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by Charles Goodhart and Boris Hofmann
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In 2008 all ECB publications feature a motif taken from the €10 banknote.


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ABSTRACT

This paper assesses the linkages between money, credit, house prices and economic activity in industrialised countries over the last three decades. The analysis is based on a fixed-effects panel VAR estimated using quarterly data for 17 industrialized countries spanning the period 1970-2006. The main results of the analysis are the following: (i) There is evidence of a significant multidirectional link between house prices, monetary variables and the macroeconomy. (ii) The link between house prices and monetary variables is found to be stronger over a more recent sub-sample from 1985 till 2006. (iii) The effects of shocks to money and credit are found to be stronger when house prices are booming. The last two results are, however, in general not statistically significant due to the large confidence bands of the impulse responses.

Keywords: House prices; wealth effects; collateral; financial liberalisation; money and credit.

The empirical analysis of this paper shows that there is evidence of a significant multidirectional link between house prices, broad money, private credit and the macroeconomy. Money growth has a significant effect on house prices and credit, credit influences money and house prices and house prices influence both credit and money. This link is found to be stronger over a more recent sub-sample from 1985 to 2006 than over a longer sample going back to the early 1970s, a finding that most likely reflects the effects of financial system liberalisations in industrialised countries during the 1970s and early 1980s. Due to the large confidence bands of the impulse responses this result is, however, in general not statistically significant. The results further suggest that shocks to house prices, credit and money all have significant repercussions on economic activity and aggregate price inflation. Shocks to GDP, the CPI and the interest rate are in turn found to have significant effects on house prices, money and credit. The empirical analysis further reveals that the effects of shocks to money and credit on house prices are stronger when house prices are booming than otherwise, although generally again not in a statistically significant way due to the large confidence bands of the impulse responses.

On the basis of these findings, we conclude that a monetary policy strategy that gives due weight to the analysis of monetary developments could in principle induce the central bank to indirectly react to emerging financial imbalances and thereby mitigate their adverse longer-run consequences. However, given that such a policy might be difficult to communicate in times of low and stable inflation, and the further problem of regional differences in house price and credit dynamics, which can only be addressed by monetary policy to the extent that they are reflected in the area wide aggregates, we propose to also consider a secondary financial instrument that could directly address the link between house prices and monetary variables, and could also be used at the regional level in a currency union. This instrument could take the form of a countercyclical regulatory ceiling for loan-to-value ratios (LTVs) on mortgage lending that could be raised when mortgage growth (and house price inflation) was low or declining, and lowered during booms.
1. Introduction

Modern-style macro models are inherently non-monetary. Since there are by construction no banks, no borrowing constraints and no risks of default, the risk free short-term interest rate suffices to model the monetary side of the economy (Goodhart, 2007). As a consequence, money or credit aggregates and asset prices play no role in standard versions of these models. This stands in sharp contrast to the concerns recently expressed by many non-academic observers who have argued that, as a result of the world-wide brisk growth of monetary and credit aggregates over the last couple of years, asset markets are “awash with liquidity” and that this situation has been responsible for low capital market yields and inflated asset prices, at least until mid 2007.

In particular, in recent years many industrialised countries have experienced extraordinarily strong rates of money and credit growth accompanied by strong increases in house prices. This observation raises a number of questions which are potentially of importance for monetary and regulatory policies: Does the observed coincidence between house prices and monetary variables reflect merely the effects of a common driving force, such as monetary policy or the economic cycle, or does it reflect a direct link between the two variables? If there is a direct link, does it run from house prices to monetary variables or from monetary variables to house prices, or in both directions? Do fluctuations in house prices and monetary variables have repercussions on the macroeconomy, i.e. for the development of real GDP and consumer prices? And finally, what is the relevant monetary variable in this context, money or credit, or both?

From a theoretical point of view, the interlinkages between monetary variables, house prices and the macroeconomy are multi-facetted. Optimal portfolio adjustment mechanisms, which are at the heart of the traditional monetarist view of the transmission process, suggest a two-way link between house prices and money. An expansion of money changes the stock and the marginal utility of liquid assets relative to the stock and the marginal utility of other assets. Agents attempt to restore equilibrium by means of adjustments in spending and asset portfolios that re-equate for all assets as well as for consumption the ratios of marginal utilities to relative prices. This implies that an increase in money triggers increases in a broad range of asset prices and decreases in a broad range of interest rates and yields. In this sense, monetarists characterise the development of money as reflecting changes in the whole spectrum of interest rates and asset prices which are relevant for spending and investment decisions (Meltzer, 1995, Nelson, 2003). By the same token, a change in
house prices alters the value of the stock of housing assets, triggering a portfolio rebalancing which will also involve an adjustment in the demand for monetary assets (Greiber and Setzer, 2007).²

A link between credit and house prices may arise via housing wealth and collateral effects on credit demand and credit supply and via repercussions of credit supply fluctuations on house prices. According to the lifecycle model of household consumption, a permanent increase in housing wealth leads to an increase in household spending and borrowing when homeowners try to smooth consumption over the life cycle. Besides this wealth effect, there is also a collateral effect of house prices emanating from the fact that houses are commonly used as collateral for loans because they are immobile and can, therefore, not easily be put out of a creditor’s reach. As a consequence, higher house prices not only induce homeowners to spend and borrow more, but also enable them to do so by enhancing their borrowing capacity.³,⁴

It is, however, often claimed that, while an increase in the physical stock of houses undeniably represents an augmentation of the nation’s wealth, the effects of a change in housing wealth induced by a change in house prices is not clear a priori. This is because a permanent increase in house prices will not only have a positive wealth and collateral effect on landlords and owner-occupiers, but it will also have a negative income effect on tenants who have to pay higher rents, and on prospective first-time buyers who now have to save more for their intended house purchase. Thus, those who have already satisfied their housing requirements gain, while those who have yet to do so, or who are renting, lose. But then it is not clear why the same analysis is not applied when the relative prices of equities, or bonds, rise, in so far as both housing and financial asset prices increase because of a fall in discount rates. Also there it might be argued that those who have already completed their life-cycle purchases gain from asset price increases, while those who have yet to save up for retirement lose. Moreover, a large proportion of the ‘losers’ from a relative housing price increase are those yet to be born, and those too young to be earning for themselves. They can hardly save more, or lower their current consumption, whereas the old home owners (the net gainers) can, and will, raise their consumption. There is, therefore, an

² Besides the housing wealth effect on money demand, there might further be a transactions effect, arising generally from higher demand for transactions balances when wealth increases, and specifically from higher transactions related to house purchase when house prices rise.
³ Aoki et al (2004) and Iacoviello (2004, 2005) show based on general equilibrium models that a financial accelerator effect arises in the household sector via house prices when households’ ability to borrow depends on the value of housing collateral.
⁴ For a more detailed exposition of the wealth and collateral effect of house prices on consumption see Muellbauer (2007).
asymmetry between gainers and losers, which works in favour of a positive wealth or collateral effect of house prices on consumption.

