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Identifying the influences of nominal and real rigidities in aggregate price-setting behavior

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EUROSYSTEM INFLATION PERSISTENCE NETWORK

IDENTIFYING THE INFLUENCES OF NOMINAL AND REAL RIGIDITIES IN AGGREGATE PRICE-SETTING BEHAVIOR

by Günter Coenen and Andrew T. Levin
In 2004 all publications will carry a motif taken from the €100 banknote.

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IDENTIFYING THE INFLUENCES OF NOMINAL AND REAL RIGIDITIES IN AGGREGATE PRICE-SETTING BEHAVIOR

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The Eurosystem Inflation Persistence Network

This paper reflects research conducted within the Inflation Persistence Network (IPN), a team of Eurosystem economists undertaking joint research on inflation persistence in the euro area and in its member countries. The research of the IPN combines theoretical and empirical analyses using three data sources: individual consumer and producer prices; surveys on firms’ price-setting practices; aggregated sectoral, national and area-wide price indices. Patterns, causes and policy implications of inflation persistence are addressed.

The IPN is chaired by Ignazio Angeloni; Stephen Cecchetti (Brandeis University), Jordi Galí (CREI, Universitat Pompeu Fabra) and Andrew Levin (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System) act as external consultants and Michael Ehrmann as Secretary.

The refereeing process is co-ordinated by a team composed of Vítor Gaspar (Chairman), Stephen Cecchetti, Silvia Fabiani, Jordi Galí, Andrew Levin, and Philip Vermeulen. The paper is released in order to make the results of IPN research generally available, in preliminary form, to encourage comments and suggestions prior to final publication. The views expressed in the paper are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Eurosystem.
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Abstract

We formulate a generalized price-setting framework that incorporates staggered contracts of multiple durations and that enables us to directly identify the influences of nominal vs. real rigidities. Using German macroeconomic data over the period 1975Q1 through 1998Q4 to estimate this framework, we find that the data is well-characterized by a truncated Calvo-style distribution with an average duration of about two quarters. We also find that new contracts exhibit very low sensitivity to marginal cost, corresponding to a relatively high degree of real rigidity. Finally, our results indicate that backward-looking behavior is not needed to explain the aggregate data, at least in an environment with a stable monetary policy regime and a transparent and credible inflation objective.

*JEL classification:* E31, E52

*Keywords:* overlapping contracts, nominal rigidity, real rigidity, inflation persistence, simulation-based indirect inference
Non-Technical Summary

In this paper, we formulate a generalized price-setting framework that incorporates staggered price contracts of multiple durations and that enables us to directly identify the influences of nominal versus real rigidities. In analyzing price contracts with random duration, we assume that every firm which resets its price faces the same *ex ante* probability distribution of contract duration, as in Calvo (1983), but we do not impose any restrictions on the shape of the hazard function. This framework also enables us to consider specifications in which each firm signs price contracts with a fixed and known duration, as in Taylor (1980), but this duration is permitted to vary across different groups of firms. Finally, our price-setting framework encompasses two sources of real rigidity: firm-specific factor inputs, and non-constant elasticity of demand.

Our empirical analysis utilizes German macroeconomic data over the period 1975Q1 through 1998Q4—a dataset that provides a virtually ideal setting for determining the structural characteristics of price-setting behavior in the context of a stable monetary policy regime. In particular, the Bundesbank maintained a transparent and, one may presume, reasonably credible medium-term inflation objective that declined gradually from 5 percent in 1975 to 2 percent in 1984, and remained essentially constant thereafter. Thus, our investigation proceeds by fitting the deviations of actual inflation from the downward trend in the Bundesbank’s medium-term inflation objective.

Using simulation-based indirect inference methods to estimate the model, we find that price-setting behavior is well-characterized by staggered contracts with an average duration of about two quarters. Furthermore, the results are reasonably similar regardless of whether we assume that contracts have random or fixed duration. We also find that new price contracts exhibit very low sensitivity to marginal cost, corresponding to a relatively high degree of real rigidity involving *both* firm-specific inputs and strong curvature of the demand function. Finally, we confirm that the estimated model is not rejected by tests of overidentifying restrictions, and that the implied autocorrelations are virtually indistinguishable from those of an unrestricted vector autoregression. Evidently, backward-looking behavior (due to informational constraints or rule-of-thumb price-setting) is not needed to explain the aggregate data, at least in the context of a stable policy regime with a transparent and credible inflation objective.

Our empirical findings regarding the frequency of price adjustments are broadly consistent with recent evidence from firm-level surveys and micro price records. This evidence also provides some indirect support for our focus on time-dependent rather than state-dependent specifications of price-setting behavior.
1 Introduction

Micro-founded models of price-setting behavior are essential for understanding aggregate inflation dynamics and for evaluating the performance of alternative monetary policy regimes.¹ Both nominal and real rigidities play a crucial role in determining the particular implications of these models; thus, a large body of empirical research has been oriented towards gauging the frequency of price adjustment, the sensitivity of price revisions to demand and cost pressures, and the prevalence of indexation or rules of thumb.²

The recent empirical literature has mainly focused on estimating variants of the New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC), which can be derived under the assumption that price contracts have random duration with a constant hazard rate.³ Nevertheless, since the slope of the NKPC depends on the mean duration of price contracts as well as potential sources of real rigidity, the underlying structural parameters cannot be separately identified using this framework.⁴ Furthermore, while most studies have obtained highly significant estimates of the coefficient on lagged inflation, no consensus has been reached about whether to interpret these results as reflecting backward-looking price-setting behavior or gradual learning about occasional shifts in the monetary policy regime.⁵

In this paper, we formulate a generalized price-setting framework that incorporates staggered contracts of multiple durations and that enables us to directly identify the influences of nominal vs. real rigidities. In analyzing contracts with random duration, we assume that every firm which resets its price faces the same ex ante probability distribution of contract duration, as in Calvo (1983), but we do not impose any restrictions on the shape of the hazard function. This framework also enables us to consider specifications in which each firm signs price contracts with a fixed and known duration, as in Taylor (1980), but

²The importance of combining nominal and real rigidities has been emphasized by Ball and Romer (1990), Chari, Kehoe, and McGratten (2000), and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2004).
³Following Gali and Gertler (1999) and Sbordone (2002), the literature has become too voluminous to be enumerated here; recent examples include Lindé (2001), Neiss and Nelson (2002), Sondergaard (2003), and Cogley and Sbordone (2004).
⁵For example, Gali and Gertler (1999) consider a specification with rule-of-thumb price-setters, while Erceg and Levin (2003) show that the lagged inflation term in the hybrid Phillips curve can be generated by rational agents who use signal extraction to learn about shifts in the central bank’s inflation objective.
this duration is permitted to vary across different groups of firms. Finally, our framework encompasses two sources of real rigidity: firm-specific factors, and non-constant elasticity of demand.

Our empirical analysis utilizes German macroeconomic data over the period 1975Q1 through 1998Q4—a dataset that provides a virtually ideal setting for determining the structural characteristics of price-setting behavior in the context of a stable monetary policy regime. In particular, the Bundesbank maintained a transparent and, one may presume, reasonably credible medium-term inflation objective that declined gradually from 5 percent in 1975 to 2 percent in 1984, and remained essentially constant thereafter. Thus, our investigation proceeds by fitting the deviations of actual inflation from the Bundesbank’s medium-term inflation objective.

Using simulation-based indirect inference methods to estimate the model, we find that price-setting behavior is well-characterized by staggered contracts with an average duration of about two quarters. Furthermore, the results are reasonably similar regardless of whether we assume that contracts have random or fixed duration. We also find that new price contracts exhibit very low sensitivity to marginal cost, corresponding to a relatively high degree of real rigidity involving both firm-specific inputs and strong curvature of the demand function. Finally, we confirm that the estimated model is not rejected by tests of overidentifying restrictions, and that the implied autocorrelations are virtually indistinguishable from those of an unrestricted vector autoregression.  

Evidently, backward-looking behavior (due to informational constraints or rule-of-thumb price-setting) is not needed to explain the aggregate data, at least in the context of a stable policy regime with a transparent and credible inflation objective.

