulator chooses investment directly (e.g. by command and control), or decentralizes this decision by means of an investment tax/subsidy. In the former case, firms make no investment decision, and in the latter case, firms merely carry out the optimal investment decision induced by the investment tax/subsidy.

As an aid to intuition, it is useful to think of decentralizing the optimal investment decision (from the auxiliary problem) using an investment tax/subsidy. The *optimal* investment tax/subsidy is identically 0 if and only if Markov Perfect rules are equivalent to the optimal policy rules in the auxiliary problem. With an identically zero investment tax, agents have exactly the same optimization problem as in the game. It is optimal to use a non-zero investment tax/subsidy if and only if the Markov Perfect policies do not solve the auxiliary problem.

The Markov Perfect equilibrium investment rule is conditioned on $(K_{t-1}, \theta_t, S_{t-1})$, whereas the emissions rule is conditioned on $(K_{t-1}, \theta_{t-1}, S_{t-1})$. Consequently, in the auxiliary problem we need to consider a two-stage optimization within each period. At the beginning of the

period the regulator knows $(K_{t-1}, \theta_{t-1}, S_{t-1})$ and chooses the emissions policy (a tax or quota); the regulator then learns θ_t and chooses the level of investment (equivalently, the investment tax/subsidy).

It does not matter whether this time-line is “plausible”. We use this problem only as a means of finding conditions under which the Markov Perfect rules can be obtained by solving a control problem. If the Markov Perfect investment rule is equivalent to the investment rule in the auxiliary problem, then a regulator who had to choose investment (or an investment tax/subsidy) before knowing θ_t would obviously prefer to allow firms to choose investment; i.e., the regulator would use a zero investment tax/subsidy.

We describe the auxiliary control problem when the regulator uses an emissions quota, and then when he uses an emissions tax.

4.2.1 Quotas

The regulator solves the following DPE:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{J}^Q(K_{t-1}, S_{t-1}, \theta_{t-1}) = & \max_{x_t} E_{\theta_t | \theta_{t-1}} \{B(K_{t-1}, \theta_t, x_t) - D(S_{t-1}) \\ & + \max_{I_t} [-C(I_t, K_{t-1}) + \beta \mathcal{J}^Q(K_t, S_t, \theta_t)]\} \end{aligned} \quad (9)$$

subject to equations (1) and (3). The first order condition for the optimal quota is

$$E_{\theta_t | \theta_{t-1}} \{B_x(K_{t-1}, \theta_t, x_t) + \beta \mathcal{J}_S^Q(K_t, S_t, \theta_t)\} = 0 \quad (10)$$

and the Euler equation for investment under quotas is

$$\beta E_{\theta_{t+1} | \theta_t} \{B_K(K_t, \theta_{t+1}, x_{t+1}) - C_K(I_{t+1}, K_t) + \delta C_I(I_{t+1}, K_t)\} - C_I(I_t, K_{t-1}) = 0. \quad (11)$$

The transversality condition is

$$\lim_{T \rightarrow \infty} E_{\theta_T | \theta_t} \{\beta^{T-t} C_I(I_T, K_{T-1}) K_T\} = 0. \quad (12)$$

4.2.2 Taxes

Using the firm’s emission response function (5), the regulator in the auxiliary problem solves the following DPE

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{J}^T(K_{t-1}, S_{t-1}, \theta_{t-1}) = & \max_{p_t} E_{\theta_t | \theta_{t-1}} \{B(K_{t-1}, \theta_t, x_t^*) - D(S_{t-1}) + \\ & \max_{I_t} [-C(I_t, K_{t-1}) + \beta \mathcal{J}^T(K_t, S_t, \theta_t)]\} \end{aligned} \quad (13)$$

subject to equations (1), (3) and (5). We use the definition

$$H_t \equiv [B_x(K_{t-1}, \theta_t, x_t^*) + \beta \mathcal{J}_S^T(K_t, S_t, \theta_t)],$$

and the abbreviation $\chi_t \equiv \chi(K_{t-1}, \theta_t, p_t) = x_t^*$. The function H_t is the social benefit of an additional unit of emissions. With this notation, we can write the first-order condition with respect to p_t as

$$E_{\theta_t | \theta_{t-1}} \left\{ H_t \frac{\partial \chi_t}{\partial p_t} \right\} = 0, \quad (14)$$

and the stochastic Euler equation for investment as

$$\begin{aligned} \beta E_{\theta_{t+1} | \theta_t} \left\{ B_K(K_t, \theta_{t+1}, x_{t+1}^*) - C_K(I_{t+1}, K_t) + \delta C_I(I_{t+1}, K_t) + H_{t+1} \frac{\partial \chi_{t+1}}{\partial K_t} \right\} \\ - C_I(I_t, K_{t-1}) = 0. \end{aligned} \quad (15)$$

The transversality condition is equation (12).

4.3 Social Optimality of the Markov Perfect Rules

Here we find conditions under which the solution to the auxiliary control problem is a Markov Perfect equilibrium to the original game. We refer to the following as the “separability condition” since it requires that $\frac{\partial}{\partial \theta} B_{xx} = \frac{\partial}{\partial \theta} B_{xK} = 0$ when evaluated at the optimal level of emissions:

Condition 1 (Separability) B_{xx} and B_{xK} , evaluated at the optimal x^* , are both independent of the cost shock θ .

We have

Lemma 1 The separability condition is equivalent to the following two conditions: (a) $\frac{\partial \chi(K_{t-1}, \theta_t, p_t)}{\partial p_t}$ is independent of θ_t . (b) $\frac{\partial \chi(K_{t-1}, \theta_t, p_t)}{\partial K_{t-1}}$ is independent of θ_t , where p_t is the emissions tax at time t .

Proof. Totally differentiating the first-order condition (4) gives

$$\frac{\partial \chi_t}{\partial p_t} = \frac{1}{B_{xx}(K_{t-1}, \theta_t, x_t^*)}, \quad \frac{\partial \chi_t}{\partial K_{t-1}} = -\frac{B_{xK}(K_{t-1}, \theta_t, x_t^*)}{B_{xx}(K_{t-1}, \theta_t, x_t^*)}.$$

Condition (a) holds if and only if $B_{xx}(K_{t-1}, \theta_t, x_t^*)$ is independent of θ_t . This independence means that Condition (b) holds if and only if $B_{xK}(K_{t-1}, \theta_t, x_t^*)$ is independent of θ_t . ■

Our main result is the following

Proposition 1 (i) When the regulator uses emissions quotas, the solution to the auxiliary problem (9) is a Markov Perfect equilibrium to the original game. (ii) When the regulator uses emissions taxes, the solution to the auxiliary problem (13) is a Markov Perfect equilibrium to the original game if and only if the separability condition holds.

The proof, contained in Appendix A, verifies that the equilibrium conditions in the games and in the auxiliary problems are identical under the conditions stated in the Proposition.

4.3.1 Discussion of the proposition

When the regulator uses quotas to control emissions, the Markov Perfect investment rule is socially optimal. If the regulator uses taxes to control emissions, the Markov Perfect investment rule is socially optimal provided that the separability condition is satisfied. This condition depends only on the benefit function $B(\cdot)$, not on the damage or the investment cost function. Under the two conditions in Proposition 1, the investment tax that would support the optimal investment (from the auxiliary problem) is identically 0.

Proposition 1 identifies a previously unnoticed difference between taxes and quotas. When the separability condition does not hold, the emissions tax creates a secondary distortion in investment. In these circumstances, private investment is optimal under an emissions quota but not under an emissions tax.

The Proposition also provides a simple way of obtaining the equilibrium for the game when the separability condition holds. This method requires only solving a dynamic optimization problem rather than a dynamic equilibrium problem.

4.3.2 Interpretation of the Separability Condition

Suppose that firms face an investment tax s_t , so their single period payoff is $B(\cdot) - C(\cdot) - s_t I_t - p_t x_t$. By writing the Euler equation for capital stock corresponding to this problem, and comparing it to equation (15), we conclude that the tax supports the socially optimal level of investment if and only if⁵

$$-s_t + \beta \delta E_{\theta_{t+1}|\theta_t} s_{t+1} = \beta E_{\theta_{t+1}|\theta_t} \left\{ H_{t+1} \frac{\partial \chi_{t+1}}{\partial K_t} \right\}. \quad (16)$$

⁵The right side of equation (16) equals the function τ , used in the proof of Proposition 1.

Under the investment tax, an additional unit of investment costs the firm s_t in the current period, but reduces the cost of tax payments by $\beta\delta E_t s_{t+1}$ in the next period. The left side of equation (16) equals the effect of the tax sequence on the marginal incentive to invest in the current period. H_{t+1} is the marginal value to society of an additional unit of emissions in the next period, and $\frac{\partial \chi_{t+1}}{\partial K_t}$ equals the change in emissions in the next period caused by an additional unit of investment in the current period. Thus, the term in brackets in equation (16) is the value to society of the lower future emissions caused by the additional investment. The optimal investment tax sequence induces the firm to internalize the present value of the expectation of this additional social benefit of investment. When the separability condition holds, this additional expected social benefit is identically 0.

Under the optimal emissions quota, the expected social benefit of an additional unit of emissions is 0 in each period (equation (10)). The optimality condition for the emissions tax, on the other hand, requires that an expected marginal change in the tax has 0 social value (equation (14)). This condition implies that the expected social benefit of an additional unit of emissions is 0 if and only if B_{xx} is independent of θ (equivalently, if and only if $\frac{\partial \chi}{\partial p}$ is independent of θ). Even if this independence holds, H_t (the social benefit of an additional unit of emissions) is a random variable, a function of θ . If $\frac{\partial \chi}{\partial K}$ is also a function of θ (i.e., if B_{xK} is not independent of θ), then the social benefit of an additional unit of emissions is correlated with $\frac{\partial \chi}{\partial K}$. In that case, the expected marginal value to society of the lower future emissions caused by the additional investment, is non-zero. Here, the investment externality is non-zero. Consequently, both B_{xx} and B_{xK} must be independent of θ in order for the investment externality to vanish under emissions taxes.

5 The Linear-Quadratic Model

The linear-quadratic model has been widely used both for qualitative and numerical analysis. Here we provide the linear-quadratic model that includes endogenous investment.

The representative firm's benefit function is

$$B(K_{t-1}, \theta_t, x_t) = f_0 + (f_1 + \psi\theta_t) K_{t-1} - \frac{f_2}{2} K_{t-1}^2 + (a - \phi K_{t-1} + \theta_t) x_t - \frac{b}{2} x_t^2$$

with $f_1 > 0$, $f_2 > 0$, $b > 0$, $\psi \geq 0$, $\phi \geq 0$. The function $B(\cdot)$ (which includes the rental cost

of capital) satisfies the separability condition. The cost of changing the level of capital is⁶

$$C(I_t) = \frac{d}{2} (I_t)^2, \quad d > 0.$$

Environmental damages are also quadratic:

$$D(S_{t-1}) = \frac{g}{2} (S_{t-1} - \bar{S})^2$$

where \bar{S} is the stock level that minimizes damages.

The following Remark collects a number of useful facts about the comparison of policies. These results will be obvious to readers familiar with the linear-quadratic control problem, so we state them without proof:

Remark 1 *In this linear-quadratic model with additive errors, the Principle of Certainty Equivalence holds. The expected trajectories of all stock and flow variables are the same under taxes and quotas. The higher moments of these trajectories differ under the two policies. Neither the policy ranking nor the magnitude of the payoff difference depends on the information state $(K_{t-1}, S_{t-1}, \theta_{t-1})$. The magnitude (but not the sign) of the difference in payoffs depends on the parameters σ_0^2 and σ_μ^2 .*

In the static version of this problem, damages are caused by the flow of pollution, shocks are *iid*, and there is no abatement capital. The static linear-quadratic model has properties analogous to those listed in Remark 1. In both the static and the dynamic problems, these properties make it possible to compare policies using a minimum of information (e.g., without using information on the magnitude of uncertainty or stocks).

