Arribillaga, R. Pablo; Massó, Jordi

Article
Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability

Theoretical Economics

Provided in Cooperation with:
The Econometric Society

Suggested Citation: Arribillaga, R. Pablo; Massó, Jordi (2016) : Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability, Theoretical Economics, ISSN 1555-7561, Wiley, Hoboken, NJ, Vol. 11, Iss. 2, pp. 547-586, http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/TE1910

This Version is available at:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/150286

Terms of use:
Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal and scholarly purposes.
You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public.
If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence.
Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability

R. PABLO ARRIBILLAGA
Instituto de Matemática Aplicada San Luis, Universidad Nacional de San Luis and CONICET

JORDI MASSÓ
Departament d’Economia i Història Econòmica, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona and Barcelona GSE

We propose a simple criterion to compare generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability. We identify three necessary and sufficient conditions for the comparability of two generalized median voter schemes in terms of their vulnerability to manipulation. The three conditions are stated using the two associated families of monotonic fixed ballots and depend very much on the power each agent has to unilaterally change the outcomes of the two generalized median voter schemes. We perform a specific analysis of all median voter schemes: the anonymous subfamily of generalized median voter schemes.

KEYWORDS. Generalized median voting schemes, strategy-proofness, anonymity.

JEL classification. C78, D78.

1. INTRODUCTION

Consider a set of agents who have to collectively choose an alternative. Each agent has a preference relation on the set of alternatives. We would like the chosen alternative to depend on the preference profile (a list of preference relations, one for each agent), but preference relations are private information and, to be used to choose the alternative, they have to be revealed by the agents. A social choice function collects individual preference relations and selects an alternative for each declared preference profile. Hence, a social choice function induces a game form that generates, at every preference profile, a strategic problem to each agent. An agent manipulates a social choice function if there exist a preference profile and a different preference relation for the agent such
that, if submitted, the social choice function selects a strictly better alternative according to the preference relation of the agent of the original preference profile. A social choice function is strategy-proof if no agent can manipulate it. That is, the game form induced by a strategy-proof social choice function has the property that, at every preference profile, declaring the true preference relation is a weakly dominant strategy for all agents. Hence, each agent has an optimal strategy (to tell the truth) that is independent of the agent’s beliefs about the other agents’ declared preference relations. This absence of any informational hypothesis about the others’ preference relations is one of the main reasons why strategy-proofness is an extremely desirable property of social choice functions.

However, the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem establishes that nontrivial strategy-proof social choice functions do not exist on universal domains. Strategy-proofness is a strong requirement since a social choice function is no longer strategy-proof as soon as there exist a preference profile and an agent that can manipulate the social choice function by submitting another preference relation that if submitted, causes the social choice function to select another alternative that is strictly preferred by the agent. Nevertheless, there are many social choice problems where the structure of the set of alternatives restricts the set of conceivable preference relations, and hence the set of strategies available to agents, for instance, when the set of alternatives has a natural order in which all agents agree. The localization of a public facility, the temperature of a room, the platform of political parties in the left–right spectrum, or the income tax rate are all examples of such structures that impose natural restrictions on agents’ preference relations. Black (1948) was the first to argue that in those cases agents’ preference relations have to be single-peaked (relative to the unanimous order on the set of alternatives). A preference relation is single-peaked if there exists a top alternative that is strictly preferred to all other alternatives and at each of the two sides of the top alternative the preference relation is monotonic, increasing in the left, and decreasing in the right.

A social choice function operating only on a restricted domain of preference profiles may become strategy-proof. The elimination of preference profiles restricts the normal form game induced by the social choice function, and strategies (i.e., preference relations) that were not dominant may become dominant. Consider any social choice problem where the set of alternatives can be identified with the interval $[a, b]$ of real numbers and where single-peaked preference relations are defined on $[a, b]$. For this setup Moulin (1980) characterizes all strategy-proof and tops-only social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preference relations as the class of all generalized median voter schemes. In addition, Moulin (1980) also characterizes the subclass of median voter schemes as the set of all generalized median voter schemes.

A median voter scheme can be identified with a vector $x = (x_1, \ldots, x_{n+1})$ of $n+1$ numbers in $[a, b]$, where $n$ is the cardinality of the set of agents $N$ and $x_1 \leq \cdots \leq x_{n+1}$. Then, for each preference profile, the median voter scheme identified with $x$ selects the alternative that is the median among the $n$

\footnote{A social choice function is tops-only if it only depends on the profile of top alternatives.}
top alternatives of the agents and the $n+1$ fixed numbers $x_1, \ldots, x_{n+1}$. Since $2n+1$ is an odd number, this median always exists and belongs to $[a, b]$. Observe that median voter schemes are tops-only and anonymous by definition. They are strategy-proof on the domain of single-peaked preference relations because, given a preference profile, each agent can only change the chosen alternative by moving his declared top away from his true top; thus, no agent can manipulate a median voter scheme at any preference profile. A median voter scheme distributes the power to influence the outcome among agents according to its associated vector $x$ in an anonymous way. Generalized median voter schemes constitute non-anonymous extensions of median voter schemes. A generalized median voter scheme can be identified with a set of fixed ballots \( \{p_S\}_{S \subseteq N} \) on $[a, b]$, one for each subset of agents $S$. Then, for each preference profile, the generalized median voter scheme identified with \( \{p_S\}_{S \subseteq N} \) selects the alternative $\alpha$ that is the smallest one with the following two properties: (i) there is a subset of agents $S$ whose top alternatives are smaller than or equal to $\alpha$ and (ii) the fixed ballot $p_S$ associated to $S$ is also smaller than or equal to $\alpha$.

Generalized median voter schemes are strategy-proof on the domain of single-peaked preference profiles, but are manipulable on the universal domain. There are several papers that have identified, in our or similar settings, maximal domains under which social choice functions are strategy-proof, but as soon as the domain is enlarged with a preference outside the domain, the social choice function becomes manipulable. Barberà et al. (1998), Barberà et al. (1991), Berga and Serizawa (2000), Bochet and Storcken (2009), Ching and Serizawa (1998), Hatsumi et al. (2014), Kalai and Müller (1977), and Serizawa (1995) are some examples of these papers. Our contribution in this paper builds on this literature and has the objective of giving criterion to compare generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability. We want to emphasize the fact that the manipulability of a social choice function does not indicate the degree of its lack of strategy-proofness. There may be only one instance at which the social choice function is manipulable or there may be many such instances. The mechanism design literature that has focused on strategy-proofness has not distinguished between these two situations; it has declared that both social choice functions are not strategy-proof, period!2

Our criterion to compare two social choice functions takes the point of view of individual agents. We say that an agent is able to manipulate a social choice function at a preference relation (the true one) if there exist preference relations, one for each of the other agents and another for the agent (the strategic one) such that if submitted, the agent obtains a strictly better alternative according to the true preference relation. Consider two generalized median voter schemes, $f$ and $g$, that can operate on the universal domain of preference profiles. Assume that for each agent the set of preference relations under which the agent is able to manipulate $f$ is contained in the set of preference relations under which the agent is able to manipulate $g$. Then, from the point of view of all agents, $g$ is more manipulable than $f$. Hence, we think that $f$ is unambiguously a better generalized median voter scheme than $g$ according to the strategic incentives.

2Kelly (1977), Campbell and Kelly (2009), and Pathak and Sönmez (2013) are some exceptions. We will refer to this more recent paper later on.
induced to the agents. Often, it may be reasonable to think that agents’ preferences are single-peaked, but if the designer foresees that agents also may have non-single-peaked preferences, then $f$ may be a better choice than $g$ if strategic incentives are relevant and important to the designer.

Before presenting our general result in Theorem 2, we focus on median voter schemes, the subclass of anonymous generalized median voter schemes. In Theorem 1 we provide two necessary and sufficient conditions for the comparability of two median voter schemes in terms of their manipulability. Let $f$ and $g$ be two (nonconstant) median voter schemes and let $x = (x_1, \ldots, x_{n+1})$ and $y = (y_1, \ldots, y_{n+1})$ be their associated vectors of fixed ballots, $x$ to $f$ and $y$ to $g$, where $x_1 \leq \cdots \leq x_{n+1}$ and $y_1 \leq \cdots \leq y_{n+1}$. Then $g$ is at least as manipulable as $f$ if and only if $[x_1, x_{n+1}] \subset [y_1, y_{n+1}]$ and $[x_2, x_n] \subset [y_2, y_n]$. Using this characterization we are able to establish simple comparability tests for the subclass of unanimous and efficient median voter schemes. Using the partial order “to be equally manipulable as” obtained in Theorem 1, we show that the set of equivalence classes of median voter schemes has a complete lattice structure with the partial order “to be as manipulable as”; the supremum is the equivalence class containing all median voter schemes with $x_1 = x_2 = a$ and $x_n = x_{n+1} = b$; and the infimum is the equivalence class with all constant median voter schemes; i.e., for all $k = 1, \ldots, n+1$, $x_k = \alpha$ for some $\alpha \in [a, b]$.

In Theorem 2 we provide three necessary and sufficient conditions for the comparability of two generalized median voter schemes in terms of their manipulability. The three conditions are stated using the two associated families of monotonic fixed ballots and depend very much on the power each agent has to unilaterally change the outcome of the two generalized median voter schemes (i.e., the intervals of alternatives where agents are non-dummies). Obviously, Theorem 2 is more general than Theorem 1. However, our analysis can be sharper and deeper on the subclass of anonymous generalized median voter schemes. In addition, Theorem 1 can be seen as a first step to better understand the general characterization of Theorem 2.

Before finishing this Introduction, we want to relate our comparability notion to two notions recently used in centralized matching markets. Pathak and Sönmez (2013) proposed two different notions to compare, in terms of their manipulability, specific matching mechanisms in school choice problems. The two notions are related in the sense that one is stronger than the other, and both are based on the inclusion of preference profiles at which there exists a manipulation. In contrast, our notion is based on the inclusion of preference relations at which an agent is able to manipulate. In applications, preference profiles are not common knowledge while each agent knows his preference relation (and he may only know that). To use a more manipulable generalized median voter scheme means that each agent has to worry about his potential capacity to manipulate in a larger set. Again, using the inclusion of preference relations as a basic criterion to compare generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability does not require any informational hypothesis. Thus, we find it more appealing. Moreover, we show that if two generalized median voter schemes are comparable according to Pathak

---

3When $n$ is odd, this class contains the true median voter scheme.
and Sönmez’s weaker notion, then they are also comparable according to our notion. Furthermore, Example 1 shows that our notion is indeed much weaker than Pathak and Sönmez’s weaker notion (and hence, also weaker than their stronger one).

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains preliminary notation and definitions. Section 3 describes the family of anonymous generalized median voter schemes and compares them according to their manipulability. Section 4 extends the analysis to all generalized median voter schemes. Section 5 contains a final remark about the use of median voter schemes on the universal domain of preferences and the comparison of Pathak and Sönmez’s criteria with ours. Two appendices collect all omitted proofs.

2. Preliminaries

Agents are the elements of a finite set $N = \{1, \ldots, n\}$. The set of alternatives is the interval of real numbers $[a, b] \subseteq \mathbb{R}$. We assume that $n \geq 2$ and $a < b$. Generic agents will be denoted by $i$ and $j$, and generic alternatives will be denoted by $\alpha$ and $\beta$. Subsets of agents will be represented by $S$ and $T$.

The (weak) preference of each agent $i \in N$ on the set of alternatives $[a, b]$ is a complete, reflexive, and transitive binary relation (a complete pre-order) $R_i$ on $[a, b]$. As usual, let $P_i$ and $I_i$ denote the strict and indifference preference relations induced by $R_i$, respectively; namely, for all $\alpha, \beta \in [a, b]$, $\alpha P_i \beta$ if and only if $\neg \beta R_i \alpha$, and $\alpha I_i \beta$ if and only if $\alpha R_i \beta$ and $\beta R_i \alpha$. The top of $R_i$ is the set of alternatives that are weakly preferred to any other alternative. We will restrict our attention to preferences with a unique top, which will be denoted by $\tau(R_i)$; i.e., $\tau(R_i) P_i \alpha$ for all $\alpha \in [a, b] \setminus \{\tau(R_i)\}$. Let $U$ be the set of preferences with a unique top on $[a, b]$. A preference profile $R = (R_1, \ldots, R_n) \in \mathcal{U}^n$ is an $n$-tuple of preferences. To emphasize the role of agent $i$ or subset of agents $S$, a preference profile $R$ will be represented by $(R_i, R_{-i})$ or $(R_S, R_{-S})$, respectively.

A subset $\hat{U}^n \subseteq \mathcal{U}^n$ of preference profiles (or the set $\hat{U}$ itself) will be called a domain. A social choice function is a function $f : \hat{U}^n \to [a, b]$ selecting an alternative for each preference profile in the domain $\hat{U}^n$. The range of a social choice function $f : \hat{U}^n \to [a, b]$ is denoted by $r_f$. That is,

$$r_f = \{\alpha \in [a, b] \mid \text{there exists } R = (R_1, \ldots, R_n) \in \hat{U}^n \text{ s.t. } f(R_1, \ldots, R_n) = \alpha\}.$$

Social choice functions require each agent to report a preference on a domain $\hat{U}$. A social choice function is strategy-proof on $\hat{U}$ if it is always in the best interest of agents to reveal their preferences truthfully. Formally, a social choice function $f : \hat{U}^n \to [a, b]$ is strategy-proof if for all $R \in \hat{U}^n$, all $i \in N$, and all $R'_i \in \hat{U}$,

$$f(R_i, R_{-i}) R_i f(R'_i, R_{-i}).$$

In the sequel we will say that a social choice function $f : \hat{U}^n \to [a, b]$ is not manipulable by $i \in N$ at $R_i \in U$ if (1) holds for all $(R'_i, R_{-i}) \in \mathcal{U}^n$. To compare social choice functions according to their manipulability, our reference set of preferences will be the full set $\mathcal{U}$.

The set of manipulable preferences of agent $i \in N$ for $f : \mathcal{U}^n \to [a, b]$ is given by

$$\mathcal{M}_f^i = \{R_i \in \mathcal{U} \mid f(R'_i, R_{-i}) P_i f(R_i, R_{-i}) \text{ for some } (R'_i, R_{-i}) \in \mathcal{U}^n\}.$$
Obviously, a social choice function \( f : \mathcal{U}^n \to [a, b] \) is strategy-proof if and only if \( \mathcal{M}^f_i = \emptyset \) for all \( i \in \mathbb{N} \). We say that \( f : \mathcal{U}^n \to [a, b] \) is more manipulable than \( g : \mathcal{U}^n \to [a, b] \) for \( i \in \mathbb{N} \) if \( \mathcal{M}^g_i \subseteq \mathcal{M}^f_i \).

Now, we introduce our criterion to compare social choice functions according to their manipulability.

**Definition 1.** A social choice function \( f : \mathcal{U}^n \to [a, b] \) is at least as manipulable as a social function \( g : \mathcal{U}^n \to [a, b] \) if \( \mathcal{M}^g_i \subseteq \mathcal{M}^f_i \) for all \( i \in \mathbb{N} \).

**Definition 2.** A social choice function \( f : \mathcal{U}^n \to [a, b] \) is equally manipulable as a social function \( g : \mathcal{U}^n \to [a, b] \) if \( f \) is at least as manipulable as \( g \) and vice versa; i.e., \( \mathcal{M}^g_i = \mathcal{M}^f_i \) for all \( i \in \mathbb{N} \).

**Definition 3.** A social choice function \( f : \mathcal{U}^n \to [a, b] \) is more manipulable than a social function \( g : \mathcal{U}^n \to [a, b] \) if \( f \) is at least as but not equally manipulable as \( g \); i.e., \( \mathcal{M}^g_i \subseteq \mathcal{M}^f_i \) for all \( i \in \mathbb{N} \) and there exists \( j \in \mathbb{N} \) such that \( \mathcal{M}^g_j \nsubseteq \mathcal{M}^f_j \).

Given two social choice functions \( f : \mathcal{U}^n \to [a, b] \) and \( g : \mathcal{U}^n \to [a, b] \) we write (i) \( f \succeq g \) to denote that \( f \) is at least as manipulable as \( g \), (ii) \( f \simeq g \) to denote that \( f \) is equally manipulable as \( g \), and (iii) \( f > g \) to denote that \( f \) is more manipulable than \( g \). Obviously, there are many pairs of social choice functions that cannot be compared according to their manipulability.

Strategy-proofness is not the unique property we will look at. A social choice function \( f : \hat{\mathcal{U}}^n \to [a, b] \) is anonymous if it is invariant with respect to the agents’ names; namely, for all one-to-one mappings \( \alpha : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N} \) and all \( R \in \hat{\mathcal{U}}^n \), \( f(R_1, \ldots, R_n) = f(R_{\alpha(1)}, \ldots, R_{\alpha(n)}) \). A social choice function \( f : \hat{\mathcal{U}}^n \to [a, b] \) is dictatorial if there exists \( i \in \mathbb{N} \) such that for all \( R \in \hat{\mathcal{U}}^n \), \( f(R) = R_i \alpha \) for all \( \alpha \in r_f \). A social choice function \( f : \hat{\mathcal{U}}^n \to [a, b] \) is efficient if for all \( R \in \hat{\mathcal{U}}^n \), there is no \( \alpha \in [a, b] \) such that, for all \( i \in \mathbb{N} \), \( R_i f(R) \) and \( \alpha R_j f(R) \) for some \( j \in \mathbb{N} \). A social choice function \( f : \hat{\mathcal{U}}^n \to [a, b] \) is unanimous if for all \( R \in \hat{\mathcal{U}}^n \) such that \( \tau(R_i) = \alpha \) for all \( i \in \mathbb{N} \), \( f(R) = \alpha \). A social choice function \( f : \hat{\mathcal{U}}^n \to [a, b] \) is onto if for all \( \alpha \in [a, b] \), there is \( R \in \hat{\mathcal{U}}^n \) such that \( f(R) = \alpha \) (i.e., \( r_f = [a, b] \)). A social choice function \( f : \hat{\mathcal{U}}^n \to [a, b] \) is tops-only if for all \( R, R' \in \hat{\mathcal{U}}^n \) such that \( \tau(R_i) = \tau(R'_i) \) for all \( i \in \mathbb{N} \), \( f(R) = f(R') \).

In our setting the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem states that a social choice function \( f : \mathcal{U}^n \to [a, b] \), with \( \#r_f \neq 2 \), is strategy-proof if and only if it is dictatorial (see Barberà and Peleg 1990). An implicit assumption is that the social choice function operates on all preference profiles on \( \mathcal{U}^n \), because all of them are reasonable. However, for many applications, a linear order structure on the set of alternatives naturally induces a domain restriction in which, for each preference \( R_i \) in the domain, not only does there exist a unique top but also at each of the sides of the top of \( R_i \) the preference is monotonic. A well known domain restriction is the set of single-peaked preferences on an interval of real numbers.

**Definition 4.** A preference \( R_i \in \mathcal{U} \) is single-peaked on \( A \subseteq [a, b] \) if for all \( \alpha, \beta \in A \) such that \( \beta \leq \alpha < \tau(R_i) \) or \( \tau(R_i) < \alpha \leq \beta \), \( \tau(R_i) P_i \alpha R_i \beta \).
We will denote the domain of all single-peaked preferences on \([a, b]\) by \(\mathcal{SP} \subset \mathcal{U}\). Moulin (1980) characterizes the family of strategy-proof and tops-only social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences. This family contains many non-dictatorial social choice functions. All of them are extensions of the median voter. Following Moulin (1980), and before presenting the general result, we first compare in Section 3, the anonymous subclass according to their manipulability on the full domain of preferences \(\mathcal{U}\). In Section 4 we will give a general result to compare, according to their manipulability, all strategy-proof and tops-only social choice functions on \(\mathcal{SP}^n\) when they operate on the domain \(\mathcal{U}^n\).

3. Anonymity: Comparing median voter schemes

3.1 Median voter schemes

Assume first that \(n\) is odd and let \(f : \mathcal{U}^n \rightarrow [a, b]\) be the social choice function that selects, for each preference profile \(R = (R_1, \ldots, R_n) \in \mathcal{U}^n\), the median among the top alternatives of the \(n\) agents; namely, \(f(R) = \text{med}(\tau(R_1), \ldots, \tau(R_n)).\) This social choice function is anonymous, efficient, tops-only, and strategy-proof on \(\mathcal{SP}\). Now add to the \(n\) agents’ top alternatives, \(n + 1\) fixed ballots: \((n + 1)/2\) ballots at alternative \(a\) and \((n + 1)/2\) ballots at alternative \(b\). Then the median among the \(n\) top alternatives, and the median among the \(n\) top alternatives and the \(n + 1\) fixed ballots coincide since the \((n + 1)/2\) ballots at \(a\) and the \((n + 1)/2\) ballots at \(b\) cancel each other; namely, for all \(R = (R_1, \ldots, R_n) \in \mathcal{U}^n\),

\[
f(R) = \text{med}\left\{\tau(R_1), \ldots, \tau(R_n), a, \ldots, a, b, \ldots, b\right\} = \text{med}(\tau(R_1), \ldots, \tau(R_n)).
\]

To proceed, and instead of adding \(n + 1\) fixed ballots at the extremes of the interval, we can add, regardless of whether \(n\) is odd or even, \(n + 1\) fixed ballots at any of the alternatives in \([a, b]\). Then a social choice function \(f : \mathcal{U}^n \rightarrow [a, b]\) is a median voter scheme if there exist \(n + 1\) fixed ballots \((x_1, \ldots, x_{n+1}) \in [a, b]^{n+1}\) such that for all \(R \in \mathcal{U}^n\),

\[
f(R) = \text{med}(\tau(R_1), \ldots, \tau(R_n), x_1, \ldots, x_{n+1}).
\]

Hence, each median voter scheme can be identified with its vector \(x = (x_1, \ldots, x_{n+1}) \in [a, b]^{n+1}\) of fixed ballots. Moulin (1980) shows that the class of all tops-only, anonymous, and strategy-proof social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences coincides with all median voter schemes.