Our empirical findings regarding the frequency of price adjustments are broadly consistent with recent evidence from firm-level surveys and micro price records.  

\footnote{Mash (2003) uses micro evidence to calibrate a similar price-setting framework with a generalized hazard function, and shows that the calibrated model can roughly match empirical autocorrelations.}

\footnote{Survey evidence has been obtained by Blinder, Canetti, Lebow, and Rudd (1998), Hall, Walsh, and Yates (2000), Apel, Fröberg, and Hallsten (2001), and Fabiani, Gattulli, and Sabbatini (2004). For recent evidence from micro price records, see Chevalier, Kashyap, and Rossi (2003), Golosov and Lucas (2003), Aucremanne and Dhyne (2004), Bils and Klenow (2004), and Dias, Dias, and Neves (2004). Additional references and discussion may be found in Taylor (1999).}
nomic evidence also provides some indirect support for our focus on time-dependent rather than state-dependent specifications of price-setting behavior.\(^8\)

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the generalized price-setting framework. Section 3 describes the data used in our analysis, while Section 4 reviews the estimation methodology. Section 5 reports the estimated distribution of contract durations and confirms that these results are reasonably robust to alternative proxies for real marginal cost; this section also confirms the goodness-of-fit of the model and documents the importance of accounting for the evolution of the Bundesbank’s medium-term inflation objective. Section 6 reports the estimated degree of real rigidity, interprets these results in terms of the underlying structural parameters, and assesses the potential downward bias due to persistent mismeasurement of real marginal cost. Section 7 concludes.

2 The Generalized Price-Setting Framework

In this section we formulate a generalized price-setting framework that incorporates staggered nominal contracts of multiple durations. Within this framework, we allow price contracts to have either random duration à la Calvo (1983) or fixed duration à la Taylor (1980). In the former case, we assume that every firm which resets its price faces the same \textit{ex ante} probability distribution of contract duration, without imposing any restrictions on the shape of the hazard function. In the latter case, every price contract has a fixed and known duration which varies across different groups of firms.

Our framework encompasses two sources of real rigidity. First, following Kimball (1995), each firm’s demand may exhibit a high degree of curvature (approximating a “kinked demand curve”) as a function of the firm’s price deviation from the average price level.\(^9\) Thus, when a firm is resetting its price contract, its optimal price will be relatively less sensitive to changes in the firm’s marginal cost. Second, the presence of fixed firm-specific inputs causes each firm’s marginal cost to vary with its level of output and hence dampens the

\(^8\)Caplin and Leahy (1997) and Dotsey, King, and Wolman (1999) have developed models of state-dependent price-setting, while Klenow and Kryvstov (2004) provide recent evidence on its limited role in generating aggregate inflation variability; see also recent work by Dotsey and King (2004).

\(^9\)See also Woglom (1982) and Ball and Romer (1990).
sensitivity of new contract prices to an aggregate shock. For example, in considering a price hike in response to a particular shock, the firm recognizes that lower demand will reduce its marginal cost, thereby partially offsetting the original rationale for raising its price.

Henceforth we will use the term “capital” to refer to the fixed factor in production, while the variable factor will be referred to as “labor.” Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that the fixed factor could include land as well as any overhead labor that cannot easily be adjusted in the short run. Furthermore, while our analysis abstracts from the influence of endogenous capital accumulation, the results of Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004) indicate that the degree of real rigidity is quantitatively similar for specifications with fixed capital and for specifications with an empirically reasonable magnitude of adjustment costs for investment.\(^ {10} \)

2.1 The Market Structure

Consider a continuum of monopolistically competitive firms indexed by \( f \in [0, 1] \), each of which produces a differentiated good \( Y_t(f) \) using the following production function:

\[
Y_t(f) = A_t K(f)^{\alpha} L_t(f)^{1-\alpha}.
\]  

(1)

Note that all firms have the same level of total factor productivity, \( A_t \). To ensure symmetry in the deterministic steady state, we also assume that every firm owns an identical capital stock, \( K(f) = \bar{K} \).

A distinct set of perfectly competitive aggregators combine all of the differentiated products into a single final good, \( \bar{Y}_t \), using the following technology:

\[
\int_0^1 G(Y_t(f)/\bar{Y}_t) df = 1,
\]

(2)

where the function \( G(\cdot) \) is increasing and strictly concave with \( G(1) = 1 \). Under this definition, the steady state of aggregate output, \( \bar{Y} \), is identical to the steady-state output of each individual firm, \( \bar{Y}(f) \).

\(^ {10}\)Optimal price setting with firm-specific capital accumulation has recently been analyzed by Sveen and Weinke (2003), Christiano (2004), and Woodford (2004); see also Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Lindé (2004) and de Walque, Smets, and Wouters (2004).
Henceforth we use \( \eta \) to denote the steady-state elasticity of demand; that is, \( \eta = -G'(1)/G''(1) > 1 \). Furthermore, we use \( \epsilon \) to denote the relative slope of the demand elasticity around its steady-state value; that is, \( \epsilon = \eta G''(1)/G'(1) + \eta + 1 \). Thus, the special case \( \epsilon = 0 \) corresponds to the Dixit-Stiglitz specification of constant demand elasticity, for which \( G(x) = x^{\eta/(\eta-1)} \).

Under these assumptions, each firm \( f \) faces the following implicit demand curve for its output as a function of its price \( P_t(f) \) relative to the price of the final good, \( P_t \):

\[
G'(Y_t(f)/Y_t) = \left( \frac{P_t(f)}{P_t} \right) \int_0^1 \left( \frac{Y_t(z)/Y_t}{Y_t} \right) G'(Y_t(z)/Y_t) dz.
\] (3)

The concavity of \( G(\cdot) \) ensures that the demand curve is downward-sloping; that is, \( dY_t(f)/dP_t(f) < 0 \). The price index \( P_t \) can be obtained explicitly by multiplying both sides of equation (3) by the factor \( Y_t(f)/Y_t \) and then integrating over the unit interval:

\[
P_t = \int_0^1 \left( \frac{Y_t(z)/Y_t}{Y_t} \right) P_t(z) dz.
\] (4)

Finally, the firm’s real marginal cost function \( MC_t(f) \) is given as follows:

\[
MC_t(f) = \frac{W_t}{(1-\alpha)P_tA_tK(f)^\alpha L_t(f)^{1-\alpha}},
\] (5)

where \( W_t \) denotes the nominal wage rate.

### 2.2 The Duration of Price Contracts

We assume that the prices for the differentiated goods, \( P_t(f) \), are determined by staggered nominal price contracts with a maximum duration of \( J \) periods. For \( j = 1, \ldots, J \), let \( \omega_j \) denote the fraction of price contracts that have a duration of \( j \) periods, where \( \omega_j \geq 0 \) and \( \sum_{j=1}^J \omega_j = 1 \).

In the case of random contract durations, every firm has the same hazard function, which determines the probability that the firm is permitted to reset its price. The specification here generalizes that of Calvo (1983), because the probability of a price revision can depend on the number of periods that the existing contract has been in effect. Specifically, a firm \( f \) whose contract has been in effect for \( k \) periods faces the probability \( \sum_{j=1}^k \omega_j \) of receiving permission to reset its contract in the current period, where, as noted above, \( \omega_j \geq 0 \) and
\[ \sum_{j=1}^{J} \omega_j = 1. \] With probability \[ \sum_{j=k+1}^{J} \omega_j, \] this firm is not permitted to reset its contract in period \( t \), and its price remains unchanged; that is, \( P_t(f) = P_{t-1}(f) \).

In the case of fixed contract durations, \( \omega_j \) denotes the fraction of firms that sign price contracts with a duration of \( j \) periods (\( j = 1, \ldots, J \)), where again \( \omega_j \geq 0 \) and \( \sum_{j=1}^{J} \omega_j = 1 \). For each contract length \( j \), an equi-proportionate fraction \( \omega_j/j \) of firms reset their contracts in any given period \( t \). For each firm which does not reset its contract in period \( t \), its price remains unchanged, that is, \( P_t(f) = P_{t-1}(f) \).