While the housing wealth and housing collateral effects on consumption are the most important or most explored channels of the transmission of house price fluctuations to the real economy, the transmission via private investment also plays a role. The most direct effect of house price fluctuations on economic activity is via residential investment. An increase in house prices raises the value of housing relative to construction costs, i.e. the Tobin $q$ for residential investment. New housing construction becomes profitable when house prices rise above construction costs. Residential investment is therefore a positive function of house prices. Furthermore, the value of collateralisable property and land also affects the ability of firms to borrow and finance business investment, giving rise to a positive link between house prices and business investment.5

These wealth and collateral effects of house prices on consumption and investment imply adjustments in credit demand and credit supply, thereby potentially giving rise to a causal link from house prices to credit aggregates. House prices influence credit demand via wealth effects on consumption and Tobin’s $q$ effects on investment, while the collateral effects also have an impact on credit supply. Additional credit supply effects may arise via the effect of house prices on the balance sheets of banks. Such an effect may result directly via banks’ property wealth, and indirectly via the effect on the value of loans secured by real estate.6

An exogenous change in credit supply, e.g. driven by financial liberalization, may in turn also have repercussions on house prices. The price of property can be seen as an asset price, which is determined by the discounted future stream of property returns. An increase in credit supply lowers lending interest rates and stimulates current and future expected economic activity. As a result, property prices may rise because of higher expected returns on property and a lower discount factor. An increase in the availability of credit may also increase the demand for housing if households are borrowing constrained. With supply temporarily fixed because of the time it takes to

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5 Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Bernanke et al. (1999) have developed modified real business cycle models wherein firms’ borrowing capacity depends on their collateralisable net worth and show that fluctuations in firms’ net worth amplify macroeconomic shocks and can give rise to a powerful financial accelerator effect.

6 For example, Chen (2001) develops a general equilibrium model in which both borrowers’ and banks’ net worth influences the supply of credit. Just as borrowers’ net worth acts as an incentive mechanism and collateral for the banks, bank capital acts in these models as an incentive mechanism and as collateral for the bank’s providers of loanable funds, e.g. depositors. So, the availability of loanable funds to banks depends on their capitalisation.
construct new housing units, this increase in demand will be reflected in higher property prices.

These (very basic) theoretical considerations suggest that there are probably good reasons to believe that there exists a multidirectional link between money, credit, house prices and the wider economy. However, while these theoretical considerations give us some tentative indications, they do obviously not allow any definite conclusions. In the absence of a fully fledged theoretical model integrating all the potential interlinkages between house prices, money, credit and the macroeconomy we have described above, the issue ultimately has to be addressed empirically.

There are already quite a number of empirical studies on this subject. However, none of the existing studies addresses all the relevant questions we have raised above. Most studies focus on the link between credit and property prices but explore the link only in one direction.⁷ Other studies investigate the two-way character of the link, but do not address the question whether credit or money is the relevant monetary variable.⁸ Finally, there are a number of studies addressing the latter, but without addressing the potential two way character of any potential link between house prices and monetary variables.⁹

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⁷ Borio, Kennedy and Prowse (1994) investigate the relationship between credit to GDP ratios and aggregate asset prices for a large sample of industrialised countries. They find that adding the credit to GDP ratio to an asset pricing equation helps to improve the fit of this equation in most countries. Based on simulations, they demonstrate that the boom-bust cycle in asset markets of the late 1980s - early 1990s would have been much less pronounced or would not have occurred at all had credit ratios remained constant. Goodhart (1995) investigates the effect of property prices on bank lending in the UK and the US using long-spans of historical data and finds that property prices significantly affect credit growth in the UK, but not in the US. Hofmann (2004) analyses the role of property prices in explaining credit dynamics in industrialised countries since 1980. He finds that property prices are an important determinant of the long-term trend development in credit over this period and that increases in property prices have a highly significant positive effect on credit dynamics.

⁸ Hofmann (2003), Goodhart and Hofmann (2004a) and Goodhart et al. (2006) analyse the relationship between bank lending and property prices based on a multivariate empirical framework and find that causality does in fact seem to go in both directions, but that the effect of property prices on credit appears to be stronger than the effect of credit on property prices. Gerlach and Peng (2005) analyse the link between property prices and credit in Hong Kong and find that causality runs from property prices to lending, rather than conversely. Greiber and Setzer (2007) investigate the link between broad money and property prices in the US and the euro area. They find that adding property prices to an otherwise standard money demand system restores a stable money demand equation in both economies. Based on a standard impulse response analysis they further show that causality runs in both directions: an increase in broad money growth triggers an increase in property prices and vice versa.

⁹ Gouteron and Szpiro (2005) investigate the effect of excess liquidity, measured by the ratio of broad money to GDP and alternatively the ratio of private credit to GDP, in the US, the euro area, the UK and Japan, but fail to detect any significant links except for the UK. Adalid and Detken (2007) explore the effect of broad money growth on house prices in a panel of industrialized countries and find that the link is significant and particularly strong in times of aggregate asset price booms. They further find that private credit growth does not have a significant effect on house price dynamics.
In this paper we try to contribute to closing this gap by assessing the link between money, credit, house prices, and the economy in a multivariate context. The analysis is performed for a panel of 17 industrialised countries based on a fixed-effects panel VAR estimated over the sample period 1973 till 2006, which is the longest sample period for which the variables required for the analysis are available and which is also the period covered by many of the above referenced studies. We further re-estimate the model over a shorter sub-sample, 1985 till 2006 and compare the results with those obtained for the full sample period. This is done because there are good reasons to believe that the link between monetary variables and house prices, and also macroeconomic dynamics in general, have changed in the late 1970s and early 1980s. On the one hand, there has been a major change in the paradigm governing the conduct of monetary policy since the late 1970s. After the experiences of the ‘Great Inflation’ in the 1970s, with high and volatile inflation accompanied by high volatility of output and unemployment, restoring price stability became the overarching goal of monetary policy in industrialised countries. This change in paradigm was reflected in a significant decline in inflation rates around the world in the early 1980s. Over the same period, there has been a substantial reduction in macroeconomic volatility in many countries, a phenomenon referred to as the ‘Great Moderation’, which is probably, at least in part, also attributable to the change in the monetary policy paradigm. On the other hand, as we have argued in Goodhart et al. (2004), financial systems have undergone substantial changes over the last decades since the 1970s. Financial systems in the industrialized countries have been liberalized and deregulated, which could have strengthened the link between property prices and the financial sector.\(^\text{10}\)

In Goodhart et al. (2004) we have further argued that financial sector liberalization is likely to have increased the procyclicality of financial systems by fostering procyclical lending practices of banks. In fact, the historical experience has shown that financial imbalances and asset price booms or bubbles have often been preceded by brisk expansions of credit and money.\(^\text{11}\) Against this background, some commentators have recently argued that a monetary policy strategy that attaches some weight to the monitoring of monetary variables, rather than following a pure inflation targeting approach, may help to avoid adverse longer-run consequences of building up

\(^{10}\) In a similar vein, Muellbauer and Murphy (1989), and more recently Muellbauer (2007), have argued that the housing collateral effect on consumption will be stronger when credit markets are liberalized.

financial imbalances by automatically inducing a leaning against the wind monetary policy mitigating excessive asset price bubbles.\textsuperscript{12}

We test the hypothesis that monetary shocks have stronger effects on house prices in times of house price booms based on a dummy variable augmented panel VAR. Whether the effect credit and money shocks are stronger during house prices booms is then assessed by comparing the impulse responses obtained under the boom scenario with those under the no-boom scenario. This is done based on a dummy variable capturing mechanically identified house price boom episodes across countries, and based on a dummy variable capturing cross country differences in average house price inflation over the period by singling out those countries that have experienced particularly high rates of house price increases.

