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WHAT EXPLAINS THE SURGE IN EURO AREA SOVEREIGN SPREADS DURING THE FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 2007-09?

by Maria-Grazia Attinasi, Cristina Checherita and Christiane Nickel
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Abstract

This paper uses a dynamic panel approach to explain the determinants of widening sovereign bond yield spreads vis-à-vis Germany in selected euro area countries during the period end-July 2007 to end-March 2009, when the financial turmoil developed into a full-blown financial and economic crisis. Emphasis is given to the role of fiscal fundamentals and government announcements of substantial bank rescue packages. The paper finds that higher expected budget deficits and/or higher government debt ratios relative to Germany contributed to higher government bond yield spreads in the euro area during the analysed period. More importantly, the announcements of bank rescue packages have led to a re-assessment, from the part of investors, of sovereign credit risk, first and foremost through a transfer of risk from the private financial sector to the government.

Keywords: Fiscal Policy, Sovereign Spreads, Fiscal Announcements

JEL Classification: E62, E43, G12
Non-technical summary

Since the intensification of the financial crisis in September 2008 up to end-March 2009, long-term government bond yield spreads relative to Germany have increased dramatically for most euro area countries. In March 2009, the spread between the Greek government bonds and the German bund widened to almost 300 bps from about 35 bps, the average spread after Greece’s accession to EMU. To stop the meltdown of the financial system following the default of Lehman Brothers, many euro area governments announced broad-based bank rescue packages whereby they committed a substantial amount of resources to safeguard confidence in the financial system and restore the flow of credit to the economy.

This paper uses a dynamic panel approach to explain the determinants of widening sovereign bond yield spreads in selected euro area countries during the period between 31 July 2007 and 25 March 2009. In particular, it looks at the role of fiscal fundamentals as determinants of sovereign creditworthiness and pays special attention to government announcements of substantial bank rescue packages.

In line with the existing empirical literature, this paper finds that sovereign bond yield spreads in the euro area reflect concerns about a country’s credit risk and liquidity risk as well as higher international risk aversion. Higher expected budget deficits and/or higher expected government debt relative to Germany have contributed to higher government bond yield spreads in the euro area over the period of analysis.

More importantly, the announcement of bank rescue packages has led to a re-assessment of sovereign credit risk from the part of investors, through a transfer of risk from the private financial sector to the public sector. We also find that the amount of resources committed by the governments for the purpose of stabilising the banking sector does not have, on average, a statistically significant effect on sovereign bond spreads, especially when Ireland is excluded from the analysis. In our view, this shows that investors’ discrimination among sovereign borrowers was triggered by governments’ credible commitment to extend support to the banking sector, and not by the mere size of this support. Investors’ may have believed that governments would provide as much
support as needed to shore up ailing banks regardless of the amounts explicitly announced in the first place.

Our findings are robust to the use of different time frequencies (daily and monthly), various estimation techniques, and to the inclusion of additional control variables. In this respect, we also found that the reduction in the ECB main refinancing operations rate contributed significantly to narrowing sovereign bond spreads for the period under consideration. Similarly, private external imbalances relative to Germany have an influence on sovereign bond spreads, whereas the expected economic growth rate does not seem to matter for the period covered in our analysis. Controlling for other types of announcements, such as the release of macroeconomic data and lead indicators, does not change our conclusions.

Our model has a very high predictive power of both average and country-specific sovereign bond spreads in the sample. Based on the (average) coefficient estimates from our basic model, we find that our explanatory variables contributed, on average, to the daily change in sovereign bond spreads in the following maximum proportions: 56% the international risk aversion; 21% the expected fiscal position (expected budget balance and debt), 14% the liquidity proxy, and 9% the announcement of bank rescue packages. The large relevance of international risk aversion in driving changes in sovereign bond yield spreads can be ascribed to the extraordinary severeness of the financial crisis during the period of our analysis.

To conclude, the empirical evidence presented in this paper indicates that governments with relatively more favourable expected fiscal positions may benefit from lower relative borrowing costs in times of crisis. This gives them more room for manoeuvre in bearing the additional costs entailed by the bank rescue operations that have been critical in safeguarding confidence in and the stability of the financial system. The current crisis has thus shown the importance of preserving the public’s trust in the soundness of public finances and the need for countries to consolidate during good economic times.
I. Introduction

Since September 2008, for most euro area countries the long-term government bond yield spreads to Germany have widened markedly. Since the starting of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and until the first half of 2008, bond yields of EMU governments’ debt had generally been relatively close. Over this period, the average bond spread of 10-year sovereign bonds, relative to the benchmark German bund, had been about 16 basis points (bps).¹ For the Greek 10-year sovereign bonds, the spread to the benchmark German bund had been on average just about 30 bps. After the intensification of the financial crisis in September 2008, government bond yields differentials relative to Germany have increased dramatically for most euro area countries and in March 2009 the average spread between the Greek government bond and the German bund was about 270 bps.

This unprecedented surge in sovereign bond yield spreads reflected increasing concerns in financial markets about some governments’ capacity to meet their future debt obligations. In addition to a higher cost of borrowing, the increase in sovereign bond yield spreads may signal that investors are less willing to provide funding to sovereign borrowers; thus in the extreme threatening the latter’s ability to access capital markets.

The economic literature on the determinants of long-term government bond yields has found evidence of the market-based fiscal discipline hypothesis according to which financial markets ask a higher default premium to countries that borrow excessively (Goldstein and Woglom 1991; Bayoumi et al. 1995).

The widening of sovereign bond spreads vis-à-vis Germany was interpreted by many observers as a welcome reassessment and differentiation of country risks. This is also understandable in the context of the European fiscal framework. The Stability and Growth Pact not only hinges upon the concept of peer pressure, i.e. that European countries among themselves “urge” countries with excessive deficits to correct them, but also on the idea that financial markets exert pressure, via higher bond risk

¹ This average is computed for the period January 2000 to July 2008 using daily 10-year sovereign bond yield spreads relative to Germany. Greece is included in the sample only since January 2001, the year of EMU accession. The data source is Bloomberg.
premia, on countries with unsustainable fiscal positions. This differentiation of country risk across the euro area was virtually absent before the financial crisis.

Against this backdrop the question arises: Is the widening of sovereign bond spreads observed during the financial crisis indeed an outcome of investors differentiating between countries’ fiscal positions and/or macroeconomic fundamentals? Or is the widening explained by more general factors such as liquidity risk or international risk aversion?

To shed light on these questions, this paper provides an empirical analysis of the determinants of long-term government bond yield spreads for selected euro area countries over the period from 31 July 2007 to 25 March 2009. In this way the analysis captures developments in bond spreads since the early stages of the financial crisis, when its consequences for the euro area appeared limited to a few banks, up to its intensification, when uncertainty in financial markets heightened considerably. Indeed, in the euro area the first signs of the crisis were felt since end-July 2007, when the German government rescued the Deutsche Industriebank (IKB) due to its exposure to the US sub-prime mortgage market.

Largely following the literature, this paper looks at the main determinants of long-term government bond spreads, such as: (i) a country’s credit risk, as captured in particular by the relative soundness of its expected fiscal position; (ii) international risk aversion, which in times of heightened uncertainty could be higher for some euro area countries than for others; and (iii) market liquidity risk, which may be related to the relative size of sovereign bond markets. In addition, given the particular nature of the financial crisis period covered in this paper, our empirical analysis also investigates whether government announcements of substantial bank rescue packages have contributed to the widening of euro area sovereign bond yield spreads and to a transfer of credit risk from the private financial sector to the public sector.

The paper is structured as follows. Section II provides a brief review of the literature on the determinants of sovereign bond yield spreads. Section III presents stylised facts on the developments in long-term government bond yields, gives details about data construction and sources and shows descriptive statistics for our main
variables of interest. Section IV describes the basic empirical model and its extensions, presents the empirical results, and discusses the model’s goodness-of-fit and various robustness checks. The last part presents the conclusions and areas of future research.

II. Literature review

The literature on the determinants of government bond yield spreads lists several factors influencing the risk premia paid by governments relative to the benchmark government bond. First, sovereign bond spreads are influenced by a country’s creditworthiness as reflected by its fiscal and macroeconomic position (the so-called “credit risk”). Second, liquidity risk, i.e. the size and depth of the government’s bond market, plays a role. Third, government bond spreads reflect international risk aversion, i.e. investor sentiment towards this asset class for each country. Finally, and related to credit risk, the effect of announcements, for example, macroeconomic news/surprises or fiscal policy events (e.g. government plans) might also play a role in the development of sovereign bond spreads. Since the analysis in this paper covers the period from the beginning of the crisis in financial markets (i.e. August 2007) until the end of March 2009, that is, the period during which the (presumed) sovereign yield differentiation based on countries’ credit risk intensified, this review focuses on the role of credit risk and announcements.

