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VAT multipliers
and pass-through dynamics

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Abstract

To quantify fiscal multipliers in Eurozone countries, ECB, European Commission, and IMF draw heavily on large-scale DSGE models. In these models, the value added tax (VAT) is represented by a consumption tax, implying that changes in the tax liability directly translate into changes in consumer prices. This is inconsistent with empirical evidence suggesting that VAT pass-through in Europe is only gradual. To study the implications of this shortcoming for VAT multipliers, I derive a DSGE model featuring both a consumption tax and a VAT with pass-through dynamics consistent with empirical evidence. Short-run multipliers from the consumption tax are dramatically larger than those from the VAT, which suggests systematic overestimation in institutional research.

JEL classification: E62.

Keywords: Fiscal multipliers, value added tax, tax pass-through, DSGE models.
1 Introduction

A precise quantification of multipliers associated with different fiscal instruments is crucial for the design of fiscal stimulus and macroeconomic consolidation packages. For stimulus, the relative magnitudes of multipliers tell us which choice of instruments provides the most "bang for the buck". For consolidation, they tell us how a given improvement in the primary balance can be achieved with the smallest possible reduction of aggregate demand. Among fiscal instruments, the VAT plays a prominent role: between 2007 and 2013, 15 EU countries increased the VAT in order to improve public finances (see Benedek et al. (2015)). On the other hand, VAT reductions are also commonly used to stimulate spending, as e.g. the temporary 2.5%-reduction in the UK in 2010. This gives VAT multipliers central political significance, especially in light of the Eurozone’s public debt overhang. As of 2014, 160 countries employ a VAT, including all OECD member countries other than the US.\(^1\)

Due to the importance of fiscal policy to counteract the Great Recession, academic interest in fiscal multipliers surged after 2008 (for surveys, see Ramey (2011), Parker (2011), Fatás & Mihov (2009), or Hebus (2011)). However, no consensus has emerged on the macroeconomic impact of discretionary fiscal policy, a phenomenon labeled “fiscal multiplier morass” by Leeper et al. (2015). To asses the size of fiscal multipliers, ECB, European Commission, and IMF draw heavily on large-scale DSGE models. These models commonly use a consumption tax as a simplified representation of the VAT. Because this consumption tax is paid to the government by households, changes in the tax liability immediately affect (tax-inclusive) consumer prices. Interpreting this tax as VAT – which is paid to the government by the seller – thus means to implicitly assume full and instantaneous pass-through of changes in the tax liability. This, however, is inconsistent with a wealth of empirical evidence suggesting that pass-through of changes in the VAT is only gradual.\(^2\) The contribution of this paper is to show that neglecting empirically plausible pass-through dynamics leads to a dramatic overestimation of the short-run impact of VAT changes.

The analysis is conducted in a New Keynesian DSGE model that features a consumption tax levied on households as well as a VAT which is levied on firms and modeled such that its pass-through dynamics are consistent with empirical estimates. Short-run multipliers obtained for the consumption tax are dramatically larger than those obtained for the VAT. For example, increasing tax revenues by 1% of GDP for five years causes an average first-year GDP decline of 0.52% (0.23%) if it is achieved by increasing the consumption tax (the VAT). Since the model resembles the institutions’ workhorse models in its basic structure, the results suggest that output dynamics projected in the institutions’ models in consequence of a VAT change would dramatically change if these models incorporated realistic pass-through dynamics. The intuition for the result is simple: VAT changes affect consumption when intertemporal optimization leads agents to cut back spending during periods of high consumer prices. Gradual pass-through means that the increase in consumer prices lags the increase in the tax rate, because it takes time for firms to pass on the additional tax liability. As a result, the adjustment in consumption is delayed. In contrast, changes in the consumption tax instantaneously affect consumer prices and thereby consumption.

In particular, the critique concerns the ECB’s New Area-Wide and EAGLE models (see Christoffel et al. (2008) and Gomes et al. (2010)), the European Commission’s QUEST model (see Ratto et al. (2009)), and the IMF’s GIMF model (see Kumhof et al. (2010)). The consumption tax in these four models represents the VAT in various papers addressing discretionary fiscal

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1 Source: OECD Consumption Tax Trends, 2014.

2 This shortcoming does not apply when the consumption tax in IMF’s GIMF model is interpreted as the US sales tax, because this tax is reported to have swift and comprehensive pass-through.
policy in Europe. As an example, we consider IMF’s GIMF model. Consumption tax liabilities in the household budget are given by $P_t^C c_t \tau_{c,t}$, with $P_t^C$ denoting the price index, $c_t$ consumption, and $\tau_{c,t}$ the tax rate (see Kumhof et al. (2010), p.9). The tax liability moves with $\tau_{c,t}$, so if $P_t^C$ were constant, changes in the tax liability translate into consumer price changes in full and without delay – which corresponds to full instantaneous pass-through if the tax represents the VAT. The implicit pass-through is only less than full if there is a general equilibrium downward-adjustment of producer prices. However, because of price and wage rigidity, producer prices are virtually constant in the short-run after a tax change, so the implicit short-run pass-through is essentially full. This strongly contradicts empirical estimates. For example, the comprehensive IMF study Benedek et al. (2015) rejects full contemporaneous pass-through in a sample of all VAT reforms in the Eurozone between 1999 and 2013: “The null of full pass-through is firmly rejected, with the point estimates implying that only around one-third of a VAT change is passed forward to consumer prices”. It is concluded that “[S]imply assuming full pass-through of all VAT reforms is, it seems, a significant mistake.”

The results are also policy-relevant to the extent that policymakers can influence VAT pass-through dynamics. Benedek et al. (2015) report that pass-through for reduced VAT rates is considerably slower than for the standard rate. The latter rate appears thus more suitable for fiscal stimulus, as faster pass-through leads to a sooner increase in consumption. Vice versa, reduced rates are better suited for fiscal consolidation, as the adverse impact on GDP is delayed.

The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines institutional details and empirical evidence. Section 3 presents the model and its calibration. Section 4 provides economic intuition for the results presented in Section 5. Section 6 provides a robustness analysis. The paper concludes with Section 7.

2 Institutional background and evidence on tax pass-through

The European-style VAT taxes the value added at each stage of the supply chain (see, for example, the textbook Wendler et al. (2008)). Each seller on the chain charges the VAT to the buyer and pays it to the government. At the same time, all buyers other than the end consumer are entitled to refund the VAT liability that accrued for the purchase of intermediate goods used in the production (final goods in the case of retailers). The tax liability for each business on the supply chain is thus a fraction of the difference between its revenues and its expenses for upstream products. Since the end consumer is charged the VAT for the final product but is not entitled for a refund, she or he ends up paying the total VAT liability. For the US-style sales tax, it also holds that ultimately only the end consumer is taxed. However, its collection

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3For examples of papers that use the consumption tax in GIMF to represent the VAT in Europe, see IMF (2014b) (on fiscal devaluation in Spain), IMF (2014a) (on fiscal multipliers in Denmark), IMF (2013) (on fiscal consolidation in Hungary), Smallden & Klyuev (2011) (on fiscal consolidation in the Czech Republic), Anderson et al. (2013b) (on fiscal consolidation in various Euro Area countries), and IMF (2015) (on the impact of VAT hikes in Iceland). For ECB publications in which the consumption tax represents the VAT, see Coenen et al. (2008) (monthly bulletin on fiscal consolidation), and Barrell et al. (2014) as well as ECB (2014) on multipliers. The European Commission follows the same approach in context of the QUEST model, as e.g. in’t Veld (2013), Roeger & in’t Veld (2010), and Giudice et al. (2003).

4Anderson et al. (2013a) p.27 shows price adjustments in GIMF to a permanent fiscal consolidation in the size of 1% of GDP, implemented by higher consumption taxes. Prices decline by about 0.03% in the first year and by roughly 0.06% (0.08%) in the second (third) year after the consolidation started. Coenen et al. (2010) study the impact of fiscal stimulus in four different structural models. Without monetary accommodation, annual inflation in response to a two-year 1%-GDP decrease in consumption taxes is is below 0.05% in the QUEST model, the GIMF model, and the ECB’s NAWM model (p.106).

5This paragraph takes a long-run perspective, in which all prices have adjusted such that every firm passes on its tax liability to the respective buyer.
procedure is simpler. Here, only the business that sells the final product to the end consumer charges the sales tax and pays it to the government.

Empirical evidence on VAT pass-through can be divided into studies that focus on a narrow set of goods and studies that investigate the impact of VAT changes on the CPI. Beginning with the former, Kosonen (2013) reports that a decline in the VAT on hairdressing services in Finland led to price reductions of only half of what full pass-through would imply. Carbonnier (2007) examines a reduction of the VAT on car sales and on housing repair services in France. In both cases, the pass-through was swift (during the first four months) but incomplete. For housing repair services, the consumer share of the tax reduction was estimated to be 77% and 57% for car sales. Politi & Mattos (2011) investigate VAT pass-through for ten different food items in Brazil. In their baseline specification, full pass-through is rejected for all items, with point estimates ranging from 55% for rice to 26% for bread. Regarding the second type of studies, the IMF publication Carare & Danninger (2008) looks at the 3% VAT hike in Germany in 2007. They report a cumulative pass-through of 73% over a time period of two years: one third occurred in the year preceding the reform due to anticipation effects, and the remaining two thirds took place in the implementation year. Various papers study the 13-month VAT reduction starting in December 2008 in the UK. Pike et al. (2009) estimate a pass-through of only a half, while Chirakijja et al. (2009) report substantial and rapid pass-through, with a point estimate of 75%. The Bank of England assumes that around half of the tax cut is passed on to consumers in the course of the 13-month reduction (Bank of England Inflation Reports for February 2009 (p.31) and for August 2010 (p.32)).