In formal terms, the distribution of fixed-duration contracts can be represented as follows. Let \( \{ \Omega_1, \ldots, \Omega_J \} \) denote a partition of the continuum of monopolistically competitive firms \( \Omega = [0, 1] \) into subintervals with \( \Omega_j = \left[ s_{j-1}, s_j \right) \) for \( j = 1, \ldots, J - 1 \) together with \( \Omega_J = \left[ s_{J-1}, s_J \right] \), satisfying \( 0 = s_0 \leq s_1 \leq \cdots < s_J = 1 \); and let \( \omega_j = \mu(\Omega_j) \) denote the measure of the subinterval \( \Omega_j \). The individual firms in \( \Omega_j \) may be indexed so that every firm with index \( f \in \left[ s_{j-1}, s_j + (s_j - s_{j-1})/j \right) \) resets its contract price whenever the period \( t \) is evenly divisible by \( j \); similarly firms with index \( f \in \left[ s_{j-1} + (s_j - s_{j-1})/j, s_{j-1} + 2(s_j - s_{j-1})/j \right) \) reset prices during periods in which modulus(\( t, j \)) = 1, and so forth.

2.3 The Optimal Price-Setting Decision

In period \( t \), each firm resetting its contract chooses its new price \( P_t(f) \) to maximise the firm’s expected discounted profits over the life of the contract,

\[
\mathbb{E}_t \left[ \sum_{i=0}^{J-1} \chi_i \lambda_{t,t+i} \left( P_t(f)Y_{t+i}(f) - W_{t+i}L_{t+i}(f) \right) \right],
\]

subject to the production function (1) and the implicit demand curve (3), where the stochastic discount factor \( \lambda_{t,t+i} \) can be obtained from the consumption Euler equation of the representative household.

If the price contract has random duration, then the coefficient \( \chi_i \) indicates the probability that the price contract will still be in effect after \( i \) periods; that is, \( \chi_i = \sum_{k=i+1}^{J} \omega_k \) for \( i = 0, \ldots, J - 1 \). In the special case of Calvo-style contracts, the firm faces a constant probability \( \xi \) of not revising its contract in any given period; thus, \( \chi_i = \xi^i \), and the maximum duration \( J \to \infty \).
If the price contract has a fixed duration, then the coefficient $\chi_i$ is simply an indicator function. In particular, when the contract has a duration of $j$ periods (for $j = 1, \ldots, J$), then $\chi_i = 1$ for $i = 0, \ldots, j - 1$ and 0 otherwise.

2.4 The Log-Linearization with Random Contract Duration

We now proceed to log-linearize the pricing equation and the aggregate price identity around the deterministic steady state with zero inflation.\footnote{For analysis of the log-linearization around a non-zero steady state, see Ascani (2003) for the case of random-duration contracts, and Erceg and Levin (2003) for the case of fixed-duration contracts. The same first-order approximation is obtained under the assumption that all price contracts are indexed to the (possibly non-zero) steady-state inflation rate.} We use $\pi_t$ to denote the aggregate inflation rate, while $mc_t$ denotes the average real marginal cost across all firms in the economy (expressed as a logarithmic deviation from its steady-state value), and $y_t$ denotes the logarithmic deviation of aggregate output from steady state.

In the case of random contract durations, all firms signing new contracts at date $t$ set the same price. Thus, using $x_t$ to denote the logarithmic deviation of the new contract price from the aggregate price level, we obtain the following expression for the log-linearized optimal price-setting equation:

$$x_t = E_t \left[ \sum_{i=1}^{J-1} \Phi_i \pi_{t+i} + \gamma \sum_{i=0}^{J-1} \phi_i mc_{t+i} \right],$$

where $\beta$ denotes the household’s discount factor, and the weights satisfy $\phi_i = \beta \sum_{j=i+1}^J \omega_j / \left( \sum_{j=1}^J \sum_{k=0}^{j-1} \beta^k \omega_j \right)$ and $\Phi_i = \sum_{k=i}^{J-1} \phi_k$. The coefficient $\gamma$ in equation (7) determines the sensitivity of new price contracts to aggregate real marginal cost. In particular, as shown by Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004), this coefficient can be expressed as the product of two components; that is, $\gamma = \gamma_d \cdot \gamma_{mc}$, where

$$\gamma_d = \frac{\eta - 1}{\epsilon + \eta - 1},$$

$$\gamma_{mc} = \frac{1}{1 + \frac{\alpha}{1-\eta} \gamma_d}.$$

It should be noted that the coefficient $\gamma_d$ depends solely on the relative curvature of the firm’s demand function, and has a value of unity in the special case with constant demand.
elasticity; that is, $\gamma_{id} = 1$ when $\epsilon = 0$. The coefficient $\gamma_{mc}$ reflects the degree to which the
firm’s relative price influences its marginal cost, and has a value of unity in the special case
with no fixed factors; that is, $\gamma_{mc} = 1$ when $\alpha = 0$.

The log-linearized aggregate price identity can be expressed as follows:

$$\sum_{i=0}^{J-1} \psi_i x_{t-i} = \sum_{i=0}^{J-2} \Psi_{i+1} \pi_{t-i},$$  \hspace{1cm} (10)

where the weights satisfy $\psi_i = \sum_{j=i+1}^{J} \omega_j / \left( \sum_{j=1}^{J} \sum_{k=0}^{j-1} \omega_j \right)$ and $\Psi_i = \sum_{k=1}^{J-1} \psi_k$.

2.5 The Log-Linearization with Fixed Contract Duration

For the case of fixed-duration contracts, let $x_{j,t}$ indicate the logarithmic deviation of the
new contract price of duration $j$ from the aggregate price level. Then the log-linearized
price-setting equation can be expressed as follows:

$$x_{j,t} = E_t \left[ \sum_{i=1}^{j-1} \tilde{\Phi}_{j,i} \pi_{t+i} + \gamma \sum_{i=0}^{j-1} \tilde{\phi}_{j,i} mc_{t+i} \right],$$  \hspace{1cm} (11)

where $\tilde{\phi}_{j,i} = \beta_i / \sum_{k=0}^{j-1} \beta^k$ and $\tilde{\Phi}_{j,i} = \sum_{k=i}^{j-1} \phi_{j,k}$. The aggregate price level depends on all
of the price contracts in effect at date $t$; thus, we obtain the following expression for the
aggregate price identity:

$$\sum_{i=0}^{J-1} \sum_{j=i+1}^{J} \frac{\omega_j}{j} x_{j,t-i} = \sum_{i=0}^{J-2} \sum_{j=i+2}^{J} \frac{\omega_j}{j} \pi_{t-i}. \hspace{1cm} (12)$$

The empirical results reported below for fixed-duration contracts are based on analysis
of equations (11) and (12). In addition, for purposes of comparison with some of the earlier
literature on fixed-duration contracts, Appendix B provides results using the simplifying
assumption of negligible variation across new price contracts.

3 The Data

In estimating a structural price-setting framework, it is essential to avoid spurious influences
due to shifts in the monetary policy regime. In cases where the shift is not transparent or
credible, price-setting behavior may appear to be backward-looking when in fact private
agents are using optimal filtering to determine the policy regime (cf. Erceg and Levin 2003). Even a transparent and credible change in the central bank’s inflation objective tends to raise the measured degree of inflation persistence unless the shift is explicitly taken into account in the estimation procedure (cf. Levin and Piger 2004).