Proposition 1 (Moulin 1980). A social choice function \(f : \mathcal{SP}^n \rightarrow [a, b]\) is strategy-proof, tops-only, and anonymous if and only if \(f\) is a median voter scheme; namely, there exist \(n + 1\) fixed ballots \((x_1, \ldots, x_{n+1}) \in [a, b]^{n+1}\) such that for all \(R \in \mathcal{SP}^n\),

\[
f(R) = \text{med}(\tau(R_1), \ldots, \tau(R_n), x_1, \ldots, x_{n+1}).
\]

\(^4\)Given a set of real numbers \(\{x_1, \ldots, x_K\}\), where \(K\) is odd, define its median as \(\text{med}(x_1, \ldots, x_K) = y\), where \(y\) is such that \(\#\{1 \leq k \leq K \mid x_k < y\} \geq K/2\) and \(\#\{1 \leq k \leq K \mid x_k \geq y\} \geq K/2\). Since \(K\) is odd, the median is unique and belongs to the set \(\{x_1, \ldots, x_K\}\).
Median voter schemes are tops-only and anonymous by definition. To see that they are strategy-proof, let \( f : S\mathcal{P}^n \rightarrow [a, b] \) be any median voter scheme and fix \( R \in S\mathcal{P}^n \) and \( i \in N \). If \( f(R) = \tau(R_i) \), \( i \) cannot manipulate \( f \). Assume \( \tau(R_i) < f(R) \) (the other case is symmetric). Agent \( i \) can only modify the chosen alternative by declaring a preference \( R'_i \in S\mathcal{P} \) with the property that \( f(R) \leq \tau(R'_i) \). But then either \( f(R) = f(R'_i, R_{-i}) \) or \( f(R) < f(R'_i, R_{-i}) \). Hence, \( \tau(R_i) < f(R) \leq f(R'_i, R_{-i}) \). Since \( R_i \) is single-peaked, \( f(R) \leq f(R'_i, R_{-i}) \). Thus, \( i \) cannot manipulate \( f \). It is less immediate to see that the set of all median voter schemes (one for each vector of \( n+1 \) fixed ballots) coincides with the class of all tops-only, anonymous, and strategy-proof social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences. The key point in the proof is to identify, given a tops-only, anonymous, and strategy-proof social choice function \( f : S\mathcal{P}^n \rightarrow [a, b] \), the vector \( x = (x_1, \ldots, x_{n+1}) \in [a, b]^{n+1} \) of fixed ballots. To identify each \( x_k \) with \( 1 \leq k \leq n+1 \), consider any preference profile \( R \in S\mathcal{P}^n \) with the property that \( \# \{ i \in N \mid \tau(R_i) = a \} = n - k + 1 \) and \( \# \{ i \in N \mid \tau(R_i) = b \} = k - 1 \), and define \( x_k = f(R) \). The proof concludes by checking that indeed \( f \) satisfies (2) with this vector \( x = (x_1, \ldots, x_{n+1}) \in [a, b]^{n+1} \) of identified fixed ballots.

To see that in the statement of Proposition 1 tops-onlyness does not follow from strategy-proofness and anonymity, consider the social choice function \( f : S\mathcal{P}^n \rightarrow [a, b] \), where for all \( R \in S\mathcal{P}^n \),

\[
f(R) = \begin{cases} 
 a & \text{if } \# \{ i \in N \mid aR_i b \} \geq \# \{ i \in N \mid bP_i a \} \\
 b & \text{otherwise.}
\end{cases}
\]

Notice that \( f \) is strategy-proof and anonymous but it is not top-only. It also violates efficiency, unanimity, and ontoness.

We finish this subsection with a useful remark stating that median voter schemes are monotonic.

**Remark 1.** Let \( f : \mathcal{U}^n \rightarrow [a, b] \) be a median voter scheme and let \( R, R' \in \mathcal{U}^n \) be such that \( \tau(R_i) \leq \tau(R'_i) \) for all \( i \in N \). Then \( f(R) \leq f(R') \).

### 3.2 Main result with anonymity

Median voter schemes are strategy-proof on the domain \( S\mathcal{P}^n \) of single-peaked preferences. However, when they operate on the larger domain \( \mathcal{U}^n \) they may become manipulable. Then all median voter schemes are equivalent from the classical manipulability point of view. In this subsection we give a simple test to compare two median voter schemes according to their manipulability. Given a vector \( x = (x_1, \ldots, x_{n+1}) \in [a, b]^{n+1} \), we will denote by \( f^x \) its associated median voter scheme on \( \mathcal{U}^n \); namely, for all \( R \in \mathcal{U}^n \),

\[
f^x(R) = \text{med}\{\tau(R_1), \ldots, \tau(R_n), x_1, \ldots, x_{n+1}\}.
\]

Given \( x = (x_1, \ldots, x_{n+1}) \in [a, b]^{n+1} \), we will assume that \( x_1 \leq \cdots \leq x_{n+1} \). This can be done without loss of generality because the social choice function associated to any reordering of the components of \( x \) coincides with \( f^x \). Obviously, the range of \( f^x \) is \([x_1, x_{n+1}]\), i.e., \( r_{f^x} = [x_1, x_{n+1}] \). Any constant social choice function, \( f(R) = a \) for all
Let \( x = (x_1, \ldots, x_{n+1}) \in [a, b]^{n+1} \) and \( y = (y_1, \ldots, y_{n+1}) \in [a, b]^{n+1} \) be two vectors of fixed ballots such that \( f^x \) and \( f^y \) are not constant; i.e., \( x_1 < x_{n+1} \) and \( y_1 < y_{n+1} \). Then \( f^x \) is at least as manipulable as \( f^y \) if and only if \( [x_1, x_{n+1}] \subset [y_1, y_{n+1}] \) and \( [x_2, x_n] \subset [y_2, y_n] \).

The formal proof of Theorem 1 is left for the next subsection, but we now give some intuition about it. Whether or not agent \( i \) can manipulate \( f^x \) at \( R_i \) roughly depends on the set of alternatives that may be selected by \( f^x \) for some subprofile \( R_{-i} \), given \( R_i \) (this set is called the set of options left open by \( R_i \)). How \( R_i \) compares pairs of alternatives that will never be selected by \( f^x \) once \( R_i \) is submitted is unrelated to the ability of \( i \) to manipulate \( f^x \). Moreover, given \( f^x \), the set of options left open by \( R_i \) depends only on \( x_1, x_2, x_n, \) and \( x_{n+1} \), and it does in a very particular way: the closer \( x_1 \) and \( x_2 \) are to \( a \), and \( x_n \) and \( x_{n+1} \) are to \( b \), the larger the options left open by \( R_i \) will be and, hence, \( i \) will be able to manipulate \( f^x \) easily. And finally, \( R_i \) has to be single-peaked on the set of options left open by itself, because otherwise there would exists \( R_{-i} \) such that \( i \) is able to induce a preferred alternative further away from his top \( \tau(R_i) \) by declaring another preference \( R'_i \).

### 3.3 Proof of Theorem 1

In the proof of Theorem 1 the following option set will play a fundamental role.

**Definition 5.** Let \( f : \mathcal{U}^n \rightarrow [a, b] \) be a social choice function and let \( R_i \in \mathcal{U} \). The set of options left open by \( R_i \) in \( \mathcal{U} \) is defined as

\[
o^i(R_i) = \{ \alpha \in [a, b] \mid f(R_i, R_{-i}) = \alpha \text{ for some } R_{-i} \in \mathcal{U}^{n-1} \}.
\]

If \( f^x \) is a median voter scheme, we denote \( o^{f^x}(R_i) \) by \( o^x(R_i) \).

Before proving Theorem 1 we state three useful lemmata, whose proofs are given in Appendix A.

**Lemma 1.** Let \( f^x : \mathcal{U}^n \rightarrow [a, b] \) be a median voter scheme associated with \( x = (x_1, \ldots, x_{n+1}) \in [a, b]^{n+1} \). Then \( f^x \) is not manipulable by \( i \in N \) at \( R_i \in \mathcal{U} \) if and only if \( R_i \) is single-peaked on \( o^x(R_i) \cup \{ \tau(R_i), \alpha \} \) for all \( \alpha \in r_{fx} \).
Lemma 2. Let \( f^x : \mathcal{U} \rightarrow [a, b] \) be a median voter scheme associated with \( x = (x_1, \ldots, x_{n+1}) \in [a, b]^{n+1} \). Then

\[
o^x(R_i) = \begin{cases} [x_1, x_n] & \text{if } a \leq \tau(R_i) < x_1 \\ [\tau(R_i), x_n] & \text{if } x_1 \leq \tau(R_i) < x_2 \\ [x_2, x_n] & \text{if } x_2 \leq \tau(R_i) \leq x_n \\ [x_2, \tau(R_i)] & \text{if } x_n < \tau(R_i) \leq x_{n+1} \\ [x_2, x_{n+1}] & \text{if } x_{n+1} < \tau(R_i) \leq b. \end{cases}
\]

Lemma 3. Let \( f^x : \mathcal{U} \rightarrow [a, b] \) and \( f^y : \mathcal{U} \rightarrow [a, b] \) be two median voter schemes associated with \( x = (x_1, \ldots, x_{n+1}) \in [a, b]^{n+1} \) and \( y = (y_1, \ldots, y_{n+1}) \in [a, b]^{n+1} \) such that \([x_1, x_{n+1}] \subset [y_1, y_{n+1}]\) and \([x_2, x_n] \subset [y_2, y_n]\). Then \( o^x(R_i) \subset o^y(R_i) \) for all \( R_i \in \mathcal{U} \).

Lemma 1 plays a key role in the proof of Theorem 1. To understand it, notice that it roughly says that whether or not agent \( i \) can manipulate \( f^x \) at \( R_i \) depends on the fact that \( R_i \) should only be single-peaked on the set of alternatives that may be selected by \( f^x \) for some subprofile \( R_{-i} \), given \( R_i \). The comparison, in terms of \( R_{-i} \), of pairs of alternatives that will never be selected once \( R_i \) is submitted is irrelevant in terms of agent \( i \)'s power to manipulate \( f^x \). To illustrate that, consider the case where \( n = 3 \), \( x_1 = a \), \( x_2 = (a+b)/3 \), \( x_3 = 2(a+b)/3 \), and \( x_4 = b \). Then \( f_{x_1} = [a, b] \). Let \( R_i \in \mathcal{U} \) be any preference with \( \tau(R_i) \in ((a+b)/3, 2(a+b)/3) \). By Lemma 2, \( o^x(R_i) = [(a+b)/3, 2(a+b)/3] \). Lemma 1 says that \( R_i \) should be single-peaked on this interval and that the preference away from \( \tau(R_i) \) toward the direction of \( (a+b)/3 \) has to be monotonically decreasing until alternative \((a+b)/3\), and that all alternatives further away have to be worse than \((a+b)/3\) but they can be freely ordered among themselves and symmetrically from \( \tau(R_i) \) toward the direction of \( 2(a+b)/3 \). Figure 1 illustrates a preference that is single-peaked on \( \alpha \) and \( \tau(R_i) \) for all \( \alpha \in \mathcal{U}_{f_x} \). It also shows that this set may be significantly larger than the set of single-peaked preferences.

Proof of Theorem 1. First, we will prove that if \([x_1, x_{n+1}] \subset [y_1, y_{n+1}]\) and \([x_2, x_n] \subset [y_2, y_n]\), then \( f^y \) is at least as manipulable as \( f^x \). Suppose that \( R_i \in \mathcal{M}_{f_x}^x \). By Lemma 1, there exists \( \alpha^* \in f_{x_i} \) such that \( R_i \) is not single-peaked on \( o^x(R_i) \cup \{\tau(R_i), \alpha^*\} \). By Lemma 3, \( o^x(R_i) \subset o^y(R_i) \). Since \( f_{x_i} = [x_1, x_{n+1}] \subset [y_1, y_{n+1}] \), we have that \( \alpha^* \in f_{y_i} \). Hence, \( R_i \) is not single-peaked on \( o^y(R_i) \cup \{\tau(R_i), \alpha^*\} \), where \( \alpha^* \in \mathcal{U}_{f_y} \). Thus, by Lemma 1, \( R_i \in \mathcal{M}_{f_y}^y \). Therefore, \( f^y \) is at least as manipulable as \( f^x \).

To prove the other implication, assume that \( f^y \) is at least as manipulable as \( f^x \). Hence,

\[
\mathcal{M}_{f_x}^x \subset \mathcal{M}_{f_y}^y \quad \text{for all } i \in N.
\]

To obtain a contradiction, assume that \([x_1, x_{n+1}] \not\subset [y_1, y_{n+1}]\) or \([x_2, x_n] \not\subset [y_2, y_n]\). We will divide the proof between two cases.

Case 1: \([x_1, x_{n+1}] \not\subset [y_1, y_{n+1}]\). In particular, suppose that \( x_1 < y_1 \); the proof for the case \( y_{n+1} < x_{n+1} \) proceeds similarly and is therefore omitted. We will divide the proof between two cases again, depending on whether \( x_1 < x_2 \) or \( x_1 = x_2 \).
Thus, by Lemma 1,

\[ \tau(R_i)/, \alpha = \alpha \\lor \gamma \]

Hence, and since

\[ \alpha \\lor \beta /, \gamma \]

and, for all \( \alpha \), \( \beta \), \( \gamma \), \( \delta \), if \( \rho, \delta \in [a, b] \) and \( y_1 < \rho < \delta \), then \( \rho R_i \delta \). Since \( x_1 < \tau(R_i) < y_1 \), by Lemma 2,

\[ o^x(R_i) = [\tau(R_i), x_n] \quad \text{and} \quad o^y(R_i) = [y_1, y_n]. \]

Hence, and since \( \tau(R_i), \beta, \gamma \in o^x(R_i) \) and (ii) holds, \( R_i \) is not single-peaked on \( o^x(P_i) \) and, for all \( \alpha' \in r_{f^y} \), \( R_i \) is single-peaked on \( o^x(R_i) \cup \{\tau(R_i)\} \cup \{\alpha'\} \) because \( r_{f^y} = [y_1, y_{n+1}] \).

Thus, by Lemma 1, \( R_i \in M_i^f \setminus M_i^{f^y} \), which contradicts (3).

Case 1.1: \( x_1 < x_2 \). Let \( \alpha, \beta, \gamma \in [a, b] \) be such that \( x_1 < \alpha < \beta < \gamma < \min\{x_2, y_1\} \) and let \( R_i \in U \) be such that (i) \( \tau(R_i) = \alpha \), (ii) \( \alpha P_i \beta \), and (iii) if \( \rho, \delta \in [a, b] \) and \( y_1 < \rho < \delta \), then \( \rho R_i \delta \). Since \( x_1 < \tau(R_i) < y_1 \), by Lemma 2,

\[ o^x(R_i) = \begin{cases} [x_2, x_n] & \text{if } x_2 \leq \tau(R_i) \leq x_n \\ [x_2, \tau(R_i)] & \text{if } x_n < \tau(R_i) \leq x_{n+1} \end{cases} \quad \text{and} \quad o^y(R_i) = [y_1, y_n]. \]

Hence, and since \( \alpha, \beta, \gamma \in o^x(R_i) \) and (ii) holds, \( R_i \) is not single-peaked on \( o^x(R_i) \) and, for all \( \alpha' \in r_{f^y} \), \( R_i \) is single-peaked on \( o^x(R_i) \cup \{\tau(R_i)\} \cup \{\alpha'\} \) because \( r_{f^y} = [y_1, y_{n+1}] \).

Thus, by Lemma 1, \( R_i \in M_i^f \setminus M_i^{f^y} \), which contradicts (3).

Case 2: \( [x_2, x_n] \notin [y_2, y_n] \) and \( [x_1, x_{n+1}] \subset [y_1, y_{n+1}] \). In particular, suppose that \( x_2 < y_2 \); the proof for the case \( y_n < x_n \) proceeds similarly and therefore is omitted. Let \( \alpha, \beta \in [a, b] \) be such that \( x_2 < \alpha < \beta < (x_2 + y_2)/2 < y_2 \) and let \( R_i \in U \) be such that (i) \( \tau(R_i) = (x_2 + y_2)/2 \), (ii) \( \alpha P_i \beta \), and (iii) if \( \gamma \in [a, b] \) and \( \tau(R_i) < \gamma < \delta \), then \( \gamma P_i \delta \). Since \( y_1 \leq x_1 \leq x_2 < \tau(R_i) < y_2 \), by Lemma 2,

\[ o^x(R_i) = \begin{cases} [x_2, x_n] & \text{if } x_2 \leq \tau(R_i) \leq x_n \\ [x_2, \tau(R_i)] & \text{if } x_n < \tau(R_i) \leq x_{n+1} \end{cases} \quad \text{and} \quad o^y(R_i) = [\tau(R_i), y_n], \]

Figure 1. Single-peaked preference on the relevant set.
Hence, and since $\alpha, \beta, \tau(R_i) \in o^x(R_i)$ and (ii) holds, $R_i$ is not single-peaked on $o^x(R_i)$ and, for all $\alpha' \in r_f\gamma$, $R_i$ is single-peaked on $o^y(R_i) \cup \{\tau(R_i), \alpha\}$. Thus, by Lemma 1, $R_i \in M_i^x \setminus M_i^y$, which contradicts (3).

For further reference, let $MVS$ denote the set of all median voting schemes from $U^n$ to $[a, b]$. An immediate consequence of Theorem 1 is that if median voter scheme $f$ is at least as manipulable as median voter scheme $g$, then the range of $g$ is contained in the range of $f$. The improvement in terms of the strategy-proofness of median voter schemes necessarily requires the corresponding reduction of their ranges since smaller ranges reduce agents’ power to manipulate. Corollary 1 below, which follows from Theorem 1 and the fact that for all $f^x \in MVS$, $r_{f^x} = [x_1, x_{n+1}]$, states this observation formally.

**Corollary 1.** Let $f, g \in MVS$. If $f \succsim g$, then $r_g \subseteq r_f$.

Consider a problem where the range of the social choice has to be fixed a priori to be a subinterval $[c, d] \subseteq [a, b]$. Let $MVS_{[c, d]}$ be the set of all median voter schemes with range $[c, d]$ (i.e., $f^x \in MVS_{[c, d]}$ if and only if $x_1 = c$ and $x_{n+1} = d$). Theorem 1 gives criteria to compare the elements in $MVS_{[c, d]}$.

**Corollary 2.** Let $f^y, f^x \in MVS_{[c, d]}$.

(a) Then $f^y \succsim f^x$ if and only if $[x_2, x_n] \subseteq [y_2, y_n]$.

(b) If $y_2 = y_n$, then there does not exist $g \in MVS_{[c, d]}$ such that $f^y \succ g$.

Statement (b) identifies the median voter schemes in $MVS_{[c, d]}$ that do not admit a less manipulable median voter scheme in $MVS_{[c, d]}$.

### 3.4 Unanimity

According to Proposition 1 in Moulin (1980), a median voter scheme $f^x : S^n \rightarrow [a, b]$ is efficient (on the single-peaked domain) if and only if $x_1 = a$ and $x_{n+1} = b$; namely, $f^x$ can be described as the median of the $n$ top alternatives submitted by the agents and only $n - 1$ fixed ballots since $x_1 = a$ and $x_{n+1} = b$ cancel each other in (2). But this subclass of median voter schemes is appealing because it coincides with the class of all unanimous median voter schemes ($MVS_{[a, b]}$ using the notation introduced in the previous subsection). Corollary 3 below shows that Theorem 1 has clear implications on how unanimous and non-unanimous median voter schemes can be ordered according to their manipulability. In particular, given a unanimous median voter scheme, there is always a non-unanimous median voter scheme that is less manipulable. Moreover, if a unanimous median voter scheme and a non-unanimous median voter scheme are comparable according to their manipulability, then the former is more manipulable than the later.

\[5\text{Observe that when unanimous median voter schemes operate on the full domain } U^n \text{ they are not any-}\]

\[\text{more efficient. In the next subsection we will provide some simple criteria to compare efficient median voter schemes on the full domain } U^n \text{ according to their manipulability.}\]
COROLLARY 3. Let $f^y \in \text{MVS}$ be unanimous.

(a) Then, for all $f^x \in \text{MVS}$, $f^y \succeq f^x$ if and only if $[x_2, x_n] \subset [y_2, y_n]$.

(b) There exists a nonconstant and non-unanimous $f^x \in \text{MVS}$ such that $f^y > f^x$.

(c) Let $f^x \in \text{MVS}$ be non-unanimous and assume $f^x$ and $f^y$ are comparable according to their manipulability. Then $f^y \succ f^x$.

PROOF. Let $f^y \in \text{MVS}$ be unanimous. Hence, $y_1 = a$ and $y_{n+1} = b$.

(a) The statement follows immediately from Theorem 1.

(b) We distinguish between two cases.

Case 1: Assume $y_2 < y_n$ and let $\alpha, \beta, \gamma \in [a, b]$ be such that $y_2 < \alpha < \beta < \gamma < y_n$. Consider $x = (\alpha, \beta, \ldots, \beta, \gamma) \in [a, b]^{n+1}$. Then $[x_2, x_n] = \{\beta\} \subset [y_2, y_n]$. By Theorem 1, $f^x$ is at least as manipulable as $f^y$ and since $[y_2, y_n] \not\subset [x_2, x_n]$, $f^x$ is not at least as manipulable as $f^y$. Hence, $f^y$ is more manipulable than $f^x$, and $f^x$ is neither constant nor unanimous since $a < x_1 < x_{n+1} < b$.

Case 2: Assume $y_2 = y_n$. Furthermore, suppose that $a < y_2$; the proof when $y_n < b$ proceeds symmetrically and therefore is omitted. Let $\alpha \in (a, y_2)$ and consider $x = (\alpha, y_2, \ldots, y_2, b) \in [a, b]^{n+1}$. Then $[x_2, x_n] = \{y_2\}$. By Theorem 1, $f^x$ is at least as manipulable as $f^y$ and since $[y_1, y_{n+1}] = [a, b] \not\subset [x_1, x_{n+1}]$, $f^x$ is not at least as manipulable as $f^y$. Hence, $f^y$ is more manipulable than $f^x$. Furthermore, and since $a < x_1 = \cdots = x_n < x_{n+1} = b$, $f^x$ is neither constant nor unanimous.

(c) Assume $f^x \in \text{MVS}$ is not unanimous. Then $[x_1, x_{n+1}] \not\subset [y_1, y_{n+1}] = [a, b]$. By Theorem 1, $f^x$ is not at least as manipulable as $f^y$. Furthermore, as $f^x$ and $f^y$ are comparable, $f^y \succ f^x$ must hold. \hfill $\square$

We conclude this subsection with a corollary that identifies the unanimous median voter schemes that do not admit a less manipulable unanimous median voter scheme. The statement also follows immediately from Theorem 1.