The most comprehensive study on VAT pass-through in Europe is the IMF study Benedek et al. (2015). The authors use a dataset that ranges from 1999 to 2013 and covers monthly price and tax data for 67 consumption items and 1231 VAT changes in total. To isolate the impact of a VAT change on the consumer price of a commodity, the study uses as control variables the prices of the same commodity sold in countries other than the one in which the tax change occurs. Benedek et al. (2015) strongly reject full contemporaneous pass-through for the average VAT change. Because of the high statistical power of the dataset and its unmatched completeness, this study serves as the calibration target for VAT pass-through in the model. It is discussed in more detail in the context of the calibration in Section 3.8.

Studies on the US sales tax generally point towards a fast and complete pass-through. For example, Poterba (1996) reports that “results for the postwar period suggest that retail prices rise by approximately the amount of the sales tax”. Some studies, as for example Sidhu (1971) and Besley & Rosen (1998), even report “overshifting” for some product categories, i.e. that prices move by more than the sales tax. Besley & Rosen (1998) estimate that the mean lags of price adjustment varies from 0.29 to 1.2 quarters and conclude that “prices react very quickly to changes in tax rates”. This observation is in line with Poterba (1996), who finds that contemporaneous price reactions to tax changes are in general dramatically stronger than lagged adjustments.

On the backdrop of this evidence, a consumption tax seems only suitable to represent a US-style sales tax, since the implicit model pass-through is in line with estimates. A possible explanation for differences in pass-through dynamics are menu costs combined with the fact that retail prices are typically quoted exclusive of the sales tax in the US, but quoted inclusive of the VAT in Europe. In the former case, the present-day tax rate is added to the retail price at the cash desk, so rigidities in retail prices consequently do not impede the pass-through. In the latter case, the tax liability is included in the quoted retail price, so pass-through to consumers is conditional on nominal adjustments, which means that it occurs gradually if retail prices are rigid.
3 Model

In the following DSGE framework, the small open economy under consideration belongs to a monetary union and represents a typical country of Europe’s distressed periphery, in which fiscal consolidation is highly relevant. The home country trades with the rest of the union (henceforth “RoU”), but RoU-countries are not affected by developments in the home country (apart from adjusting imports according to the terms of trade). Domestic households trade non-contingent bonds with RoU-households. In the baseline model, the home country has a negligible weight in the union-wide inflation measure stabilized by the central bank. Intermediate goods prices and wages can only be adjusted in a staggered fashion. The only non-standard component of the model is a retail rm sector which distributes the nal good to households. A government levies taxes and has constant government consumption defined as plain waste. We study two versions of the model. In the “European VAT model”, the government exclusively levies a VAT, which is paid by rm and modeled such that pass-through dynamics are consistent with empirical evidence for the Eurozone. In the “consumption tax model”, the government only levies a consumption tax on households. As in the institutions’ models, tax changes directly aect consumer prices, corresponding to essentially full contemporaneous pass-through.\footnote{Pass-through dynamics in either version are illustrated and explained in Section 3.8.}

Both models are used to conduct standard consolidation exercises in order to obtain tax multipliers. Since both model versions differ only in the speed of the pass-through of changes in the tax liability, they have identical steady states (when all adjustments are completed, and pass-through is thus the same in both versions). Differences in multipliers derived in both model versions can therefore be fully attributed to the different pass-through dynamics. These differences are the primary interest of the paper, since they correspond to the error that results from neglecting empirically plausible pass-through dynamics.

3.1 Households

Households on the continuum \([0, 1]\) are indexed by \(j\). The index is neglected for the most part to ease notation. A household’s lifetime utility is given by

\[
U_t = \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \beta^k \left( \frac{(1 - \gamma)}{1 - \gamma} \right) \left( \frac{1 + \phi}{1 + \phi} \right)^k ,
\]

where \(n_{t+k}\) and \(c_{t+k}\) are hours worked and consumption in period \(t + k\).

The household faces the following series of period budget constraints for \(t \geq 0\):

\[
(1 + \tau_t^c)P_t c_t + a_t + b_t \leq R_{t-1} a_{t-1} + R_{t-1} b_{t-1} + w_t(j)N_t(j) + \Pi_t - T_t ,
\]

where \(P_t\) denotes the retail price index, and \(c_t\) is the nal consumption bundle, both introduced below. \(\tau_t^c\) is the tax rate of the consumption tax, which is implemented as in the institutions’ models. It set to zero in the European VAT model. \(R_t\) is the gross nominal interest rate, and \(a_t\) as well as \(b_t\) are one-period risk-free nominal bonds. \(a_t\) is issued by the domestic government, and \(b_t\) denotes bonds traded with RoU-households. Both bonds mature at the beginning of period \(t+1\). \(w_t(j)N_t(j)\) is nominal labor income, corresponding to the product of the household-specific wage \(w_t(j)\) (which it earns for its work at all intermediate good firms \(i \in [0, 1]\) on the continuum) and its total employment, defined as \(N_t(j) = \int_0^1 n_t(i, j) di\). \(T_t\) are lump-sum taxes levied by the government, and \(\Pi_t\) denotes nominal prots from the ownership of rm (including retail firms
introduced below). Intertemporal optimization leads to the following Euler equation:

\[ R_t - R P_t = \beta E_t \left( \frac{c_t}{c_{t+1}} \right)^\gamma \frac{P_t}{P_{t+1}} \frac{1 + \tau_t^c}{1 + \tau_{t+1}^c} . \]  

(3)

\[ RP_t = -\phi^B B_t \] is a risk premium proposed by Schmitt-Grohé & Uribe (2003), with \( B_t = \int_0^1 b_t(j) dj \) denoting aggregate bond holdings. It forces external debt to return asymptotically to the steady state level of zero after a shock, which ensures stationarity of the model. However, \( \phi^B \) is so small that the risk premium can be neglected in the short and medium term shock adjustment, and thus does not affect the results of this paper.

Hours worked are determined by labor demand. As discussed below, workers reduce their labor supply below the competitive level because they have market power.

The final consumption bundle \( c_t \) consists of retail good varieties from all retail firms on the continuum (indexed by \( r \in [0, 1] \)). Varieties of different retail firms \( c_t^{ret}(r) \) are imperfect substitutes for households and are bundled with the following Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator:

\[ c_t = \left[ \int_0^1 \left( c_t^{ret}(r) \right)^{\epsilon r - 1} dr \right]^{\frac{\epsilon r}{\epsilon r - 1}} . \]  

(4)

Cost minimization implies a standard demand schedule for retail firm varieties:

\[ c_t^{ret}(r) = \left( \frac{p_t^{ret}(r)}{P_t} \right)^{-\epsilon r} c_t , \]  

(5)

where \( p_t^{ret}(r) \) is the price of retail variety \( r \) and \( P_t \) the retail price index, given by

\[ P_t = \left( \int_0^1 \left( p_t^{ret}(r) \right)^{1-\epsilon r} dr \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\epsilon r}} . \]  

(6)

### 3.2 Supply side

Intermediate good firms produce differentiated intermediate good varieties, which are sold domestically and exported to the RoU. A competitive final good firm bundles domestic intermediate goods as well as imports into a final good. In contrast to the standard model, the final good is not sold to households directly, but distributed by a continuum of retail firms. These firms have market power because they repackagethe final good into differentiated retail firm varieties that are imperfect substitutes in (4). Retail firms pay the European VAT to the government in the respective version of the model.\(^7\) Figure 1 summarizes the supply side (neglecting government consumption). Arrows denote the flow of goods and the respective price levels.

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\(^7\)The shortcut of levying the VAT only on retailers is discussed in Section 3.2.3.
3.2.1 Intermediate good producers

Intermediate good firm \( i \in [0, 1] \) produces its variety \( y_t(i) \) with a linear production function:

\[
y_t(i) = n_t(i). \tag{7}
\]

The input is a labor composite \( n_t(i) \) that contains differentiated labor services \( n_t(i, j) \) of all households \( j \in [0, 1] \):

\[
n_t(i) \equiv \left( \int_0^1 n_t(i, j)^{1-\epsilon} \, dj \right)^\frac{1}{1-\epsilon}. \tag{8}
\]

Cost-minimizing composition of \( n_t(i) \) implies the following demand schedule for type-\( j \) labor:

\[
n_t(i, j) = \left( \frac{w_t(j)}{W_t} \right)^{-\epsilon} n_t(i), \tag{9}
\]

where \( w_t(j) \) is the wage for type-\( j \) labor and \( W_t \) is the aggregate wage index:

\[
W_t \equiv \left( \int_0^1 w_t(j)^{1-\epsilon} \, dj \right)^\frac{1}{1-\epsilon}. \tag{10}
\]

Using (9) and (10), firm \( i \)'s total wage bill can be expressed as:

\[
\int_0^1 w_t(j) \, n_t(i, j) \, dj = W_t n_t(i). \tag{11}
\]