For developed countries, a range of empirical literature has found a significant impact of fiscal variables on risk premia, in particular with regard to the level of public debt. For the U.S., a seminal paper by Goldstein and Woglom (1992) finds evidence that the debt level of U.S. states has a positive impact on their bond yield relative to that of other states. Further evidence in this direction was provided by Bayoumi et al. (1995) and Poterba and Rueben (1999). Regarding the fiscal deficit, Laubach (2009) estimates the effect of the five-year ahead projection of the U.S. government deficit, as provided by the Office of Management and Budget, on the level of the five year ahead real Treasury yield. He finds a significant impact of deficits and debt on long-term interest rates, isolating the effects of the business cycle and associated monetary policy actions. However, he finds no evidence that yield spreads between corporate and sovereign bonds (as a proxy for
changes in the sovereign risk) are systematically related to expected fiscal balances. Finally, for the OECD countries, Alesina et al. (1992) analyse the yield differential between sovereign and corporate bonds and find that it depends positively on the public debt level.

For European and, in particular, EMU countries, several studies tend to point to a significant impact of government debt and (not quite unambiguously) deficit on sovereign bond spreads. Faini (2006) finds a significant effect of fiscal deficit and debt levels on the aggregate EMU interest rate level, as well as on sovereign bond spreads in a model with identical slope coefficients across countries. Bernoth et al. (2004) find that fiscal fundamentals, as proxied by the budget balance or the government debt, have a significant impact on sovereign bond spreads for a pooled sample of 13 EU countries. Similar results are obtained by Hallerberg and Wolff (2006) using fixed effects panel estimations. With a similar econometric approach Bernoth and Wolff (2008) focus on the accuracy of government-reported fiscal data and find a spread-reducing impact of fiscal transparency in addition to a positive impact of deficits but not debt. Codogno et al. (2003) in their Seemingly Unrelated Regressions analysis (SUR) of government bond spreads, use public debt as the only proxy for a country’s fiscal position and find that only for Italy and Spain fluctuations in yield differentials can be attributed to domestic fiscal fundamentals, whereas for the other countries in the sample (e.g. Belgium, France and Portugal) international risk-related factors seem to matter more. By contrast, assuming that it is expected fiscal developments rather than past outcomes that matter for investment decisions, Heppke-Falk and Hufner (2004) analyse whether expected budget deficits, derived from the Consensus Forecasts, have an impact on interest rate swap spreads of France, Germany and Italy. Using a SUR framework, they find no such evidence for the period 1994-2004. However, they find that since July 1997 (after the Stability and Growth Pact had been signed) market discipline (i.e. markets’ sensitivity to public finance outcomes) increased in Germany and France (but not in Italy) and for Germany also after the start of EMU in 1999. Manganelli and Wolswijk (2009) find that

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2 For a literature review and empirical investigation of government bond spreads in emerging markets using expected fiscal positions see Nickel et al. (2009).
in the euro area, bond spreads are largely driven by the level of short-term interest rates (i.e. common international risk), while credit risk and liquidity risk still matter in EMU.

Finally, event study analyses have shown that announcements, for example of macroeconomic data, have a discernable impact on government bond spreads, especially on shorter-term horizons. Existing papers applied to the euro area government bond markets, find that US data releases not only affect US markets but also exert a significant effect on European bond markets. In a dynamic model of intra-day bond returns for long-term German government bonds, Andersson et al. (2006) use announcements of euro area, German, French and Italian macroeconomic releases, in addition to US announcements, and find significant effects on the prices of long term bonds. Codogno et al. (2003) find that fiscal announcements about the initiation of excessive deficit procedures for Germany and Portugal have affected bond spreads only for Portugal. By contrast, Afonso and Strauch (2004) show that there is no persistent and systematic reaction of the default risk premium to the identified fiscal policy events during 2002, even if some specific events had a significant and temporary impact on swap spreads.

As to the role of other factors, such as the liquidity risk premium, the literature does not provide clear-cut evidence on its relative importance versus credit risk for sovereign bond markets. Compared to studies that emphasize credit risk, several papers, such as Gomez-Puig (2006) and Beber et al. (2009) find that liquidity risk is a highly relevant (even the most important) factor in explaining sovereign bond spreads after the introduction of the euro and in times of heightened uncertainty respectively.

The role of a common international risk factor, as one of the main explanatory variables for sovereign spreads, is underlined in several studies, such as Codogno et al. (2003), Geyer et al. (2004), Barrios et al. (2009), Sgherri and Zoli (2009). The international risk factor is found to have a larger impact in countries with high government debt ratios (Codogno et al. 2003) and to magnify the impact of fiscal variables on yield spreads in crisis times (Haugh et al. 2009; Barrios et al. 2009).

To conclude, the review of the empirical literature provides, on balance, evidence for a significant impact of fiscal fundamentals in explaining sovereign bond spreads in normal economic times. The role of fiscal announcements is less well analysed and the
existing evidence is weak. This paper contributes to the existing empirical literature by looking at the impact of these factors during the economic and financial crisis that has hit the euro area and the world markets since September 2008.

III. Stylised facts and data description

Our empirical analysis covers the period from end-July 2007, when the first signs of increasing turmoil in global financial markets became visible, until about end-March 2009. The dependent variable is the daily 10-year government bond yield spreads relative to Germany for the following ten euro area countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain.4

Since the start of stage three of the EMU5 and until the onset of the financial crisis, 10-year government bond yields for euro area countries converged and differentials vis-à-vis Germany became very low. Since September 2008, when the financial turmoil intensified, spreads started to widen considerably, as shown in Chart 1. In particular, countries such as Greece and Ireland experienced the largest increase in their bond spreads, followed by Portugal, Italy, Belgium, Austria and Spain (Table 1).

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3 This was the time when we finalised the collection of our dataset; it also coincided with the period the financial markets started to gradually stabilise.
4 The remaining euro area countries (i.e. Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovakia, and Slovenia) are not included in the analysis for two main reasons. First of all, information on 10-year government bond yields is not readily available for these euro area countries as their government bond markets are relatively small. Secondly, the countries included in the analysis are those that have announced bank rescue packages to support the banking sector since September 2008. The construction of the dependent variable is in line with existing empirical studies (Codogno et al. 2003; Manganelli and Wolsijik 2009).
5 The tightening of sovereign bond spreads was mainly associated to the lower liquidity premia being asked by markets as a result of the increasing integration of financial markets.
As already introduced in the literature review section, long-term government bond yield spreads are likely to depend on three sets of factors: (i) countries’ credit risk, as captured particularly by indicators of fiscal positions; (ii) markets’ liquidity risk, and (iii) degree of international risk aversion.
Credit Risk Variables

The most commonly used indicators of a country’s fiscal position are the general government debt and deficit ratio. Several papers also use the debt service ratio, interest payments as a share of GDP (Bernoth et al. 2004), a country’s credit rating (Manganelli and Wolswijk 2009), and in some cases dummies on fiscal announcements (Afonso and Strauch 2004). Our analysis looks at the role of a country’s fiscal position in determining its bond spreads vis-à-vis Germany, but also at whether the announcement of broad based bank rescue packages had some effects on investor’s assessment of credit risk (i.e. we control for the announcement effect).

However, unlike most previous studies for the euro area\(^6\), our analysis does not use historical fiscal data, but the expected general government budget balance and debt ratios. These variables are taken from the European Commission Forecasts that are released on a bi-annual basis. For each country, we compute the average for a 2-year period of the expected budget balance and debt ratio, using the European Commission forecasts available at each point in time, and we take differences vis-à-vis Germany. In this way, our explanatory variables are consistent with the specification of the dependent variable.\(^7\) Since a worsening of the expected fiscal position (i.e. higher expected deficits and/or higher expected debt ratios) could signal to investors increasing risks to the sustainability of a country’s fiscal policy, in our analysis the expected sign on the expected general government budget balance is negative and the expected sign on the expected debt ratio is positive.

The rationale for including expected rather than historical fiscal data in our analysis relies on the assumption that at each point in time investors form their expectations about a country’s fiscal position on the basis of the available information at that time. Given its prominent role in the application of the EU fiscal surveillance framework, we assume that investors use the European Commission’s forecast as a reliable source of information to form their expectations.

\(^6\) Several studies, such as Heppke-Falk and Huefner (2004), Haugh et al. (2009), Barrios et al. (2009), Sgherri and Zoli (2009), use expected fiscal variables in explaining sovereign bond spreads in the euro area.