COROLLARY 4. Let $f^y$ be a unanimous median voter scheme such that $y_2 = y_n$. Then there does not exist an unanimous median voting scheme $g$ such that $f^y > g$.

3.5 Efficiency

A median voter scheme $f^x : \mathcal{U}^n \to [a, b]$ (operating on the full domain of preferences) is efficient if and only if $x_1 = a$, $x_{n+1} = b$, and $x_k \in [a, b]$ for all $2 \leq k \leq n$. This is because on the larger domain, if a median voter scheme $f^x$ has an interior fixed ballot $x_k \in (a, b)$, it is always possible to find a preference profile $R$ with $f^x(R) = x_k$ such that there exists an alternative $y$ that is unanimously strictly preferred by all agents; namely, $y P_i f^x(R)$ for all $i \in N$. Moreover, all efficient median voter schemes are unanimous.

\footnote{Hence, an efficient median voter scheme $f^x : \mathcal{U}^n \to [a, b]$ has the property that for all $(R_1, \ldots, R_n) \in \mathcal{U}^n$, $f^x(R_1, \ldots, R_n) \in \tau(R_1, \ldots, \tau(R_n))$.}

Miyagawa (1998) and Heo (2013) have studied this property under the name of peak selection.
We now present simple criteria that are useful to compare efficient median voter schemes with other unanimous median voter schemes according to their manipulability. But before, we need a bit of additional notation.

Let $k$ be an integer such that $1 \leq k \leq n$ and $(\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n) \in [a, b]^n$. Denote by $\pi_k(\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n)$ the $k$th ranked number; namely, $\# \{\alpha_i \in \{\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n\} \mid \alpha_i \leq \pi_k(\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n)\} \leq n - k + 1$ and $\# \{\alpha_i \in \{\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n\} \mid \alpha_i \geq \pi_k(\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n)\} \leq k$. In particular, for $k = 1$ and $k = n$,

$$
\pi_1(\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n) = \max\{\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n\},
$$

$$
\pi_n(\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n) = \min\{\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n\}.
$$

Let $f^x : \mathcal{U}^n \to [a, b]$ be an efficient median voter scheme. Then $x = (a, \ldots, a, b, \ldots, b)$ for some $1 \leq k \leq n$ and, for all $R \in \mathcal{U}^n$,

$$
f^x(R_1, \ldots, R_n) = \pi_k(\tau(R_1), \ldots, \tau(R_n)).
$$

We denote the efficient median voter scheme $f^x$ with $k$ fixed ballots at $a$ by $f^k$.

**Corollary 5.** Let $f^k : \mathcal{U}^n \to [a, b]$ be an efficient median voter scheme such that $k \notin \{1, n\}$. Then the following statements hold.

(a) For any $f^x \in \text{MVS}$, $f^k \succeq f^x$.

(b) If $1 < k' < n$, then $f^k \approx f^{k'}$.

(c) We have $f^k \succ f^1$ and $f^k \succ f^n$.

(d) If $f^x$ is non-unanimous, then $f^k \succ f^x$.

(e) There exists a non-efficient and unanimous $f^x \in \text{MVS}$ such that $f^k \succ f^x$.

**Corollary 5** says the following. Statement (a) states that any efficient median voter scheme $f \notin \{f^1, f^n\}$ belongs to the set of the most manipulable median voter schemes. Statement (c) states that the two efficient median voter schemes $f^1$ and $f^n$ are less manipulable than any other efficient median voter scheme $f \notin \{f^1, f^n\}$. Statement (d) states that any non-unanimous median voter scheme is less manipulable than any efficient median voter scheme $f \notin \{f^1, f^n\}$. Statement (e) states that given an efficient median voter scheme $f \notin \{f^1, f^n\}$, there is always a (non-efficient) unanimous median voter scheme that is less manipulable. Moreover, **Corollary 5** has the following two implications when $n$ is odd. First, for any $f^x \in \text{MVS}$, $f^{(n+1)/2} \succeq f^x$, and second, for all non-unanimous $f^x \in \text{MVS}$, $f^{(n+1)/2} \succ f^x$.

**Proof of Corollary 5.** Let $y$ be the vector of fixed ballots associated to $f^k$. Since $k \notin \{1, n\}$,

$$
y_1 = y_2 = a \quad \text{and} \quad y_n = y_{n+1} = b. \quad (4)
$$
(a) It follows from (4) and Theorem 1.
(b) It follows from (a).
(c) Let \( z \) be the vector of fixed ballots associated to \( f^1 \); namely, \( z_1 = a \) and \( z_2 = \cdots = z_{n+1} = b \). Hence, by (4) and Theorem 1, \( f^k \) is more manipulable than \( f^1 \). Using a similar argument, it also follows that \( f^k \succ f^n \).
(d) Let \( f^x \) be a non-unanimous median voter scheme. Then either \( a < x_1 \) or \( x_{n+1} < b \). Hence, by (4) and Theorem 1, \( f^k \) is more manipulable than \( f^x \).
(e) Consider any \( \alpha \in (a, \ldots, a, b, \ldots, b) \). Then \( f^x \) is unanimous but it is not efficient. By (4) and Theorem 1, \( f^k \succ f^x \).

\[ \text{Corollary 6. Let } f \in \text{MVS be efficient and such that } f \notin \{f^1, f^n\}. \]

(a) Then there exists a non-efficient and nonconstant \( f^x \in \text{MVS} \) such that \( f \succ f^x \).

(b) If \( f^x \) and \( f \) are comparable and \( f^x \) is non-efficient, then \( f \succ f^x \).

Corollary 6 says the following. Statement (a) states that there exists a non-efficient and nonconstant median voter scheme that is less manipulable than \( f^1 \) (or \( f^n \)). Statement (b) says that if the efficient median voter scheme \( f^1 \) (or \( f^n \)) and a non-efficient median voter scheme \( f \) are comparable according to their manipulability, then the former is more manipulable than the later. Corollaries 5 and 6 make clear the well known trade-off between strategy-proofness and efficiency.

**Proof of Corollary 6.** Consider \( f^1 \in \text{MVS} \) and let \( y = (a, b, \ldots, b) \) be its associated vector of fixed ballots. The case \( f^n \in \text{MVS} \) proceeds symmetrically.

(a) Define \( x = (a, \alpha, b, \ldots, b) \), where \( \alpha \in (a, b) \). Then, by Theorem 1, \( f^1 \succ f^x \) and it is clear that \( f^x \) is non-efficient.

(b) Since \( [y_2, y_n] = \{b\} \), and \( f^x \) and \( f^1 \) are comparable, Theorem 1 implies that \( f^1 \succ f^x \). \( \square \)

### 3.6 Complete lattice structure

Using Theorem 1 we can partition the set of median voter schemes MVS into equivalence classes in such a way that each equivalence class contains median voter schemes that are all equally manipulable. Denote the (quotient) set of those equivalence classes by MVS/\( \approx \). Furthermore, we can extend \( \succcurlyeq \) on MVS to the set of equivalence classes MVS/\( \approx \) in a natural way. Denote this extension by \([\succcurlyeq]\). In this subsection we will show that the pair (MVS/\( \approx \),\([\succcurlyeq]\)) is a complete lattice; namely, any nonempty subset of equivalence classes in MVS/\( \approx \) has a supremum and an infimum according to \([\succcurlyeq]\). Formally, given \( f^x \in \text{MVS} \), denote by \([f^x]\) the equivalence class of \( f^x \) with respect to \( \approx \); i.e.,

\[ [f^x] = \{g \in \text{MVS} \mid g \approx f^x \} . \]
Let \([c]\) be the class of all constant median voter schemes.\(^7\) Assume that \([f^x] \neq [c]\). By Theorem 1, \([f^x]\) can be identified with the four-tuple \((x_1, x_2, x_n, x_{n+1})\).

Denote by \(\text{MVS}/\sim\) the set of all equivalence classes induced by \(\sim\) on \(\text{MVS}\) and consider the binary relation \(\succeq\) on \(\text{MVS}/\sim\) defined as follows. For any pair \([f^x], [f^y]\) in \(\text{MVS}/\sim\), set

\[
[f^x] \succeq [f^y] \quad \text{if and only if} \quad f^x \succeq f^y.
\]

Since \(\succeq\) is a pre-order on \(\text{MVS}\), it follows that \(\succeq\) is a partial order on \(\text{MVS}/\sim\). Furthermore, by Theorem 1, if \([f^x] \neq [c]\) and \([f^y] \neq [c]\), then

\[
[f^x] \succeq [f^y] \quad \text{if and only if} \quad x_1 \leq y_1, x_2 \leq y_2, x_n \geq y_n \text{ and } x_{n+1} \geq y_{n+1}.
\]

We can now state and prove the result of this subsection.

**Proposition 2.** The pair \((\text{MVS}/\sim, \succeq)\) is a complete lattice.

**Proof.** Let \(\emptyset \neq Z \subseteq \text{MVS}/\sim\). Define

\[
(x_1^{SZ}, x_2^{SZ}, x_n^{SZ}, x_{n+1}^{SZ}) = \left( \inf_{x_1 \in [f^x] \subseteq Z} x_1, \inf_{x_2 \in [f^y] \subseteq Z} x_2, \sup_{x_n \in [f^x] \subseteq Z} x_n, \sup_{x_{n+1} \in [f^y] \subseteq Z} x_{n+1} \right)
\]

and

\[
(x_1^{IZ}, x_2^{IZ}, x_n^{IZ}, x_{n+1}^{IZ}) = \begin{cases} 
\{ \sup_{x_1 \in [f^x] \subseteq Z} x_1, \sup_{x_2 \in [f^y] \subseteq Z} x_2, \inf_{x_n \in [f^x] \subseteq Z} x_n, \inf_{x_{n+1} \in [f^y] \subseteq Z} x_{n+1} \} & \text{if } [c] \notin Z \\
[c] & \text{if } [c] \in Z.
\end{cases}
\]

Observe that if \([f^x] \in Z\), then \(x_k \in [a, b]\) for all \(k = 1, 2, n, n + 1\). Hence, \((x_1^{SZ}, x_2^{SZ}, x_n^{SZ}, x_{n+1}^{SZ})\) and \((x_1^{IZ}, x_2^{IZ}, x_n^{IZ}, x_{n+1}^{IZ})\) are well defined and \(x_k^{SZ}, x_k^{IZ} \in [a, b]\) for all \(k = 1, 2, n, n + 1\). Consider the equivalence classes \([f^{SZ}]\) and \([f^{IZ}]\) associated to \((x_1^{SZ}, x_2^{SZ}, x_n^{SZ}, x_{n+1}^{SZ})\) and \((x_1^{IZ}, x_2^{IZ}, x_n^{IZ}, x_{n+1}^{IZ})\), respectively. That is, \(f^x \in [f^{SZ}]\) if and only if \(y_k = x_k^{SZ}\) for \(k = 1, 2, n, n + 1\) and \(f^y \in [f^{IZ}]\) if and only if \(y_k = x_k^{IZ}\) for \(k = 1, 2, n, n + 1\). Since \(x_k^{SZ}, x_k^{IZ} \in [a, b]\) for all \(k = 1, 2, n, n + 1\), we have that

\[
[f^{SZ}], [f^{IZ}] \in \text{MVS}/\sim.
\]

Moreover, if \(Z = \text{MVS}/\sim\), then \([f^{SZ}] = [a, a, b, b]\) and \([f^{IZ}] = [c]\).

Now we show that \((\text{MVS}/\sim, \succeq)\) is a complete lattice. Let \(\emptyset \neq Z \subseteq \text{MVS}/\sim\). By (5), \([f^{SZ}], [f^{IZ}] \in \text{MVS}/\sim\). By Theorem 1 and the definition of \([f^{SZ}]\) and \([f^{IZ}]\), \text{lub} \(Z = [f^{SZ}]\) and \text{lib} \(Z = [f^{IZ}]\) are, respectively, the least upper bound and the largest lower bound with respect to \(\succeq\). Hence, \(\sup_{\succeq} Z = [f^{SZ}]\) and \(\inf_{\succeq} Z = [f^{IZ}]\). Thus, \((\text{MVS}/\sim, \succeq)\) is a complete lattice. \(\square\)

Two immediate consequences follow from the proof of Proposition 2. First, and since \([c]\) is the smallest equivalence class in \(\text{MVS}/\sim\) according to \(\succeq\), all constant me-
Median voter schemes are less manipulable than any other nonconstant median voter scheme (i.e., \([c] = \inf{\succeq} \text{MSV} / \approx\)). Second, and since the equivalence class containing all median voter schemes identified with the four-tuple \((a, a, b, b)\) is the largest equivalence in \(\text{MVS} / \approx\) according to \([\succeq]\) (i.e., this equivalence class is the \(\sup{\succeq}\) \(\text{MSV} / \approx\)), any median voter scheme \(f^x\) such that \(x_1 = x_2 = a\) and \(x_n = x_{n+1} = b\) is more manipulable than any other MVS outside this class. Observe that this class includes all efficient median voting schemes except \(f^1\) and \(f^n\) and it has the property that the set of options left open by any preference is the full set \([a, b]\) and, hence, its admissible domain is the smallest one. As soon as the extreme fixed ballots move toward more intermediate alternatives, the options sets left open by any preference become smaller and therefore more non-single-peaked preferences are admissible in the domain of the corresponding median voter scheme so as to remain non-manipulable. Thus, although somehow disappointing, the class of unbiased median voter schemes is the most manipulable one precisely because it is more sensible to agents’ preferences (the options that they leave open are larger).

Finally, if \(n \leq 3\) and \(f^x \in \text{MVS}\) is nonconstant, then \([f^x] = \{f^3\}\). Thus, the pair \((\text{MVS}, \succeq)\) is like a complete lattice (it is not because the equivalence class of constant median voter schemes is not degenerated).

Figure 2 summarizes the complete lattice structure of the pair \((\text{MVS} / \approx, [\succeq])\) for any \(n \geq 2\), whose properties have been collected among Corollaries 3, 4, 5, and 6.

4. Comparing all generalized median voter schemes

4.1 Generalized median voter schemes

Median voter schemes are anonymous. All agents have the same power to influence the outcome of a given median voter scheme \(f^x\), although this power depends on the
distribution of its associated fixed ballots $x = (x_1, \ldots, x_{n+1})$. **Generalized median voter schemes** admit the possibility that different agents may have different power to influence its outcome. This power will be described by a monotonic family of fixed ballots, one for each coalition (subset) of agents. To develop a useful intuition to understand the class of all generalized median voter schemes, consider first the case $n = 2$. Given a monotonic family of fixed ballots $\{p_{1,2}, p_{1}, p_{2}, p_{\emptyset}\}$, one for each coalition of agents, such that $a \leq p_{1,2} \leq p_{1} \leq p_{2} \leq p_{\emptyset} \leq b$, we define the social choice function $f : U^2 \rightarrow [a, b]$ as follows: for each $R \in U^2$,

$$f(R) = \begin{cases} 
  p_{1,2} & \text{if } \tau(R_1), \tau(R_2) \leq p_{1,2} \\
  \tau(R_2) & \text{if } \tau(R_1) \leq p_{1,2} \leq \tau(R_2) \leq p_{1} \\
  p_{1} & \text{if } \tau(R_1) \leq p_{1,2} \leq p_{1} \leq \tau(R_2) \\
  \text{med}\{\tau(R_1), \tau(R_2), p_{1}\} & \text{if } p_{1,2} \leq \tau(R_1) \leq p_{1} \\
  \tau(R_1) & \text{if } p_{1} \leq \tau(R_1) \leq p_{2} \\
  \text{med}\{\tau(R_1), \tau(R_2), p_{2}\} & \text{if } p_{2} \leq \tau(R_1) \leq p_{\emptyset} \\
  p_{2} & \text{if } p_{\emptyset} \leq \tau(R_1) \leq p_{2} \\
  \text{med}\{\tau(R_1), \tau(R_2)\} & \text{if } p_{\emptyset} \leq \tau(R_1) \leq \tau(R_2) \\
  \tau(R_2) & \text{if } p_{\emptyset} \leq \tau(R_2) \leq \tau(R_1) \\
  p_{\emptyset} & \text{if } p_{\emptyset} \leq \tau(R_1) \leq \tau(R_2). 
\end{cases}$$

Observe that $r_f = \{p_{1,2}, p_{\emptyset}\}$. We can interpret this function as a way to assign to agents 1 and 2 the power to select the alternative in the subset $r_f = \{p_{1,2}, p_{\emptyset}\}$. For instance, agent 1 can make sure that the outcome is at most $p_{1}$ by voting below $p_{1}$ and at most $\tau(R_1)$ by voting above $p_{1}$. And agent 1 is a dictator on $[p_{1}, p_{2}]$ (i.e., $f(R) = \tau(R_1)$ whenever $\tau(R_1) \in [p_{1}, p_{2}]$). It is easy to check that $f$ can be rewritten as

$$f(R) = \min_{S \subseteq \{1, 2\}} \max_{i \in S} \{\tau(R_i), p_S\}.$$

To present the characterization of all strategy-proof and tops-only social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences for all $n \geq 2$, we say that a collection $\{p_S\}_{S \subseteq 2^N}$ is a **monotonic family of fixed ballots** if (i) $p_S \in [a, b]$ for all $S \subseteq 2^N$ and (ii) $T \subset Q$ implies $p_Q \leq p_T$. The characterization is the following.

**Proposition 3 (Moulin 1980).** A social choice function $f : SP^n \rightarrow [a, b]$ is strategy-proof and tops-only if and only if there exists a monotonic family of fixed ballots $\{p_S\}_{S \subseteq 2^N}$ such that for all $R \in SP^n$,

$$f(R) = \min_{S \subseteq 2^N} \max_{i \in S} \{\tau(R_i), p_S\}.$$

The social choice functions identified in Proposition 3 are called **generalized median voter schemes**. A simple way to interpret them is as follows. Each generalized median voting scheme (and its associated monotonic family of fixed ballots) can be understood as a particular way to distribute the power among coalitions to influence the social choice. To see that, take an arbitrary coalition $S$ and its fixed ballot $p_S$. Then coalition $S$ can make sure that, by all of its members reporting a top alternative below $p_S$, the social choice will be at most $p_S$, independently of the reported top alternatives.
of the members of the complementary coalition. An alternative way to describe this distribution of power among coalitions is as follows. Fix a monotonic family of fixed ballots \( \{ p_S \}_{S \in 2^N} \) (i.e., a generalized median voter scheme) and take a vector of tops \( \{ \tau(R_1), \ldots, \tau(R_n) \} \). Start at the left extreme of the interval \( a \) and push the outcome to the right until it reaches an alternative \( \alpha \) for which the following two things happen simultaneously: (i) there exists a coalition of agents \( S \) such that all its members have reported a top alternative below or equal to \( \alpha \) (i.e., \( \tau(R_i) \leq \alpha \) for all \( i \in S \)) and (ii) the fixed ballot \( p_S \) associated to \( S \) is also located below \( \alpha \) (i.e., \( p_S \leq \alpha \)). Median voter schemes are the anonymous subclass of generalized median voter schemes. Hence, the fixed ballots of any two coalitions with the same cardinality of any anonymous generalized median voter scheme are equal. From a monotonic family of fixed ballots \( \{ p_S \}_{S \in 2^N} \) associated to an anonymous generalized median voter scheme \( f : \mathcal{U}^n \to [a, b] \) we can identify the \( n+1 \) ballots \( x_1, \ldots, x_{n+1} \) needed to describe \( f \) as a median voter scheme as follows: for each \( 1 \leq k \leq n+1 \), \( x_k = p_S \) for all \( S \in 2^N \) such that \#\( S = n - k + 1 \). Moreover, the onto social choice function \( f : \mathcal{U}^n \to [a, b] \), where agent \( j \in N \) is the dictator (i.e., for all \( R \in \mathcal{U}^n \), \( f(R) = \tau(R_j) \)), can be described as a generalized median voter scheme by setting \( p_T = a \) for all \( T \subset N \) such that \( j \in T \) and \( p_S = b \) for all \( S \subset N \) such that \( j \notin S \). Then, for any \( R \in \mathcal{U}^n \), (i) \( \max\{\tau(R_j), p_{\{j\}}\} = \tau(R_j) \), \( \tau(R_j) \leq \max_{i \in T}\{\tau(R_i), p_T\} \) for any \( T \subset N \) such that \( j \in T \), and (ii) \( \max_{i \in S}\{\tau(R_i), p_S\} = b \) for any \( S \subset N \) such that \( j \notin S \). Thus, \( \min_{S \in 2^N} \max_{i \in S}\{\tau(R_i), p_S\} = \tau(R_j) \).

Given a monotonic family of fixed ballots \( p = \{ p_S \}_{S \subseteq N} \), let \( f^p \) denote the generalized median voter scheme associated to \( p \).

### 4.2 Main result

Our main result will provide a systematic way to compare non-constant and non-dictatorial generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability. It turns out that to perform this comparison it is crucial to identify, for each agent \( i \in N \), the subintervals where \( i \) is a non-dummy agent; i.e., the subset of alternatives that are eventually chosen at some profile but agent \( i \) is able to change the chosen alternative by reporting a different preference relation. Below, we define formally the general notion of a non-dummy agent at an alternative in a social choice function.

**Definition 6.** Let \( f : \mathcal{U}^n \to [a, b] \) be a social choice function. Agent \( i \) is non-dummy at \( \alpha \in [a, b] \) in \( f \) if there exists \( R \in \mathcal{U}^n \) and \( R'_i \in \mathcal{U} \) such that

\[
f(R_i, R_{-i}) = \alpha \quad \text{and} \quad f(R'_i, R_{-i}) \neq \alpha.
\]

The lemma below characterizes non-dummyness at an alternative in a generalized median voter scheme \( f^p : \mathcal{U}^n \to [a, b] \) in terms of the monotonic family of fixed ballots \( p \). This characterization will be useful in the sequel.

---

8See Barberà et al. (1997) for a similar interpretation for the case of a finite number of ordered alternatives.
Lemma 4. Let $f^p : \mathcal{U}^n \rightarrow [a, b]$ be a generalized median voter scheme. Then $i$ is non-dummy at $\alpha$ in $f^p$ if and only if there exists $S \subset N$ such that $i \in S$, $p_S < p_{S \setminus \{i\}}$ and $p_S \leq \alpha \leq p_{S \setminus \{i\}}$.