Demand for firm \( i \)'s variety stems from domestic private and government consumption and, via exports, from consumption in the RoU. All buyers of the variety use the same aggregation technology as the final good firm (governed by (17) below). Consequently, cost minimization implies the following demand schedule:

\[
y_t(i) = \left( \frac{p_t^{int}(i)}{P_t^{int}} \right)^{-\epsilon} Y_t^{total}, \tag{12}
\]
where \( p^{int}_t(i) \) is the price of firm \( i \)'s variety, and \( Y^{total}_t \) denotes aggregate demand for domestic goods, given by (35) below. \( P^{int}_t \) is the price index for intermediate goods, defined by

\[
P^{int}_t \equiv \left( \int_0^1 p^{int}_t(i)^{1-\gamma} \, di \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\gamma}}.
\]  

(13)

Only a random share \((1-\theta)\) of firms is allowed to re-adjust prices in a given period. A firm that is allowed to re-adjust its price solves the following problem:

\[
\max_{p^{int}_t(i)} \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} Q_{t,t+k} \theta^k \left[ y_{t+k|t}^t(i) p^{int}_t(i) - \Psi_{t+k} \left( y_{t+k|t}^t(i) \right) \right],
\]

(14)

where \( y_{t+k|t}^t(i) \) is period \( t+k \) output (determined by (12)), given that the price set in \( t \) remains valid up to period \( t+k \). The stochastic discount factor (SDF) is

\[
Q_{t,t+k} \equiv \beta^k (c_{t+k}/c_t)^{-\gamma} \left( P_t (1 + \tau_t^i) / P_{t+k} (1 + \tau_{t+k}^i) \right).
\]

The cost function \( \Psi_t(\cdot) \) represents the firm’s total wage bill \((11)\), which, using (7), can be written as:

\[
\Psi_{t+k} \left( y_{t+k|t}^t(i) \right) = W_{t+k} y_{t+k|t}^t(i).
\]

The optimal price \((p^{int}_t)^*\) set by re-adjusting firms is governed by the following FOC:

\[
\mathbb{E}_t \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} Q_{t,t+k} \theta^k y_{t+k|t}^t \left[ (p^{int}_t)^* - \frac{\epsilon}{(\epsilon - 1)} W_{t+k} \right] = 0.
\]

(16)

\((p^{int}_t)^*\) is a markup over a weighted average of expected effective marginal costs, which are equal to the wage rate.

Note that if the European VAT was modeled as a tax paid by intermediate good firms on their sales, tax pass-through would be gradual. Changes in the tax liability would affect firm profits until prices are adjusted in order to pass it on to consumers. However, this modeling strategy would be inconsistent with the destination-based nature of the VAT. Since the VAT is reimbursed on exports, it is not reasonable to assume that foreign prices are adjusted in order to roll over changes in the domestic VAT liability. This would nevertheless happen if the tax was levied on intermediate good producers,\(^8\) unless the model features a second pricing equation for the foreign market (i.e. a pricing-to-market strategy). The chosen modeling strategy is not subject to this shortcoming (discussed later on).

### 3.2.2 Final good producer

In a first step, the competitive final good firm bundles domestic intermediate goods \( \{y_t(i)\} \) into the domestic goods bundle \( Y_t^H \). In a second step, it bundles \( Y_t^H \) with the foreign goods bundle \( Y_t^{RoU} \) into the final consumption good that is distributed via the retail sector. The aggregation technology for the first step is given by

\[
Y_t^H \equiv \left( \int_0^1 y_t(i)^{1-\frac{1}{\gamma}} \, di \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\gamma}}.
\]

(17)

Bundling of \( Y_t^H \) with the foreign goods bundle \( Y_t^{RoU} \) is subject to consumption home bias. The final good \( Y_t \) is packed with the following technology:

\[
Y_t = \left( 1 - \omega \right)^{\frac{1}{\beta}} \left( Y_t^H \right)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\alpha}} + \omega^{\frac{1}{\beta}} \left( Y_t^{RoU} \right)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\alpha}}.
\]

(18)

\(^8\)Intermediate good firms would account for after-tax revenues in their pricing FOC, so tax changes would directly lead to adjustments in pre-tax prices.
where $\omega$ reflects home bias in consumption, and $\sigma$ determines the elasticity of substitution between domestic goods and goods from the RoU.

The price of the final good $P_{t}^{fin}$ is given by:

$$P_{t}^{fin} = \left(1 - \omega\right)\left(P_{t}^{int}\right)^{1-\sigma} + \omega\left(P_{t}^{RoU}\right)^{1-\sigma},$$

where $P_{t}^{RoU}$ is the price index for the foreign goods bundle.\(^9\) Cost-efficient bundling of $Y_{t}$ implies the following demand schedule for the domestic intermediate goods bundle:\(^10\)

$$Y_{t}^{H} = (1 - \omega)\left(P_{t}^{int}/P_{t}^{fin}\right)^{-\sigma}Y_{t}.$$  

Since the terms of trade are one in the steady state of the model, the steady state import share is given by $\omega$. Profits made by intermediate firms are discussed in Section 3.2.4.

### 3.2.3 Retailers

A retail firm $r \in [0, 1]$ buys the final good at price $P_{t}^{fin}$ and sells it to households with a firm-specific markup $\xi_{r}(r)$, so its price $P_{t}^{ret}(r)$ is given by

$$P_{t}^{ret}(r) = (1 + \xi_{r}(r))P_{t}^{fin}.$$  

In the European VAT model, retailers pay a tax-inclusive\(^11\) VAT rate of $\tau_{t}^{c}$ (set to zero in the consumption tax model). They thus only receive after-tax revenues of $P_{t}^{ret}/(1 + \tau_{t}^{c})$ per unit. This accounts for the destination-based nature of the VAT. It is paid on imports, since imports are part of the final good bundle sold by retailers, but not paid on exports, since the VAT exclusively affect retailers who only sell to the domestic market.

Substituting (21) in (6) yields $P_{t} = \left(\int_{0}^{1}(1 + \xi_{r}(r))^{1-c_{r}}dr\right)^{1+c_{r}}P_{t}^{fin}$. Defining

$$(1 + \xi_{r}) \equiv \left(\int_{0}^{1}(1 + \xi_{r}(r))^{1-c_{r}}dr\right)^{\frac{1}{1+c_{r}}}$$

as the aggregate markup factor, the retail price index can be written as

$$P_{t} = (1 + \xi_{t})P_{t}^{fin}. \quad (23)$$

Retailers choose their markups subject to a Calvo constraint: in each period, they are only allowed to re-adjust $\xi_{t}(r)$ with a probability $0 < 1 - \theta^{c} < 1$. When deciding on $\xi_{t}(r)$, re-adjusting retailers solve the following problem:

$$\max_{\xi_{t}} \mathbb{E}_{t}\sum_{k=0}^{\infty}(\theta^{c})^{k}Q_{t,t+k}\left[p_{t+k}^{ret}\frac{p_{t+k}^{ret}}{1 + \tau_{t+k}^{c}} - P_{t+k}^{fin}\right]. \quad (24)$$

Because retail firms are owned by households, $Q_{t,t+k}$ discounts future profits,\(^12\) $y_{t+k}^{ret}$ is period $t + k$ demand for retailers that have not adjusted their markup since $t$ and therefore still charge

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9Foreign prices are constant and assumed to equal domestic prices in the steady state.

10Demand for the foreign goods bundle is not shown because it has no relevance in a small open economy model.

11For a tax-inclusive rate, the tax liability is included in the tax base.

12In the baseline calibration, retailers discount future profits in the same way as households, which is consistent with their ownership of these firms. Section 5 also considers different discount factors of retail firms ($\beta^{c}$), in which case the SDF reads $Q_{t,t+k} \equiv (\beta^{c})^{k}(\gamma_{t+k}/\gamma)^{-\gamma}\left(P_{t}(1 + \tau_{t})/P_{t+k}(1 + \tau_{t+k})\right)$. This allows to study a broader set of pass-through dynamics, but comes at the cost of the inconsistency that retail firms use a different discount factor than their owners. However, apart from affecting pass-through dynamics, this has no further implications for the model’s adjustment properties.
the price $p_{t+k}^{re}$ is defined by demand schedule (5). The square bracket denotes profits, as it subtracts expenses $P_{t+k}^{fin}$ from period $t+k$ after-tax revenues $p_{t+k}^{re}/(1+\tau_{t+k})$.

Using (21) and (23) in (5), $y_{t+k}^{re}$ can be written as $y_{t+k}^{re} = \left(\frac{1+\xi_{t+k}}{\tau_{t+k}}\right)^{-\epsilon_r} C_{t+k}$, where $C_t \equiv \int_0^1 c_t(j) dj$ denotes aggregate consumption. Substituting $y_{t+k}^{re}$ in (24) leads to the following FOC for newly set markups $\xi_t^*$:

$$
E_t \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} (\theta^*)^k Q_{t,t+k} C_{t+k} P_{t+k}^{fin} (1 + \xi_{t+k})^\epsilon_r \left[\frac{1 + \xi_t^*}{1 + \tau_r^*} - \frac{\epsilon_r}{\epsilon_r - 1}\right] = 0.
$$

(25)

The FOC implies that retailers charge a markup over their expenses for the final good, and, in the European VAT model, also roll over the tax liability to consumers in the long run. In the steady state, all firms have adjusted markups and charge $\xi^*$, so it holds that $(1 + \xi^*) = (1 + \xi) = \frac{\epsilon_r}{\epsilon_r - 1} (1 + \tau^*)$). If retail varieties were perfect substitutes $(\epsilon_r \to \infty)$, the aggregate markup would equal the tax rate, so retailers would roll over the full tax liability and thus break even. However, since retailers have market power $(\frac{\epsilon_r}{\epsilon_r - 1} > 1)$, they charge a higher price and therefore make profits in the steady state. These profits deviate from their steady state value in the short run when $\tau_r^*$ is shocked in the European VAT model. A change in $\tau_r^*$ directly affects after-tax revenues, so if a retailer is not allowed to re-adjust its markup, the change in the tax liability fully falls on its profits. It is passed on to consumers only when the retailer is allowed to re-adjust. This means that the aggregate pass-through of a change in the tax liability depends on the share of retailers that adjusted markups in response. Since $\theta^* < 1$, the immediate aggregate pass-through is incomplete, and the value of $\theta^*$ determines the delay until full pass-through is achieved. In the consumption tax model, $\tau_r^* = 0$ implies that all retailers charge the constant markup $\frac{\epsilon_r}{\epsilon_r - 1}$ reflecting their market power.

