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Repeated games with incomplete information on one side

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This paper studies repeated games with incomplete information on one side and equal discount factors for both players. The payoffs of the informed player I depend on one of two possible states of the world, which is known to her. The payoffs of the uninformed player U do not depend on the state of the world (that is, U knows his payoffs), but player I’s behavior makes knowledge of the state of interest to player U. We define a finitely revealing equilibrium as a Bayesian perfect equilibrium where player I reveals information in a bounded number of periods. We define an ICR profile as a strategy profile in which (a) after each history the players have individually rational payoffs and (b) no type of player I wants to mimic the behavior of the other type. We show that when the players are patient, all Nash equilibrium payoffs in the repeated game can be approximated by payoffs in finitely revealing equilibria, which themselves approximate the set of all ICR payoffs. We provide a geometric characterization of the set of equilibrium payoffs, which can be used for computations.

Keywords. Repeated games, incomplete information, discounting.

JEL classification. C73.

1. Introduction

Many strategic situations involve long-run interactions in which there is uncertainty about payoffs. Aumann and Maschler (1995) (written 1966–68) introduce repeated games with incomplete information to model such situations. There are two players. The informed player (player I, she) knows which of two states of the world is true; the uninformed player (U, he) starts the repeated interaction with prior beliefs. Player I’s, but not player U’s, stage-game payoffs depend on the state of the world. It was understood very early that this model leads to novel strategic issues that cannot be adequately analyzed by focusing separately on either the uncertainty or the long-run aspect. These issues include questions of learning, strategic revelation of information, and reputation effects.
As a first step toward a complete analysis of equilibrium behavior, one may ask about equilibrium payoffs. This is the goal of the current paper. Suppose that the two players discount the future with the same discount factor $\delta$, and that the stage-game payoffs satisfy a certain full-dimensionality condition. Then, if the players are sufficiently patient, all feasible payoffs that satisfy appropriate individual rationality and incentive compatibility conditions can be approximated by payoffs in sequential equilibria. The main result provides a geometric characterization for the whole correspondence of payoff sets for each initial prior.

The analysis is divided into three parts. The first part characterizes a lower bound on the set of payoffs in a simple subclass of finitely revealing equilibria. The second part constructs an upper bound on the set of payoffs in profiles that satisfy both incentive compatibility and individual rationality. The third part shows that these bounds are equal. Specifically, when players are patient, any payoff in a profile that satisfies the incentive compatibility and individual rationality conditions can be approximated by payoffs in Nash equilibria; furthermore, any payoff in a Nash equilibrium can be approximated by payoffs in finitely revealing equilibria. As a by-product of the proof, I obtain a geometric characterization of the equilibrium correspondence that can be used in applications.

The full-dimensionality condition implies that there is an open set of player $I$’s payoffs such that for any degenerate prior $p \in \{0, 1\}$, any payoff of $I$ is attained in some equilibrium. The assumption allows for flexibility in choosing continuation payoffs, and its role and strength are comparable to the standard requirement in the folk theorem literature of a feasible payoff set with a non-empty interior (for example, Fudenberg et al. 1994).

I now describe the characterization in more detail. The major difficulty with repeated games with incomplete information is their lack of stationarity. The stage payoffs of player $U$ depend on his beliefs, which change throughout the game. Some stationarity can be restored by focusing on finitely revealing equilibria, i.e. equilibria in which player $I$ reveals information in finitely many periods. During periods when player $I$ does not reveal information, the prior belief of player $U$ does not change, and payoffs can be analyzed through the methods of dynamic programming from the literature on games with imperfect monitoring (see Abreu et al. 1990 and Fudenberg et al. 1994). Section 3 describes the lower bound on payoffs in finitely revealing equilibria, assuming full dimensionality; this in turn forms a lower bound on the set of payoffs in all equilibria. The main result shows that these two bounds are equal.

The reader might find such a result intuitive. In any equilibrium, the belief of player $U$ is a martingale, and thus converges. This means that, with high probability, substantial amounts of information are revealed only finitely many times, and thus any equilibrium is “approximately” finitely revealing. However, this intuition does not easily turn into a proof, and in fact fails utterly in the no-discounting case, in which examples of equilibrium payoffs that cannot be approximated by finitely revealing profiles are well-known (see Aumann and Hart 1986).
An ICR profile is any (potentially mixed) strategy profile that satisfies two conditions:

**IR** The continuation payoffs of each player after each history are individually rational.

**IC** Each type of player $I$ is indifferent between playing any pure strategy in the support of her own mixed strategy and weakly prefers any such strategy to any pure strategy in the support of the other type’s mixed strategy.

The incentive compatibility condition IC ensures that neither type of player $I$ wants to mimic the other. Any equilibrium profile is necessarily an ICR profile, but not the reverse; in an ICR profile, player $U$ is not required to best-respond to player $I$, and there might be profitable deviations for some type of player $I$ not in the support of $I$’s strategy.

Section 4 characterizes the upper bound on the set of ICR profiles. This characterization is related to an idea in Fudenberg and Levine (1994), who show that the equilibrium payoffs in a game with complete information (but imperfect monitoring) cannot lie beyond a certain hyperplane. Here one could try to use hyperplanes to bound payoffs in a game that starts with some fixed prior $p$. However, in order to obtain a tight bound, one needs to control payoffs across all games starting with any prior $p \in [0, 1]$ at the same time. For this purpose, I use biaffine functions, i.e., functions that are affine in the prior and payoffs separately. Biaffine functions are introduced in Aumann and Hart (1986) to study bimartingales, which are useful in games with no discounting.

The lower and upper bounds are stated as correspondences that assign payoff sets to prior beliefs $p \in [0, 1]$. Characterizations in Sections 3 and 4 derive two classes of geometric constraints on the infinitesimal changes in payoffs with respect to the infinitesimal changes in prior beliefs. These constraints are different, but related. Using a certain “differential technique,” I show that they can be satisfied by only one correspondence.

1.1 Related literature

The characterization of equilibrium payoffs is the goal of a large part of the repeated games literature. This field originated with Aumann et al. (1966–68) and initially concentrated on the no-discounting criterion. In that model, Hart (1985) shows that all feasible and individually rational payoffs that satisfy the incentive compatibility condition can be obtained in an equilibrium. Shalev (1994) and Koren (1992) present sharper results in the case of known own payoffs, where player $U$’s payoffs do not depend on the state of the world.

So far, there have been no analogous results for games with discounting. The most advanced analysis, found in Cripps and Thomas (2003), looks at the limit correspondence of payoffs when the probability of one of the types is close to 1.\footnote{Cripps and Thomas (2003) discuss also the limit of payoff sets when the two players become infinitely patient, but player $I$ becomes patient much more quickly than does player $U$. Their characterization is closely related to Shalev and Koren’s results for the no-discounting case.} It is shown there that the set of payoffs of player $U$ and the high probability type are close to the folk theorem payoffs in a complete information game. Cripps and Thomas (1997) and Chan (2000) ask the same question within the framework of reputation games. All these results are proved by the construction of finitely revealing equilibria.
This paper extends Hart’s result to discounting in the special case of two states of the world and known own payoffs. The main result indicates a curious relationship between incomplete information and long-run payoff criteria. In games with complete information, the sets of equilibrium payoffs in the no-discounting and discounting cases are equal, i.e., the folk theorem characterizations of Rubinstein (1979) and Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) coincide. Under incomplete information, the difference between the two cases is non-trivial: the set of equilibrium payoffs in the no-discounting case is included (typically strictly) in the set of equilibrium payoffs in the discounted case. Section 2.11 explains this difference by comparing the meaning of individual rationality in each case.

Cripps et al. (2005) study reputation effects in games with strictly conflicting interests. They provide an upper bound on the payoffs of player $U$ and the normal type of player $I$. Although the authors do not state it in this way, their methods are very closely related to the derivation of the upper bound on ICR payoffs in the current paper. (Note that reputation games do not satisfy the full-dimensionality assumption; however, this assumption is not necessary for the upper bound on ICR payoffs.) In fact, biaffine functions lead to a simple argument for reputational effects, and they can be used to show that these effects are continuous with respect to games that have only close to strictly conflicting interests.

2. Model and main result

This section introduces the model and definitions, then states the main result.

2.1 Notation

For any $v \in \mathbb{R}^K$, let $\|v\|$ be the Euclidean length of $v$. Let $\Phi^d \subseteq \mathbb{R}^d$ be a set of all unitary vectors in $\mathbb{R}^d$: $\Phi^d = \{ \phi \in \mathbb{R}^d : \|\phi\| = 1 \}$. Let $\Phi^d_+ \subseteq \Phi^d$ be the subset of vectors with nonnegative coordinates: $\Phi^d_+ = \{ \phi : \phi_k \geq 0 \}$. I use the following set operators. For any set $A$, let $\Delta A$ denote the set of probability distributions on $A$. For any $A \subseteq \mathbb{R}^3$,

- $\text{int} A$ denotes the interior of $A$ (the largest open set contained in $A$)
- $\text{cl} A$ denotes the closure of $A$ (the smallest closed set containing $A$)
- $\text{proj} A$ denotes the projection of $A$ on its last two coordinates:
  \[ \text{proj} A = \{(v_0, v_1) : \text{there is } v_U \text{ such that } (v_U, v_0, v_1) \in A \} \]
- $\text{con} A$ denotes the convexification of $A$ (the smallest convex set containing $A$).

2.2 Repeated game

Two players, uninformed $U$ and informed $I$, repeatedly play a stage game. There are finite sets of pure actions $S_U$ for player $U$ and $S_I$ for player $I$. Player $I$ knows the state of the world $k \in \{0, 1\}$. I say that $k$ is a type of player $I$ and write $-k = 1 - k$. Player $I$’s payoffs in the stage game depend on the state of the world and are given by $g_k : S_U \times S_I \to \mathbb{R}$. 
Player $U$’s payoffs do not depend on the state of the world (known-payoff case) and are given by $g_U: S_U \times S_I \to \mathbb{R}$. Let $M$ denote the uniform bound on payoffs:

$$M = \max_{i=U,0,1} \max_{a_U \in S_U, a_I \in S_I} |g_i(a_U,a_I)|.$$  

(1)

Players have access to a public randomization device (this assumption is for convenience only and can be dropped using standard arguments). Let $H_t = (S_U \times S_I \times [0,1])^t$ be the space of $t$-period histories of actions and public signals. A (behavior) strategy of player $U$ is a mapping $\sigma_U : \cup_t H_t \to \Delta S_U$. A (behavior) strategy of player $I$ of type $k$ is a mapping $\sigma_k : \cup_t H_t \to \Delta S_U$. A strategy profile is a triple $\sigma = (\sigma_U, \sigma_0, \sigma_1)$.

Future payoffs are discounted by the factor $\delta < 1$, the same for each player. Let $\Gamma(p, \delta)$ denote the game with initial prior $p$ and discount factor $\delta$. Let $v_k(\sigma_U, \sigma_k)$ denote the repeated game payoff of type $k$ when player $U$ uses the strategy $\sigma_U$ and player $I$ uses $\sigma_k$. Let $v_U(\sigma_U, \sigma_k)$ denote the payoff of player $U$ facing type $k$. The expected payoff of player $U$ in the game with initial prior $p$ is equal to $p v_U(\sigma_U, \sigma_k) + (1-p)v_U(\sigma_U, \sigma_0)$. Denote the vector of payoffs as follows:

$$v^p(\sigma_U, \sigma_0, \sigma_1) = (p v_U(\sigma_U, \sigma_1) + (1-p)v_U(\sigma_U, \sigma_0), v_0(\sigma_U, \sigma_0), v_1(\sigma_U, \sigma_1)).$$

2.3 Nash equilibria

A strategy profile $\sigma = (\sigma_U, \sigma_0, \sigma_1)$ is a Nash equilibrium if $\sigma_U$ is a best response for player $U$ and $\sigma_k$ ($k = 0, 1$) is a best response for type $k$ of player $I$. Denote the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs in the game $\Gamma(p, \delta)$ by

$$NE_\delta(p) = \{v^p(\sigma) : \sigma \text{ is a Nash equilibrium}\}.$$ 

The correspondence $NE_\delta : [0,1] \rightrightarrows \mathbb{R}^3$ can be treated as a subset of $[0,1] \times \mathbb{R}^3$. Define $NE \subseteq [0,1] \times \mathbb{R}^3$ by

$$NE = \bigcap_{\delta < 1} \text{cl} \bigcup_{\delta \leq \delta' < 1} NE_{\delta'}.$$ 

The correspondence $NE$ describes the largest reasonable definition of the limit set of equilibrium payoffs as $\delta \to 1$. Notice that $NE$ is necessarily closed and can be treated as an upper hemi-continuous correspondence $NE : [0,1] \rightrightarrows \mathbb{R}^3$.

2.4 Finitely revealing equilibria

An updating rule is a mapping $p : \cup H_t \to [0,1]$, such that $p(\emptyset) = p$. The rule $p$ is consistent with $\sigma$ if, given any history $h_t$, beliefs are updated via Bayes’ formula after any action $a_i \in S_I$ such that $\sigma_k(h_t)(a_i) > 0$ for some $k = 0, 1$. The rule $p$ is SR-consistent (consistent with support restriction) if, additionally, $U$’s beliefs never change after any history along which player $I$ has already fully revealed her type (if $p(h_t) \in \{0,1\}$ then $p(h_t, h_s) = p(h_t)$ for any continuation history $(h_t, h_s)$).

A profile $\sigma$ is sequentially rational given the updating rule $p$ if, after any history $h_t$, the continuation strategies are best responses to the strategy of the opponent and beliefs $p(h_t)$.

Madrigal et al. (1987) discuss various support restrictions in equilibria of extensive form games.
Fix strategies $\sigma_0$, $\sigma_1$ of player $I$ and an updating rule $p$. For any history $h_t$, period $t$ is a period of revelation if (a) there is uncertainty about the types of player $I$ ($p(h_t) \notin \{0,1\}$) and (b) the types of player $I$ play different (possibly mixed) actions at period $t$ ($\sigma_0(h_t) \neq \sigma_1(h_t)$). Say that strategy $\sigma_I$ is $K$-revealing for some $K$ if there is an SR-consistent updating rule $p$ such that for any $t$, along any history $h_t$ the number of periods of revelation $t' < t$ is not greater than $K$.

For example, if $p_0 \in \{0,1\}$, then the beliefs remain constant along any path ($p_t(h_t) = p_0$), and any profile is 0-revealing. If there is initial uncertainty about the type of player $I$ ($p_0 \notin \{0,1\}$), then in any 0-revealing profile $\sigma$, two types of player $I$ play the same strategy along any path. The payoff in a 0-revealing $\sigma$ belongs to the convex hull of the stage-game payoffs when player $I$’s types play the same action:

$$v^p(\sigma) \in V = \text{con}\{(g_U(a_U,a_I), g_0(a_U,a_I), g_1(a_U,a_I)) : a_U \in S_U \text{ and } a_I \in S_I\}.$$ (2)

The set $V \subseteq \mathbb{R}^3$ is called a set of feasible non-revealing payoffs. Note for further reference that $V$ is spanned by finitely many vertices.

If player $I$ follows a $K$-revealing strategy, it does not mean that she will stop revealing any information after $K$ periods. In particular, a $K$-revealing strategy does not put any bound on the occurrence of the last period of revelation. Also, a $K$-revealing strategy does not require player $I$ to reveal her information fully.

A profile $\sigma = (\sigma_U, \sigma_0, \sigma_1)$ is a $K$-revealing equilibrium if there is an updating rule $p$ that is SR-consistent with $\sigma$, $\sigma$ is sequentially rational given $p$, and $(\sigma_0, \sigma_1)$ is $K$-revealing given $p$. Any $K$-revealing equilibrium satisfies the conditions for a sequential equilibrium in Kreps and Wilson (1982).$^3$ Denote the correspondence of payoffs in all finitely revealing equilibria in game $\Gamma(p, \delta)$ by

$$FE_\delta(p) = \bigcup_{K=0}^{\infty} \{v^p(\sigma) : \sigma \text{ is a } K\text{-revealing equilibrium}\}.$$ 

Define the limit correspondence $FE$ as

$$FE = \bigcup_{\delta < 1} \text{int} \bigcap_{\delta \leq \delta' < 1} FE_{\delta'}.$$ 

The correspondence $FE$ consists of all interior equilibrium payoffs in finitely revealing equilibria for a sufficiently high discount factor $\delta$. It is the smallest possible reasonable definition of the limit set of finitely revealing equilibrium payoffs as $\delta \to 1$. (Note that the definitions of $NE$ and $FE$ interchange intersection and union to obtain the largest and the smallest reasonable definitions.)

### 2.5 Individual rationality

Let $(\sigma_U, \sigma_0, \sigma_1)$ be a Nash equilibrium profile. The expected payoff of player $U$ is not smaller than $U$’s minmax value; similarly, the weighted average of the expected payoffs

$^3$Strictly speaking, it satisfies an appropriate extension of Kreps and Wilson’s (1982) conditions to games with infinitely many stages. See also the discussion in Mailath and Samuelson (2006).
of the types of player \( I \) is not smaller than the weighted \( \minmax \) of player \( I \):

\[
p v_U(\sigma_U, \sigma_1) + (1-p) v_U(\sigma_U, \sigma_0) \geq m_U = \max_{\sigma_U \in \Delta \Sigma_U} \min_{a_i \in \Delta \Sigma_I} g_U(a_U, a_I)
\]

and

\[
\phi_0 v_0(\sigma_U, \sigma_0) + \phi_1 v_1(\sigma_U, \sigma_1) \geq m_t(\phi) = \max_{\sigma_U \in \Delta \Sigma_U} \min_{a_i \in \Delta \Sigma_I} \sum_{k=0,1} \phi_k g_k(a_U, a_I) \text{ for any } \phi \in \Phi_+^2.
\]

For example, let \( \phi_k^* \in \Phi_+^2 \) be such that \( \phi_k^* 1 = 1 \) and \( \phi_k^* 0 = 0 \). Then \( m_t(\phi_k^*) \) is the \( \minmax \) payoff of type \( k \) in the complete information repeated game between player \( U \) and type \( k \). This is standard (see Hart 1985 or Sorin 1999). Define the set of \emph{individually rational} payoffs as

\[
IR = \{(v_U, v_0, v_1) : v_U \geq m_U \text{ and } \forall \phi \in \Phi_+^2, \phi \cdot (v_0, v_1) \geq m_t(\phi)\}.
\]

Say that the profile \( \sigma \) satisfies \emph{ex ante} individual rationality if \( v^p(\sigma) \in IR \). Let \( v^p(h_t)(\sigma|h_t) \) denote the vector of expected continuation payoffs after the history \( h_t \), given the strategy profile \( \sigma \) and an SR-consistent updating rule \( p \). The profile \( \sigma \) satisfies the condition \( IR \) if

\[
IR: v^p(h_t)(\sigma|h_t) \in IR \text{ after any positive probability history } h_t \text{ (where positive probability is with respect to the prior beliefs of player } U).\)

The condition \( IR \) requires that individual rationality hold not only ex ante but also after any positive probability history. Of course, any equilibrium profile satisfies \( IR \).

2.6 \textbf{Incentive compatibility}

Say that the profile \( \sigma \) satisfies the condition \( IC \) if

\[
 IC: \text{Given the strategy of player } U, \text{ each type } k \text{ of } I \text{ is indifferent between the pure strategies in the support of her own mixed strategy and weakly prefers any such pure strategy to any pure strategy in the support of the mixed strategy of type } -k.
\]

If the profile \( \sigma \) satisfies \( IC \), then

\[
v_0(\sigma_U, \sigma_0) \geq v_0(\sigma_U, \sigma_1) \text{ and } v_1(\sigma_U, \sigma_1) \geq v_1(\sigma_U, \sigma_0). \tag{4}
\]

Recall the set \( V \) of feasible non-revealing payoffs defined in (2). Consider the correspondence

\[
E^{IC}(p) = \{(p v_U^0 + (1-p) v_U^1, v_0, v_1) : v^0, v^1 \in V \text{ such that } v_0^0 \geq v_0^1 \text{ and } v_1^1 \geq v_1^0\}. \tag{5}
\]

Because of (4), if \( \sigma \) satisfies the \( IC \) condition, then \( v_U^p(\sigma) \in E^{IC}(p) \). On the other hand, one can show that each vector \( v \in \text{int} E^{IC}(p) \) is the payoff in a profile that satisfies
the IC condition when $\delta$ is sufficiently high.\footnote{Because $\nu \in \text{int} E^{E,I,C}(p)$, there exist $\nu^0, \nu^1 \in \text{int} V$ such that $\nu = (p\nu_0^1 + (1-p)\nu_0^0, \nu_0^0, \nu_1^1)$, $\nu_0^0 \geq \nu_0^1$, and $\nu_1^1 \geq \nu_0^1$. Fix any two actions $a_0^*, a_1^* \in S_I$ such that $a_0^* \neq a_1^*$. Fix an action $a_U^* \in S_U$. Define $\hat{v}^k = \frac{1}{\delta} (\nu^k - (1-\delta)(g_U(a_U^*, a_U^*, a_U^*, a_U^*), g_U(a_U^*, a_U^*, a_U^*, a_U^*))).$ For sufficiently high $\delta$, $\hat{v}^k \in V$. Find strategy profiles $\sigma^k$ such that $\nu^k(\sigma^k) = \hat{v}^k$ for $k = 0, 1$. (Such profiles exist because $\hat{v}^k \in V; public randomization may need to be used.) Construct a strategy profile $\sigma^*$ such that $\sigma^*(\emptyset) = (a_U^*, a_U^*, a_U^*), \sigma^*(a_U, a_U^*, a_U^*) = \sigma^k$, and $\sigma^*(a_U, a_I) = \sigma^1$ for any $a_U$ and any $a_I \neq a_U^*$. Then $\sigma^*$ satisfies the IC condition and $\nu^\partial(\sigma^*) = \nu$.}} For this reason, I refer to $E^{E,I,C}$ as the correspondence of feasible and incentive compatible payoffs.

Because the sets $E^{E,I,C}(k)$, $k = 0, 1$ are important later, it is helpful to develop some intuition into how they are constructed. Figure 1 presents the construction of the set $E^{E,I,C}(0)$. The left-hand side shows an example of the set of non-revealing payoffs $V$. The solid line outlines the projection of $V$ onto the payoffs of the player $I$ types, proj $V$; the shaded area is the set of payoffs of $I$ that are associated with individually rational payoffs of $U$, proj $\{\nu \in V : \nu_U \geq m_U\}$. Four payoff vectors $\nu^0, \nu^1, \nu_0, \nu_1 \in V$ are indicated. Notice that $\nu_1^1 \geq \nu_0^0$ and $\nu_0^0 \geq \nu_1^0$, hence $\nu = (\nu_0^0, \nu_0^1, \nu_1^1) \in E^{E,I,C}(0)$. Similarly, $u = (u_0^0, u_0^1, u_1^1) \in E^{E,I,C}(0)$. The right-hand side of Figure 1 presents proj $E^{E,I,C}(0)$ (solid line) and proj $\{\nu \in E^{E,I,C}(0) : \nu_U \geq m_U\}$ (shaded area). In particular, because $(\nu_0^0, \nu_1^0)$ belongs to the shaded area on the left-hand side, $(\nu_0, \nu_1)$ belongs to the shaded area on the right-hand side. On the other hand, because $(u_0^0, u_1^0)$ does not belong to the shaded area on the left-hand side, $(u_0, u_1)$ does not belong to the shaded area on the right-hand side.