We are aware of the fact that, with the chosen empirical set-up, we are obviously not able to disentangle the different structural links we have discussed above, nor are we able to disentangle these structural links from non-structural links arising from forward looking behaviour. For example, a positive effect of house prices on GDP may reflect the housing wealth and collateral channels described above, but it may also be due to forward-looking agents in the housing market anticipating future movements in GDP and the repercussions of such movements on the future returns of housing assets. We do not see this as a major problem, since the declared aim of this paper is to uncover the lead-lag relationships between money, credit, house prices and key macroeconomic variables and to detect changes and non-linearities in these relationships. We do not aim to disentangle the different channels potentially driving any of the estimated statistical associations, which would certainly be a much more challenging, if not an impossible, task.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data set and discusses data issues. Section 3 describes the empirical methodology. In Section 4 we present the empirical results. Section 5 analyses whether the link between monetary variables and house prices is stronger in times of house price booms. Section 6 concludes.

\textsuperscript{12} For example, The Economist (2006) recently stated that “(t)his link between money and asset prices is why the ECB’s twin-pillar framework may be one of the best ways for central banks to deal with asset prices.” See also Mayer (2005), who characterises the ECB’s strategy as providing “a bridge between inflation targeting and a new paradigm which takes account of financial and asset market developments in monetary policy decisions.”
2. Data

The empirical analysis is based on quarterly data for the following 17 industrialised countries: the US, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, the UK, Canada, Switzerland, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark, Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium, Ireland and Australia spanning the period 1970Q1 till 2006Q4. The set of data series used in the empirical analysis comprises real GDP, the consumer price index (CPI)\(^{13}\), a short-term nominal interest rate, nominal house prices, nominal broad money and nominal bank credit to the private sector. Except for the short-term interest rate all data are seasonally adjusted. A detailed description of the construction of the database and of the original data sources is provided in the Appendix.

Figure 1 shows the year-on-year percent change in nominal house prices (solid line) and the year-on-year percent change in real house prices (dotted line), calculated by deflating nominal house prices with the CPI. The figures reveal that, while there were a couple of occasions when real house prices declined, a nominal house price deflation is an extremely rare event and has always been associated with episodes of severe economic downturns or crises, such as the recessions in the early 1980s and early 1990s, and the Nordic and the Japanese banking crises in the 1990s. The US never experienced a nominal house price deflation over this sample period.

Figure 2 displays the year-on-year percent change in nominal broad money (solid line) and nominal bank credit to the private sector (dotted line). The main message to be taken from these graphs is that while there is correlation between the two series, this correlation is far from perfect, which means that including both variables in an empirical model, as we will do in the following sections, will not give rise to major multicollinearity problems.\(^{14}\)

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\(^{13}\) We used the CPI rather than alternative measures of the aggregate price level, like the GDP deflator or the consumption deflator, mainly for the reason that central banks’ inflation targets or objectives usually refer to some kind of consumer price index. A drawback of using the CPI is that there are occasional changes in methodology, for example in the US with regard to the measurement of homeownership costs in 1983.

\(^{14}\) For the panel of 17 countries, the cross correlation of the growth rates of nominal broad money and nominal bank credit is 0.56 for the year-on-year growth rates and 0.38 for the quarterly growth rates.
Figure 1: House price inflation in industrialized countries, 1971-2006

Note: The graph displays the year-on-year percent change in nominal house prices (solid line) and in real house prices (dotted line).
Figure 2: Money and credit growth in industrialized countries, 1971-2006

Note: The graph displays the year-on-year percent change in broad money (solid line) and in private credit (dotted line).
3. Methodology

The analysis is based on a panel VAR given by:

(1) \[ Y_{i,t} = A_i + A(L)Y_{i,t-1} + \varepsilon_{i,t}, \]

where \( Y_{i,t} \) is a vector of endogenous variables and \( \varepsilon_{i,t} \) is a vector of errors. \( A_i \) is a matrix of country-specific fixed effects, \( A(L) \) is a matrix polynomial in the lag operator whose order is determined by the Akaike information criterion considering orders up to four. The vector of endogenous variables comprises the log difference of real GDP (\( \Delta y \)), the log difference of the consumer price index (\( \Delta cpi \)), the level of the short-term nominal interest rate (\( ir \)), the log difference of nominal residential house prices (\( \Delta hp \)), the log difference of nominal broad money (\( \Delta m \)) and the log difference of nominal private credit (\( \Delta c \)). The vector \( Y_{i,t} \) is therefore given by

(2) \[ Y = [\Delta y, \Delta cpi, ir, \Delta hp, \Delta m, \Delta c]' . \]

The advantage of using a panel modeling framework is that it substantially increases the efficiency and the power of the analysis. Estimating the six dimensional VAR at the individual country level would suffer from too few degrees of freedom, in particular when the models are re-estimated over a shorter sub-sample starting in 1985. A drawback of the panel approach is that it imposes pooling restrictions across countries and thereby disregards cross-country differences in the estimated dynamic relationships. Indeed, when we checked the validity of the pooling restrictions implied by the panel set-up, we found that they were consistently rejected. However, when we performed the analysis at the individual country level, we also found that the estimated dynamic relationships were often insignificant and in some cases even implausible. In contrast to this, as we will show in the following sections, the results from the panel analysis uncovered highly significant dynamic interactions and the results generally made good sense. But rather than interpreting these findings as invalidating the panel set-up, we tend to share the view of Gavin and Theodorou (2005), who argue that adopting a panel approach in a macro framework like our own helps to uncover common dynamic relationships which might otherwise be obscured by idiosyncratic effects at the individual country level.16

15 The results of the individual country analysis are available upon request.
16 Gavin and Theodorou (2005) find in their empirical application that, while the pooling restrictions are generally rejected in-sample, the panel model performs significantly better than the individual country model in out-of-sample forecasting.
We estimate model (1) by fixed effects OLS\textsuperscript{17} without time dummies. In typical panel-data studies when the cross section dimension is large and the time dimension is small, time dummies are usually included. This is done because it involves only a minor loss in efficiency because only a small number of dummies have to be added to the model, and because the relationships to be uncovered by the analysis are driven by the cross section dimension. In our case, the time dimension is large, which means that including time dummies would involve a considerable loss in efficiency. Furthermore, the interlinkages we wish to investigate are in part driven by developments shared at least by subgroups of countries so that dummying out common time effects may substantially reduce the information content of the dataset. To be on the safe side we replicated all the exercises we report in the following sections with a full set of time dummies included and found that the results were qualitatively not altered.\textsuperscript{18}

The results reported in the following section are therefore based on a panel VAR estimated based on the thus estimated panel VAR, we first perform standard Granger causality tests. A variable $x$ is said to Granger cause another variable $y$ if the hypothesis that the coefficients on the lags of variable $x$ in the VAR equation of