Relative to the alternative modeling strategy of levying the tax on intermediate good firms that follow a pricing-to-market strategy, this modeling choice has the advantage that pass-through dynamics can be varied while all other adjustment properties of the model are held constant. Changing $\theta^*$ only affects VAT pass-through dynamics, while changing $\theta$ under the alternative modeling strategy would at the same time also alter general inflation dynamics.

The evolution of the aggregate markup factor $\xi_t$ over time is determined in a way that is familiar from standard Calvo pricing. The fraction $(1 - \theta^*)$ of re-adjusting retailers charge $\xi^*$, while the distribution of markups among non-adjusting retailers is the same as in the previous period. It follows that (22) can be written as

$$
1 + \xi_t = \left(\int_{S(t)} (1 + \xi_{t-1}(r))^{1-\epsilon_r} dr + (1 - \theta^*) (1 + \xi^*)^{1-\epsilon_r}\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\epsilon_r}},
$$

(26)

where $S(t)$ denotes the set of non-adjusting retailers (which has a mass of $\theta^*$). Using (22) for $t-1$, the equation can be written as

$$
1 + \xi_t = \left(\theta^* (1 + \xi_{t-1})^{1-\epsilon_r} + (1 - \theta^*) (1 + \xi^*)^{1-\epsilon_r}\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\epsilon_r}}
$$

(27)

---

13 After-tax revenues per unit $\frac{p_{t+k}^{re}(r)}{1+\tau_{t+k}} = \frac{1+\xi_{t+k}}{1+\tau_{t+k}} P_{t+k}^{fin}$ then equal $P_{t+k}^{fin}$, which are the expenses for one unit of the final good.

14 In the hypothetical case of $\theta^* = 0$, the European VAT model is equivalent to the consumption tax model. Retailers are then able to instantaneously pass on the tax liability to consumers, which is equivalent to the consumption tax, for which changes in the tax liability immediately fall on consumers.
which (jointly with (25)) governs the evolution of the aggregate retail markup factor \((1 + \xi_t)\).

**Discussion of the modeling strategy**

Assuming that only retail firms pay VAT is at odds with the collection scheme outlined in Section 2. In a more realistic setup, intermediate good firms would charge VAT to the final good firm, which would charge VAT to retail firms, which in turn would charge the VAT to consumers (the final good firm and retail firms would also receive tax refunds). As argued in the following, the simplified setup in this model is nevertheless well suited to study VAT multipliers. This is because all three channels by which VAT changes affect output (first and second, intertemporal substitution and income effects for domestic consumption, and third, expenditure switching) are either calibrated based on empirical evidence, or they operate in the same way as under a realistic collection scheme.

First, intertemporal substitution is triggered by a VAT change via the induced adjustment of consumer prices, which is in turn jointly determined by the adjustment of the final good price \(P_{\text{fin}}^t\) and of the aggregate retail markup \(\xi_t\) (see (23)). The change of \(P_{\text{fin}}^t\) reflects changes in intermediate good prices (see (19) and (13)), whose rigidity (governed by \(\theta\)) is calibrated to match empirical evidence. As discussed in Section 3.8, the adjustment speed of \(\xi_t\) (governed by \(\theta'\)) is also calibrated based on empirical evidence. The adjustment of consumer prices is thus empirically plausible.

Second, household income would be the same under a realistic VAT collection scheme as in the setup at hand. It would be different under a realistic collection scheme if household income was dependent on the distribution of profits across the three different types of firms. Under a realistic collection scheme, the immediate impact of a change in the tax liability is distributed over after-tax profits of all three types of firms, and is not, as in the model at hand, concentrated on retail firm profits.\(^{15}\) However, since the representative household owns all firms, its income is independent of the distribution of after-tax profits across the different types of firms, and, in general, of the overall profit share.

Third, expenditure switching effects only depend on the adjustment of intermediate good prices, because the VAT is destination-based and therefore does not matter for the terms of trade.\(^{16}\) Hence, using a standard value for \(\theta\) implies standard expenditure switching effects in the model.

### 3.2.4 Profits

Profits of retailers and intermediate good firms are pooled and paid out to households. Aggregate profits \(\Pi_t\) are given by

\[
\Pi_t = P_{\text{fin}}^t Y_{\text{total}}^t - W_t N_t + \left[ \frac{(1 + \xi_t) P_{\text{fin}}^t}{1 + \tau_v^t} - P_{\text{fin}}^t \right] C_t ,
\]

where \(N_t\) is aggregate employment defined as \(N_t = \int_0^1 n_t(i) \, di\), and \(Y_{\text{total}}^t\) is given by (35) below. Subtracting the aggregate wage bill from aggregate revenues of intermediate good firms (the first two terms) yields total profits in that sector. The third term denotes profits in the retail sector:

\(^{15}\)Under a realistic collection scheme, all types of firms would pay a portion of total VAT revenues to the government. Thus, prior to any price adjustments, a change in the total tax liability would be split among intermediate good firms, the final good firm, and retailers. Price adjustments would then cause the tax liability to be passed on downwards the supply chain to the consumer.

\(^{16}\)The domestic VAT applies on imports and on domestic goods, while a foreign VAT applies on exports to the respective country as well as on goods produced and sold in that country. A country's VAT thus applies regardless of a good's origin and does therefore not affect relative prices between imports and domestic goods.
the square bracket represents average profits per unit sold (after-tax revenues minus expenses to buy one unit of the final good) and is multiplied by total consumption.

### 3.3 Unions and wage setting

Nominal wage rigidity is modeled as in Erceg et al. (2000).\footnote{Wage rigidity is a standard feature in the institutions' models and matters for the short-run pass-through of tax changes because it affects producer price dynamics. It is included to bring the implicit pass-through of the consumption tax in line with the institutions' models. Flexible wages are considered as a robustness exercise.} Households exert market power on the labor market because differentiated labor services are imperfect substitutes in (8). Each household $j$ is represented by its own labor union that sets the household-specific wage rate $w_t(j)$ subject to a Calvo constraint, so each period only a random share $1 - \theta^w$ of unions can re-adjust.

Aggregating demand equation (9) over all intermediate good firms yields

$$\int_0^1 n_t(i,j) \, di = \int_0^1 \left( \frac{w_t(j)}{W_t} \right)^{-\epsilon_w} n_t(i) \, di$$

(29)

which, using the definition for total type-$j$ labor $N_t(j)$ (see (2)) and the definition of aggregate employment, can be written as:

$$N_t(j) = \int_0^1 \left( \frac{w_t(j)}{W_t} \right)^{-\epsilon_w} N_t \, .$$

(30)

A union maximizes the expected present value of the household it represents, which is governed by

$$\max_{w_t(j)} \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} (\beta \theta^w)^k U(c_{t+k|t}(j), n_{t+k|t}(j)),$$

(31)

where $c_{t+k|t}(j)$ and $n_{t+k|t}(j)$ are period $t + k$ consumption and hours, given that the newly set wage is still valid. Maximization is subject to demand schedule (30). The optimal wage $w_t^*$ satisfies the following FOC that (jointly with (10)) governs the evolution of aggregate wages:

$$\mathbb{E}_t \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} (\beta \theta^w)^k MU_{t+k|t}n_{t+k|t} \left[ \frac{w_t^*}{(1 + \tau^w_t)P_{t+k}} - \frac{\epsilon_w}{\epsilon_w - 1} MRS_{t+k|t} \right] = 0 \, ,$$

(32)

where $n_{t+k|t} = (w_t^*/W_{t+k})^{-\epsilon_w} N_{t+k}$ is period $t + k$ total demand for type-$j$ labor, provided that $w_t^*$ is still valid. $MU_{t+k|t}$ and $MRS_{t+k|t}$ denote household $j$’s period $t + k$ marginal utility and marginal rate of substitution, also conditional on $w_t^*$. For $w_t^*$, it holds that after-tax real wages are a markup over an expected weighted average of marginal rates of substitution.