5.1 Regulated Emissions and Investment

For the linear-quadratic model we obtain an explicit equation for the emissions rule (equation (5)) under taxes:

$$x_t^* = z_t - \frac{\phi}{b} K_{t-1} + \frac{\theta_t}{b}; \quad z_t \equiv \frac{a - p_t}{b}.$$

⁶We can replace the investment cost function with a quadratic function of net rather than gross investment, so that adjustment costs are zero in the steady state. This slightly more plausible model does not lead to any interesting changes in analysis below. However, it complicates the problem of calibrating the model. Therefore we discuss only the model in which adjustment depends on gross investment.

A higher cost shock increases current emissions, and a higher tax or a higher stock of abatement capital decreases emissions.

Using standard methods (e.g. Chapter 14 of Sargent [26]) we can solve the firm's Euler equation ((6) under taxes and (8) under quotas) to write current investment as a linear function of current capital (K_{t-1}) and the firm's expectations of the future cost shocks and policies (taxes or quotas). The optimal investment under emissions taxes is

$$I_t^* = \frac{\lambda\beta f_1}{d\delta(1-\lambda\beta)} + (\lambda - \delta) K_{t-1} \\ + \frac{\lambda\beta}{d\delta} E_t \left[(\psi - \frac{\phi}{b}) \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} (\lambda\beta)^j \theta_{t+1+j} - \phi \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} (\lambda\beta)^j z_{t+1+j} \right]$$

where $0 < \lambda < 1$ is the smaller root of the quadratic equation $\lambda^2 + \frac{h}{\beta}\lambda + \frac{1}{\beta} = 0$ and $h \equiv -\left[\frac{1}{\delta} + \frac{\beta}{d\delta} \left(f_2 - \frac{\phi^2}{b}\right) + \beta\delta\right]$. A lower expected future tax (i.e., a higher value of z_{t+j}) decreases current investment. A higher expected future cost shock increases (decreases) current investment if $\psi - \frac{\phi}{b}$ is positive (negative). Since $B_{K\theta} = \psi > 0$, a higher expected cost shock increases the expected marginal benefit of capital – and thus increases the marginal shadow value of capital. This effect encourages investment. However, a higher expected cost shock increases expected emissions, reducing the expected marginal benefit of capital ($B_{xK} = -\phi < 0$) and discouraging investment. These offsetting effects are exactly balanced if $\psi = \frac{\phi}{b}$, in which case the cost shock has no effect on investment, under emissions taxes.

The optimal investment under emissions quotas is

$$I_t^* = \frac{\mu\beta f_1}{d\delta(1-\mu\beta)} + (\mu - \delta) K_{t-1} \\ + \frac{\mu\beta}{d\delta} E_t \left[\psi \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} (\mu\beta)^j \theta_{t+1+j} - \phi \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} (\mu\beta)^j x_{t+1+j} \right] \quad (17)$$

where $0 < \mu < 1$ is the smaller root of the quadratic equation $\mu^2 + \frac{w}{\beta}\mu + \frac{1}{\beta} = 0$ and $w \equiv -\left(\frac{1}{\delta} + \frac{\beta f_2}{d\delta} + \beta\delta\right)$. Higher expected quotas decrease investment, and higher expected cost shocks increase investment. With quotas, cost shocks have an unambiguous effect, because the firm treats future emissions quotas as exogenous.

5.2 A Limiting Case: Flow Externality

If $\Delta = 0$ the model collapses to the case of a flow externality, in which emissions in the current period cause damages only in the next period: $D(S_{t-1}) = D(x_{t-1})$. By defining $\tilde{D}(x_t) = \beta D(x_t)$ we can write the difference between the benefits and costs of current emissions as $B(K_{t-1}, \theta_t, x_t) - \tilde{D}(x_t)$. This simplification eliminates a state variable (S), making it possible

to obtain some analytic results. We can solve the dynamic programming equations under taxes and quotas and compare the payoffs. (Details of the calculations are available on request).

We noted in Section 3.2 that both policies enable the regulator to acquire the same information about the current cost shock if either of these conditions hold: (a) $\rho = 0$; or (b) $\rho \neq 0$ and $\psi \neq 0$. The last inequality implies that the regulator learns the lagged value of θ by observing investment under quotas – see section 3.2 and equation (17). We show that in either of these two cases, the policy ranking does not depend on the parameters associated with abatement costs. If, however, neither of these two conditions hold (and if in addition quotas are not traded) taxes have an informational advantage. In that case, the policy ranking does depend on the parameters associated with abatement costs.

If $\rho = 0$, the payoff difference under taxes and quotas, is⁷

$$\mathcal{J}^T - \mathcal{J}^Q = \frac{\sigma_0^2}{2b(1-\beta)} \left(1 - \frac{\beta g}{b}\right).$$

If $\rho \neq 0$, and $\psi \neq 0$ the payoff difference is

$$\mathcal{J}^T - \mathcal{J}^Q = \frac{1}{2b} \left(\sigma_0^2 + \frac{\beta}{1-\beta} \sigma_u^2 \right) \left(1 - \frac{\beta g}{b}\right).$$

These expressions reproduce a result in Weitzman's [29] static model and in two dynamic models (Hoel and Karp [7], Karp and Zhang [13]).

If $\rho \neq 0$ and $\psi = 0$, and quotas are not traded, the regulator learns the past cost shock under taxes but not under quotas. Here the payoff difference equals

$$\mathcal{J}^T - \mathcal{J}^Q = \frac{1}{2b} \left(\sigma_0^2 + \frac{\beta}{1-\beta} \sigma_u^2 \right) \left[\Gamma + \left(1 - \frac{\beta g}{b}\right) \right]$$

The function $\Gamma > 0$ embodies the informational advantage of taxes; Γ depends on f_2 , d and δ (among other parameters).

We summarize the implications of these expressions in the following:

Remark 2 (i) When taxes and quotas have the same informational content (i.e., if (a) $\rho = 0$, or if (b) $\rho \neq 0$ and $\psi \neq 0$), the policy ranking depends only on the relative slopes (appropriately discounted) of the marginal benefit and damage functions. (ii) When taxes have an informational advantage (i.e., when neither conditions (a) or (b) in part (i) hold and quotas are not traded) the policy ranking also depends on the parameters associated with abatement capital.

⁷With uncorrelated cost shocks we assume $\theta_t \sim iid(\bar{\theta}_0, \sigma_0^2)$, $\forall t \geq 0$.

The next section considers the problem of a stock-related pollutant. There, even when neither policy has an informational advantage, the policy ranking does depend on the parameters associated with abatement capital – in contrast to Remark 2.i. Here we explain why stock and flow pollutants have this qualitative difference.

As Remark 1 notes, the expected levels of emissions and of investment are the same under taxes and quotas. The first order condition for investment (using equation (9) or (13)) is

$$-C_I(I_t, K_{t-1}) + \beta \mathcal{J}_K^i(K_t, S_t, \theta_t) = 0, \quad i = T, Q.$$

The linear-quadratic structure with additive shocks implies that $\mathcal{J}_K^T(K_t, S_t, \theta_t) \equiv \mathcal{J}_K^Q(K_t, S_t, \theta_t)$: the investment rules under taxes and quotas, conditional on (K_{t-1}, S_t, θ_t) , are identical.

For a stock pollutant, $\mathcal{J}_{K,S}^i \neq 0$, so investment at time t depends on the pollution stock at the beginning of the next period, S_t . That pollution stock depends on current emissions; therefore, emissions in period t affect investment in period t . Conditional on the information at the beginning of a period, the current level of emissions is random under taxes and is a choice variable under quotas. Therefore, conditional on the information at the beginning of a period, the distribution function for the current level of investment differs under the two policies. The expected payoff difference therefore depends on the parameters associated with abatement capital.

In contrast, with a flow pollutant, the current level of emissions has no effect on future payoffs. The shadow value of capital \mathcal{J}_K^i depends only on (K_t, θ_t) . With a flow pollutant, the *current* investment and *current* emissions decisions are decoupled. Therefore, the value to the regulator of the difference in emissions under taxes and quotas does not depend on investment costs.

6 An Application to Global Warming

With a stock externality problem such as global warming, we have three state variables (greenhouse gasses, the capital stock, and the expected cost shock) and therefore cannot obtain an analytic solution. However, using Proposition 1, it is straightforward to solve the tax and quota problems numerically. The resulting control problem is almost standard, except that new information arrives within a period, so there are two stages of optimization within a period. This fact accounts for the nested maximization in equations (9) and (13). For the linear-quadratic

1. Pollutant stock growth	$S_t - \bar{S} = \Delta (S_{t-1} - \bar{S}) + x_t.$
2. Environmental damage	$D(S_{t-1}) = \frac{g}{2} (S_{t-1} - \bar{S})^2.$
3. Abatement capital growth	$K_t = \delta K_{t-1} + I_t.$
4. Investment cost	$C(I_t) = \frac{d}{2} I_t^2.$
5. “Business as usual” emissions	$x_t^b = m_0 - m_1 K_{t-1} + \tilde{\theta}_t.$
6. Abatement cost	$A(x_t) = \frac{b}{2} (x_t^b - x_t)^2.$
7. “General” benefit function	
	$B(K_{t-1}, \theta_t, x_t) = f_0 + (f_1 + \psi \theta_t) K_{t-1} - \frac{f_2}{2} K_{t-1}^2 + (a - \phi K_{t-1} + \theta_t) x_t - \frac{b}{2} x_t^2.$

Parameter restriction:

$$0 \leq \Delta \leq 1, \quad g > 0, \quad 0 \leq \delta \leq 1, \quad d > 0, \quad m_0 > 0, \quad m_1 \geq 0, \quad b > 0.$$

Relation of parameters:

$$\theta_t = b\tilde{\theta}_t, \quad f_0 = -\frac{b}{2}m_0^2, \quad f_1 = bm_0m_1, \quad f_2 = bm_1^2, \quad a = bm_0, \quad \phi = bm_1, \quad \text{and } \psi = \frac{\phi}{b} = m_1.$$

Table 1: The Model of Global Warming.

model, we can solve each of these dynamic programming problems by solving a matrix Riccati equation. (Details are available upon request.)

6.1 Model Calibration

Table 1 describes the model. In order to calibrate the general linear quadratic model described in the previous section, we assume that benefits are equal to the value of abatement cost that the firm avoids by increasing emissions. Abatement costs are a quadratic function of abatement, $x_t^b - x_t$ (row 6), where the BAU emissions x_t^b is a decreasing linear function of abatement capital (row 5). A higher level of abatement capital makes it cheaper to reach a given (low) level of emissions, and also decreases the marginal abatement costs. The cost shock $\tilde{\theta}$ (which is proportional to the random variable θ used above) changes the level of BAU emissions and therefore changes marginal abatement costs. Row 7 of Table 1 repeats the general linear quadratic model; the final row gives the parameter restrictions under which this general model reproduces the special model described in the rows 2–6 of the table.⁸

Table 2 lists baseline parameter values. In presenting the simulation results, we use the

⁸We ignore the effect of $\tilde{\theta}$ on the constant term since the constant has no effect on the regulator’s control.

parameter π , defined as the percentage loss in Gross World Product due to a doubling of greenhouse gasses. This parameter is linearly related to g , the slope of marginal damages. Our baseline parameters assume that $\pi = 1.33$, an estimate that has been widely used (Nordhaus [23]). For comparison, we also discuss results when $\pi = 3.6$ (the average of expert opinions, reported by Nordhaus [22]) and $\pi = 21$ (the maximum of these expert opinions).

Our previous paper (Karp and Zhang [12])⁹ describes the calibration of the growth and damage functions (rows 1 and 2 of Table 1) and of the equation for the random shock (equation (2)). Appendix B reviews this material. Here we discuss only the new calibration material, involving rows 3- 6 of Table 1.

We assume that abatement capital depreciates at an annual rate of 16.25%, the mean of capital stock depreciation rates in 14 OECD countries (Cummins, et al. [4]). This depreciation rate implies that $\delta = 0.85$.

A higher unit of abatement capital decreases the BAU emissions by m_1 units. When $m_1 = 0$, BAU emissions are constant, and abatement capital has no effect on the marginal benefit of pollution (i.e., on marginal abatement costs). In this special case, the firm’s emission decision and investment decision are decoupled, and the firm’s capital stock has no effect on the regulator’s optimal policy. The restriction $m_1 = 0$ therefore reproduces previous linear-quadratic models of global warming.