Thus, German macroeconomic data for 1975-1998 provides a virtually ideal setting for determining the structural characteristics of price-setting, because the Bundesbank maintained a reasonably transparent and credible medium-term inflation objective over this period. In particular, in the process of deriving money growth targets (starting in 1975), the Bundesbank regularly stated its assumptions regarding the level of inflation over the medium run, set in the broader context of the ultimate goal of price stability. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, the medium-term assumption was referred to as the “unavoidable” level of inflation, reflecting the Bundesbank’s willingness to attain price stability over a longer horizon rather than inducing a sudden sharp contraction in real economic activity.12 After reaching the neighborhood of price stability in the mid-1980s, the Bundesbank referred to its inflation assumption as the “medium-term price norm”.13

The upper-left panel of Figure 1 depicts the evolution of actual inflation and the Bundesbank’s medium-term inflation objective over the period 1974-1998. At the beginning of the sample period, GDP price inflation was at a transitory peak of about 8 percent in the wake of the collapse of the Bretton Woods regime and the first OPEC oil price shock. Inflation subsequently stabilized around the Bundesbank’s medium-term inflation objective of about 5 percent, and then declined fairly gradually through the late 1970s and early 1980s, roughly in parallel with reductions in the Bundesbank’s medium-term objective. From about 1985 through the advent of the European Monetary Union, the inflation objective remained essentially constant at 2 percent; actual inflation exhibited an average level fairly close to this objective, with only one large deviation in the early 1990s during the process of German unification. Our empirical investigation proceeds by fitting

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12 As shown by Erceg and Levin (2003), even a transparent and credible disinflation causes a transitory recession in a model with four-quarter Taylor-style wage and price contracts. In contrast, disinflations can be costless in models with Calvo-style contracts.
13 Further details regarding the Bundesbank’s monetary policy strategy may be found in Schmid (1999) and Gerberding, Seitz, and Worms (2004).
Figure 1: German Inflation and Markup Gaps, 1974-1998

![Graphs showing German Inflation and Markup Gaps](image)

Note: Inflation is measured as the annualized quarter-on-quarter change in the logarithm of the GDP price deflator. The inflation gap is defined as the deviation of inflation from the Bundesbank's medium-term inflation objective. The labor share is constructed as the ratio of total compensation (including imputed labor income of self-employed workers) to nominal GDP. The markup gap is defined as the deviation of the logarithm of the labor share from a linear trend.

The deviations of actual inflation from the Bundesbank’s medium-term inflation objective; this “inflation gap” is shown in the upper-right panel of Figure 1.

The labor share serves as our benchmark proxy for real marginal cost. In measuring the labor share, it is important to account for the significant role of self-employed workers in the German economy. In the absence of direct measures of labor compensation for self-employed workers, we follow the fairly standard approach of computing the labor share by taking the compensation of employees (which does not include self-employed workers), multiplying this...
figure by the ratio of total employment (including self-employed workers) to the number of employees, and then dividing by nominal GDP. In effect, this procedure uses the average compensation rate of employees to impute the labor compensation of self-employed workers.

The lower-left panel of Figure 1 depicts the evolution of the German labor share. This series exhibits a clear downward trend over the sample period, presumably reflecting gradual structural changes in the German economy. Since our analytical framework follows the standard New Keynesian view that prices adjust in response to deviations of the actual markup from a desired level, we interpret the low-frequency movement of the labor share as a deterministic trend in the desired markup. Thus, our price-setting framework is estimated using the detrended labor share—henceforth referred to as the markup gap—as depicted in the lower-right panel of Figure 1.

In performing sensitivity analysis, we consider several alternative proxies for real marginal cost, each of which is depicted in Figure 2. The upper-right panel shows two measures of the output gap, which have been constructed from real GDP (shown in the upper-left panel) using linear detrending and Hodrick-Prescott filtering, respectively. The lower-left panel depicts the ratio of employee compensation to nominal GDP. This measure—henceforth referred to as the uncorrected labor share—implicitly attributes all of the income of self-employed workers as compensation to capital rather than labor. The behavior of the detrended series (shown in the lower-right panel) is broadly similar to that of the benchmark series, but the deviation from trend is much larger in the mid-1970s; given that this deviation is not accompanied by substantial movement in inflation, we shall see below that the uncorrected labor share implies an even higher degree of real rigidity than the benchmark series.

4 Estimation Methodology

Our empirical analysis essentially follows the approach of Coenen and Wieland (2004). In the first stage, we estimate an unconstrained VAR model that provides an empirical description of the dynamics of the inflation gap, the markup gap, and the output gap. In
Figure 2: Alternative Proxies for the Markup Gap

Note: Output is measured as the logarithm of real GDP. The output gap is constructed by detrending output using either a linear trend or a Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter of 10,000. The uncorrected labor share is the ratio of employee compensation to nominal GDP, and does not incorporate the imputed labor income of self-employed workers. The corresponding markup gap is obtained by linearly detrending the logarithm of the uncorrected labor share.

In the second stage, we employ simulation-based indirect inference methods to estimate the structural price-setting equations, using the unconstrained VAR as the auxiliary model. In effect, this method determines the parameters of the structural model by matching its reduced form—which constitutes a constrained VAR—as closely as possible with the unconstrained VAR.¹⁴

¹⁴The method of indirect inference was proposed by Smith (1993) and Gouriéroux, Monfort and Renault (1993); see also Gouriéroux and Monfort (1996). For a summary of the asymptotic properties of this procedure, see the appendix of the working paper version of Coenen and Wieland (2004).
In the remainder of this section, we compare our procedure with alternative approaches that have been employed in the literature, and then describe the estimation methodology in further detail.

4.1 Comparison with Alternative Approaches

Unlike most of the literature on estimating NKPCs, standard method-of-moments procedures cannot be applied to our generalized price-setting framework due to the presence of unobserved variables (namely, the new contracts signed each period). Furthermore, since each contract price depends on expected future markup gaps, we need to specify how these gaps are determined. To avoid imposing any additional restrictions, we simply take the markup gap and output gap equations from the unconstrained VAR and combine these with the structural price-setting equations; we refer to the combined set of equations as the “structural model” even though only part of the model is truly structural.\(^{15}\)

Our estimation methodology has some appealing features compared with several other commonly-employed procedures. For example, one alternative approach is to specify a complete structural model and estimate its parameters by matching some of the implied impulse response functions (IRFs) to those of an identified VAR model.\(^{16}\) In contrast, our procedure matches the implications of the structural model to those of an unconstrained VAR, thereby avoiding the need to impose potentially controversial identifying assumptions on the auxiliary model. Furthermore, our procedure essentially matches all of the sample autocorrelations and cross-correlations rather than a limited set of characteristics of the data.

Another alternative approach involves the use of full-information methods to estimate a complete structural model.\(^{17}\) Nevertheless, one potential pitfall of that approach is that the price-setting parameter estimates could be sensitive to misspecifications in other aspects of the model—a particularly important issue in this case due to the lack of consensus about

\(^{15}\)This limited-information approach follows Taylor (1993) and Fuhrer and Moore (1995), and is similar in spirit to the approach of Sbordone (2002).

\(^{16}\)Recent examples of this approach include Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), Christiano et al. (2004), and Altig et al. (2004).

\(^{17}\)For recent examples of full-information estimation, see Schorfheide (2000), Smets and Wouters (2003), and Onatski and Williams (2004).
which labor market rigidities are relevant in determining the behavior of the markup gap.

4.2 Details of the Estimation Procedure

We begin by using ordinary least-squares to estimate an unconstrained VAR involving the inflation gap, the markup gap, and the output gap. We then proceed to use this model as a benchmark for conducting indirect inference on the structural model, which consists of the generalized price-setting framework combined with the markup gap and output gap equations taken from the unconstrained VAR.\footnote{Of course, when the output gap is used as the proxy for real marginal cost, the unconstrained model is simply a bivariate VAR involving the inflation gap and the output gap, and the structural model consists of the generalized price-setting framework and the output gap equation from the unconstrained VAR.} In our empirical analysis, the optimal price-setting equation includes an exogenous white-noise disturbance that may reflect shifts in sales tax rates or stochastic variation in the desired markup.\footnote{See Clarida et al. (1999) and Woodford (2003).}

For a sample of length $T$, the vector of parameter estimates of the unconstrained VAR is denoted by $\hat{\zeta}_T$, while the estimated covariance matrix of these parameters is denoted by $\hat{\Sigma}_T(\hat{\zeta}_T)$. It should be noted that the vector $\hat{\zeta}_T$ includes not only the VAR coefficients but also the variances and contemporaneous correlations of the innovations. The unconstrained VAR is specified with three lags of each variable; this specification yields serially uncorrelated residuals (based on the Ljung-Box $Q(12)$ statistic) and corresponds to the reduced-form VAR representation of the structural model when price contracts have a maximum duration of four quarters.