\(^7\) In our daily database the value of the budget balance (debt ratio) is updated every time new forecasts are published by the Commission.
A potential drawback of these data is their low frequency (bi-annual) as opposed to the high frequency of our dependent variable. An alternative approach would be to use fiscal forecasts released on a monthly basis by professional forecasters, e.g. the Consensus Forecast is an example. However, since not all countries in our sample are covered in these monthly forecasts, this approach would limit the scope of our analysis.

Chart 2 below plots the ten-year government bond yield spreads over Germany for the euro area countries under consideration against their expected budget balance relative to Germany, both variables averaged over the period of our analysis. The chart shows that countries that are expected to have a less favourable budget balance compared to Germany have experienced larger bond yield differentials. France is an outlier in this respect, as it has experienced only a slight increase in its ten-year government bond yield differential to Germany despite its higher budget deficit. This may be explained by the relatively lower liquidity premium that France may benefit from compared with other countries under consideration, as well as lower perceived vulnerability to the financial turmoil.

Chart 2: Ten-year government bond yield spreads of euro area countries over Germany and the expected budget balance relative to Germany (average 31/07/2007 to 25/03/2009)

Sources: Bloomberg, European Commission and ECB staff calculations.
Note: For each country, the average expected budget balance for 2007, 2008 and 2009 is computed using vintages of the European Commission forecasts available at each point in time.
Interestingly, with the exception of Ireland, the countries that experienced the largest increase in their sovereign bond yield spreads (see also Table 1 and Chart 1), are those that entered the crisis with high deficits (and debt ratios). By contrast, as it will be shown below (see Table 2), the size of the bank rescue packages announced by the individual countries had no significant impact on the widening of bond spreads. Therefore, the crisis seems to have triggered a *flight to quality effect* whereby investors started to discriminate among sovereign borrowers on the basis of their fiscal outlook.

Given the particular nature of the period of financial crisis covered in our analysis, we expect that the announcements of bank rescue packages may have also affected investors’ perceptions of euro area countries credit risk. To capture this announcement effect, we construct a country dummy variable which equals 0 before the date of the announcement and 1 as of that date. We assume that investors may have interpreted the governments’ decision to support the banking sector as an indicator of future higher fiscal burden, thus asking higher premia on their debt. Therefore, the expected sign on the dummy variable is positive.

Bank rescue packages were directed at banks experiencing liquidity and/or solvency problems. Financial support schemes included: (i) government guarantees for interbank lending and new debt issued by banks; (ii) the recapitalisation of financial institutions in difficulty; (iii) asset relief schemes and (iv) higher retail deposit insurance. These support measures were announced in the aftermath of the default of Lehman Brothers, between end-September and end-October 2008. Although all countries acted within the common guidelines setup by the European Action Plan, the timing of adoption of the measures differed across countries and it was not clear a priori whether all of them would provide such support, or what its precise shape would be. Ireland, for example, announced its blanket guarantee scheme on all deposits and debts of both domestic banks and foreign subsidiaries well ahead of the European Action Plan. Furthermore, whereas some countries adopted broad-based schemes consisting of both guarantees and recapitalisation measures (Germany, Austria, Greece, Spain, France and the Netherlands), some other

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8 We do not consider the fiscal stimulus packages to boost aggregate demand announced by euro area governments. Their effect on the fiscal variables would already be captured by the expected budget deficits and debt ratios, given their direct statistical recording, thus making the two sets of variables strongly correlated.

9 The concerted European action plan of the euro area countries was adopted on 12 October 2008.
(Belgium, Luxembourg) did not announce a general scheme, but carried out ad hoc interventions to support individual institutions. Therefore, by recording the exact date of announcement of the government support measures, our dummy variable is able to capture the announcement effect related to the adoption of bank rescue packages by each country in our sample.

The amount of resources committed varied across countries to a great extent. Ireland, for example, announced a guarantee scheme of €400 billion, including the retail bank deposit guarantee, which amounts to more than 200% of its GDP. Countries such as the Netherlands, Austria and Germany committed resources above 20% of their GDP. Overall, the total amount of resources committed to bank rescue packages between mid-September and mid-October 2008 amounted to about 23% of the euro area GDP.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Date of (first) announcement</th>
<th>Cumulative recapitalisation</th>
<th>Cumulative guarantees*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AT</td>
<td>13/10/08</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>26.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BE</td>
<td>26/09/08</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>74.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>06/10/08</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>07/10/08</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FI</td>
<td>20/10/08</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>26.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>30/09/08</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GR</td>
<td>15/10/08</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IE</td>
<td>29/09/08</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>259.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>08/10/08</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NL</td>
<td>26/09/08</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>33.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT</td>
<td>13/10/08</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Includes retail deposit guarantees.

Source: Authors’ calculations.

Using information available on the size of the bank rescue packages we construct two additional variables, namely: the size of recapitalisation and the size of guarantees. For each country in the sample we record the size of bank rescue packages as initially announced by governments between end-September and end-October 2008, separately for bank recapitalisations and guarantees. To these amounts we add any individual operations announced outside the packages over the period between 31 July 2007 and 25 March 2009. Therefore, for each day (or month) of the sample period, the value of the

10 For Italy, we consider the size of government guarantees as percent of GDP to be zero.
variable is the cumulative amount of bank rescue measures announced until that moment, expressed as percent of the respective country’s GDP.

Concurrent to the announcement of bank rescue packages, pressures on the financial sector seemed to have eased whereas the opposite occurred at the general government level. This was felt through a sharp increase in sovereign credit default swap (CDS) premia for most euro area countries, whereas the CDS premia for European financial corporations (i.e. those covered by the iTraxx financial index), reversed their upward trend and started to decline. Chart 3 illustrates these developments and depicts the cumulative changes since mid-September 2008 in average five-year sovereign CDS premia for 11 euro area countries and in the CDS premia for European financial institutions covered by the iTraxx index.

**Chart 3: Cumulative changes in average five-year sovereign CDS premia for euro area countries and iTraxx financial index (15 September 2008- 25 March 2009; bps)**

Until end-September 2008 average sovereign CDS premia had been very low and stable. The dramatic rise in CDS premia for most euro area countries after the...
announcements of bank rescue packages, broadly coinciding with the Irish guarantee scheme (29 September 2008), and the fact that they remained at elevated levels for a prolonged period of time point to a reassessment of countries’ credit risk. At the same time, CDS premia for financial institutions declined. All in all this would suggest that the broad-based bank rescue packages have alleviated some credit risk in the banking sector and brought about a transfer of credit risk from the private financial to the public sector. Our empirical analysis tests the credit risk transfer hypothesis through the impact of the announcement of bank rescue packages on the difference between sovereign CDS premia and CDS premia for European financial corporations. Under this hypothesis, the announcement of bank rescue packages should lead to a widening of the difference between the sovereign and the corporate CDS premia. Daily data are from Bloomberg.

Since we look at premia rather than spreads, Germany is also part of the analysis. A closer look at developments in CDS premia during the period of the analysis shows that they have differed quite substantially across countries. On the one hand, CDS premia for Ireland, Greece, Austria and Italy experienced high volatility and rose to above 200 bps at the peak of the financial crisis. On other hand, CDS premia for Germany, France and Finland were much less volatile (see Chart 4 and Table 3).
**Chart 4: Sovereign CDS premia (levels) for euro area countries (bp), daily data 15 September 2009 to 25 March 2009**

Source: Bloomberg.

**Table 3: Five-year sovereign CDS premia: descriptive statistics (31/07/2007 to 25/03/2009; bps)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>St. dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>81</td>
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<td>282</td>
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<td>Austria</td>
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<td>260</td>
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<td>Italy</td>
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<td>Spain</td>
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<td>Belgium</td>
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<td>Portugal</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Bloomberg and authors' calculation.

**Liquidity Risk Variable**

Liquidity factors also play a role in determining sovereign bond spreads. High liquidity is usually associated with lower yields in equilibrium, as more liquid bonds can be traded more easily, thus carrying lower transaction costs. Liquidity conditions can
vary across sovereign issues depending on the trading volumes, the amounts of bonds outstanding, the trading activity of market makers and the efficiency of the secondary market.