Our decision to have adjustment costs depend on gross rather than net investment leads to a simple method of calibration. In the absence of additional regulation – i.e., under Business as Usual – firms never invest: $I_t^b = 0, \forall t \geq 0$. If the initial level of abatement capital is positive, the level monotonically decreases over time, so BAU emissions monotonically increase:

$$K_t^b = \delta^{t+1} K_{-1}, \quad x_t^b = m_0 - m_1 K_{t-1}^b + \tilde{\theta}_t = m_0 - m_1 \delta^t K_{-1} + \tilde{\theta}_t,$$

where $K_{-1} > 0$ is the abatement capital at the beginning of the initial period ($t = 0$). Our assumptions provide a simple way to include endogenous investment, and also to reproduce the stylized fact that BAU emissions will increase. The model is “incomplete”, since it does not explain why $K_{-1} > 0$. The expected future BAU atmospheric CO₂ stock is:

$$S_t = \Delta^{t+1} S_{-1} - m_1 K_{-1} \frac{\delta^t \left[1 - \left(\frac{\Delta}{\delta} \right)^{t+1} \right]}{1 - \frac{\Delta}{\delta}} + \left[m_0 + (1 - \Delta) \bar{S} \right] \frac{1 - \Delta^{t+1}}{1 - \Delta}, \quad (18)$$

⁹That paper studies the problem in which the regulator learns about the relation between pollution stocks and environmental damages; there we ignore abatement capital.

Parameter	Note	Value
β	a continuous discount rate of 5%	0.9512
Δ	pollutant stock persistence	0.9917
δ	capital stock persistence	0.85
π	the percentage loss in GWP from doubling \bar{S}	1.33
g	slope of the marginal damage billion \$/(billion tons of carbon) ²	0.0022
b	slope of the marginal abatement cost, billion \$/(billion tons of carbon) ²	26.992
d	slope of the marginal investment cost, billion \$	703.31
m_0	intercept of the BAU emissions, billion tons of carbon	12.466
m_1	slope of the BAU emissions, (billion tons of carbon)/(billion \$)	0.7266
ρ	cost correlation coefficient	0.90
σ_μ	standard deviation of cost shock, \$/ton of carbon)	1.7275
x_0^b	current CO ₂ emissions into the atmosphere billion tons of carbon	5.20
\bar{S}	preindustrial stock, billion tons of carbon	590
S_{-1}	current pollutant stock, billion tons of carbon	781
K_{-1}	initial capital stock, billion \$	10

Table 2: Parameter Values for the Baseline Model.

where S_{-1} is the pollutant stock at the beginning of the initial period.

The current anthropogenic fluxes of CO₂ into the atmosphere is 5.2 GtC¹⁰ so we set $Ex_0^b = m_0 - m_1 K_{-1} = 5.2$ to obtain one calibration equation. The *IPCC IS92a* scenario projects BAU CO₂ stocks at 1500 GtC in 2100 (IPCC [10], page 23). This estimate, equation (18), and the estimate of current atmospheric CO₂ concentration at $S_{-1} = 781$ GtC (Keeling et al. [15]), gives a second calibration equation. The two equations imply

$$m_0 = 12.466, \quad m_1 K_{-1} = 7.2661.$$

We have no data on abatement capital, so we choose an arbitrary value for K_{-1} .¹¹ We set $K_{-1} = 10$.

We choose the baseline values of d (the slope of the marginal investment cost) and b (the slope of the marginal abatement cost) to satisfy a scenario in which firms are required to maintain emissions at the current level in each period. Firms begin with the initial abatement capital and solve an infinite horizon investment problem to minimize the present discounted sum of investment and abatement cost under emission stabilization. In order to determine the two unknown parameters, we assume: (1) The annualized discounted present value of firms' total (abatement-related) costs is about 1% of 1998 GWP (Manne and Richels [16]).¹² (2) In the steady state the ratio of investment costs to total abatement costs is about 0.5 (Vogan [28]). These two assumptions lead to the baseline parameter values: $d = 703.31$, and $b = 26.992$.

6.2 Numerical Results

We begin by summarizing results from earlier static and dynamic models. We then discuss results that are directly related to abatement capital.

¹⁰We use “current” to mean the year 2000. The current total anthropogenic CO₂ emissions are about 8.12 GtC, which equals the sum of 6.518 GtC of global CO₂ emissions from fossil fuel combustion and cement production (Marland et. al. [18]) and 1.6 GtC annual average net CO₂ emissions from changes in tropical land-use (IPCC [10]). We obtain the current anthropogenic fluxes of CO₂ into the atmosphere 5.20 GtC by multiplying the total anthropogenic emissions by 0.64, the marginal atmospheric retention ratio.

¹¹Even for pollution problems that have been studied in more detail, data on abatement capital is difficult or impossible to obtain. For example, Becker and Henderson [1] note the absence of estimates of abatement capital stocks associated with U.S. air quality regulation.

¹²Manne and Richels [16] estimate that the total global costs of stabilizing CO₂ emissions at the 1990 level are about 4,560 billions of 1990 US dollars, or 20.25% of the 1990 GWP. We take the same percentage loss and use the annualized value $(1 - \beta) \times 20.25\% = 1\%$.

6.2.1 Previous results

Previous papers study the relation between the policy ranking and parameters in the linear-quadratic model with additive errors (Hoel and Karp [7], Karp and Zhang [13]; see also Newell and Pizer [21] for an open-loop model). Those papers show that the difference in payoffs under optimal taxes and quotas, $\mathcal{J}^T - \mathcal{J}^Q$, is increasing in $\frac{g}{b}$. The intuition is the same as in Weitzman's static model [29]. A larger value of g means that damages are more convex in S . In view of Jensen's inequality, as damages become more convex it becomes more important to control emissions exactly (as under a quota) rather than to choose only the expected value of emissions (as under a tax). A higher value of b makes it more important for the firm to be able to respond to changes in the cost shock by changing emissions. It is able to respond under a tax but not under a quota.

There is a critical value of $\frac{g}{b}$ above which quotas are preferred. This critical value is increasing in both β and Δ . When more weight is put on future costs and benefits (higher β), or when the stock is more persistent (higher Δ), it is more important to control the exact level of emissions (as under quotas) rather than the first moment of emissions (as under taxes).

The previous papers calibrate models using parameter values that are consistent with published estimates of the abatement costs and environmental damages associated with greenhouse gasses. These studies find that taxes dominate quotas for the control of greenhouse gasses. A larger β magnifies the positive payoff difference between the two policies, and therefore increases the preference for taxes. A larger Δ increases the importance of controlling emissions exactly, and therefore erodes the advantage of taxes. The more persistent is the pollution stock, the more valuable is the reduced stock variability under quotas.

All of these results also hold for our parameterization of the model with endogenous abatement capital. This robustness is worth noting, but our analysis adds nothing to the intuition for these results, and therefore we do not discuss them further. Instead, we emphasize the comparative statics and dynamics associated with endogenous abatement costs.

6.2.2 The role of abatement capital

There are three important parameters related to abatement capital: δ , d , and m_1 . We consider the first two briefly, and then concentrate on the third. In all cases, we perform the obvious experiment of varying one of these parameters, holding all others constant. This experiment has a shortcoming that we discuss later, where we consider a second type of experiment.

We explained why a more durable pollution stock (higher Δ) decreases the preference for taxes. However, a more durable capital stock (higher δ) increases the preference for taxes. Under taxes, the firm responds to a cost shock by changing the level of emissions. Under both taxes and quotas, the firm responds to a cost shock by changing the level of capital, provided that $\rho \neq 0$.¹³ The adjustment mechanism via capital provides a partial substitute for the inability to change emissions under quotas. A large value of δ means that current investment has long-lasting effects, tending to make capital less flexible. The decreased flexibility associated with larger values of δ increases the value of being able to respond to cost shocks by changing emissions. A larger value of δ therefore increases the advantage of taxes.




Figure 1: Dependence of expected payoff difference on the cost-related parameters.

A lower value of m_1 (a decrease in the marginal effect of capital on BAU emissions) or a larger value of d (an increase in the adjustment cost for abatement capital), favors quotas. Figure 1 shows the relation between the difference in payoffs (the value of using taxes minus the value of using quotas) and the parameters d and m_1 for three values of π , holding all other parameters constant. (Recall that π is the percentage loss in global world product due to a doubling of greenhouse gasses.) When environmental damages are small ($\pi = 1.33$ or $\pi = 3.6$) the difference in payoffs is insensitive to changes in d and m_1 ; for large environmental damages ($\pi = 21$) the change in either parameter has a noticeable affect on the payoff difference.

¹³If $\rho = 0$, the current cost shock provides no information about the future cost shocks. Since current investment reduces abatement costs only in future periods, the firm's investment does not depend on the current cost shock if $\rho = 0$.

Previous linear-quadratic models that do not include investment capital are a special case of the model here, obtained by letting $d \rightarrow \infty$ or $m_1 \rightarrow 0$. Those models tend to underestimate the advantage of using taxes.

As d increases, capital increasingly resembles a fixed input; as m_1 decreases, abatement capital has less effect on the marginal benefit of pollution. A larger value of d or a smaller value of m_1 both imply less flexibility of marginal abatement costs (smaller B_x). This diminished flexibility favors quotas, just as does the diminished flexibility in B_x associated with a smaller value of b (the slope of B_x).

In all cases, the present discounted value of the payoff difference under taxes and quotas is approximately 1 billion dollars, implying an annualized cost of about 50 million dollars. Our parameterization of abatement costs assumes that the annualized cost of stabilizing emissions is about 1 percent of income, or 290 billion dollars. Thus, the payoff difference of the two policies is less than 0.02% of the estimated costs of stabilizing emissions.

The small difference in the expected payoffs may be due largely to the Principle of Certainty Equivalence, mentioned in Section 5: the expected stock trajectories are identical under taxes and quotas – only higher moments differ. Uncertainty in our calibrated model (but not in the general formulation) arises only because BAU emissions are uncertain. Given the (small) magnitude of this particular type of uncertainty, the higher moments of stocks simply are not very important. Models that do not satisfy the Principle of Certainty Equivalence (Hoel and Karp [8], Pizer [25]) tend to find a larger payoff difference under taxes and quotas.

The relations between the equilibrium decision rules and levels of the state variables are as expected. The optimal quota (which equals the expected level of emissions under the optimal tax) decreases with the level of pollution and with the capital stock and increases with the lagged cost shock (for $\rho > 0$, as in our calibration). Equilibrium investment is an increasing function of the stock of pollution and a decreasing function of capital stock. Firms understand that a higher pollution stock will lead to lower future equilibrium emissions, increasing the marginal value of investment. A higher aggregate capital stock encourages the regulator to reduce future emissions, increasing the value of investment. However, the representative firm's level of capital equals the aggregate level. For a given quota or tax, a higher capital stock reduces the marginal value of investment. The net effect of higher capital stocks is to reduce investment.

For our baseline parameters, the optimal quota during the initial period is 4.77 GtC, an

8.3% decrease from the BAU level. It is interesting to compare this level of abatement with the Kyoto Protocol proposals. The Protocol required industrialized countries to reduce their collective emissions of greenhouse gasses by 5.2% of 1990 levels by the year 2012. Targets for individual countries varied; the reduction for the US was to have been 7%. (UNFCC [27])

In 2001 the US rejected the Kyoto Protocol. A number of prominent economists supported this rejection on the grounds that satisfying the Protocol would be too expensive. Our results suggest that the proposed levels of abatement might have been close to optimal. Our simulation results do not provide independent evidence supporting the Kyoto Protocol, since our calibration uses the same kinds of assumptions that form the basis for the targets in the Protocol. However, our results suggest that the targets in the Protocol are at least approximately consistent with an optimizing model based on widely held assumptions.

As we mentioned above, the comparative dynamics associated with a change in a single parameter value might be misleading. For example, when we decrease m_1 holding other parameters constant, we change the BAU level of emissions and the abatement costs associated with a particular emissions trajectory, in addition to changing the marginal effect of capital on abatement costs. Here we consider a slightly different experiment: When we vary m_1 we make offsetting changes in m_0 in order to maintain current BAU emissions at 5.2 and so that the year 2100 BAU emissions are consistent with a particular IPCC scenario.