### 2.7 ICR profiles

A strategy profile $\sigma$ is an ICR profile if it satisfies the IR and IC conditions. Note that the continuation profile of an ICR profile after any positive probability history is also an ICR profile. Denote the set of payoffs in all ICR profiles in the game $\Gamma(p, \delta)$ and the limit
correspondence by

\[
ICR_\delta(p) = \{ v^P(\sigma) : \sigma \text{ is an ICR profile} \}
\]

\[
ICR = \bigcap_{\delta<1} \text{cl} \bigcup_{\delta \leq \delta' < 1} ICR_{\delta'}
\]

Any equilibrium profile is necessarily an ICR profile, but not the reverse. In an ICR profile, player \( U \) is not required to best-respond to player \( I \), and there might be profitable deviations for each of the types of player \( I \) as long as they do not belong to the supports of the mixed strategies of the two types.

2.8 Feasible, incentive compatible and ex ante individually rational payoffs

Let

\[
E_p = \text{IR} \cap E^{E,IC}(p).
\]

Here, \( E_p \) is the set of feasible, incentive compatible, and \textit{ex ante} individually rational payoffs. As a corollary to the previous sections, we obtain the following result.

**Corollary 1.** For any \( \delta < 1 \) and any \( p \in [0, 1] \),\( \text{NE}_\delta(p) \subseteq ICR_\delta(p) \subseteq E_p \).

In general, the last inclusion is strict. This is because the \textit{IR} condition requires individual rationality after any positive probability history, and that is, typically, more restrictive than \textit{ex ante} individual rationality. However, when the prior \( p = 0, 1 \) is degenerate, Proposition 1 in Section 3 shows that \( \text{int} E_p \subseteq \text{NE}(p) \). In particular, \( E_p \) has a non-empty interior if and only if \( \text{NE}(p) \) has a non-empty interior; in such a situation, \( E_p = \text{NE}(k) \). (An analogous result holds in the no-discounting case; see Hart 1985.)

**Figure 2** presents the steps in the construction of the sets \( E_k, k = 0, 1 \). The left-hand side presents the projections \( \text{proj } E^{E,IC}(k), k = 0, 1 \) on the sets of player \( I \)'s payoffs (compare with Figure 1). The shaded areas correspond to player \( U \)'s individually rational payoffs and the thick line bounds the payoffs that are individually rational for player \( I \). By definition, \( E_k \) is the set of these payoffs in \( E^{E,IC}(k) \) that are individually rational for the two players. The projections of the sets \( E_k \) are depicted as the shaded areas in the central part of the figure.

2.9 Full-dimensionality

**Assumption 1** (Full-dimensionality). \( \text{proj } E_0 \cap \text{proj } E_1 \neq \emptyset \).

\footnote{One can also check that}

\[
\{(v_U, v_k) : (v_U, v_k, v_{-k}) \in E_k \} = \text{con} \{(g_U(a_U, a_I), g_I(a_U, a_I)) : a_U \in S_U \text{ and } a_I \in S_I \} \cap \{(v_U, v_k) : v_U \geq m_U \text{ and } v_k \geq m_I(\phi^*) \}.
\]

Thus, the set of payoffs of player \( U \) and type \( k \) in the incomplete information game with degenerate prior \( p = k \) is equal to the set of feasible and individually rational payoffs of players \( U \) and \( I \) in the complete information game between player \( U \) and type \( k \) of player \( I \). Not surprisingly, the above result implies the complete information folk theorem.
The construction of the sets $E_0$ and $E_1$. The thick lines delineate the sets of player $I$’s individually rational payoffs. The shaded areas correspond to payoffs that are individually rational for player $U (v_U \geq m_U)$.

See the right-hand side graph of Figure 2. Full-dimensionality says that there are two interior payoff vectors $v^0 \in \text{int } E_0$ and $v^1 \in \text{int } E_1$ such that the payoffs of each type of player $I$ are equal, $v^0_k = v^1_k$ for $k = 0, 1$. The assumption relates directly to the standard requirement of full dimensionality from the folk theorem literature (for example, Fudenberg et al. 1994). The next result says that if one drops the “int” from the assumption, then it is always satisfied. The role of the assumption is explained in Section 3.3.

**Lemma 1.** $\text{proj } E_0 \cap \text{proj } E_1 \neq \emptyset$.

**Proof.** For each $k$, choose a payoff vector $v^k \in V$ that maximizes the payoff of type $k$ of player $I$ among all payoff vectors in $V$ that yield individually rational payoffs to player $U$:

$$v^k \in \arg \max_{v \in V, v_U \geq m_U} v_k.$$  

Let $a^*_U \in \Delta S_U$ be the minmax action of player $U$, i.e., the mixed action that guarantees him at least $m_U$. Then, for $k = 0, 1$,

$$v^k_k \geq \max_{a_I \in \Delta S_I} g_k(a^*_U, a_I) \text{ and } v^k_k \geq v^{-k}_k. \quad (7)$$

For $k = 0, 1$, define $u^k = (v^k_U, v^0_U, v^1_U)$. Because of (7), $u^k \in E_{EIC}(k)$. I now check that $u^k \in IR$. For any $\phi \in \Phi^2_I$,

$$m_I(\phi) \leq \max_{a_I \in \Delta S_I} \sum_{k=0,1} \phi_k g_k(a^*_U, a_I) \leq \sum_{k=0,1} \max_{a^*_I} \phi_k g_k(a^*_U, a_I) \leq \sum_{k=0,1} \phi_k v^k_k.$$  

Thus $u^k \in E_k$ and $(v^0_U, v^1_U) \in \text{proj } E_k$ for $k = 0, 1$. This yields the lemma. \qed
2.10 Main result

So far, it is clear that $FE \subseteq NE \subseteq ICR$. The main result of this paper shows that the inclusions can be replaced by equalities.

**Theorem 1.** If Assumption 1 holds, then

$$\text{cl}FE = NE = ICR.$$  

In other words, all Nash equilibrium payoffs can be approximated by payoffs in finitely revealing equilibria, and the limit set of all Nash equilibrium payoffs is equal to the limit set of payoffs in ICR profiles.

Theorem 1 is proved in parts. Section 3 characterizes a lower bound $FE^* \subseteq \text{cl}FE$. Section 4 characterizes an upper bound $ICR^* \supseteq ICR$. Section 5 shows that the two bounds are equal. Assumption 1 is used in the first and the third parts, but is not necessary for the discussion of the upper bound in Section 4.

2.11 Individual rationality and the no-discounting case

It is useful to compare the main result to the no-discounting case. Formally, define the payoffs as Banach limits of the finite period averages of stage-game payoffs (see Hart 1985). Nash equilibrium profiles are defined in the standard way. Let $NE_{nd}(p) \subseteq \mathbb{R}^3$ denote the set of payoffs in Nash equilibria. (An interested reader is encouraged to look at the excellent survey of all related methods in Sorin 1999.)

**Theorem 2** (Shalev 1994, Koren 1992). For any $k = 0, 1$,

$$NE_{nd}(k) = E_k.$$  

For any $p \in (0, 1)$,

$$NE_{nd}(p) = \{(1 - p)v_0^0 + pv_1^1, v_0, v_1) : (v_k^k, v_0, v_1) \in E_k, k = 0, 1\}.$$  

In particular, for any $p \in (0, 1)$

$$\text{proj}NE_{nd}(p) = \text{proj}E_0 \cap \text{proj}E_1.$$  

The theorem has a simple interpretation: any equilibrium payoff can be obtained in a 1-revealing equilibrium in which player 1 immediately reveals all her information and subsequently the players play the complete information game. It is shown below (Proposition 4) that, if Assumption 1 holds, then

$$NE_{nd}(p) \subseteq \text{cl}FE \subseteq NE.$$  

Thus, the payoffs in the no-discounting case are contained in the set of payoffs in the discounted case. Typically, the inclusion is strict.

The discrepancy between the two cases can be attributed to the restrictiveness of individual rationality.\(^6\) Consider the following condition:

---

\(^6\)I am grateful to Martin W. Cripps for suggesting this connection.
**IR-in-every-state:** The profile $\sigma$ satisfies IR and after any positive probability history $h_t$, $v_U(\sigma_U, \sigma_k | h_t) \geq m_U$ for any type $k$ of player $I$.

This condition says that the continuation payoffs of player $U$ are individually rational after all positive probability histories, conditional on each state of the world. In the no-discounting case, the conditions IR and IR-in-every-state are equivalent. The intuition behind this fact is very simple. If $v_U^{nd}(\sigma_U, \sigma_k) < m_U < v_U^{nd}(\sigma_U, \sigma_{-k})$, then the two types of player $I$ play substantially different mixed actions in infinitely many periods. Thus, player $U$ learns the type of player $I$ in finite time, with a probability arbitrarily close to 1. Upon learning that player $I$ has type $k$, player $U$ should play a best response, which guarantees him a payoff of at least $m_U$. Since the payoffs received in finitely many periods do not matter, it must be that $v_U^{nd}(\sigma_U, \sigma_k) \geq m_U$. This yields a contradiction.

In the discounted case, IR-in-every-state implies IR, but IR is typically weaker. To see why IR does not imply IR-in-every-state, notice that, in the discounted case, the payoffs in each period matter. It may happen that player $U$ agrees on a low-payoff action today only because he counts on a reward tomorrow if player $I$ turns out to be of type $k$. If today’s action yields a payoff lower than $m_U$ and tomorrow’s continuation payoff given type $-k$ is equal to $m_U$, then today’s discounted payoff given type $-k$ is lower than $m_U$.

Because the condition IR is usually less restrictive than IR-in-every-state in the discounted case, one should expect that a larger set of profiles can be sustained as equilibria in the discounted case.

**3. Lower bound—finitely revealing equilibria**

In this section, I characterize the sets of payoffs in finitely revealing equilibria. It is convenient to consider separately equilibria in which player $I$ begins with a non-revealing strategy (Section 3.1) and when she reveals some information (Section 3.2). In the last part, I construct a lower bound $FE^*$ on the correspondence of finitely revealing payoffs $FE$.

### 3.1 Non-revealing strategies

Let $v$ be the payoff in an equilibrium of the game $\Gamma(p, \delta)$ and let $v(a_U, a_I)$ be the continuation payoffs. Let $a_U^*$ and $a_I^*$ denote the first period mixed action of player $U$ and type $k$ of player $I$. Denote also the expected action of player $I$ by $a_I^* = p a_I^* + (1-p) a_0^*$. Then, by the definition of continuation payoffs,

$$
v_U = (1-\delta) g_U(a_I^*, a_I^*) + \delta v_U(a_I^*, a_I^*),
$$

$$
v_k = (1-\delta) g_k(a_I^*, a_k^*) + \delta v_k(a_I^*, a_k^*) \text{ for } k = 0, 1.
$$

Because $v$ is an equilibrium payoff, incentive compatibility must hold: for any $a_U, a_0$, and $a_1$,

$$
v_U \geq (1-\delta) g_U(a_U, a_I^*) + \delta v_U(a_U, a_I^*)
$$

$$
v_k \geq (1-\delta) g_k(a_U, a_k) + \delta v_k(a_U, a_k) \text{ for } k = 0, 1.
$$
If player $I$ does not reveal any information in the first period, then the posterior beliefs of player $U$ do not change. Thus, $v(a_U, a_I)$ are equilibrium payoffs in the game with the same initial prior. Such payoffs can be analyzed using the self-generation technique of Abreu et al. (1990) that is further extended in Fudenberg et al. (1994), Fudenberg and Levine (1994), and Kandori and Matsushima (1998). It is convenient to solve the following problem. Recall that $\Phi \in \mathbb{R}^3$ is the space of unit vectors in $\mathbb{R}^3$, and fix $\phi \in \Phi$. What is the highest possible value of $\phi \cdot v$ if, after any realized action profile $(a_U, a_I)$, the continuation payoffs lie below a hyperplane $\phi$ that passes through $v$,

$$\phi \cdot v(a_U, a_I) \leq \phi \cdot v? \quad (10)$$

It cannot be larger than

$$\eta(\phi, p) = \max_{\phi} \phi \cdot v \text{ such that there are mixed actions } \alpha^*_U \in \Delta S_U, \alpha^*_0, \alpha^*_1 \in \Delta S_I \text{ and continuation payoffs } v : S_U \times S_I \to \mathbb{R}^3 \text{ so that}$$

(1) equations (8) hold
(2) the incentive compatibility inequalities (9) hold
(3) payoff corrections are separated from the origin by the hyperplane $\phi$: inequalities (10) hold
(4) player $I$ plays non-revealing strategies: if $p \in (0, 1)$, then $\alpha^*_0 = \alpha^*_1$.

There are two differences between the way that problem (11) is formulated and the literature on games with imperfect monitoring. First, condition (4) requires that two types of player $I$ play the same strategies when the prior $p$ is nondegenerate. This ensures that the actions of player $I$ are non-revealing. Second, the continuation payoffs depend only on the realized action of player $I$ and not on the actions played by the two types separately. However, the reader should not expect these to cause any major difficulty. The first simply imposes a constraint on the set of available strategies; the second is dealt with in a way analogous to games with imperfect monitoring that fail identifiability (see, for example, Fudenberg and Levine 1994).

The next two results are proved in Section A of the Appendix.

**Proposition 1.** For $k = 0, 1$,

$$\text{int } E_k \subseteq \text{int } \bigcap_{\phi \in \Phi} \{v : \phi \cdot v \leq \eta(\phi, k)\} \subseteq FE(k).$$

This result constructs equilibria in which player $U$ believes that he faces type $k$ and $\phi \cdot v \leq \eta(\phi, k)$ for each continuation payoff $v$ and each $\phi$.

**Proposition 2.** Fix $p \in (0, 1)$ and set $A \subseteq FE(p)$ such that $A = \text{cl int} A$. Then

$$\text{int} \left[ \text{con} (A \cup V) \cap IR \right] \subseteq \text{int } \bigcap_{\phi \in \Phi} \left\{v : \phi \cdot v \leq \max_{v' \in A} \left[ \max_{\phi \in \Phi} \phi \cdot v', \eta(\phi, p) \right] \right\} \subseteq FE(p). \quad (12)$$
This result constructs equilibria in which player $I$ plays non-revealing strategies until the continuation payoffs fall into the set $A$. After that, players follow the equilibrium strategies associated with payoffs in $A$. If $A$ consists of finitely revealing payoffs, then such profiles are also finitely revealing equilibria. In any such equilibrium, the payoffs vector is equal to the convex combination of some $v \in V$ and $a \in A$ where the weight on $v$ depends on the expected time it takes to push the continuation payoff into $A$.

As mentioned above (Section 2.9), Proposition 1 has an exact equivalent in the no-discounting literature. The situation is only slightly different with Proposition 2. When $p \in (0,1)$, Hart (1985) shows that the set of equilibrium payoffs is convex and contained in $IR$. That result looks like equation (12), but with $V$ dropped. The difference is easy to explain: in the discounted case, periods in which player $I$ plays non-revealing actions contribute to the total discounted payoffs.

### 3.2 Revelation of information

I now show how to construct payoffs in equilibria that begin with the revelation of information. Take any $p_0 < p_1$ and subsets of finitely revealing payoffs $A_{p_j} \subseteq FE(p_j)$ for $j = 0, 1$. For any $p \in (p_0, p_1)$, define the set

$$A_p = \left\{ \left( \frac{p - p_0}{p_1 - p_0} v^1_{ij} + \frac{p_1 - p}{p_1 - p_0} v^0_{ij}, v_0, v_1 \right) : (v^1_{ij}, v_0, v_1) \in A_{p_j} \text{ for } j = 0, 1 \right\}.$$

If the sets $A_{p_j}$ are open and convex, then $A_p$ is open and convex.

**PROPOSITION 3.** If the sets $A_{p_j}$ are open and convex, then $A_p \subseteq FE(p)$ for any $p \in (p_0, p_1)$.

**PROOF.** Assume that the set $A_p$ is non-empty (otherwise there is nothing to prove). Take $v = (v^1_{ij}, v_0, v_1) \in A_p$. By the definition of $A_{p_j}$, there are payoff vectors

$$v^j = (v^j_{ij}, v_0, v_1) \in A_{p_j} \text{ for } j = 0, 1$$

such that

$$(v^j_{ij}, v_0, v_1) = \left( \frac{p - p_0}{p_1 - p_0} v^1_{ij} + \frac{p_1 - p}{p_1 - p_0} v^0_{ij}, v_0, v_1 \right) \text{ for } j = 0, 1.$$

Because sets $A_{p_0}$ and $A_{p_1}$ are open and convex, and because of the definition of the correspondence $FE$, there exist $\delta_0$ and $\epsilon > 0$ such that $FE_{\delta}(p)$ contains a ball with center at $v^j$ and radius $2\epsilon$: $B(v^j, 2\epsilon) \subseteq FE_{\delta}(p)$ for $\delta \geq \delta_0$. Assume that $\delta_0$ is high enough that $(1 - \delta_0)M \leq \epsilon$. (Recall that $M$ is defined in (1) as the uniform bound on stage game payoffs.) I show that for all $\delta \geq \delta_0$, $B(v, \epsilon) \subseteq FE_{\delta}(p)$.

Find a profile of mixed actions of player $I$, $(\alpha_0, \alpha_1)$, so that each type randomizes between all actions in such a way that the posterior after every action is equal to either $p_0$ or $p_1$. Denote by $S^I_0$ the set of actions after which the posterior is equal to $p_0$. Then $S_I = S^I_0 \cup S^I_1$. Take any mixed action $\alpha_U \in \Delta S^I_{ij}$ of player $U$. Construct continuation
payoffs \( v : S_U \times S_I \to \mathbb{R}^3 \) as follows. For \( a_I \in S_I^j \),
\[
\begin{align*}
    v_k(a_U, a_I) &= \frac{1}{\delta} \left[ v_k - (1 - \delta') g_k(a_U, a_I) \right] \text{ for } k = 0, 1 \\
    v_U(a_U, a_I) &= \frac{1}{\delta} \left[ v_U^k - (1 - \delta') g_U(a_U, p\alpha_1 + (1 - p)\alpha_0) \right].
\end{align*}
\]
Then \( v(a_U, a_I) \in B(v^j, 2\varepsilon) \), so there exist finitely revealing continuation equilibria with payoffs \( v(a_U, a_I) \). Hence \( v \) is a payoff in a finitely revealing equilibrium. □

3.3 Finitely revealing correspondence

Let \( \mathcal{F} \) be the collection of all correspondences \( F \subseteq [0, 1] \times \mathbb{R}^3 \) such that \( F(p) \in \mathbb{R}^3 \) is closed for each \( p \in [0, 1] \) and \( F \) satisfies the following properties.

\( FE-1 \) For any \( \alpha \in [0, 1] \), \( p_0 < p_1 \), and \( (v_U^k, v_0, v_1) \in F(p_k) \) for \( k = 0, 1 \),
\[
(\alpha v_U^1 + (1 - \alpha)v_U^0, v_0, v_1) \in F(\alpha p_1 + (1 - \alpha)p_0).
\]

\( FE-2 \) \( E_k \subseteq F(k) \) for \( k = 0, 1 \).

\( FE-3 \) \( \text{con}(F(p) \cup V) \cap IR \subseteq F(p) \) for \( p \in (0, 1) \).

All three properties correspond to the propositions above: \( FE-1 \) says that \( F \) contains all payoffs in equilibria that start with revealing information and later continue with payoffs in \( F \); \( FE-2 \) insures that \( F \) contains all equilibrium payoffs in states 0 and 1; and \( FE-3 \) says that \( F \) contains all payoffs in profiles that start with a non-revealing action and later continue with payoffs in \( F \).

Proposition 4. The correspondence \( FE^* = \bigcap_{F \in \mathcal{F}} F(p) \) is closed and \( FE^* \in \mathcal{F} \), i.e., it satisfies properties \( FE-1 \), \( FE-2 \), and \( FE-3 \). Moreover, if Assumption 1 holds, then
\[
FE^*(p) \subseteq \text{cl} FE(p) \text{ for any } p \in [0, 1].
\]

Proof. The fact that \( FE^* \in \mathcal{F} \) is immediate. In Section A.4 of the Appendix I show that \( FE^* \) is closed. For any \( p \in [0, 1] \), define
\[
FE'(p) = \text{clint} FE(p).
\]

In the second part of Section A.4, I show that \( FE' \in \mathcal{F} \). By the definition of \( FE^* \), \( FE^* \subseteq FE' \). This completes the proof. □

The correspondence \( FE^* \) is a lower bound on the set of finitely revealing equilibrium payoffs. This bound is characterized purely in geometric terms. Notice that the set \( FE^* \) is a function of the sets \( V \) and \( IR \). Therefore any pair of stage games that have the same minmax values and the same convex hull of non-revealing payoffs generate the same sets \( FE^* \).
This is a good place to explain the role of Assumption 1. The assumption implies that there are two open and convex sets $A_k \subseteq E_k$, $k = 0, 1$, such that

$$\text{proj} A_0 = \{(v_0, v_1) : (v^k_{U}, v_0, v_1) \in A_k \text{ for } k = 0, 1\} = \text{proj} A_1.$$ 

By Proposition 1, sets $A_k$ are contained in the sets of equilibrium payoffs for $p = k$. For each $p \in (0, 1)$, let $A_p$ be defined as in the statement of Proposition 3. Then, $A_p$ is non-empty, open, and, by the above result, contained in $FE^*(p) \subseteq \text{cl} FE(p)$. (There is a natural interpretation of the payoffs in $A_p$ as those obtained by a single full revelation of $I$’s type.) Hence, the assumption guarantees that for each $p$, the set $FE^*(p) \subseteq FE(p) \subseteq NE(p)$ has a non-empty interior. This plays the same role as the standard full-dimensionality assumption in the complete information case. Open sets give enough room to construct continuation payoffs with appropriate incentives.

4. Upper bound—ICR profiles

This section develops tools to bound the set of ICR payoffs. By Corollary 1, $\text{ICR}(k) \subseteq E_k$ for any $k = 0, 1$.