### 3.4 Government

Government consumption $G$ is constant and defined as plain waste. It consists of domestic intermediate goods, aggregated by the same technology as in (17). The government issues bonds to domestic households, and $A_t = \int_0^t a_t(j) \, dj$ denotes aggregate bond holdings. The period budget (for all $t \geq 0$) reads as

$$P_{tstricted}^{int} G + R_{t-1} A_{t-1} = A_t + T_t + \tau^w_t P_t C_t + \frac{\tau^w t}{1 + \tau^w_t} P_tC_t \, ,$$

(33)
where $P^\text{int}G$ are consumption expenditures (the government does not pay taxes and is not dependent on the retail sector). The last two terms on the RHS are revenues from the consumption tax and from the European VAT (depending on the model version, either $\tau_c^t$ or $\tau_v^t$ is to zero). The non-zero tax rate is exogenous and calibrated such that revenues equal expenditures in the zero-debt steady state.\footnote{Allowing for steady state government debt would only affect the model’s adjustment properties (and thereby the results) if it significantly affected the real allocation in the steady state. However, steady state interest payments to households would not affect the real allocation if they were financed by lump-sum taxes. If they were financed by distortionary taxes, they would mildly affect the steady state allocation, but not enough to significantly change the model’s adjustment properties.}

Lump-sum taxes $T_t$ are introduced as technical device to achieve stationarity. $T_t$ depend positively on the government’s indebtedness:

\[ T_t = \phi^A A_t . \] (34)

The responsiveness parameter is set to $\phi^A = 0.0125$, which is marginally larger than the (quarterly) steady state interest rate. Consequently, $T_t$ only reacts very mildly to deviations of $A_t$ from zero, but forces $A_t$ to asymptotically revert to its steady state value of zero after a shock.\footnote{If $\phi^A$ were equal to the steady state interest rate, $T_t$ would balance interest payments (revenues) for a given deviation $A_t > 0$ ($A_t < 0$). $A_t$ would thus have unit root. A marginally higher value of $\phi^A$ ensures that $T_t$ increases by enough to also redeem a positive fraction of the principle in the case of $A_t > 0$. Vice versa, in the case of $A_t < 0$, $T_t$ declines by enough to pay out a positive fraction of the principle as lump-sum transfer.}

Since the adjustment of $T_t$ is so small, its impact is negligible for the short-term and medium-term adjustment of the model and thereby for the results of this paper.

The public sector is highly stylized, but rich enough to compare multipliers of the consumption tax with those of the European VAT.\footnote{A more realistic public sector that also features labor taxes is considered as robustness exercise in Section 6. It does not significantly change the results.}

3.5 Aggregate demand

Demand for the domestic goods bundle stems from domestic consumption ($Y_t^H$ in (20)), government consumption, and exports. Assuming market clearing for final goods ($Y_t = C_t$), it is governed by

\[ Y_t^{\text{total}} = (1 - \omega) \left( \frac{P_t^\text{int}}{P_t^\text{fin}} \right)^{-\sigma} C_t + \omega^{\text{RoU}} \left( \frac{P_t^\text{int}}{P_t^\text{fin,RoU}} \right)^{-\sigma} C^{\text{RoU}} + G , \] (35)

where the second term is export demand. The price of the foreign final good in the RoU ($P_t^{\text{fin,RoU}}$) as well as RoU consumption ($C^{\text{RoU}}$) are constant and equal to the steady state values of the respective variables in the home country. The home bias parameter in the RoU ($\omega^{\text{RoU}}$) is the same as in the home country, which implies balanced trade in the steady state.

3.6 Monetary policy

Monetary policy targets zero union-wide average inflation. It is described by the following standard Taylor Rule:

\[ R_t = \beta^{-1} \left[ n (\pi_t - 1) + (1 - n) \left( \pi_t^{\text{RoU}} - 1 \right) \right]^{\alpha^R} , \] (36)
where $n$ is the weight of the home country in the monetary union. It is set on a negligibly small value in the baseline calibration, so the nominal rate is virtually constant. This corresponds to the current monetary policy environment in the Eurozone – policy rates can effectively not be lowered further and are not expected to increase in the face of an overall depressed economy. However, a robustness exercise in Section 6 considers “normal times” and calibrate $n$ to match HICP country weights of highly indebted Eurozone countries.

The domestic inflation measure $\pi_t = \frac{P_{t+1}}{P_t}$ only accounts for producer prices, but a broader inflation measure is considered as robustness exercise. $\pi_t^{RoU} = 1 \forall t$ is inflation in the RoU, and $\alpha^{\pi}$ governs the responsiveness of monetary policy.

### 3.7 Calibration

Table 1 shows the baseline calibration of the quarterly model. It largely follows Evers (2012) who calibrates a related model to members of the EMU. Calvó probabilities for prices and wages correspond to the empirical findings of Druant et al. (2009), who report for the Euro Area an average lifetime of prices and wages of 9.6 and 12.5 months respectively (excluding the outlier Italy). Elasticities of substitution between different good varieties and labor types match 11% price markup and 15% wage markup, as estimated in Basu & Kimball (1997) and Chari et al. (2002). The steady state import share is 0.33 as in Evers (2012).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Motivation / target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\beta$ Discount factor</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>Annual risk-free rate of 4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma$ Relative risk aversion</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Log-utility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi^{-1}$ Frisch elasticity of labor supply</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Kimball (2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\epsilon$ Elasticity of substitution goods varieties</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11% price markup, Basu (1997)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\epsilon_w$ Elasticity of substitution types of labor</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>15% wage markup, Chari et al. 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\theta$ Calvó probability firms</td>
<td>0.6875</td>
<td>Avg. lifetime 9.6 months, Druant et al. 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\theta_w$ Calvó probability unions</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>Avg. lifetime 12.5 months, Druant et al. 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha^{\pi}$ Inflation coefficient in Taylor Rule</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>Standard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\omega$ Steady state import share</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>Evers (2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\tau^v$ Steady state tax rate European VAT model</td>
<td>20% (0%)</td>
<td>Eurozone avg., Lipinska &amp; Von Thadden (2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\tau^c$ Steady state tax rate cons. tax model</td>
<td>21.3% (0%)</td>
<td>Same revenues as in European VAT model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$G$ Government spending</td>
<td>0.165</td>
<td>Balanced budget in steady state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\theta^r$ Calvó probability of retail firms</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>Avg. lifetime markup: 1 year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\epsilon_r$ Substitution elasticity retail varieties</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Retailers’ profits 20% of total profits</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The steady state tax rate in the European VAT model $\tau^v$ is set to 20%, which Lipinska & Von Thadden (2012) report to be the Eurozone average. In the consumption tax model, the steady state tax rate $\tau^c$ is 21.3%, which leads to the same revenues (so the steady state is the same in both model versions). Government consumption $G = 0.165$ (corresponding about 18% of steady state GDP) is chosen such that it equals the revenues from the respective tax in the European VAT rate is defined as a tax-inclusive rate, so the effective tax rate is $20%/ (1 + 20%) = 16.67%$, which is way below the effective consumption tax rate of 21.3%. It nevertheless generates the same revenues as the consumption tax (despite its smaller effective rate) because the tax base is higher under a European VAT. Revenues from the European VAT and from the consumption tax are given by $\left(\tau^v_t/ (1 + \tau^c_t)\right) P_t C_t$ and $\tau^c_t P_t C_t$ respectively.
steady state. As robustness exercise, we also consider a larger government (corresponding to 45% of GDP) that also levies labor taxes.

The elasticity of substitution between retail varieties \( \epsilon_r = 30 \) implies that about one fifth of total profits accrue in the retail sector, in line with data for the US.\(^{23}\) Retail markup rigidity \( \theta_r \) is 0.75 in the baseline calibration, implying an average lifetime of a markup of one year. The resulting pass-through dynamics are discussed in the following subsection.

### 3.8 Model pass-through

This section illustrates tax pass-through in the two model versions. Figure 2 shows pass-through of the VAT as well as the implicit pass-through when the VAT is represented by a consumption tax. Analog to Benedek et al. (2015), the cumulative pass-through at a given time after a VAT change is defined as the cumulative proportionate response of consumer prices to an increase in the respective tax factor.\(^{24}\) The upper (lower) panel depicts pass-through for an anticipated (unanticipated) tax increase by 1% of steady state GDP. Horizontal axes denote time in quarters, and both policies are implemented in \( t=0 \). For the anticipated reform, the two-year time window shown in Figure 2 begins at the time of the announcement in \( t=-4 \), while it begins at the time of the implementation for the unanticipated reform.

![Figure 2: Cumulative pass-through in both models.](image)

\(^{23}\) Using different values of \( \epsilon_r \) is virtually irrelevant for the model’s adjustment properties. The calibration data comes from the 2014 National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) of the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, which provides corporate profits by industry. Retail trade and wholesale trade (both sectors that distribute final goods) make about one fifth of total profits of non-financial firms.

\(^{24}\) Formally, cumulative pass-through after \( t \) periods is given by \( \frac{P^{c_{t+1}}P^{c_{t}}}{\tau t+\tau} \), where \( \tau \) is the respective tax rate (either \( \tau^c \) or \( \tau^w \)) and \( P^{c_{t+1}} = (1 + \tau^c)P_t \) (1 + \( \tau^w \))(1 + \( \xi_t \))\( P_t^{fin} \) corresponds in both model versions to the CPI. Steady state values have no time subscript.
In the consumption tax model, changes in $\tau^c_t$ directly enter consumer prices (see budget (2)), so the implicit full pass-through subsides only due to general equilibrium price adjustments. However, as we can see in the lower panel, this happens only slowly, because price adjustments are mitigated by price and wage rigidity – in line with the institutions’ models. There are no significant anticipation effects (upper panel).