Measures of liquidity differ widely across studies. Bid/ask spreads are often used as a measure of the cost incurred by investors in unwinding an asset position. Trading volumes, turnover ratios and trading intensity are used as measures of how frequently a given asset is traded in the market in a given period. Finally, a less traditional measure of liquidity is the amount of outstanding government debt which represents a measure of market depth. Codogno et al. (2003) use three different measures of liquidity (i.e. bid/ask spread, trading volume and turnover ratio) and find that trading volumes are the best performing liquidity indicator. Bernoth et al. (2004) use the size of government bond markets (i.e. the amount of debt issued by a country as a share of total debt in the EU) as an indicator of liquidity and find a significant effect of this variable on the yield differentials of euro area countries. Similarly, Gómez-Puig (2006) uses bid/ask spread and the overall outstanding volume of sovereign debt as measures of liquidity and finds that both measures played a role in the widening of sovereign bond spreads since the EMU. However, according to some authors the main drawback of the bid/ask spread measure is that it is not truly exogenous, as they depend on some features of the marketplace where they are determined (Dunne et al. 2006).

In line with Bernoth et al. (2004) and Gómez-Puig (2006), our analysis includes a proxy for liquidity expressed as the size of the government bond markets (i.e. the amount of gross government debt issuance). For each country in the sample, total debt issuance is taken as a share of the euro area bond market and the difference to the German ratio is computed. Since better liquidity conditions in the government bond market are expected to lead to lower yields, our liquidity proxy is expected to have a negative sign. Data are available on a quarterly basis and are taken from the ECB Securities Issues Statistics. As an alternative measure for liquidity, in line with Codogno et al. (2003), we also use traded volumes of total government securities maturing at 9- to 11-years relative to Germany which are available from Datastream at a monthly frequency. However, this variable has a weak or no significance in our model, while the sign stays the same as in the case of gross government debt issuance.
*International Risk Aversion*

A common finding of the empirical literature is that besides country specific factors, sovereign bond spreads are driven by a single-time varying common factor, which is typically associated with shifts in international risk appetite. A proxy for international risk aversion frequently used in the literature, is the spread between the yield on AAA US corporate bonds and the yield on the 10-year US government bonds (Codogno et al. 2003; Manganelli and Wolswijk 2009). A widening of the spread is meant to capture shifts in investors’ preferences from the riskier private sector assets towards safer government bonds. Other studies (e.g. Sgherri and Zoli 2009) estimate the common risk factor by using a simple asset pricing model.

Following Codogno et al. (2003) our measure for international risk aversion is computed as the spread between the US AAA corporate bonds and the US 10-year sovereign bonds. In line with other studies we expect a positive sign for this variable in our analysis.

Table A1 in Appendix 1 summarises the variables in our dataset.

**IV. The empirical model and results**

This section introduces a simple estimation model to analyse the determinants of sovereign bond spreads and to assess whether a transfer of risk from the private financial to the public sector occurred as result of government intervention to support the banking sector. Moreover, we gauge the predictive power of the model by quantifying the relative contributions of our main explanatory variables to the change in sovereign bond spreads during the period of analysis.

**IV.1. The basic model**

Given the high persistency in our dependent variable - the level of bond yield spreads today depends also on past values - our preferred specification is a dynamic panel model. Moreover, we estimate the model using both daily and monthly data as a robustness check and in an attempt to mitigate persistency in the dependent variable.
Hence, the following empirical model (Equation (1)) is used to explain 10-year government bond yield spreads over Germany (spread) in ten euro area countries.

\[
\text{spread}_t = \alpha + \rho \text{spread}_{t-1} + \beta_1 (\text{ANN})_t + \beta_2 E(FISC)_t + \beta_3 \text{Intl.Risk}_t + \beta_4 \text{LIQ}_t + \varepsilon_t
\]

(1)

\(\text{ANN}\) is our country dummy variable on the announcements of bank rescue packages\(^{12}\); \(E(FISC)\) denotes governments’ expected fiscal positions, as given by the general government balance and/or gross government debt in percent of GDP, relative to Germany; \(\text{Intl.Risk}\) is our proxy for international risk aversion; \(\text{LIQ}\) is a proxy for liquidity of euro area governments’ bond markets; \(\varepsilon_t\) is the error term.

The empirical methodology uses the Feasible Generalised Least Squares (FGLS) estimator, corrected for heteroskedasticity across panels and panel-specific AR(1) autocorrelation. The model is estimated using daily, as well as monthly averages for the dependent variable for the period from 31 July 2007 to 25 March 2009. Estimation results of Equation (1) are shown in Table 4 below. For both time frequencies model 1 includes both the expected budget balance and expected government debt, model 2 includes only the expected budget balance and model 3 only the expected government debt.

\textit{Table 4: Panel regression to explain 10-year government bond yield spreads over Germany}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Daily data</th>
<th>Monthly data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1</td>
<td>Model 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spread (t-1)</td>
<td>0.9829***</td>
<td>0.9851***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANN</td>
<td>0.0046**</td>
<td>0.0039*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exp. budget bal.</td>
<td>-0.0007**</td>
<td>-0.0010***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exp. gov. debt</td>
<td>0.0001**</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intl.Risk</td>
<td>0.0041***</td>
<td>0.0037***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liquidity (GDI)</td>
<td>-0.0037***</td>
<td>-0.0033***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_cons</td>
<td>0.0024*</td>
<td>0.0016</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number obs. (N)     | 4212       | 4212         | 4212         | 196        | 196          | 196          |

Note: The dependent variable is spreads\(_t\). The dependent variable and the explanatory variable Intl.Risk are expressed in percentage points. The abbreviations for the explanatory variables are explained in the text above (Exp. budget bal. and Exp. gov. debt denote the expected budget balance and, respectively, gross government debt).

Countries included in the analysis: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. The table shows the estimated coefficients and their significance level (*10%; **5%, ***1%).

\(^{12}\)The variables included in equation (1) are specified in terms of differentials to Germany. However, the ANN variable can not be defined as a differential to Germany being based on calendar dates. Therefore, to ensure consistency in the model specification, in the construction of the dummy variable ANN, we dropped the dates of the announcement of bank rescue packages by Germany.
The first lag of the dependent variable is highly significant and is indicative of the high persistency in spreads even when monthly frequencies are used, though the size of the coefficient is slightly smaller in the latter case. However, we find that past values alone do not explain the widening of bond yield spreads over the period of our analysis. Our estimates show that a higher expected budget balance and/or higher expected government debt relative to Germany is on average associated with higher government bond yield spreads for the euro area countries in our sample. Moreover, the expected budget balance is robust to all specifications and its coefficient increases substantially when monthly frequencies are used. The expected government debt is less robust with monthly data, as it loses significance when used together with the budget balance in the regression equation. This suggests that in periods of heightened economic uncertainty, the expected fiscal deficit seems to have a larger impact on the movements in sovereign bond spreads.

Liquidity risk is found to play a role as government bond yield spreads seem to be lower the higher the liquidity in the government bond market. Similarly, the higher the international risk aversion the higher sovereign bond yield spreads.

Turning to the announcements of bank rescue packages, our estimates show that the government announcements to support the banking sector have increased, on average, the perceived risk of government borrowing compared with Germany. The size of the coefficient increases when the model is estimated using monthly frequencies, although its significance is lower in this case, especially when used in conjunction with the budget balance (model 1+2). The results remain robust if we restrict the period of the analysis to start from September 2008 instead of end-July 2007. Interestingly, the regression results also remain unaffected if Ireland is excluded from the panel. This evidence shows that investors’ discrimination across sovereign borrowers was triggered by the governments’ credible commitment to extend support to the banking sector. Investors may have anticipated that governments would provide as much support as needed to shore up ailing banks regardless of the amounts explicitly announced in the first place (i.e. in case of systemic banking risk, significant implicit guarantees may add-up to the explicit ones).
This evidence is supported if we investigate the impact of the announced size of bank rescue operations on investors’ perception of euro area governments’ borrowing risk relative to Germany. To this purpose we replace the ANN variable in Equation (1) with the two Size variables taken as differences relative to Germany and we drop expected government debt which reflects part of the impact from bank recapitalisation operations. Table 5 below presents the estimation results when the model is run using monthly frequencies.