4.1 Separation with biaffine functions

The function $l : [0, 1] \times \mathbb{R}^2 \to \mathbb{R}$ is biaffine if for any $\alpha \in \mathbb{R}$, any $p, p' \in [0, 1]$, and any $(v_0, v_1), (v'_0, v'_1) \in \mathbb{R}^2$,

$$l(\alpha p + (1 - \alpha)p', v_0, v_1) = \alpha l(p, v) + (1 - \alpha)l(p', v_0, v_1)$$

$$l(p, \alpha(v_0, v_1) + (1 - \alpha)(v'_0, v'_1)) = \alpha l(p, v_0, v_1) + (1 - \alpha)l(p, v'_0, v'_1).$$

**Proposition 5.** Take any biaffine $l : [0, 1] \times \mathbb{R}^2 \to \mathbb{R}$ such that for any $k = 0, 1$ and any $(v^k_{U}, v^k_0, v^k_1) \in E_k \cup V$,

$$v^k_U < l(k, v^k_0, v^k_1).$$

Then, for any $\varepsilon > 0$, there is $\delta_0 < 1$ such that for all $\delta \geq \delta_0$, for any $p \in (0, 1)$ and $v = (v_U, v_0, v_1) \in ICR_\delta(p)$,

$$v_U \leq l(p, v_0, v_1) + \varepsilon.$$ 

Moreover, if the inequality in (13) is reversed, then the following statement continues to hold with the inequality also reversed.

Take a biaffine function $l$ that is above all ICR payoffs for degenerate priors, $k \in \{0, 1\}$ (by Corollary 1, these payoffs are contained in the set $E_k$) and above the set of non-revealing payoffs $V$ (even those non-revealing payoffs that are not individually rational). The proposition says that it is also above all ICR payoffs for any prior $p \in [0, 1]$.\footnote{Biaffine functions (or more generally, biconvex functions) were introduced in Aumann and Hart (1986) to analyze bimartingales, which Hart (1985) used in his characterization of the set of equilibrium payoffs in the no-discounting case. In the no-discounting case, the thesis of Proposition 5 holds for any biaffine function $l$ such that for any $k = 0, 1$ and any $(v^k_{U}, v^k_0, v^k_1) \in E_k$, (13) is satisfied. In particular, it is not required that $l$ lie above (below) the set of non-revealing payoffs $V$. The proof in the no-discounting case is shorter due to the bimartingale property.}
Suppose that the thesis of the proposition does not hold, and that \( v \) is a payoff in an ICR profile such that \( v_U - l(p, v_0, v_1) \geq \varepsilon > 0 \). In the proof, I propose to measure the information revealed by player \( I \)'s first period action by a specific function denoted here as \( Info \). In particular, if, in the first period, player \( I \) plays a non-revealing mixed action, then \( Info = 0 \). The proof of the proposition shows that there exists a continuation payoff vector \( v(a_U, a_I) \) such that

\[
v_U(a_U, a_I) - l(p, v_0(a_U, a_I), v_1 v_0(a_U, a_I)) \geq v_U - l(p, v_0, v_1) + O(\varepsilon - Info). \tag{14}
\]

Here, \( O(\varepsilon - Info) \) is not smaller than a term proportional to \( \varepsilon - Info \). To see some intuition, suppose that \( Info = 0 \), that is, player \( I \) plays a non-revealing action and the vector of first period payoffs belongs to \( V \). Recall that \( v \) is a convex combination of the first period payoffs and the payoffs in the continuation ICR profiles in a game with the same prior \( p \). Because the first-period payoffs belong to \( V \) and, by assumption, lie below the biaffine function \( l \), there must be at least one continuation payoff vector \( v(a_U, a_I) \) that lies further from the biaffine function \( l \) than the original payoff vector. In fact, I can bound how much \( U \)'s continuation payoff moves away from \( l \) by a term that is proportional to the distance between the original payoff of \( U \) and \( l \), which is of order \( \varepsilon \) (with a coefficient of proportionality of order \( (1 - \delta) \)).

Because of (14), the distance between \( U \)'s continuation payoff and the biaffine function \( l \) decreases only when player \( I \) reveals a substantial amount of information, and increases otherwise. However, information cannot be revealed indefinitely—at a certain moment, player \( U \) learns the type of player \( I \), and there is nothing more to reveal. But this means that the distance between \( U \)'s payoffs and the biaffine function \( l \) must grow to infinity. This leads to a contradiction. Hence, it cannot be that \( v_U - l(p, v_0, v_1) \geq \varepsilon \).

The proof of the proposition develops this intuition formally.

**Proof of Proposition 5.** Take any \((p, v) \in ICR_\delta \) such that \( p \notin \{0, 1\} \). Let \( \sigma = (\sigma_U, \sigma_0, \sigma_I) \) be a strategy profile supporting \( v \) as an ICR payoff in the game \( \Gamma(p, \delta) \). Let \( a_U = \sigma_U(\emptyset) \) be the first period mixed action of player \( U \), and \( a_k = \sigma_k(\emptyset) \) be the first period mixed action of type \( k \) player \( I \). Define the average mixed action used by player \( I \):

\[
a_I = pa_1 + (1-p)a_0.
\]

Let \( S_I = \text{supp} a_I = \text{supp} a_0 \cup \text{supp} a_1 \) be the set of actions that player \( I \) plays with positive probability. After any action \( a_I \in S_I \), player \( U \) updates his prior about the state of the world using Bayes’ formula:

\[
p(a_I) = \frac{pa_1(a_I)}{a_I(a_I)}.
\]

For any positive probability pair of actions \( a_U \in \text{supp} a_U \) and \( a_I \in S_I \), the continuation payoffs \( v(a_U, a_I) \) are payoffs in an ICR profile. Let \( w(a_U, a_I) \in \mathbb{R}^2 \) denote the continuation payoffs of the two types of \( I \) that would make them indifferent across all actions in \( S_I \):

\[
w_k(a_U, a_I) = v_k(a_U, a_I) + \frac{1}{\delta} [v_k(1 - \delta) g_k(a_U, a_I) - \delta v_k(a_U, a_I)]. \tag{15}
\]
If type $k$ of player $I$ plays action $a_I$ with positive probability (i.e., $a_I \in \text{supp} a_k$), then $v_k(a_U,a_I) = w_k(a_U,a_I)$; otherwise, $v_k(a_U,a_I) \leq w_k(a_U,a_I)$. This follows from the IC condition.

Suppose that the hypothesis of the proposition is satisfied, i.e., for any $k = 0,1$ and any $(v_0^k, v_1^k, v_I^k) \in E_k \cup V$, $v_0^k < l(k, v_0^k, v_I^k)$. (The case of the reverse inequality is completely analogous.) I relegate two technical steps to the appendix. Section B.1 shows that when $\delta$ is sufficiently high, then, for any $a_I$ such that $p(a_I) \in [0,1]$,

$$v_U(a_U,a_I) - l(p(a_I), w(a_U,a_I)) < 0. \tag{16}$$

Section B.2 finds a constant $C < \infty$ such that, if

$$v_U - l(p,v_0,v_1) \geq \frac{\varepsilon}{2},$$

then

$$\sum_{a_I \in S_I} a_I(a_I)\left[v_U(a_U,a_I) - (l(p(a_I), w(a_U,a_I)) - \frac{1-\delta}{\delta} \frac{C}{\varepsilon} (p(a_I))^2)\right] > v_U - \left(l(p,v_0,v_1) - \frac{1-\delta}{\delta} \frac{C}{\varepsilon} p^2\right) + \frac{1-\delta}{4\delta} \varepsilon. \tag{17}$$

The constant $C$ depends on the payoffs in the stage game and on the biaffine function $l$, but not on $\varepsilon$ or $\delta$.

Fix $\varepsilon > 0$ and choose $\delta$ high enough that $((1-\delta)/\delta)(C/\varepsilon) \leq \frac{1}{4} \varepsilon$. Choose $(p^*, v^*) \in \text{ICR}_\delta$ so that

$$\left[v_U^* - \left(l(p^*,v_0^*,v_1^*) - \frac{1-\delta}{\delta} \frac{C}{\varepsilon} (p^*)^2\right)\right] \geq \sup_{(p,v) \in \text{ICR}_\delta} \left[v_U - \left(l(p,v_0,v_1) - \frac{1-\delta}{\delta} \frac{C}{\varepsilon} p^2\right)\right] - \frac{1-\delta}{8\delta} \varepsilon.$$

Suppose that $v_U^* - l(p^*,v_0^*,v_1^*) \geq \frac{1}{2} \varepsilon$. Because of (17), there is an action $a_I \in S_I$ such that

$$v_U^*(a_U,a_I) - (l(p(a_I), w^*(a_U,a_I)) - \frac{1-\delta}{\delta} \frac{C}{\varepsilon} (p(a_I))^2) > v_U^* - \left(l(p^*,v_0^*,v_1^*) - \frac{1-\delta}{\delta} \frac{C}{\varepsilon} (p^*)^2\right) + \frac{1-\delta}{4\delta} \varepsilon. \tag{18}$$

Because

$$\frac{1-\delta}{\delta} \frac{C}{\varepsilon} (p(a_I))^2 - \frac{1-\delta}{\delta} \frac{C}{\varepsilon} (p^*)^2 \leq \frac{1-\delta}{\delta} \frac{C}{\varepsilon} \leq \frac{\varepsilon}{4},$$

it must be that

$$v_U^*(a_U,a_I) - l(p(a_I), w^*(a_U,a_I)) > \frac{\varepsilon}{2} - \frac{\varepsilon}{4} > 0.$$

Hence, by (16), $p(a_I) \in (0,1)$ and $w^*(a_U,a_I) = (v_0^*(a_U,a_I), v_1^*(a_U,a_I))$. Together with (18), this means that there exists an action $a_U \in S_U$ such that $v_U^*(a_U,a_I)$ is a payoff in an ICR profile and

$$v_U^*(a_U,a_I) - (l(p(a_I), v_0^*(a_U,a_I), v_1^*(a_U,a_I)) - \frac{1-\delta}{\delta} \frac{C}{\varepsilon} (p(a_I))^2) > v_U^* - \left(l(p,v_0^*,v_1^*) - \frac{1-\delta}{\delta} \frac{C}{\varepsilon} p^2\right) + \frac{1-\delta}{4\delta} \varepsilon.$$
(Note that the above bound corresponds to (14) with $\text{Info}(a_1) = 4(C/\varepsilon)((p(a_1))^2 - p^2)$.) This contradicts the choice of $(p^*, v^*)$. The contradiction implies that $v^*_U - l(p^*, v^*_0, v^*_1) < \frac{1}{2}\varepsilon$, and for each $\varepsilon > 0$, each $\delta$ such that $\max(((1 - \delta)/\delta)(C/\varepsilon), ((1 - \delta)/(4\delta))\varepsilon) \leq \frac{1}{4}\varepsilon$, and for each $(p, v) \in \text{ICR}_\delta$,

$$v_U - l(p, v_0, v_1) \leq v^*_U - l(p^*, v^*_0, v^*_1) + \frac{1 - \delta}{\delta} C \frac{C}{\varepsilon} (p^*)^2 - \frac{1 - \delta}{\delta} C \frac{C}{\varepsilon} p^2 + \frac{1 - \delta}{4\delta} \varepsilon,$$

$$\leq \frac{\varepsilon}{2} + \frac{\varepsilon}{3} + \frac{\varepsilon}{4} = \varepsilon.$$

\[\square\]

4.2 The ICR correspondence

Due to Proposition 5, one can use information about ICR payoffs in games with degenerate priors $p \in \{0, 1\}$ to derive a bound on the payoffs in games with $p \in (0, 1)$. The bound is not tight, and it can be tightened through a natural generalization. Suppose that one has some information about ICR payoffs for some priors $p_0, p_1$, such that $p_0 < p_1$. This information can be used to bound the sets of ICR payoffs $ICR(p)$ for all priors $p \in (p_0, p_1)$. Let $\mathcal{I}$ be a collection of correspondences $I \subseteq [0, 1) \times \mathbb{R}^3$ such that

**ICR-1** $I(p) \subseteq IR$ for $p \in [0, 1)$.

**ICR-2** $I(k) \subseteq E_k$ for $k = 0, 1$.

**ICR-3** Fix any $0 \leq p_0 < p_1 \leq 1$ and an any biaffine function $l : [0, 1) \times \mathbb{R}^2 \to \mathbb{R}$ such that for any $(v^*_U, v^*_0, v^*_1) \in I(p_1) \cup V$, $j = 0, 1$,

$$v^*_j \leq l(p_j, v^*_0, v^*_1) \text{ (or } v^*_j > l(p_1, v^*_0, v^*_1)).$$

Then, for any $\alpha \in (0, 1)$ and any $(v_U, v_0, v_1) \in I(\alpha p_1 + (1 - \alpha)p_0)$,

$$v_U \leq l(\alpha p_1 + (1 - \alpha)p_0, v_0, v_1) \text{ (or } v_U \geq l(\alpha p_1 + (1 - \alpha)p_0, v_0, v_1)).$$

Property ICR-1 says that all payoffs are individually rational. Property ICR-2 says that $I(k)$ is contained in the set of equilibrium payoffs for degenerate priors $k \in \{0, 1\}$. Properties 1 and 2 correspond to Corollary 1. Property 3 is a separation property. It extends the thesis of Proposition 5 to cover cases when $p_0 > 0$ or $p_1 < 1$.

**Proposition 6.** The correspondence $ICR^* = \bigcup_{I \in \mathcal{I}} I$ is closed and $ICR^* \in \mathcal{I}$. Moreover, $ICR \subseteq ICR^*$ and $ICR^*$ satisfies properties FE-1 and FE-3.

Proposition 6 defines a geometric upper bound $ICR^*$ for the set of ICR payoffs. In addition to properties ICR-1, ICR-2, and ICR-3, the proposition shows that the correspondence $ICR^*$ satisfies properties FE-1 and FE-3 (defined in Section 3.3). The proof of the proposition is based on the methods used in the proof Proposition 5 and can be found in Section B.3.

Notice that conditions ICR-1, ICR-2, and ICR-3 that define the correspondence $ICR^*$ are stated in purely geometrical terms and that they depend only on the sets $V$ and $IR$. Thus, two games with the same convex hull of non-revealing payoffs and the same sets of individually rational payoffs generate the same correspondence $ICR^*$. This remark corresponds to an analogous observation about the correspondence $FE^*$. 

5. Proof of the main result

In the previous two sections, I construct correspondences \( FE^* \) and \( ICR^* \). By Proposition 6, the correspondence \( ICR^* \) contains the correspondence \( ICR \). If Assumption 1 is satisfied, Proposition 4 says that the correspondence \( FE^* \) is contained in the correspondence \( cl FE \). Hence, Theorem 1 is a consequence of Propositions 4 and 6 and the following result.

**Theorem 3.** Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then for any \( p \in [0, 1] \),

\[
FE^*(p) = ICR^*(p).
\]

The characterizations in Sections 3 and 4 derive two collections of geometric properties that are satisfied by the correspondences \( FE^* \) and \( ICR^* \). These properties lead to constraints on the infinitesimal changes in \( FE^*(p) \) and \( ICR^*(p) \) with respect to infinitesimal changes of \( p \). These constraints are different, but related. The idea of the proof of Theorem 3 is to make use of these constraints and show that they can be satisfied by only one correspondence. This is done through a “differential technique.” The rest is divided into three parts. First, I describe the correspondences \( FE^* \) and \( ICR^* \) through their upper and lower surfaces. It is sufficient to show that the respective surfaces of the two correspondences are equal. In the second part, I demonstrate that the upper surfaces of the two correspondences are equal. The last part deals with lower surfaces.

5.1 Description of the correspondences \( FE^* \) and \( ICR^* \)

Define functions

\[
u^I, u^F, l^I, l^F : [0, 1] \times \mathbb{R}^2 \to \mathbb{R} \cup \{-\infty, \infty\}
\]

in the following way. Let

\[
u^F(p)(v_0, v_1) = \sup\{v_U : (v_U, v_0, v_1) \in \text{con}[FE^*(p) \cup V]\}
\]

\[
u^I(p)(v_0, v_1) = \sup\{v_U : (v_U, v_0, v_1) \in \text{con}[ICR^*(p) \cup V]\}
\]

if the sets are not empty and \(-\infty\) otherwise. For example, \( u^I(p)(v_0, v_1) > -\infty \) if and only if \((v_0, v_1) \in \text{proj con}[ICR^*(p) \cup V]\). The functions \( u^I \) and \( u^F \) describe the upper surfaces of the correspondences \( ICR^*(p) \) and \( FE^*(p) \). Next, let

\[
l^F(p)(v_0, v_1) = \inf\{v_U : (v_U, v_0, v_1) \in \text{con}[FE^*(p) \cup V]\}
\]

\[
l^I(p)(v_0, v_1) = \inf\{v_U : (v_U, v_0, v_1) \in \text{con}[ICR^*(p) \cup V]\}
\]

if the sets are not empty and \(+\infty\) otherwise. The functions \( l^I, l^F \) describe the lower surfaces of the two correspondences. By property FE-3 of the correspondences \( FE^* \) and \( ICR^* \) (Proposition 6), for each \( p \in [0, 1] \),

\[
FE^*(p) = \{v \in IR : l^F(p)(v_0, v_1) \leq v_U \leq u^F(p)(v_0, v_1)\}
\]

\[
ICR^*(p) = \{v \in IR : l^I(p)(v_0, v_1) \leq v_U \leq u^I(p)(v_0, v_1)\}.
\]
Because $FE^* \subseteq ICR^*$, it must be that
\[
  u^F(p)(v_0, v_1) \leq u^I(p)(v_0, v_1) \quad (19)
\]
\[
  l^I(p)(v_0, v_1) \leq l^F(p)(v_0, v_1). \quad (20)
\]

To prove Theorem 3, it is sufficient to show that the inequalities (19) and (20) can be in fact replaced by equalities.

The next lemma collects all the properties of the functions $u^I, u^F, l^I, l^F$ that are needed for the subsequent proofs.

**Lemma 2.** The functions $u^I, u^F, l^I, l^F$ have the following properties.

(i) $u^F(k)(v_0, v_1) = u^I(k)(v_0, v_1)$ and $l^F(k)(v_0, v_1) = l^I(k)(v_0, v_1)$, for $k = 0, 1$.

(ii) $u^I$ and $u^F$ are concave in $(v_0, v_1)$ and $l^I$ and $l^F$ are convex in $(v_0, v_1)$.

(iii) $u^I$ is convex in $p$; $u^I$ is linear in $p$ above the individually rational payoffs: if for some $p_0 < p_1$ and $(v_0, v_1) \in \text{proj } IR$,
\[
  u^I(p_k)(v_0, v_1) \geq m_U, \text{ for } k = 0, 1,
\]
then, for any $p \in [p_0, p_1]$,
\[
  u^I(p)(v_0, v_1) = \frac{p - p_0}{p_1 - p_0} u^I(p_1)(v_0, v_1) + \frac{p_1 - p}{p_1 - p_0} u^I(p_0)(v_0, v_1).
\]

\(l^I\) is concave in $p$.

(iv) $u^F$ is concave in $p$ above the individually rational payoffs: if for some $p_0 < p_1$, $(v_0, v_1) \in \text{proj } IR$,
\[
  u^F(p_k)(v_0, v_1) \geq m_U, \text{ for } k = 0, 1,
\]
then, for any $p \in [p_0, p_1]$,
\[
  u^F(p)(v_0, v_1) \geq \frac{p - p_0}{p_1 - p_0} u^F(p_1)(v_0, v_1) + \frac{p_1 - p}{p_1 - p_0} u^F(p_0)(v_0, v_1).
\]

\(l^F\) is convex in $p$ above the individually rational payoffs: if for some $p_0 < p_1$, $(v_0, v_1) \in \text{proj } IR$,
\[
  l^F(p_k)(v_0, v_1) \geq m_U, \text{ for } k = 0, 1,
\]
then, for any $p \in [p_0, p_1]$,
\[
  l^F(p)(v_0, v_1) \leq \frac{p - p_0}{p_1 - p_0} l^F(p_1)(v_0, v_1) + \frac{p_1 - p}{p_1 - p_0} l^F(p_0)(v_0, v_1).
\]

**Proof.** Part (i) is a consequence of FE-2 and ICR-2. Part (ii) comes from the definitions of the functions $u^I, u^F, l^I, l^F$. Part (iii) is a consequence of ICE-3 and Proposition 6 (the fact that $ICR^*$ satisfies property FE-1). Part (iv) is implied by property FE-3 of the correspondence $FE^*$.
Suppose that, instead of part (iv) of Lemma 2, its stronger version were true. More precisely, suppose that the function $u^E$ is known to be concave in $p$ for all $p$ and $(v_0, v_1)$. Because of (19), $u^E(p) \geq u^I(p)$ for all $p$, and, because of part (i) of the lemma, $u^E(p) = u^I(p)$ for $p = 0, 1$. Because of part (iii), $u'$ and $l'$ are convex in all $p$, which implies that $u^E(p) = u^I(p)$ for all $p$, and the correspondences $ICR^*$ and $FE^*$ are equal. Unfortunately, the stronger version of part (iv) of the lemma is not generally true; the fact that the functions $u^E$ and $l^E$ are known to be, respectively, concave and convex only above the individually rational payoffs is the main source of difficulty of the proof of Theorem 3.

Observe that $proj ICR^*(p)$ consists of all payoffs $(v_0, v_1)$ at which the upper surface of $ICR^*$ lies above the individually rational payoffs, $u^I(p)(v_0, v_1) \geq m_U$. These sets play an important role in the statement of the lemma. It is helpful to notice that they have some monotonicity properties.

**Lemma 3.** For any $p \in (0, 1)$,

$$proj ICR^*(0) \cap proj ICR^*(1) \subseteq proj ICR^*(p) \subseteq proj ICR^*(0) \cup proj ICR^*(1).$$

For any $p < p'$,

$$proj ICR^*(p) \cap proj ICR^*(1) \subseteq proj ICR^*(p') \cap proj ICR^*(1),$$

$$proj ICR^*(p') \cap proj ICR^*(0) \subseteq proj ICR^*(p) \cap proj ICR^*(0).$$

By Corollary 1 and Proposition 1, $proj ICR^*(k) = proj E_k$ for each $k = 0, 1$. The left and right graphs on Figure 3 present the projections of the payoffs in $ICR^*(k)$ for $k = 0, 1$ on the set of player $I$'s payoffs (compare with Figure 2). For general $p \in [0, 1]$, the sets $proj ICR^*(p)$ have the following monotonicity properties. First, $proj ICR^*(p)$ contains the intersection of, and is contained in the union of the sets $proj ICR^*(0)$ and $proj ICR^*(1)$. Next, $proj ICR^*(p) \cap proj ICR^*(1)$ is (setwise) increasing in $p$ and $proj ICR^*(p) \cap proj ICR^*(0)$ is (setwise) decreasing.

**Proof of Lemma 3.** Notice that $(v_0, v_1) \in proj ICR^*(p)$ if and only if $(v_0, v_1) \in proj IR$ and $u^I(p)(v_0, v_1) \geq m_U$. 
The first inclusion is implied by property FE-1 of the correspondence $ICR^*$ (Proposition 6) and part (iii) of Lemma 2 (the linearity of $u^I$ in $p$ over individually rational payoffs). Take any $(v_0, v_1) \notin \text{proj } ICR^*(k)$ for $k = 0, 1$. Then $u^I(k)(v_0, v_1) < m_U$ for $k = 0, 1$. By part (iii) of Lemma 2, $u^I(p)(v_0, v_1) < m_U$ and $(v_0, v_1) \notin \text{proj } ICR^*(p)$. This implies the second inclusion.