\textsuperscript{17} It is well known that OLS estimation of VAR models is subject to Hurwicz-type bias inherent in dynamic models. Since the Hurwicz–type bias goes to zero as the number of observations approaches infinity, it usually does not receive much attention in time-series VAR studies as the number of observations is perceived to be sufficiently large. Unsurprisingly, there has been considerable attention paid to this issue in panel econometrics, since panel data are usually characterised by a large number of cross-sections and a small number of time series observations. Nickell (1981) has derived analytical expressions for the size of the bias for the first order autoregressive case, concluding that it is large for panels with small time series dimensions even when the number of cross sections goes to infinity. His results also show that the size of the bias depends negatively on the size of the time series dimension. In order to overcome this drawback of the fixed effects OLS panel estimator, a number of alternative estimators have been proposed in the literature which are based on instrumental variable estimation (Anderson and Hsiao, 1981) or GMM (Arellano and Bond, 1991 and Arellano and Bover, 1995). We have nevertheless decided to continue to use the fixed-effects OLS estimator for several reasons. In the present application the time series dimension of the panel is large, with 136 observation per cross-section unit for the full sample estimation starting in 1973Q1 and 88 observations for the sub-sample estimation starting in 1985Q1. Since the size of the fixed-effects bias depends negatively on the number of time series observations in the panel (Nickell, 1981), it is likely to be of limited importance in our application. Moreover, while the above mentioned instrumental variable or GMM-based estimators can overcome the bias of the FE estimator, they are in turn subject to other drawbacks. First, instrumental variable estimators are less efficient than OLS estimators, i.e. they tend to produce estimates with a larger variance. This drawback can outweigh the bias of the FE estimator in empirical applications when the time dimension of the model is not too small. Judson and Owen (1999) compare the performance of the fixed effects estimator with the Anderson-Hsiao and the Arellano-Bond estimator in terms of bias and root mean squared error (RMSE) of the coefficient estimates based on a Monte Carlo experiment. They conclude that even for moderate time series sample sizes of 30 the FE estimator performs just as well or better than the alternative instrument-based estimators. Second, when the instruments used in the instrumental variables or GMM estimation are only weakly correlated with the instrumented variables, this can in turn give rise to biased coefficient estimates and hypothesis tests with large size distortions (Stock and Yogo, 2002).

\textsuperscript{18}The results of the fixed effects panel VAR estimation with a full set of time dummies included are also available upon request.
variable \( y \) are all equal to zero (i.e. that the lags of variable \( x \) can be excluded from the VAR equation of variable \( y \)) is rejected by a Wald test. In order to take into account potential heteroskedasticity of the VAR residuals over time and across countries, the tests are based on heteroskedasticity robust variance-covariance matrices.

Based on Granger causality tests we can assess the significance of the direct lead-lag relationships between the endogenous variables. These tests, however, do not take into account the indirect effects running via the other variables included in the system and also do not provide any information about the direction and the strength of the effects. In order to get a more complete picture of the dynamic interactions we perform, as the next step, an impulse response analysis based on the estimated VARs. We recover the orthogonalised shocks of the systems based on a simple Cholesky decomposition with the ordering as given in (2). The ordering of the first three variables is standard from the monetary transmission literature. The ordering of house prices, money and credit is of course somewhat arbitrary and was based on the consideration that the price of a house is probably stickier than monetary variables. Credit was ordered last because it appeared more plausible to allow for an immediate effect of a change in the money stock on credit rather than vice versa. Robustness checks suggested, however, that changes in the ordering of the variables had no substantial effect on the results. Finally, since we want to compare the transmission of the shocks for two different sample periods we simulate one unit shocks rather than one standard deviation shocks.

The orthogonalised shocks should not be interpreted as structural shocks, but rather as orthogonalised reduced form shocks. For example, the money shock should be interpreted as an increase in broad money which is unrelated to changes in GDP, goods prices, house prices and interest rates. It is not possible to disentangle whether the underlying structural driving force is a money demand or a money supply shock. Identification of structural shocks might, in principle, be possible, when based on a smaller model set-up and a different shock identification scheme, such as a combination of long-run and short-run restrictions or sign restrictions. But the use of these more sophisticated identification schemes would require estimating a smaller model, which would drive us away from our original goal, which is to uncover the dynamic lead-lag link between house prices, money credit and the three key macroeconomic variables. Furthermore, even based on a more sophisticated shock identification scheme, it would prove difficult to identify all relevant structural shocks, i.e. to disentangle aggregate demand and supply shocks, a monetary policy shock, a money demand and supply shocks, a credit demand and supply shock and a housing demand and supply shock.
Confidence bands for the impulse response functions were computed based on a wild bootstrap (Goncalves and Kilian, 2004) in order to take into account potential heteroskedasticity of the residuals. The wild bootstrap is set up in the following way. For each draw, we first construct an artificial vector of innovations by multiplying each element of the vector of sample residuals $e_{i,t}$ with an iid innovation drawn from the standard normal distribution. With these artificial innovations we construct artificial datasets based on the estimated VAR. The artificial dataset is then used to re-estimate the VAR and to generate shock impulse responses based on the Choleski decomposition described above. This procedure is replicated 1,000 times and a 90% confidence band for the impulse responses is obtained by calculating the 5th and the 95th percentiles of the 1,000 bootstrapped shock impulse responses.

4. Empirical results

The panel VAR described in the previous section was first estimated over the longest possible sample period 1973Q1 till 2006Q4 with a lag order of four, which was selected based on the Akaike information criterion. Table 1 displays the results from the Granger causality tests, which reveal strong evidence of multidirectional causality between house prices, money, credit, GDP, the CPI and interest rates. In particular, monetary variables are found to have a significant effect on future house prices and, at the same time, house prices are found to have a highly significant effect on future money and credit growth. Monetary variables and house prices also significantly affect future GDP growth, while only money growth affects future CPI inflation.

Figure 3 displays the impulse responses to orthogonalised one unit shocks in a two-standard-error band. Although it is, as we have already pointed out in the previous section, not possible to attach a clear structural meaning to the orthogonalised shocks, the patterns of the impulse responses do in some cases allow a cautious structural interpretation. The dynamic effects of a GDP shock suggest that this shock mainly captures aggregate demand shocks: Real GDP, consumer prices and the nominal interest rate increase. Also house prices and monetary variables increase both in nominal and real terms. A CPI shock seems to mainly capture supply-side disturbances: the CPI increases, real GDP falls, the nominal interest rate increases and house prices, money and credit fall in real terms. Also the responses to an

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19 The response of real house prices and real money and credit is given by the difference between the response of the respective nominal values and the response of the CPI. E.g. if the CPI increases by more after a shock than nominal house prices then real house prices fall.
interest rate shock are in line with prior expectations. Nominal interest rates increase temporarily, while all other variables fall. A house price shock triggers significant increases in all the variables in the system. The same holds true for the dynamic effects of a money shock and of a credit shock. These results imply that there is a strong and highly significant multi-directional relationship between monetary variables, house prices and the macroeconomy.