The vector of structural parameters, $\theta$, includes the distribution of contract durations ($\omega_j$ for $j = 1, ..., 4$), the sensitivity of new contracts to aggregate real marginal cost ($\gamma$), and the standard deviation of the white-noise disturbance to the optimal price-setting equation ($\sigma_\varepsilon$). The distribution of contract durations is estimated subject to the constraint that these parameters are non-negative and sum to unity. Finally, rather than estimating the discount factor, we simply calibrate $\beta = 0.9925$, corresponding to an annualized steady-state real interest rate of about 3 percent.

For any particular vector of structural parameters $\theta$, we confirm that the model has a unique linear rational expectations solution and then obtain its reduced-form VAR repre-
sentation using the AIM algorithm of Anderson and Moore (1985). Using this reduced-form model, we generate “artificial” time series of length \( S \) for the endogenous variables, namely, the relative contract prices, the inflation gap, the markup gap, and the output gap.\(^{20}\) We then fit the latter three randomly-generated series with an unconstrained VAR model that is isomorphic to the one applied to the observed data. The vector of fitted VAR parameters is denoted by \( \hat{\zeta}_S(\theta) \) because these VAR parameters depend on the particular values of the structural parameters \( \theta \) as well as the restrictions of the structural model and the sample size \( S \) of the simulated data.

We then use a numerical optimization algorithm to determine the set of structural parameters that maximizes the fit between the simulation-based VAR parameters and those of the unconstrained VAR of the observed data. In particular, the estimated value of \( \theta \) minimizes the following criterion function:

\[
Q_{S,T}(\theta) = (\hat{\zeta}_T - \hat{\zeta}_S(\theta))' S' \left[ S \hat{\Sigma}_T(\hat{\zeta}_T) S' \right]^{-1} S \left( \hat{\zeta}_T - \hat{\zeta}_S(\theta) \right),
\]

where \( S \) is the matrix of zeros and ones that selects the elements of \( \hat{\zeta}_T \) that correspond to the inflation equation of the unconstrained VAR.\(^{21}\)

Because this criterion function employs the optimal weighting matrix, the resulting estimator of \( \theta \) is asymptotically efficient. In particular, under certain regularity conditions (including the assumption that the sample size ratio \( S/T \) converges to a constant \( q \) as \( T \to \infty \)), this estimator is consistent and has the following asymptotic normal distribution:

\[
\sqrt{T}(\hat{\theta}_{S,T} - \theta_0) \overset{d}{\to} N(0, (1 + q^{-1})(Z' S' \left[ S \Sigma(\zeta_0) S' \right]^{-1} S Z)^{-1}),
\]

where \( \theta_0 \) is the probability limit of \( \hat{\theta}_{S,T} \); \( \zeta_0 \) is the plim of \( \hat{\zeta}_T \); \( \Sigma(\zeta_0) \) is the plim of \( \hat{\Sigma}_T(\hat{\zeta}_T) \); \( z(\theta_0) \) is the plim of \( \hat{\zeta}_S(\theta_0) \) as \( S \to \infty \); and \( Z = (\partial z(\theta_0)/\partial \theta') \).

\(^{20}\)To simulate the model, we employ a Gaussian random-number generator for the disturbances, and we use steady-state values as initial conditions for the endogenous variables; the first few years of simulated data are excluded from the sample used for indirect inference to ensure that the results are not influenced by these particular initial conditions. The effective sample size is \( S = 100T \).

\(^{21}\)This choice of the selection matrix \( S \) is useful for alleviating the computational burden of our estimation procedure. In principle, all elements of \( \hat{\zeta}_T \) could be included in the estimation. However, our estimation results are unlikely to change because the markup gap and output gap equations in our structural model are taken from the unconstrained VAR itself. The finding that the autocorrelation functions of the markup gap and the output gap implied by the estimated structural model are virtually identical to those implied by the unconstrained VAR is reassuring in this respect.
5 Gauging the Degree of Nominal Rigidity

By applying the methodology described above, we can now proceed to gauge the degree of nominal rigidity in terms of the estimated distribution of contract durations. We also consider evidence on the model’s goodness-of-fit, which confirms that this framework provides a close match to the dynamics of the data even without more complex propagation mechanisms such as imperfect information or indexation to lagged inflation. Finally, we document the empirical importance of accounting for the evolution of the Bundesbank’s medium-term inflation objective.

5.1 The Distribution of Price Contract Durations

Table 1 provides results for the distribution of price contract durations when the model is estimated using the benchmark markup gap and inflation gap. For both the random-duration and fixed-duration specifications, the estimated distribution of contract durations corresponds to a relatively moderate degree of nominal rigidity, broadly consistent with evidence from surveys and micro price records regarding the frequency of price adjustment. Furthermore, given the precision of these estimates, the null hypothesis of no nominal inertia (that is, all prices adjusted every period) can be decisively rejected.

For the random-duration specification, the estimated distribution of contract durations is remarkably close to that of a truncated Calvo specification with a mean duration of two quarters. In particular, the truncated Calvo model would imply that 48 percent of contracts are adjusted each period, while 23 percent are adjusted after two quarters, 11 percent after three quarters, and the remaining 18 percent are adjusted upon reaching the maximum contract length of four quarters. Each of these probabilities is within about one standard deviation of the corresponding estimate reported in the top row of Table 1, and indeed, formal hypothesis tests do not reject the null hypothesis that the data are consistent with this truncated Calvo specification.

It is interesting to note that the distribution of contract durations is noticeably longer for the fixed-duration specification. In this case, each individual firm is assumed to know

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Random-Duration Specification</th>
<th>Fixed-Duration Specification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 period</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 quarters</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 quarters</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 quarters</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

...
Table 1: Benchmark Estimates of Nominal Rigidity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Distribution of Contract Durations</th>
<th>Mean Duration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ω₁</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Random-Duration Contracts</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed-Duration Contracts</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: This table reports the estimated distribution of contract durations for each specification of the generalized price-setting framework (that is, random or fixed durations), obtained using the benchmark markup gap and the inflation gap. Estimated standard errors are given in parentheses.

exactly how long its price contract will remain in effect, whereas the random-duration specification assumes that all new price contracts signed each period have the same *ex ante* expected duration. Thus, to match the observed sensitivity of aggregate inflation to the one-year-ahead markup gap, the fixed-duration specification must incorporate a somewhat larger share of four-quarter contracts and a correspondingly smaller share of one-quarter contracts compared with the random-duration specification.

Finally, as shown in Table 2, the estimated distribution of contract durations is relatively insensitive to the choice of proxy for real marginal cost. As discussed in Section 3, these proxies include an alternative markup gap (that is, a measure of the labor share that omits the imputed labor income of self-employees) as well as linearly-detrended and HP-filtered measures of the output gap. In all cases, the estimated mean contract duration remains at about two quarters, and the individual results are quite close to the corresponding benchmark estimates reported in Table 1.

5.2 Consistency with the Data

As discussed earlier, our estimation procedure is aimed at matching the reduced-form implications of the structural model to those of an unconstrained VAR. Thus, a natural starting point for evaluating the goodness-of-fit of the structural model is to compare its implied
Table 2: Robustness to Alternative Proxies for Real Marginal Cost

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Distribution of Contract Durations</th>
<th>Mean Duration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( \omega_1 )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A. Random-Duration Contracts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alternative</th>
<th>Markup Gap (Linear Trend)</th>
<th>Output Gap (Linear Trend)</th>
<th>Output Gap (HP Trend)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Markup Gap</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \omega_1 )</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \omega_2 )</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \omega_3 )</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \omega_4 )</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Duration</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>2.07</td>
<td>2.25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. Fixed-Duration Contracts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alternative</th>
<th>Markup Gap (Linear Trend)</th>
<th>Output Gap (Linear Trend)</th>
<th>Output Gap (HP Trend)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Markup Gap</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \omega_1 )</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \omega_2 )</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \omega_3 )</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \omega_4 )</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Duration</td>
<td>2.35</td>
<td>2.36</td>
<td>2.37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: This table reports the distribution of contract durations for each specification of the generalized price-setting framework (that is, random or fixed durations) using three alternative proxies for real marginal cost. Estimated standard errors are given in parentheses.

autocorrelations with the sample autocorrelations of the observed time series.\(^{22}\) We also check the implied disturbances to the optimal price-setting equation and to the markup gap and output gap equations whether these disturbances are serially uncorrelated, consistent with our maintained assumption of white-noise disturbances in the optimal price-setting equation.