The monotonicity of the sets $\text{proj } ICR^*(p) \cap \text{proj } ICR^*(k)$ in $p$ follows from part (iii) of Lemma 2. $\square$

### 5.2 Upper surfaces

The goal of this section is to show that the upper surfaces of the two correspondences are equal, or, in other words, that the inequality in (19) can be replaced by an equality. There are two steps. First, I define difference functions $\theta_k(p)$, $k = 0, 1$, that (indirectly) measure the distance between the upper surfaces of the correspondences $ICR^*(p)$ and $FE^*(p)$. If $\theta_k$ is identically equal to 0 for $k = 0, 1$, then the upper surfaces of the correspondences $ICR^*(p)$ and $FE^*(p)$ are equal. Next, I show that $\theta_k$ is identically equal to 0.

#### 5.2.1 Difference function

For each $k = 0, 1$, define auxiliary correspondences

$$
I_k(p) = \{ v \in ICR^*(p) : u^I(p)(v_0, v_1) = m_U \text{ and } (v_0, v_1) \in \text{proj } ICR^*(k) \}
$$

$$
F^*(p) = \{ v \in \text{con}(FE^*(p) \cup V) : v_U \geq m_U \}.
$$

The correspondence $I_k(p)$ consists of payoff vectors on the upper surface of $ICR^*(p)$, for which player $U$'s payoff is equal to his minmax value and player $I$'s payoffs belong to $\text{proj } ICR^*(k)$ for $k = 0, 1$. The correspondence $F^*(p)$ consists of payoff vectors in the convex hull of the sets $FE^*(p)$ and $V$, and such that $U$'s payoff is not lower than the minmax. Note that $FE^*(p) \subseteq F^*(p)$, and the inclusion is typically strict, because the payoffs of player $I$ must be individually rational for any $v \in FE^*(p)$. For each $k = 0, 1$, define functions

$$
\theta_k(p) = \sup_{v^I \in I_k(p)} \inf_{v^F \in F^*(p)} \| (v^I_0, v^I_1) - (v^F_0, v^F_1) \|,
$$

with the convention that $0/0 = 0$ and $a/0 = \infty$ for $a > 0$. The functions $\theta_k$ measure the distance between the correspondences $ICR^*$ and $FE^*$. By part (i) of Lemma 2, for each $k = 0, 1$,

$$
\theta_k(0) = \theta_k(1) = 0.
$$

The next lemma shows that if the functions $\theta_k$ are identically equal to 0, then the inequality in (19) can be replaced by an equality.

**Lemma 4.** Suppose that $\theta_k(p) = 0$ for each $p = [0, 1]$ and $k = 0, 1$. Then $u^F(p)(v_0, v_1) = u^I(p)(v_0, v_1)$ for each $p$ and each $(v_0, v_1) \in \text{proj } ICR^*(p)$.

**Proof.** I show that for any $(v_0, v_1) \in \text{proj } ICR^*(1) \cap \text{proj } ICR^*(p)$, we have $u^F(p)(v_0, v_1) = u^I(p)(v_0, v_1)$. For any $(v_0, v_1) \in \text{proj } ICR^*(1)$, define

$$
p(v_0, v_1) = \inf \{ p : u^I(p)(v_0, v_1) \geq m_U \}.
$$
Because \( u^I(1)(v_0, v_1) \geq m_U, p(v_0, v_1) \) is well defined. I show that for any \((v_0, v_1) \in \text{proj ICR}^*(1)\),

\[
u^I(p(v_0, v_1))(v_0, v_1) = u^F(p(v_0, v_1))(v_0, v_1) \geq m_U.
\]

(21)

If \( p(v_0, v_1) = 1 \), then (21) holds by part (i) of Lemma 2. If \( p(v_0, v_1) = 0 \), then the equality in (21) holds by part (ii) of Lemma 2 and the inequality comes from the convexity (hence, upper semi-continuity) of \( u^I \) in \( p \). If \( 0 < p(v_0, v_1) < 1 \), then, by part (iii) of Lemma 2, \( u^I(p)(v_0, v_1) \) is convex in \( p \in (0, 1) \) and hence continuous in a neighborhood of \( p(v_0, v_1) \). This implies that

\[(m_U, v_0, v_1) = (u^I(p(v_0, v_1))(v_0, v_1), v_0, v_1) \in I_1(p).\]

Because \( \theta_1(p) = 0 \),

\[u^F(p(v_0, v_1), (v_0, v_1)) \geq m_U,
\]

which, together with (19), implies (21).

Observe that

\[u^I(1)(v_0, v_1) = u^F(1)(v_0, v_1) \geq m_U \text{ for any } (v_0, v_1) \in \text{proj ICR}^*(1)\]

Because of (21) and parts (iii) and (iv) of Lemma 2, the inequalities in (19) can be replaced by equalities for any \( p \in [p(v_0, v_1), 1] \).

An analogous argument shows that for any \((v_0, v_1) \in \text{proj ICR}^*(0) \cap \text{proj ICR}^*(p), u^F(p)(v_0, v_1) = u^I(p)(v_0, v_1)\). By the first part of Lemma 3, \( \text{proj ICR}^*(p) \subseteq \text{proj ICR}^*(0) \cup \text{proj ICR}^*(1) \). This concludes the proof of the lemma.

Notice that for any \((v_0, v_1) \in \mathbb{R}^2, u^I(p)(v_0, v_1) \) is either (a) equal to a convex combination of the form

\[u^I(p)(v_0, v_1) = \alpha v^V_0 + (1 - \alpha)u^I(p)(v^V_0, v^V_1)\]

for some \( \alpha \in [0, 1], v^V \in V \), and \((v^V_0, v^V_1) \in \text{proj ICR}^*(p)\) such that \( \alpha(v^V_0, v^V_1) + (1 - \alpha)(v^V_0, v^V_1) = (v_0, v_1) \), or (b) equal to \(-\infty\) if such a tuple of elements cannot be found. Because

\[u^F(p)(v_0, v_1) \geq \alpha v^V_0 + (1 - \alpha)u^F(p)(v^V_0, v^V_1)\]

the previous lemma leads to the following result.

**Corollary 2.** Suppose that \( \theta_k(p) = 0 \) for each \( p = [0, 1] \) and \( k = 0, 1 \). Then we have \( u^F(p)(v_0, v_1) = u^I(p)(v_0, v_1) \) for each \( p \) and each \((v_0, v_1)\).

5.2.2 “Differential” step Here I show that \( \theta_k(p) = 0 \) for \( p \in [0, 1] \) and \( k = 0, 1 \). Because the arguments are exactly analogous, I assume without loss of generality that \( k = 1 \). To save on notation, I also drop the subscript and write \( \theta \) instead of \( \theta_1 \).

The next result is a crucial step in the proof.
Lemma 5. Suppose that \( \theta(p^u) = 0 \) for some \( p^u < 1 \). There are constants \( D \) and \( d^* \), \( \theta^* > 0 \), such that if \( \theta(p) \leq \theta^* \), then

\[
\theta(p') \leq \theta(p) + D((p' - p)\theta(p) + (p' - p)^2)
\]

(22)

for any \( p, p' \in [p^u, \frac{1}{2}(1 + p^u)] \) such that \( p \leq p' \) and \( p' - p < d^* \).

Hence, \( \theta(p') \) is bounded by \( \theta(p) \) plus a term that is of second order in \( \theta(p) \) and \( p' - p \). The lemma is proved in Section C (in the Appendix).

Suppose that \( \theta(p^u) = 0 \) for some \( p^u < 1 \). I show that \( \theta(p) = 0 \) for any \( p \in [p^u, \frac{1}{2}(1 + p^u)] \). Take any

\[
m \geq \max \left[ \frac{1}{d^*}, \sqrt{\frac{D}{\theta^*}}, D, \frac{1}{\theta^*}e^{4D} \right]
\]

and consider any increasing sequence of numbers \( p^u = p_0 \leq p_1 \leq \cdots \leq p_{2m} \leq \frac{1}{2}(1 + p^u) \) such that \( |p_{i+1} - p_i| \leq \frac{1}{m} \leq d^* \) for all \( i \). Applying Lemma 5 once shows that \( \theta(p_1) \leq D(\frac{1}{m})^2 \leq \theta^* \). Inductive application of Lemma 5 leads to

\[
\begin{align*}
\theta(p_i) & \leq \theta(p_{i-1}) + D((p_i - p_{i-1})\theta(p_{i-1}) + (p_i - p_{i-1})^2) \\
& \leq \max(\theta(p_{i-1}), p_i - p_{i-1})(1 + 2D(p_i - p_{i-1})) \\
& \leq \max \left( \theta(p_{i-1}), \frac{1}{m} \right) \left( 1 + 2D \frac{1}{m} \right) \\
& \leq \max \left( \theta(p_1), \frac{1}{m} \right) \left( 1 + 2D \frac{1}{m} \right)^{i-1} \\
& \leq \frac{1}{m} \max \left( \frac{D}{m}, 1 \right) \left( 1 + 2D \frac{1}{m} \right)^{2m} \\
& \leq \frac{1}{m} e^{4D}.
\end{align*}
\]

Lemma 5 applies at each step because the choice of \( m \) implies that \( \theta(p_i) \leq \theta^* \). Since any sequence of \( p_i \)'s could have been chosen, it follows that for any \( p \in [p^u, \frac{1}{2}(1 + p^u)] \), \( \theta(p) \) is not larger than \( 1/m \) times a constant. But, in turn, any large \( m \) could have been chosen. This shows that \( \theta(p) = 0 \) for any \( p \in [p^u, \frac{1}{2}(1 + p^u)] \).

I use the lemma to prove that \( \theta(p) = 0 \) for all \( p \). Recall that \( \theta(p) = 0 \) for \( p = 0, 1 \). Construct a sequence of prior beliefs: \( p_0^u = 0 \) and

\[
p_n^u = \frac{1}{2}(1 + p_{n-1}^u).
\]

Then \( \lim_n p_n^u = 1 \), and the above argument shows that \( \theta(p) = 0 \) for any \( p \in [0, 1] \).

Together with Corollary 2, this means that the upper surfaces of \( ICR^* \) and \( FE^* \) are equal.
5.3 Lower surfaces

The goal of this section is to show that the lower surfaces of the two correspondences are equal (that is, the inequality in (20) can be replaced by an equality).

For any \( p \in [0, 1] \) and any \((v_0, v_1)\), define

\[
\theta(p, v_0, v_1) = I^F(p)(v_0, v_1) - I^L(p)(v_0, v_1),
\]

where, as a convention, I take \( \infty - \infty = 0 \). The function \( \theta \) measures the distance between the lower surfaces of the two correspondences. Because of (20), \( \theta(p, v_0, v_1) \geq 0 \). Notice that \( I^F(p)(v_0, v_1) < \infty \) whenever \( u^F(p)(v_0, v_1) > -\infty \). This is equivalent to \( u^L(p)(v_0, v_1) < -\infty \), which, in turn, implies that \( I^L(p)(v_0, v_1) < \infty \). Hence, \( \theta(p, v_0, v_1) \) is always finite and bounded by \( 2M \).

The proofs of the two lemmas below can be found in Section D (in the Appendix).

**Lemma 6.** Suppose that \( \theta(p, v_0, v_1) > 0 \) for some \( p, v_0, v_1 \). Then there is \( p' \in [0, 1] \) such that

\[
\theta(p', v_0, v_1) \geq \theta(p, v_0, v_1)
\]

\[
I^L(p')(v_0, v_1) \leq M_U - \frac{1}{2} \theta(p', v_0, v_1).
\]

**Lemma 7.** Suppose that

\[
I^L(p)(v_0, v_1) \leq M_U - \frac{1}{2} \theta(p, v_0, v_1)
\]

for some \( p, v_0, v_1 \). Then, there exist \( v_0' \) and \( v_1' \) such that

\[
\theta(p, v_0', v_1') \geq \frac{4M}{4M - \theta(p, v_0, v_1)} \theta(p, v_0, v_1).
\]

Denote

\[
\theta^* = \sup_{p \in [0, 1] \cap (v_0, v_1)} \theta(p, v_0, v_1)
\]

and suppose that \( \theta^* > 0 \). I show that this leads to a contradiction. Choose \( p \in [0, 1] \) and \((v_0, v_1)\) such that \( \theta(p, v_0, v_1) \geq \frac{\theta^*}{2} \). Notice that \( p \in (0, 1) \). Alternating between the two lemmas, I construct a sequence \((p^n, v_0^n, v_1^n)\) such that

\[
\theta(p^n, v_0^n, v_1^n) \geq \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{4M}{4M - \theta^*} \right)^n \theta^* \to \infty.
\]

This yields the contradiction.

### 6. Comments and conclusion

An interesting application of the methods developed in this paper is present in unpublished work by Gregory Pavlov, who studies repeated bargaining between a firm and a union. The union is uncertain about the firm’s commitment to aggressive bargaining. It turns out that the best equilibrium for the union involves a screening phase during
which the union resorts to strikes and the firm reveals information about its type finitely many times. When one interprets the discount factor converging to 1 as a division of periods into smaller and smaller units, the length of the screening phase converges to a positive constant. Pavlov uses differential equations to describe the set of equilibrium payoffs.

The model of this paper has obvious limitations. For example, it is stated for only two states of the world. When there are more than two states of the world, it is still possible to define finitely revealing equilibria and construct the correspondence $FE^*$ as in Proposition 4. One can also show an analog of Proposition 5. However, it is unclear how to proceed further and prove that the two bounds are equal. In yet another extension, one can relax the known-own-payoffs assumption.

More importantly, this paper is concerned only with one-sided incomplete information. I believe that it can serve as a step toward the characterization of payoffs in games with multisided incomplete information. So far, that problem remains open.\(^8\)

**Appendix**

A. PROOFS FOR SECTION 3

A.1 Linear problem (11)

In order to solve the linear problem (11), it is convenient to introduce payoff correction functions\(^9\) $x : S_U \times S_I \to \mathbb{R}^3$. Let

$$x(a_U, a_I) = \delta(g(a_U, a_I) - v(a_U, a_I)).$$

Then (8) and (9) take the form

$$v_U \geq g_U(a_U, a_I^*) + x_U(a_U, a_I^*)$$
$$v_k \geq g_j(a_U^*, a_k) + x_k(a_U^*, a_k) \text{ for } k = 0, 1,$$

with equalities when $a_U \in \text{supp}a_U^*$ and $a_k \in \text{supp}a_k^*$. Similarly, (10) corresponds to $\phi \cdot x(a_U, a_I) \leq 0$. The payoff corrections are used to characterize the function $\eta(\cdot)$.

**Lemma 8.** (i) If either (a) $\phi_k > 0$ for some $k = U, 0, 1$ or (b) $\phi_U < 0$ and $\phi_k < 0$ for some $k = 0, 1$, then $\eta(p, \phi) \geq \max_{\phi' \in V} \phi \cdot \nu'$. If $p \in (0, 1)$, then $\eta(p, \phi) = \max_{\phi' \in V} \phi \cdot \nu'$.

(ii) If $\phi_U = -1$ and $\phi_k = 0$, for $k = 0, 1$, then $\eta(p, \phi) = -m_U$.

(iii) If $\phi_U = 0$ and for $k = 0, 1$, $\phi_k \leq 0$, then $\eta(p, \phi) = -m_1(-\phi_0, -\phi_1)$.

---

\(^8\)In a recent paper, Athey and Bagwell (forthcoming) study a repeated Bertrand duopoly where each firm has private information about its own costs. A specific structure of the game allows the authors to use mechanism design tools to describe the optimal equilibria. It would be very interesting to check whether the methods of this paper extend to their model.

\(^9\)This representation is introduced in Kandori and Matsushima (1998). They refer to $x(\cdot)$ as a "sidepayment contract."
(iv) If either (a) \( \phi_0, \phi_1 > 0 \) or (b) \( \phi_U \neq 0 \) and for some \( k = 0, 1, \phi_{-k} > 0 \), then \( \eta(k, \phi) = \infty. \)

Proof. The proof consists of solving the linear problem (11) for each case separately. The first three parts are relatively standard and therefore omitted.

Case (iv)(a). Suppose that \( k = 0 \) and that \( \phi_0, \phi_1 > 0 \). Take any pure actions \( a_U^* \in S_U, a_0^*, a_1^* \in S_I \), such that \( a_0^* \neq a_1^* \). I enforce the profile \( (a_U^*, a_0^*, a_1^*) \) with a payoff correction

\[
x(a_U^*, a_0^*) = (0, 0, 0) \text{ and } x_1(a_U^*, a_1^*) = X_1 \text{ for any large } X_1.
\]

- Choose the payoff correction \( x_1(a_U, a_1), (a_U, a_1) \neq (a_U^*, a_0^*) \) so that type 1’s incentive compatibility holds.

- Choose \( x_0(a_U^*, a_1^*) \) small enough so that type 0’s incentive compatibility holds and condition (10) is satisfied at the profile \( (a_U^*, a_1^*) \) (this can be done because \( \phi_0 > 0 \)).

- Choose \( x_0(a_U^*, a_0) \), \( a_0 \neq a_0^*, a_1^* \) small enough so that type 0’s incentive compatibility holds.

- Choose \( x_1(a_U^*, a_1), a_1 \neq a_1^* \), so that type 1’s incentive compatibility holds and condition (10) is satisfied at the profile \( (a_U^*, a_1) \) (this can be done because \( \phi_1 > 0 \)).

- Choose all other payoff corrections to make (10) satisfied for any other pair of actions.

Case (iv)(b). Suppose that \( k = 0 \), \( \phi_U \neq 0 \), and \( \phi_1 > 0 \). Take any pure actions \( a_U^* \in S_U, a_0^*, a_1^* \in S_I \), such that \( a_0^* \neq a_1^* \). I enforce the profile \( (a_U^*, a_0^*, a_1^*) \) with a payoff correction

\[
x(a_U^*, a_0^*) = (0, 0, 0) \text{ and } x_1(a_U^*, a_1^*) = X_1 \text{ for any large } X_1.
\]

- Choose \( x_U(a_U, a_0^*) \), \( a_U \neq a_U^* \), so that player U’s incentive compatibility holds.

- Choose \( x_0(a_U^*, a_0) \), \( a_0 \neq a_0^* \), so that 0’s incentive compatibility holds.

- Choose \( x_U(a_U^*, a_1^*) \), to make condition (10) satisfied at the profile \( (a_U^*, a_1^*) \) (this can be done because \( \phi_U \neq 0 \)).

- Choose \( x_1(a_U^*, a_1), a_1 \neq a_1^* \) small enough so that 1’s incentive compatibility holds and condition (10) is satisfied at the profile \( (a_U^*, a_1) \) (this can be done because \( \phi_1 > 0 \)).

- Choose all other payoff corrections for players U and type 0.

- Choose \( x_1(a_U, a_1), a_U \neq a_U^* \), to satisfy condition (10) at profiles \( (a_U, a_1) \) (this can be done because \( \phi_1 \neq 0 \)). \( \square \)
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1

**Lemma 9.** For any \( k = 0, 1 \),

\[
E_k \subseteq \bigcap_{\phi} \{ v : \phi \cdot v \leq \eta(k, \phi) \}.
\]

**Proof.** Suppose that \( k = 0 \). Observe that \( IR = \bigcap_{\phi} \{ v : \phi \cdot v \leq \eta(k, \phi) \} \) satisfies cases (ii) and (iii) from Lemma 8.

I show that \( E_F \), \( E_I \subset (0) \subseteq \bigcap_{\phi} \{ v : \phi \cdot v \leq \eta(0, \phi) \} \) satisfies case (i) but not cases (ii)–(iv) from Lemma 8.

Indeed, take any \((v_0^0, v_0^1, v_1^1) \in E_F(0) \) where \( v_0^0, v_1^1 \in V \) and \( v_0^1 \leq v_1^1, v_0^1 \leq v_0^0 \). Suppose that \( \phi \) satisfies case (1) and \( \phi_1 \leq 0 \); then

\[
\phi \cdot (v_0^0, v_0^1, v_1^1) \leq \phi \cdot (v_0^0, v_0^1, v_1^1) \leq \max_{v' \in V} \phi \cdot v' \leq \eta(0, \phi).
\]

Suppose that \( \phi \) satisfies case (i) but not cases (ii)–(iv) and that \( \phi_1 > 0 \). Then it must be that \( \phi_U = 0 \) and \( \phi_0 \leq 0 \). Hence,

\[
\phi \cdot (v_0^0, v_0^1, v_1^1) \leq \phi \cdot (v_1^1, v_0^1, v_1^1) \leq \max_{v' \in V} \phi \cdot v' \leq \eta(0, \phi). \quad \Box
\]

Take a closed convex set with a smooth boundary

\[
E^* \subseteq \text{int} E_k \subseteq \bigcap_{\phi \in \Phi} \{ v : \phi \cdot v \leq \eta(k, \phi) \}.
\]

(Note that the second inclusion holds by Lemma 9.) I show that there exists \( \delta_0 \) such that \( E^* \) is a set of equilibrium payoffs for any \( \delta \geq \delta_0 \). Take any boundary vector of payoffs \( v \in \text{bd } E^* \) and a vector \( \phi \) normal to \( E^* \). For a high enough \( \delta \), there is a mixed action profile \((\alpha_U, \alpha_0, \alpha_1) \in \Delta S_U \times \Delta S_I \times \Delta S_I \) and a continuation payoff function \( v : S_U \times S_I \rightarrow \text{int } E^* \) so that the payoffs \( v \) are supported by the profile and the continuation payoffs (equations (8)) and incentive compatibility hold (inequalities (9)). By the argument in Fudenberg et al. (1994), for each \( v \in E^* \) there is an open set \( U \ni v \) such that each \( \delta \geq \delta_0 \), each \( v' \in E^* \cap v \) can be supported with an action profile and continuation payoffs inside \( E^* \) so that incentive compatibility holds. In the terminology of Fudenberg et al. (1994), \( E^* \) is locally self-decomposable. Lemma 4.2 of Fudenberg et al. (1994) shows that \( E^* \subseteq FE(k) \).
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2

Assume without the loss of generality that $A$ is convex (if not, then it is easy to use public randomization to construct non-revealing equilibria with payoffs in con $A$). By Parts (i)–(iii) of Lemma 8, if $p \in (0, 1)$ then

$$
\eta(p, \phi) = \begin{cases} 
-m_U & \text{if } \phi_U = -1, \phi_0 = \phi_1 = 0 \\
-m_1(-\phi_0, -\phi_1) & \text{if } \phi_0, \phi_1 \leq 0, \phi_U = 0 \\
\max_{v' \in V} \phi \cdot v' & \text{otherwise.}
\end{cases}
$$

Together with the definition of individually rational payoffs $IR$ in (3), this implies that the first inclusion in (12) holds as an equality:

$$
\text{int}[\text{con}(A \cup V) \cap IR] = \text{int} \bigcap_{\phi \in \Phi} \left\{ v : \phi \cdot v \leq \max \left[ \max_{v' \in A} \phi \cdot v', \eta(\phi, p) \right] \right\}.
$$

In order to show the second inclusion, an intermediate result is needed.