Our baseline calibration ($m_1 = 0.7266$) makes our model consistent with the *IPCC IS92a* scenario that projects BAU CO₂ stocks of 1500 GtC in the year 2100 – an approximate doubling of stocks. For comparison we also choose parameters that are consistent with the *IS92c* scenario of a 35% increase in CO₂ concentration ($m_1 = 0.0416$) and with the *IS92e* scenario of a 170% increase in CO₂ concentration ($m_1 = 1.6622$).

Figure 2 graphs optimal abatement levels, i.e. the difference in the BAU and the optimal levels of emissions (the left panel) and the difference between BAU and the regulated pollution stock (the right panel), as a function of time. The three graphs in each panel correspond to the three values of m_1 . In all cases, abatement increases over time. Both the level and the change over time of abatement is greatest when abatement capital has a large effect on marginal abatement costs (m_1 is large). This result is further evidence that the consideration of endogenous investment in abatement capital increases the optimal level of abatement.




Figure 2: Changes in expected pollution flow and stock relative to BAU levels.

7 Conclusions

We studied the problem of optimally controlling a stock externality under asymmetric information about abatement costs. Non-strategic firms have rational expectations about future policies, and they make investment decisions in abatement capital. The regulator is able to use either emissions taxes or quotas, but he is not able to make credible commitments about levels of future emissions policies. We considered a Markov Perfect equilibrium, i.e. one in which agents condition their beliefs on payoff-relevant variables.

When the regulator uses quotas, the inability to make binding commitments (the Markov Perfect restriction) is not binding. In general, this inability to make commitments does reduce the regulator's payoff when he uses emissions taxes. These taxes create a secondary distortion in investment. Thus, we have identified a previously unnoticed difference between taxes and quotas.

If a “separability condition” holds, the firm's emission response to the tax and to the level of capital are both independent of the cost shock. In this case, the secondary distortion associated with taxes vanishes. If the regulator uses quotas, or if he uses taxes and the separability condition holds, we can obtain the Markov Perfect equilibrium by solving an optimization problem rather than an equilibrium problem.

The linear quadratic model satisfies the separability condition. In this model, if damages are caused by a flow, we obtain closed form expressions for the policy ranking. When neither

policy has an informational advantage – the typical case – the policy ranking is independent of parameters associated with abatement capital. We explained why this independence does not hold when damages are caused by the stock rather than the flow of pollution.

We calibrated the linear-quadratic model to describe the problem of global warming. We confirmed that previous results hold in the more general setting where abatement capital is endogenous. In addition, we showed that the endogeneity of abatement capital increases both the level of abatement, and the preference for taxes. We also found that our estimates of optimal abatement levels are similar to target levels in the Kyoto Protocol.

8 Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1

We use $\mathbb{J}^j(\cdot)$ ($j = T, Q$) for the regulator's value function in the dynamic game (where the regulator chooses only an emissions policy), and $\mathcal{J}^j(\cdot)$ ($j = T, Q$) for the regulator's value function in the corresponding auxiliary problem (where the regulator chooses an emissions policy and then chooses investment after observing the current cost shock). We want to find conditions under which the equilibrium capital and pollution stocks are identical in the Markov Perfect equilibrium to the game and in the auxiliary problem. Equivalently, we want to find conditions under which the optimal investment tax/subsidy is identically 0 in the auxiliary problem.

(i) *Quotas* When the regulator uses an emissions quota, the Euler equations for investment in the Markov perfect equilibrium (equation (8)) and investment in the auxiliary problem (equation (11)) are identical, as are the corresponding transversality conditions. We need to confirm that the Euler equations for the pollution stock are also identical in the two settings.

In the Markov Perfect equilibrium with quotas the regulator solves the following DPE:

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbb{J}^Q(K_{t-1}, S_{t-1}, \theta_{t-1}) &= \max_{x_t} E_{\theta_t | \theta_{t-1}} \{ B(K_{t-1}, \theta_t, x_t) - D(S_{t-1}) - C(I_t^Q, K_{t-1}) \\ &\quad + \beta \mathbb{J}^Q(\delta K_{t-1} + I_t^Q, \Delta S_{t-1} + x_t, \theta_t) \},\end{aligned}$$

subject to the private investment rule $I_t^Q \equiv I^Q(K_{t-1}, \theta_t, S_{t-1})$, which is independent of the current quota level x_t . The stochastic Euler equation for pollution stock is:

$$E_{\theta_t | \theta_{t-1}} B_x(K_{t-1}, \theta_t, x_t) - \beta D'(\Delta S_{t-1} + x_t) - \beta \Delta E_{\theta_{t+1} | \theta_{t-1}} B_x(K_t, \theta_{t+1}, x_{t+1}) = 0.$$

The transversality condition is

$$\lim_{T \rightarrow \infty} E_{\theta_T | \theta_{t-1}} \{ \beta^{T-t} B_x(K_{T-1}, \theta_T, x_T) S_T \} = 0.$$

A straightforward calculation confirms that the corresponding Euler equation and transversality condition in the auxiliary problem are identical to the last two equations. (To obtain the Euler equation in the auxiliary problem we differentiate the DPE (9) with respect to S_{t-1} , using the envelope theorem; we combine the resulting equation with the first order condition equation (10).)

(ii) *Taxes* We first consider the equations that determine the evolution of capital stock. Inspection of the Euler equations for capital (equation (6) in the Markov Perfect equilibrium and equation (15) in the auxiliary problem) establishes that these are identical if and only if the function τ , defined as

$$\tau_t \equiv \beta E_{\theta_{t+1}|\theta_t} \left\{ H_{t+1} \frac{\partial \chi_{t+1}}{\partial K_t} \right\},$$

is identically 0. We therefore find necessary and sufficient conditions for $\tau_t \equiv 0$. Note that the assumptions that $B_{xK} < 0$ and $B_{KK} < 0$ imply that $\frac{\partial \chi_{t+1}}{\partial K_t} \neq 0$.

By Lemma 1, the separability condition is equivalent to

Condition 2 (a) $\frac{\partial \chi(K_{t-1}, \theta_t, p_t)}{\partial p_t}$ is independent of θ_t . (b) $\frac{\partial \chi(K_{t-1}, \theta_t, p_t)}{\partial K_{t-1}}$ is independent of θ_t .

We therefore need only show that Condition 2 is necessary and sufficient for $\tau_t \equiv 0$. We first consider sufficiency. If Condition (2a) holds, the first-order condition (14) implies

$$E_{\theta_t|\theta_{t-1}} \{ H_t \} = 0, \quad \forall t. \tag{19}$$

If Condition (2b) also holds, we can write τ_t as

$$\tau_t \equiv \beta \left(\frac{\partial \chi_{t+1}}{\partial K_t} \right) E_{\theta_{t+1}|\theta_t} \{ H_{t+1} \}.$$

Using equation (19), the last equality implies that $\tau_t \equiv 0$. Clearly the transversality conditions in the two problems are the same.

The necessity of the separability condition follows from the previous argument. If either part of Condition 2 does not hold the function τ is not identically 0. (Of course the equality $\tau = 0$ might hold for some values of the information state, but we need the stronger condition that the equality hold identically, i.e., for all possible values of the information state.)

To complete the proof, we need only check that the Euler equations and transversality conditions for the pollution stock are also the same in the two problems. In the Markov Perfect

equilibrium with taxes, the regulator solves the following DPE:

$$\mathbb{J}^T(K_{t-1}, S_{t-1}, \theta_{t-1}) = \max_{p_t} E_{\theta_t | \theta_{t-1}} \left\{ B(K_{t-1}, \theta_t, \chi_t) - D(S_{t-1}) - C(I_t^T, K_{t-1}) + \beta \mathbb{J}^T(\delta K_{t-1} + I_t^T, \Delta S_{t-1} + \chi_t, \theta_t) \right\}, \quad (20)$$

subject to emissions χ_t given by equation (5), and the private investment rule $I_t^T \equiv I^T(K_{t-1}, \theta_t, S_{t-1})$. I_t^T is independent of the current tax level p_t as discussed in Section 3; $\frac{\partial \chi_t}{\partial p_t}$ is independent of θ_t because of Condition 1. Thus the first order condition for the optimal tax is

$$E_{\theta_t | \theta_{t-1}} \left\{ B_x [K_{t-1}, \theta_t, \chi(K_{t-1}, \theta_t, p_t)] + \beta \mathbb{J}_S^T [K_t, \Delta S_{t-1} + \chi(K_{t-1}, \theta_t, p_t), \theta_t] \right\} = 0. \quad (21)$$

Differentiating the DPE (20) with respect to S_{t-1} , using the envelope theorem, and combining the resulting equation with the first order condition (21) gives the stochastic Euler equation for the pollution stock in the dynamic game:

$$\begin{aligned} & E_{\theta_t | \theta_{t-1}} \left\{ B_x [K_{t-1}, \theta_t, \chi(K_{t-1}, \theta_t, p_t)] - \beta D' [\Delta S_{t-1} + \chi(K_{t-1}, \theta_t, p_t)] \right\} \\ & - \beta \Delta E_{\theta_{t+1} | \theta_{t-1}} B_x [K_t, \theta_{t+1}, \chi(K_t, \theta_{t+1}, p_{t+1})] = 0 \end{aligned} . \quad (22)$$

The transversality condition is

$$\lim_{T \rightarrow \infty} E_{\theta_T | \theta_{t-1}} \left\{ \beta^{T-t} B_x [K_{T-1}, \theta_T, \chi(K_{T-1}, \theta_T, p_T)] S_T \right\} = 0.$$

Again, it is straightforward to obtain the Euler equation for pollution stocks in the auxiliary problem. We differentiate equation (13) with respect to S_{t-1} , using the envelope theorem. Combining the resulting equation with the first order condition (19) leads to the stochastic Euler equation for the pollution stock in the auxiliary problem. This equation is identical to equations (22). The transversality conditions are also the same. *QED*

9 Appendix B: Calibration Details

The information here appeared in a previous paper, so this appendix is not intended for publication. We reproduce the information so that the referee can assess the calibration.

9.1 Pollutant Stock and Environmental Damages

Row 1 in Table 1 is pollutant stock growth equation. We measure S_t , the CO₂ atmospheric concentration, in billions of tons of carbon equivalent (GtC). \bar{S} equals 590GtC, the preindustrial

CO_2 concentration (Neftel et al. [20]). Let e_t be total anthropogenic CO_2 emissions in period t . The proportion of emissions contributing to the atmospheric stock is estimated at 0.64 (Goulder and Mathai [5], Nordhaus [23]). This fraction accounts for oceanic uptake, other terrestrial sinks, and the carbon cycle (IPCC [10]). The linear approximation of the evolution of the atmospheric pollutant stock is

$$S_t - 590 = \Delta (S_{t-1} - 590) + 0.64e_t.$$

This equation states that 64% of current emissions contribute to atmospheric CO_2 , and that CO_2 stocks in excess of the preindustrial level decays naturally at an annual rate of $1 - \Delta$. We take $x_t \equiv 0.64e_t$, the anthropogenic fluxes of CO_2 into the atmosphere, as the control variable. The stock persistence is $\Delta = 0.9917$ (an annual decay rate of 0.0083 and a half-life of 83 years). (Goulder and Mathai[5], Nordhaus [23])

We assume that the preindustrial CO_2 concentration has zero environmental damage. Damages from higher CO_2 concentration are $\frac{g}{2} (S - \bar{S})^2$. (Row 2 in Table 1). For ease of interpreting the numerical values, we use π to denote the percentage loss in GWP (Gross World Product) from a doubling of the preindustrial CO_2 concentration. With the 1998 GWP of 29,185 billion dollars (IMF [9]), we have

$$\pi\% \cdot 29185 = g/2 \cdot 590^2 \implies g = 0.0017\pi.$$

For example, $\pi = 1.33$ which is widely used (Nordhaus [23]) corresponds to $g = 0.0022$. For the sensitivity analysis we consider two other damage parameters, $\pi = 3.6$ and $\pi = 21.0$, the mean and the maximum of expert opinions (Nordhaus [22]).