According to both metrics, the generalized price-setting framework performs very well in fitting the characteristics of the German macroeconomic data. Complete results are given in Appendix B; here we simply illustrate the general pattern using one particular specification, namely, the random-duration contract model estimated using the benchmark markup gap as the measure of real marginal cost. As shown in the left panel of Figure 3, the

autocorrelogram of inflation implied by the structural model is virtually indistinguishable from that of the observed data and lies well within the asymptotic confidence bands.\textsuperscript{23} Furthermore, as depicted in the right panel, the contract price shocks exhibit negligible autocorrelation—a finding which is confirmed by portmanteau tests for serial correlation.\textsuperscript{24}

A more formal means of evaluating the structural model is to test whether the overidentifying restrictions of the model are consistent with the data. The degrees of freedom of the overidentification test depends on the number of free parameters in the structural model compared with the unconstrained VAR. When the structural model is estimated using one of the markup gap series as a proxy for real marginal cost, the model is matched to an trivariate VAR involving the markup gap, inflation gap, and output gap; in this case, the test of overidentifying restrictions has seven degrees of freedom. When the structural model

\textsuperscript{23}See Coenen (2004) for a detailed discussion of the methodology used in computing the asymptotic confidence bands for the estimated autocorrelation functions.

\textsuperscript{24}For the fixed-duration contract model a similar characterisation is provided in Appendix Figure B3. As can be seen by comparing the panels in Figure 3 with those in Appendix Figure B3, the implications of the two types of staggered contracts for the dynamics of inflation and the correlation pattern of price shocks are virtually the same.
Table 3: Testing the Overidentifying Restrictions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Random-Duration Contracts</th>
<th>Fixed-Duration Contracts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benchmark Markup Gap</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternative Markup Gap</td>
<td>0.03**</td>
<td>0.03**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output Gap (Linear Trend)</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output Gap (HP Trend)</td>
<td>0.06*</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: This table indicates the probability that the overidentifying restrictions are consistent with each specification of the generalized price-setting framework for each of the four different proxies for real marginal cost. A single asterisk indicates rejection at the 90% confidence level, while two asterisks denote rejection at the 95% confidence level.

is estimated using the output gap as the proxy for real marginal cost, then the corresponding unconstrained model is a bivariate VAR involving the inflation gap and the output gap, and the overidentification test has three degrees of freedom.

As shown in Table 3, when the model is estimated using either the benchmark markup gap or the linearly-detrended output gap, the overidentifying restrictions are not rejected at the 95 percent confidence level for either the random-duration or fixed-duration versions of the model. Evidently, these results are not simply due to lack of statistical power: the overidentifying restrictions are rejected at a confidence level exceeding 95 percent when the uncorrected markup gap is used as the proxy for real marginal cost, and these restrictions are rejected at nearly the 95 percent confidence level for the random-duration model when the HP-detrended output gap is used as the proxy variable.

5.3 The Role of the Time-Varying Inflation Objective

The generalized price-setting framework is oriented towards explaining short-run inflation dynamics in response to shifts in real marginal cost, treating the central bank’s objective as fixed and known. For this reason, our discussion thus far has focused on the estimation results obtained using the “inflation gap”; that is, the deviation of actual inflation from the
Table 4: Results in the Absence of a Time-Varying Inflation Objective

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Distribution of Contract Durations</th>
<th>Mean Duration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ω₁</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Random-Duration Contracts</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed-Duration Contracts</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: This table reports the parameter estimates for each specification of the generalized price-setting framework (that is, random or fixed contract duration) when the model is estimated using the level of inflation and the specified proxy for real marginal cost over the period 1974-1998. Estimated standard errors are given in parentheses.

Bundesbank’s medium-term inflation objective.\(^{25}\) Now we briefly turn to the implications of ignoring time-variation in the inflation objective—an approach which characterizes much of the empirical NKPC literature.

Table 4 reports the contract distribution and real rigidity parameters obtained when the price-setting framework is estimated using the level of inflation rather than the inflation gap.\(^{26}\) Evidently, the mean duration of price contracts is noticeably longer—close to three quarters for the random-duration model, and a bit longer for the fixed-duration model. Furthermore, the restrictions implied by a truncated Calvo distribution can be clearly rejected in either case, because the estimated distribution involves a relatively large number of one and four quarter contract durations with relatively few 2-3 quarter contracts.

Nevertheless, our model diagnostics indicate that this specification falls short of a satisfactory match with the observed data. In particular, while the left panel of Figure 4 shows that the inflation autocorrelations implied by the model match those of the data, the right panel reveals that the autocorrelogram of the price contract shocks looks unreasonable in this case, especially the highly significant degree of fourth-order serial correlation. Thus, we conclude that accounting for time-variation in the Bundesbank’s implicit inflation objective during the period 1975-84 is important in obtaining accurate estimation results.

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\(^{25}\) We have obtained broadly similar results using an inflation gap series constructed via quadratic detrending, with the one notable difference being a somewhat shorter estimated mean duration for each contracting specification.

\(^{26}\) For the fixed-duration specification, the estimation procedure hits the non-negativity constraint on ω₂; thus, the results are reported under the restriction that ω₂ = 0.
6 Interpreting the Degree of Real Rigidity

While our generalized price-setting framework directly identifies the distribution of nominal contract durations, the degree of real rigidity is summarized by a single composite parameter, \( \gamma \). We now consider the implications of the estimated value of \( \gamma \)—corresponding to a relatively high degree of real rigidity—in terms of the underlying structural parameters of the firm’s production and demand functions. Finally, we analyze a small Monte Carlo simulation experiment intended to gauge the magnitude of downward bias in \( \gamma \) that might be attributed to persistent mismeasurement of real marginal cost.

6.1 The Estimated Degree of Real Rigidity

In evaluating the degree of real rigidity, the model with no firm-specific inputs and a constant elasticity of demand provides a natural benchmark, because in this case \( \gamma = \gamma_d = \gamma_{mc} = 1 \); that is, a one percent increase in real marginal cost causes a one percent rise in the level of new price contracts. In contrast, Table 5 indicates that new price contracts exhibit much
Table 5: The Estimated Degree of Real Rigidity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Random-Duration Contracts</th>
<th>Fixed-Duration Contracts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benchmark Markup Gap</td>
<td>0.0265</td>
<td>0.0139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0035)</td>
<td>(0.0022)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternative Markup Gap</td>
<td>0.0078</td>
<td>0.0039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0028)</td>
<td>(0.0013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output Gap (Linear Trend)</td>
<td>0.0064</td>
<td>0.0032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0016)</td>
<td>(0.0008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output Gap (HP Trend)</td>
<td>0.0280</td>
<td>0.0145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0035)</td>
<td>(0.0023)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: For each specification of the generalized price-setting framework (that is, random or fixed durations), this table reports the estimated real rigidity parameter (\( \gamma \)) obtained using the inflation gap and the specified proxy for real marginal cost. Estimated standard errors are given in parentheses.

6.2 Structural Interpretation of the Estimates

As indicated in Section 2, the sensitivity of new price contracts to aggregate marginal cost (\( \gamma \)) depends on the share parameter (\( \alpha \)), the steady-state demand elasticity (\( \eta \)), and the relative slope of the demand elasticity at steady state (\( \epsilon \)). Thus, we now investigate how the implied degree of real rigidity varies with each of these underlying structural parameters.

To explore the role of firm-specific fixed factors, we consider two distinct values for the share parameter \( \alpha \). With the fairly standard calibration of \( \alpha = 0.3 \), the firm-specific fixed factor (capital) accounts for 30 percent of total cost while the variable input (labor) accounts for 70 percent of total cost. The alternative calibration \( \alpha = 0.6 \) may be interpreted

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\(^{27}\) It should be noted that the estimated degree of real rigidity is slightly higher if one ignores time-variation in the inflation objective (cf. Section 5.3). For example, estimating the model using inflation in levels together with the benchmark measure of marginal cost yields \( \hat{\gamma} = 0.0413 \) for the random-duration specification and \( \hat{\gamma} = 0.0319 \) for the fixed-duration specification, with estimated standard errors of 0.0042 and 0.0037, respectively.
as reflecting a much higher degree of capital intensity in production, or (perhaps more realistically) the extent to which a substantial fraction of the labor input should also be viewed as a firm-specific fixed factor.