**Lemma 10.** Suppose that $A' \subseteq A$ is closed and convex with a nonempty interior and a smooth boundary. Then for each $v^* \in \text{int}[\text{con}(A' \cup V) \cap IR]$ there is $\epsilon > 0$ and a closed, convex set $W \subseteq IR$ with a nonempty interior and a smooth boundary such that $v^* \in W$, and for each $v \in \text{bd} W$ and $\phi \in \Phi$ such that $\phi$ is normal to $W$ at $v$, either $v \in A'$ or $\phi \cdot v \leq \eta(\phi, p) - \epsilon$.

**Proof.** Instead of a complete argument, I present only the construction of the set $W$. For each $\epsilon, \gamma > 0$, define

$$
W_\epsilon = \bigcap_{\phi \in \Phi} \left\{ v : \phi \cdot v \leq \max \left[ \max_{v' \in A} \phi \cdot v', \eta(\phi, p) - \epsilon \right] \right\},
$$

$$
W_{\epsilon, \gamma} = \left\{ v \in W_\epsilon : \inf_{v' \notin W_\epsilon} \|v - v'\| \geq \gamma \right\},
$$

$$
\overline{W}_{\epsilon, \gamma} = \left\{ v : \inf_{v' \notin W_{\epsilon, \gamma}} \|v - v'\| \leq \gamma \right\}.
$$

The set $W_{\epsilon, \gamma}$ consists of the elements of $W_\epsilon$ that are at least $\gamma$-far from the complement of $W_\epsilon$; the set $\overline{W}_{\epsilon, \gamma}$ consists of the vectors that are at most $\gamma$-far from $W_{\epsilon, \gamma}$. Observe that $W_{\epsilon, \gamma} \subseteq W_\epsilon$, but the inclusion might be strict. It is easy to check that, for sufficiently small $\epsilon$ and $\gamma$, $W_{\epsilon, \gamma}$ is closed and convex, and has a nonempty interior and a smooth boundary. It is easy to see that $U_{\epsilon, \gamma} = \text{int}[\text{con}(A' \cup V) \cap IR]$. Because $A'$ has a smooth boundary, when $\gamma$ is sufficiently small, $A' \subseteq \overline{W}_{\epsilon, \gamma}$. One can check that, for such $\epsilon$ and $\gamma$ and any $v \in \text{bd} \overline{W}_{\epsilon, \gamma} \setminus A'$, if $\phi$ is normal to $\overline{W}_{\epsilon, \gamma}$ at $v$, then $\phi \cdot v \leq \eta(\phi, p) - \epsilon$. \(\square\)

Take any $v^* \in \text{int}[\text{con}(A' \cup V) \cap IR]$. There exist $\delta_0 < 1$ and closed, convex sets $A'$ and $A''$ such that $A' \subseteq \text{int} A'' \subseteq A'' \subseteq \text{int} A$, $v^* \in \text{int}[\text{con}(A' \cup V) \cap IR]$, and $A'' \subseteq \text{FE}_{\delta}(p)$ for $\delta \geq \delta_0$. By the previous lemma, there exists $\epsilon > 0$ and a closed, convex set $W$ with a nonempty interior and a smooth boundary such that $v^* \in W$ and for each $v \in \text{bd} W$ and $\phi \in \Phi$ such that $\phi$ is normal to $W$ at $v$, either $v \in A'$ or $\phi \cdot v \leq \eta(\phi, p) - \epsilon$. 
I show that there exists \( \delta^* \geq \delta_0 \) such that \( W \subseteq FE_\delta(p) \) for all \( \delta \geq \delta^* \). More precisely, I show that for each \( v \in W \), either (a) \( v \in \text{int} A'' \), hence \( v \) is a payoff in a finitely revealing equilibrium, or (b) \( v \) is supported by a profile of mixed actions \( \alpha^*_{U}, \alpha^*_{k}, k = 0, 1 \), and continuation payoffs \( v(a_U, a_j) \in W \) (equations (8)) such that incentive compatibility (inequalities (9)) holds. Using the argument for Lemma 4.2 of Fudenberg et al. (1994), one can construct a strategy that makes \( v \in W \) a payoff in a finitely revealing equilibrium.

I show that (b) holds for any \( v \in W \setminus \text{int} A'' \). By the definition of the function \( \eta(\phi, p) \), there exists \( \delta_v < 1 \) such that for each \( \delta \geq \delta_v \) there is a profile \( \alpha^*_{U}, \alpha^*_{k}, k = 0, 1 \) and continuation payoffs \( v(a_U, a_j) \in \text{int} W \) so that equations (8) and inequalities (9) hold. Because the continuation payoffs \( v(a_U, a_j) \) belong to the interior of \( W \), for each \( v \), one can find a neighborhood \( U_v \ni v \) such that \( \delta_v \geq \delta_{v'} \) for each \( v' \in U_v \). Because \( W \setminus \text{int} A'' \) is compact, one can find \( \delta^* \geq \delta_0 \) such that for each \( \delta \geq \delta^* \) and each \( v \in W \setminus \text{int} A'' \), there are a mixed profile and continuation payoffs so that (8) and (9) hold.

### A.4 Proof of Proposition 4

This section contains the steps missing from the proof of Proposition 4.

A.4.1 \( FE^* \) is closed Suppose not and there is \( (p^n, v^n) \to (p^*, v^*) \) with \( (p^n, v^n) \in FE^* \) and \( v^* \notin FE^*(p^*) \). Without loss of generality I assume that \( p^n > p^* \) for all \( n \) (taking a subsequence might be necessary). Since \( FE^*(p^*) \) is closed and bounded (notice that \([-M, M]^3 \times [0, 1] \in \mathcal{F} \)) and satisfies property FE-3, there is a vector \( \phi = (\phi_U, \phi_0, \phi_1) \in \Phi \) such that \( \phi_U \neq 0 \) and

\[
\phi \cdot v^* \geq \sup_{v \in FE^*(p^*) \cup V} \phi \cdot v := x^*.
\]

I assume without loss of generality that \( \phi_U > 0 \) (the argument in the other case is analogous). Let \( x_1 = \sup_{v \in FE^*(p^*) \cup V} \phi \cdot v \). Define the biaffine function \( l_\phi : [0, 1] \times \mathbb{R}^2 \to \mathbb{R} \) by

\[
l_\phi(p, v_0, v_1) = \frac{1}{\phi_U} \left( \frac{p - p^*}{1 - p^*} x_1 + \frac{1 - p}{1 - p^*} x^* \right) - \frac{1}{\phi_U}(\phi_0, \phi_1) \cdot (v_0, v_1).
\]

Then \( v_U \leq l_\phi(p, v_0, v_1) \) for each \( p \in \{p^*, 1\} \) and for each \( v \in FE^*(p) \cup V \) and for high enough \( n \), \( v^n_U \geq l_\phi(p^n, v^n_0, v^n_1) \).

Define

\[
FE^{**} = \{(p, v) \in FE^* : \text{if } p \leq p^*, \text{ then } v_U \leq l_\phi(p, v_0, v_1)\}.
\]

Then for a high enough \( n \), \( v^n \notin FE^{**}(p^n) \). I show that \( FE^{**} \) satisfies properties FE-1, FE-2, and FE-3. Because \( v^n \in FE^*(p^n) \) and \( FE^{**} \subseteq FE^* \), this implies that \( FE^* \) is not the smallest set in the collection \( \mathcal{F} \), which contradicts the definition of \( FE^* \).

It is immediate to check that \( FE^{**} \) has properties FE-2 and FE-3. I check that \( FE^{**} \) satisfies property FE-1.

**Lemma 11.** Suppose \( F \subseteq [0, 1] \times \mathbb{R}^3 \) satisfies property FE-1. Suppose that there are \( p_0 < p_1 \) and a biaffine function \( l \) such that

\[
v_U \leq l(p_j, v_0, v_1) \text{ for each } v \in F(p_j) \text{ and } j = 0, 1.
\]
Proposition 3 implies that there are non-empty, open, and convex sets 
\[ \mathcal{E}(p) \subseteq \{ (p, v) \in F : \text{if } p^* \leq p \leq 1, \text{ then } v^p \leq l(p, v_0, v_1) \}. \]

Then \( \mathcal{E}^{**} \) satisfies property FE-1.

One can apply the lemma to the correspondence \( \mathcal{E}^* \), priors \( p^* \), and biaffine function \( l_\phi \) to conclude that \( \mathcal{E}^{**} \) satisfies FE-1.

**Proof of Lemma 11.** Take any \( p^0 < p^1 \) and \( (v^p_{ij}, v_0, v_1) \in \mathcal{E}^{i}(p^j), j = 0, 1. \) For any \( p \), define \( v^p = ((p - p^0)/(p^1 - p^0))v^1 + ((p^1 - p)/(p^1 - p^0))v^0 \). Notice that by the biaffinity of \( l \),

\[
 v^p = l(p, v_0, v_1) \tag{A.1}
\]
is affine in \( p \). Because \( F \) satisfies FE-1, then \( v^p \in \mathcal{E}(p) \) for any \( p \in [p^0, p^1] \).

If \( p^0, p^1 \in [p_0, p_1] \), then \( v^p \leq l(p^v, v_0, v_1) \). The biaffinity of \( l \) implies that \( v^p \leq l(p, v_0, v_1) \) for each \( p \in (p^0, p^1) \).

If \( p^0 < p_0 < p^1 \), then \( v^p > l(p^0, v_0, v_1) \). Suppose that there is \( p \in (p_0, p^1) \) such that \( v^p > l(p, v_0, v_1) \). Then it must be that \( v^p > l(p^0, v_0, v_1) \). Thus (A.1) is decreasing in \( p \). In particular, \( v^p > l(p_0, v_0, v_1) \). But this contradicts the thesis of the lemma.

If \( p^0 < p_0 < p^1 \) and there is \( p \in (p_0, p_1) \) such that \( v^p > l(p, v_0, v_1) \), then, for at least one \( j \), \( v^p > l(p^j, v_0, v_1) \). Suppose that \( j = 0 \). We have \( v^p > l(p^j, v_0, v_1) \), so \( v^p > l(p, v_0, v_1) \) for any \( j = 0, 1 \) (because (A.1) is affine). If \( v^p \leq l(p^v, v_0, v_1) \), then (A.1) is decreasing in \( p \) and \( v^p \geq l(p_0, v_0, v_1) \). In each case, we get a contradiction to the thesis of the lemma.

\[ A.4.2 \quad \mathcal{E}' \subseteq \mathcal{E} \]

I need to check that \( \mathcal{E}' \) satisfies properties FE-1, FE-2, and FE-3. Assumption 1 implies that for \( k = 0, 1 \), the sets \( E_k \) have a non-empty interior. Because \( E_k \) is convex, we have \( E_k = \text{cl int } E_k \) and \( E_k \subseteq \mathcal{E}(p) \) by Proposition 1. This establishes FE-2. Proposition 2 implies FE-3:

\[ \mathcal{E}(p) = \text{cl int } \mathcal{E}(p) \subseteq \text{cl int } \text{con (int } \mathcal{E}(p) \cup V) \cap \text{IR} \subseteq \mathcal{E}(p). \]

Thus only property FE-1 needs to be verified. Recall that Assumption 1 together with Proposition 3 imply that there are non-empty, open, and convex sets \( A_p \subseteq \text{int } \mathcal{E}(p) \), \( p \in [0, 1] \), such that \( \text{proj } A_y = \text{proj } A_{y'} \) for any \( p, p' \in [0, 1] \).

Take \( p^0 < p^1 \) and \( v^i = (v_{ij}, v_0, v_1) \in \mathcal{E}(p^j) \) for \( j = 0, 1 \). I show that for any \( p \in (p^0, p^1) \),

\[
 v^p = \frac{p - p^0}{p^1 - p^0} v^1 + \frac{p^1 - p}{p^1 - p^0} v^0 \in \mathcal{E}(p) \tag{A.2}
\]

There are sequences \( v^{j, n} = (v^{j, n}_i, v_0, v_1) \in \text{int } \mathcal{E}(p^j) \) such that \( v^{j, n} \to v^j \) for \( j = 0, 1 \). I have already established property FE-3; hence

\[ \text{con } \{ v^{j, n} \} \cup A_{p^j} \subseteq \text{int } \mathcal{E}(p^j) \]

A simple continuity argument shows that

\[ \text{int con } \{ v^{j} \} \cup A_{p_j} \subseteq \mathcal{E}(p^j) \]
where \( \text{int} \{v^n \cup A_{p^n}\} \) is non-empty, open, and convex. But this implies that sequences \( v^{i,n} \rightarrow v \) can be chosen in such a way that \( (v^0_{0,n}, v^0_{1,n}) = (v^1_{0,n}, v^1_{1,n}) \). Then, for each \( p \in (p^0, p^1) \),

\[
v^{p,n} = \frac{p - p^0}{p^1 - p^0} v^{1,n} + \frac{p^1 - p}{p^1 - p^0} v^{0,n} \in \text{int} \ FE(p).
\]

Because \( v^{p,n} \xrightarrow{n \to \infty} v^p \), this demonstrates (A.2).

**B. PROOFS FOR SECTION 4**

**B.1 Proof of property (16)**

Suppose that \( p(a_1) = 0 \). There are open neighborhoods \( U_{IR} \supseteq IR \) and \( U_E \supseteq E^{FIC}(0) \) such that for any \( (u_I, u_0, u_1) \in U_{IR} \cap U_E \), \( u_I < l(0, u_0, u_1) \). I show that for a high enough \( \delta \),

\[(v_I(a_I, a_1), w(a_I, a_1)) \in U_{IR}.
\]

Because of the IR condition, \( v_I(a_I, a_1) \geq m_I \) and \( (v_I(a_I, a_1), v_0, v_1) \in IR \). By (15),

\[
\|w(a_I, a_1) - (v_0, v_1)\| \leq \frac{1-\delta}{\delta} M. \tag{B.1}
\]

Hence for \( \delta \) high enough, \( (v_I(a_I, a_1), w(a_I, a_1)) \in U_{IR} \).

Let \( \sigma' \) denote the strategy of player \( I \) that takes action \( a_I \) in the first period and then follows with continuation strategy \( \sigma_0(a_I, a_1) \); let \( v_I(\sigma_I, \sigma', \sigma') \) denote the expected payoff of player \( U \) when the two types of player \( I \) use the strategy \( \sigma' \). Recall that after observing \( a_I \), player \( U \) is certain that he faces type 0. Hence the difference between the expected payoffs \( v_I(\sigma_I, \sigma', \sigma') \) and the expected continuation payoffs \( v_I(a_I, a_1) \) is not larger than the difference between the first-period payoffs and

\[
\|v_I(a_I, a_1) - v_I(\sigma_I, \sigma', \sigma')\| \leq \frac{1-\delta}{\delta} M. \tag{B.2}
\]

Clearly,

\[(v_I(\sigma_I, \sigma', \sigma'), v_0(\sigma_I, \sigma', \sigma'), v_1(\sigma_I, \sigma', \sigma')) \in V.
\]

Type 0 is indifferent between the strategies \( \sigma' \) and \( \sigma_0 \) because of condition \( IC \). Type 1 prefers to play \( \sigma_1 \); hence we have \( v(\sigma_I, \sigma', \sigma') \leq v_1 \). This implies that \( (v_I(\sigma_I, \sigma', \sigma'), v_0, v_1) \in E^{FIC}_0 \). Together with (B.1) and (B.2), this implies that for \( \delta \) high enough, \( (v_I(a_I, a_1), w(a_I, a_1)) \in U_E \).

**B.2 Proof of inequality (17)**

Observe that

\[
\sum_{a_I \in S_I^1} a_I(a_I)(v_I(a_I, a_1) - l(p(a_I), w(a_I, a_1)) - (v_I - l(p, v_0, v_1)))
\]

\[
= \sum_{a_I \in S_I^1} a_I(a_I) \left( [v_I(a_I, a_1) - v_I] + [l(p, v_0, v_1) - l(p, w(a_I, a_1))] \right) \tag{B.3}
\]

\[
+ \sum_{a_I \in S_I^1} a_I(a_I) \left( l(p, w(a_I, a_1)) - l(p(a_I), w(a_I, a_1)) \right).
\]
I bound each of the terms in (B.3). Observe that

\[
\sum_{a_1 \in S_l^*} a_1(a_1)v_0(a,U,a_1) = \frac{1}{\delta} v_0 - \frac{1-\delta}{\delta} \sum_{a_1 \in S_l^*} a_1(a_1)g_0(a,U,a_1)
\]

and

\[
\sum_{a_1 \in S_l^*} a_1(a_1)w(a_U,a_1) = \frac{1}{\delta} (v_0, v_1) - \frac{1-\delta}{\delta} \sum_{a_1 \in S_l^*} a_1(a_1)(g_0(a,U,a_1), g_1(a,U,a_1))
\]

and \(v_U \geq l(p, v_0, v_1) + \frac{1}{2} \epsilon\). Hence

\[
\sum_{a_1 \in S_l^*} a_1(a_1)[v_U(a_U,a_1) - v_U] + [l(p, v_0, v_1) - l(p, w(a_U,a_1))]
\]

\[
= \frac{1-\delta}{\delta} \sum_{a_1 \in S_l^*} a_1(a_1)[v_U - g_U(a_U,a_1) + l(p, g_0(a_U,a_1), g_1(a,U,a_1)) - l(p, v_0, v_1)]
\]

\[
\geq \frac{1-\delta}{\delta} \epsilon - \frac{1-\delta}{\delta} [g_U(a_U,a_1) - l(p, g_0(a_U,a_1), g_1(a,U,a_1)] \geq \frac{1-\delta}{\delta} \epsilon \geq \frac{1-\delta}{\delta} \frac{\epsilon}{2}.
\]

(The last inequality holds because, by the hypothesis, for any \((v'_U, v'_0, v'_1) \in V,\)

\[
v' - l(p, v'_0, v'_1) = p(v' - l(1, v'_0, v'_1)) + (1 - p)(v' - l(0, v'_0, v'_1)) \leq 0\).

The second term in (B.3) is bounded by

\[
\sum_{a_1 \in S_l^*} a_1(a_1)[l(p, w(a_U,a_1)) - l(p(a_1), w(a_U,a_1))]
\]

\[
= \sum_{a_1 \in S_l^*} a_1(a_1)[l(p, (v_0, v_1)) - l(p(a_1), (v_0, v_1)] + \sum_{a_1 \in S_l^*} a_1(a_1)[(l(p, w(a_U,a_1)) - l(p, (v_0, v_1))]
\]

\[
- (l(p(a_1), w(a_U,a_1)) - l(p(a_1), (v_0, v_1))].
\]

The first term above is equal to 0 because \(l\) is affine in \(p\) and \(\sum_{a_1 \in S_l^*} a_1(a_1)p(a_1) = p\). By biaffinity, the second term is not smaller than

\[
0 - 2C' \sum_{a_1 \in S_l^*} a_1(a_1)\|w(a_U,a_1) - (v_0, v_1)\|\|p - p(a_1)\|
\]

\[
\geq -4C'M \frac{1-\delta}{\delta} \sum_{a_1 \in S_l^*} a_1(a_1)\|p - p(a_1)\|
\]

where \(C'\) is defined by

\[
C' = \sup_{\|v\| \leq 1} \max(|l(0,v)|, |l(1,v)|).
\]

Also, observe that \(\|w(a_U,a_1) - (v_0, v_1)\| \leq 2((1-\delta)/\delta)M\).
Putting the two bounds together leads to
\[
\sum_{a_i \in S_i^*} a_i(a_i)(v_{ij}(a_i, a_i) - l(p(a_i), w(a_i), a_i)) - (v_{ij} - l(p, (v_0, v_1))) \geq \frac{1 - \delta}{\delta} \left( \frac{\varepsilon}{2} - 4CM \sum_{a_i \in S_i^*} a_i(a_i)|p - p(a_i)| \right).
\]

Let
\[
C = 32M^2. \tag{B.4}
\]

Observe that for any \(x \geq 0, \frac{1}{4}x - 4CMx > -(C'/\varepsilon)x^2\), and
\[
\frac{\varepsilon}{4} - 4CM \sum_{a_i \in S_i^*} a_i(a_i)|p - p(a_i)| = \sum_{a_i \in S_i^*} a_i(a_i)\left(\frac{\varepsilon}{4} - 4CM|p - p(a_i)|\right) \\
> -\frac{C}{\varepsilon} \sum_{a_i \in S_i^*} a_i(a_i)(p(a_i) - p)^2
\]

Then, for any any \(a_i \in S_i^*\),
\[
\frac{1 - \delta}{\delta} \left( \frac{\varepsilon}{2} - 4CM \sum_{a_i \in S_i^*} a_i(a_i)|p - p(a_i)| \right) > -\frac{1 - \delta}{\delta} \frac{C}{\varepsilon} \sum_{a_i \in S_i^*} a_i(a_i)(p(a_i) - p)^2 + \frac{1 - \delta}{4\delta} \varepsilon \\
= \frac{1 - \delta}{\delta} \frac{C}{\varepsilon} \left( p^2 - \sum_{a_i \in S_i^*} a_i(a_i)(p(a_i))^2 \right) + \frac{1 - \delta}{4\delta} \varepsilon.
\]

**B.3 Proof of Proposition 6**

It is easy to see that \(ICR^* \in \mathcal{I}\). The proof is divided into a few steps.

**B.3.1 ICR* satisfies FE-1** Define \(I \subseteq [0, 1] \times \mathbb{R}^3\): 
\[
I = \left\{(p, \frac{p - p_0}{p_1 - p_0}v_U^1 + \frac{p_1 - p}{p_1 - p_0}v_U^0, v_0, v_1) : (v_U^j, v_0, v_1) \in ICR^*(p_j) \text{ for } j = 0, 1 \text{ and } p_0 < p < p_1 \right\}.
\]

Then \(I\) satisfies FE-1. One easily checks that \(I\) satisfies properties ICR-1, ICR-2, and ICR-3 and \(I \in \mathcal{I}\). Since \(I \supseteq ICR^*\), it must be that \(I = ICR^*\).