In the European VAT model, in contrast, changes in $\tau^v_t$ affect the CPI only via adjustments in the aggregate markup $\xi_t$. Since the latter is sticky and set by forward-looking retail firms (see Section 3.2.3), we observe a gradual pass-through and significant anticipation effects (in line with Carare & Danninger (2008), see Section 2). The model pass-through corresponds to the estimate by Benedek et al. (2015): Figure 3 is taken from that study and shows the cumulative VAT pass-through (measured as in Figure 2) for an estimation that includes all VAT changes in their sample. Comparing the upper panel of Figure 2 with Figure 3 shows that VAT pass-through in the model is broadly in line with the upper end of the 95% confidence interval of the estimate. Targeting the upper end of the confidence interval makes the parametrization conservative because a weaker pass-through would further reduce short-run multipliers and thereby enlarge differences to their values in the consumption tax model.

Pass-through in either model version converges to roughly 80% in the long run, and differences between pass-through dynamics are only significant for about two years after a tax change (recognizable in the lower panel of Figure 2). This is desirable for the sake of conservative modeling, because reliable empirical evidence of partial pass-through exists only for the short-run after a VAT change: The studies mentioned in Section 2 typically document pass-through in a time window ending one or two years after a VAT change, while no study explicitly addresses pass-through in the long run. We therefore only deviate from the (implicit) pass-through dynamics in the institutions’ models when it is supported by strong empirical evidence, that is, in the short-run after a VAT change.

Figure 3: Estimated cumulative pass-through in the Eurozone. Source: Benedek et al. (2015).

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25The anticipated VAT change is the suitable exercise for a comparison because Benedek et al. (2015) estimate pass-through in the period from one year prior to a VAT change to one year thereafter.

26The main results are reported for different variations of pass-through dynamics.

27This is not surprising, since it is easier to attribute price changes to a recent VAT change than to a VAT change that occurred long ago.
4 Dissecting multipliers

This section builds the economic intuition for differences in multipliers between both model versions. Multipliers are obtained from an exemplary fiscal consolidation exercise: The respective tax rate ($\tau_c$ or $\tau_v$) exogenously increases such that revenues rise by 1% of steady state GDP for three years, and the additional revenues are used to buy assets.\(^{28}\) The next subsection addresses the consumption tax model, while the subsequent subsection studies the European VAT model.

4.1 Consumption tax model

Figure 4 shows the impact of the exemplary fiscal consolidation when it is implemented by a higher consumption tax. Since the tax base (consumption) is smaller than output in the steady state (due to the public sector), the tax rate has to increase by about 1.4% to elevate revenues by 1% of steady state GDP (1,4)\(^{29}\). Since the government lends additional revenues back to households, the tax hike ceteris paribus does not affect households' financial means. In the course of the adjustment, households reduce consumption by about 0.9% of steady state GDP (1,1). This only lowers aggregate demand and output by roughly 0.5%, because households also reduce imports (1,2) and because government consumption is constant. The overhang of the reduction in consumption expenditures over the reduction in income — about 0.3% of steady state GDP — is lent to foreign households and leads to an accumulation of bond holdings (1,3).

The effective real interest rate (accounting for changes in the consumption tax) exhibits a sharp peak in period 12, i.e. when the tax rate reverts to its initial level (2,2). Producer price inflation\(^{30}\) is very small (2,1) and the nominal rate virtually constant (both explained below), so changes in the real rate are dominated by changes in the consumption tax. The downward-reversion of the tax rate to its initial level thus gives rise to the observed peak. This corresponds to an increase in the long real rate already at the onset of the consolidation, and explains the immediate decline in consumption (1,1). Intuitively, households anticipate that consumer prices will drop when the fiscal consolidation comes to an end and postpone consumption until then.

The nominal rate is virtually constant due to the home country's small weight in the union. In line with the institutions' models, producer prices are very stable (2,1), because wages paid by firms (3,3) — and thereby marginal costs (3,2) — are remarkably steady due to nominal wage rigidity.\(^{31}\) A further consequence of the small adjustment in producer prices is that the depreciation in the terms of trade (2,3), and the resulting expenditure switching (1,2), is negligible.

\(^{28}\)As argued in Section 3.4, we would obtain the same multipliers for fiscal stimulus.
\(^{29}\)Parentheses indicate the relevant panel. They read as (row, column).
\(^{30}\)Producer prices refer to $P_{\text{fin}}^t$, the price that retailers pay for the final good bundle.
\(^{31}\)Flexible wages are examined in the robustness analysis. A further reason for the mild wage adjustment is that the MRS (3,1) declines in line with effective real wages (accounting for the consumption tax) (3,3). (Effective real wages decline for a given nominal wage due to the hike in the consumption tax, while the MRS drops because of lower consumption and hours.) As a result, no substantial adjustment of nominal wages is required in order to maintain the optimal proportion $\frac{\epsilon_w}{\epsilon_w - 1}$ between effective real wages and the MRS.
4.2 European VAT model

Figure 5 depicts the adjustment to the fiscal consolidation in the European VAT model. To facilitate a comparison with the consumption tax model, the adjustment in the latter is replicated in dashed blue lines (and with circles as markers). As in the consumption tax model, the tax rate has to rise by about 1.4% to improve the primary balance by 1% of steady state GDP (1.4). We begin by examining the aggregate retail markup, which increases as retailers roll over the additional tax liability to consumers (3,4). It peaks roughly two years after the VAT hike sets in (in t=8), but its deviation remains below the deviation of the tax factor throughout the adjustment. The aggregate markup is still elevated after five years, i.e. for two more years after the tax hike has ended. This is because Calvo-rigidity forbids some retailers who increased their markup during the time of the tax hike to undo this action as soon as the policy comes to an end. The peak occurs at t=8 because some retailers begin to lower their markup in anticipation of the near reversal of the tax rate in t=12. Panel (2,1) shows that CPI inflation is dramatically stronger than producer price inflation, implying that the adjustment of the CPI is dominated by...
inflation in retailer markups.\footnote{It is not surprising that retail firms carry out the lion’s share of the nominal adjustment, as they are directly affected by the change in the tax rate.} Since the nominal rate is virtually constant, the deviation of the real rate (2,2) mirrors CPI inflation. The fact that the real rate deviation switches its sign after seven periods explains the hump-shaped decline in consumption (1,1).

In both model versions, households reduce consumption because the fiscal consolidation causes a transitory increase in consumer prices – either directly via a higher consumption tax or indirectly via higher retail markups. However, the short-run decline of consumption is dramatically weaker in the European VAT model. The reason is that markup rigidities prevent retailers to instantaneously roll over the full increment in the tax liability to consumer prices, whereas it directly falls on consumer prices in the consumption tax model. The second difference between consumption adjustment in both models is that the European VAT model predicts a gradual reversal of consumption to its initial level – lasting beyond the reversal of the tax hike – and not, as the consumption tax model, a jump that occurs at the moment when the tax hike ends. This is because consumer price changes caused by adjustments in retail markups exhibit inertia (since markups are Calvo-sticky), which does not apply for consumer price changes driven by a change in consumption taxes.
5 Comparing multipliers

This section systematically compares multipliers across both models: Multipliers are derived for consolidations of various durations, and under various calibrations of pass-through dynamics in the European VAT model. In particular, Table 2 considers four different fiscal consolidation scenarios, which improve the primary balance by 1% of steady state GDP for one, two, five, and 20 years respectively.\textsuperscript{34} The following multiplier statistics are computed: impact multiplier (percentage change of GDP when the VAT hike sets in), peak multiplier (peak percentage deviation of GDP), as well as average multipliers for one, two, five, and 20 years (average percentage deviations of GDP). In addition, the table reports the average GDP adjustment during the time from the beginning of the consolidation until two years after it has ended (last column).\textsuperscript{35} Statistics are computed for the consumption tax model, as well as for the European VAT model in the following six calibrations of retail markup setting: for the rigidity parameter $\theta^r$, values 0.67, 0.75 (baseline), and 0.85 are considered, while we use 0.85 and 0.99 (baseline) for the time-discount factor $\beta^r$.\textsuperscript{36} The table also provides statistics to quantify pass-through dynamics for the respective calibration of $\theta^r$ and $\beta^r$: columns one, two, and three respectively show the instantaneous pass-through, as well as cumulative pass-through after one and two years.\textsuperscript{37} To facilitate the comparison of multipliers between both model versions, parentheses next to European VAT multipliers report the percentage difference to their value in the consumption tax model.

Before we consider the different calibrations of pass-through dynamics, we discuss two main insights of Table 2. First, regardless of a consolidation’s duration, short-run multipliers (i.e. impact multipliers and one-year and two-year average multipliers) are dramatically smaller in the European VAT model. The explanation directly follows from the discussion in Section 4: delay in the pass-through dampens the short-run GDP adjustment because it defers the incentive to postpone consumption. Second, multipliers averaging over the entire duration of a consolidation (as well as the average GDP decline reported in the last column) are also smaller in the European VAT model, but differences become weaker in a consolidation’s duration. For short consolidations, retail firms anticipate the near reversal of the tax rate already at the onset of the policy. This weakens the incentive to raise markups, which dampens total tax pass-through and thereby the present value of the decline in output. These anticipation effects become weaker in the duration of a consolidation, and they play a minor role for the five-year and 20-year consolidation. For these consolidations, differences in long-run multipliers are driven by the fact that the adjustment in both models is virtually identical once pass-through has converged to 80% in both model versions (see Section 3.8). The weight of the early phase – when the adjustment is different between both models – is smaller for multipliers that average over a longer time horizon.

Regarding the different calibrations of markup rigidity, we observe that $\beta^r$ is of minor importance for multipliers. For $\theta^r$, we find that more rigidity in the markup (a higher value) increases the differences in multipliers. The explanation is straightforward: differences are driven by delayed tax pass-through in the European VAT model, and this delay becomes stronger in the degree of markup rigidity.