For the proof, see Appendix B at the end of the paper.

The set of all $\alpha \in [a, b]$ such that $i$ is non-dummy at $\alpha$ in $f^p : \mathcal{U}^n \rightarrow [a, b]$ is denoted by $\text{ND}_{p,i}$. By Lemma 4, $\text{ND}_{p,i} = \bigcup_{S \subseteq N, i \in S \text{ and } p_S < p_{S \setminus \{i\}}} [p_S, p_{S \setminus \{i\}}]$.

We are now ready to state the main result of the paper.

Theorem 2. Let $p = \{p_S\}_{S \subseteq N}$ and $\tilde{p} = \{\tilde{p}_S\}_{S \subseteq N}$ be two monotonic families of fixed ballots and assume that the two associated generalized median voter schemes $f^p : \mathcal{U}^n \rightarrow [a, b]$ and $f^{\tilde{p}} : \mathcal{U}^n \rightarrow [a, b]$ are neither constant nor dictatorial. Then

\begin{align*}
[p_N, p_{\{i\}}] \cap \text{ND}_{p,i} &\subset [\tilde{p}_N, \tilde{p}_{\{i\}}] \cap \text{ND}_{\tilde{p},i}, \\
[p_{N \setminus \{i\}}, p_{\{\varnothing\}}] \cap \text{ND}_{p,i} &\subset [\tilde{p}_{N \setminus \{i\}}, \tilde{p}_{\{\varnothing\}}] \cap \text{ND}_{\tilde{p},i}
\end{align*}

and

\begin{align*}
[p_{\{i\}}, p_{N \setminus \{i\}}] \subset \text{ND}_{\tilde{p},i}
\end{align*}

hold for all $i \in N$ if and only if $f^{\tilde{p}}$ is at least as manipulable as $f^p$.

Before presenting three lemmata used in the proof of Theorem 2, a few remarks are in order.

First, conditions (7), (8), and (9) say that the relevant information to compare two generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability for agent $i \in N$ lies in the values of the fixed ballots associated to coalitions $N$, $N \setminus \{i\}$, $\{i\}$, and $\{\varnothing\}$ and in $i$’s non-dummy sets.

Second, observe that condition (9) is only relevant when $p_{\{i\}} < p_{N \setminus \{i\}}$ because if $p_{N \setminus \{i\}} < p_{\{i\}}$, then $[p_{\{i\}}, p_{N \setminus \{i\}}] = \varnothing$, and if $p_{N \setminus \{i\}} = p_{\{i\}}$, then (9) follows from (7) and (8) since $f^p$ is not constant and $p_{N \setminus \{i\}} = p_{\{i\}} \in \text{ND}_{p,i}$.

Third, if the nonconstant generalized median voter schemes associated to the monotonic families of fixed ballots $p = \{p_S\}_{S \subseteq N}$ and $\tilde{p} = \{\tilde{p}_S\}_{S \subseteq N}$ are anonymous, then $\text{ND}_{p,i} = [p_N, p_{\{i\}}]$, $\text{ND}_{\tilde{p},i} = [\tilde{p}_N, \tilde{p}_{\{i\}}]$ ($i$ is non-dummy in the full ranges of $f^p$ and $f^{\tilde{p}}$), $p_{N \setminus \{i\}} \leq p_{\{i\}}$, and $\tilde{p}_{N \setminus \{i\}} \leq \tilde{p}_{\{i\}}$ for all $i \in N$. Therefore, conditions (7), (8), and (9) are equivalent to

\begin{align*}
[p_N, p_{\{i\}}] \subset [\tilde{p}_N, \tilde{p}_{\{i\}}]
\end{align*}

and

\begin{align*}
[p_{N \setminus \{i\}}, p_{\{\varnothing\}}] \subset [\tilde{p}_{N \setminus \{i\}}, \tilde{p}_{\{\varnothing\}}]
\end{align*}
Theorem 2. 

and denote of $p$ used in the proof of Theorem 2. To simplify notation, given $f$ when the median voter scheme used as a reference is $I_i$ which is what Theorem 1 says. Hence, Theorem 1 can be seen as a corollary of Theorem 2.

We will say that an interval $I_i = [c, d]$ with $c < d$ is a non-dummy interval for $i$ in $f^p$ if $I_i \subseteq \text{ND}_R\{i\}$. Whenever we refer to an interval as a non-dummy interval we exclude the possibility that the interval contains only one alternative. If $i \in S$ with $p_S < p_{S\{i\}}$, then $[p_S, p_{S\{i\}}]$ is a non-dummy interval for $i$ in $f^p$ and we denote it by $I^S_i$. We will write $I^S_i$ when the median voter scheme used as a reference is $f^\{i\}$ instead of $f^p$.

We state now the three lemmata, whose proofs are given in Appendix B, that will be used in the proof of Theorem 2. To simplify notation, given $p = \{p_S\}_{S \subseteq N}$ and $R_i \in \mathcal{U}$, we denote $o^{f^p}(R_i)$ by $o^p(R_i)$.

**Lemma 5.** Let $f^p : \mathcal{U}^n \rightarrow [a, b]$ be a nonconstant generalized median voter scheme. Then $f^p$ is not manipulable by $i$ at $R_i$ if and only if, for all $I^S_i$, $R_i$ is single-peaked on $(o^p(R_i) \cap I^S_i) \cup \{\tau(R_i), \alpha^*\}$ for all $\alpha^* \in I^S_i$.

**Lemma 6.** Let $p = \{p_S\}_{S \subseteq N}$ be a monotonic family of fixed ballots and let $R_i \in \mathcal{U}$.

If $p_{[i]} < p_{N\{i\}}$, then

$$o^p(R_i) = \begin{cases} [p_N, p_{[i]}] & \text{if } a \leq \tau(R_i) \leq p_N \\ [\tau(R_i), p_{[i]}] & \text{if } p_N < \tau(R_i) \leq p_{[i]} \\ \{\tau(R_i)\} & \text{if } p_{[i]} < \tau(R_i) \leq p_{N\{i\}} \\ [p_{N\{i\}}, \tau(R_i)] & \text{if } p_{N\{i\}} < \tau(R_i) \leq p_{[\varnothing]} \\ [p_{N\{i\}}, p_{[\varnothing]}] & \text{if } p_{[\varnothing]} < \tau(R_i). \end{cases}$$

If $p_{N\{i\}} \leq p_{[i]}$, then

$$o^p(R_i) = \begin{cases} [p_N, p_{[i]}] & \text{if } a \leq \tau(R_i) \leq p_N \\ [\tau(R_i), p_{[i]}] & \text{if } p_N < \tau(R_i) \leq p_{N\{i\}} \\ [p_{N\{i\}}, p_{[i]}] & \text{if } p_{N\{i\}} < \tau(R_i) \leq p_{[i]} \\ [p_{N\{i\}}, \tau(R_i)] & \text{if } p_{[i]} < \tau(R_i) \leq p_{[\varnothing]} \\ [p_{N\{i\}}, p_{[\varnothing]}] & \text{if } p_{[\varnothing]} < \tau(R_i). \end{cases}$$
Lemma 7. Let \( p = (p_S)_{S \subseteq N} \) and \( \bar{p} = (\bar{p}_S)_{S \subseteq N} \) be two monotonic families of fixed ballots such that \( f^p \) and \( f^{\bar{p}} \) are not constant. Assume (7), (8), and (9) in Theorem 2 hold. Then, for any non-dummy interval \( I_i^f \) and for all \( \alpha^* \in I_i^f \), there exists a non-dummy interval \( \bar{I}_i \) for \( i \) in \( f^\bar{p} \) such that \( \alpha^* \in \bar{I}_i \) and \( (\alpha^*(R_i) \cap I_i^f) \subset (\alpha^*(R_i) \cap \bar{I}_i) \) for all \( R_i \in \mathcal{U} \).

Definition 7. Let \( f : \mathcal{U} \rightarrow [a, b] \) be a social choice function. Agent \( i \) is a dictator at \( \alpha \in [a, b] \) in \( f \) if for all \( R_i \in \mathcal{U} \) such that \( \tau(R_i) = \alpha \),

\[
f(R_i, R_{-i}) = \alpha \quad \text{for all } R_{-i} \in \mathcal{U}^{n-1}.
\]

Let \( f^p : \mathcal{U}^n \rightarrow [a, b] \) be a generalized median voter scheme and let \( i \in N \) be an agent. Denote the set of all \( \alpha \in [a, b] \) such that \( i \) is a dictator at \( \alpha \) in \( f^p \), by \( \text{DT}^i_p \). By Lemma 6, \( \text{DT}^i_p = [p_{[i]}, p_{N \setminus [i]}] \). Observe that if \( p_{N \setminus [i]} < p_{[i]} \), then \( i \) is not a dictator at any \( \alpha \in [a, b] \) in \( f^p \). Furthermore, if \( p_{[i]} < p_{N \setminus [i]} \), then, by monotonicity, \( p_{N \setminus [i]} \leq p_{[i]} \leq p_{N \setminus [i]} \) for all \( j \neq i \). Therefore, if \( p_{[i]} < p_{N \setminus [i]} \), then \( j \) is not a dictator at any \( \alpha \in [a, b] \) in \( f^p \) for all \( j \neq i \).

Definition 8. Let \( p = (p_S)_{S \subseteq N} \) and \( \bar{p} = (\bar{p}_S)_{S \subseteq N} \) be two monotonic families of fixed ballots. The generalized median voter scheme \( f^p : \mathcal{U}^n \rightarrow [a, b] \) is at least more (or more) dictatorial for \( i \) than the generalized median voter scheme \( f^{\bar{p}} : \mathcal{U}^n \rightarrow [a, b] \) if \( \emptyset \neq \text{DT}^i_p \subset \text{DT}^i_{\bar{p}} \) (or \( \emptyset \neq \text{DT}^i_{\bar{p}} \subset \text{DT}^i_p \)).

Proposition 4 below formalizes the trade-off between dictatorialness and manipulability.

Proposition 4. Let \( p = (p_S)_{S \subseteq N} \) and \( \bar{p} = (\bar{p}_S)_{S \subseteq N} \) be two monotonic families of fixed ballots. Assume that \( f^p : \mathcal{U}^n \rightarrow [a, b] \) and \( f^{\bar{p}} : \mathcal{U}^n \rightarrow [a, b] \) are nonconstant, non-dictatorial, and comparable according to their manipulability. If \( f^p \) is more dictatorial for \( i \) than \( f^{\bar{p}} \), then \( f^{\bar{p}} \) is more manipulable than \( f^p \).

Proof. Since \( f^p \) is more dictatorial than \( f^{\bar{p}} \) for \( i \), \( \emptyset \neq \text{DT}^i_p \subset \text{DT}^i_{\bar{p}} \). Then \( [p_{[i]}, p_{N \setminus [i]}] \subset [p_{[i]}, p_{N \setminus [i]}] \) and \( \bar{p}_{[i]} \leq p_{N \setminus [i]} \). Therefore, \( p_{[i]} < \bar{p}_{[i]} \) and \( p_{N \setminus [i]} \leq p_{N \setminus [i]} \) or \( p_{[i]} \leq \bar{p}_{[i]} \) and \( \bar{p}_{N \setminus [i]} < p_{N \setminus [i]} \). Assume that \( p_{[i]} < \bar{p}_{[i]} \) and \( p_{N \setminus [i]} \leq p_{N \setminus [i]} \) hold; the proof for the other case proceeds similarly and therefore is omitted. Since \( \text{DT}^i_{\bar{p}} \neq \emptyset \) and \( p = (p_S)_{S \subseteq N} \) is monotonic, \( \text{ND}^i_p = [p_{P}, p_{\{\emptyset\}}] \) holds by (6). Thus,

\[
[p_{N}, p_{[i]}] \cap \text{ND}^i_p = [p_{N}, p_{[i]}].
\]

Similarly, and since \( \text{DT}^i_p \neq \emptyset \),

\[
[p_{\bar{N}}, \bar{p}_{[i]}] \cap \text{ND}^i_p = [p_{\bar{N}}, p_{\{\emptyset\}}].
\]

Since \( f^p \) and \( f^{\bar{p}} \) are comparable according to their manipulability and \( p_{[i]} < \bar{p}_{[i]} \),

\[
[p_{N}, p_{[i]}] \cap \text{ND}^i_p = [p_{N}, p_{[i]}] \subset [p_{\bar{N}}, \bar{p}_{[i]}] = [p_{\bar{N}}, p_{\{\emptyset\}}] \cap \text{ND}^i_{\bar{p}}.
\]

Thus, by Theorem 2, \( f^{\bar{p}} \) is more manipulable than \( f^p \). \( \square \)

\( ^9 \)Note that \( \bar{I}_i \) does not necessarily have to be written as \( \bar{I}_i^S \) for some \( S \ni i \).
5. Final remarks

Before moving to the omitted proofs we finish with two final remarks.

The reader could ask about the meaning of applying a median voter scheme to the universal domain of preferences. One could argue that if preferences are unrestricted it is like having no order on the set of alternatives. We also share this point of view. Under the universal domain of preferences median voter schemes lose their appeal. However, they still can be understood as a particular process for defining a specific subclass of social choice functions. Each ordering on the set of alternatives and each median voter scheme relative to this ordering defines a social choice function on the universal domain of preferences. This procedure becomes meaningful only when the structure and characteristics of the set of alternatives induce a natural order on it. But then if we want to design strategy-proof social choice functions on any domain that contains the set of single-peaked preferences (relative to this natural ordering), we have to look only inside the class of median voter schemes (this is a consequence of Moulin's 1980 characterization); otherwise, the social choice function would be manipulable. Our approach is relevant if agents, in addition to single-peaked preferences, may have additional preferences. The key point is to understand that a median voter scheme does not necessarily become manipulable under this larger domain. This depends very much on the identity of the agent, the particular properties of the additional preferences, and the median voter scheme under consideration. Lemmata 1 and 5 in the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 identify exactly the class of extra preferences that an agent may have and simultaneously preserve the strategy-proofness of the median voter scheme. And again, this class depends very much on the particular median voter scheme and, if it is not anonymous, depends on the specific agent to whose domain these additional preferences have been included. Our main contribution is then to compare, in terms of their manipulability, some pairs of median voter schemes by using the setwise inclusion criterion on the corresponding extra classes of admissible preferences.

The second remark relates our comparability notion with two alternative notions proposed by Pathak and Sönmez (2013) to compare two different matching mechanisms (in school choice problems) according to their manipulability. Following Pathak and Sönmez (2013), the profile R is vulnerable under the mechanism f if f is manipulable by some agent at R; i.e., there exist $i \in N$ and $R'_i \in U$ such that $f(R'_i, R_{-i}) P_i f(R_i, R_{-i})$. First, and following their definitions in Section 1, a mechanism $f$ is at least as manipulable as mechanism $g$ according to Pathak and Sönmez (at least as PS-manipulable as, for short) if any profile that is vulnerable under $g$ is also vulnerable under $f$:

- If there exist $i \in N$ and $R'_i \in U$ such that $g(R'_i, R_{-i}) P_i g(R_i, R_{-i})$, then there exist $j \in N$ and $R''_j \in U$ such that $f(R''_j, R_{-j}) P_j f(R_j, R_{-j})$.

Second, and following their definitions in Section 3, a mechanism $f$ is at least as strongly manipulable as mechanism $g$ according to Pathak and Sönmez (at least as

---

10We are grateful to a referee who did ask this question. This first remark may help the reader to better understand the meaning and interest of our contribution.
strongly PS-manipulable as, for short) if for any profile where \( g \) is vulnerable, \( f \) is also vulnerable by any agent who can manipulate \( g \).

- If there exist \( i \in N \) and \( R'_i \in \mathcal{U} \) such that \( g(R'_i, R_{-i}) P_i g(R_i, R_{-i}) \), then there exists \( R^*_i \in \mathcal{U} \) such that \( f(R^*_i, R_{-i}) P_i f(R_i, R_{-i}) \).

**Remark 2.** If \( f \) is at least as strongly PS-manipulable as \( g \), then \( f \) is at least as PS-manipulable as \( g \).

**Proposition 5** below shows that if a generalized median voter scheme \( f \) is at least as PS-manipulable as a generalized median voter scheme \( g \), then \( f \) is at least as manipulable as \( g \).

**Proposition 5.** Let \( f \) and \( g \) be two generalized median voter schemes and assume that \( f \) is at least as PS-manipulable as \( g \). Then \( f \) is at least as manipulable as \( g \).

**Proof.** Fix \( i \in N \) and let \( R_i \in \mathcal{M}^f_i \). This means that there exists \( (R'_i, R_{-i}) \in \mathcal{U}^n \) such that \( g(R'_i, R_{-i}) P_i g(R_i, R_{-i}) \). Since \( g \) is tops-only, we may assume that \( R_{-i} \in SP^{n-1} \). By assumption, there exist \( j \in N \) and \( R'_j \in \mathcal{U} \) such that

\[
f(R'_j, R_{-j}) P_j f(R_j, R_{-j}).
\]

If \( j \neq i \), (10) implies that \( j \) can manipulate the generalized median voter scheme \( f \) at a profile \( R \), where \( R_j \) is a single-peaked preference, a contradiction with either Lemma 1 or Lemma 5. Hence, \( j = i \). But then, by (10), \( R_i \in \mathcal{M}^f_i \). Thus, \( R_i \in \mathcal{M}^f_i \) whenever \( R_i \in \mathcal{M}^g_i \), which implies that \( f \) is at least as manipulable as \( g \).

**Example 1** below shows that the reverse implication does not hold; i.e., there exist two median voter schemes \( f \) and \( g \) such that \( f \) is at least as manipulable as \( g \) but \( f \) is not at least as PS-manipulable as \( g \) (and, by Remark 2, \( f \) is not at least as strongly PS-manipulable as \( g \)). Therefore, Example 1 shows that our notion of being at least as manipulable as is different than the two notions proposed by Pathak and Sönmez (2013).

**Example 1.** Let \( n = 3 \) and let \( f^x \) and \( f^y \) be two median voter schemes associated to \( x = (0, \tfrac{1}{2}, \tfrac{1}{2}, 1) \) and \( y = (0, 0, 1, 1) \), respectively. By Theorem 1, and since \( [x_1, x_{n+1}] \subset [y_1, y_{n+1}] \) and \( [x_2, x_n] \subset [y_2, y_n] \), \( f^y \) is at least as manipulable as \( f^x \). On the one hand, consider any profile \( R = (R_1, R_2, R_3) \in \mathcal{U}^3 \) and any preference \( R'_3 \in \mathcal{U} \) such that (i) \( \tau(R_3) = 1 \) for \( i = 1, 2 \), (ii) \( \tau(R_3) = \frac{1}{4} \) and \( \frac{3}{4} P_3 \frac{1}{2} \), and (iii) \( \tau(R'_3) = \frac{3}{4} \). Therefore, \( f^x(R_1, R_2, R'_3) = \frac{3}{4} P_3 \frac{1}{2} = f^x(R) \) and, hence, \( R \) is vulnerable under \( f^x \). Moreover, \( f^y(R) = 1 \) and \( R \) is not vulnerable under \( f^y \). Thus, \( f^y \) is not at least as PS-manipulable as \( f^x \) and, hence, by

---

11 Observe that the notions of “at least as PS-manipulable as” and “at least as strongly PS-manipulable as” are relative to the inclusion of the sets of vulnerable profiles, while our notion of “at least as manipulable as” is relative to the inclusion of the sets of manipulable preferences.

12 In light of Remark 2, the statement of Proposition 5 also holds after replacing “\( g \) is at least as PS-manipulable as \( f^x \)” by “\( g \) is at least as strongly PS-manipulable as \( f^x \).”
Remark 2, \( f^x \) is not at least as strongly PS-manipulable as \( f^{\hat{x}} \). On the other hand, consider any profile \( \hat{R} = (\hat{R}_1, \hat{R}_2, \hat{R}_3) \in \mathcal{U}^3 \) and any preference \( \hat{R}_2' \in \mathcal{U} \) such that (i) \( \tau(\hat{R}_1) = \frac{1}{2} \), (ii) \( \tau(\hat{R}_2) = \frac{1}{3} \), (iii) \( \tau(\hat{R}_3) = \frac{1}{2} \) and \( \hat{R}_2 \neq \hat{R}_2' \), and (iv) \( \tau(\hat{R}_3') = \frac{1}{4} \). Therefore, \( f^{\hat{x}}(\hat{R}) = \frac{1}{2} \) and \( \hat{R} \) is not vulnerable under \( f^{\hat{x}} \). Moreover, \( f^x(\hat{R}_1, \hat{R}_2, \hat{R}_3') = \frac{1}{4} \hat{P}_3 \frac{1}{4} = f^{\hat{x}}(\hat{R}) \) and, hence, \( \hat{R} \) is vulnerable under \( f^x \). Thus, \( f^x \) is not at least as PS-manipulable as \( f^{\hat{x}} \) and, hence, by Remark 2, \( f^x \) is not at least as strongly PS-manipulable as \( f^{\hat{x}} \). Therefore, \( f^x \) and \( f^{\hat{x}} \) are not comparable according to the two notions proposed by Pathak and Sönmez (2013) \( \diamond \)

**Example 1** illustrates the fact that our comparability notion is based on the inclusion of the maximal domains of preferences under which each of the two generalized median voter schemes are strategy-proof. In this case, the maximal domain of preferences under which \( f^{\hat{x}} \) is strategy-proof is the set of single-peaked preferences on [0, 1] while \( f^x \) admits a much larger maximal domain, the union of the three sets: \( \{ R_i \in \mathcal{U} | 0 \leq \tau(R_i) < \frac{1}{2} \}, \tau(R_i) < \alpha < \beta \leq \frac{1}{2} \Rightarrow \alpha R_i \beta, \frac{1}{2} < \alpha \Rightarrow \frac{1}{2} R_i \alpha \}, \{ R_i \in \mathcal{U} | \frac{1}{2} < \tau(R_i) \leq 1 \}, \{ R_i \in \mathcal{U} | \tau(R_i) \leq 1, \frac{1}{2} \leq \beta < \alpha \Rightarrow \alpha R_i \beta, \frac{1}{2} \leq \alpha \Rightarrow \frac{1}{2} R_i \alpha \}, \{ R_i \in \mathcal{U} | \tau(R_i) = \frac{1}{2} \}. \)

**Appendix A**

**Proof of Lemma 1.** (\( \Rightarrow \)) Suppose there exists \( \alpha^* \in f^x \) such that \( R_i \) is not single-peaked on \( \sigma^x(R_i) \cup \{ \tau(R_i), \alpha^* \} \). We will prove that there exist \( R'_i \in \mathcal{U} \) and \( R_{-i} \in \mathcal{U}^{n-1} \) such that \( f^x(R'_i, R_{-i}) \neq f^x(R_i, R_{-i}) \). We will divide the proof into three different cases.