**B.3.2 ICR* satisfies FE-3** Define \(I \subseteq [0, 1] \times \mathbb{R}^3\): for each \(p\),
\[
I(p) = \text{con}[ICR^*(p) \cup V] \cap IR.
\]

Then \(I \supseteq ICR^*\) and \(I\) satisfies FE-3. I show that \(I \in \mathcal{I}\). Conditions ICR-1 and ICR-2 hold by definition (notice that \(\text{con}(E_k \cup V) \cap IR = E_k\) for each \(k = 0, 1\)). To see that the separation property ICR-3 holds as well, suppose that \(p_0 < p_1\) and there is a biaffine
function \( I : [0, 1] \times \mathbb{R}^2 \to \mathbb{R} \) such that \( v_{ij}^l \leq l(p_j, v_{ij}^0, v_{ij}^j) \) for any \((v_{ij}^l, v_{ij}^0, v_{ij}^j) \in I(p_j) \cup V, j = 0, 1\). Because \( l \) is biaffine, for any \( v \in V \) and any \( p \in (p_0, p_1) \),

\[
v_U \leq \frac{p-p_0}{p_1-p_0} l(p_1, v_0, v_1) + \frac{p_1-p}{p_1-p_0} l(p_0, v_0, v_1) = l(p, v_0, v_1).
\]

By property ICR-3 applied to the set ICR*, for any \( p \in (p_0, p_1) \) and any \((v_U, v_0, v_1) \in ICR^*(p)\),

\[
v_U \leq l(p, v_0, v_1).
\] (B.5)

Therefore, inequality (B.5) holds also for any \((v_U, v_0, v_1) \in \text{con}[ICR^*(p) \cup V] = I(p)\).

**B.3.3 ICR* is closed**  I show that \( \text{cl} I \in \mathcal{I} \) for any \( I \in \mathcal{I} \). A simple continuity argument shows that ICR-1 and ICR-3 hold for cl \( I \). I show that \( (\text{cl} I)) \cup \mathcal{I} \) (the argument for \( (\text{cl} I)^) \cup \mathcal{I} \) is analogous). Suppose that there is \((p^n, v^0_{ij}, v^n_{ij}, v^j_{ij}) \in \mathcal{I} \) such that \((p^n, v^0_{ij}, v^n_{ij}, v^j_{ij}) \to (1, v_U^*, v^*_0, v^*_1) \) and \((v^0_{ij}, v^*_0, v^*_1) \notin E_1 \). Because \((v^*_0, v^*, v^*_1) \in IR\), it must be that \((v^0_{ij}, v^*_0, v^*_1) \notin \text{con}(E_1 \cup V)\). Because the sets \( E_1 \) and \( V \) are bounded, there is \( \phi \in \Phi^3 \) and \( \phi_U > 0 \) such that either

\[
\phi \cdot (v^*_0, v^*_0, v^*_1) > \max_{(v_U, v_0, v_1) \in \text{con}(E_1 \cup V)} \phi \cdot (v_U, v_0, v_1)
\]

or \( \phi \cdot (v^*_0, v^*_0, v^*_1) < \min_{(v_U, v_0, v_1) \in \text{con}(E_1 \cup V)} \phi \cdot (v_U, v_0, v_1)\).

Assume without loss of generality that the first inequality holds, and define

\[
c^0 = \frac{1}{\phi_U} \max_{(v_U, v_0, v_1) \in \text{con}(E_1 \cup V)} \phi \cdot (v_U, v_0, v_1)
\]

\[
c^1 = \frac{1}{\phi_U} \max_{(v_U, v_0, v_1) \in \text{con}(E_1 \cup V)} \phi \cdot (v_U, v_0, v_1)
\]

\[
l(p, v_0, v_1) = (1-p)c^0 + pc^1 - \frac{1}{\phi_U} (\phi_0, \phi_1) \cdot (v_0, v_1).
\]

Then, for \( k = 0, 1 \), any \((v_U, v_0, v_1) \in \text{con}(E_1 \cup V)\),

\[
v_U = \frac{1}{\phi_U} \phi \cdot (v_U, v_0, v_1) - \frac{1}{\phi_U} (\phi_0, \phi_1) \cdot (v_0, v_1) \leq l(k, v_0, v_1).
\]

Property ICR-3 applied to the set ICR* implies that \( v^n_{ij} \leq l(p^n, v^n_{ij}, v^j_{ij}) \) for all \( n \). But this leads to a contradiction:

\[
\lim_{n \to \infty} v^n_{ij} - l(p^n, v^n_{ij}, v^j_{ij}) = v^*_{ij} - l(1, v^*_0, v^*_1) = \frac{1}{\phi_U} \phi \cdot (v^*_0, v^*_0, v^*_1) - c^1 > 0.
\]

**B.3.4 ICR* contains ICR payoffs** Define the set \( I \subseteq [0, 1] \times \mathbb{R}^3 \) as the smallest closed set such that

(a) \( ICR \subseteq I \)

(b) for any \( k \in \{0, 1\} \), \( E_k \subseteq I(k) \)
(c) $I$ satisfies FE-1 and FE-3.

The set $I$ is well-defined as the intersection of all closed sets with properties (a)–(c).

I show that $I \in \mathcal{S}$, which implies that $ICR \subseteq I \subseteq ICR^*$.

Property ICR-1 holds by Corollary 1. The next two subsections establish properties ICR-2 and ICR-3.

B.3.5 $I$ satisfies property ICR-2. For each $\phi \in \Phi^3$ and $\phi_U \neq 0$, for $k = 0, 1$ define $c^k_\phi = \sup_{\phi \in \Phi^3} \phi \cdot v$. Define $I' \subseteq [0, 1] \times \mathbb{R}^3$ by

$$I'(p) = \bigcap_{\phi \in \Phi^3} \{ \phi \cdot v \leq (1 - p)c^0_\phi + pc^1_\phi \}.$$

Then, $I'$ is closed. Clearly, it satisfies properties (a), (b), and FE-3. Property FE-1 follows from Proposition 5. For each $k = 0, 1$, $I'(k) \subseteq E_k$. Also, by definition, $I \subseteq I'$. Hence, for $k = 0, 1$, $I(k) \subseteq I'(k) \subseteq E_k$.

B.3.6 $I$ satisfies property ICR-3. I show that the correspondence $I$ satisfies ICR-3 with inequality “<” (the other case is analogous). I start with a lemma.

**Lemma 12.** Suppose that for each $p_0 < p_1$ and biaffine function $l$, if

$$v_U \leq l(p_j, v_0, v_1) \text{ for each } v \in I(p_j) \cup V \text{ and } j = 0, 1,$$

then $v_U \leq l(p, v_0, v_1)$ for each $v \in ICR(p)$ and $p \in (p_0, p_1)$. Then the correspondence $I$ satisfies property ICR-3.

**Proof.** Suppose to the contrary that there are $p_0 < p_1$, a biaffine function $l$, $p \in (p_0, p_1)$, and $v \in I(p)$ such that $v_U^j \leq l(p_j, v_0^j, v_1^j)$ for each $v^j \in I(p_j) \cup V$ and $v_U > l(p, v_0, v_1)$. Define $I' \subseteq [0, 1] \times \mathbb{R}^3$ by

$$I' = \{ (p, v_U, v_0, v_1) \in I : \text{ if } p_0 \leq p \leq p_1, \text{ then } v_U \leq l(p, v_0, v_1) \}.$$

Then, $I' \not\subseteq I$ and $I'$ is closed. By the hypothesis of the lemma, $I'$ satisfies property (a). Clearly, $I'$ satisfies property (b) and FE-3. An application of Lemma 11 shows that $I'$ satisfies property FE-1. But this contradicts the definition of $I$ as the smallest closed set that satisfies properties (a)–(c).

Therefore, if $I$ violates ICR-3, then there are $\epsilon > 0$, $p_0 < p^* < p_1$, a biaffine function $l$, and $v \in ICR(p^*)$ such that $v_U^j \leq l(p_j, v_0^j, v_1^j)$ for each $v^j \in I(p_j) \cup V$ and $j = 0, 1$, and $v_U \geq l(p^*, v_0, v_1) + 11\epsilon$. Choose sequences $\delta_n \to 1$ and $(p^n, v_U^n, v_0^n, v_1^n) \in ICR\delta_n$ such that

$$(p^n, v_U^n, v_0^n, v_1^n) \to (p^*, v_U^*, v_0^*, v_1^*) \in ICR$$

$$v_U^* \geq l(p^*, v_0^*, v_1^*) + 10\epsilon$$

and, for any $n$,

$$(p^n, v_U^n, v_0^n, v_1^n) \in \arg\max_{p_0 \leq p \leq p_1, (p, v_U, v_0, v_1) \in ICR\delta_n} v_U - \left( l(p, v_0, v_1) - \frac{1 - \delta_n}{\delta_n} D \frac{1 - p^2}{\epsilon} \right),$$

(B.6)
where $D$ is the constant defined in equation (B.4). For each $n$, let $(a^n_{U}, a^n_{I}, a^n_{I})$ be the profile of first-period mixed actions, let $v^n(a_U, a_I)$ be the continuation payoffs, and let $p^n(a_I)$ be the posterior beliefs (posteriors are well-defined only after the action is played with positive probability). For any $a_U \in S_U$, $a_I \in S_I$, and any type $k = 0, 1$, define

$$w^n_k(a_U, a_I) = v^n_k(a_U, a_I) + \frac{1}{\delta} [v_k - (1 - \delta_n)g_k(a_U, a_I) - \delta_n v^n_k(a^n_I, a_I)]. \quad (B.7)$$

These continuation payoffs would make the two types of player $I$ indifferent between any action $a_I$. Observe that, for any $a_I$,

$$w^n_k(a^n_U, a_I) \geq v^n_k(a^n_U, a_I)$$
$$w^n_k(a^n_U, a_I) = v^n_k(a^n_U, a_I), \text{ if } p^n(a_I) \in (0, 1) \cup \{k\}. \quad (B.8)$$

I show below (Section B.3.7) that for all sufficiently high $n$, if $a_I$ is played with positive probability and $p^n(a_I) \notin (p_0, p_1)$, then

$$v^n_{ij}(a^n_U, a_I) - l(p^n(a_I), w^n_0(a^n_U, a_I), w^n_1(a^n_U, a_I)) < \epsilon. \quad (B.9)$$

The proof is concluded in the same way as the proof of Proposition 5. As in Section B.2, one can show that for a high enough $\delta$, inequality (17) holds for any ICR payoff $(v_U, v_0, v_1) \in ICR_\delta(p)$, $p_0 < p < p_1$, such that $v_U - l(p, v_0, v_1) \geq \epsilon$. In particular, there is an $a_I$ such that

$$v^n_{ij}(a^n_U, a_I) - l(p^n(a_I), w^n_0(a^n_U, a_I), w^n_1(a^n_U, a_I)) - \frac{1 - \delta_n}{\delta_n} D \frac{1 - \delta_n}{\epsilon} (p^n(a_I))^2 \quad > v^n_{ij} - \left( l(p^n, v^n_0, v^n_1) - \frac{1 - \delta_n}{\delta_n} C \frac{1 - \delta_n}{\epsilon} (p^n)^2 \right).$$

Because of (B.9), $p^n(a_I) \in (p_0, p_1)$. Then, by (B.8),

$$(v^n_{ij}(a^n_U, a_I), w^n_0(a^n_U, a_I), w^n_1(a^n_U, a_I)) = (v^n_{ij}(a^n_U, a_I), v^n_0(a^n_U, a_I), v^n_1(a^n_U, a_I))$$

is a continuation ICR payoff for all $a_U$ played by $U$ with positive probability. Hence there is a profile $(a_U, a_I)$ after which ICR continuation payoffs satisfy

$$v^n_{ij}(a^n_U, a_I) - l(p^n(a_I), v^n_0(a^n_U, a_I), v^n_1(a^n_U, a_I)) - \frac{1 - \delta_n}{\delta_n} C \frac{1 - \delta_n}{\epsilon} (p^n(a_I))^2 \quad > v^n_{ij} - \left( l(p^n, v^n_0, v^n_1) - \frac{1 - \delta_n}{\delta_n} C \frac{1 - \delta_n}{\epsilon} (p^n)^2 \right)$$

and $p^n(a_I) \in (p_0, p_1)$. But this contradicts the choice of $(p^n, v^n_{ij}, v^n_0, v^n_1)$ as the maximizers of expression (B.6).

B.3.7 (B.9) is satisfied for a high enough $n$ Suppose not. Then one can find an action $a_I$ and subsequences (denoted further as a sequence of $n$s) such that $a_I$ is played with positive probability for all $n$, $p^n(a_I) \to p^n(a_I) \notin (p_0, p_1)$, $a^n_{ij} \to \alpha^n_{ij}$, $v^n_{ij}(a_U, a_I) \to v^n_{ij}(a_U, a_I)$, and $w^n_k(a_U, a_I) \to w^n_k(a_U, a_I)$, and such that

$$\epsilon \leq v^n_{ij}(a_U, a_I) - l(p^n(a_I), w^n_0(a^n_U, a_I), w^n_1(a^n_U, a_I)).$$
Assume without loss of generality that \( p^*(a_I) \leq p_0 \leq 1 \) (the other case, \( p^*(a_I) > p_1 \), is treated analogously). By definition (B.7), \( \|w^n_k(a^n_{IJ}, a_I) - (v^n_0, v^n_1)\| \leq 2M(1 - \delta_n)/\delta_n \) for each \( n \). This implies that \( w(a^n_{IJ}, a_I) = (v^n_0, v^n_1) \) and
\[
\epsilon \leq v^n_{IJ}(a_I, a_I) - l(p^*(a_I), v^n_0, v^n_1).
\]

**Lemma 13.** \( (v^n_{IJ}(a^n_{IJ}, a_I), v^n_0, v^n_1) \in I(p^*(a_I)) \).

**Proof.** Suppose first that \( p^*(a_I) > 0 \). Because \( p^*(a_I) < 1 \), this means that for sufficiently large \( n \), \( a_I \) is played with positive probability by each type of player \( I \). Thus \( (v^n_{IJ}(a^n_{IJ}, a_I), v^n_0(a^n_{IJ}, a_I), v^n(a^n_{IJ}, a_I)) \) is a convex combination of payoffs in ICR profiles. Moreover, each type of player \( I \) has to be indifferent between \( a_I \) and any other equilibrium action. Because the first-period payoffs from playing \( a_I \) converge to 0 when \( n \to \infty \), this means that \( \lim_{n \to \infty} v^n_k(a^n_{IJ}, a_I) = v^*_k \) for each \( k = 0, 1 \). Hence \( (v^n_{IJ}(a^n_{IJ}, a_I), v^n_0, v^n_1) \in ICR(p^*(a_I)) \subseteq I(p^*(a_I)) \).

Next, suppose that \( p^*(a_I) = 0 \). By property (b) of the set \( I \), it is sufficient to show that
\[
(v^n_{IJ}(a^n_{IJ}, a_I), v^n_0, v^n_1) \in E_0 = IR \cap E^{\text{FIC}}(0).
\]
Clearly, \( v^n_{IJ}(a^n_{IJ}, a_I) = \lim_{n \to \infty} v^n_{IJ}(a^n_{IJ}, a_I) \geq m_I \) and \( (v^n_0, v^n_1) = \lim_{n \to \infty} (v^n_0, v^n_1) \in \text{proj } IR \).

Let \( v^n(a^n_{IJ}, (a_I, \sigma_0)) \) denote the vector of expected payoffs if player \( I \) chose \( a_I \) in the first period and then mimicked the strategy \( \sigma_0 \) of type 0 (the expectation is taken with respect to the mixed action \( a^n_{IJ} \) of player \( I \)). Observe that \( v^n(a^n_{IJ}, (a_I, \sigma_0)) \in V \). Because the difference between \( v^n_{IJ}(a^n_{IJ}, (a_I, \sigma_0)) \) and \( v^n_{IJ}(a^n_{IJ}, a_I) \) is not higher than the first-period payoffs,
\[
\|v^n_{IJ}(a^n_{IJ}, (a_I, \sigma_0)) - v^n_{IJ}(a^n_{IJ}, a_I)\| \leq 2M(1 - \delta_n)/\delta_n \text{ for each } n.
\]
Because \( a_I \) is played with positive probability by type 0, for each \( n \),
\[
v^n_0(a^n_{IJ}, (a_I, \sigma_0)) = v^n_0 \text{ and } v^n_1(a^n_{IJ}, (a_I, \sigma_0)) \leq v^n_1.
\]
Let \( \tilde{v}^* = \lim_{n \to \infty} v^n(a^n_{IJ}, (a_I, \sigma_0)) \in V \) (note that the limit exists, possibly after taking subsequences). Hence \( \tilde{v}^*_{IJ} = v^*_0(a^n_{IJ}, a_I), \tilde{v}^*_0 = v^*_0, \text{ and } \tilde{v}^*_1 = v^*_1 \). This implies that we have \( (v^n_{IJ}(a^n_{IJ}, a_I), v^n_0, v^n_1) \in E^{\text{FIC}}(0) \). \( \square \)

Define
\[
\tilde{v} = \frac{p_0 - p^*(a_I)}{p^n - p^*(a_I)}(v^n_{IJ}(a^n_{IJ}, a_I), v^n_0, v^n_1) + \frac{p^*-p_0}{p^n - p^*(a_I)}v^*.
\]

Observe that \( \tilde{v} \in I(p_0) \) because \( p^*(a_I) \leq p_0 < p^* \) and because of the above lemma, the fact that \( \sigma^* \in I(p^*), p^*(a_I) \leq p_0 < p^* \), and the fact that the correspondence \( I \) satisfies property FE-1. By the choice of a bijective function \( l \), \( \tilde{v}_{IJ} \leq l(p_0, \tilde{v}_0, \tilde{v}_1) \). However, notice
that

\[
0 \geq \tilde{w}_U - l(p_0, \tilde{v}_0, \tilde{v}_1)
\]

\[
= p_0 - p^*(a_1) \left( v_U(a_U, a_1) - l(p^*(a_1), v^*_0, v^*_1) \right) + \frac{p^* - p_0}{p^* - p^*(a_1)} (v^*_U - l(p^*, v^*_0, v^*_1))
\]

\[
\geq p_0 - p^*(a_1) \epsilon + \frac{p^* - p_0}{p^* - p^*(a_1)} 10 \epsilon \geq \epsilon > 0.
\]

The contradiction shows that for a high enough \( n \), if \( p^n(a_1) \leq p_0 \) or \( p^n(a_1) \geq p_1 \), then (B.9) must hold. This ends the proof of the proposition.

C. Proof of Lemma 5

This section is devoted to the proof of Lemma 5. Section C.1 proves some geometrical results. Section C.2 defines all the constants and states a helpful assumption. Section C.3 proves the lemma given the assumption. Sections C.4 and C.5 fill in some missing steps. Section C.6 shows how to extend Theorem 3 to games that do not satisfy the assumption in Section C.2.

C.1 Geometrical results

Suppose that \( A \subseteq \mathbb{R}^2 \) is a (not necessarily bounded) set with finitely many extreme points \( A_{extr} \subseteq A \). Then there exists a finite set of unitary vectors \( \Phi_A \subseteq \Phi^2 \) such that

\[
A = \bigcap_{\phi \in \Phi_A} \{ a \in \mathbb{R}^2 : \phi \cdot a \leq \sup_{a^* \in A} \phi \cdot a^* \}.
\]

**Lemma 14.** Suppose that \( A \subseteq \mathbb{R}^2 \) is a (not necessarily bounded) set with finitely many extreme points \( A_{extr} \subseteq A \). Suppose that \( B \subseteq \mathbb{R}^2 \) is a finite set such that \( A \cap \text{con} \ B = \emptyset \). Then there is a constant \( C_B < \infty \) such that for any \( a^* \in A \), if

\[
A \cap \text{con}(B \cup \{ a^* \}) = \{ a^* \},
\]

then, for any \( b \in \text{con} B \) and \( \alpha \in [0, 1] \),

\[
\alpha \leq C_B \inf_{a^* \in A} \| (1 - \alpha) a^* + \alpha b - a' \|.
\]

**Proof.** Given the assumptions about the sets \( A \) and \( B \), there is a finite set \( \Phi_B^* \subseteq \Phi^2 \) of unit vectors so that, whenever \( a^* \in A \) and (C.1) holds, there is \( \phi \in \Phi_B^* \) so that

\[
\sup_{a' \in A} \phi \cdot a' = \phi \cdot a^* < \min_{b \in B} \phi \cdot b.
\]

Indeed, for any \( a \in A_{extr} \), either \( A \cap \text{con}(B \cup \{ a \}) \neq \{ a \} \) or there is \( \phi_a \) such that

\[
\phi_a \cdot a = \max_{a' \in A} \phi_a \cdot a' < \min_{b \in B} \phi_a \cdot b.
\]

Define

\[
\Phi_B^* = \{ \phi_a : A \cap \text{con}(B \cup \{ a \}) = \{ a \} \} \cup \{ \phi \in \Phi_A : \max_{a' \in A} \phi \cdot a' < \min_{b \in B} \phi \cdot b \}.
\]
It is easy to check that $\Phi^*_B$ has the required property.

Suppose now that (C.1) holds for some $a^* \in A$. Then, for any $b \in \text{con } B$, $a \in [0, 1]$, and any $\phi$,

$$\inf_{a' \in A} \| (1-\alpha)a^* + ab - a' \| \geq \phi \cdot ((1-\alpha)a^* + ab) - \sup_{a'' \in A} \phi \cdot a''$$

$$\geq \alpha [ \inf_{b' \in B} \phi \cdot b' - \sup_{a'' \in A} \phi \cdot a'' ] + (1-\alpha) [ \phi \cdot a^* - \sup_{a'' \in A} \phi \cdot a' ] .$$

By the remark above, there exists $\phi \in \Phi^*_B$ so that the first term in the last line of the inequality is strictly positive and the second term is equal to 0. For such $\phi$,

$$\alpha \leq \frac{1}{\min_{b' \in B} \phi \cdot b' - \sup_{a'' \in A} \phi \cdot a''} \sup_{a'' \in A} \| (1-\alpha)a^* + ab - a' \| .$$

Define

$$C_B = \max_{\phi \in \Phi^*_B; \min_{b' \in B} \phi \cdot b' > \sup_{a'' \in A} \phi \cdot a''} \frac{1}{\min_{b' \in B} \phi \cdot b' - \sup_{a'' \in A} \phi \cdot a''} .$$

This constant is well-defined, as a maximum over finitely many finite constants.

Say that $v^* \in \mathbb{R}^3$ is represented by tuple $(v, \alpha, \rho)$, $v \in \mathbb{R}^3, \alpha \in [0, 1], \rho \in \Delta B$, where $B \subseteq \mathbb{R}^3$ is a finite set, if

$$v^* = \alpha \sum_{b \in B} b \rho(b) + (1-\alpha)v .$$

**Lemma 15.** Suppose that $v^*$ is represented by $(\hat{v}, \alpha, \rho)$ for some $\alpha \in (0, 1)$. Then there is an open neighborhood $U \ni \hat{v}$ such that for any $\tilde{v}' \in U \cap \text{con } (\text{supp } \rho \cup \{ \hat{v} \})$, $v^*$ is represented by $(\tilde{v}', \alpha', \rho')$ for some $\alpha' < \alpha$ and $\rho' \in \Delta (\text{supp } \rho)$.