9.2 Cost Correlation and Uncertainty

Using maximum likelihood, we fit the following data generating process for global carbon emissions over the 50 year period 1947-1996 from Marland et. al. [18].

$$e_t = e_0 + nt + \varepsilon_t, \quad \varepsilon_t = \rho\varepsilon_{t-1} + \nu_t, \quad \nu_t \sim iid N(0, \sigma_v^2).$$

The estimates are $\rho = 0.9$ and $\sigma_v = 0.1\text{GtC}$. We convert the emission uncertainty σ_v into cost uncertainty σ_μ by multiplying it by 0.64 (because $x_t \equiv 0.64e_t$), and then by the slope of marginal abatement cost $b = 26.992$ (because $\theta_t \equiv b\tilde{\theta}_t$). The result is $\sigma_\mu = 0.1 \times 0.64 \times 26.992 = 1.7275\$/\text{(ton of carbon)}$. For simplicity, we assume $\sigma_0 = \sigma_\mu$. (The regulator's subjective prior on θ_0 has the same variance as the subsequent shocks.)

References

- [1] R. A. Becker and J. V. Henderson. Costs of air quality regulation. Working Paper 7308, National Bureau of Economic Research, Aug. 1999.
- [2] P. Buonanno, C. Carraro, and M. Galeotti. Endogenous induced technical change and the costs of kyoto. Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei Nota di Lavoro No. 64-01, May 2001.
- [3] C. Costello and L. Karp. Dynamic taxes and quotas with learning. Giannini Foundation of Agricultural Economics Working Paper No. 914, Apr. 2001.
- [4] J. G. Cummins, K. A. Hassett, and R. G. Hubbard. Tax reforms and investment: A cross-country comparison. *Journal of Public Economics*, 62(1-2):237–273, Oct. 1996.
- [5] L. H. Goulder and K. Mathai. Optimal CO₂ abatement in the presence of induced technological. *Journal of Environmental and Economic Management*, 39(1):1–38, Jan. 2000.
- [6] L. H. Goulder and S. H. Schneider. Induced technological change and the attractiveness of CO₂ abatement policies. *Resource and Energy Economics*, 21(3-4):211–253, Aug. 1999.
- [7] M. Hoel and L. Karp. Taxes versus quotas for a stock pollutant. Giannini Foundation of Agricultural Economics Working Paper No. 855, Mar. 1999.
- [8] M. Hoel and L. Karp. Taxes and quotas for a stock pollutant with multiplicative uncertainty. *Journal of Public Economics*, 82(1):91–114, Oct. 2001.
- [9] IMF. *World Economic Outlook*. International Monetary Fund (IMF), Washington, DC, Oct. 1999.
- [10] IPCC. *Climate Change 1995: The Science of Climate Change*. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Cambridge, UK, 1996. J.T. Houghton, L.G. Meira Filho, B.A. Callander, N. Harris, A. Kattenberg, and K. Maskell, editors.
- [11] K. L. Judd. *Numerical Methods in Economics*. MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1998.
- [12] L. Karp and J. Zhang. Bayesian learning and the regulation of greenhouse gas emissions. Giannini Foundation of Agricultural Economics Working Paper No. 926, Aug. 2001.

- [13] L. Karp and J. Zhang. Regulation of stock externalities with learning. Giannini Foundation of Agricultural Economics Working Paper No. 892, Sept. 1999. Revised January, 2001.
- [14] L. Karp and J. Zhang. Stock externality regulation with endogenous technical change and learning. Paper for the 2000 AERE Workshop on the Effectiveness of Resource and Environmental Regulation, May 2000.
- [15] C. Keeling and T. Whorf. Atmospheric CO₂ records from sites in the SIO air sampling network. In *Trends: A Compendium of Data on Global Change*. Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, U.S. Department of Energy, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, 1999.
- [16] A. S. Manne and R. G. Richels. *Buying Greenhouse Gas Insurance: The Economic Costs of Carbon Dioxide Emission Limits*. MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1992.
- [17] R. Marimon and A. Scott, editors. *Computational Methods for the Study of Dynamic Economies*. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999.
- [18] G. Marland, T. Boden, R. Andres, A. Brenkert, and C. Johnston. Global, regional, and national CO₂ emissions. In *Trends: A Compendium of Data on Global Change*. Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, U.S. Department of Energy, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, 1999.
- [19] M. J. Miranda and P. L. Fackler. *Applied Computational Economics and Finance*. MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, forthcoming.
- [20] A. Neftel, H. Friedli, E. Moor, H. Lötscher, H. Oeschger, U. Siegenthaler, and B. Stauffer. Historical CO₂ record from the Siple Station ice core. In *Trends: A Compendium of Data on Global Change*. Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, U.S. Department of Energy, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, 1999.
- [21] R. Newell and W. Pizer. Stock externality regulation under uncertainty. Resources for the Future Working Paper 99-10, Dec. 1998.
- [22] W. D. Nordhaus. Expert opinion on climate change. *American Scientist*, pages 45–51, January–February 1994.

- [23] W. D. Nordhaus. *Managing the Global Commons: The Economics of Climate Change*. MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1994.
- [24] W. D. Nordhaus. Modelling induced innovation in climate-change policy. Paper presented at the IIASA Workshop on Induced Technological Change and the Environment, Laxenburg, June 21-22, 1999.
- [25] W. A. Pizer. Prices vs. quantities revisited: The case of climate change. *Journal of Public Economics*, forthcoming.
- [26] T. J. Sargent. *Macroeconomic Theory*. Academic Press, Inc., San Diego, California, second edition, 1987.
- [27] UNFCCC. Press Release: Climate talks to explore how to put Kyoto Protocol into action. Buenos Aires 1998, Fourth Session of the Conference of the Parties UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. http://www.unep.ch/iuc_submenu/press/climate/pr6-98.htm.
- [28] C. R. Vogan. Pollution abatement and control expenditures, 1972-94. *Survey of Current Business*, pages 48–67, Sept. 1996.
- [29] M. L. Weitzman. Prices versus quantities. *Review of Economic Studies*, 41(4):477–491, Oct. 1974.
- [30] D. Xie. On time inconsistency: A technical issue in stackelberg differential games. *Journal of Economic Theory*, 76(2):412–430, Oct. 1997.
- [31] J. Zhang. *Essays on Dynamic Regulation under Uncertainty with Learning*. PhD thesis, University of California, Berkeley, 2001.

NOTE DI LAVORO DELLA FONDAZIONE ENI ENRICO MATTEI
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers Series

Our working papers are available on the Internet at the following addresses:

Server WWW: WWW.FEEM.IT

Anonymous FTP: FTP.FEEM.IT

To order any of these papers, please fill out the form at the end of the list.

CLIM	1.2000	<i>Claudia KEMFERT: The Impacts of Emissions Trading on World Economies. Contemplation of baseline emissions paths and a ceiling on emissions trading</i>
CLIM	2.2000	<i>Pascal FAVARD: Does Productive Capital Affect the Order of Resource Exploitation?</i>
CLIM	3.2000	<i>Robert T. DEACON (xxxix): The Political Economy of Environment-Development Relationships: A Preliminary Framework</i>
SUST	4.2000	<i>Piet RIETVELD and Roberto ROSON: Joint Costs in Network Services: the Two-way Problem in the Case of Unbalanced Transport Markets</i>
CLIM	5.2000	<i>Robert S. PINDYCK (xxxix): Irreversibilities and the Timing of Environmental Policy</i>
MGMT	6.2000	<i>Domenico SINISCALCO, Stefania BORGHINI, Marcella FANTINI and Federica RANGHIERI (x): The Response of Companies to Information-Based Environmental Policies</i>
SUST	7.2000	<i>Guy D. GARROD, Riccardo SCARPA and Ken G. WILLIS: Estimating the Benefits of Traffic Calming on Through Routes: A Choice Experiment Approach</i>
CLIM	8.2000	<i>ZhongXiang ZHANG: Estimating the Size of the Potential Market for the Kyoto Flexibility Mechanisms</i>
VOL	9.2000	<i>Jean-Christophe PEREAU and Tarik TAZDAIT (xli): Partial and Global Cooperation with Unilateral Commitment in the Presence of Global Environmental Problems</i>
KNOW	10.2000	<i>Giacomo CALZOLARI and Giovanni IMMORDINO: Hormone Beefs, Chloridric Chicken and International Trade: Can Scientific Uncertainty be an Informational Barrier to Trade?</i>
CLIM	11.2000	<i>Laura MARSILIANI and Thomas I. RENSTRÖM (xxxvi): Imperfect Competition, Labour Market Distortions, and the Double Dividend Hypothesis</i>
KNOW	12.2000	<i>Patrizia BUSSOLI : An Empirical Analysis of Technological Convergence Process and RJs in Europe at the Firm Level</i>
KNOW	13.2000	<i>Luigi BENFRATELLO and Alessandro SEMBENELLI: Research Joint Ventures and Firm Level Performance</i>
KNOW	14.2000	<i>Nicholas S. VONORTAS: US Policy towards Research Joint Ventures</i>
ETA	15.2000	<i>Y.H. FARZIN: The Effects of Emissions Standards on Industry in the Short Run and Long Run</i>
ETA	16.2000	<i>Francis BLOCH and Stéphane ROTTIER (xli): Agenda Control in Coalition Formation</i>
CLIM	17.2000	<i>Giovanni IMMORDINO: Looking for a Guide to Protect the Environment: the Development of the Precautionary Principle</i>
CLIM	18.2000	<i>Hans W. GOTTINGER: Negotiation and Optimality in an Economic Model of Global Climate Change</i>
VOL	19.2000	<i>Paola MILIZIA and Marialuisa TAMBORRA: Juridical Framework of Voluntary Agreements in Italy and Policy Relevance at the Local Level</i>
CLIM	20.2000	<i>Richard S.J. TOL, Wietze LISE and Bob van der ZWAAN (xli): Technology Diffusion and the Stability of Climate Coalitions</i>
CLIM	21.2000	<i>Pietro TEATINI and Giuseppe GAMBOLATI (xlii): The Impact of Climate Change, Sea-Storm Events and Land Subsidence in the Adriatic</i>
CLIM	22.2000	<i>Emiliano RAMIERI (xlii): An Overview of the Vulnerability of Venice to the Impacts of Climate Change and Sea Level Rise</i>
PRIV	23.2000	<i>Bernardo BORTOLOTTI, Marcella FANTINI and Carlo SCARPA: Why do Governments Sell Privatised Companies Abroad?</i>
ETA	24.2000	<i>Carlo CARRARO and Gilbert E. METCALF: Behavioral and Distributional Effects of Environmental Policy: Introduction</i>
ETA	25.2000	<i>Santiago J. RUBIO and Juana AZNAR: Sustainable Growth and Environmental Policies</i>
KNOW	26.2000	<i>Francesca RECANATINI and Randi RYTERMAN: Disorganisation or Self-Organisation?</i>
KNOW	27.2000	<i>Giorgio BARBA NAVARETTI and David TARR: International Knowledge Flows and Economic Performance. An Introductory Survey of the Evidence</i>
SUST	28.2000	<i>Francesca CODA CANATI: Secondary Raw Materials Market Creation: Waste Stock Exchange</i>
KNOW	29.2000	<i>Giorgio BRUNELLO and Simona COMI: Education and Earnings Growth. Evidence from 11 European Countries</i>
CLIM	30.2000	<i>Michael GRUBB: The Kyoto Protocol: an Economic Appraisal</i>
CLIM	31.2000	<i>Gérard MONDELLO and Mabel TIDBALL (xxxix): Environmental Liability and Technology Choice: A Duopolistic Analysis</i>