Table 5: Panel regression to explain spreads using the size of bank rescue packages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>m1 Dynamic panel Recap. + Guarantee</th>
<th>m2 Dynamic panel Guarantee</th>
<th>m3 Dynamic panel Recap.</th>
<th>m4 Dynamic panel Recap. + Guarantee (excl. IE)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spread (t-1)</td>
<td>0.9660***</td>
<td>0.9672***</td>
<td>0.9643***</td>
<td>0.9517***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size recap.</td>
<td>0.0021</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0031</td>
<td>0.0025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size guarantee</td>
<td>0.0005***</td>
<td>0.0006***</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.0008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exp budget bal</td>
<td>-0.0161***</td>
<td>-0.0141***</td>
<td>-0.0203***</td>
<td>-0.0129***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Int'l Risk</td>
<td>0.0445***</td>
<td>0.0461***</td>
<td>0.0464***</td>
<td>0.0488***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liquidity (GDI)</td>
<td>-0.0325***</td>
<td>-0.0302***</td>
<td>-0.0380***</td>
<td>-0.0307***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_cons</td>
<td>-0.0191*</td>
<td>-0.0220**</td>
<td>-0.0194*</td>
<td>-0.0202*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No. of observations: 196 196 196 179

Note: The dependent variable is spreadsit. The abbreviations for the explanatory variables are explained in the text above (“Size recap.” represents the cumulative size of bank recapitalisation; “Size guarantee” represents the cumulative size of bank guarantee, both as % of GDP and relative to the size of packages extended by Germany). Model m1 includes both variables Size recap. and Size guarantee; m2 includes only Size guarantee; m3 includes only Size recap. and m4 includes both variables but excludes Ireland from the sample, while m1 - m3 are run on the entire sample. The table shows the estimated coefficients and their significance level (*10%; **5%, ***1%).

When Equation (1) is estimated including the size of the packages, the significance of the expected budget balance remains unaffected, whereas the impact of the new variables is less conclusive. When daily data are used we find that the size of both government guarantees and bank recapitalisations has no impact on government bond yield spreads. When monthly data are used (i.e. those reported in Table 5), we find that the relative size of guarantees extended by governments to the banking sector has contributed to the widening of sovereign bond yield spreads for the period of our analysis. However, this result is driven by Ireland, which is an extreme outlier in terms of the size of guarantees to the banking sector. If we eliminate Ireland from the panel, then the relative size of guarantees is not significantly related to the widening of government bond yield spreads. The size of recapitalisations is weakly significant only when included separately in the regression equation.
The absence of, or at best weak, correlation between the size of bank rescue packages announced by the countries in our sample and the widening in sovereign bond yield spreads is not surprising. As discussed in Section III, with the exception of Ireland, the countries that experienced the highest volatility and the largest increase in their bond spreads are not those that have committed the largest amount of resources to the bank rescue packages. The evidence presented in this section is that a country’s expected fiscal position matters for investors’ perception of its credit risk. It can be argued that the size of bank rescue packages depends, on average, on the country’s fiscal room for manoeuvre: countries with limited fiscal space committed relatively less resources for the purpose of broad-based rescue packages.\textsuperscript{13}

To conclude, investors seem to have reacted on average more forcefully to the announcement of financial support whereas they have been less responsive to the size of the packages, except in the case of Ireland whose package size was extremely large.

\textit{IV.2. The credit risk transfer hypothesis}

As discussed in Section III, the announcements of broad-based bank rescue packages may have signalled to investors the governments’ commitment to take over part of the risks and liabilities from ailing financial institutions. This may have led to a reassessment of sovereign credit risk vis-à-vis the private financial sector, possibly reflected in an increase in the sovereign CDS premia and a decrease (or lower increase) in CDS premia of the private financial sector. To test this hypothesis, we regress the differential between sovereign CDS premia and the iTraxx financials over the same variables as in Equation (1), but the proxy for liquidity in the government bond market, as CDS premia does not incorporate a liquidity risk premium. Table 6 below shows the results using a dynamic panel model and a fixed effects model (FE) for all eleven countries of the euro area considered, including Germany. We find evidence of the transfer of credit risk hypothesis as the estimated coefficient of the $\text{ANN}$ variable is positive and highly statistically significant across all model specifications, meaning that

\textsuperscript{13} Moreover, a fixed effect estimate of the size of bank rescue packages on the historical values of government debt and deficit shows indeed that both the size of budget deficits and the amount of government debt have a negative and significant impact on the size of the rescue package.
the announcement of bank rescue packages led to a widening of the differential between the sovereign and the private financial CDS premia for the period of analysis. This evidence is confirmed when we run two separate regressions having sovereign CDS premia and iTraxx financials as dependent variables respectively. We find that the coefficient of the ANN variable is positive in the regression explaining sovereign CDS, implying an increase in the sovereign credit risk as a result of the announcements, and it is negative in the regression explaining iTraxx, implying a reduction of risk for the financial corporate sector.

Table 6: Panel regression to explain the transfer of risk from the private banking sector to the government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(CDS gov – ItraxxFin)_{t-1}</td>
<td>0.9851***</td>
<td>0.6065***</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANN</td>
<td>0.0253***</td>
<td>0.5278***</td>
<td>0.6023***</td>
<td>0.7479***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exp. budget bal.</td>
<td>-0.0000</td>
<td>-0.0905***</td>
<td>-0.0303***</td>
<td>-0.1037***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intl. Risk</td>
<td>-0.0116***</td>
<td>-0.2662***</td>
<td>-0.2920***</td>
<td>-0.4655***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time trend</td>
<td>-0.0005***</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.0242**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country dummies</td>
<td>- Included</td>
<td>- Included</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cons</td>
<td>0.0103***</td>
<td>-0.0995***</td>
<td>0.2159***</td>
<td>0.271</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The dependent variable is the difference between sovereign’ Credit Default Swap (CDS) premia and CDS premia for iTraxx financials (CDSgov_{t-1} – ItraxxFin_{t-1}). Countries included in the analysis: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. In this analysis, the expected budget balance is expressed as % of GDP (value by country) and not in spreads to Germany. Therefore, unlike in Table 4 above, the ANN variable also includes the bank rescue package announced by Germany (also see footnote 12). The table shows the estimated coefficients and their significance level (*10%; **5%, ***1%).

On the other hand, the Intl.Risk variable has a negative and significant coefficient. We interpret this as an indication that, all other factors constant, higher international risk aversion hit more forcefully the creditworthiness of the European financial sector than that of the euro area governments. Again, if we run two separate regressions on sovereign CDS premia and iTraxx financials as dependent variables, we find that the coefficient of the Intl.Risk variable is positive in both regressions but its size is much larger in the regression explaining iTraxx financials.14

Finally, the ANN variable also seems to have had a higher economic impact compared with the international risk aversion (the coefficient of ANN is higher than that

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14 Results are available upon request.
of \( \text{IntRisk} \) across all specifications). This implies that the net effect of the two factors has been a higher relative increase of risk in the government sector vis-à-vis the private financial sector.

**IV.3. Predictive power and relative contribution of factors**

In this section, we gauge the predictive power of our basic model and attempt to measure the relative contributions of our main regressors to the change in spreads, both on average for the panel and for each country separately. When computing the relative contributions, we transfer the first lag of the dependent variable to the LHS of Equation (1), thus broadly explaining the contribution of our variables of interest (fiscal variables; liquidity risk and international risk aversion) to the change in sovereign bond yield spreads.

Thus, for country \( i \) the contribution to the change in spread of each variable is calculated as the product between the average value of that variable across time for country \( i \), and its coefficient estimate from Table 4, dynamic model 1 (daily). The relative contribution of each variable is then calculated as the ratio between the absolute value of the contribution (as calculated above) and the sum of the absolute value of the contributions of all (statistically significant) variables in the model.

For example, the relative contribution of the \( \text{ANN} \) variable is calculated as follows:

\[
\text{ANN rel contr} = \frac{\hat{\beta}_1 * \text{ANN}_i}{\hat{\beta}_1 * \text{ANN}_i + \hat{\beta}_2 * E(\text{bal})_i + \hat{\beta}_3 * E(\text{debt})_i + \hat{\beta}_4 * \text{Liq}_i + \hat{\beta}_5 * \text{IntRisk}_i}
\]

where \( |\hat{\beta}_1| \) represents the regression coefficient of the variable \( \text{ANN} \) in model 1 (daily) (i.e. 0.0046) taken in absolute value; \( |\text{ANN}_i| \) is the average value over time of the variable \( \text{ANN} \), taken in absolute value, for each country \( i \). The other four variables (i.e. expected budget balance, expected gross government debt, the liquidity proxy and

---

\(^{15}\) More specifically, we assume that \( y_{it} - \rho y_{it-1} = \Delta y_{it} \). In the analysis we only include those explanatory variables that are statistically significant.

\(^{16}\) We follow the methodology in Beber et al. (2009).
international risk aversion), as well as their corresponding coefficients, are expressed in a similar manner.

Table 7 summarizes these results. Column 2 represents the actual values of the dependent variable (spreads$_{it}$) averaged over the period of the analysis, while column 3 shows the averaged predicted values. The predictive power of the basic model is very high for the sample as a whole (up to the 1/100th basis point). By country, the predictive power of the model is also large, differences being in the range of 1/10th basis point - the largest difference seems to be for Finland, about 2 basis points, while for Greece and Ireland, the difference is about 1 basis point.