Table 1: Granger causality tests (1973-2006 sample)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$\Delta y \rightarrow \Delta cpi$</th>
<th>$\Delta y \rightarrow ir$</th>
<th>$\Delta y \rightarrow \Delta hp$</th>
<th>$\Delta y \rightarrow \Delta m$</th>
<th>$\Delta y \rightarrow \Delta c$</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.35 (0.01)</td>
<td>8.14 (0.00)</td>
<td>6.07 (0.00)</td>
<td>0.44 (0.77)</td>
<td>6.94 (0.00)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$\Delta cpi \rightarrow \Delta y$</th>
<th>$\Delta cpi \rightarrow ir$</th>
<th>$\Delta cpi \rightarrow \Delta hp$</th>
<th>$\Delta cpi \rightarrow \Delta m$</th>
<th>$\Delta cpi \rightarrow \Delta c$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.80 (0.00)</td>
<td>7.63 (0.26)</td>
<td>4.36 (0.00)</td>
<td>11.39 (0.00)</td>
<td>3.49 (0.01)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$ir \rightarrow \Delta y$</th>
<th>$ir \rightarrow \Delta cpi$</th>
<th>$ir \rightarrow \Delta hp$</th>
<th>$ir \rightarrow \Delta m$</th>
<th>$ir \rightarrow \Delta c$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7.80 (0.00)</td>
<td>3.23 (0.01)</td>
<td>10.51 (0.00)</td>
<td>0.89 (0.46)</td>
<td>4.40 (0.00)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$\Delta hp \rightarrow \Delta y$</th>
<th>$\Delta hp \rightarrow \Delta cpi$</th>
<th>$\Delta hp \rightarrow ir$</th>
<th>$\Delta hp \rightarrow \Delta m$</th>
<th>$\Delta hp \rightarrow \Delta c$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6.23 (0.00)</td>
<td>1.32 (0.26)</td>
<td>1.73 (0.14)</td>
<td>4.99 (0.00)</td>
<td>8.86 (0.00)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$\Delta m \rightarrow \Delta y$</th>
<th>$\Delta m \rightarrow \Delta cpi$</th>
<th>$\Delta m \rightarrow ir$</th>
<th>$\Delta m \rightarrow \Delta hp$</th>
<th>$\Delta m \rightarrow \Delta c$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6.70 (0.00)</td>
<td>4.46 (0.00)</td>
<td>1.40 (0.23)</td>
<td>2.57 (0.04)</td>
<td>3.02 (0.02)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$\Delta c \rightarrow \Delta y$</th>
<th>$\Delta c \rightarrow \Delta cpi$</th>
<th>$\Delta c \rightarrow ir$</th>
<th>$\Delta c \rightarrow \Delta hp$</th>
<th>$\Delta c \rightarrow \Delta m$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.89 (0.02)</td>
<td>1.90 (0.10)</td>
<td>3.98 (0.00)</td>
<td>2.58 (0.04)</td>
<td>6.31 (0.00)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The table reports heteroskedasticity robust test statistics for Granger causality (F-tests). P-values are in parentheses. Significant test statistics are in bold.

As we have pointed out in the introduction, there are good reasons to conjecture that the dynamic link between house prices and monetary variables, but also the dynamics of the macroeconomy in general changed in the early/mid 1980s due to structural changes in financial systems and changes in the monetary policy regime. We would expect that the link between monetary variables and house prices has become stronger over the more recent sub-sample because of financial deregulation, while the reaction of consumer prices to macroeconomic shocks in general, and also shocks to money and credit, would be expected to have become weaker because of a more stability-orientated monetary policy. In order to test this hypothesis we replicate the empirical exercises for the sample period 1985Q1 till 2006Q4 and compare the results with those obtained from the full sample period.
Figure 3: Impulse responses to orthogonalised one unit shocks, Sample 1973Q1 – 2006Q4

Note: The figures display impulse responses to a unit shock together with the 5th and 95th percentile. The percentiles were calculated based on a wild bootstrap with 1,000 draws.
Over this shorter-sample period, the panel VAR was estimated with a lag order of three in accordance with the indications of the Akaike information criterion. Table 2 presents the results for the Granger causality tests. The test statistics reveal that the effects of monetary variables seem to have become weaker, while the effects of house prices seem to have become stronger. Many of the Granger causality tests for the monetary variables are now insignificant. Money and credit growth do not have a significant effect on future output growth and on future house price inflation anymore. Money growth is also found not to Granger cause CPI inflation over the shorter-sample period. Interestingly, credit growth now Granger causes CPI inflation, which was not the case over the full sample period. The Granger causality tests of the effects of house prices are all significant at least at the 5% level, which is a stronger outcome than for the full sample period.

Table 2: Granger causality tests (1985-2006 sample)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Δy → Δcpi</th>
<th>Δy → ir</th>
<th>Δy → Δhp</th>
<th>Δy → Δm</th>
<th>Δy → Δc</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>2.85</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>7.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.39)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.34)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δcpi → Δy</td>
<td>Δcpi → ir</td>
<td>Δcpi → Δhp</td>
<td>Δcpi → Δm</td>
<td>Δcpi → Δc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>2.77</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.47)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.71)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ir → Δy</td>
<td>ir → Δcpi</td>
<td>ir → Δhp</td>
<td>ir → Δm</td>
<td>ir → Δc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.89</td>
<td>19.84</td>
<td>7.35</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>0.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
<td>(0.51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δhp → Δy</td>
<td>Δhp → Δcpi</td>
<td>Δhp → ir</td>
<td>Δhp → Δm</td>
<td>Δhp → Δc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.64</td>
<td>3.35</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>8.83</td>
<td>11.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δm → Δy</td>
<td>Δm → Δcpi</td>
<td>Δm → ir</td>
<td>Δm → Δhp</td>
<td>Δm → Δc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>2.39</td>
<td>1.51</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.28)</td>
<td>(0.47)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td>(0.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δc → Δy</td>
<td>Δc → Δcpi</td>
<td>Δc → ir</td>
<td>Δc → Δhp</td>
<td>Δc → Δm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>7.52</td>
<td>4.50</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>5.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.66)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.36)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The table reports heteroskedasticity robust test statistics for Granger causality (F-tests). P-values are in parentheses. Significant test statistics are in bold.

Figure 4 displays the impulse responses for the shorter sub-sample in a 90% confidence band together with the impulse response function from the full sample (dotted line) for comparison. Overall the results are not fundamentally different from
those obtained for the full sample. There is still clear evidence of a strong and highly significant multi-directional relationship between monetary variables, house prices and the macroeconomy. There are, however, a number of interesting changes which are all in line with our prior expectations. First, the response of the CPI to the five different shocks is much weaker. In particular, while the CPI fell after some time following an interest rate shock over the full sample, it now significantly increases. This may be interpreted as reflecting a more forward-looking conduct of monetary policy since the mid 1980s. Second, the dynamic effects of a house price shock on real GDP, the interest rate and monetary variables have become stronger. Third, the dynamic effects of both a shock to money and to credit have become weaker. However, since the response of the CPI has weakened by more than the response of nominal house prices, the effect of a shock to money or credit on real house prices has in fact become stronger. However, due to the large confidence bands the difference between the full- and the sub-sample impulse responses is generally not statistically significant when the uncertainty surrounding both responses is taken into account.

5. House price booms

As we have already stated the introduction, there is evidence that the link between monetary variables and asset prices is particularly close in times of asset price booms. The panel set-up of the analysis also allows us to test the hypothesis that money and credit are more closely linked to house prices when house prices are booming by running a dummy variable augmented panel VAR of the form:

\[
Y_{i,t} = A_t + A_{NB}(L)Y_{i,t} \times D_{i,t}^{NB} + A_B(L)Y_{i,t} \times D_{i,t}^{B} + \varepsilon_{i,t}
\]

where \(D_{i,t}^B\) is dummy variable that is set equal to one when there is a house price boom in period \(t\) in country \(i\) and equal to zero otherwise. \(D_{i,t}^{NB}\) is in turn a dummy variable that is set equal to one when there is no house price boom in period \(t\) in country \(i\) and equal to zero otherwise.

---

20 The phenomenon if a positive response of the CPI to an interest rate increase is known as the price puzzle and is attributed to forward-looking monetary policy, so that the impulse response captures in part also the reaction of monetary policy to expected future inflation.