**Case 1.** Suppose \( \alpha^* \in \sigma^x(R_i) \) and there exists \( \beta \in \sigma^x(R_i) \) such that \( \alpha^* < \beta < \tau(R_i) \) and \( \alpha^* P_i \beta \); the other case where \( \tau(R_i) < \alpha^* < \beta \) and \( \beta P_i \alpha^* \) is similar and therefore is omitted. Let \( \hat{R} \in \mathcal{U}^n \) be such that \( \tau(\hat{R}_j) = \alpha^* \) for all \( j \in N \). Since \( \alpha^* \in \sigma^x(R_i) \) and \( f^{\hat{x}} \) is a median voter scheme, \( f^{\hat{x}}(R_i, \hat{R}_{-i}) = \alpha^* \). Similarly, let \( \hat{R} \in \mathcal{U}^n \) be such that \( \tau(\hat{R}_j) = \beta \) for all \( j \in N \). Since \( \beta \in \sigma^x(R_i) \), \( f^{\hat{x}}(R_i, \hat{R}_{-i}) = \beta \). Since \( f^{\hat{x}}(R_i, \hat{R}_{-i}) = \alpha^* P_i \beta \), by the definition of \( f^x \), there must exist \( S \subset N \setminus \{i\} \) and \( j' \notin S \) such that

\[
\begin{align*}
  f^x(R_i, \hat{R}_j, \hat{R}_S, \hat{R}_{-S \cup \{i, j'\}}) P_i f^x(R_i, \hat{R}_{j'}, \hat{R}_S, \hat{R}_{-S \cup \{i, j'\}}). 
\end{align*}
\]

Now, let \( R'_i \in \mathcal{U} \) be such that \( \tau(R'_j) = f^x(R_i, \hat{R}_{j'}, \hat{R}_S, \hat{R}_{-S \cup \{i, j'\}}) \). Since \( \tau(\hat{R}_j) = \alpha^* < \beta = \tau(R'_j) \) for all \( j \in N \),

\[
\begin{align*}
  \tau(\hat{R}_j) &= \alpha^* = f^x(R_i, \hat{R}_{-i}) \\
  &\leq f^x(R_i, \hat{R}_j', \hat{R}_S, \hat{R}_{-S \cup \{i, j'\}}) \\
  &\leq f^x(R_i, \hat{R}_j', \hat{R}_S, \hat{R}_{-S \cup \{i, j'\}}) \\
  &\leq f^x(R_i, \hat{R}_{-i}) \\
  &= \beta \\
  &= \tau(R'_j) \\
  &< \tau(R_i). 
\end{align*}
\]
Then, by (12) and the definition of $f^x$,

$$f^x(R_i', \tilde{R}_j, \tilde{R}_S, \tilde{R}_{-S\cup[i,j']}) = f^x(R_i, \tilde{R}_j, \tilde{R}_S, \tilde{R}_{-S\cup[i,j']}).$$

Hence, by (11),

$$f^x(R_i', \tilde{R}_j, \tilde{R}_S, \tilde{R}_{-S\cup[i,j']}) \in P_i f^x(R_i, \tilde{R}_j, \tilde{R}_S, \tilde{R}_{-S\cup[i,j']}).$$

Thus, $f^x$ is manipulable by $i$ at $R_i$ with any $R_i'$ with the property that $\tau(R_i') = f^x(R_i, \tilde{R}_j, \tilde{R}_S, \tilde{R}_{-S\cup[i,j']})$.

Case 2. Suppose $\alpha^* \notin o^x(R_i)$ and there exists $\beta \in o^x(R_i)$ such that $\alpha^* < \beta < \tau(R_i)$ and $\alpha^* P_i \beta$; the other case where $\tau(R_i) < \beta < \alpha^*$ and $\alpha^* P_i \beta$ proceeds similarly and is therefore omitted. Let $\tilde{R} \in \mathcal{U}^n$ be such that $\tau(\tilde{R}_j) = \beta$ for all $j \in N$. Since $\beta \in o^x(R_i)$,

$$f^x(R_i, \tilde{R}_j) = \beta. \quad (13)$$

Let $\tilde{R} \in \mathcal{U}^n$ be such that $\tau(\tilde{R}_j) = \beta$ for all $j \in N$. If there exist $S \subset N \setminus \{i\}$ and $j' \notin S$ such that

$$f^x(R_i, \tilde{R}_j, \tilde{R}_S, \tilde{R}_{-S\cup[i,j']}) P_i f^x(R_i, \tilde{R}_j, \tilde{R}_S, \tilde{R}_{-S\cup[i,j']}) \quad (14)$$

holds, the proof proceeds as in Case 1. Hence, assume that there do not exist $S \subset N \setminus \{i\}$ and $j' \notin S$ satisfying (14). Let $N \setminus \{i\} = \{j_1, \ldots, j_{n-1}\}$. Then

$$\beta = f^x(R_i, \tilde{R}_{i-1}) \quad \text{by (13)}$$

$$R_i f^x(R_i, \tilde{R}_{j_1}, \tilde{R}_{-\{i\},j_1}) \quad \text{consider } S_1 = \emptyset, j' = j_1 \notin S_1, \text{ and } \neg(14)$$

$$R_i f^x(R_i, \tilde{R}_{j_2}, \tilde{R}_{j_1}, \tilde{R}_{-\{i\},j_2}) \quad \text{consider } S_2 = \{j_1\}, j' = j_2 \notin S_2, \text{ and } \neg(14)$$

$$R_i f^x(R_i, \tilde{R}_{j_3}, \tilde{R}_{j_1}, \tilde{R}_{-\{i\},j_3}) \quad \text{consider } S_3 = \{j_1, j_2\}, j' = j_3 \notin S_3, \text{ and } \neg(14)$$

$$\vdots$$

$$R_i f^x(R_i, \tilde{R}_{j_{n-2}}, \tilde{R}_{j_{n-3}, \ldots,j_{n-3}}), \tilde{R}_{-\{i\},j_{n-2}}) \quad \text{consider } S_{n-1} = \{j_1, j_2, \ldots, j_{n-3}\}, j' = j_{n-2} \notin S_{n-1}, \text{ and } \neg(14)$$

$$R_i f^x(R_i, \tilde{R}_{j_{n-1}}, \tilde{R}_{j_{n-2}, \ldots,j_{n-3}}), \tilde{R}_{-\{i\},j_{n-1}}) \quad \text{consider } S_n = \{j_1, j_2, \ldots, j_{n-2}\}, j' = j_{n-1} \notin S_n, \text{ and } \neg(14)$$

$$= f^x(R_i, \tilde{R}_{i-1}) \quad \{j_1, j_2, \ldots, j_{n-2}\} \cup \{i, j_{n-1}\} = N.$$

Hence, as $\alpha^* P_i \beta$,

$$\alpha^* P_i f^x(R_i, \tilde{R}_{i-1}). \quad (15)$$

Since $\alpha^* \in r^x$, $f^x(\tilde{R}_i, \tilde{R}_{i-1}) = \alpha^*$. Thus, by (15), $f^x(\tilde{R}_i, \tilde{R}_{i-1}) \in P_i f^x(R_i, \tilde{R}_{i-1})$, which means that $f^x$ is manipulable by $i$ at $R_i$ with any $\tilde{R}_i$ such that $\tau(\tilde{R}_i) = \alpha^*$.

Case 3. Suppose $\alpha^* \notin o^x(R_i)$ and there exists $\beta \in o^x(R_i)$ such that $\beta < \alpha^* < \tau(R_i)$ and $\beta P_i \alpha^*$; the other case where $\tau(R_i) < \alpha^* < \beta$ and $\beta P_i \alpha^*$ proceeds similarly and
is therefore omitted. We will prove that this case is not possible. Consider the profile \( \hat{R} \) such that \( \tau(\hat{R}) = \alpha^* \) for all \( j \in N \). Since \( \alpha^* \notin \sigma^*(R_i) \), \( \beta \in \sigma^*(R_i) \), and \( \sigma^*(R_i) \) is an interval (see Lemma 2), \( f(R_i, \hat{R}_{-i}) < \alpha^* \). Furthermore, and since \( \alpha^* \leq \tau(R_i) \), \( f^x(\hat{R}, \hat{R}_{-i}) \leq f^x(R_i, \hat{R}_{-i}) < \alpha^* \). Hence, \( f^x(\hat{R}) < \alpha \). Thus, \( \alpha^* \notin \rho_f \), which contradicts the initial hypothesis.

\((\Leftarrow)\) Suppose \( f^x \) is manipulable by \( i \) at \( R_i \); that is, there exist \( R'_i \in \mathcal{U} \) and \( R_{-i} \in \mathcal{U}^{n-1} \) such that

\[
f^x(R'_i, R_{-i}) P_i f^x(R_i, R_{-i}).
\] (16)

Consider the case \( \tau(R'_i) < \tau(R_i) \); the other case is similar and therefore is omitted. We distinguish among three different cases.

**Case 1:** \( \tau(R'_i) < \tau(R_i) \). Since \( f^x \) is a median voter scheme and \( \tau(R'_i) < \tau(R_i) \), \( f^x(R'_i, R_{-i}) = f^x(R_i, R_{-i}) \). But this contradicts (16).

**Case 2:** \( \tau(R_i) = f^x(R_i, R_{-i}) \). Then \( f^x(R_i, R_{-i}) P_i f^x(R'_i, R_{-i}) \), which also contradicts (16).

**Case 3:** \( f^x(R_i, R_{-i}) < \tau(R_i) \). Since \( \tau(P'_i) < \tau(R_i) \) and (16) hold, \( f^x(R'_i, R_{-i}) < f^x(R_i, R_{-i}) \). Hence, \( f^x(R'_i, R_{-i}) < f^x(R_i, R_{-i}) < \tau(R_i) \), and \( \tau(R_i) \) is symmetric and its proof proceeds similarly; therefore, it is omitted. We prove that \( \sigma^*(R_i) = [x_1, x_n] \). Let \( \alpha \in \sigma^*(R_i) \) be arbitrary. Then there exists \( R_{-i} \in \mathcal{U}^{n-1} \) such that

\[
\text{med}(\tau(\hat{R}_1), \ldots, \tau(\hat{R}_n), x_1, \ldots, x_{n+1}) = \alpha.
\]

Redefine \( y = (y_1, \ldots, y_{2n+1}) \equiv (\tau(\hat{R}_1), \ldots, \tau(\hat{R}_n), x_1, \ldots, x_{n+1}) \in [a, b]^{2n+1} \). If \( y_{x^*} < x_1 \), and since \( \tau(R_i) < x_1 \leq \cdots \leq x_{n+1} \), \( \#\{s \in \{1, \ldots, 2n+1\} | y_s \geq y_{x^*} \} \geq n + 2 \). Hence, \( \alpha \neq y_{x^*} \). If \( y_n < x_{x^*} \) and since \( \tau(R_i) < x_1 \leq x_2 \leq \cdots \leq x_n \), \( \#\{s \in \{1, \ldots, 2n+1\} | y_s \leq y_{x^*} \} \geq n + 2 \). Hence, \( \alpha \neq y_{x^*} \). Thus, \( \alpha \in [x_1, x_n] \). Now, let \( \alpha \in [x_1, x_n] \), \( \hat{R}_i = R_i \), and for all \( j \in N \setminus \{i\} \), set \( \tilde{R}_j \in \mathcal{U} \) such that \( \tau(\tilde{R}_j) = \alpha \). Redefine \( y = (y_1, \ldots, y_{2n+1}) \equiv (\tau(\hat{R}_1), \ldots, \tau(\hat{R}_n), x_1, \ldots, x_{n+1}) \in [a, b]^{2n+1} \). Since \( \alpha \leq x_n \leq x_{n+1} \), \( \#\{s \in \{1, \ldots, 2n+1\} | y_s \geq \alpha \} \geq n + 1 \) and for all \( j \in N \setminus \{i\} \), let \( \tilde{R}_j \in \mathcal{U} \) be such that \( \tau(\tilde{R}_j) = \alpha \). Redefine \( y = (y_1, \ldots, y_{2n+1}) \equiv (\tau(\hat{R}_1), \ldots, \tau(\hat{R}_n), x_1, \ldots, x_{n+1}) \in [a, b]^{2n+1} \). Since \( \alpha \leq x_n \leq x_{n+1} \), \( \#\{s \in \{1, \ldots, 2n+1\} | y_s \alpha \} \) \( n + 1 \). Hence, \( \#\{s \in \{1, \ldots, 2n+1\} | y_s \geq \alpha \} = \#\{s \in \{1, \ldots, 2n+1\} | y_s \leq \alpha \} = n + 1 \). Thus, \( \text{med}(\tau(R_1), \ldots, \tau(R_n), x_1, \ldots, x_{n+1}) = \alpha \). Since \( \hat{R}_i = R_i \), \( \alpha \in \sigma^*(R_i) \). Therefore, \( \sigma^*(R_i) = [x_1, x_n] \).

**Case 2:** \( x_1 \leq \tau(R_i) < x_2 \). The case \( x_n < \tau(R_i) \leq x_{n+1} \) is symmetric and its proof proceeds similarly; therefore, it is omitted. We prove that \( \sigma^*(R_i) = [\tau(R_i), x_{n+1}] \). Let \( \alpha \in \sigma^*(R_i) \) be arbitrary. Then there exists \( R_{-i} \in \mathcal{U}^{n-1} \) such that

\[
\text{med}(\tau(\hat{R}_1), \ldots, \tau(\hat{R}_n), x_1, \ldots, x_{n+1}) = \alpha.
\]

Redefine \( y = (y_1, \ldots, y_{2n+1}) = (\tau(R_1), \ldots, \tau(R_n), x_1, \ldots, x_{n+1}) \in [a, b]^{2n+1} \). If \( y_{x^*} < \tau(R_i) \) and since \( \tau(R_i) < x_2 \leq \cdots \leq x_{n+1} \), \( \#\{s \in \{1, \ldots, 2n+1\} | y_s \geq y_{x^*} \} \geq n + 2 \). Hence,
α ≠ y∗. If xₙ < y∗ and since τ(R_i) < x₂ ≤ ⋯ ≤ xₙ₊₁, #{s ∈ [1, 2n + 1] | yₙ ≤ yₙ} ≥ n + 2. Hence, α ≠ y∗. Thus, α ∈ [τ(R_i), xₙ]. Now let α ∈ [τ(R_i), xₙ]. We have that α ≤ xₙ ≤ xₙ₊₁, #{s ∈ [1, 2n + 1] | yₛ ≥ α} ≥ n + 1. Furthermore, since x₁ ≤ τ(R_i) ≤ α, #{s ∈ [1, 2n + 1] | yₛ ≤ α} ≥ n + 1. Hence, #{s ∈ [1, 2n + 1] | yₛ ≥ α} = #{s ∈ [1, 2n + 1] | yₛ ≤ α} = n + 1. Thus, med(τ(NDER), τ(NDER), x₁, ⋯, xₙ₊₁) = α. Since Rᵢ = Rᵢ, α ∈ oᵢ(Rᵢ). Therefore, oᵢ(Rᵢ) = [τ(Rᵢ), xₙ] Share cached content.Redefine y = (y₁, ⋯, y₂n+₁) ≡ (τ(NDER), x₁, ⋯, xₙ₊₁) ∈ [a, b]²n₊₁. Since α ≤ xₙ ≤ xₙ₊₁, #{s ∈ [1, 2n + 1] | yₛ ≥ α} ≥ n + 1. Furthermore, since x₁ ≤ τ(R_i) ≤ α, #{s ∈ [1, 2n + 1] | yₛ ≤ α} ≥ n + 1. Hence, #{s ∈ [1, 2n + 1] | yₛ ≥ α} = #{s ∈ [1, 2n + 1] | yₛ ≤ α} = n + 1. Thus, med(τ(NDER), τ(NDER), x₁, ⋯, xₙ₊₁) = α. Since Rᵢ = Rᵢ, α ∈ oᵢ(Rᵢ). Therefore, oᵢ(Rᵢ) = [τ(Rᵢ), xₙ].

**Case 3:** x₂ ≤ τ(R_i) ≤ xₙ. We prove that oᵢ(Rᵢ) = [x₂, xₙ]. Let α ∈ oᵢ(Rᵢ) be arbitrary. Then there exists Rᵢⱼ ∈ Uᵢⁿ⁻¹ such that

\[
\text{med}(τ(R₁), ⋯, τ(Rₙ), x₁, ⋯, xₙ₊₁) = α.
\]

Redefine y = (y₁, ⋯, y₂n₊₁) = (τ(R₁), ⋯, τ(Rₙ), x₁, ⋯, xₙ₊₁) ∈ [a, b]²n₊₁. If yᵡ < x₂, and since x₂ ≤ ⋯ ≤ xₙ₊₁ and x₂ ≤ τ(R_i), we have that #{s ∈ [1, 2n + 1] | yₛ ≥ yᵡ} ≥ n + 2. Hence, α ≠ yᵡ. If xₙ < yᵡ, and since x₁ ≤ ⋯ ≤ xₙ and τ(R_i) ≤ xₙ, we have that #{s ∈ [1, 2n + 1] | yₛ ≤ yᵡ} ≥ n + 2. Hence, α ≠ yᵡ. Thus, α ∈ [x₂, xₙ]. Now let α ∈ [x₂, xₙ], Rᵢ = Rᵢ, and, for all j ∈ N \ {i}, let Rⱼ ∈ Uᵢ be such that τ(Rⱼ) = α. Redefine y = (y₁, ⋯, y₂n₊₁) ≡ (τ(R₁), ⋯, τ(Rₙ), x₁, ⋯, xₙ₊₁) ∈ [a, b]²n₊₁. Since α ≤ xₙ ≤ xₙ₊₁, #{s ∈ [1, 2n + 1] | yₛ ≥ α} ≥ n + 1. Furthermore and since x₁ ≤ x₂ ≤ α, #{s ∈ [1, 2n + 1] | yₛ ≤ α} ≥ n + 1. Hence, #{s ∈ [1, 2n + 1] | yₛ ≥ α} = #{s ∈ [1, 2n + 1] | yₛ ≤ α} = n + 1. Thus, med(τ(NDER), τ(NDER), x₁, ⋯, xₙ₊₁) = α. Since Rᵢ = Rᵢ, α ∈ oᵢ(Rᵢ). Therefore, oᵢ(Rᵢ) = [x₂, xₙ].

**Proof of Lemma 3.** We divide the proof into five cases.

**Case 1:** τ(R_i) < x₁. Then, by Lemma 2, oᵢ(R_i) = [x₁, xₙ]. Since τ(R_i) < x₁ ≤ xₙ ≤ yᵡ,

\[
oᵢ(R_i) = \begin{cases} [y₁, yₓ] & \text{if } τ(R_i) < y₁ \\ [τ(R_i), yₓ] & \text{if } y₁ ≤ τ(R_i) < y₂ \\ [y₂, yₓ] & \text{if } y₂ ≤ τ(R_i) ≤ yₙ. \end{cases}
\]

Hence, oᵢ(R_i) ⊆ oᵢ(R_i).

**Case 2:** x₁ ≤ τ(R_i) < x₂. Then, by Lemma 2, oᵢ(R_i) = [τ(R_i), xₙ]. Since y₁ ≤ x₁ ≤ τ(R_i) < x₂ ≤ xₙ ≤ yᵡ,

\[
oᵢ(R_i) = \begin{cases} [τ(R_i), yₓ] & \text{if } y₁ ≤ τ(R_i) < y₂ \\ [y₂, yₓ] & \text{if } y₂ ≤ τ(R_i) ≤ yₙ. \end{cases}
\]

Hence, oᵢ(R_i) ⊆ oᵢ(R_i).

**Case 3:** x₂ ≤ τ(R_i) ≤ xₙ. Then y₂ ≤ τ(R_i) ≤ yᵡ. By Lemma 2, oᵢ(R_i) = [x₂, xₙ] and oᵢ(R_i) = [y₂, yₓ]. Hence, oᵢ(R_i) ⊆ oᵢ(R_i).

**Case 4:** xₙ < τ(R_i) ≤ xₙ₊₁. Then, by Lemma 2, oᵢ(R_i) = [x₂, τ(R_i)]. Since y₂ ≤ x₂ ≤ xₙ < τ(R_i) ≤ xₙ₊₁ ≤ yₙ₊₁,

\[
oᵢ(R_i) = \begin{cases} [y₂, yₓ] & \text{if } y₂ ≤ τ(R_i) ≤ yₙ \\ [y₂, τ(R_i)] & \text{if } y₂ < τ(R_i) ≤ yₙ₊₁. \end{cases}
\]

Hence, oᵢ(R_i) ⊆ oᵢ(R_i).
Case 5: \( x_{n+1} < \tau(R_i) \). Then, by Lemma 2, \( o^{3}(R_i) = [x_2, x_{n+1}] \). Since \( y_2 = x_2 \leq x_{n+1} < \tau(R_i) \),

\[
o^{3}(R_i) = \begin{cases} [y_2, y_n] & \text{if } y_2 \leq \tau(R_i) \leq y_n \\ [y_2, \tau(R_i)] & \text{if } y_n < \tau(R_i) \leq y_{n+1} \\ [y_2, y_{n+1}] & \text{if } y_{n+1} < \tau(R_i) \end{cases}
\]

Hence, \( o^{3}(R_i) \subset o^{3}(R_i) \).

\[
\square
\]

APPENDIX B

We start with two preliminary notions and several remarks.

First, a generalized median voter scheme \( f^p : U^n \rightarrow [a, b] \) can alternatively be represented by a monotonic family of right fixed ballots \( p^r = \{p^r_S\}_{S \in 2^N} \), where (i) for all \( S \in 2^N \), \( p^r_S \in [a, b] \), (ii) \( S \subset T \) implies \( p^r_S \leq p^r_T \), (iii) for all \( S \in 2^N \), \( p^r_S = p^r_{N \setminus S} \), and (iv) for all \( R \in U^n \), \( f^p(R) = \max_{S \subseteq 2^N} \min_{r \in S} \{\tau(R_j) \} \) for all non-dummy interval \( I_i \).