Reflecting the degree of empirical controversy regarding the steady-state demand elasticity, we consider values of \( \eta \) ranging from 5 to 20. Since the steady-state markup rate is equal to \( \eta / (\eta - 1) \), the bottom of this range corresponds to a steady-state markup rate of 25 percent, while the top of the range implies a 5 percent markup rate. With an even more severe paucity of evidence about the value of \( \epsilon \), we examine three distinct specifications for this parameter: \( \epsilon = 0 \), corresponding to the Dixit-Stiglitz specification of constant demand elasticity; \( \epsilon = 10 \), consistent with results obtained by Bergin and Feenstra (2000); and \( \epsilon = 33 \), the benchmark value of Kimball (1995) and Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2000).

Each panel of Figure 5 depicts the implied value of \( \gamma \) for alternative values of \( \eta \) and \( \epsilon \) for a particular value of the share parameter \( \alpha \). For ease of reference, the figure also indicates the estimated value of \( \hat{\gamma} = 0.027 \) and the corresponding 95 percent confidence interval that we obtained for the random-duration contract model using the benchmark labor share as the proxy for real marginal cost.

When firm-specific fixed inputs account for 30 percent of total cost (\( \alpha = 0.3 \)), no plausible combination of values of \( \eta \) and \( \epsilon \) can account for the estimated value of \( \gamma \). For example, with a constant demand elasticity and a steady-state markup rate of 10 percent (that is, \( \epsilon = 0 \) and \( \eta = 11 \)), the implied value of \( \gamma \) is about 0.12. Even with very strong curvature of the demand function (\( \epsilon = 33 \)), the implied value of \( \gamma \) is several times larger than the benchmark estimate \( \hat{\gamma} \).

In contrast, when firm-specific factors account for 60 percent of total cost (\( \alpha = 0.6 \)), the model-implied value of \( \gamma \) lies within the 95 percent confidence interval whenever the steady-state demand elasticity is sufficiently high. For example, with a constant demand elasticity (\( \epsilon = 0 \)), the value of \( \gamma = 0.03 \) is obtained for \( \eta = 16 \), corresponding to a steady-state markup rate of about 6 percent. Furthermore, the specific value of \( \epsilon \) is relatively unimportant in this case, because the value of \( \gamma \) is insensitive to \( \epsilon \) when \( \eta \) and \( \alpha \) are both relatively large.
Figure 5: Accounting for the Estimated Degree of Real Rigidity

A. 30 Percent Cost Share of Firm-Specific Inputs

Implied $\gamma$

B. 60 Percent Cost Share of Firm-Specific Inputs

Implied $\gamma$

Note: Each panel indicates the implied degree of real rigidity ($\gamma$) corresponding to alternative combinations of the steady-state demand elasticity ($\eta$) and the curvature of demand ($\varepsilon$); the upper panel depicts these results for $\alpha = 0.3$, while the lower panel gives corresponding results for $\alpha = 0.6$. The horizontal line at $\hat{\gamma} = 0.027$ indicates the parameter estimate obtained for the random-duration contract model using the benchmark labor share as the measure of real marginal cost, while the dotted lines denote the 95% confidence bands associated with this estimate.
6.3 Implications of Mismeasuring Real Marginal Cost

Although our empirical results are reasonably robust to the choice of proxy for real marginal cost (e.g., the labor share or the output gap), it is important to recognize that each of these variables is likely to involve fairly large and persistent measurement errors. Thus, before drawing definitive conclusions about the likely combination of underlying structural parameters, it is important to gauge the extent to which the estimated real rigidity parameter may exhibit downward bias due to the mismeasurement of real marginal cost.

To investigate this issue, we have conducted a small Monte Carlo simulation experiment for each specification of the generalized contracting framework (that is, either random or fixed-duration contracts). First, we assume that the parameter estimates obtained using the benchmark labor share are those of the “true” model of the economy, and proceed to generate 500 artificial datasets from this model; each artificial dataset has the same time dimension $T$ as that of the actual data described in Section 3. For each artificial dataset, we construct an “observed” proxy variable by adding measurement errors to the “true” series for real marginal cost; these measurement errors follow an AR(1) process with persistence parameter $\rho_m$, while the innovations have an i.i.d. Gaussian distribution with a standard deviation which is calibrated such that the unconditional standard deviation of the measurement error is equal to 1 percent, regardless of the value of the persistence parameter $\rho_m$. For each artificial dataset, we then use the “observed” data to estimate the structural model, employing the indirect inference procedure described in Section 4. Finally, we compute the mean estimate of $\gamma$, averaging across all artificial datasets, and then determine the relative degree of bias by calculating the percent difference between this mean estimate and the “true” value of $\gamma$.

As indicated in Table 6, mismeasurement of real marginal cost may indeed induce a non-trivial degree of downward bias in estimating the real rigidity parameter, especially when the measurement errors exhibit substantial persistence. For example, when $\rho_m = 0.95$, the estimated value of $\gamma$ is biased downward by about 30 percent for both the random-duration and fixed-duration specifications of the model.

These results are reasonably reassuring, because raising the estimated value of $\gamma$ by 30
Table 6: Implications of Mismeasuring Real Marginal Cost

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Persistence of Measurement Errors</th>
<th>Relative Bias of $\hat{\gamma}$ (in percent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Random-Duration Contracts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho_m = 0$</td>
<td>-3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho_m = 0.5$</td>
<td>-12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho_m = 0.75$</td>
<td>-24.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho_m = 0.95$</td>
<td>-31.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: For each specification of the generalized price-setting framework, this table reports the results of a Monte Carlo simulation experiment to determine the relative bias (in percent) in estimating the real rigidity parameter ($\gamma$) under alternative assumptions about the persistence of the measurement errors ($\rho_m$).

percent (or even 50 percent) continues to imply a very high degree of real rigidity, consistent with a relatively high steady-state demand elasticity and a substantial role for firm-specific fixed inputs. Of course, these results also underscore the need for further work in finding better proxies for real marginal cost, or alternatively, identifying instrumental variables that are orthogonal to the measurement errors that are likely to be present in the observed series.

7 Conclusion

In this paper, we have formulated a generalized price-setting framework that incorporates staggered contracts of multiple durations and that directly identifies the influences of nominal vs. real rigidities. Using German macroeconomic data over the period 1975Q1 through 1998Q4 to estimate this framework, we find that the data is well-characterized by a truncated Calvo-style distribution with an average duration of about two quarters and by a relatively high degree of real rigidity. Finally, our results indicate that backward-looking behavior is not needed to explain the aggregate data, at least in an environment with a stable monetary policy regime and a transparent and credible inflation objective.

This paper has proceeded under the assumption that all firms face the same output
elasticity of marginal cost. In subsequent work, it will be interesting to explore whether this parameter varies systematically across groups of firms with different contract durations; that is, whether the aggregate data imply a cross-sectional relationship between nominal and real rigidities. Furthermore, the approach used here can easily be applied to other economies, especially for sample periods over which the inflation objective has been reasonably stable or has evolved gradually in a transparent way. Finally, our approach can be extended to consider the joint determination of aggregate wages and prices, in a framework that allows for multiple-period durations of both types of contracts.
Appendix A

This appendix considers a simplified version of the generalized price-setting framework for purposes of comparison with some earlier literature. In particular, in the case of fixed-duration contracts, the average new contract price $\bar{x}_t$ is given by

$$\bar{x}_t = E_t \left[ \sum_{i=1}^{J-1} \Phi_i \pi_{t+i} + \gamma \sum_{i=0}^{J-1} \phi_i mc_{t+i} \right]$$

with $\phi_i = \beta^i \sum_{j=i+1}^{J} \left( \omega_j / \sum_{k=0}^{j-1} \beta^k \right)$ and $\Phi_i = \sum_{k=1}^{J-1} \phi_k$.