21 These results are consistent with evidence presented by Ludwig and Sløk (2004) and Muellbauer (2007) suggesting that the effect of house prices on consumption has become stronger since the mid 1980s.
Figure 4: Impulse responses to orthogonalised one unit shocks, Sample 1985Q1 – 2006Q4

Note: The figures display impulse responses to a unit shock together with the 5th and 95th percentile. The percentiles were calculated based on a wild bootstrap with 1,000 draws. The dotted line is the impulse response from the full sample analysis.
In light of the results in the previous section, our analysis focuses on the more recent sample period 1985 – 2006. Following the approach of Borio and Lowe (2004) and Adalid and Detken (2007) to define aggregate asset price booms, we define a house price boom as a persistent deviation of real house prices from a smooth trend, calculated based on a one-sided HP filter with a smoothing parameter of 100,000. A boom is defined as a positive deviation of house prices from this smooth trend of more than 5% lasting at least 12 quarters. The boom episodes identified in that way are reported in Table 3.22

The dummy augmented panel VAR in (3) was estimated with the dummy variables specified in line with the identified boom episodes. Figure 5 displays the impulse responses. The solid lines are the impulse responses (in a 90% confidence band) for the no boom scenario, i.e. obtained from a simulation of the estimated panel VAR with the no-boom-dummy $D_{i,t}^{NB}$ set equal to one and the boom-dummy set equal to zero. The dotted lines are the impulse responses obtained under the boom scenario, i.e. when the impulse responses are simulated with the dummy $D_{i,t}^{B}$ set equal to one and the dummy $D_{i,t}^{NB}$ set equal to zero.

The results reveal that the dynamic repercussions of most shocks are stronger during house price booms. In particular, the effect of money and credit shocks on the economy and on nominal and real house prices is stronger.23 This result supports the

22 The boom episodes differ from those identified by Adalid and Detken (2007) for several reasons. First, we identify booms of real residential property prices, while Adalid and Detken identify asset price booms based on an aggregate asset price index constructed by the BIS by aggregating share prices, residential property prices and commercial property prices weighted by their respective share in household wealth. Second, we define a real house price boom as a consecutive period where real house prices exceed the trend by at least 5% for at least 12 quarters, while Adalid and Detken choose a threshold of 10% and a minimum duration of four quarters in order to identify their aggregate asset price booms. We chose a lower (though equally arbitrary) threshold value (5% instead of 10%) in order to get a sufficient number of boom episodes since house prices are characterized by smaller fluctuations around their trend than aggregate asset prices. We chose a higher (though again equally arbitrary) duration (twelve quarters instead of four quarters) in order to increase the number of time periods of the boom episodes with a view to mitigating the bias in the coefficient estimates discussed in footnote 17. For the same reason Adalid and Detken include only booms lasting also at least twelve quarters in the econometric panel analysis in Section 6 of their paper.

23 These results are broadly consistent with those reported by Adalid and Detken (2007). However, while they find that only money growth influences future house prices when there is an asset price boom, we find that both money and credit matter. There are three potential explanations for this discrepancy. First, Adalid and Detken (2007) focus on the effect of monetary variables on real house prices in a single-equation framework, while our analysis is based on a multivariate framework. Second, Adalid and Detken investigate the link between house prices and money and credit during aggregate asset price booms (see previous footnote) while we investigate the dynamics during house price booms. Finally, there is a difference in sample periods. The sample period in Adalid and Detken is 1972-2004, while here it is 1985-2006.
view that money and credit growth contain useful information about emerging house price booms or bubbles. Somewhat surprisingly, the dynamic effects of house price shocks on the other variables in the system are not stronger during house price booms. However, if the uncertainty surrounding both impulse responses is taken into account, the difference between any two boom- and no-boom-impulse responses is in general not statistically significant due to the large confidence bands.

Table 3: Episodes of house price booms (1985-2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Episodes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>2001Q1-2005Q2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1988Q3-2001Q1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1986Q3-1990Q1, 2002Q1-2006Q4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1995Q1-2002Q2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>1985Q1-1990Q3, 1997Q2-2006Q4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1988Q1-1991Q2, 2000Q1-2006Q4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1992Q1-1994Q4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>1995Q4-2004Q2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1989Q2-1993Q4, 2002Q2-2006Q4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1986Q4-1991Q1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1988Q2-2002Q3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1986Q4-1992Q2, 2002Q1-2006Q4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1987Q4-1991Q4, 1998Q1-2006Q4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>1986Q1-1990Q2, 2002Q1-2006Q4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1986Q1-1990Q3, 1998Q3-2006Q2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>2000Q2-2006Q4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The table reports periods of house price booms. A boom is defined as a consecutive positive deviation of house prices from a smooth Hodrick-Prescott trend (smoothing parameter = 100,000) of more than 5% lasting at least 12 quarters.
Figure 5: Dynamics during house prices booms (1985-2006)

Note: The dotted line is respectively the impulse response for episodes of house price booms. The solid lines are the responses together with the 5th and 95th percentiles when there is no boom. The percentiles were calculated based on a wild bootstrap with 1,000 draws.
An alternative way to test the boom hypothesis is to assess whether the link between monetary variables and house prices has been stronger in countries that have experienced particularly strong house price increases over the sample period. Figure 6 shows the accumulated increase in real house prices (in %) over the period 1985-2006 in each of the 17 countries covered by this study. There is a group of five countries (Ireland, Spain, the UK, Belgium and the Netherlands) which have experienced very strong real house prices increases of more than 200% over this period. The majority of countries experienced a moderate increase in real house prices of between 60% and 130%. There are three countries (Switzerland, Germany and Japan) where real house prices decreased over this sample period.

**Figure 6: Accumulated real house price increases 1985-2006 (in %)**

In order to test whether the dynamic interaction between house prices and monetary variables is different in countries which have experienced relatively strong real house price increases we re-estimate the dummy variable augmented panel VAR in (3) but now specified in order to separate the countries with particularly high real house price inflation since 1985 from the other countries. This was achieved by setting the dummy variables $D^{i_1}_t$ equal to one for the five countries with high real house price increases and equal to zero for all other countries, while the dummy $D^{NB}_t$ was specified conversely.
Figure 7 displays the impulse responses. The solid lines are the impulse responses (in a 90% confidence band) for the countries with moderate and low house price increases, i.e. obtained from a simulation of the estimated panel VAR with the dummy $D_{it}^{NB}$ set equal to one and the boom-dummy set equal to zero. The dotted lines are the impulse responses obtained for the high house price increase countries, i.e. when the impulse responses are simulated with the dummy $D_{it}^{B}$ set equal to one and the dummy $D_{it}^{NB}$ set equal to zero. The results again support the view that money and credit growth are useful indicators of house price booms. Money and credit shocks are found to have a stronger effect on nominal and real house prices in the group of countries characterised by high real house price inflation. The dynamic effects of house price shocks on the other variables in the system are not found to be stronger in these countries, confirming the finding of the previous exercise that house price movements do not have stronger repercussions on the economy during periods of a house price boom. But, as in the previous exercise, it needs to be pointed out that, due to the large confidence bands, the difference between any two impulse responses is in general not statistically significant when the uncertainty surrounding both impulse responses is taken into account.