Table 7: Predictive power of the basic model and relative contributions of the explanatory factors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Actual spreads</th>
<th>Predicted spreads</th>
<th>Maximum relative contribution of the main factors in explaining the daily change in sovereign spreads over Germany (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ann. financial packages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT</td>
<td>0.3743</td>
<td>0.3763</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BE</td>
<td>0.4427</td>
<td>0.4443</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>0.4139</td>
<td>0.4124</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FI</td>
<td>0.2802</td>
<td>0.2999</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>0.2374</td>
<td>0.2375</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GR</td>
<td>0.9318</td>
<td>0.9229</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IE</td>
<td>0.7397</td>
<td>0.7306</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>0.6718</td>
<td>0.6678</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NL</td>
<td>0.2795</td>
<td>0.2794</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT</td>
<td>0.5701</td>
<td>0.5695</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>average sample-DE</td>
<td>0.4942</td>
<td>0.4940</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The results presented are obtained based on the dynamic Model 1 with daily data (see column 2 of Table 1 for details of the model and estimated coefficients).

For the whole panel, the average factor contribution is calculated by averaging the values of the explanatory variables both across time and countries. According to these calculations, our explanatory variables have contributed, on average, to the daily change in sovereign bond spreads in the sample in the following maximum proportions: 56% the international risk aversion; 21% the expected fiscal position (i.e. expected budget balance and expected debt ratio), 14% the liquidity proxy, and 9% the announcement of bank rescue packages. We consider these proportions as being the maximum since other
uncontrolled explanatory factors may also play some additional role.\textsuperscript{17} Hence, international risk aversion seems to be the largest relative contributor to the widening of spreads during the period covered by our analysis. This period has indeed been characterised by high investors’ uncertainty and our proxy of international risk seems to capture this effect quite well. In particular, international risk aversion seems to matter more for countries with weaker fiscal positions.\textsuperscript{18} The fiscal indicators and the fiscally-related factors, i.e. the ANN variable, contribute for about one third to the widening in sovereign bond yield spreads and seem to play a more important role than the liquidity factor. The expected debt-to-GDP ratio relative to Germany, though having a small regression coefficient, seems to be the largest contributor (about one third) among our proxies for country creditworthiness during the period of the analysis.

Turning to country specific results, the expected fiscal position (i.e. expected budget balance and debt ratio) have contributed the most to the change of sovereign bond spreads for Finland (up to 39\%), followed by Ireland (up to 32\%), Greece (29\%) and Italy (up to 26\%). The announcements of bank rescue packages have contributed up to 12\% to the change in the sovereign bond yield spread in Austria, 11\% in Portugal and about 10\% in Belgium, Spain and Ireland. The large contribution of the ANN variable in the case of Austria may reflect possible market concerns regarding future liabilities given the country’s exposure to the Eastern and Central European banking sector. This conjuncture is also buttressed by the fact that Austria is the country in which the international risk aversion seems to have played the largest role in explaining the change in sovereign spreads compared to the other countries in the sample.

As regards the liquidity variable, it is found to be, by far, the largest contributor to the developments of sovereign bond spreads in France (up to 43\%). Corroborated by the relatively low international risk aversion, this result is in line with Codogno et al. (2003), which found that France was the only country where the liquidity risk proved to be more

\textsuperscript{17} We did not include the constant in the calculation of the relative factor contributions (in the denominator of the formula used above) since it was not significant at 5\% level (the constant is mostly not significant across the dynamic panel models used).

\textsuperscript{18} When we estimate our model including the interaction terms between the international risk aversion indicator and both expected deficit and expected debt relative to Germany, we find that \textit{ceteris paribus} the impact of international risk aversion on sovereign bond yield spreads is slightly higher for countries with higher expected debt and higher expected deficit.
important than the international risk factor. Other countries in which our liquidity proxy had a high contribution in explaining the change in the dependent variable are Italy (up to 29%), the Netherlands (20%) and Belgium (up to 17%).

To conclude, the results in this section reveal a high explanatory power of our basic model and help gauging the relative contribution of factors in explaining the widening of sovereign bond spreads in the euro area.

IV.4. Robustness checks

In this section, we perform several robustness checks of our results. First, we investigate the robustness across various estimation techniques. Second, for the results with daily data, we control for the impact of other type of announcements, such as the release of lead indicators and main macroeconomic variables for the euro area, Germany, France, Italy and the U.S. Third, we control for other potentially omitted variables, such as expected external imbalances, expected economic growth rate, and the short term interest rate in the euro area as given by ECB’s main refinancing rate.

1) Robustness across estimation techniques

Our results remain robust when we apply different estimation techniques to Equation (1) as well as when we specify our model in static rather than dynamic form.

An alternative estimator for dynamic panel data is the Blundell-Bond (system GMM) estimator. Since the system GMM estimator\(^\textsuperscript{19}\) is more adequate for highly persistent dependent variables with a short time dimension, we applied it only to our monthly data and found that the results were robust. Moreover, the significance of the announcement variable increases to 1% when this model is used (see Table A2.3, model m2 in Appendix 2).

\(^{19}\) The system GMM estimator (Blundell-Bond 1998) is used when the dependent variable is highly persistent since its lag is not a good instrument for the first-difference. Compared to the Arellano-Bond estimator (difference GMM), the system GMM estimates an additional level equation (in a system of equations, hence its name) using lagged differences as instruments for levels. These estimation methods assume that there is no second order (or higher) autocorrelation in the error term. In the case of our data, this condition is met when we use both the first and second lag of the dependent variable as explanatory variables.
Turning to the static specification, we estimate Equation (1) with daily data using pooled OLS with corrected standard errors (clustered) to correct for the different time frequency of our data, as well as the fixed effects estimator to control for country specific characteristics and correct for autocorrelation of up to order 2 (the Newey estimator). This allows us to compare our results with other studies in the literature, especially in the case of the pooled OLS estimator.

As regards the correction for different time frequency of data, our main concern is related to the fiscal data, which are the main variables of interest in our analysis. First, as explained in Section II, we were faced with the trade-off between using higher-frequency fiscal data available from private forecasters, but limit dramatically the number of countries included in the analysis, or employing the European Commission forecasts, available for each country at a lower time frequency. The latter choice seems more appropriate to capture the developments in the euro area.

Second, since we use forward-looking fiscal variables, which capture the signal to investors on future sovereign credit risks, we cannot interpolate our data for lower frequencies (e.g. monthly fiscal data to be used in our alternative monthly analysis), as done in some studies using historical data. This method would artificially introduce new signals to investors related to the release of fiscal data.

Hence, as a robustness check in the static model, we proceed to correcting our empirical results for the lower time frequency of our fiscal variable. To this end, we construct a daily time identifier matching the dates of change in the expected fiscal variables. We use this new variable to cluster the standard errors, thus capturing potential correlation between observations within the same time cluster. Results are shown under models m3 of Tables A2.1 and A2.2, Appendix 2 (robust and cluster-corrected standard errors) and illustrate that our fiscal variables (expected budget deficit and debt ratio) remain highly statistically significant. We also use a cross-sectional “country” identifier to check the robustness of our Intl.Risk variable, which is common across countries (and

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20 See for instance Alexopoulou et al. (2009).
varies daily across time). Clustering by country yields similar results as above, with the $\text{Intl.Risk}$ again highly statistically significant (at 1%).\textsuperscript{21}

The conclusion of these robustness tests is that the explanatory variables of interest - the expected fiscal position and the announcement of bank rescue packages - remain robust across various estimation techniques. In addition, the very good explanatory power of the model is also confirmed by the high goodness of fit measures (as given by the adjusted $R$-square in the pooled OLS model and the $R$-square within in the fixed effects model of about 70%). The results are presented in Appendix 2.

2) Controlling for macroeconomic news events

We also control whether during the period of our analysis investors’ perception of sovereign risk has been driven by other types of announcements. The release of macroeconomic data and other lead indicators is likely to affect investors’ perception of sovereign risk in the short run, especially on a daily basis. To control for the impact of these events, we collected the dates of macroeconomic announcements during the period of our analysis following Andersson et al. (2006). They investigate the intra-day impact on bond yield spreads in the euro area of a series of macro indicators released for the euro area, Germany, France, Italy and the U.S.