**Proof.** Let $U_V \subseteq \text{con } (\text{supp } \rho \cup \{ \hat{v} \})$ be defined by

$$U_V = \left\{ \alpha'' \sum_{v \in \text{supp } \rho'} v \rho''(v) + (1-\alpha'')\hat{v} : \alpha'' \in [0, \alpha), \rho'' \in \Delta \text{supp } \rho, \right.$$  

$$\text{and } \rho(v) > \frac{(1-\alpha)\alpha''}{\alpha(1-\alpha'')} \rho''(v) \text{ for each } v \in \text{supp } \rho. \right\} .$$

Then $\hat{v} \in U_V$ and $U_V$ is open relative to $\text{con } (\text{supp } \rho \cup \{ \hat{v} \})$. Hence, there exists an open set $U \subseteq \mathbb{R}^3$ such that $U_V = U \cap \text{con } (\text{supp } \rho \cup \{ \hat{v} \})$.

Take any $\tilde{v}' \in U_V$ and $\tilde{v}' \neq \hat{v}$ and find $\alpha'' \in [0, \alpha)$ and $\rho'' \in \Delta \text{supp } \rho$ such that

$$\tilde{v}' = \alpha'' \sum_{v \in \text{supp } \rho'} v \rho''(v) + (1-\alpha'')\hat{v}$$

$$\rho(v) > \frac{(1-\alpha)\alpha''}{\alpha(1-\alpha'')} \rho''(v) \text{ for each } v \in \text{supp } \rho .$$

Let

$$\alpha' = \frac{\alpha - \alpha''}{1-\alpha''} .$$
which is less than $\alpha$ because $\alpha < 1$, and

$$\rho'(v) = \frac{1}{\alpha - \alpha''}[\alpha(1 - \alpha'')\rho(v) - (1 - \alpha)\alpha'' \rho''(v)] > 0$$

Then $\rho' \in \Delta(\text{supp } \rho)$ is a probability measure with support contained in $\text{supp } \rho$ and $(\bar{v}', \alpha', \rho')$ represents $v^*$:

$$\alpha' \sum_{v \in \text{supp } \rho'} v \rho'(v) + (1 - \alpha')\bar{v}' = \alpha' \frac{1}{\alpha - \alpha''} \sum_{v \in \text{supp } \rho'} v[\alpha(1 - \alpha'')\rho(v) - (1 - \alpha)\alpha'' \rho''(v)]$$

$$+ \frac{1 - \alpha}{1 - \alpha''} \left( \alpha'' \sum_{v \in \text{supp } \rho'} v \rho''(v) + (1 - \alpha'')\bar{v}' \right) = v^*. \quad \Box$$

C.2 Assumption and constants

Throughout Sections C.3, C.4, and C.5 of the Appendix I make the following assumption.

**Assumption 2.** $\text{proj } IR$ has finitely many extreme points.

This assumption implies that there is a finite set of unitary vectors $\Phi_{IR} \subseteq \Phi^2$ such that

$$\text{proj } IR = \bigcap_{\phi \in \Phi_{IR}} \{ (v_0, v_1) \in \mathbb{R}^2 : \phi \cdot (v_0, v_1) \geq m_I(\phi) \}.$$ 

The assumption is restrictive. Initially, I prove that Lemma 5 holds for all games that satisfy the assumption. Together with the analysis of Section 5, this demonstrates Theorem 3 for all games satisfying the assumption. In Section C.6 I extend Theorem 3 to all games.

Define the closed sets

$$V^+ = V \cap \{ v : v_U \geq m_U \} \text{ and } V^- = V \cap \{ v : v_U \leq m_U \}.$$ 

Both sets are convex and spanned by finitely many vertices. Let $V^{+\text{ vert}}$ and $V^{-\text{ vert}}$ consist of the vertices of, respectively, $V^+$ and $V^-$. Let

$$V^* = V^{+\text{ vert}} \cup V^{-\text{ vert}}.$$ 

Then $V^*$ is finite. Let $\mathcal{B}$ be the set of all finite subsets of $\text{proj } V^* \subseteq \mathbb{R}^2$ such that $\text{con } B \cap \text{proj } IR = \emptyset$. For any $B \in \mathcal{B}$, let $C_B$ be the constant from Lemma 14 applied to the set $A = \text{proj } IR$. (Notice that $\text{proj } IR$ satisfies the hypotheses of the lemma because of the assumption.) Let

$$C_F = \max_{B \in \mathcal{B}} C_B < \infty. \quad \text{(C.2)}$$

Consider a finite class of closed convex sets indexed by subsets $\Phi \subseteq \Phi_{IR}$:

$$S(\Phi) = \bigcap_{\phi \in \Phi} \{ v : \phi \cdot (v_0, v_1) \leq m_I(\phi) \}.$$
Observe that for each $\Phi \subseteq \Phi_{IR}$, $S(\Phi)$ is spanned by a finite set of vertices $S_{vert}(\Phi)$. Define
\[
C_I = m_I - \max_{\Phi \subseteq \Phi_{IR}} \{v_U : (v_U, v_0, v_1) \in S_{vert}(\Phi), v_U < m_U \} > 0.
\] (C.3)
The number $C_I$ is strictly positive because $\Phi_{IR}$ is finite and each $S_{vert}(\Phi)$ is finite.

Define
\[
L = \sup_{(v_0, v_1), (v_0', v_1') \in \text{proj} ICR^*(1)} \frac{|u^I(v_0, v_1)(1) - u^I(v_0', v_1')(1)|}{\| (v_0, v_1) - (v_0', v_1') \|} < \infty.
\] (C.4)
The constant $L$ is finite because the set $ICR^*(1) = E_1$ is the convex hull of finitely many vertices.

Recall that $M$ is the uniform bound on the stage-game payoffs defined in (1). Let
\[
C_0 = \max \left( \frac{2}{1 - p^u} [L(1 + M C_F) + 2 M C_F], 2 \frac{L M}{(1 - p^u) C_I} \right) \quad \text{(C.5)}
\]
\[
\theta^* = \min \left( \frac{1 - p^u}{2 C_0}, \frac{1}{L(1 + M C_F)}, \frac{1}{C_0} \right)
\]
\[
d^* = \min \left( \frac{1}{2(C_I LM + 1)}, \frac{1}{2LM}, \frac{1}{C_0} \right)
\]
\[
D = \frac{4M^2(2C_0 + 2 + L)}{(1 - p^u)^2 C_I^2} + 2C_0. \quad \text{(C.6)}
\]

C.3 Proof of Lemma 5 (given Assumption 2)

In order to shorten the notation, I write $v_{0,1} = (v_0, v_1) \in \mathbb{R}^2$ for any $v = (v_U, v_0, v_1) \in \mathbb{R}^3$. Assume that the hypothesis of Lemma 5 is satisfied and, in particular,
\[
p' - p \leq d^* \text{ and } \theta(p) \leq \theta^*.
\]

Denote
\[
\theta = \theta(p).
\]
Take any $y^I \in I_I(p')$ for some $p' > p$. I show that there is $y^F \in F(p')$ such that
\[
\|y^I_{0,1} - y^F_{0,1}\| \leq (\theta + D(\theta^2 + (p' - p)\theta + (p' - p)^2))(u^I(1)(y^I_{0,1}) - m_U).
\] (C.7)

This establishes (22) and the lemma.

The main objective of the proof is to bound the distances between a number of payoff vectors. It is helpful to list all the variables involved, together with the relationships between them. There are two types of payoff vectors: for those associated with prior beliefs $p$, I write $x^I, x^{I,a}, x^{F,a} \in \mathbb{R}^3$, and for those associated with $p'$, I write $y^I, y^{I,a}, y^F, y^{F,a} \in \mathbb{R}^3$. The following hold:
\[
\begin{align*}
x^A_{0,1} &= y^A_{0,1} \text{ for any } A = I, (I, a), F, (F, a) \\
x^I &= \alpha^I v^I + (1 - \alpha^I)x^{I,a} \\
y^I &= \alpha^I v^I + (1 - \alpha^I)y^{I,a} \\
y^F &= \alpha^F v^I + (1 - \alpha^F)y^{F,a}
\end{align*}
\]
for some \( v^l \in V \) and \( \alpha^l, \alpha^f \in [0,1] \).

The rest of the proof is divided into six steps. All constants are defined in Section C.2. Lemmas 16 and 17 are proved in Sections C.4 and C.5, respectively.

Step 1. Define \( x^l = (u^l(p)(y^l_{0,1}), y^l_{0,1}) \). Because \( y^l \in I_1(p') \), it must be that \( u^l(1)(y^l_{0,1}) \geq m_U \). Then

\[
x^l_{0,1} = u^l(p)(y^l_{0,1}) \leq m_U;
\]

otherwise, by part (iii) of Lemma 2, \( u^l(p')(y^l_{0,1}) > m_U \), which contradicts \( y^l \in I_1(p') \).

Lemma 16. There exist \( x^{l,a} \in I_1(p), \alpha^l \in [0,1], \) and \( v^l \in V \) such that \( v^l \leq m_U - C \) and

\[
x^l = \alpha^l v^l + (1 - \alpha^l)x^{l,a}.
\]

For future reference, note that

\[
\|x^{l,a}_{0,1} - x^l_{0,1}\| \leq \alpha^l M.
\]

Step 2. Due to the concavity of the function \( u^l \) in \( v_{0,1} \),

\[
\alpha^l v^l + (1 - \alpha^l)x^{l,a}_{0,1} = x^l_{0,1} = u^l(p)(x^l_{0,1}) \geq \alpha^l u^l(p)(v^l_{0,1}) + (1 - \alpha^l)u^l(p)(x^{l,a}_{0,1})
\]

and all inequalities can be turned into equalities. Note that

\[
x^{l,a}_{0,1} = u^l(p)(x^{l,a}_{0,1}) = m_U,
\]

because \( x^{l,a} \in I_1(p) \). Therefore, part (iii) of Lemma 2 implies that

\[
u^l(p')(x^{l,a}_{0,1}) = m_U + \frac{p' - p}{1 - p} u^l(1)(x^{l,a}_{0,1}) - m_U\]

By the definition of the constant \( L \) in (C.4) and by (C.9),

\[
u^l(1)(x^l_{0,1}) \leq u^l(1)(x^{l,a}_{0,1}) + L\|x^{l,a}_{0,1} - x^l_{0,1}\| \leq u^l(1)(x^{l,a}_{0,1}) + \alpha^l LM.
\]

The above conditions and the convexity of \( u^l \) in \( p \) imply that

\[
m_U = y^l_{0,1} = u^l(p')(x^l_{0,1}) \leq \frac{p' - p}{1 - p} u^l(1)(x^l_{0,1}) + \frac{1 - p'}{1 - p} u^l(p)(x^l_{0,1})\]

\[
\leq \frac{p' - p}{1 - p} u^l(1)(x^{l,a}_{0,1}) + \frac{p' - p}{1 - p} \alpha^l LM + \frac{1 - p'}{1 - p} (1 - \alpha^l)x^{l,a}_{0,1} + \frac{1 - p'}{1 - p} \alpha^l v^l
\]

\[
= m_U + \frac{p' - p}{1 - p} [u^l(1)(x^{l,a}_{0,1}) - m_U] - \alpha^l \left[ \frac{1 - p'}{1 - p} (m_U - v^l_{0,1}) - \frac{1 - p'}{1 - p} LM \right]
\]

\[
u^l(p')(x^{l,a}_{0,1}) - \alpha^l \left[ \frac{1 - p'}{1 - p} (m_U - v^l_{0,1}) - \frac{1 - p'}{1 - p} LM \right].
\]
This leads to a bound on $\alpha^I$:

$$\alpha^I \leq \frac{u^I(p')(x_{0,1}^{I,a}) - m_U}{\frac{1-p'}{1-p} (m_U - v_U^I) - \frac{p'}{1-p} LM}$$

(C.12)

where the equality in the second line comes from (C.10).

**Step 3.** The bound (C.12) implies that

$$\alpha^I \leq \frac{u^I(1)(x_{0,1}^{I,a}) - m_U}{\frac{1}{1-p} (1-p^u) C_I} (p' - p)$$

for $p' - p \leq d^* \leq (1 - p^u)C_I/(2LM)$. Because of (C.11) and the equality $y_{0,1}^I = x_{0,1}^I$,

$$u^I(1)(y_{0,1}^I) - m_U \geq (1 - \frac{1}{2} C_0(p' - p))(u^I(1)(x_{0,1}^{I,a}) - m_U).$$

(Recall the definition of the constant $C_0$ in (C.5).) For $p' - p \leq d^* \leq 1/C_0$, we have $(1 - \frac{1}{2} C_0(p' - p))^{-1} \leq (1 + C_0(p' - p))$. Hence

$$u^I(1)(x_{0,1}^{I,a}) - m_U \leq (1 + C_0(p' - p))(u^I(1)(y_{0,1}^I) - m_U).$$

(C.13)

**Step 4.** By the hypothesis of the lemma, there is $x^{F,a} \in F^*(p)$ such that

$$\|x_{0,1}^{I,a} - x_{0,1}^{F,a}\| \leq (u^I(1)(x_{0,1}^I) - m_U)\theta.$$

(C.14)

**Lemma 17.** $u^I(p')(x_{0,1}^{I,a}) - u^F(p')(x_{0,1}^{F,a}) \leq C_0(p' - p)(u^I(1)(x_{0,1}^I) - m_U)\theta$.

By (C.10)

$$u^F(p')(x_{0,1}^{F,a}) \geq m_U + \left(1 - \frac{1}{1-p} - C_0 \theta\right)(u^I(1)(x_{0,1}^{I,a}) - m_U)(p' - p) \geq m_U,$$

where the last inequality holds for $\theta \leq \theta^* \leq (1 - p^u)/C_0$.

Define payoff vectors

$$y_{F,a} = (u^F(p')(x_{0,1}^{F,a}), x_{0,1}^{F,a})$$

$$y^F(a) = \alpha v^I + (1 - \alpha)y_{F,a}.$$

Clearly, $y_{F,a}, y^F(a) \in \text{con}(F^*(p) \cup V)$. Define

$$\alpha_{F^*} = \frac{(1 - C_0(1-p)\theta)(u^I(1)(x_{0,1}^{I,a}) - m_U)(p' - p)}{(1 - C_0(1-p)\theta)(u^I(1)(x_{0,1}^{I,a}) - m_U)(p' - p) + (1-p)(m_U - v^I_U)}.$$  

(C.16)

Then (C.15) implies that

$$\frac{\alpha_{F^*}}{y_{F,a} - y^F} \leq \frac{y_{F,a} - m_U}{y_{F,a} - v^I_U}.$$  

(Notice that $(x-a)/(x-b)$ is increasing in $x$ for $a < b$.) Therefore,

$$y^F(a) \in F^*(p)$$

for each $\alpha \leq \alpha_{F^*}$. 

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Step 5. Use (C.12) and (C.16) to bound the difference:

\[
\frac{\alpha^{i^s} - \alpha^{F^s}}{p' - p} \leq \frac{u^I(1)(x_{0,1}^{l,a}) - m_U}{(1-p')(m_U - v_{U}^I) - (p' - p)LM} - \frac{(1 - C_0(1 - p)\theta)(u^I(1)(x_{0,1}^{l,a}) - m_U)}{M(p' - p) + (1 - p)(m_U - v_{U}^I)}. 
\]

For \( p' - p \leq d^* \leq (1 - p^u)C_i/(2LM) \),

\[
(1 - C_0(1 - p)\theta)((1 - p')(m_U - v_{U}^I) - (p' - p)LM) \leq (1 - p^u)C_i 
\]

Hence

\[
\frac{\alpha^{i^s} - \alpha^{F^s}}{p' - p} \leq \frac{2(u^I(1)(x_{0,1}^{l,a}) - m_U)}{(1-p^u)^2C_i^2}[(M(p' - p) + (1 - p)(m_U - v_{U}^I))] 
- (1 - C_0(1 - p)\theta)((1 - p')(m_U - v_{U}^I) - (p' - p)LM)] 
\leq \frac{2(u^I(1)(x_{0,1}^{l,a}) - m_U)}{C_i^2}(1 + 2C_0\theta)[C_0(1 - p)\theta(M(p' - p) 
+ (1 - p)M) + (p' - p)(2M + LM)] 
\leq \frac{2[C_0(1 - p)M\theta + (2 + L)M(p' - p)][1 + 2C_0\theta]}{2M}(u^I(1)(x_{0,1}^{l,a}) - m_U) 
\leq \frac{D - 2C_0}{2M}((\theta + p' - p)(u^I(1)(x_{0,1}^{l,a}) - m_U),
\]

where the constant \( D \) is defined in equation (C.6).

Step 6. Compute the distance between \( y_{0,1}^I \) and \( y_{0,1}^F(\alpha) \):

\[
\|y_{0,1}^I - y_{0,1}^F(\alpha)\| = \|\alpha^I v_{0,1}^I + (1 - \alpha^I)x_{0,1}^{l,a} - \alpha y_{0,1}^I\| 
= \|(\alpha^I - \alpha)v_{0,1}^I + (1 - \alpha^I)(x_{0,1}^{l,a} - y_{0,1}^I) - (\alpha^I - \alpha)y_{0,1}^I\| 
\leq |\alpha^I - \alpha|2M + \|x_{0,1}^{l,a} - y_{0,1}^I\|.
\]

Steps 4 and 5, inequality (C.14), and the last inequality imply that one can find \( \alpha^F \) so that \( y^F(\alpha^F) \in F(p) \) and

\[
\|y_{0,1}^I - y_{0,1}^F(\alpha^F)\| \leq (\theta + (D - 2C_0)((\theta + (p' - p)\theta + (p' - p)^2))(u^I(1)(x_{0,1}^{l,a}) - m_U). 
\]

Finally, use inequality (C.13) to obtain

\[
\|y_{0,1}^I - y_{0,1}^F(\alpha^F)\| 
\leq (\theta + (D - 2C_0)((\theta + (p' - p)\theta + (p' - p)^2))(1 + C_0(p - p'))(u^I(1)(y_{0,1}^I) - m_U) 
\leq (\theta + D((p' - p)\theta + (p' - p)^2))(u^I(1)(y_{0,1}^I) - m_U).
\]

This ends the proof of (C.7) and the lemma.
C.4 Proof of Lemma 16

The proof of the lemma is divided into two parts.

**Lemma 18.** There exist $x^{l,a} \in ICR^*(p)$, $a^l \in [0,1]$, and $\rho^l \in \Delta V$ such that

$$x^l = a^l \sum_{v \in V} v \rho^l(v) + (1 - a^l)x^{l,a}, \quad (C.17)$$

$x^{l,a}_U = m_U$, and $v_U \leq m_U - C_I$ for each $v \in \text{supp} \rho^l$.

Any tuple $(x^{l,a}, a^l, v^l)$ such that $x^{l,a} \in ICR^*(p)$, $a^l \in [0,1]$, $\rho^l \in \Delta V$, and (C.17) holds is called a representation of $x^l$.

**Proof.** There exists at least one representation $(x, a, \rho)$ of $x^l \in \text{con}(ICR^*(p) \cup V)$. Among all such representations, choose $(x^{l,a}, a^l, \rho)$ to minimize $a^l$. Such a representation exists by a simple compactness argument.

I show that $x^{l,a}_U = m_U$. Consider the following three cases.

1. If $a^l = 0$, then $m_U \leq x^{l,a}_U = x_U^l \leq m_U$ by (C.8).

2. Suppose that $0 < a^l < 1$. If $x^{l,a}_U > m_U$, then construct

$$x^{l,a'} = x^{l,a} + \frac{x^{l,a}_U - m_U}{x^{l,a}_U - x^{l,a}}(x^l - x^{l,a}).$$

By construction, $x^{l,a'}_U \geq m_U$. Because $x^{l,a}, x^{l,a}_0, x^{l,a}_1 \in \text{proj} IR$, we have $x^{l,a'}_0, x^{l,a'}_1 \in \text{proj} IR$. Hence $x^{l,a'} \in IR$ and there is $a' < a^l$ such that $(x^{l,a'}, a', \rho)$ is a representation of $x^l$. This contradicts the choice of $(x^{l,a}, a^l, \rho)$ as the representation that minimizes $a^l$.

3. If $a^l = 1$, then any $x^{l,a} \in I_1(p)$ satisfies (C.17).

Recall the definition of $C_I$ and the set $S_{\text{vert}}(\Phi')$, where $\Phi' \subseteq \Phi IR$. (These definitions may be found in Section C.2.) Define

$$\nu^\rho = \sum_{v \in V} v \rho(v)$$

$$\Phi^l = \{ \Phi \in \Phi IR : \Phi \cdot (\nu^\rho_0, \nu^\rho_1) \leq m_I(\Phi) \}$$

$$S = S_{\text{vert}}(\Phi^l).$$

Then $\nu^\rho \in \text{con} S$ and there exists $\rho^l \in \Delta S$ such that (C.17) holds.

I show that for each $v \in \text{supp} \rho^l$, $v_U < m_U$. By the definition of the constant $C_I$ in (C.3), this implies that for each $v \in \text{supp} \rho^l$, $v_U < m_U - C_I$. On the contrary, suppose that there is $v \in \text{supp} \rho^l$ with $v_U \geq m_U$. There are two cases to be considered.
1. If there is \( \phi \in \Phi_{IR} \) such that \( \phi \cdot x_{0,1}^{I,a} = m_I(\phi) \) and \( \phi \cdot v_{0,1} < m_I(\phi) \), then, by the definition of the set \( S(\Phi^I) \), \( \phi \cdot v_{0,1}^p < m_I(\phi) \). But then, for any \( \alpha \in [0,1] \),
\[
\phi \cdot [(1-\alpha)x_{0,1}^{I,a} + \alpha v_{0,1}^p] < m_I(\phi) \tag{C.18}
\]
\[
(1-\alpha)x_{0,1}^{I,a} + \alpha v_{0,1}^p \notin \text{proj } IR.
\]
Recall that \( x_{0,1}^I = y_{0,1}^I \in \text{proj } IR \). Hence (C.18) contradicts the fact that \( (x^{I,a}, \alpha^I, v^p) \) is a representation of \( x^I \).

2. Next, suppose that \( \phi \cdot v_{0,1} \leq m_I(\phi) \) for any \( \phi \in \Phi_{IR} \) such that \( \phi \cdot x_{0,1}^{I,a} = m_I(\phi) \). This implies that for small \( \epsilon > 0 \),
\[
x_{0,1}^{I,a} + \epsilon(v_{0,1} - x_{0,1}^{I,a}) \in \text{proj } IR.
\]
Because \( v_U, x_U^{I,a} \geq m_U \), it must be that \( x_{0,1}^{I,a} + \epsilon(v_{0,1} - x_{0,1}^{I,a}) \geq m_U \). One concludes that for small \( \epsilon > 0 \),
\[
x^{I,a} = x^{I,a} + \epsilon(v - x^{I,a}) \in IR.
\]
But then, by Lemma 15, there is a representation \( (x^{I,a'}, \alpha^{I'}, v^p) \) such that \( \alpha^{I'} < \alpha^I \).
This contradicts the choice of \( (x^{I,a}, \alpha^I, v^p) \) as the representation that minimizes \( \alpha^I \).