Second, a non-dummy interval \( I_i \) is a maximal non-dummy interval for \( i \) if there is no non-dummy interval \( I_i' \) such that \( I_i \subset I_i' \). Since the number of coalitions that contain a player is finite, any maximal non-dummy interval \( I_i \) can be written as the union of a family of intervals; namely, \( I_i = \bigcup_{k=1}^{K} I_{i_k}^S \), where \( i \in S_k \) for all \( k = 1, \ldots, K \).

Before moving to the proof of the four lemmata used to prove Theorem 2, we state without proof the following facts.

Remark 3. Let \( f^p : U^n \rightarrow [a, b] \) be a generalized median voter scheme and let \( R_i \in U \). Then \( R_i \) is single-peaked on \( \{o^p(R_i) \cap I_i\} \cup \{\tau(R_i), \alpha^*\} \) for all \( \alpha^* \in I_i \), for all maximal non-dummy interval \( I_i \) if and only if \( R_i \) is single-peaked on \( \{o^p(R_i) \cap I_i^S\} \cup \{\tau(R_i), \alpha^*\} \) for all \( \alpha^* \in I_i^S \), for all non-dummy interval \( I_i^S \).

Remark 4. If \( p_{\{i\}} < p_{\{\varnothing\}} \), then \( [p_{\{i\}}, p_{\{\varnothing\}}] \) is a non-dummy interval for \( i \) in \( f^p : U^n \rightarrow [a, b] \). If \( p_{\varnothing} < p_{\varnothing \setminus \{i\}} \), then \( [p_{\varnothing}, p_{\varnothing \setminus \{i\}}] \) is a non-dummy interval for \( i \) in \( f^p \).

Remark 5. If \( \alpha \in [p_{\varnothing}, p_{\varnothing \setminus \{i\}}] \), \( \beta \in [p_{\{i\}}, p_{\{\varnothing\}}] \), and \( I_i \) is a maximal non-dummy interval for \( i \) in \( f^p : U^n \rightarrow [a, b] \) such that \( \alpha, \beta \in I_i \), then \( I_i = [p_{\varnothing}, p_{\{\varnothing\}}] \).

Remark 6. If \( p_{\{i\}} < p_{\varnothing \setminus \{i\}} \), then \( [p_{\varnothing}, p_{\{\varnothing\}}] \) is a (maximal) non-dummy interval for \( i \) in \( f^p : U^n \rightarrow [a, b] \).

Remark 7. If \( p_{\varnothing} = p_{\{i\}} < p_{\varnothing \setminus \{i\}} = p_{\{\varnothing\}} \), then \( i \) is a dictator in \( f^p : U^n \rightarrow [a, b] \).

Proof of Lemma 4. Let \( f^p : U^n \rightarrow [a, b] \) be a generalized median voter scheme. We will denote \( f^p \) simply by \( f \).

\( \Rightarrow \) Assume \( i \) is non-dummy at \( \alpha \) in \( f \). Then there exist \( R \in U^n \) and \( R'_i \in U \) such that \( f(R_i, R_{-i}) = \alpha \) and \( f(R'_i, R_{-i}) \neq \alpha \). We distinguish between two cases.

Case 1: \( f(R_i, R_{-i}) = \alpha < f(R'_i, R_{-i}) \). Since \( f \) is a generalized median voter scheme, \( \tau(R_i) \leq \alpha < \tau(R'_i) \). Let \( S = \{ j \in N \mid \tau(R_j) \leq \alpha \} \). Observe that \( i \in S \). First, we prove that
\( p_S \leq \alpha \). Suppose otherwise, \( \alpha < p_S \); then \( \max_{j \in S}\{\tau(R_j), p_S\} = p_S > \alpha \). By the definition of \( S \) and \( f, f(R_i, R_{-i}) > \alpha \), a contradiction with \( f(R_i, R_{-i}) = \alpha \). Now we prove that \( p_S \leq \alpha < p_{S\setminus i} \). Suppose otherwise, \( p_{S\setminus i} \leq \alpha \). For all \( j \in S \setminus \{i\}, \tau(R_j) = \tau(R_i) \leq \alpha \). Hence, \( \max_{j \in S\setminus i}\{\tau(R_j), p_{S\setminus i}\} \leq \alpha \). Thus, \( f(R_j, R_{-i}) \leq \alpha \), a contradiction with \( f(R_j, R_{-i}) > \alpha \). Therefore, \( p_S \leq \alpha \leq p_{S\setminus i} \). Since \( f(R_i, R_{-i}) < f(R_j, R_{-i}), p_S < p_{S\setminus i} \).

**Case 2:** \( f(R_j, R_{-i}) < \alpha = f(R_i, R_{-i}) \). The proof proceeds symmetrically to Case 1 using the right fixed ballots representation of \( f \).

\((\Leftarrow)\) Assume there exists \( S \subseteq N \) such that \( i \in S, p_S < p_{S\setminus i} \), and \( p_S \leq \alpha \leq p_{S\setminus i} \). We distinguish between two cases.

**Case 1:** \( p_S \leq \alpha < p_{S\setminus i} \). Let \( R \in \mathcal{U}^a \) be such that \( \tau(R_j) = \alpha \) for all \( j \in S \) and \( \tau(R_j) = b \) for all \( j \notin S \). Then \( f(R) = \alpha \). Let \( R_i' \in \mathcal{U} \) be such that \( \alpha < \tau(R_i') < p_{S\setminus i} \). Hence, \( f(R_i', R_{-i}) = \tau(R_i') \neq \alpha \). Thus, \( i \) is non-dummy at \( \alpha \) in \( f \).

**Case 2:** \( p_S < \alpha \leq p_{S\setminus i} \). Let \( R \in \mathcal{U}^a \) be such that \( \tau(R_j) = p_S \) for all \( j \in S \setminus \{i\}, \tau(R_j) = \alpha \), and \( \tau(R_j) = b \) for all \( j \notin S \). Then \( f(R) = \alpha \). Let \( R_j' \in \mathcal{U} \) be such that \( p_S < \tau(R_j') < \alpha \). Hence, \( f(R_j', R_{-i}) = \tau(R_j') \neq \alpha \). Thus, \( i \) is non-dummy at \( \alpha \) in \( f \).

**Proof of Lemma 5.** We will denote \( f^p \) and \( o^p(R_i) \) simply by \( f \) and \( o(R_i) \), respectively.

\((\Rightarrow)\) Assume \( f \) is not manipulable by \( i \) at \( R_j \) and let \( I_i^S = [p_S, p_{S\setminus i}] \) be a non-dummy interval for \( i \) in \( f \). Fix \( \alpha^* \in I_i^S \) and let \( \beta \in (o(R_i) \cap I_i^S) \cup \{\tau(R_j)\} \). We distinguish among four cases.

**Case 1:** \( \alpha^* \in (o(R_i) \cap I_i^S) \cup \{\tau(R_j)\} \) and \( \alpha^* < \beta \leq \tau(R_i) \) (if \( \beta < \alpha^* \), the proof is similar, changing the role of \( \alpha^* \) and \( \beta \)). We will show that \( \beta \leq \alpha^* \). If \( \beta = \tau(R_j) \), the statement holds immediately. Assume \( \beta < \tau(R_j) \). Then \( \alpha^*, \beta \in I_i^S \). Hence and since \( \alpha^* < \beta \), \( p_S \leq \alpha^* < p_{S\setminus i} \). Consider any \( R_{-i} \in \mathcal{U}^{a-1} \) with the property that for every \( j \in N \setminus \{i\} \),

\[\tau(R_j) = \begin{cases} \alpha^* & \text{if } j \in S \setminus \{i\} \\ \beta & \text{if } j \in N \setminus S.\end{cases}\]

Let \( \bar{R} \in \mathcal{U}^a \) be such that \( \tau(\bar{R}_j) = \beta \) for all \( j \in N \setminus \{i\} \) and \( \tau(\bar{R}_i) = \tau(R_i) \). Since \( \beta \in o(R_i) = o(\bar{R}_i), f(\bar{R}) = \beta \). As \( \tau(R_j) \leq \tau(\bar{R}_j) \) for \( j \in N \), by Remark 1, \( f(R) \leq f(\bar{R}) = \beta \). Moreover, \( \alpha^* \leq f(R) \). Hence,

\[\alpha^* \leq f(R) \leq \beta.\]

If \( S' \subseteq S \setminus \{i\} \), then \( \alpha^* < p_{S\setminus i} \leq p_S \) because \( p \) is monotonic. Hence, \( \max_{j \in S'}\{\tau(R_j), p_S\} > \alpha^* \). If \( S' \not\subseteq S \setminus \{i\} \), then \( \max_{j \in S'}\{\tau(R_j), p_S\} \geq \beta > \alpha^* \). Thus, \( \alpha^* < f(R) \leq \beta \). We proceed by distinguishing between two subcases.

**Subcase 1.1:** \( f(R) = \beta \). Consider any \( \bar{R}_i \in \mathcal{U} \) such that \( \tau(\bar{R}_i) = \alpha^* \). Since \( \alpha^* < f(R), \alpha^* \leq f(\bar{R}_i, R_{-i}) \). Furthermore, since \( p_S \leq \tau(\bar{R}_i) = \alpha^* \) for all \( j \in S \setminus \{i\}, f(\bar{R}_i, R_{-i}) \leq \alpha^* \). Hence, \( f(\bar{R}_i, R_{-i}) = \alpha^* \). Since \( f \) is not manipulable by \( i \) at \( R_i \), \( \beta \leq \alpha^* \) holds.

**Subcase 1.2:** \( f(R) < \beta \). Then \( f(R) \notin \{\alpha^*, \beta, \tau(R_i)\} \) \( \subseteq \{\tau(R_j) \mid j \in N\} \). Thus, \( f(R) \in \{p_S \mid S \subseteq N\} \). Set \( R_i^1 \equiv R \) and \( \alpha_i^1 \equiv f(R_i^1) \). Observe that \( \alpha^* < \alpha_i^1 < \beta \) and since \( f \) is not manipulable by \( i \) at \( R_i \), \( \alpha_i^1 = f(R_i^1) \) \( R_i \) \( \alpha^* \) (because \( f(\bar{R}_i, R_{-i}) = \alpha^* \) if \( \tau(\bar{R}_i) = \alpha^* \)). Since \( (p_S \mid S \subseteq N) \) is finite, we apply successively the previous argument starting with \( \alpha_i^1 < \beta \) and obtaining \( R_i^1, R_i^2, \ldots, R_i^K \), where (i) \( K \leq 2^a \), (ii) \( R_i^K = R_i \) for all \( k = 1, \ldots, K \), (iii) \( \alpha_i^k < \beta \)
$f(R^k) < f(R^{k+1}) < \beta$ for all $k = 1, \ldots, K - 1$, (iv) $f(R^1) R_i \alpha^*$ and $f(R^k) R_i f(R^{k-1})$ for all $k = 1, \ldots, K$, (v) $f(R^f) \in \{p_S \mid S \subset N\}$, and (vi) $f(R^K) = \beta$. Then, by transitivity of $R_i$, $\beta R_i \alpha^*$.

Case 2: $\alpha^* \in (\sigma(R_i) \cap I^f_1) \cup \{\tau(R_i)\}$ and $\tau(R_i) \leq \beta < \alpha^*$. The proof proceeds as in Case 1 using the right fixed ballots representation of $f$.

Case 3: $\alpha^* \notin \sigma(R_i)$ and $\alpha^* < \beta \leq \tau(R_i)$ (if $\tau(R_i) \leq \beta < \alpha^*$, the proof is similar using the right fixed ballots representation of $f$). We will show that $\beta R_i \alpha^*$. If $\beta = \tau(R_i)$, the statement holds immediately. Assume $\beta \not< \tau(R_i)$ and consider any profile $\tilde{R} \in U^\alpha$, where, for every $j \in N$, $\tau(\tilde{R}) = \alpha^*$. Since $\alpha^* \in I^\beta_1 \subset \tau_f$, $f(\tilde{R}) = \alpha^*$. We will show that $\alpha^* \leq f(R_i, \tilde{R}_{-i}) \leq \beta$. Let $\tilde{R} = (R_i, \tilde{R}_{-i})$. Since $\alpha^* \leq \tau(\tilde{R})$ for all $j \in N$, $\alpha^* \leq f(\tilde{R})$. Consider any subprofile $\tilde{R}_{-i} \in U^{\alpha-1}$, where, for every $j \in N \setminus \{i\}$, $\tau(\tilde{R}) = \beta$. Since $\beta \not< \sigma(R_i, \tilde{R}_{-i})$, $f(R_i, \tilde{R}_{-i}) = \beta$. As $\tau(\tilde{R}) = \alpha^* < \beta = \tau(\tilde{R})$ for all $j \in N \setminus \{i\}$, by Remark 1, $f(R_i, \tilde{R}_{-i}) \leq \beta$. Since $f$ is not manipulable by $i$ at $R_i$ and $f(R_i, \tilde{R}_{-i}) \not< \alpha^*$ (because $\alpha^* \notin \sigma(R_i)$), we have that $f(R_i, \tilde{R}_{-i}) R_i f(\tilde{R}) = \alpha^*$. Define $\alpha' = f(R_i, \tilde{R}_{-i})$. Notice that $\alpha' \leq \beta \leq \tau(\tilde{R})$ and $\alpha' \in o(R_i) \cap I^f_1$. Therefore, by Case 1, $\beta R_i \alpha'$. By transitivity of $R_i$, $\beta R_i \alpha^*$.

Case 4: $\alpha^* \notin \sigma(R_i)$ and $\beta < \alpha^* \leq \tau(R_i)$ (if $\tau(R_i) \leq \alpha^* < \beta$, the proof is similar, changing the role of $\alpha^*$ by $\beta$). We will show that this case is not possible. Consider any profile $R' \in U^\alpha$ such that $\tau(R'_j) = \alpha^*$ for all $j \in N$. Since $\alpha^* \notin \sigma(R_i)$, $\beta \in o(R_i)$, and $o(R_i)$ is an interval, $f(R_i, R'_{-i}) < \alpha^*$. Furthermore, as $\alpha^* \leq \tau(R_i)$ and Remark 1 holds, $f(R'_i, R'_{-i}) \leq f(R_i, R'_{-i}) < \alpha^*$. Hence, $f(R') < \alpha^*$. Thus, $\alpha^* \not< R_I$, which contradicts the fact that $\alpha^* \in I^f_1$.

$(\Leftarrow)$ Assume $f$ is manipulable by $i$ at $R_i$. Then there exist $R'_i \in U_r$ and $R_{-i} \in U^{\alpha-1}$ such that

$$f(R'_i, R_{-i}) P_i f(R_i, R_{-i}).$$

We assume that $\tau(R'_i) \not< \tau(R_i)$ (if $\tau(R_i) \not< \tau(R'_i)$, the proof is similar using the right fixed ballots representation of $f$). Set $R' = (R'_i, R_{-i})$. We distinguish among three cases.

Case 1: $\tau(R_i) \not< f(R)$. Since $f$ is a generalized median voter scheme and $\tau(R'_i) < \tau(R_i)$, $f(R) = f(R)$, which contradicts (17).

Case 2: $\tau(R_i) = f(R)$. Then $f(R) R_i f(R')$, which also contradicts (17).

Case 3: $f(R) < \tau(R_i)$. Since $\tau(R'_j) < \tau(R_i)$, by Remark 1, $f(R') \not< f(R)$, and (17), $f(R') < f(R)$ holds. Hence, $f(R') < f(R) < \tau(R_j)$ and $\tau(R_i) P_i f(R') P_i f(R)$. Thus, as $f(R), \tau(R_i) \in o(R_i) \cup \{\tau(R_i)\}$, $R_i$ is not single-peaked on $o(R_i) \cup \{\tau(R_i)\}$. We will show that there exists $S \subset N$ such that $i \in S$ and $f(R'), f(R) \in I^S = \{p_S, p_S \cup \{i\}\}$. Set $\alpha^* \equiv f(R') < f(R) \equiv \beta$. Since $f(R') < f(R)$ and $f$ is a generalized median voter scheme, $\tau(R') \leq f(R') = \alpha^*$. Define $\tilde{S} = \{j \in N \mid \tau(R_j) \leq \alpha^*\}$. Then $i \notin \tilde{S}$ and because $\beta = f(R)$,

$$p_{\tilde{S}} \geq \beta.$$ (18)

Set $S \equiv \tilde{S} \cup \{i\}$. Hence, $S = \{j \in N \mid \tau(R_j) \leq \alpha^*\}$. Suppose $p_S > \alpha^*$. Then, for all $S' \subset S \max_{j \in S'} \{\tau(R'_j), p_{S'}\} \geq p_S \geq \alpha^*$ and for all $S^* \not\subset S$, $\max_{j \in S^*} \{\tau(R'_j), p_{S^*}\} > \alpha^*$. Therefore, if $j \notin S$, then $\tau(R'_j) > \alpha^*$. Thus, $\alpha^* < f(R')$, which is a contradiction. Hence $p_S \leq \alpha^*$. Therefore, $i \in S$ and

$$p_S \leq \alpha^* < \beta \leq p_{S \setminus \{i\}}.$$
since $S \setminus \{i\} = \bar{S}$ and (18) hold. Thus, there exist a non-dummy interval $[pS, p_{S\setminus\{i\}}]$ and $\alpha^* = f(R') \in [pS, p_{S\setminus\{i\}}]$ such that $R_i$ is not single-peaked on \((\alpha(R_i) \cap [pS, p_{S\setminus\{i\}}]) \cup \{\tau(R_i), \alpha^*\}\). \hfill \qed

The proof of Lemma 6 is omitted since it consists of verifying that the option set can be written as stated.

**Proof of Lemma 7.** Let $i \in S \subset N$, let $I^S_i$ be a non-dummy interval for $i$ in $f^p$, and let $\alpha^* \in I^S_i$ be arbitrary. The proof proceeds by looking at different cases that can be grouped into two main cases depending on whether $p_{N\setminus\{i\}} \leq p_{\{i\}}$ (Case 1) or $p_{\{i\}} < p_{N\setminus\{i\}}$ (Case 2).

**Case 1:** $p_{N\setminus\{i\}} \leq p_{\{i\}}$. Since $[p_N, p_{\{i\}}] \cup [p_{N\setminus\{i\}}, p_{\{i\}}] = r_f$ and $I^S_i \subset ND^S_p \subset r_f$, either $\alpha^* \in [p_N, p_{\{i\}}] \cap ND^S_p$ or $\alpha^* \in [p_{N\setminus\{i\}}, p_{\{i\}}] \cap ND^S_p$. Hence, by (7) and (8), either $\alpha^* \in [\hat{p}_N, \hat{p}_{\{i\}}] \cap ND^S_p$ or $\alpha^* \in [\hat{p}_{N\setminus\{i\}}, \hat{p}_{\{i\}}] \cap ND^S_p$. Thus, there exists a non-dummy interval $\bar{I}_i$ for $i$ in $f^\bar{p}$ such that $\alpha^* \in \bar{I}_i$. Let $\hat{I}_i$ be a maximal non-dummy interval for $i$ in $f^\hat{p}$ such that $\hat{I}_i \subset \bar{I}_i$. We have that $\alpha^* \in \hat{I}_i$. We will show that $(o^{\hat{p}}(R_i) \cap I^S_i) \subset (o^{\hat{p}}(R_i) \cap \hat{I}_i)$ for all $R_i \in \mathcal{U}$, showing that for all $\beta \in o^{\hat{p}}(R_i) \cap I^S_i$, two things happen simultaneously: $\beta \in \hat{I}_i$ (Claim a) and $\beta \in o^{\hat{p}}(R_i)$ (Claim A) for all $R_i \in \mathcal{U}$.

**Claim a.** $\alpha \in \hat{I}_i$.

**Proof.** We distinguish among five cases.

**Case a.1:** $\alpha^* \in [p_N, p_{\{i\}}] \setminus [p_{N\setminus\{i\}}, p_{\{i\}}]$ and $p_N \leq \beta \leq p_{\{i\}}$. Assume $\beta \leq \alpha^*$ (the proof of the other case proceeds similarly). As $\beta, \alpha^* \in [p_N, p_{\{i\}}] \cap I^S_i$ and $I^S_i$ is a interval, $[\beta, \alpha^*] \subset [p_N, p_{\{i\}}] \cap I^S_i$. Hence, by (7), $[\beta, \alpha^*] \subset [p_N, p_{\{i\}}] \cap ND^S_p \subset [\hat{p}_N, \hat{p}_{\{i\}}] \cap ND^S_p$. Then $[\beta, \alpha^*] \subset ND^S_p$. As $\hat{I}_i$ is a maximal non-dummy interval and $\alpha^* \in \hat{I}_i$, $[\beta, \alpha^*] \subset \hat{I}_i$. Therefore, $\beta \in \hat{I}_i$.

**Case a.2:** $\alpha^* \in [p_{N\setminus\{i\}}, p_{\{i\}}] \setminus [p_{N\setminus\{i\}}, p_{\{i\}}]$ and $p_{\{i\}} < \beta \leq p_{\{i\}}$. As $p_N \leq \alpha^* < p_{N\setminus\{i\}}$, $p_{\{i\}} < \alpha^* \leq p_{\{i\}}$, and $I^S_i$ is a non-dummy interval such that $\alpha^*, \beta \in I^S_i$, we have that by Remark 5, $ND^S_p = [p_N, p_{\{i\}}]$. Then, by (7) and (8), $[p_N, p_{\{i\}}] \subset [\hat{p}_N, \hat{p}_{\{i\}}] \cap ND^S_p$ and $[p_{N\setminus\{i\}}, p_{\{i\}}] \subset [\hat{p}_{N\setminus\{i\}}, \hat{p}_{\{i\}}] \cap ND^S_p$. Hence, $[\beta, \alpha^*] \subset ND^S_p$. Thus, $[\alpha^*, \beta] \subset ND^S_p$. As $\bar{I}_i$ is a maximal non-dummy interval and $\alpha^* \in \bar{I}_i$, $[\alpha^*, \beta] \subset \bar{I}_i$. Therefore, $\beta \in \bar{I}_i$.