We use the indicators that were found statistically significant in the above mentioned study and add several other indicators, which are all listed in Appendix 3. Given the low frequency of most macroeconomic data releases, we cannot control directly in the regression equation for the surprise effect of the macroeconomic announcements (the difference between the actual data and the median expected by the market, available from Bloomberg); this would reduce our daily sample size from over four thousand to about 40 observations. Hence, we net-out the impact of macroeconomic announcements by estimating Equation (1) (excluding the lagged dependent variable\textsuperscript{22}) on a sample that excludes: (i) the days of announcements (model m2 in Table A2.4, 2\textsuperscript{1} Results available upon request.
\textsuperscript{22} We do not use the dynamic model since the first lag of the dependent variable may also be eliminated together with the macroeconomic events and results may not comparable (in addition, we would lose a large number of observations). Hence, all models are estimating using fixed effects (FE). Model m1 in column 1 of Table A2.4, Appendix 2, is the FE model with the whole sample shown for comparison.
Appendix 2) and (ii) the first day following each announcement (model m3 in the same table). By eliminating the days of (or following) macro data releases, our conclusions do not change: the variables of interest that may be affected - the announcement of bank rescue packages, as well as the fiscal position variables, remain highly statistically significant and have the same sign. Moreover, the sizes of their coefficients increase slightly, which may be an indication of the fact that the macro announcements do not interfere with the impact of the fiscal variables (as found in Andersson et al. (2006), the bulk of the impact may be intra-day).

3) Controlling for other explanatory variables

We also control for additional macroeconomic fundamentals and policy variables that may have an impact on sovereign bond spreads and check whether our variables of interest remain robust. The additional macroeconomic fundamentals that we use are the expected economic growth rate and a proxy for the expected external imbalances (the saving-investment balance of the private sector as a share of GDP). Both variables are calculated following the same procedure as previously used, i.e. the average over the current and the next year as projected in the European Commission’s forecast, relative to that for Germany. For the policy variable, we investigate the impact of the short term interest rate, as proxied by the ECB’s main refinancing operations rate for the period of our analysis.

Table A2.5 in Appendix 2 shows the estimation results of our basic dynamic panel model to which we add the new variables separately: the expected S-I balance of the private sector in model m1; the expected real GDP growth rate in model m2 and the ECB policy rate in model m3.

The results of these tests show that our explanatory variables of interest remain statistically significant even when we control for additional variables. The expected economic growth rate does not seem to have had an impact on the widening of spreads, whereas larger expected external imbalances (i.e. higher current account deficits) are associated to higher sovereign bond yield spreads for the period of our analysis. On the other hand, the ECB policy rate is highly statistically significant and has a positive sign, i.e. a lower reference interest rate has contributed to lowering sovereign spreads in the
V. Conclusions and areas for future research

Since the intensification of the financial crisis in September 2008 up to end-March 2009, long-term government bond yield spreads relative to Germany have increased dramatically for most euro area countries. In March 2009 the spread between the Greek and the German government bonds was almost 270 bps from about 30 bps, the average spread after Greece’s accession to EMU.

In line with the existing empirical literature, this paper finds that sovereign bond yield spreads in the euro area reflect concerns about a country’s credit risk and liquidity risk as well as higher international risk aversion. Higher expected budget deficits and/or higher expected government debt relative to Germany have contributed to higher government bond yield spreads in the euro area over the period end-July 2007 to end-March 2009. The results are robust if we restrict the period of analysis to after the crisis has intensified, i.e. the period from end-August 2008 to end-March 2009. The expected budget balance seems to be more robust than the expected debt across the various specifications. We interpret this result as pointing to a greater relevance of the fiscal deficit in shaping investors expectations in periods of heightened uncertainty.

In addition to standard measures of government creditworthiness we also take into account the impact that the announcements of bank rescue packages have had on government bond yield spreads. Interestingly, we found that the government commitment to support ailing financial institutions led to a re-assessment of sovereign credit risk from the part of investors, through a transfer of risk from the banking sector to the government. Moreover, we also find that this perception is not influenced by the amount of resources explicitly committed by governments to the bank rescue packages. The size of rescue packages does not have, on average, a statistically significant effect on sovereign bond yield spreads, especially when Ireland is excluded from the analysis. In our view, this can be explained by the fact that investors’ discrimination among sovereign borrowers was triggered by governments’ credible commitment to extend support to the banking sector, and not by the mere size of this support. Investors’ perceptions may have been driven by
expectations that governments would provide as much support as needed to shore up ailing banks regardless of the amounts explicitly announced in the first place.

The liquidity of government bond markets has also played a role in the widening of sovereign bond yield spreads. Countries with a more liquid bond market seem to enjoy relatively lower bond yield spreads during periods of financial turmoil. Finally, and in line with the existing empirical literature, we also found that international risk aversion is an important factor in explaining sovereign bond yield spreads.

Our findings are robust to the use of different time frequencies (daily and monthly), various estimation techniques, and to the inclusion of additional control variables. In this respect, we also found that the reduction in the ECB main refinancing operations rate contributed significantly to narrowing sovereign bond spreads for the period under consideration. In line with Manganelli and Wolswijk (2009) we interpret this variable as capturing (inter-alia) risk aversion in the euro-area. Similarly, private external imbalances relative to Germany have an influence on sovereign bond spreads, whereas the expected economic growth rate does not seem to matter for the period covered in our analysis. Controlling for other types of announcements, such as the release of macroeconomic data and lead indicators for the euro area, Germany, France, Italy and the U.S., does not change our conclusions regarding the impact of announcements of bank rescue packages on sovereign spreads.

Our model has a very high predictive power of both average and country-specific sovereign bond spreads in the sample. Using the (average) coefficient estimates from the basic model over the period from 31 July 2007 to 25 March 2009, we calculate the relative contribution of each explanatory variable in our sample to the daily change in average sovereign bond spreads both for each country and for the whole sample. This allows us to gauge the relative importance of each factor in explaining movements in sovereign bond spreads. For the sample as a whole we find that each explanatory variable contributes to the change in daily sovereign bond yield spreads in the following maximum proportions: 56% the international risk aversion; 21% the expected fiscal position (expected budget balance and debt), 14% the liquidity proxy, and 9% the announcement of bank rescue packages. The large relevance of international risk aversion
for changes in sovereign bond yield spreads can be explained by the extraordinary severeness of the financial crisis during the period of our analysis. Moreover, the fact that fiscally-relevant variables account for about one-third of the movements in euro area sovereign spreads during the financial crisis points to the importance of preserving the public’s trust in the soundness of public finances. This is essential to anchor market expectations about a government ability to meet its future debt obligations. Therefore, an important lesson from the financial crisis is that countries should consolidate during good economic times in order to build a “fiscal cushion” that provides sufficient room for manoeuvre during an economic downturn or a crisis. Many euro area countries failed to do so and entered the crisis with high fiscal deficits and debt ratios and thus, limited the scope of their fiscal actions at a time when it was needed the most.

Future lines of research could focus on the role of country-specific financial sector vulnerabilities in explaining sovereign bond spreads. A more in depth analysis of the impact of monetary policy announcements could provide a comprehensive view of the drivers of euro area sovereign bond spreads in crisis times. Finally, extending the econometric analysis to assess the developments of bond spreads on a country-by-country basis could provide additional insights as to the specific role of fiscal variables.
References


### Appendix 1 – Data description

Table A1: Data definition, frequency and source

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10-yr government bond yields</td>
<td>Current yield on 10-year government bonds</td>
<td>Daily</td>
<td>Bloomberg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-yr government bond spreads</td>
<td>Differential in the current government bond yield vis-à-vis the German Bund</td>
<td>Daily</td>
<td>Authors’ calculations based on government bond yields data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government CDS premia</td>
<td>Cost of ensuring against the default of government debt</td>
<td>Daily</td>
<td>Bloomberg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iTraxx Financials Senior</td>
<td>CDS Index covering 25 European financial institutions including the UK and Switzerland</td>
<td>Daily</td>
<td>Bloomberg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Announcement of bank rescue packages</td>
<td>(=1) since the day of announcements of broad-based bank rescue packages (=0) before</td>
<td>Daily</td>
<td>Authors’ calculation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size recapitalisation</td>
<td>Cumulative size of bank recapitalisations</td>
<td>Daily</td>
<td>Authors’ calculation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size guarantee</td>
<td>Cumulative size of bank guarantees.</td>
<td>Daily</td>
<td>Authors’ calculation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liquidity</td>
<td>Gross government debt issuance at all maturities as share of total euro area issuance vis-à-vis Germany</td>
<td>Quarterly</td>
<td>ECB Securities Issues Statistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expected government budget balance</td>
<td>Differential in the projected government budget balance vis-à-vis Germany</td>
<td>Biannual</td>
<td>EC Commission forecasts, different vintages. All variables expressed as ratio to country GDP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Expected government debt | Differential in the projected government vis-à-vis Germany | Biannual | }
### Appendix 2 – Results of robustness tests