The general picture is that differences between both models are striking for impact multipliers, one-year and two-year average multipliers, and peak multipliers. By and large, incorporating re-
Table 2: VAT multipliers in both model versions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cumulative PT</th>
<th>Impact multiplier</th>
<th>Peak multiplier</th>
<th>1 year</th>
<th>Average multipliers</th>
<th>5 years</th>
<th>20 years</th>
<th>Avg. adjustment duration +2 yrs.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>One-year consolidation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cons. tax model</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\theta^r = 0.67$</td>
<td>$\beta^r = 0.85$</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.17 (-72%)</td>
<td>0.32 (-48%)</td>
<td>0.27 (-56%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\theta^r = 0.75$</td>
<td>$\beta^r = 0.85$</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.12 (-81%)</td>
<td>0.24 (-62%)</td>
<td>0.20 (-68%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\theta^r = 0.85$</td>
<td>$\beta^r = 0.85$</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.06 (-90%)</td>
<td>0.13 (-79%)</td>
<td>0.11 (-82%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\theta^r = 0.99$</td>
<td>$\beta^r = 0.85$</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.04 (-93%)</td>
<td>0.09 (-86%)</td>
<td>0.07 (-88%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Two-year consolidation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cons. tax model</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\theta^r = 0.67$</td>
<td>$\beta^r = 0.85$</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>0.18 (-71%)</td>
<td>0.45 (-27%)</td>
<td>0.32 (-45%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\theta^r = 0.75$</td>
<td>$\beta^r = 0.85$</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>0.13 (-79%)</td>
<td>0.39 (-37%)</td>
<td>0.25 (-46%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\theta^r = 0.85$</td>
<td>$\beta^r = 0.85$</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>0.12 (-81%)</td>
<td>0.33 (-47%)</td>
<td>0.23 (-61%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\theta^r = 0.99$</td>
<td>$\beta^r = 0.85$</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>0.07 (-89%)</td>
<td>0.25 (-60%)</td>
<td>0.14 (-66%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Five-year consolidation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cons. tax model</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\theta^r = 0.67$</td>
<td>$\beta^r = 0.85$</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>0.16 (-73%)</td>
<td>0.44 (-26%)</td>
<td>0.29 (-47%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\theta^r = 0.75$</td>
<td>$\beta^r = 0.85$</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>0.11 (-81%)</td>
<td>0.42 (-30%)</td>
<td>0.25 (-59%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\theta^r = 0.85$</td>
<td>$\beta^r = 0.85$</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>0.06 (-90%)</td>
<td>0.36 (-29%)</td>
<td>0.14 (-75%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\theta^r = 0.99$</td>
<td>$\beta^r = 0.85$</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>0.06 (-90%)</td>
<td>0.32 (-46%)</td>
<td>0.13 (-75%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>20-year consolidation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cons. tax model</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\theta^r = 0.67$</td>
<td>$\beta^r = 0.85$</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>0.11 (-79%)</td>
<td>0.41 (-25%)</td>
<td>0.26 (-49%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\theta^r = 0.75$</td>
<td>$\beta^r = 0.85$</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>0.07 (-88%)</td>
<td>0.39 (-29%)</td>
<td>0.19 (-61%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\theta^r = 0.85$</td>
<td>$\beta^r = 0.85$</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>0.02 (-97%)</td>
<td>0.37 (-33%)</td>
<td>0.11 (-78%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\theta^r = 0.99$</td>
<td>$\beta^r = 0.85$</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>0.02 (-97%)</td>
<td>0.35 (-30%)</td>
<td>0.11 (-78%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

alistic pass-through dynamics reduces the first-year (two-year) average GDP decline by roughly 50%-80% (30%-60%), relative to the projections in the model that implements the VAT as a consumption tax paid by households. Even for the weakest calibration of retail markup rigidity ($\theta^r = 0.67$, corresponding to an expected markup lifetime of three quarters), the first-year multiplier declines by at least 45%. Since this calibration of VAT pass-through is extremely conservative — in the sense that it overstates VAT pass-through and thereby understates differences in multipliers — the results strongly suggest that neglecting pass-through dynamics leads to a severe overestimation of the short-run impact of VAT changes.

$38^{\theta^r = 0.67}$ implies a more comprehensive short-run pass-through than the baseline calibration, for which tax pass-through is already stronger than what is estimated by Benedek et al. (2015) (see Section 3.8).
6 Robustness analysis

To examine the robustness of the results, Tables 3 and 4 (p. 25 and p. 26 in the appendix) report the same statistics as Table 2, but for variations in parameters and in the model specification. Rows labeled “European VAT model” depict the results for the baseline parameters $\theta^r = 0.75$ and $\beta^r = 0.99$. As in Table 2, parentheses indicate the percentage difference between multipliers in both models.

6.1 Exercise A: Introducing Rule-of-Thumb households

In this exercise, 40% of households are credit-constrained “Rule-of-Thumb” consumers, introduced by Galí et al. (2004). This in general increases multipliers and also slightly raises their differences across the two models. The reason is that changes in disposable income of Rule-of-Thumb households translate to their full extent into changes in consumption. The reduction in hours worked and labor income induced by the consolidation thus lead to a further decline in Rule-of-Thumb consumption, and the emerging adverse feedback loop increases multipliers.

6.2 Exercise B: Flexible wages

To obtain wage flexibility, the rigidity parameter of wages $\theta^w$ (see equation (31)) is set to a negligibly small value, which slightly reduces the overall size of multipliers. Under wage flexibility, nominal wages decline in the short-run as response to the fall in the MRS between consumption and leisure. This reduction in marginal costs leads to lower producer prices. The latter stabilizes output in the face of the consolidation, because it offsets some of the increase in consumer prices (the driver of the reduction in consumption), and because the implied deterioration in the terms of trade induces more export demand. However, the implications for the differences in multipliers between both model versions are very modest.

6.3 Exercise C: Weaker elasticity of intertemporal substitution

This exercise considers $\gamma = 2$ instead of $\gamma = 1$ in the utility function (1), which lowers the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. We observe that multipliers are significantly smaller, but differences between both model versions decrease only slightly. The reason why multipliers are smaller is that weaker intertemporal substitution dampens the main channel by which the consolidation affects output – the postponement of consumption until the tax hike is over.

6.4 Exercise D: Larger public sector and labor taxes

As of 2014, general government expenditure as share of GDP is on average as high as 49% in the Euro Area (source: Eurostat). To replicate this figure, the model is extended by a constant labor tax rate of 32%, and government consumption $G$ is increased by the amount of the additional revenues. This has a mild impact on the level of multipliers in both model versions, but does not significantly change differences between both models.

39 The model description is available upon request.
40 The model description is available upon request.
6.5 Exercise E and F: Higher weight in Taylor Rule and different inflation measure

The baseline value \( n = 0.01 \) implies that the home country has a negligible weight in the union-wide inflation measure, so monetary policy does not react to price changes in the home country. This exercise considers “normal times” of unconstrained monetary policy. The baseline value of \( n \) roughly matches the 2016 HICP country weights of Ireland, Greece and Portugal (1.4%, 2.4% and 2.2% respectively). To study the implications of higher country weights, we also consider \( n = 0.11 \) to match the HICP weight of Spain, as well as \( n = 0.2 \), which roughly corresponds the weight of Italy and France (17.6% and 20.7% respectively).\(^41\) If the central bank reacts to inflation in domestic producer prices (i.e. follows Taylor Rule (36)), the results for all three values of \( n \) are almost the same as in the baseline model (therefore they are not shown in the table). The reason is that intermediate good prices are remarkably stable in the course of the consolidations, so their weight in the Taylor Rule is of little consequence.

We also consider \( \pi_t = \left[ (1 + \tau^i_t) (1 + \xi_t) P^{int}_t \right] / \left[ (1 + \tau^i_{t-1}) (1 + \xi_{t-1}) P^{int}_{t-1} \right] \) as inflation measure, which includes changes in the consumption tax rate and in the aggregate retail markup. For \( n = 0.01 \) the results are virtually the same as in the baseline model (thus not shown in the table), because domestic inflation has a very small weight in the union. For \( n = 0.11 \) and \( n = 0.2 \) (exercises E and F in Table 4), it leads to a moderate reduction in short-run multipliers, which is more pronounced for the higher country weight \( n = 0.2 \). To see why, recall that the decline in consumption is driven by the anticipation of the fall in consumer prices when a consolidation comes to an end. Responsive monetary policy means that the downward-reversion of consumer prices goes along with a decline in the nominal rate. Consequently, the positive deviation of the long-run real rate – causal for the decline in consumption – is weaker. Regarding the differences in multipliers between both model versions, a higher \( n \) does not significantly affect the results.

7 Conclusion

I have shown that short-run multipliers from a European-style VAT with gradual pass-through are dramatically smaller than those from a consumption tax, for which changes in the tax liability immediately affect consumer prices. Since empirical evidence suggests gradual pass-through of changes in the European VAT, it appears inaccurate to have the VAT be represented by a consumption tax. Nevertheless, this is done in numerous publications of leading policy-making institutions. The resulting errors in short-run VAT multipliers are substantial. In the DSGE model derived in this paper – which shares its basic structure with the workhorse models used at the institutions – neglecting realistic pass-through dynamics leads to overestimation in a magnitude that ranges from 50% to 80% for one-year average multipliers, and from 30% to 60% for two-year average multipliers.