**Case a.3:** $\alpha^* \in [p_{N\setminus\{i\}}, p_{\{i\}}] \setminus [p_{N\setminus\{i\}}, p_{\{i\}}]$ and $p_{N\setminus\{i\}} \leq \beta \leq p_{\{i\}}$. Assume $\alpha^* < \beta$ (the proof of the other case proceeds similarly). Since $\beta, \alpha^* \in [p_{N\setminus\{i\}}, p_{\{i\}}] \cap I^S_i$ and $I^S_i$ is an interval, by (8), $[\alpha^*, \beta] \subset [p_{N\setminus\{i\}}, p_{\{i\}}] \cap I^S_i \subset [p_{N\setminus\{i\}}, p_{\{i\}}] \cap ND^S_p \subset [\hat{p}_{N\setminus\{i\}}, \hat{p}_{\{i\}}] \cap ND^S_p$. Hence, $[\alpha^*, \beta] \subset ND^S_p$. As $\bar{I}_i$ is a maximal non-dummy interval and $\alpha^* \in \bar{I}_i$, $[\alpha^*, \beta] \subset \bar{I}_i$. Therefore, $\beta \in \bar{I}_i$.

**Case a.4:** $\alpha^* \in [p_{N\setminus\{i\}}, p_{\{i\}}] \setminus [p_{N\setminus\{i\}}, p_{\{i\}}]$ and $p_{N\setminus\{i\}} \leq \beta < p_{N\setminus\{i\}}$. Since $p_{\{i\}} < \alpha^* \leq p_{\{i\}}$, $p_N \leq \beta < p_{N\setminus\{i\}}$, and $I^S_i$ is a non-dummy interval such that $\alpha^*, \beta \in I^S_i$, by Remark 5, $ND^S_p = [p_N, p_{\{i\}}]$. Hence, by (7) and (8), $[p_N, p_{\{i\}}] \subset [\hat{p}_N, \hat{p}_{\{i\}}] \cap ND^S_p$ and $[p_{N\setminus\{i\}}, p_{\{i\}}] \subset [\hat{p}_{N\setminus\{i\}}, \hat{p}_{\{i\}}] \cap ND^S_p$. Hence, $[\beta, \alpha^*] \subset ND^S_p$. As $\bar{I}_i$ is a maximal non-dummy interval and $\alpha^* \in \bar{I}_i$, $[\beta, \alpha^*] \subset \bar{I}_i$. Therefore, $\beta \in \bar{I}_i$.

**Case a.5:** $\alpha^* \in [p_{N\setminus\{i\}}, p_{\{i\}}] \cap [p_N, p_{\{i\}}]$. Hence, $\alpha^* \in [p_{N\setminus\{i\}}, p_{\{i\}}] \cap ND^S_p$. Thus, by (7) and (8), $\alpha^* \in [\hat{p}_{N\setminus\{i\}}, \hat{p}_{\{i\}}] \cap [\hat{p}_N, \hat{p}_{\{i\}}] \cap ND^S_p$. Assume $\alpha^* < \beta$ (the proof of the other
case proceeds similarly). Since \( p_{N \setminus \{i\}} < \alpha^* < \beta \leq p_{\{\emptyset\}} \) and \( I^R \) is an interval, \([\alpha^*, \beta] \subseteq [p_{N \setminus \{i\}}, p_{\{\emptyset\}}] \cap I^R \). Hence, by (8), \([\alpha^*, \beta] \subseteq [\tilde{p}_{N \setminus \{i\}}, \tilde{p}_{\{\emptyset\}}] \cap \text{ND}_{\hat{p}}^i \). Thus \([\alpha^*, \beta] \subseteq \text{ND}_{\hat{p}}^i \). As \( \hat{I}_i \) is a maximal non-dummy interval and \( \alpha^* \in \hat{I}_i \), \([\alpha^*, \beta] \subseteq \hat{I}_i \). Therefore, \( \beta \in \hat{I}_i \).

\begin{claim}
\( \beta \in o^{\hat{p}}(R_i) \).
\end{claim}

**Proof.** We proceed by first distinguishing between Case A.1 and Case A.2, and in turn for each one of them, the proof is divided in five subcases.

**Case A.1:** \( \tilde{p}_{N \setminus \{i\}} \leq \tilde{p}_{\{i\}} \). By Lemma 6,

\[
\sigma^p(R_i) = \begin{cases} 
[p_N, p_{\{i\}}] & \text{if } a \leq \tau(R_i) \leq p_N \\
[\tau(R_i), p_{\{i\}}] & \text{if } p_N < \tau(R_i) \leq p_{N \setminus \{i\}} \\
[p_{N \setminus \{i\}}, p_{\{i\}}] & \text{if } p_{N \setminus \{i\}} < \tau(R_i) \leq p_{\{i\}} \\
[p_{N \setminus \{i\}}, \tau(R_i)] & \text{if } p_{\{i\}} < \tau(R_i) \leq p_{\emptyset} \\
[p_{N \setminus \{i\}}, \tilde{p}_{\{\emptyset\}}] & \text{if } p_{\emptyset} < \tau(R_i),
\end{cases}
\]

and

\[
\sigma^{\hat{p}}(R_i) = \begin{cases} 
[\tilde{p}_N, \tilde{p}_{\{i\}}] & \text{if } a \leq \tau(R_i) \leq \tilde{p}_N \\
[\tau(R_i), \tilde{p}_{\{i\}}] & \text{if } \tilde{p}_N < \tau(R_i) \leq \tilde{p}_{N \setminus \{i\}} \\
[\tilde{p}_{N \setminus \{i\}}, \tilde{p}_{\{i\}}] & \text{if } \tilde{p}_{N \setminus \{i\}} < \tau(R_i) \leq \tilde{p}_{\{i\}} \\
[\tilde{p}_{N \setminus \{i\}}, \tau(R_i)] & \text{if } \tilde{p}_{\{i\}} < \tau(R_i) \leq \tilde{p}_{\emptyset} \\
[\tilde{p}_{N \setminus \{i\}}, \tilde{p}_{\emptyset}] & \text{if } \tilde{p}_{\emptyset} < \tau(R_i).
\end{cases}
\]

**Case A.1.1:** \( a \leq \tau(R_i) \leq p_N \). Then \( \beta \in [p_N, p_{\{i\}}] \). Since \( \beta \in I^R, \beta \in [p_N, p_{\{i\}}] \cap \text{ND}_{\hat{p}}^i \). By (7), \( \beta \in [\tilde{p}_N, \tilde{p}_{\{i\}}] \). Then \( \beta \in [\tau(R_i), \tilde{p}_{\{i\}}] \) and \( \tilde{p}_N \leq \beta \). Therefore, by the first three rows in (19), \( \beta \in o^{\hat{p}}(R_i) \) holds.

**Case A.1.2:** \( p_N < \tau(R_i) \leq p_{N \setminus \{i\}} \). Then \( \beta \in [\tau(R_i), p_{\{i\}}] \). Since \( \beta \in I^R, \beta \in [p_{N \setminus \{i\}}, p_{\{i\}}] \cap \text{ND}_{\hat{p}}^i \). By (7), \( \beta \in [\tilde{p}_N, \tilde{p}_{\{i\}}] \). Then \( \beta \in [\tau(R_i), \tilde{p}_{\{i\}}] \) and \( \tilde{p}_N \leq \beta \). Therefore, by the first three rows in (19), \( \beta \in o^{\hat{p}}(R_i) \) holds.

**Case A.1.3:** \( p_{N \setminus \{i\}} < \tau(R_i) \leq p_{\{i\}} \). Then \( \beta \in [p_{N \setminus \{i\}}, p_{\{i\}}] \). Since \( \beta \in I^R, \beta \in [p_{N \setminus \{i\}}, p_{\{i\}}] \cap \text{ND}_{\hat{p}}^i \). By (7) and (8), \( \beta \in [\tilde{p}_N, \tilde{p}_{\{i\}}] \). By (19), \( \beta \in o^{\hat{p}}(R_i) \).

**Case A.1.4:** \( p_{\{i\}} < \tau(R_i) \leq p_{\emptyset} \). Then \( \beta \in [p_{N \setminus \{i\}}, \tau(R_i)] \). Since \( \beta \in I^R, \beta \in [p_{N \setminus \{i\}}, \tau(R_i)] \cap \text{ND}_{\hat{p}}^i \). By (8), \( \beta \in [\tilde{p}_N, \tilde{p}_{\emptyset}] \). Then \( \beta \in [\tilde{p}_N, \tau(R_i)] \) and \( \beta \leq \tilde{p}_{\emptyset} \). Therefore, by the last three rows in (19), \( \beta \in o^{\hat{p}}(R_i) \) holds.

**Case A.1.5:** \( p_{\emptyset} < \tau(R_i) \). Then \( \beta \in [p_{N \setminus \{i\}}, p_{\emptyset}] \). Since \( \beta \in I^R, \beta \in [p_{N \setminus \{i\}}, p_{\emptyset}] \cap \text{ND}_{\hat{p}}^i \). By (8), \( \beta \in [\tilde{p}_N, \tilde{p}_{\emptyset}] \). Then \( \beta \in [\tilde{p}_N, \tau(R_i)] \) and \( \beta \leq \tilde{p}_{\emptyset} \). Therefore, by the last three rows in (19), \( \beta \in o^{\hat{p}}(R_i) \) holds.

**Case A.2:** \( \tilde{p}_{\{i\}} < \tilde{p}_{N \setminus \{i\}} \). By Lemma 6,

\[
\sigma^{\hat{p}}(R_i) = \begin{cases} 
[\tilde{p}_N, \tilde{p}_{\{i\}}] & \text{if } a \leq \tau(R_i) \leq \tilde{p}_N \\
[\tau(R_i), \tilde{p}_{\{i\}}] & \text{if } \tilde{p}_N < \tau(R_i) \leq \tilde{p}_{\{i\}} \\
[\tau(R_i)] & \text{if } \tilde{p}_{\{i\}} < \tau(R_i) \leq \tilde{p}_{N \setminus \{i\}} \\
[\tilde{p}_{N \setminus \{i\}}, \tau(R_i)] & \text{if } \tilde{p}_{N \setminus \{i\}} < \tau(R_i) \leq \tilde{p}_{\emptyset} \\
[\tilde{p}_{N \setminus \{i\}}, \tilde{p}_{\emptyset}] & \text{if } \tilde{p}_{\emptyset} < \tau(R_i).
\end{cases}
\]

**Case A.2.1:** \( a \leq \tau(R_i) \leq p_N \). The proof proceeds as in Case A.1.1.

**Case A.2.2:** \( p_N < \tau(R_i) \leq p_{N \setminus \{i\}} \). The proof proceeds as in Case A.1.2.
Case A.2.3: \( p_{N\setminus\{i\}} < \tau(R_i) \leq p_{\{i\}} \). Then \( \beta \in [p_{N\setminus\{i\}}, p_{\{i\}}] \). By (7), (8), and \( \beta \in \overline{N}_D \), \( \beta \in [\hat{p}_{N\setminus\{i\}}, \hat{p}_{\{i\}}] \cap N_D \), contradicting that \( \hat{p}_{\{i\}} < \hat{p}_{N\setminus\{i\}} \). Then, in this case, \( I^S_1 \cap o^p(R_i) = \emptyset \) and the proof is trivial.

Case A.2.4: \( p_{\{i\}} < \tau(R_i) \leq p_{\{\varnothing\}} \). The proof proceeds as in Case A.1.4.

Case A.2.5: \( p_{\{\varnothing\}} < \tau(R_i) \). The proof proceeds as in Case A.1.5.

Case 2: Assume \( p_{\{i\}} < p_{N\setminus\{i\}} \). Then, by Remark 6, \( \overline{N}_D = [p_{N}, p_{\{\varnothing\}}] \) and itself is a maximal non-dummy interval for \( i \) in \( f^\beta \). As \( [p_{N}, p_{\{\varnothing\}}] = [p_{N}, p_{\{i\}}] \cup \{p_{\{i\}}, p_{N\setminus\{i\}}\} \cup [p_{N\setminus\{i\}}, p_{\{\varnothing\}}] \), by (7), (8), and (9), we have that there exists a non-dummy interval for \( i \) in \( f^\beta \) such that \( [p_{N}, p_{\{\varnothing\}}] \subset \hat{I}_1 \). Let \( \alpha^* \in [p_{N}, p_{\{\varnothing\}}] \) be arbitrary. Then \( \alpha^* \in \hat{I}_1 \). We will show that

\[
(\alpha(R_i) \cap [p_{N}, p_{\{\varnothing\}}]) \subset (\alpha^*(R_i) \cap \hat{I}_1) \quad \text{for all } R_i \in \mathcal{U}.
\]

(20)

Then, and since \( I^S_1 \subset [p_{N}, p_{\{\varnothing\}}] \) for any \( S \subset N \), the statement of Lemma 7 will follow immediately since \( (\alpha(R_i) \cap I^S_1) \subset (\alpha(R_i) \cap [p_{N}, p_{\{\varnothing\}}]) \subset (\alpha(R_i) \cap \hat{I}_1) \). To prove that (20) holds, observe first that \( \alpha^*(R_i) \cap [p_{N}, p_{\{\varnothing\}}] \subset \hat{I}_1 \). It remains to be proven that if \( \beta \in \alpha^*(R_i) \cap [p_{N}, p_{\{\varnothing\}}] \), then \( \beta \in \alpha(R_i) \). We proceed by distinguishing between two cases.

Case 2.1: \( \hat{p}_{N\setminus\{i\}} \leq \hat{p}_{\{i\}} \). By Lemma 6,

\[
o^p(R_i) = \begin{cases} [p_{N\setminus\{i\}}, p_{\{i\}}] & \text{if } a \leq \tau(R_i) \leq p_{N} \\ [\tau(R_i), p_{\{i\}}] & \text{if } p_{N} < \tau(R_i) \leq p_{\{i\}} \\ \{\tau(R_i)\} & \text{if } p_{\{i\}} < \tau(R_i) \leq p_{N\setminus\{i\}} \\ [p_{N\setminus\{i\}}, \tau(R_i)] & \text{if } p_{N\setminus\{i\}} < \tau(R_i) \leq p_{\{\varnothing\}} \\ [p_{N\setminus\{i\}}, p_{\{\varnothing\}}] & \text{if } p_{\{\varnothing\}} < \tau(R_i) \end{cases}
\]

and

\[
o^\beta(R_i) = \begin{cases} [\hat{p}_{N\setminus\{i\}}, \hat{p}_{\{i\}}] & \text{if } a \leq \tau(R_i) \leq \hat{p}_{N} \\ [\tau(R_i), \hat{p}_{\{i\}}] & \text{if } \hat{p}_{N} < \tau(R_i) \leq \hat{p}_{N\setminus\{i\}} \\ [\hat{p}_{N\setminus\{i\}}, p_{\{i\}}] & \text{if } \hat{p}_{N\setminus\{i\}} < \tau(R_i) \leq \hat{p}_{\{i\}} \\ [\hat{p}_{N\setminus\{i\}}, \hat{p}_{\{i\}}] & \text{if } \hat{p}_{N\setminus\{i\}} < \tau(R_i) \leq \hat{p}_{\{\varnothing\}} \\ [\hat{p}_{N\setminus\{i\}}, \hat{p}_{\{\varnothing\}}] & \text{if } \hat{p}_{\{\varnothing\}} < \tau(R_i) \end{cases}
\]

(21)

We distinguish among five subcases.

Case 2.1.1: \( a \leq \tau(R_i) \leq p_{N} \). Then \( \beta \in [p_{N}, p_{\{i\}}] \). Since \( \beta \in I^S_1 \), \( \beta \in [p_{N}, p_{\{i\}}] \cap N_D \). By (7), \( \beta \in [\hat{p}_{N}, \hat{p}_{\{i\}}] \). Then \( \beta \in \{\tau(R_i), \hat{p}_{\{i\}}\} \) and \( \hat{p}_{N} \leq \beta \). Therefore, by the first three rows in (21), \( \beta \in o^\beta(R_i) \) holds.

Case 2.1.2: \( p_{N} < \tau(R_i) \leq p_{\{i\}} \). Then \( \beta \in [\tau(R_i), p_{\{i\}}] \). Since \( \beta \in I^S_1 \), \( \beta \in [p_{N}, p_{\{i\}}] \cap N_D \). By (7), \( \beta \in [\hat{p}_{N}, \hat{p}_{\{i\}}] \). Then \( \beta \in \{\tau(R_i), \hat{p}_{\{i\}}\} \) and \( \hat{p}_{N} \leq \beta \). Therefore, by the first three rows in (21), \( \beta \in o^\beta(R_i) \) holds.

Case 2.1.3: \( p_{\{i\}} < \tau(R_i) \leq p_{N\setminus\{i\}} \). Then \( \beta = \tau(R_i) \in [p_{N\setminus\{i\}}, p_{\{\varnothing\}}] \subset \hat{I}_1 \subset [\hat{p}_{N\setminus\{i\}}, \hat{p}_{\{\varnothing\}}] \). Since \( \beta = \tau(R_i) \in [\hat{p}_{N\setminus\{i\}}, \hat{p}_{\{\varnothing\}}] \), \( \beta \in \alpha^\beta(R_i) \) because \( f^\beta \) is unanimous on \( r_{f^\beta} = [\hat{p}_{N\setminus\{i\}}, \hat{p}_{\{\varnothing\}}] \).

Case 2.1.4: \( p_{N\setminus\{i\}} < \tau(R_i) \leq p_{\{\varnothing\}} \). Then \( \beta \in [p_{N\setminus\{i\}}, \tau(R_i)] \). Since \( \beta \in I^S_1 \), \( \beta \in [p_{N\setminus\{i\}}, p_{\{\varnothing\}}] \cap N_D \). By (8), \( \beta \in [p_{N\setminus\{i\}}, p_{\{\varnothing\}}] \). Then \( \beta \in [p_{N\setminus\{i\}}, \tau(R_i)] \) and \( \beta \leq \hat{p}_{\{\varnothing\}} \). Therefore, by the last three rows in (21), \( \beta \in o^\beta(R_i) \) holds.
To obtain a contradiction, assume \( \hat{\text{I}} \) and Remark 3, be such that \( \tau(R_i) \) and \( \beta \leq \bar{\bar{p}}(\varnothing) \). Therefore, by the last three rows in (21), \( \beta \in o^p(R_i) \) holds.

**Case 2.2:** \( \hat{p}(i) < \hat{p}(\varnothing) \). By Lemma 6,

\[
\alpha^p(R_i) = \begin{cases} 
[p_N \setminus \{i\}, \hat{p}[i]] & \text{if } a \leq \tau(R_i) \leq \hat{p}_N \\
[\tau(R_i), \hat{p}[i]] & \text{if } \hat{p}_N < \tau(R_i) \leq \hat{p}(i) \\
[\tau(R_i), \bar{\bar{p}}[i]] & \text{if } \hat{p}_N < \tau(R_i) \leq \bar{\bar{p}}(\varnothing) \\
[\bar{\bar{p}}(\varnothing), \bar{\bar{p}}(\varnothing)] & \text{if } \hat{p}(i) < \tau(R_i) \leq \bar{\bar{p}}(\varnothing)
\end{cases}
\]

The proof follows arguments similar to those already used in Case 2.1.

**Proof of Theorem 2.** (\( \Rightarrow \)) Suppose \( R_i \in M^f_p \). By Lemma 5, there exist a non-dummy interval \( I^S = [p_S, p_N[i]] \) for \( i \) in \( f^p \) and \( \alpha^p \in I^S \) such that \( R_i \) is not single-peaked on \( \{o^p(R_i), \alpha^p\} \cup (\tau(R_i), \alpha^p) \). Hence, by Lemma 7, there exists a maximal non-dummy interval \( I^I_i \) for \( i \) in \( f^p \) such that \( \alpha^p \in I^I_i \) and \( \{o^p(R_i), \alpha^p\} \cup (\tau(R_i), \alpha^p) \subset \{o^p(R_i), \alpha^p\} \cup (\tau(R_i), \alpha^p) \). Thus, \( R_i \) is not single-peaked on \( \{o^p(R_i), \alpha^p\} \cup (\tau(R_i), \alpha^p) \). Then by Lemma 5 and Remark 3, \( R_i \in M^f_p \).

(\( \Leftarrow \)) Assume \( f^p \) is at least as manipulable as \( f^p \). Then

\[ M^f_p \subset M^f_p \quad \forall \, i \in N. \]  

(22)

To obtain a contradiction, assume \( [p_N, \hat{p}[i]] \cap \text{ND}_p \not\subset [\hat{p}_N, \hat{p}[i]] \cap \text{ND}_p \) or \( [p_N[i], \hat{p}[\varnothing]] \cap \text{ND}_p \not\subset [\hat{p}_N[i], \hat{p}[\varnothing]] \cap \text{ND}_p \). We proceed by distinguishing among the three cases.

**Case 1:** \( [p_N, \hat{p}[i]] \cap \text{ND}_p \not\subset [\hat{p}_N, \hat{p}[i]] \cap \text{ND}_p \). Then there exists a maximal non-dummy interval \( I \) for \( i \) in \( f^p \) such that \( [p_N, \hat{p}[i]] \cap \text{ND}_p \not\subset [\hat{p}_N, \hat{p}[i]] \cap \text{ND}_p \). Let \( \sigma_1 \leq \sigma_2 \) be such that \( [p_N, \hat{p}[i]] \cap I \not\subset [\hat{p}_N, \hat{p}[i]] \cap \text{ND}_p \). Let \( \{I^I_i\}_{i=1, \ldots, T} \) be the collection of all maximal non-dummy intervals for \( i \) in \( f^p \); in particular, by the definition of \( \text{ND}_p \) and the fact that they are maximal intervals, \( \text{ND}_p = \bigcup_{i=1, \ldots, T} I^I_i \) and for all \( t, t' = 1, \ldots, T \) such that \( t \neq t' \), \( I^I_i \cap I^I_{i'} = \varnothing \). Then, for any maximal non-dummy interval \( I^I_i \) for \( i \) in \( f^p \), we have that

\[ [\sigma_1, \sigma_2] \not\subset [\hat{p}_N, \hat{p}[i]] \cap I^I_i. \]  

(23)

We distinguish between two subcases.