#### 1. Robustness across estimation techniques

Table A2.1: Panel regression with daily data using *Exp. budget bal*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>m1 Dynamic panel XTGLS</th>
<th>m2 Pooled OLS, robust SE</th>
<th>m3 Pooled OLS robust and clustered SE</th>
<th>m4 FE, AR(2) robust SE (Newey)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spread (t-1)</td>
<td>0.9851***</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ann Fin Pack</td>
<td>0.0039*</td>
<td>0.2999***</td>
<td>0.2999**</td>
<td>0.3328***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Exp budget bal</em></td>
<td>-0.0010***</td>
<td>-0.0695***</td>
<td>-0.0695**</td>
<td>-0.0572***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Int'l Risk</td>
<td>0.0037***</td>
<td>0.0871***</td>
<td>0.0871</td>
<td>0.0816***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liquidity (GDI)</td>
<td>-0.0033***</td>
<td>-0.1591***</td>
<td>-0.1591*</td>
<td>-0.2875***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>time_id</td>
<td>0.0012***</td>
<td>0.0012***</td>
<td>0.0012**</td>
<td>0.0013***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dummy_BE</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.2132***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dummy_ES</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.1464***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dummy_FI</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.1651**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dummy_FR</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.3544***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dummy_GR</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.5169***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dummy_JE</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.1579***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dummy_IT</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.6443***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dummy_NL</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.1832***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dummy_PT</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.0822***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_cons</td>
<td>0.0016</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>-0.1547***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number obs. (N)</td>
<td>4212</td>
<td>4222</td>
<td>4222</td>
<td>4222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-sq adj.</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A2.2: Panel regression with daily data using *Exp. gov. debt*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>m1 Dynamic panel XTGLS</th>
<th>m2 Pooled OLS, robust SE</th>
<th>m3 Pooled OLS robust and clustered SE</th>
<th>m4 FE, AR(2) robust SE (Newey)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spread (t-1)</td>
<td>0.9842***</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ann Fin Pack</td>
<td>0.0049***</td>
<td>0.3714***</td>
<td>0.3714**</td>
<td>0.3313***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Exp gov. debt</em></td>
<td>0.0001***</td>
<td>0.0074***</td>
<td>0.0074**</td>
<td>0.0243***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Int'l Risk</td>
<td>0.0035***</td>
<td>0.0650***</td>
<td>0.0650</td>
<td>0.0755***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liquidity (GDI)</td>
<td>-0.0028***</td>
<td>-0.1951***</td>
<td>-0.1951*</td>
<td>-0.3141***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>time_id</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.0014***</td>
<td>0.0014***</td>
<td>0.0014***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dummy_BE</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.3812***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dummy_ES</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.6323***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dummy_FI</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.5387***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dummy_FR</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.3520***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dummy_GR</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.2441</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dummy_JE</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.8693***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dummy_IT</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-0.3356*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dummy_NL</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.4487***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dummy_PT</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.0217</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_cons</td>
<td>0.0025</td>
<td>0.0956***</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>-0.0042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number obs. (N)</td>
<td>4212</td>
<td>4222</td>
<td>4222</td>
<td>4222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-sq adj.</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The dependent var. is spreads. The abbreviations for the explanatory variables are explained in the text. Countries included in the analysis: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. The time frame is 31.07.2007 – 25.03.2009. The table shows the estimated coefficients and their significance level (*10%; **5%, ***1%). In model m3, standard errors (SE) are robust and cluster-corrected. The cluster variable is either cross-sectional “country” or temporal – a time id matching the dates of change in the expected fiscal variables to account for their different time frequency. The table presents results of clustering by time id, in which our fiscal variables remain statistically significant. Clustering by country yields the same results, only that the Int'l Risk variable is again highly statistically significant (at ***). Clustering by country is the relevant methodology for the robustness of Int'l Risk, which is common across countries (and varies daily only across time).
Table A2.3: Panel regression with *monthly* data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>m1 Dynamic panel XTGLS</th>
<th>m2 Dynamic panel Blundell-Bond (system GMM)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spread (t-1)</td>
<td>0.9714***</td>
<td>1.1656***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spread (t-2)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-0.2374***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ann Fin Pack</td>
<td>0.0438*</td>
<td>0.0840***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exp budget bal</td>
<td>0.0157***</td>
<td>-0.0207**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exp gov. debt</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.0019*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Int’l Risk</td>
<td>0.0312**</td>
<td>0.0330**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liquidity (GDI)</td>
<td>-0.0322***</td>
<td>-0.0544***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_cons</td>
<td>-0.0048</td>
<td>0.0121</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number obs. (N) 196 186
AR test (Ho= no AR)
AR(1) p-value 0.0146
AR(2) p-value 0.2244
AR(3) p-value 0.3560

Note: The second lag of the dependent variables is included in m2 to satisfy the AR condition of no second order correlation (excluding it would bring the p-value of the AR(2) test at 0.0731).

2) Robustness checks excluding macroeconomic news events

Table A2.4: Panel regression with daily data using *Exp. budget bal.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>m1 FE (Newey) Whole sample</th>
<th>m2 FE (Newey) No macro. events at time t</th>
<th>m2 FE (Newey) No macro. events at time t+1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANN</td>
<td>0.3328***</td>
<td>0.3816***</td>
<td>0.3238***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exp. Budget Bal.</td>
<td>-0.0572***</td>
<td>-0.0735***</td>
<td>-0.0547***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Int’l Risk</td>
<td>0.0800***</td>
<td>0.0700*</td>
<td>0.0400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liquidity (GDI)</td>
<td>-0.2875***</td>
<td>-0.3173***</td>
<td>-0.2947***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time trend</td>
<td>0.0013***</td>
<td>0.0014***</td>
<td>0.0016***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country dummies</td>
<td>included</td>
<td>included</td>
<td>included</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_cons</td>
<td>-0.1546***</td>
<td>-0.1588***</td>
<td>-0.1610***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number obs. (N) 4222 1147 1018
R-sq 0.72 0.72 0.70

Note: All three models are estimated using fixed effects (FE). Model m1 is the FE model with the whole sample shown for comparison. Model m2 excludes the days of macroeconomic announcements, while model m3 excludes the first day following each announcement.
### 3) Robustness checks: controlling for other explanatory variables

Table A2.5: Dynamic panel regression with daily data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>m1 CAB private sector</th>
<th>m2 GDP growth rate</th>
<th>m3 ECB policy rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spread gov (t-1)</td>
<td>0.9816***</td>
<td>0.9829***</td>
<td>0.9865***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANN</td>
<td>0.0052**</td>
<td>0.0045*</td>
<td>0.0085***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exp. budget bal.</td>
<td>-0.0006***</td>
<td>-0.0009***</td>
<td>-0.0006**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exp. gov debt</td>
<td>0.0001***</td>
<td>0.0001***</td>
<td>0.0001*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liquidity (GDI)</td>
<td>-0.0037***</td>
<td>-0.0035***</td>
<td>-0.0033***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infl risk</td>
<td>0.0040***</td>
<td>0.0041***</td>
<td>0.0037***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exp private CAB</td>
<td>-0.0002**</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exp GDP growth</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.0014</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECB policy rate</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.0035***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

_cons 0.0017 0.0019 -0.0124**

Note: The expected private current account balance (CAB) and GDP growth rate are also expressed in relative terms to Germany and are calculated using the same methodology as the one for the fiscal variables (source of data: European Commission Forecast). ECB policy rate is the main refinancing operations rate for the period under analysis (31.07.2007 – 25.03.2009)
Appendix 3 – Other Announcements of Macroeconomic Data and Lead Indicators (released during 31/07/2007 – 25/03/2009) controlled for according to Andersson et al. (2006) (additional indicators included)

US activity and employment
US GDP advance
US GDP final
US industrial production
US initial jobless claims
US retail sales
US factory orders
US durable goods orders

US Forward-looking
US University of Michigan consumer sentiment Index
US ISM manufacturing confidence US
US ISM non-manufacturing confidence
US Chicago PMI
US consumer confidence
US Philadelphia Fed index

US prices
US consumer price index

Euro area activity and employment
EA industrial production
EA GDP
EA retail sales
EA unemployment

Euro area Forward-looking
EA business confidence
EA consumer confidence

Euro area prices
EA HICP

National Activity and Employment
DE industrial production
DE GDP
DE unemployment
FR industrial production
FR GDP
FR unemployment
IT industrial production
IT unemployment

National forward-looking
ZEW economic sentiment DE
IFO business confidence DE
IFO expectations DE
FR business confidence
IT business confidence

National prices
DE consumer price index
FR consumer price index
IT consumer price index
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NEW EVIDENCE BASED ON THE ESCB DISAGGREGATED APPROACH

by Luca Agnello and Jacopo Cimadomo