As a final exercise we take a brief look at cross-country differences in household borrowing constraints and how they evolved over time. Household borrowing against real estate collateral is usually restricted by a wealth constraint, a loan-to-value ratio (LTV) restricting the extended loan from exceeding a certain proportion of the value of the house, and/or an income constraint restricting mortgage interest payments from exceeding a certain proportion of the borrower’s income. While cross-country data on the latter are generally not available, data on maximum or typical LTVs is available though only pointwise. Based on various sources we collected three observations on typical or maximum LTVs broadly referring to the 1980s, the 1990s and the more recent period, which are reported in Table 4. We took these numbers from the existing literature, knowing well that the data are not fully comparable across time and possibly also across countries. Unfortunately no better data exist, at least to our knowledge.
Figure 7: High house price inflation countries vs moderate/low house price inflation countries (1985-2006)

Note: The dotted line is respectively the impulse response for the countries which experienced particularly high rates of house price inflation over the sample period (Belgium, the Netherlands, Ireland, Spain and the UK). The solid lines are the responses together with the 5th and 95th percentiles for the remaining countries. The percentiles were calculated based on a wild bootstrap with 1,000 draws.
**Table 4: Typical or maximum LTVs in industrialized countries (in %)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1980s(^1)</th>
<th>1990s(^2)</th>
<th>Recent(^3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>60-70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>80-85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>75-95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>70-80</td>
<td>70-85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>70-80</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>60-80</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>91-95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>70-80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>60-80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>70-80</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>70-75</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>65-80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>90-95</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\)Maximum LTVs according to Japelli and Pagano (1994) and Chiuri and Japelli (2003).

\(^2\)Typical LTVs according to Maclennan et al (2000) supplemented with maximum LTVs for Australia, Canada and the US from Chiuri and Japelli (2003).

\(^3\)Typical LTVs according to Miles and Pillonca (2007) supplemented with typical LTVs for Australia, Canada, Japan and the US from BIS (2006).

Despite this caveat, reporting these data is still useful in order to convey that characteristic LTVs vary over time. This means that it would be misleading to make a cross-country comparison based on the most recently observed LTVs to identify certain groups of countries, such as high LTV vs low LTV countries, for the purpose of comparing house price dynamics over a sample period covering a couple of decades, as is sometimes done in the literature. For example, based on the latest observation, the Netherlands would be characterised as a country with the by far highest typical LTV of 112%, but in previous decades the typical or maximum LTV was much lower at 75%.
The figures reported in Table 4 still suggest that the five countries with the highest house prices increases since 1985 were also characterised by relatively high LTVs on average or LTVs rising to high levels over this period. The figures also show, however, that there is no perfect correlation between house price increases and the level or the change in LTVs. For example, LTVs in the US have historically also been very high, but the 70% house price increase since 1985 was relatively moderate. In France, LTVs appear to have decreased over time, but real house prices still increased by 127% since 1985. There also seems to be a weak link between LTVs and the house price boom episodes reported in Table 3, suggesting that LTVs might also be procyclical. For example, LTVs in Sweden, Norway and Finland were high in the 1980s when these countries experienced a house price boom, which was respectively followed by a banking crisis. However, there have also been many house price booms occurring in countries and at times when LTVs were moderate or low.\textsuperscript{24}

6. Conclusions

The empirical analysis of this paper offers a number of interesting insights. There is evidence of a significant multidirectional link between house prices, broad money, private credit and the macroeconomy. Money growth has a significant effect on house prices and credit, credit influences money and house prices and house prices influence both credit and money. This link is found to be stronger over a more recent sub-sample from 1985 to 2006 than over a longer sample going back to the early 1970s, a finding that most likely reflects the effects of financial system liberalisations in industrialised countries during the 1970s and early 1980s. Due to the large confidence bands of the impulse responses this result is, however, not statistically significant. The results further suggest that shocks to house prices, credit and money all have significant repercussions on economic activity and aggregate price inflation. Shocks to GDP, the CPI and the interest rate are in turn found to have significant effects on house prices, money and credit. The empirical analysis further reveals that the effects of shocks to money and credit on house prices are stronger when house prices are

\textsuperscript{24} The experiences of the more recent episode make a clearer case for the view that LTVs are procyclical. In the UK, for example, LTVs had been consistently easing prior to mid 2007, with many mortgages having a LTV of 100% and even some of 125%. Recently, LTVs have gone down below 100%, and some first-time borrowers are being required to meet LTVs of 75% if they want to get the best rates.
booming than otherwise, although again not in a statistically significant way due to the large confidence bands of the impulse responses.

These findings suggest that a monetary policy strategy that gives due weight to the analysis of monetary developments could in principle induce the central bank to indirectly react to emerging financial imbalances and thereby mitigate their adverse longer-run consequences. However, in times of low and stable inflation, central banks might find it difficult to communicate such a leaning-against-the-wind policy. In a currency union like the euro area, there is the further problem of regional differences in house price and credit dynamics, which can only be addressed by a common monetary policy to the extent that they are reflected in the area wide aggregates (Goodhart, 2005). A way out of these dilemmas might be to consider a secondary financial instrument that could directly address the link between house prices and monetary variables, and could also be used at the regional level in a currency union. In previous work (Goodhart and Hofmann, 2004b, 2007) we have made the suggestion to introduce regulatory ceilings for LTVs on mortgage lending that should be varied countercyclically. Thus the LTV-ceiling could be raised when mortgage growth (and house price inflation) was low or declining, and lowered during booms. Measures of this kind have been applied in the past in Hong Kong and South Korea and more recently in Estonia.

The case for such a secondary instrument is, however, not empirically supported by the analysis of this paper. Based on pointwise descriptive analysis we have uncovered only a weak correlation between the level of LTVs and cross-country differences in house price increases or episodes of house price booms. But this might well be due to the fact that the quality of cross-country data on maximum or typical LTV levels is rather poor and that other structural features of mortgage markets also play a role which is difficult to control for. A more rigorous empirical and theoretical analysis of the role of the level of LTVs for house price and monetary dynamics and their interactions would in our view be a fruitful avenue for future research.
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Appendix

Real GDP data for the euro area countries were taken from the Eurostat database, backdated using real GDP series taken from OECD Quarterly National Accounts (QNA) database (France prior to 1978Q1 and Spain prior to 1980Q1) and the BIS Macrodatabase (Finland prior to 1975Q1), if necessary. In some cases (Belgium prior to 1980, Netherlands prior to 1977 and Ireland prior to 1997) we had to construct quarterly GDP data by interpolation from annual GDP data (taken from the BIS database) based on the Chow-Lin procedure using industrial production (taken from the IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS) database) as the reference series. The real GDP series for the other countries were collected from the BIS Macrodatabase (Sweden), the OECD QNA database (Australia, Canada, Japan, UK) and the St. Louis FRED database (USA). For Denmark we linked a quarterly series from the OECD QNA starting in 1977Q1 to an interpolated quarterly series derived from annual GDP data and quarterly industrial production data (both taken from the IMF IFS database) using the Chow-Lin procedure. For Norway, we linked a quarterly series from the OECD QNA database to a quarterly series taken from the Global Financial Data (GFD) database in 1978Q1.

The CPI data series for the euro area countries were taken from the ECB database. The ECB series for Germany was linked to a CPI series from the BIS database in 1980Q1, while for Ireland the ECB series was linked to a series taken from the OECD MEI database in 1976Q1. For all other countries the CPI data were taken from the OECD Main Economic Indicators (MEI), except for the USA where the source is the St. Louis FRED Database.

The short-term interest rate is for most countries a 3-month Treasury Bill rate taken from the GFD database. When a T-Bill rate was not available, we complemented the database using money market rates. 3-month money market rates were used for Finland (from the OECD Economic Outlook database 1970Q1-1998Q4, from the GFD database thereafter) and Spain prior to 1982Q3 (from the GFD database). Overnight money market rates were used for Switzerland (from the GFD Database), Denmark prior to 1975Q4 (from the IMF IFS database) and Norway prior to 1983Q4 (from the GFD database).