KNOW	32.2000	<i>Alberto PETRUCCI and Edmund PHELPS: Capital Subsidies Versus Labour Subsidies: A Trade-Off between Capital and Employment?</i>
VOL	33.2000	<i>Petr ŠAUER, Antonín DVORÁK and Petr FIALA: Negotiation between Authority and Polluters - Model for Support of Decision Making in Environmental Policy: Principles and Experimental Case Test</i>
SUST	34.2000	<i>Riccardo SCARPA, George W. HUTCHINSON and Sue M. CHILTON: Reliability of Benefit Value Transfers from Contingent Valuation Data with Forest-Specific Attributes</i>
CLIM	35.2000	<i>Allen PERRY (xlii): Impact of Climate Change on Tourism in the Mediterranean: Adaptive Responses</i>
CLIM	36.2000	<i>Laura MARSILIANI and T.I. RENGSTRÖM (xxxvi): Inequality, Environmental Protection and Growth</i>
CLIM	37.2000	<i>Massimiliano MONTINI (xlii): Italian Policies and Measures to Respond to Climate Change</i>
CLIM	38.2000	<i>Horst STERR, Richard KLEIN and Stefan REESE (xlii): Climate Change and Coastal Zones. An Overview of the State-of-the-Art on Regional and Local Vulnerability Assessment</i>
CLIM	39.2000	<i>Tullio SCOVAZZI (xlii): Ideas Behind the New or Updated Mediterranean Legal Instruments</i>
CLIM	40.2000	<i>Dimitrios GEORGAS (xlii): Assessment of Climatic Change Impacts on Coastal Zones in the Mediterranean. UNEP's Vulnerability Assessments Methodology and Evidence from Case Studies</i>
SUST	41.2000	<i>Herath M. GUNATILAKE and Ujjayant CHAKRAVORTY: Forest Resource Extraction by Local Communities: A Comparative Dynamic Analysis</i>
PRIV	42.2000	<i>Giancarlo SPAGNOLO: Optimal Leniency Programs</i>
CLIM	43.2000	<i>Paolo BUONANNO, Carlo CARRARO, Efrem CASTELNUOVO and Marzio GALEOTTI: Emission Trading Restrictions with Endogenous Technological Change</i>
CLIM	44.2000	<i>Alan S. MANNE and Richard G. RICHELS: A Multi-Gas Approach to Climate Policy - with and without GWPs</i>
WAT	45.2000	<i>Ujjayant CHAKRAVORTY and Chieko UMETSU: Basinwide Water Management: A Spatial Model</i>
CLIM	46.2000	<i>Don FULLERTON, Inkee HONG and Gilbert E. METCALF (xl): A Tax on Output of the Polluting Industry is not a Tax on Pollution: The Importance of Hitting the Target</i>
PRIV	47.2000	<i>Axel GAUTIER and Dimitri PAOLINI: Delegation and Information Revelation</i>
ETA	48.2000	<i>Andreas PAPANDREOU: Externality, Convexity and Institutions</i>
ETA	49.2000	<i>Cesare DOSI and Michele MORETTO: The Timing of Adoption of Cleaner Technologies: Private Costs and Public Incentives</i>
ETA	50.2000	<i>Michele MORETTO and Roberto TAMBORINI: Liquidity: What can a "Hausbank" do that Other Lenders Cannot Do?</i>
PRIV	51.2000	<i>Michele MORETTO and Paola VALBONESI: Option to Revoke and Regulation of Local Utilities</i>
PRIV	52.2000	<i>Giancarlo SPAGNOLO: Self-Defeating Antitrust Laws</i>
PRIV	53.2000	<i>William L. MEGGINSON and Maria K. BOUTCHKOVA: The Impact of Privatisation on Capital Market Development and Individual Share Ownership</i>
KNOW	54.2000	<i>Giorgio BARBA NAVARETTI, Marzio GALEOTTI and Andrea MATTOZZI: Moving Skills from Hands to Heads: Import of Technology and Export Performance</i>
ETA	55.2000	<i>Elisabetta STRAZZERA, Riccardo SCARPA, Pinuccia CALIA, Guy GARROD and Ken WILLIS: Modelling Zero Bids in Contingent Valuation Surveys</i>
CLIM	56.2000	<i>Paola CONCONI: Can Green Lobbies Replace a World Environmental Organisation?</i>
VOL	57.2000	<i>Paola CONCONI and Carlo PERRONI (xl): Issue Linkage and Issue Tie-in in Multilateral Negotiations</i>
ETA	58.2000	<i>Fernando JARAMILLO, Hubert KEMPF and Fabien MOIZEAU (xli): Conspicuous Consumption, Social Status and Clubs</i>
SUST	59.2000	<i>Gianni CICIA and Riccardo SCARPA: Willingness to Pay for Rural Landscape Preservation: A Case Study in Mediterranean Agriculture</i>
CLIM	60.2000	<i>Josef JANSSEN: Will Joint Implementation Survive International Emissions Trading? Distinguishing the Kyoto Mechanisms</i>
CLIM	61.2000	<i>Carlo CARRARO: Costs, Structure and Equity of International Regimes for Climate Change Mitigation</i>
KNOW	62.2000	<i>Alberto BUCCI: On Scale Effects, Market Power and Growth when Human and Technological Capital are Complements</i>
KNOW	63.2000	<i>Alberto BUCCI and H.C. SAGLAM: Growth Maximising Patent Lifetime</i>
WAT	64.2000	<i>Michele MORETTO and Paolo ROSATO: The Value of Licences for Recreational Resources Use</i>
WAT	65.2000	<i>Edi DEFARCESCO and Paolo ROSATO: Recreation Management in Venice Lagoon</i>
KNOW	66.2000	<i>Carlo DELL'ARINGA and Claudio LUCIFORA: Inside the Black Box: Labour Market Institutions, Wage Formation and Unemployment in Italy</i>
CLIM	67.2000	<i>Erkki KOSKELA, Markku OLLIKAINEN and Mikko PUHAKKA: Renewable Resources in an Overlapping Generations Economy without Capital</i>
CLIM	68.2000	<i>A. Lans BOVENBERG and Lawrence H. GOULDER (xl): Neutralising the Adverse Industry Impacts of CO2 Abatement Policies: What Does it Cost?</i>
KNOW	69.2000	<i>Ioanna KASTELLI: Science and Technology Policy in Greece. Policy Initiatives for R&D Cooperation</i>
CLIM	70.2000	<i>Katrin MILLOCK: Contracts for Clean Development – The Role of Technology Transfers</i>
VOL	71.2000	<i>Alberto CAVALIERE and Fabio FRONTOSO SILVESTRI (xliii): Voluntary Agreements as Information Sharing Devices: Competition and Welfare Effects</i>

VOL	72.2000	<i>Na Li DAWSON and Kathleen SEGERSON</i> (xlivi): <u>Voluntary Agreements with Industries: Participation Incentives with Industry-wide Targets</u>
VOL	73.2000	<i>Patricia M. BAILEY</i> (xlivi): <u>The Application of Competition Law and Policy to Environmental Agreements in an Oligopolistic Market</u>
VOL	74.2000	<i>Joanna POYAGO-THEOTOKY</i> (xlivi): <u>Voluntary Approaches and the Organisation of Environmental R&D</u>
VOL	75.2000	<i>Scott C. MATULICH, Murat SEVER and Fred INABA</i> (xlivi): <u>Cooperative Bargaining to Internalise Open Access Externalities: Implications of the American Fisheries Act</u>
VOL	76.2000	<i>Allen BLACKMAN and James BOYD</i> (xlivi): <u>Tailored Regulation: Will Voluntary Site-Specific Environmental Performance Standards Improve Welfare?</u>
VOL	77.2000	<i>Vincenzo DENICOLO'</i> (xlivi): <u>A Signaling Model of Environmental Overcompliance</u>
VOL	78.2000	<i>Markus A. LEHMANN</i> (xlivi): <u>Voluntary Environmental Agreements and Competition Policy. The Case of Germany's Private System for Packaging Waste Recycling</u>
VOL	79.2000	<i>Hans H.B. VEDDER</i> (xlivi): <u>Voluntary Agreements and Competition Law</u>
VOL	80.2000	<i>Thomas P. LYON and John W. MAXWELL</i> (xlivi): <u>Self-Regulation, Taxation and Public Voluntary Environmental Agreements</u>
VOL	81.2000	<i>Paola MANZINI and Marco MARIOTTI</i> (xlivi): <u>A Bargaining Model of Voluntary Environmental Agreements</u>
VOL	82.2000	<i>Alain NADAI and Benoit MOREL</i> (xlivi): <u>Product Ecolabelling, Competition and the Environment</u>
CLIM	83.2000	<i>Simone BORGHESI</i> : <u>Income Inequality and the Environmental Kuznets Curve</u>
KNOW	84.2000	<i>Giorgio BRUNELLO and Massimo GIANNINI</i> : <u>Stratified or Comprehensive? The Economic Efficiency of School Design</u>
KNOW	85.2000	<i>Giorgio BRUNELLO, Simona COMI and Claudio LUCIFORA</i> : <u>The College Wage Gap in 10 European Countries: Evidence from Two Cohorts?</u>
ETA	86.2000	<i>Michael FINUS</i> : <u>Game Theory and International Environmental Co-operation: A Survey with an Application to the Kyoto-Protocol</u>
CLIM	87.2000	<i>Clare GOODESS, Jean PALUTIKOF and Maureen AGNEW</i> (xlii): <u>Climate Change Scenarios for the Mediterranean: A Basis for Regional Impact Assessment</u>
CLIM	88.2000	<i>Ian COXHEAD</i> : <u>Tax Reform and the Environment in Developing Economies: Is a Double Dividend Possible?</u>
SUST	89.2000	<i>Peter BARTELMUS and André VESPER</i> (xlii): <u>Green Accounting and Material Flow Analysis. Alternatives or Complements?</u>
SUST	90.2000	<i>Mark DE HAAN and Steven J. KEUNING</i> (xlii): <u>The NAMEA as Validation Instrument for Environmental Macroeconomics</u>
SUST	91.2000	<i>Jochen JESINGHAUS</i> (xlii): <u>On the Art of Aggregating Apples & Oranges</u>
SUST	92.2000	<i>Jan KOLAR</i> (xlii): <u>Land Cover Accounting in the Czech Republic</u>
SUST	93.2000	<i>Anil MARKANDYA, Alistair HUNT and Pamela MASON</i> (xlii): <u>Valuing Damages for Green Accounting Purposes: The GARP II Approach</u>
SUST	94.2000	<i>Anil MARKANDYA, Pamela MASON and Marieluisa TAMBORRA</i> (xlii): <u>Green National Accounting: Synthesising and Extending the Welfare Based and Sustainability-standard Based Approaches</u>
SUST	95.2000	<i>Martin O'CONNOR</i> (xlii): <u>Towards a Typology of "Environmentally-Adjusted" National Sustainability Indicators: Key Concepts and Policy Application</u>
SUST	96.2000	<i>Anton STEURER</i> (xlii): <u>Towards an Environmental Accounting Framework for the EU</u>
SUST	97.2000	<i>Cesare COSTANTINO, Federico FALCITELLI and Angelica TUDINI</i> (xlii): <u>New Developments in Environmental Accounting at Istat</u>
CLIM	98.2000	<i>Stefan BAYER and Claudia KEMFERT</i> : <u>Reaching National Kyoto-Targets in Germany by Maintaining a Sustainable Development</u>
CLIM	99.2000	<i>Zhong Xiang ZHANG</i> : <u>An Assessment of the EU Proposal for Ceilings on the Use of Kyoto Flexibility Mechanisms</u>
KNOW	100.2000	<i>Maria Rosa BATTAGGION and Patrizia BUSSOLI</i> : <u>Italian Policy towards Cooperation in R&D</u>
KNOW	101.2000	<i>Giorgio BARBA NAVARETTI, Patrizia BUSSOLI, Georg VON GRAEVENITZ and David ULPH</i> : <u>Information Sharing, Research Coordination and Membership of Research Joint Ventures</u>
WAT	102.2000	<i>Cesare DOSI and William K. EASTER</i> : <u>Water Scarcity: Institutional Change, Water Markets and Privatisation</u>
WAT	103.2000	<i>Cesare DOSI and Naomi ZEITOUNI</i> : <u>Controlling Groundwater Pollution from Agricultural Nonpoint Sources: An Overview of Policy Instruments</u>
KNOW	104.2000	<i>Alberto PETRUCCI</i> : <u>On Debt Neutrality in the Savers-Spenders Theory of Fiscal Policy</u>
SUST	105.2000	<i>Roberto ROSON and Stefano SORIANI</i> : <u>Intermodality and the Changing Role of Nodes in Transport Networks</u>
CLIM	106.2000	<i>Alain BOUSQUET and Pascal FAVARD</i> : <u>Does S. Kuznets' Belief Question the Environmental Kuznets Curves?</u>
CLIM	107.2000	<i>Ottavio JANNI</i> : <u>EU Biodiversity Conservation in Tropical Countries</u>