As in Taylor (1993) and Guerrieri (2002), we consider the approximation obtained by assuming negligible variation across new price contracts of different durations; that is, $x_{j,t} \approx \bar{x}_t$. In this case, log-linearization around the zero steady-state inflation rate yields the following expression for the aggregate price identity:

$$\sum_{i=0}^{J-1} \psi_i \bar{x}_{t-i} = \sum_{i=0}^{J-2} \Psi_{i+1} \pi_{t-i},$$

where $\psi_i = \sum_{j=i+1}^{J} (\omega_j / j)$ and $\Psi_i = \sum_{k=1}^{J-1} \psi_k$.

Thus, using this approximation, the weights in the aggregate identity are identical to those in the price-setting equation, just as in the case of random-duration contracts. Furthermore, in the special case of no discounting ($\beta = 1$), the simplified fixed-duration contract specification is observationally equivalent to the random-duration specification.

Evidently, as shown in Table A1 the simplified fixed-duration contract specification implies somewhat longer average duration compared with the generalized fixed-duration or random-duration specifications considered above.
### Appendix Table A1: Implications of the Simplified Fixed-Duration Specification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Distribution of Contract Durations</th>
<th>Mean Real Duration</th>
<th>Real Rigidity ($\gamma$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\omega_1$</td>
<td>$\omega_2$</td>
<td>$\omega_3$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### A. Inflation Gap

| Benchmark | 0.28 | 0.18 | 0.09 | 0.45 | 2.72 | 0.0263 |
| Markup Gap | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.06) | (0.15) | (0.44) | (0.0035) |
| Alternative | 0.22 | 0.14 | 0.13 | 0.51 | 2.94 | 0.0069 |
| Markup Gap | (0.08) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.09) | (0.34) | (0.0026) |
| Output Gap | 0.24 | 0.16 | 0.20 | 0.40 | 2.77 | 0.0062 |
| (Linear Trend) | (0.10) | (0.07) | (0.10) | (0.13) | (0.32) | (0.0014) |
| Output Gap | 0.19 | 0.14 | 0.18 | 0.48 | 2.96 | 0.0276 |
| (HP Trend) | (0.05) | (0.07) | (0.08) | (0.16) | (0.45) | (0.0035) |

#### B. Inflation in Levels

| Benchmark | 0.16 | 0.01 | 0.06 | 0.77 | 3.44 | 0.0410 |
| Markup Gap | (0.04) | (0.02) | (0.05) | (0.19) | (0.65) | (0.0042) |
| Output Gap | 0.14 | 0 | 0.12 | 0.74 | 3.47 | 0.0112 |
| (Linear Trend) | (0.05) | — | (0.05) | (0.25) | (0.84) | (0.0023) |

Note: For each measure of real marginal cost, this table reports the estimated parameters of the price-setting framework with fixed-duration contracts, using the simplifying assumption of negligible variation across new price contracts of different durations. Estimated standard errors are given in parentheses. When the estimation procedure hits the non-negativity constraint on $\omega_2$, the results are reported under the restriction that $\omega_2 = 0$. 

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Appendix B

This appendix provides further details regarding the estimation results.

Appendix Table B1: Estimated Standard Deviation of Contract Price Shocks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Random-Duration Contracts</th>
<th>Fixed-Duration Contracts</th>
<th>Simplified Fixed-Duration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Estimated using Inflation Gap</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benchmark</td>
<td>0.0035</td>
<td>0.0030</td>
<td>0.0035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Markup Gap</td>
<td>(0.0006)</td>
<td>(0.0004)</td>
<td>(0.0006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternative</td>
<td>0.0032</td>
<td>0.0027</td>
<td>0.0040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Markup Gap</td>
<td>(0.0007)</td>
<td>(0.0005)</td>
<td>(0.0005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output Gap (Linear Trend)</td>
<td>0.0038</td>
<td>0.0029</td>
<td>0.0038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output Gap (HP Trend)</td>
<td>(0.0005)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.0006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output Gap</td>
<td>0.0043</td>
<td>0.0029</td>
<td>0.0043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0004)</td>
<td>(0.0004)</td>
<td>(0.0006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Estimated using Level of Inflation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benchmark</td>
<td>0.0053</td>
<td>0.0051</td>
<td>0.0053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Markup Gap</td>
<td>(0.0003)</td>
<td>(0.0003)</td>
<td>(0.0005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output Gap (Linear Trend)</td>
<td>0.0055</td>
<td>0.0049</td>
<td>0.0055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0003)</td>
<td>(0.0004)</td>
<td>(0.0003)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: This table indicates the estimated standard deviation of the contract price shock for alternative specifications of the generalized price-setting framework. For each marginal cost proxy variable, Panel A shows results when the model is estimated using the inflation gap (which incorporates the Bundesbank’s medium-term inflation objective), while Panel B provides results when the model is estimated using inflation in levels (corresponding to the assumption of a time-invariant inflation objective). The standard error of each estimate is enclosed in parentheses.
Appendix Table B2: Tests of Overidentifying Restrictions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Random-Duration Contracts</th>
<th>Fixed-Duration Contracts</th>
<th>Simplified Fixed-Duration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A. Estimated using Inflation Gap</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benchmark Markup Gap</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternative Markup Gap</td>
<td>0.03**</td>
<td>0.03**</td>
<td>0.01**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output Gap (Linear Trend)</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output Gap (HP Trend))</td>
<td>0.06*</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.06*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B. Estimated using Level of Inflation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benchmark Markup Gap</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output Gap (Linear Trend)</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: This table indicates the probability that the overidentifying restrictions are consistent with each specification of the generalized price-setting framework for each marginal cost proxy variable. The test statistic has 7 degrees of freedom for each of the markup gap measures, and 3 degrees of freedom for each of the output gap measures, except that the test has an additional degree of freedom when the estimation procedure hits the non-negativity constraint on $\omega_2$ (due to the extra restriction that $\omega_2 = 0$). The inclusion of one or two asterisks denotes rejection at the 90% or 95% confidence level, respectively.

Appendix Table B3: Ignoring Time-Variation in the Inflation Objective
(Results using Linearly-Detrended Output Gap)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Distribution of Contract Durations</th>
<th>Mean Duration</th>
<th>Real Rigidity ($\gamma$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$\omega_1$ $\omega_2$ $\omega_3$ $\omega_4$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Random-Duration</strong></td>
<td>0.38 0 (0.06) 0.11 (0.06) 0.51 (0.15)</td>
<td>2.76 (0.45)</td>
<td>0.0113 (0.0027)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Contracts</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fixed-Duration</strong></td>
<td>0.18 0.05 (0.05) 0.16 (0.08) 0.61 (0.16)</td>
<td>3.19 (0.49)</td>
<td>0.0082 (0.0019)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Contracts</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: This table reports the parameter estimates for each specification of the generalized price-setting framework (that is, random or fixed contract duration) when the model is estimated using the level of inflation and the specified proxy for real marginal cost over the period 1974-1998. Estimated standard errors are given in parentheses. When the estimation procedure hits the non-negativity constraint on $\omega_2$, the results are reported under the restriction that $\omega_2 = 0$. 
Appendix Figure B1: Comparison of Autocorrelations

Note: This figure depicts results for the random-duration contract model estimated using the benchmark markup gap. Solid lines with bold dots denote the autocorrelation functions implied by the estimated model. Plain solid lines denote the autocorrelation functions implied by the unconstrained trivariate VAR(3) model, and dotted lines denote the asymptotic 90 percent confidence bands for each autocorrelation function.
Appendix Figure B2: Autocorrelations of the Implied Structural Disturbances

Note: This figure depicts results for the random-duration contract model estimated using the benchmark markup gap. Solid bars denote the autocorrelation functions of the implied disturbances to the optimal price-setting equation and to the markup gap and output gap equations; the dotted lines denote the asymptotic 95 percent confidence bands.
Appendix Figure B3: Inflation Dynamics and Correlations of Price Shocks Implied by Fixed-Duration Contracts

Note: Solid line with bold dots: Autocorrelation function of inflation implied by the estimated fixed-duration staggered-contracts specification. Solid line: Autocorrelation function implied by the trivariate VAR(3) model of the inflation gap, markup gap, and output gap. Solid bars: Autocorrelation function of price shocks implied by the estimated fixed-duration staggered-contracts specification. Dotted lines: Asymptotic confidence bands.
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