**Lemma 19.** \( x^{I,a} \in I_1(p) \).

**Proof.** I need to show that
\[
u^{I}(p)(x_{0,1}^{I,a}) = m_U, \text{ and } x_{0,1}^{I,a} \in \text{proj } IC^*(1). \tag{C.19}
\]
First, suppose that the first part of (C.19) is not true. Because \( x_U^{I,a} = m_U \), it must be that \( u^{I}(p)(x_{0,1}^{I,a}) > m_U \). Define
\[
x = (1-\alpha^{I})(u^{I}(p)(x_{0,1}^{I,a}), x_{0,1}^{I,a}) + \alpha^{I} \sum_{v \in V} v^{I}(v).
\]
Because \( (x^{I,a}, \alpha, v) \) is a representation of \( x^{I} \), \( x_{0,1} = x_{0,1}^{I,a} \). By the above equation, we have \( u^{I}(p)(x_{0,1}^{I,a}) \geq x_U > x_{0,1}^{I,a} \). But this contradicts (C.8).

Next, I show that the second part of (C.19) holds. By (C.8), \( u^{I}(p)(x_{0,1}^{I,a}) = x_U \). Hence
\[
u^{I}(p)(x_{0,1}^{I,a}) = x_U = (1-\alpha^{I})x^{I,a}_{U} + \alpha^{I} \sum_{v \in V} v^{I}(v)
\]
\[
= (1-\alpha^{I})m_U + \alpha^{I} \sum_{v \in V} v^{I}(v)
\]
\[
\leq m_U - \alpha^{I}C_I,
\]
where the last inequality follows from the fact that \( v_U \leq m_U - C_I \) for each \( v \in \text{supp } \rho^{I} \). By the definition of the constant \( L \) in (C.4),
\[
u^{I}(1)(x_{0,1}^{I,a}) \leq u^{I}(1)(x_{0,1}^{I,a}) + L\|x^{I,a}_{0,1} - x_{0,1}^{I,a}\| 
\]
\[
\leq u^{I}(1)(x_{0,1}^{I,a}) + \alpha^{I}LM.
\]
The function \( u^I(.)(x^I_{0,1}) \) is convex in \( p \) (part (iii) of Lemma 2). Hence

\[
m_U = u^I(p')(x^I_{0,1}) \leq \frac{1-p'}{1-p} u^I(p)(x^I_{0,1}) + \frac{p'-p}{1-p} u^I(1)(x^I_{0,1}) \leq \frac{1-p'}{1-p} m_U \alpha I + \frac{p'}{1-p} \alpha I LM.
\]

(C.20)

Suppose that \( x^I_{0,1} \notin \text{proj ICR}^*(1) \), or, because \( x^I_{0,1} \in \text{proj IR} \), \( u^I(1)(x^I_{0,1}) < m_U \). Then

\[
m_U > \frac{1-p'}{1-p} m_U + \frac{p'-p}{1-p} u^I(1)(x^I_{0,1}).
\]

(C.21)

Subtract both sides of (C.21) from the corresponding sides of (C.20) and multiply by \( \frac{1-p}{1-p} \) to get

\[
p' - p > \frac{LM}{C_I(1-p)}.
\]

Therefore, if \( p' - p < LM/(C_I(1-p_u)) \), then

\[x^I_{0,1} \in \text{proj ICR}^*(1) \text{ and } x^I_{0,1} \in I_1(p).\]

\[\square\]

C.5 Proof of Lemma 17

Lemma 20. There exist \( x \in \text{FE}^*(p) \), \( \alpha^F \in [0,1] \), and \( \rho^F \in \Delta V \) such that

\[x^{F,a} = \alpha^F \sum_{v \in V} v \rho^F(v) + (1 - \alpha^F)x \]

(C.22)

and

\[\alpha^F \leq C_F \inf_{v_0,1^F \in \text{proj IR}} \| v_0,1^F \| \]

A tuple \((x, \alpha^F, \rho^F)\) such that \( x \in \text{FE}^*(p) \), \( \alpha^F \in [0,1] \), \( \rho^F \in \Delta V \), and (C.22) holds is called an \( F \)-representation of \( x^{F,a} \).

**Proof.** I show that there is a representation \((x, \alpha^F, \rho^F)\) of \( x^{F,a} \) such that

\[\text{proj con}(\text{supp} \rho^F \cup \{x\}) \cap \text{proj IR} = \{x_{0,1}\} \]

(C.23)

\[\text{proj con}(\text{supp} \rho^F) \cap \text{proj IR} = \emptyset \]

\[\text{supp} \rho^F \subseteq V^+_{\text{vert}} \cup V^-_{\text{vert}}.\]

(The sets \( V^+_{\text{vert}} \cup V^-_{\text{vert}} \) are defined in Section C.2.) By Lemma 14,

\[\alpha^F \leq C_{\text{supp} \rho^F} \inf_{v_0,1^F \in \text{proj IR}} \| v_0,1^F \| \]

The lemma is a consequence of the definition of the constant \( C_F \) in equation (C.2).
Recall that $x^{F,a} \in F'(p)$, which implies that $x^{F,a}_U \geq m_U$. If $x^{F,a} \in IR$, then $x^{F,a} \in FE^a(p)$, and the lemma is trivially true. From now on, assume that $x^{F,a} \notin IR$. There exists at least one representation $(x', a^F, \rho)$ of $x^{F,a}$ such that (C.22) holds. Among all representations, choose the one with the lowest value of $\alpha$ and denote it by $(x, a^F, \rho)$. Such a representation exists by a simple continuity argument, and $a^F > 0$ because $x^{F,a} \notin FE^a(p)$. Let

$$v^\rho = \sum_{v \in V} v \rho(v).$$

If $v^\rho_U \leq m_U$, then $v^\rho \in V^- = \text{con} \ V_{\text{vert}}$ and there is a representation $(x, a^F, \rho)$ so that $\text{supp} \ \rho \subseteq V_{\text{vert}}$. Similarly, if $v^\rho_U \geq m_U$, then there is a representation $(x, a^F, \rho)$ so that $\text{supp} \ \rho \subseteq V_{\text{vert}}^+$. I discuss separately the different cases.

Case $a^F = 1$. There is no representation such that $a^F < 1$. I can assume that $\text{supp} \ \rho \subseteq V_{\text{vert}}$ because $x^{F,a} = v^\rho$ and $x^{F,a}_U = v^\rho_U \geq m_U$.

I show that

$$\text{con} \left( \text{supp} \ \rho^F \right) \cap IR = \emptyset. \quad (C.24)$$

If not, then there exists $v \in \text{con}(\text{supp} \ \rho^F) \cap IR \subseteq V \cap IR$. Because $\text{supp} \ \rho^F \subseteq V_{\text{vert}}$, it must be that $v^\rho_U \geq m_U$ and $v \in F^a(p)$. A simple geometric argument shows that for any $v' \in \text{int} \ \text{con}(\text{supp} \ \rho^F)$, there is a representation $(v, a^{F'}, \rho')$ with $a^{F'} < 1$. Because $x^{F,a} \in \text{int} \ \text{con}(\text{supp} \ \rho^F)$, this leads to a contradiction.

Because $a^F = 1$, equation (C.22) is satisfied by any any $x \in F^a(p)$. Choose $x$ so that $\text{con}(\text{supp} \ \rho^F \cup \{x\}) \cap IR = \{x\}$. Such a value of $x$ exists by (C.24).

Because for each $v \in \text{supp} \ \rho^F$, $v^\rho_U \geq m_U$, the above argument implies that (C.23) holds.

Case $0 < a^F < 1$ and $x_U > m_U$. By Lemma 15 and the choice of $a^F$, there is an open neighborhood $U \ni x$ such that

$$U \cap \text{con} \left( \text{supp} \ \rho^F \cup \{x\} \right) \cap F^a(p) = \emptyset.$$

There is an open neighborhood $U' \ni x$ such that $x'_U > m_U$ for any $x' \in U'$. Hence

$$U' \cap \{x' : x'_{0,1} \in \text{proj} \ IR\} \subseteq F^a(p).$$

These two observations imply that

$$U \cap U' \cap \text{con} \left( \text{supp} \ \rho^F \cup \{x\} \right) \cap \{x' : x'_{0,1} \in \text{proj} \ IR\} = \emptyset. \quad (C.25)$$

Suppose that condition (C.23) does not hold and there is $v \in \mathbb{R}^3$ such that $(v_0, v_1) \in \text{proj} \ IR$ and either $v \in \text{con} \ \text{supp} \ \rho^F$ or $v \in \text{con}(\text{supp} \ \rho^F \cup \{x\}) \setminus \{x\}$. Then, for small $\gamma$,

$$\gamma v + (1 - \gamma)x \in U \cap U' \cap \text{con} \left( \text{supp} \ \rho^F \cup \{x\} \right)$$

$$\gamma v_{0,1} + (1 - \gamma)x_{0,1} \in \text{proj} \ IR,$$

which contradicts (C.25).
Case $0 < \alpha^F < 1$ and $x_U = m_U$. By Lemma 15 and the choice of $\alpha^F$, there is an open neighborhood $U \ni x$ such that

$$U \cap \text{con} (\text{supp } \rho^F \cup \{x\}) \cap F\epsilon^*(p) = \emptyset.$$ 

Because $x^F_a \geq m_U$, it must be that $\nu^\rho \geq m_U$ and $\text{supp } \rho^F \subseteq V^+_\nu$. This implies that

$$\text{con} (\text{supp } \rho^F \cup \{x\}) \cap \{x': x'_{0,1} \in \text{proj } IR\} \subseteq F\epsilon^*(p).$$

These two observations imply that

$$U \cap \text{con} (\text{supp } \rho^F \cup \{x\}) \cap \{x': x'_{0,1} \in \text{proj } IR\} = \emptyset.$$ 

The same argument as in the previous case shows that condition (C.23) must hold. □

Next, I prove Lemma 17. Use Lemma 20 to find an $F$-representation $(x, \alpha^F, \rho^F)$ of $x^F_a$. Then

$$\alpha^F \leq C_F \|x^F_a - x^I_{0,1}\| \leq C_F (u^I(1)(x^I_{0,1}) - m_U)\theta,$$

where in the second inequality I use (C.14). Denote $\nu^\rho = \sum_{v \in V} \nu^\rho (v)$. By the definition of $L$ in equation (C.4),

$$u^F(1)(x^I_{0,1}) - u^F(1)(x_{0,1}) \leq L \|x^F_a - x^I_{0,1}\|$$

$$\leq L (\|x^F_a - x^I_{0,1}\| + \|x^I_{0,1} - x^F_a\|)$$

$$\leq L (\alpha^F M + \|x^I_{0,1} - x^F_a\|)$$

$$\leq L (1 + MC_F)(u^I(1)(x^I_{0,1}) - m_U)\theta,$$

where in the last inequality I use (C.14). For sufficiently small $\theta \leq \theta^* = 1/L(1 + MC_F)$,

$$u^F(1)(x_{0,1}) - m_U \geq (u^I(1)(x^I_{0,1}) - m_U)(1 - L(1 + MC_F)\theta) \geq 0.$$

By part (iii) of Lemma 2, the function $u^I(p')(x^I_{0,1})$ is convex in $p'$. Hence

$$u^I(p')(x^I_{0,1}) \leq \frac{1 - p'}{1 - p} u^I(p)(x^I_{0,1}) + \frac{p' - p}{1 - p} u^I(1)(x^I_{0,1})$$

$$= \frac{1 - p'}{1 - p} m_U + \frac{p' - p}{1 - p} u^I(1)(x^I_{0,1}),$$

where I use the fact that $x^I_{a} \in I^I(p)$ and $u^I(p)(x^I_{0,1}) = m_U$. By Lemma 2, the function $u^F$ is concave in $p$ and $x_{0,1}$. Hence,

$$u^F(p')(x^F_a) \geq \alpha^F \nu^\rho_U + (1 - \alpha) u^F(p')(x_{0,1})$$

$$\geq \alpha^F \nu^\rho_U + (1 - \alpha^F) \left( \frac{1 - p'}{1 - p} u^F(p)(x_{0,1}) + \frac{p' - p}{1 - p} u^F(1)(x_{0,1}) \right)$$

$$\geq \frac{1 - p'}{1 - p} (1 - \alpha^F) u^F(p)(x_{0,1}) + \alpha^F \nu^\rho_U + \frac{p' - p}{1 - p} u^F(1)(x_{0,1})$$

$$\geq \frac{1 - p'}{1 - p} u^F(p)(x_{0,1}) + \nu^\rho_U + \frac{p' - p}{1 - p} u^F(1)(x_{0,1})$$

$$- \alpha^F \nu^\rho_U - \frac{p' - p}{1 - p} (u^F(1)(x_{0,1}) - \alpha^F \nu^\rho_U).$$
Recall that \( x_{t,0}^F \in F^*(p) \), hence \( m_U \leq x_{t,0}^F \leq (1 - \alpha^F)u^F(p)(x_{t,0}) + \alpha^F v_U \). Also, 
\[ |(u^F(1)(x_{t,0}) - \alpha^F v_U)| \leq 2M. \] Hence, 
\[
u^F(p)(x_{0,1})^F \geq \frac{1 - p^F}{1 - p} m_U + \frac{p - p^F}{1 - p} u^F(1)(x_{0,1}) - \alpha^F \frac{p - p^F}{1 - p} 2M. \quad (C.28)
\]

One can put (C.27) and (C.28) together. Using the second inequality in (C.26), one gets
\[
\nu^F(p)(x_{0,1})^F \leq \frac{p^F - p}{1 - p} (u^F(1)(x_{0,1})^F - u^F(1)(x_{0,1})) + \frac{p - p^F}{1 - p} \alpha^F 2M 
\leq \frac{2}{1 - p} [I(1 + MC_F + 2MC_F)(u^F(1)(x_{0,1})^F - m_U)(p^F - p)\theta].
\]

The lemma follows from the definition of \( C_0 \) in equation (C.5).

C.6 Approximation argument

So far, I have shown that Theorem 3 is true if Assumption 2 holds. Here I argue that Assumption 2 is unnecessary. The idea is that any game can be approximated by games that satisfy Assumption 2.

Recall that the correspondences \( FE^* \) and \( ICR^* \) are defined as functions of the sets \( V \) of non-revealing payoffs and \( IR \) of individually rational payoffs. Precisely, consider two collections of closed subsets of \([-M, M]^3\): \( \mathcal{V} \) consisting of all convex sets and \( \mathcal{R} \) consisting of all convex sets with the property that for any \( IR \in \mathcal{R} \) there is \( m_U \in \mathbb{R} \) such that for any \((v_{U,0}, v_0, v_1) \in IR\), \((v_{U,0}', v_0', v_1') \in IR \) if \( v_{U,0}' \geq v_{U,0} \) and \( v_0', v_1' \geq m_U \). For any \( V \in \mathcal{V} \) and \( IR \in \mathcal{R} \), define sets \( E_k(V, IR) \) as in equations (6) and (5). Using the sets \( E_k \), I may restate Assumption 1: it holds if there are two open sets \( A_k \subseteq E_k \) such that \( \text{proj} A_0 = \text{proj} A_1 \). This allows me to define correspondences \( FE^*(V, IR) \) and \( ICR^*(V, IR) \) as in Sections 3.3 and 4.2.

Theorem 3 can be interpreted as follows. Suppose that Assumption 1 (as stated in this section) holds for some \( V \in \mathcal{V} \) and \( IR \in \mathcal{R} \). Then \( FE^*(V, IR) = ICR^*(V, IR) \). Till now, I have shown that Theorem 1 is true, if, in addition, Assumption 2 is satisfied.

Suppose now that Assumption 1 holds for some \( V \in \mathcal{V} \) and \( IR \in \mathcal{R} \). Consider an approximating sequence of closed sets \( IR_n \in \mathcal{R} \), such that Assumption 2 is satisfied for all sets in the sequence, \( IR_n \subseteq IR \), and \( IR_n \) converges to the set \( IR \) in the sense of Hausdorff distance: \( \lim_{n \to \infty} IR_n = IR \). Such a sequence clearly exists. Then Assumption 1 holds for a high enough \( n \) and
\[
FE^*(V, IR_n) = ICR^*(V, IR_n).
\]

By monotonicity, \( FE^*(V, IR_n) \subseteq FE^*(V, IR) \) for all \( n \). Two simple lemmas end the proof.

Lemma 21. \( \lim_{n \to \infty} FE^*(V, IR_n) = FE^*(V, IR) \).

Proof. This is because I can take
\[
FE^* = \text{cl} \bigcup_n FE^*(V, IR_n)
\]
and show that it satisfies all the properties in Section 3.3. \( \Box \)
**Lemma 22.** \( \lim_{n \to \infty} ICR^*(V, IR_n) = ICR^*(V, IR) \).

**Proof.** Indeed, define the correspondence \( ICR^*_n \) for any \( p \in [0, 1] \) by

\[
ICR^*_n(p) = IR_n \cap ICR^*(V, IR)(p)
\]

and show that it satisfies all three properties in Section 4.2. As a consequence, \( ICR^*_n \subseteq ICR^*(V, IR_n) \).

---

**D. Proofs for Section 5.3**

I need the following auxiliary result.

**Lemma 23.** For any \((v_0, v_1)\) and any sequence \( p_n \to p \) such that \( \lim_{n \to \infty} I^F(p_n)(v_0, v_1) > m_U \),

\[
I^F(p)(v_0, v_1) = \lim_{n \to \infty} I^F(p_n)(v_0, v_1).
\]

**Proof.** Because the set \( FE^* \) is closed, \( (\lim_{n \to \infty} I^F(p_n)(v_0, v_1), v_0, v_1) \in FE^*(p) \). Hence

\[
I^F(p)(v_0, v_1) \leq \lim_{n \to \infty} I^F(p_n)(v_0, v_1).
\]

Suppose that the inequality is strict, and define

\[
v^*_U = \max\{m_U, I^F(p)(v_0, v_1)\} < \lim_{n \to \infty} I^F(p_n)(v_0, v_1).
\]

Note that \((v^*_U, v_0, v_1) \in FE^*(p)\). By part (iv) of Lemma 2, for any \( n \) and any \( p_m \in [p, p_n] \) (assuming without loss of generality that \( p_n > p \)),

\[
I^F(p_m)(v_0, v_1) \leq \frac{p_m - p}{p_n - p} \max I^F(p_n)(v_0, v_1) + \frac{p_n - p}{p_n - p} v^*_U.
\]

But then, keeping \( n \) fixed and letting \( p_m \to p \),

\[
\lim \inf_{m \to \infty} I^F(p_m)(v_0, v_1) \leq v^*_U < \lim_{n \to \infty} I^F(p_n)(v_0, v_1).
\]

This creates a contradiction. \( \square \)

---

**D.1 Proof of Lemma 6**

If \( I^F(p)(v_0, v_1) \leq m_U + \frac{1}{2} \theta(p, v_0, v_1) \), then there is nothing to prove. Suppose not and define

\[
p_0 = \sup \{ I^F(p')(v_0, v_1) \leq m_U + \frac{1}{2} \theta(p', v_0, v_1) \}
\]

\[
p_1 = \inf \{ I^F(p')(v_0, v_1) \leq m_U + \frac{1}{2} \theta(p', v_0, v_1) \}
\]

with the convention that \( p_0 = 0 \) or \( p_1 = 1 \) if the respective sets are empty. Then \( p_0 < p < p_1 \), and because of Lemma 23,

\[
I^F(p_i)(v_0, v_1) \geq m_U + \frac{1}{2} \theta(p_i, v_0, v_1) \text{ for } i = 0, 1.
\]
By part (iv) of Lemma 2, \( I^F \) is convex (hence continuous for interior prices) above \( m_U \). Thus the inequality turns into an equality whenever \( p_i \neq 0, 1 \). Using Lemma 2 again, for any \( p' \in [p_0, p_1] \),

\[
\theta(p', v_0, v_1) \leq \frac{p' - p_0}{p_1 - p_0} \theta(p_1, v_0, v_1) + \frac{p_1 - p'}{p_1 - p_0} \theta(p_0, v_0, v_1).
\]

This means that there is \( p' \in \{p_0, p_1\} \) such that

\[
\theta(p', v_0, v_1) = \theta(p_0, v_0, v_1) > 0.
\]

Because \( \theta(k, v_0, v_1) = 0 \) for \( k = 0, 1 \), it must be that \( p' \notin \{0, 1\} \). By the above argument,

\[
l^F(p')(v_0, v_1) = m_U + \frac{1}{2} \theta(p', v_0, v_1),
\]

which implies that

\[
l^I(p')(v_0, v_1) \leq m_U - \frac{1}{2} \theta(p', v_0, v_1).
\]

**D.2 Proof of Lemma 7**

By the definition of the function \( l^I \), there is \( v' = (v'_U, v'_0, v'_1) \in ICR^*(p) \), \( a \in [0, 1] \), and \( \tilde{v} \in V \) such that

\[
l^I(p)(v'_0, v'_1) = v'_U \text{ and } l^I(p)(v_0, v_1) = a \tilde{v}_U + (1 - a)v'_U. \tag{D.1}
\]

Because \( v'_U \geq m_U \), it must be that \( v'_U - l^I(p)(v_0, v_1) \geq \frac{1}{2} \theta(p, v_0, v_1) \). Because \( v'_U - \tilde{v}_U \leq 2M \), it must be that

\[
a = \frac{v'_U - l^I(p)(v_0, v_1)}{v'_U - \tilde{v}_U} \geq \frac{\theta(p, v_0, v_1)}{4M}. \tag{D.2}
\]

Because \( \tilde{v} \in \text{con}(FE^*(p) \cup V) \),

\[
l^F(p)(\tilde{v}_0, \tilde{v}_1) \leq \tilde{v}_U = l^I(p)(\tilde{v}_0, \tilde{v}_1) \leq \tilde{v}_U \leq l^F(p)(\tilde{v}_0, \tilde{v}_1)
\]

and all the inequalities can be replaced by equalities. In particular,

\[
\theta(p, \tilde{v}_0, \tilde{v}_1) = 0.
\]

By the convexity of \( l^F \) in \( (v_0, v_1) \) (part (ii) of Lemma 2),

\[
l^F(p)(v_0, v_1) \leq a l^F(p)(\tilde{v}_0, \tilde{v}_1) + (1 - a) l^F(p)(v'_0, v'_1) = a \tilde{v} + (1 - a) l^F(p)(v'_0, v'_1).
\]

Because of (D.1),

\[
\theta(p, v_0, v_1) = l^F(p)(v_0, v_1) - l^I(p)(v_0, v_1) \leq (1 - a) \theta(p, v'_0, v'_1). \tag{D.3}
\]

Inequalities (D.2) and (D.3) lead to

\[
\theta(p, v'_0, v'_1) \geq \frac{4M}{4M - \theta(p, v_0, v_1)} \theta(p, v_0, v_1).
\]
REFERENCES


Mailath, George J. and Larry Samuelson (2006), *Repeated Games and Reputations*. Oxford University Press, New York. [34]