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25 A short-term money market rate was for most countries not available for the full sample period.
The house price data were taken from the ECB and the BIS databases and from national sources. It is important to note that the available data for house prices are in most cases not directly comparable across countries, due to differences in the definition of the representative property, but also due to differences in data collection (Arthur, 2003). In most countries, different house price series had to be linked in order to obtain a series for the full sample. Also, in some cases no quarterly data were available so that interpolated semi-annual data (Italy, Japan) or interpolated annual data (Germany, Belgium pre 1980, France pre 1981, Spain pre 1987, Ireland pre 1975) had to be used. The interpolation was performed based on the Chow-Lin procedure using either a construction cost index, or the CPI sub-index for rent, or both when available as reference series. More details on the house price series are provided in Appendix-Table 1.

The data series for credit from the banking sector to the private non-financial sector (private credit) were taken from the IMF International Financial Statistics (banking institutions’ claims on the private sector, series code 22D). The exception is the UK, where we used a series for banks’ and building societies’ lending to the private sector taken from the BIS database. Many of the IMF credit series displayed large level shifts due to changes in definitions or re-classifications. Following Stock and Watson (2003) we adjust for these level shifts by replacing the quarterly growth rate in the period when the shift occurs with the median of the growth rate of the two periods prior and after the level shift. The level of the series is then adjusted by backdating the series based on the adjusted growth rates. In a few countries there were also some observations missing, which were generated based on comparable credit series taken from other sources.

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26 For the euro area countries, there is a credit series in national currency until 1998Q4 and a series in euros from 1999Q1. Even after converting the national currency series to euros based on the irrevocable fixed exchange rates, some of the spliced credit series still displayed level shifts in 1999Q1. For this reason we performed a level shift adjustment in this quarter for all euro area countries.

27 The following level shifts were adjusted for: Australia 1989Q1, 2002Q1; Belgium 1992Q4, 1999Q1; Canada 2001Q4; Denmark 1987Q4, 1991Q1, 2000Q3; Finland 1999Q1; France 1978Q1, 1999Q1; Germany 1990Q2, 1999Q1; Italy 1999Q1; Ireland 1982Q4, 1995Q1, 1999Q1; Japan 1997Q4, 2001Q4; Netherlands 1982Q4, 1999Q1; Norway 1976Q1; Spain 1983Q1, 1986Q1, 1999Q1; Sweden 1983Q1, 1996Q1; Switzerland 1974Q4, 1982Q3, 1996Q4; USA 2001Q4.

28 Belgium: A missing observation for 1998Q4 was generated using the growth rate of a series for bank lending to the private sector taken from the BIS database; France: A missing observation for 1977Q4 was generated based on the growth rate of a series from the BIS Database named “Credit of a banking character to the economy”. Netherlands: Missing observations for 1998Q1-1998Q4 were generated with the growth rates of a series for claims of monetary institutions on the private sector taken from the BIS Database. Norway: Missing observations in 1987Q1-1998Q4 were generated from the growth rate of an IMF series for credit extended by non bank financial institutions to the private sector (IMF IFS series code 42D). Sweden: Missing observations in 2001Q1-Q3 were generated from the growth rate of a series for bank lending to the private sector from the Riksbank’s website.
Data series for the broad monetary aggregate M3 in the EMU member countries were taken from the ECB database. The German series was adjusted for a level shift in 1990Q3 using the Stock-Watson methodology described in the previous paragraph. For the other countries, seasonally adjusted data series for the most relevant broad monetary aggregate were taken from the OECD MEI database (Australia: M3, Canada: M3, Denmark: M3 adjusted for a level shift in 1989Q1 based on the Stock-Watson method described above, Japan: M2 + Certificates of Deposit, Norway: M2, Switzerland: M3, UK: M4) and the St. Louis FRED database (USA: M2M).

Appendix Table 1: Details on the house price data series

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Price index of established houses, weighted average of eight capital cities (Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, Adelaide, Perth, Hobart, Darwin, Canberra); Quarterly data 1970Q1-2006Q4 (Source: BIS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Price index of existing and new dwellings; Quarterly data 1980Q1-2006Q4 (Source BIS); Annual data 1970-1979 (Source: BIS) interpolated based on the Chow-Lin procedure using a construction cost index (Source: BIS) as reference series</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Average prices of existing homes; Quarterly data 1970Q1-2006Q4 (Source: BIS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Price index of new and existing houses, Good &amp; poor condition; Quarterly data 1971Q1-2006Q4 (Source: ECB)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Price index of new and existing dwellings; Quarterly data 1978Q1-2006Q4 (Source: BIS); Annual data 1970-1977 (Source: BIS) interpolated based on the Chow-Lin procedure using the rent CPI (Source: OECD MEI) as reference series</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Price index for existing dwellings; Quarterly data 1996Q1-2006Q4 (Source: ECB); Price index for existing homes; Annual data 1970-1995 (Source: BIS) interpolated based on the Chow-Lin procedure using for 1980Q2-1995Q4 a price index for existing flats in Paris (Source: ECB) and for 1970Q1-1980Q1 a cost index for new residential construction (source: BIS) and the rent CPI (Source: OECD MEI) as reference series.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Prices of good quality existing dwellings in 125 cities (in 4 capital cities prior to 1975); Annual data 1970-2006 (Source: BIS) interpolated based on the Chow-Lin procedure using a building cost index (Source: BIS) and the rent CPI (Source: OECD MEI) as reference series.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Second hand house prices (from 1978) and new house prices (prior to 1978); Quarterly data 1975Q1-2006Q4 (Source: Irish Department of the Environment); New house prices; Annual data 1970-1974 (Source: ECB) interpolated based on the Chow-Lin procedure using the rent CPI (Source: OECD MEI) as reference series.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Price index new and existing dwellings; Semi-annual data (Source: ECB) interpolated based on the Chow-Lin procedure using a construction cost index (Source: BIS) and the rent CPI (Source: OECD MEI) as reference series.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Residential land price index; Semi-annual data (Source: BIS) interpolated based on the Chow-Lin procedure using the housing investment deflator (Source: OECD QNA) and the rent CPI (Source: OECD MEI) as reference series.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix Table 1, continued: Details on the house price data series

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Price index for one-family houses and existing flats; Quarterly data 1970Q1-2006Q4 (Source: BIS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Registered purchase price of all dwellings; Quarterly data 1970Q1-2006Q4 (Source: BIS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Price index of new and existing dwellings; Quarterly data 1987Q1-2006Q4 (Source: BIS); Madrid house prices; Annual data 1971-1986 (Source: BIS) interpolated based on the Chow-Lin procedure using a construction cost index (Source: OECD MEI) and the rent CPI (Source: OECD MEI) as reference series.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Price Index of owner occupied new and existing dwellings; Quarterly data 1970Q1-2006Q4 (Source: BIS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>Price index of single-family homes and owner-occupied flats; Quarterly data 1970Q1-2006Q4 (Source: BIS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Price index of new and existing dwellings; Quarterly data 1970Q1-2006Q4 (Source: BIS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>Price index of existing homes; Quarterly data 1970Q1-2006Q4 (Source: BIS). The BIS series links the OFHEO house prices index to the National Association of Realtors’ house price index in 1975Q1.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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