VOL	108.2000	<i>Katrin MILLOCK and François SALANIE: Collective Environmental Agreements: An Analysis of the Problems of Free-Riding and Collusion</i>
VOL	109.2000	<i>Katrin MILLOCK: The Combined Use of Taxation and Voluntary Agreements for Energy Policy</i>
VOL	110.2000	<i>Markus A. LEHMANN: The Impact of Voluntary Environmental Agreements on Firms' Incentives for Technology Adoption</i>
SUST	1.2001	<i>Inge MAYERES and Stef PROOST: Should Diesel Cars in Europe be Discouraged?</i>
SUST	2.2001	<i>Paola DORIA and Davide PETTENELLA: The Decision Making Process in Defining and Protecting Critical Natural Capital</i>
CLIM	3.2001	<i>Alberto PENCH: Green Tax Reforms in a Computable General Equilibrium Model for Italy</i>
CLIM	4.2001	<i>Maurizio BUSSOLO and Dino PINELLI: Green Taxes: Environment, Employment and Growth</i>
CLIM	5.2001	<i>Marco STAMPINI: Tax Reforms and Environmental Policies for Italy</i>
ETA	6.2001	<i>Walid OUESLATI: Environmental Fiscal Policy in an Endogenous Growth Model with Human Capital</i>
CLIM	7.2001	<i>Umberto CIORBA, Alessandro LANZA and Francesco PAULI: Kyoto Commitment and Emission Trading: a European Union Perspective</i>
MGMT	8.2001	<i>Brian SLACK (xlv): Globalisation in Maritime Transportation: Competition, uncertainty and implications for port development strategy</i>
VOL	9.2001	<i>Giulia PESARO: Environmental Voluntary Agreements: A New Model of Co-operation Between Public and Economic Actors</i>
VOL	10.2001	<i>Cathrine HAGEM: Climate Policy, Asymmetric Information and Firm Survival</i>
ETA	11.2001	<i>Sergio CURRARINI and Marco MARINI: A Sequential Approach to the Characteristic Function and the Core in Games with Externalities</i>
ETA	12.2001	<i>Gaetano BLOISE, Sergio CURRARINI and Nicholas KIKIDIS: Inflation and Welfare in an OLG Economy with a Privately Provided Public Good</i>
KNOW	13.2001	<i>Paolo SURICO: Globalisation and Trade: A "New Economic Geography" Perspective</i>
ETA	14.2001	<i>Valentina BOSETTI and Vincenzina MESSINA: Quasi Option Value and Irreversible Choices</i>
CLIM	15.2001	<i>Guy ENGELEN (xlii): Desertification and Land Degradation in Mediterranean Areas: from Science to Integrated Policy Making</i>
SUST	16.2001	<i>Julie Catherine SORS: Measuring Progress Towards Sustainable Development in Venice: A Comparative Assessment of Methods and Approaches</i>
SUST	17.2001	<i>Julie Catherine SORS: Public Participation in Local Agenda 21: A Review of Traditional and Innovative Tools</i>
CLIM	18.2001	<i>Johan ALBRECHT and Niko GOBBIN: Schumpeter and the Rise of Modern Environmentalism</i>
VOL	19.2001	<i>Rinaldo BRAU, Carlo CARRARO and Giulio GOLFETTO (xlii): Participation Incentives and the Design of Voluntary Agreements</i>
ETA	20.2001	<i>Paola ROTA: Dynamic Labour Demand with Lumpy and Kinked Adjustment Costs</i>
ETA	21.2001	<i>Paola ROTA: Empirical Representation of Firms' Employment Decisions by an (S,s) Rule</i>
ETA	22.2001	<i>Paola ROTA: What Do We Gain by Being Discrete? An Introduction to the Econometrics of Discrete Decision Processes</i>
PRIV	23.2001	<i>Stefano BOSI, Guillaume GIRMANS and Michel GUILLARD: Optimal Privatisation Design and Financial Markets</i>
KNOW	24.2001	<i>Giorgio BRUNELLO, Claudio LUPI, Patrizia ORDINE, and Maria Luisa PARISI: Beyond National Institutions: Labour Taxes and Regional Unemployment in Italy</i>
ETA	25.2001	<i>Klaus CONRAD: Locational Competition under Environmental Regulation when Input Prices and Productivity Differ</i>
PRIV	26.2001	<i>Bernardo BORTOLOTTI, Juliet D'SOUZA, Marcella FANTINI and William L. MEGGINSON: Sources of Performance Improvement in Privatised Firms: A Clinical Study of the Global Telecommunications Industry</i>
CLIM	27.2001	<i>Frédéric BROCHIER and Emiliano RAMIERI: Climate Change Impacts on the Mediterranean Coastal Zones</i>
ETA	28.2001	<i>Nunzio CAPPUCCIO and Michele MORETTO: Comments on the Investment-Uncertainty Relationship in a Real Option Model</i>
KNOW	29.2001	<i>Giorgio BRUNELLO: Absolute Risk Aversion and the Returns to Education</i>
CLIM	30.2001	<i>ZhongXiang ZHANG: Meeting the Kyoto Targets: The Importance of Developing Country Participation</i>
ETA	31.2001	<i>Jonathan D. KAPLAN, Richard E. HOWITT and Y. Hossein FARZIN: An Information-Theoretical Analysis of Budget-Constrained Nonpoint Source Pollution Control</i>
MGMT	32.2001	<i>Roberta SALOMONE and Giulia GALLUCCIO: Environmental Issues and Financial Reporting Trends</i>
Coalition Theory Network	33.2001	<i>Shlomo WEBER and Hans WIESMETH: From Autarky to Free Trade: The Impact on Environment</i>
ETA	34.2001	<i>Margarita GENIUS and Elisabetta STRAZZERA: Model Selection and Tests for Non Nested Contingent Valuation Models: An Assessment of Methods</i>

NRM	35.2001	<i>Carlo GIUPPONI: The Substitution of Hazardous Molecules in Production Processes: The Atrazine Case Study in Italian Agriculture</i>
KNOW	36.2001	<i>Raffaele PACI and Francesco PIGLIARU: Technological Diffusion, Spatial Spillovers and Regional Convergence in Europe</i>
PRIV	37.2001	<i>Bernardo BORTOLOTTI: Privatisation, Large Shareholders, and Sequential Auctions of Shares</i>
CLIM	38.2001	<i>Barbara BUCHNER: What Really Happened in The Hague? Report on the COP6, Part I, 13-25 November 2000, The Hague, The Netherlands</i>
PRIV	39.2001	<i>Giacomo CALZOLARI and Carlo SCARPA: Regulation at Home, Competition Abroad: A Theoretical Framework</i>
KNOW	40.2001	<i>Giorgio BRUNELLO: On the Complementarity between Education and Training in Europe</i>
Coalition Theory Network	41.2001	<i>Alain DESDOIGTS and Fabien MOIZEAU (xlvi): Multiple Politico-Economic Regimes, Inequality and Growth</i>
Coalition Theory Network	42.2001	<i>Parkash CHANDER and Henry TULKENS (xlvi): Limits to Climate Change</i>
Coalition Theory Network	43.2001	<i>Michael FINUS and Bianca RUNDSHAGEN (xlvi): Endogenous Coalition Formation in Global Pollution Control</i>
Coalition Theory Network	44.2001	<i>Wietze LISE, Richard S.J. TOL and Bob van der ZWAAN (xlvi): Negotiating Climate Change as a Social Situation</i>
NRM	45.2001	<i>Mohamad R. KHAWLIE (xlvii): The Impacts of Climate Change on Water Resources of Lebanon-Eastern Mediterranean</i>
NRM	46.2001	<i>Mutasem EL-FADEL and E. BOU-ZEID (xlvii): Climate Change and Water Resources in the Middle East: Vulnerability, Socio-Economic Impacts and Adaptation</i>
NRM	47.2001	<i>Eva IGLESIAS, Alberto GARRIDO and Almudena GOMEZ (xlvii): An Economic Drought Management Index to Evaluate Water Institutions' Performance Under Uncertainty and Climate Change</i>
CLIM	48.2001	<i>Wietze LISE and Richard S.J. TOL (xlviii): Impact of Climate on Tourist Demand</i>
CLIM	49.2001	<i>Francesco BOSELLO, Barbara BUCHNER, Carlo CARRARO and Davide RAGGI: Can Equity Enhance Efficiency? Lessons from the Kyoto Protocol</i>
SUST	50.2001	<i>Roberto ROSON (xlviii): Carbon Leakage in a Small Open Economy with Capital Mobility</i>
SUST	51.2001	<i>Edwin WOERDMAN (xlviii): Developing a European Carbon Trading Market: Will Permit Allocation Distort Competition and Lead to State Aid?</i>
SUST	52.2001	<i>Richard N. COOPER (xlviii): The Kyoto Protocol: A Flawed Concept</i>
SUST	53.2001	<i>Kari KANGAS (xlviii): Trade Liberalisation, Changing Forest Management and Roundwood Trade in Europe</i>
SUST	54.2001	<i>Xueqin ZHU and Ekko VAN IERLAND (xlviii): Effects of the Enlargement of EU on Trade and the Environment</i>
SUST	55.2001	<i>M. Ozgur KAYALICA and Sajal LAHIRI (xlviii): Strategic Environmental Policies in the Presence of Foreign Direct Investment</i>
SUST	56.2001	<i>Savas ALPAY (xlviii): Can Environmental Regulations be Compatible with Higher International Competitiveness? Some New Theoretical Insights</i>
SUST	57.2001	<i>Roldan MURADIAN, Martin O'CONNOR, Joan MARTINEZ-ALER (xlviii): Embodied Pollution in Trade: Estimating the "Environmental Load Displacement" of Industrialised Countries</i>
SUST	58.2001	<i>Matthew R. AUER and Rafael REUVENY (xlviii): Foreign Aid and Direct Investment: Key Players in the Environmental Restoration of Central and Eastern Europe</i>
SUST	59.2001	<i>Onno J. KUIK and Frans H. OOSTERHUIS (xlviii): Lessons from the Southern Enlargement of the EU for the Environmental Dimensions of Eastern Enlargement, in particular for Poland</i>
ETA	60.2001	<i>Carlo CARRARO, Alessandra POME and Domenico SINISCALCO (xlxi): Science vs. Profit in Research: Lessons from the Human Genome Project</i>
CLIM	61.2001	<i>Efrem CASTELNUOVO, Michele MORETTO and Sergio VERGALLI: Global Warming, Uncertainty and Endogenous Technical Change: Implications for Kyoto</i>
PRIV	62.2001	<i>Gian Luigi ALBANO, Fabrizio GERMANO and Stefano LOVO: On Some Collusive and Signaling Equilibria in Ascending Auctions for Multiple Objects</i>
CLIM	63.2001	<i>Elbert DIJKGRAAF and Herman R.J. VOLLEBERGH: A Note on Testing for Environmental Kuznets Curves with Panel Data</i>
CLIM	64.2001	<i>Paolo BUONANNO, Carlo CARRARO and Marzio GALEOTTI: Endogenous Induced Technical Change and the Costs of Kyoto</i>
CLIM	65.2001	<i>Guido CAZZAVILLAN and Ignazio MUSU (l): Transitional Dynamics and Uniqueness of the Balanced-Growth Path in a Simple Model of Endogenous Growth with an Environmental Asset</i>
CLIM	66.2001	<i>Giovanni BAIOCCHI and Salvatore DI FALCO (l): Investigating the Shape of the EKC: A Nonparametric Approach</i>