**Case 1.a:** \( \text{ND}_p = \varnothing \). Two further subcases are possible.

**Case 1.a.1:** \( \sigma_1 < \sigma_2 \). Let \( \alpha, \beta, \gamma \in [a, b] \) and \( R_i \in \mathcal{U} \) be such that \( \sigma_1 < \alpha < \beta < \gamma < \sigma_2 \), \( \tau(R_i) = \alpha \), and \( \gamma, \beta \in \mathcal{U} \). Hence, \( \tau(R_i) \in [\sigma_1, \sigma_2] \subset [p_N, \hat{p}[i]] \). By Lemma 6,

\[
o^p(R_i) = \begin{cases} 
[p_N \setminus \{i\}, \hat{p}[i]] & \text{if } p_N \setminus \{i\} < \tau(R_i) \leq \hat{p}[i] \\
[\tau(R_i), \hat{p}[i]] & \text{otherwise.}
\end{cases}
\]

Then, because \( \beta, \gamma \in [\sigma_1, \sigma_2] \subset I \) and \( \beta, \gamma \in [\tau(R_i), \sigma_2] \subset [\tau(R_i), \sigma_2] \subset o^p(R_i) \), \( R_i \) is not single-peaked on \( \{o^p(R_i), I \cup \tau(R_i) \} \) since \( \gamma, \beta \). But for all \( t = 1, \ldots, T \) and all

\[13\] The \( R_i \) is defined in any arbitrary way in \([a, b] \setminus \{\gamma, \beta\}\).
$\alpha' \in \bar{I}_i$, $R_i$ is single-peaked on $(\bar{o}^p(R_i) \cap \bar{I}_i) \cup \{\tau(R_i), \alpha'\}$ trivially since $o^p(R_i) \cap \bar{I}_i = \emptyset$. Thus, by Lemma 5, $R_i \in \mathcal{M}_i^p \setminus \mathcal{M}_i^p$, which contradicts (22).

**Case 1.a.2:** $\sigma_1 = \sigma_2$. Since $I \subset [p_N, p_{\emptyset}]$, $[p_N, p_{\emptyset}] \cap I = \{\sigma_1\}$ and $I$ is a (non-degenerated) interval (since $I$ is a non-dummy interval), $p_{\emptyset} = \sigma_1 = \sigma_2$. Therefore, $I = [p_{\emptyset}, p_{\emptyset}]$ because $I \subset [p_N, p_{\emptyset}]$, $I$ is a maximal non-dummy interval, and by Remark 4, $[p_{\emptyset}, p_{\emptyset}]$ is a non-dummy interval of $i$ in $f^p$. Hence, as $I$ is a non-degenerated interval,

$$p_{\emptyset} = \sigma_1 < p_{\emptyset}.$$ Two subcases are possible.

**Case 1.a.2.a:** $p_N \setminus \{i\} < p_{\emptyset}$. Let $\alpha, \beta, \gamma \in [a, b]$ and $R_i \in \mathcal{U}$ be such that $\max(p_N \setminus \{i\}, p_{\emptyset}) < \alpha < \beta < \gamma < p_{\emptyset}$, $\tau(R_i) = \gamma$, and $\alpha P_i \beta$. Hence, $\tau(R_i) \in [\max(p_N \setminus \{i\}, p_{\emptyset}), p_{\emptyset}]$. By Lemma 6,

$$o^p(R_i) = [p_N \setminus \{i\}, \tau(R_i)].$$ Then and because $\alpha, \beta, \gamma \in [a, b]$ and $R_i \in \mathcal{U}$ be such that $\max(p_N \setminus \{i\}, p_{\emptyset}) < \alpha < \beta < \gamma < p_{\emptyset}$,

$$\tau(R_i) = \gamma,$$ and $\alpha P_i \beta$. Hence, $\tau(R_i) \in [\max(p_N \setminus \{i\}, p_{\emptyset}), p_{\emptyset}]$. By Lemma 6,

$$o^p(R_i) = [p_N \setminus \{i\}, \tau(R_i)].$$

But for $t = 1, \ldots, T$ and all $\alpha \in \bar{I}_i$, $R_i$ is single-peaked on $(o^p(R_i) \cap \bar{I}_i) \cup \{\tau(R_i), \alpha'\}$ trivially since $o^p(R_i) \cap \bar{I}_i = \emptyset$. Thus, by Lemma 5, $R_i \in \mathcal{M}_i^p \setminus \mathcal{M}_i^p$ which contradicts (22).

**Case 1.a.2.b:** $p_{\emptyset} < p_N \setminus \{i\} = p_{\emptyset}$. Then, by Remark 6, $[p_N, p_{\emptyset}]$ is a non-dummy interval of $i$ in $f^p$. As $I = [p_{\emptyset}, p_{\emptyset}]$ is a maximal non-dummy interval of $i$ in $f^p$, we must have $I = [p_N, p_{\emptyset}]$. Therefore, $p_N = p_{\emptyset}$. Hence, $p_N = p_{\emptyset}$ and $p_N \setminus \{i\} = p_{\emptyset}$. By Remark 7, $i$ is a dictator in $f^p$, which is a contradiction.

**Case 1.b:** $\text{ND}^i_{\bar{p}} \neq \emptyset$. Then $[\bar{p}_N, \bar{p}_{\emptyset}] \cap \bar{I}_i \neq \emptyset$ for all $t = 1, \ldots, T$. To see that, observe that it holds immediately if $\bar{p}_{\emptyset} = \bar{p}_{\emptyset}$. Assume $\bar{p}_{\emptyset} < \bar{p}_{\emptyset}$. Then there exists $\bar{I}_i \supseteq \bar{I}_i^0 = [\bar{p}_{\emptyset}, \bar{p}_{\emptyset}]$ because, by Remark 4, $[\bar{p}_{\emptyset}, \bar{p}_{\emptyset}]$ is a non-dummy interval for $i$ in $f^p$. Then $[\bar{p}_N, \bar{p}_{\emptyset}] \cap \bar{I}_i \neq \emptyset$. Furthermore, for all $t \neq t'$, $[\bar{p}_N, \bar{p}_{\emptyset}] \cap \bar{I}_i \neq \emptyset$, since $\bar{I}_i \cap \bar{I}_i' = \emptyset$. For each $t = 1, \ldots, T$, let $\eta_t \leq \eta_t'$ be such that $[\bar{p}_N, \bar{p}_i] \cap \bar{I}_i = [\eta_t, \eta_t']$. Then, by (23), $[\sigma_1, \sigma_2] \subseteq [\eta_1, \eta_2]$ for all $t = 1, \ldots, T$. Hence,

$$\sigma_1 < \eta_1' \quad \text{or} \quad \sigma_2 > \eta_2' \quad \text{for all} \ t = 1, \ldots, T.$$ (24)

Assume, without loss of generality, that $\eta_1 < \eta_2 < \cdots < \eta_T$ (and $\eta_1 < \eta_2 < \cdots < \eta_T$). We distinguish among four different cases.

**Case 1.b.1.** There exists $t' \in \{1, \ldots, T\}$ such that $\sigma_1 < \eta_1' \leq \sigma_2 \leq \eta_2'$. This $t'$ is unique, because the family $[\bar{I}_i]_{t = 1, \ldots, T}$ is pairwise disjoint. Let

$$\eta_2 = \begin{cases} \max(\alpha \in \bar{I}_{t'-1}) & \text{if } t' \neq 1 \\ \alpha & \text{if } t' = 1 \end{cases}$$

and

$$\eta_1 = \begin{cases} \min(\alpha \in \bar{I}_{t'+1}) & \text{if } t' \neq T \\ \beta & \text{if } t' = T. \end{cases}$$

\[14\] The $R_i$ is defined in any arbitrary way in $[a, b] \setminus \{\alpha, \beta\}$. 
Thus, \( \eta_2 < \eta'_2 \) (if \( \eta_2 \neq a \), then the proof is trivial and if \( \eta_2 = a \), then \( a \leq \sigma_1 < \eta'_1 \) and \( \eta_1 \geq \eta'_2 \). Let \( R_i \in \mathcal{U} \) and \( \alpha, \beta, \gamma \in [a, b] \) be such that (i) \( \max(\sigma_1, \eta_2) = \alpha < \beta < \gamma < \eta'_1 \), (ii) \( \tau(R_i) = \alpha \), (iii) \( \gamma R_i \beta \), (iv) if \( \rho, \delta \in [a, b] \) and \( \eta'_1 < \rho < \delta \), then \( \eta'_1 \ \rho \ R_i \ \delta \), and (v) if \( \rho, \delta \in [a, b] \) and \( \delta < \rho < \max(\sigma_1, \eta_2) \), then \( \max(\sigma_1, \eta_2) \ \delta \ R_i \ \rho \). Hence, \( \tau(R_i) \in (\sigma_1, \sigma_2) \subset [\eta_1 \ \eta_2] \) and \( \tau(R_i) < \eta'_1 < \eta'_2 \), where the last inequality follows from the fact that \( \{ \tilde{p}_N, \tilde{p}[i] \} \cap \tilde{I}' = [\eta'_1, \eta'_2] \). By Lemma 6, and since if \( p[i] < p_N[i] \), then \( p_N \leq \sigma_1 \leq \tau(R_i) \leq \sigma_2 \leq p[i] < p_N[i] \), and if \( \tilde{p}[i] < \tilde{p}_N[i] \), then \( \tilde{p}[i] < \tilde{p}[i] < \tilde{p}_N[i] \).

\[
opt(R_i) = \begin{cases} [p_N[i], p[i)] & \text{if } p_N[i] < \tau(R_i) \leq p[i] \\ [\tau(R_i), p[i)] & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \tag{25}\]

\[
\opt(R_i) = \begin{cases} \{ \tilde{p}_N, \tilde{p}[i] \} & \text{if } \tau(R_i) < \tilde{p}_N \\ [\tilde{p}_N[i], \tilde{p}[i)] & \text{if } \tilde{p}_N[i] < \tau(R_i) \leq \tilde{p}[i] \\ [\tau(R_i), \tilde{p}[i)] & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}
\]

Then \( R_i \) is not single-peaked on \( (\opt(R_i) \cap \tilde{I}' \cup \{ \tau(R_i) \}) \) because \( \beta, \gamma \in [\sigma_1, \sigma_2] \subset I \) and \( \beta, \gamma \in [\tau(R_i), \sigma_2] \subset [\tau(R_i), p[i]) \subset \opt(R_i) \). We will now show that, for all \( t = 1, \ldots, T \), \( R_i \) is single-peaked on \( (\opt(R_i) \cap \tilde{I}' \cup \{ \tau(R_i) \}) \) for all \( \alpha' \in \tilde{I}' \). We distinguish between two subcases.

Case 1.b.1.a: \( t \neq t' \). By the definition of \( R_i \) and the fact that either \( \tilde{I}' \subset [\tilde{p}_N, \eta_2] \) or \( \tilde{I}' \subset [\eta_1, \tilde{p}[\eta]] \subset [\eta'_1, \tilde{p}[\eta]] \), \( R_i \) is single-peaked on \( \tilde{I}' \cup \{ \tau(R_i) \} \). Thus, \( R_i \) is single-peaked on \( (\opt(R_i) \cap \tilde{I}' \cup \{ \tau(R_i) \}) \) for all \( \alpha' \in \tilde{I}' \).

Case 1.b.1.b: \( t = t' \). By (25), \( \opt(R_i) \subset [\tilde{p}_N, \tilde{p}[i]) \). Hence, \( \opt(R_i) \cap \tilde{I}' \subset [\eta'_1, \eta'_2] \). Thus, by its definition, \( R_i \) is single-peaked on \( (\opt(R_i) \cap \tilde{I}' \cup \{ \tau(R_i) \}) \). Let \( \alpha' \in \tilde{I}' \). Two further subcases are distinguished.

Case 1.b.1.b.1: \( \alpha' \in [\tilde{p}_N, \tilde{p}[i]) \). Then \( \alpha' \in [\eta'_1, \eta'_2] \) because \( \alpha' \in \tilde{I}' \). Hence, by the definition of \( R_i \) and the fact that \( \opt(R_i) \cap \tilde{I}' \subset [\eta'_1, \eta'_2] \), \( R_i \) is single-peaked on \( (\opt(R_i) \cap \tilde{I}' \cup \{ \tau(R_i) \}) \).

Case 1.b.1.b.2: \( \alpha' \notin [\tilde{p}_N, \tilde{p}[i]) \). Then \( \alpha' > \tilde{p}[\eta] \geq \eta'_1 \geq \eta'_2 \). Hence, by the definition of \( R_i \) and the fact that \( \opt(R_i) \cap \tilde{I}' \subset [\eta'_1, \eta'_2] \), \( R_i \) is single-peaked on \( (\opt(R_i) \cap \tilde{I}' \cup \{ \tau(R_i) \}) \).

Then, by Lemma 5, \( R_i \in \mathcal{M}_{\tilde{I}'}^\alpha \setminus \mathcal{M}_{\tilde{I}'}^\alpha \), which contradicts (22).

Case 1.b.2: There exists \( t' \in [1, \ldots, T] \) such that \( t_1 \leq \sigma_1 < \eta'_2 < \sigma_2 \). This \( t' \) is unique, because the family \( \{ \tilde{I}' \}_{t=1,\ldots,T} \) is pairwise disjoint. The proof of this case is similar to Case 1.b.1, because the problem is symmetric, and therefore it is omitted.

Case 1.b.3: \( [\sigma_1, \sigma_2] \cap [\eta'_1, \eta'_2] = \emptyset \) for all \( t \in [1, \ldots, T] \). The proof of this case is similar to Case 1.a and therefore it is omitted.

Case 1.b.4: Assume that neither Case 1.b.1 nor Case 1.b.2 nor Case 1.b.3 hold. By (24), for all \( t \in [1, \ldots, T] \),

\[
\eta'_1 > \sigma_1 \quad \text{and} \quad \eta'_2 < \sigma_2.
\]

Let \( \eta_1 = \eta'_1 \) and \( \eta_2 = \eta'_2 \). Then

\[
\sigma_1 < \eta_1 < \eta_2 < \sigma_2.
\]

\footnote{The \( R_i \) is defined in any arbitrary way in \( \{ \max(\sigma_1, \eta_2), \eta'_1 \} \setminus \{ \gamma, \beta \} \).}
Let $R_i \in \mathcal{U}$ and $\alpha, \beta, \gamma \in [a, b]$ be such that (i) $\sigma_1 < \alpha < \beta < \gamma < \eta_1$, (ii) $\tau(R_i) = \alpha$, (iii) $\gamma P_i \beta$, and (iv) if $\rho, \delta \in [a, b]$ and $\eta_1 < \rho < \delta$, then $\eta_1 R_i \rho R_i \delta$.\textsuperscript{16} Hence, $\tau(R_i) \in [\sigma_1, \sigma_2] \subseteq \{p_N, p_{[\omega]}\}$ and $\tau(R_i) < \eta_1 \leq \tilde{p}_{[\omega]}$. By Lemma 6 and similarly as in Case 1.b.1,

$$o^R(R_i) = \begin{cases} \{p_N, p_{[\omega]}\} & \text{if } p_{N\{\omega\}} < \tau(R_i) \leq p_{[\omega]} \\ \{\tau(R_i), p_{[\omega]}\} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

$$o^\tilde{p}(R_i) = \begin{cases} \{\tilde{p}_N, \tilde{p}_{[\omega]}\} & \text{if } \tilde{p}_{N\{\omega\}} < \tau(R_i) \leq \tilde{p}_{[\omega]} \\ \{\tau(R_i), \tilde{p}_{[\omega]}\} & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

Then $R_i$ is not single-peaked on $(o^R(R_i) \cap I) \cup \{\tau(R_i)\}$ because $\beta, \gamma \in o^R(R_i) \cap I$. We will now show that, for all $t = 1, \ldots, T$, $R_i$ is single-peaked on $(o^R(R_i) \cap \tilde{I}_i) \cup \{\tau(R_i), \alpha'\}$ for all $\alpha' \in \tilde{I}_i$. Fix $t = 1, \ldots, T$. Since $o^\tilde{p}(R_i) \subseteq \{\tilde{p}_N, \tilde{p}_{[\omega]}\}$, $o^R(R_i) \cap \tilde{I}_i \subseteq [\eta_1', \eta_2'] \subseteq [\eta_1, \eta_2]$. Then, by its definition, $R_i$ is single-peaked on $(o^R(R_i) \cap \tilde{I}_i) \cup \{\tau(R_i), \alpha'\}$. We will now show that $R_i$ is single-peaked on $(o^R(R_i) \cap \tilde{I}_i) \cup \{\tau(R_i), \alpha'\}$ for all $\alpha' \in \tilde{I}_i$. We distinguish between two subcases.

**Case 1.b.4.a**: $\alpha' \in [\tilde{p}_N, \tilde{p}_{[\omega]}]$. Then $\alpha' \in [\eta_1', \eta_2']$ because $\alpha' \in \tilde{I}_i$. Hence, $\alpha' \in [\eta_1, \eta_2]$. Therefore, by definition of $R_i$ and the fact that $o^\tilde{p}(R_i) \cap \tilde{I}_i \subseteq [\eta_1, \eta_2]$, $R_i$ is single-peaked on $(o^R(R_i) \cap \tilde{I}_i) \cup \{\tau(R_i), \alpha'\}$.

**Case 1.b.4.b**: $\alpha' \notin [\tilde{p}_N, \tilde{p}_{[\omega]}]$. Then $\alpha' > \tilde{p}_{[\omega]} \geq \eta_2 \geq \eta_1$ because $\alpha' \in \tilde{I}_i \in (\eta_1, \eta_2]$). Hence, by definition of $R_i$ and the fact that $o^\tilde{p}(R_i) \cap \tilde{I}_i \subseteq [\eta_1, \eta_2]$, $R_i$ is single-peaked on $(o^R(R_i) \cap \tilde{I}_i) \cup \{\tau(R_i), \alpha'\}$.

Therefore, by Lemma 5, $R_i \in \mathcal{M}_i^{o^R} \setminus \mathcal{M}_i^{\tilde{p}}$, which contradicts (22).

**Case 2**: $p_{N\{\omega\}} \in [\tilde{p}_N, \tilde{p}_{[\omega]}] \setminus \{\tilde{p}_N, \tilde{p}_{[\omega]}\}$, Since the problem is symmetric, the proof is similar to the one used in Case 1.

**Case 3**: $p_{[\omega]} \notin [\tilde{p}_N, \tilde{p}_{[\omega]}]$. Then $p_{[\omega]} \leq p_{N\{\omega\}}$. We proceed by distinguishing among four subcases.

**Case 3.a**: $p_{[\omega]} = p_{N\{\omega\}}$. Then we can apply either Case 1 or Case 2.

Hence, assume $p_{[\omega]} < p_{N\{\omega\}}$ and let $\gamma \in [p_{[\omega]}, p_{N\{\omega\}}] \setminus \text{ND}_{\tilde{p}}^R$.

**Case 3.b**: Either $p_{[\omega]} = \gamma$ or $p_{N\{\omega\}} = \gamma$ holds. Then we can apply either Case 1 or Case 2.

**Case 3.c**: $p_{[\omega]} < \gamma < p_{N\{\omega\}}$ and $p_{[\omega]} < p_{[\omega]}$. Let $R_i \not\in \mathcal{U}$ and let $\alpha, \beta \in [a, b]$ be such that (i) $p_N < \alpha < \beta < p_{[\omega]}$, (ii) $\tau(R_i) = \alpha$, (iii) $\gamma P_i \beta$, and (iv) if $\rho, \delta \in [a, b] \setminus [\gamma]$ and $\alpha < \rho < \delta$ or $\delta < \rho < \alpha$, then $\rho R_i \delta$. By Lemma 6,

$$o^R(R_i) = \{\tau(R_i), p_{[\omega]}\}.$$ 

Since $p_{[\omega]} < p_{N\{\omega\}}$, $\text{ND}_{\tilde{p}}^R = \{p_N, p_{[\omega]}\}$ holds. As $R_i$ is not single-peaked on $(o^R(R_i) \cap \{p_N, p_{[\omega]}\}) \cup \{\tau(R_i), \gamma\} \in [\eta_1, \eta_2]$ and $\gamma \in [p_{[\omega]}, p_{[\omega]}] = \text{ND}_{\tilde{p}}^R$, by Lemma 5, $R_i \in \mathcal{M}_i^{o^R}$.

Furthermore, as $R_i$ is single-peaked on $[a, \gamma] \setminus \{\gamma\}$ and $\gamma \notin \text{ND}_{\tilde{p}}^R$, by Lemma 5, $R_i \notin \mathcal{M}_i^{\tilde{p}}$.

Thus, $R_i \in \mathcal{M}_i^{o^R} \setminus \mathcal{M}_i^{\tilde{p}}$, which contradicts (22).

**Case 3d**: $p_{[\omega]} < \gamma < p_{N\{\omega\}}$ and $p_N = p_{[\omega]}$. Then $p_{N\{\omega\}} < p_{[\omega]}$ (otherwise $i$ is a dictator). Let $R_i \not\in \mathcal{U}$ and $\alpha, \beta \in [a, b]$ be such that (i) $p_{N\{\omega\}} < \beta < p_{[\omega]}$, (ii) $\tau(R_i) = \alpha$, (iii) $\gamma P_i \beta$, (iv) if $\rho, \delta \in [a, b] \setminus [\gamma]$ and $\alpha < \rho < \delta$ or $\delta < \rho < \alpha$, then $\rho R_i \delta$. By Lemma 6,
Theoretical Economics 11 (2016) Comparing median voter schemes 585

and (iv) if $\rho, \delta \in [a, b] \setminus \{\gamma\}$ and $\alpha < \rho < \delta$ or $\delta < \rho < \alpha$, then $\rho \not\sim R \delta$. By Lemma 6,

$$o^p(R_i) = [p_{N \setminus \{i\}}, \tau(R_i)].$$

Since $p_{\{i\}} < p_{N \setminus \{i\}}$, $ND^p_i = [p_N, p_{\{\emptyset\}}]$ holds. As $R_i$ is not single-peaked on $(o^p(R_i) \cap [p_N, p_{\{\emptyset\}}]) \cup \{\tau(R_i), \gamma\}$ and $\gamma \in [p_N, p_{\{\emptyset\}}] = ND^p_i$, by Lemma 5, $R_i \in M_i^{fp}$. Furthermore, as $R_i$ is single-peaked on $[a, b] \setminus \{\gamma\}$ and $\gamma \notin ND^p_i$, by Lemma 5, $R_i \notin M_i^{fp}$. Thus, $R_i \in M_i^{fp} \setminus M_i^{fp}$, which contradicts (22). □

References


Bochet, Olivier and Ton Storcken (2009), “Maximal domains for strategy-proof or maskin monotonic choice rules.” Working paper. [549]


Co-editor Nicola Persico handled this manuscript.