Provided that a model features country-specific pricing equations, a technically inexpensive way to bring tax pass-through more in line with empirical evidence would be to implement the VAT as a tax paid by intermediate good firms on their sales (discussed at the end of Section 3.2.1).\(^42\) This would make the model substantially better suited to derive tax multipliers for countries that use a European-style VAT rather than a US-style sales tax. Having more accurate

\(^{41}\)All of these countries have a high debt-to-GDP ratio. In 2015, it is 93.8% in Ireland, 176.9% in Greece, 129% in Portugal, 99.2% in Spain, 132.7% in Italy, and 95.8% in France. Source: Eurostat.

\(^{42}\)The model at hand replicates the resulting pass-through dynamics if we use the rigidity parameter for intermediate good prices also for retail markup rigidity \((\theta^F = \theta)\). The fact that using the standard Calvo-parameter \(0.75\) for retail markup rigidity leads to empirically plausible pass-through dynamics (see Section 3.8) suggests that a reasonable calibration of price stickiness is compatible with reasonable pass-through dynamics.
estimates of the short-run impact of VAT changes is especially important on the backdrop of the debt overhang in Europe, which puts fiscal consolidation high up on the political agenda.

Furthermore, the results of this paper are relevant for the choice between using the standard VAT rate or reduced VAT rates as fiscal instrument. Benedek et al. (2015) provide evidence that pass-through is considerably larger for the standard rate than for reduced rates: Figure 6 shows the estimated cumulative pass-through in the Eurozone (as in Figure 3), but for the two types of VAT separately.

As discussed in Section 3.8, a conservative interpretation of Figure 6 concludes that short-run pass-through is weaker for reduced rates. In light of the findings, reduced rates appear thus more suitable for fiscal consolidation, as they can be expected to have a weaker adverse impact on economic activity in the short run. By the same token, the standard rate is more appropriate to be lowered in order to stimulate the economy: as the benefit is more quickly passed on to consumers, the induced GDP expansion is stronger in the short run.
### Table 3: Robustness analysis (1/2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Impact multiplier</th>
<th>Peak multiplier</th>
<th>1 year</th>
<th>2 years</th>
<th>5 years</th>
<th>20 years</th>
<th>Avg. adjustment duration +2 yrs.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Baseline model (for comparison)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One-year duration</td>
<td>Cons. tax model</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Euro. VAT model</td>
<td>0.10 (-84%)</td>
<td>0.19 (-69%)</td>
<td>0.16 (-74%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-0.08 (-55%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two-year duration</td>
<td>Cons. tax model</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Euro. VAT model</td>
<td>0.12 (-80%)</td>
<td>0.34 (-44%)</td>
<td>0.23 (-60%)</td>
<td>0.27 (-52%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-0.16 (-36%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five-year duration</td>
<td>Cons. tax model</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>-0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Euro. VAT model</td>
<td>0.11 (-81%)</td>
<td>0.41 (-30%)</td>
<td>0.22 (-59%)</td>
<td>0.30 (-40%)</td>
<td>0.34 (-26%)</td>
<td>-0.25 (-18%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-year duration</td>
<td>Cons. tax model</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>-0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Euro. VAT model</td>
<td>0.06 (-88%)</td>
<td>0.38 (-29%)</td>
<td>0.19 (-61%)</td>
<td>0.27 (-41%)</td>
<td>0.33 (-18%)</td>
<td>0.33 (-7%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Exercise A: Including Rule-of-thumb consumers**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Impact multiplier</th>
<th>Peak multiplier</th>
<th>1 year</th>
<th>2 years</th>
<th>5 years</th>
<th>20 years</th>
<th>Avg. adjustment duration +2 yrs.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One-year duration</td>
<td>Cons. tax model</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Euro. VAT model</td>
<td>0.12 (-84%)</td>
<td>0.23 (-71%)</td>
<td>0.19 (-75%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-0.10 (-57%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two-year duration</td>
<td>Cons. tax model</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Euro. VAT model</td>
<td>0.14 (-80%)</td>
<td>0.30 (-50%)</td>
<td>0.27 (-63%)</td>
<td>0.31 (-55%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-0.18 (-40%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five-year duration</td>
<td>Cons. tax model</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>-0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Euro. VAT model</td>
<td>0.13 (-83%)</td>
<td>0.42 (-43%)</td>
<td>0.25 (-61%)</td>
<td>0.33 (-43%)</td>
<td>0.35 (-30%)</td>
<td>-0.24 (-21%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-year duration</td>
<td>Cons. tax model</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Euro. VAT model</td>
<td>0.07 (-89%)</td>
<td>0.37 (-45%)</td>
<td>0.21 (-65%)</td>
<td>0.28 (-46%)</td>
<td>0.30 (-22%)</td>
<td>0.27 (-10%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Exercise B: Flexible wages**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Impact multiplier</th>
<th>Peak multiplier</th>
<th>1 year</th>
<th>2 years</th>
<th>5 years</th>
<th>20 years</th>
<th>Avg. adjustment duration +2 yrs.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One-year duration</td>
<td>Cons. tax model</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.42</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Euro. VAT model</td>
<td>0.07 (-85%)</td>
<td>0.12 (-74%)</td>
<td>0.10 (-75%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-0.05 (-56%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two-year duration</td>
<td>Cons. tax model</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Euro. VAT model</td>
<td>0.08 (-83%)</td>
<td>0.20 (-56%)</td>
<td>0.14 (-62%)</td>
<td>0.16 (-54%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-0.10 (-38%)</td>
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<td>Five-year duration</td>
<td>Cons. tax model</td>
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<td>0.21 (-39%)</td>
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<td>-0.19 (-17%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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**Exercise C: Weaker elasticity of intertemporal substitution**

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<th>20 years</th>
<th>Avg. adjustment duration +2 yrs.</th>
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<td>One-year duration</td>
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<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>0.09 (-66%)</td>
<td>0.08 (-71%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-0.04 (-52%)</td>
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<td>Two-year duration</td>
<td>Cons. tax model</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.26</td>
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<td>0.25</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Euro. VAT model</td>
<td>0.06 (-70%)</td>
<td>0.15 (-42%)</td>
<td>0.11 (-58%)</td>
<td>0.12 (-50%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-0.07 (-35%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five-year duration</td>
<td>Cons. tax model</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.25</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>0.05 (-70%)</td>
<td>0.19 (-25%)</td>
<td>0.11 (-55%)</td>
<td>0.14 (-36%)</td>
<td>0.16 (-23%)</td>
<td>-0.12 (-15%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-year duration</td>
<td>Cons. tax model</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.18</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Euro. VAT model</td>
<td>0.04 (-82%)</td>
<td>0.19 (-22%)</td>
<td>0.16 (-56%)</td>
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<td>0.16 (-15%)</td>
<td>0.17 (-4%)</td>
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**Exercise D: Larger public sector and payroll taxes**

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<th>1 year</th>
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<th>20 years</th>
<th>Avg. adjustment duration +2 yrs.</th>
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<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.53</td>
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<td>-0.17</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Euro. VAT model</td>
<td>0.09 (-84%)</td>
<td>0.17 (-69%)</td>
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<td>-</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Cons. tax model</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-0.25</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Euro. VAT model</td>
<td>0.10 (-80%)</td>
<td>0.30 (-43%)</td>
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<td>-0.15 (-37%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Cons. tax model</td>
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<td>0.48</td>
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<td>0.43 (-17%)</td>
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<td>0.30 (-39%)</td>
<td>0.35 (-25%)</td>
<td>-0.27 (-18%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>20-year duration</td>
<td>Cons. tax model</td>
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<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.46</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.43 (-12%)</td>
<td>0.20 (-57%)</td>
<td>0.28 (-38%)</td>
<td>0.37 (-17%)</td>
<td>0.40 (-8%)</td>
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</tbody>
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## Appendix

Table 4: Robustness analysis (2/2)

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<th>Average multipliers</th>
<th>Avg. adjustment duration +2 yrs.</th>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 year</td>
<td>2 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Baseline model (for comparison)</strong></td>
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<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Euro. VAT model 0.10 (-84%)</td>
<td>0.19 (-69%)</td>
<td>0.16 (-74%)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two-year duration</td>
<td>Cons. tax model 0.61</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
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<td>0.27 (-52%)</td>
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<td>0.58</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Euro. VAT model 0.11 (-81%)</td>
<td>0.41 (-30%)</td>
<td>0.22 (-50%)</td>
<td>0.30 (-40%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-year duration</td>
<td>Cons. tax model 0.53</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.50</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>0.38 (-29%)</td>
<td>0.19 (-61%)</td>
<td>0.27 (-41%)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Exercise E: 11% weight and different inflation measure</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One-year duration</td>
<td>Cons. tax model 0.63</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
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<td>Two-year duration</td>
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<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.50</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.29 (-53%)</td>
<td>0.21 (-50%)</td>
<td>0.24 (-52%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five-year duration</td>
<td>Cons. tax model 0.61</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.22 (-56%)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.38 (-34%)</td>
<td>0.20 (-57%)</td>
<td>0.27 (-37%)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Exercise F: 20% weight and different inflation measure</strong></td>
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<td>One-year duration</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.20 (-58%)</td>
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<td>0.43</td>
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<td>0.28 (-35%)</td>
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<td>0.40 (-34%)</td>
<td>0.20 (-53%)</td>
<td>0.27 (-34%)</td>
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</table>
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