CLIM	67.2001	<i>Marzio GALEOTTI, Alessandro LANZA and Francesco PAULI</i> (I): <u>Desperately Seeking (Environmental) Kuznets: A New Look at the Evidence</u>
CLIM	68.2001	<i>Alexey VIKHLYAEV</i> (xlviii): <u>The Use of Trade Measures for Environmental Purposes – Globally and in the EU Context</u>
NRM	69.2001	<i>Gary D. LIBECAP and Zeynep K. HANSEN</i> (II): <u>U.S. Land Policy, Property Rights, and the Dust Bowl of the 1930s</u>
NRM	70.2001	<i>Lee J. ALSTON, Gary D. LIBECAP and Bernardo MUELLER</i> (II): <u>Land Reform Policies, The Sources of Violent Conflict and Implications for Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon</u>
CLIM	71.2001	<i>Claudia KEMFERT</i> : <u>Economy-Energy-Climate Interaction – The Model WIAGEM -</u>
SUST	72.2001	<i>Paulo A.L.D. NUNES and Yohanes E. RIYANTO</i> : <u>Policy Instruments for Creating Markets for Biodiversity: Certification and Ecolabeling</u>
SUST	73.2001	<i>Paulo A.L.D. NUNES and Erik SCHOKKAERT</i> (III): <u>Warm Glow and Embedding in Contingent Valuation</u>
SUST	74.2001	<i>Paulo A.L.D. NUNES, Jeroen C.J.M. van den BERGH and Peter NIJKAMP</i> (III): <u>Ecological-Economic Analysis and Valuation of Biodiversity</u>
VOL	75.2001	<i>Johan EYCKMANS and Henry TULKENS</i> (II): <u>Simulating Coalitionally Stable Burden Sharing Agreements for the Climate Change Problem</u>
PRIV	76.2001	<i>Axel GAUTIER and Florian HEIDER</i> : <u>What Do Internal Capital Markets Do? Redistribution vs. Incentives</u>
PRIV	77.2001	<i>Bernardo BORTOLOTTI, Marcella FANTINI and Domenico SINISCALCO</i> : <u>Privatisation around the World: New Evidence from Panel Data</u>
ETA	78.2001	<i>Toke S. AIDT and Jayasri DUTTA</i> (II): <u>Transitional Politics. Emerging Incentive-based Instruments in Environmental Regulation</u>
ETA	79.2001	<i>Alberto PETRUCCI</i> : <u>Consumption Taxation and Endogenous Growth in a Model with New Generations</u>
ETA	80.2001	<i>Pierre LASSEUR and Antoine SOUBEYRAN</i> (II): <u>A Ricardian Model of the Tragedy of the Commons</u>
ETA	81.2001	<i>Pierre COURTOIS, Jean Christophe PÉREAU and Tarik TAZDAÏT</i> : <u>An Evolutionary Approach to the Climate Change Negotiation Game</u>
NRM	82.2001	<i>Christophe BONTEMPS, Stéphane COUTURE and Pascal FAVARD</i> : <u>Is the Irrigation Water Demand Really Convex?</u>
NRM	83.2001	<i>Unai PASCUAL and Edward BARBIER</i> : <u>A Model of Optimal Labour and Soil Use with Shifting Cultivation</u>
CLIM	84.2001	<i>Jesper JENSEN and Martin Hvidt THELLE</i> : <u>What are the Gains from a Multi-Gas Strategy?</u>
CLIM	85.2001	<i>Maurizio MICHELINI</i> (III): <u>IPCC "Summary for Policymakers" in TAR. Do its results give a scientific support always adequate to the urgencies of Kyoto negotiations?</u>
CLIM	86.2001	<i>Claudia KEMFERT</i> (III): <u>Economic Impact Assessment of Alternative Climate Policy Strategies</u>
CLIM	87.2001	<i>Cesare DOSI and Michele MORETTO</i> : <u>Global Warming and Financial Umbrellas</u>
ETA	88.2001	<i>Elena BONTEMPI, Alessandra DEL BOCA, Alessandra FRANZOSI, Marzio GALEOTTI and Paola ROTA</i> : <u>Capital Heterogeneity: Does it Matter? Fundamental Q and Investment on a Panel of Italian Firms</u>
ETA	89.2001	<i>Efrem CASTELNUOVO and Paolo SURICO</i> : <u>Model Uncertainty, Optimal Monetary Policy and the Preferences of the Fed</u>
CLIM	90.2001	<i>Umberto CIORBA, Alessandro LANZA and Francesco PAULI</i> : <u>Kyoto Protocol and Emission Trading: Does the US Make a Difference?</u>
CLIM	91.2001	<i>Zhong Xiang ZHANG and Lucas ASSUNCAO</i> : <u>Domestic Climate Policies and the WTO</u>
SUST	92.2001	<i>Anna ALBERINI, Alan KRUPNICK, Maureen CROPPER, Nathalie SIMON and Joseph COOK</i> (II): <u>The Willingness to Pay for Mortality Risk Reductions: A Comparison of the United States and Canada</u>
SUST	93.2001	<i>Riccardo SCARPA, Guy D. GARROD and Kenneth G. WILLIS</i> (III): <u>Valuing Local Public Goods with Advanced Stated Preference Models: Traffic Calming Schemes in Northern England</u>
CLIM	94.2001	<i>Ming CHEN and Larry KARP</i> : <u>Environmental Indices for the Chinese Grain Sector</u>
CLIM	95.2001	<i>Larry KARP and Jiangfeng ZHANG</i> : <u>Controlling a Stock Pollutant with Endogenous Investment and Asymmetric Information</u>

- (xxxvi) This paper was presented at the Second EFIEA Policy Workshop on "Integrating Climate Policies in the European Environment. Costs and Opportunities", organised by the Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei on behalf of the European Forum on Integrated Environmental Assessment, Milan, March 4-6, 1999
- (xxxvii) This paper was presented at the Fourth Meeting of the Coalition Theory Network organised by the Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, CORE of Louvain-la-Neuve and GREQAM of Marseille, Aix-en-Provence, January 8-9, 1999
- (xxxviii) This paper was presented at the International Conference on "Trade and Competition in the WTO and Beyond" organised by the Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei and the Department of International Studies of the University of Padua, Venice, December 4-5, 1998
- (xxxix) This paper was presented at the 3rd Toulouse Conference on Environment and Resource Economics, organised by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, IDEI and INRA and sponsored by MATE on "Environment, Energy Uses and Climate Change", Toulouse, June 14-16, 1999
- (xl) This paper was presented at the conference on "Distributional and Behavioral Effects of Environmental Policy" jointly organised by the National Bureau of Economic Research and Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Milan, June 11-12, 1999
- (xli) This paper was presented at the Fifth Meeting of the Coalition Theory Network organised by the Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei and the CODE, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, Barcelona January 21-22, 2000
- (xlii) This paper was presented at the International Workshop on "Climate Change and Mediterranean Coastal Systems: Regional Scenarios and Vulnerability Assessment" organised by the Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei in co-operation with the Istituto Veneto di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti, Venice, December 9-10, 1999.
- (xliii) This paper was presented at the International Workshop on "Voluntary Approaches, Competition and Competitiveness" organised by the Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei within the research activities of the CAVA Network, Milan, May 25-26, 2000.
- (xliv) This paper was presented at the International Workshop on "Green National Accounting in Europe: Comparison of Methods and Experiences" organised by the Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei within the Concerted Action of Environmental Valuation in Europe (EVE), Milan, March 4-7, 2000
- (xlv) This paper was presented at the International Workshop on "New Ports and Urban and Regional Development. The Dynamics of Sustainability" organised by the Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Venice, May 5-6, 2000.
- (xlvi) This paper was presented at the Sixth Meeting of the Coalition Theory Network organised by the Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei and the CORE, Université Catholique de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium, January 26-27, 2001
- (xlvii) This paper was presented at the RICAMARE Workshop "Socioeconomic Assessments of Climate Change in the Mediterranean: Impact, Adaptation and Mitigation Co-benefits", organised by the Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Milan, February 9-10, 2001
- (xlviii) This paper was presented at the International Workshop "Trade and the Environment in the Perspective of the EU Enlargement", organised by the Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Milan, May 17-18, 2001
- (xlix) This paper was presented at the International Conference "Knowledge as an Economic Good", organised by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei and The Beijer International Institute of Environmental Economics, Palermo, April 20-21, 2001
- (l) This paper was presented at the Workshop "Growth, Environmental Policies and + Sustainability" organised by the Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Venice, June 1, 2001
- (li) This paper was presented at the Fourth Toulouse Conference on Environment and Resource Economics on "Property Rights, Institutions and Management of Environmental and Natural Resources", organised by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, IDEI and INRA and sponsored by MATE, Toulouse, May 3-4, 2001
- (lii) This paper was presented at the International Conference on "Economic Valuation of Environmental Goods", organised by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei in cooperation with CORILA, Venice, May 11, 2001
- (liii) This paper was circulated at the International Conference on "Climate Policy - Do We Need a New Approach?", jointly organised by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Stanford University and Venice International University, Isola di San Servolo, Venice, September 6-8, 2001

2000 SERIES

MGMT	<i>Corporate Sustainable Management</i> (Editor: Andrea Marsanich)
CLIM	<i>Climate Change Modelling and Policy</i> (Editor: Marzio Galeotti)
PRIV	<i>Privatisation, Antitrust, Regulation</i> (Editor: Bernardo Bortolotti)
KNOW	<i>Knowledge, Technology, Human Capital</i> (Editor: Dino Pinelli)
WAT	<i>Water and Natural Resources Management</i> (Editor: Carlo Giupponi)
SUST	<i>Sustainability Indicators and Impact Assessment</i> (Editor: Marialuisa Tamborra)
VOL	<i>Task Force on Voluntary Agreements</i> (Editor: Rinaldo Brau)
ETA	<i>Economic Theory and Applications</i> (Editor: Carlo Carraro)

2001 SERIES

MGMT	<i>Corporate Sustainable Management</i> (Editor: Andrea Marsanich)
CLIM	<i>Climate Change Modelling and Policy</i> (Editor: Marzio Galeotti)
PRIV	<i>Privatisation, Antitrust, Regulation</i> (Editor: Bernardo Bortolotti)
KNOW	<i>Knowledge, Technology, Human Capital</i> (Editor: Dino Pinelli)
NRM	<i>Natural Resources Management</i> (Editor: Carlo Giupponi)
SUST	<i>Sustainability Indicators and Environmental Evaluation</i> (Editor: Marialuisa Tamborra)
VOL	<i>Voluntary and International Agreements</i> (Editor: Carlo Carraro)
ETA	<i>Economic Theory and Applications</i> (Editor: Carlo Carraro)

SUBSCRIPTION TO "NOTE DI LAVORO"

Starting from January 1998 Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei issues a Periodic E-mail "Note di Lavoro" Bulletin listing the titles and the abstracts of its most recent Working Papers.

All the "Note di Lavoro" listed in the Bulletin are available on the Internet and are downloadable from Feem's web site "www.feem.it".

If you wish to receive hard copies you may choose from the payment options listed in the following table (minimum order: 10 papers)*.

*Orders for individual papers should clearly indicate the "Nota di Lavoro" number and can therefore be issued for published papers only.

All orders must be sent by fax to:

"Publications Office" - Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: Fax +39+2+52036946

PAYMENT OPTIONS

How many papers?	What's the price?	How to pay?
10 or more*	US\$ 4.00 each ITL 7,000 each	By Credit card or Bank transfer
Annual subscription (approx. 100 papers/year)	US\$ 250.00 ITL 425,000	By Credit card or Bank transfer

*Please fill out the Working Paper Subscription Form indicating your preferences

(Periodic E-mail "Note di Lavoro" Bulletin, Annual subscription, Order for individual papers - minimum 10*)!

.....

WORKING PAPER SUBSCRIPTION FORM

Name: _____

Affiliation(if applicable): _____

Address: _____

Phone: _____ Fax: _____ E-mail: _____

I wish to: _____ Amount due: _____

- receive the Periodic E-mail Working Papers Bulletin
- place a full annual subscription for 2001 (US\$ 250.00/ITL 425,000) _____
- order no.....individual papers (minimum 10 papers at US\$ 4.00/ITL 7,000 each)* _____

Total _____

I will pay by: _____

VISA American Express Card No. _____ Expiration Date: _____

Signature: _____

Bank transfer in US\$ (or Italian Lire in Italy) to Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei - account no. 39341-56 -
SWIFT ARTIITM2 - ABI 03512 - CAB 01614 - Credito Artigiano - Corso Magenta 59, 20123 Milano, Italy.

Copy of the bank transfer should be faxed along with the order.

Please return this duly completed form to:

"Publications Office" - Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei - Corso Magenta, 63 - 20123 Milano, Italy