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Migration, displacement and social integration

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by nicholas van hear

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geneva, november 1994
The World Summit for Social Development, to be held in Copenhagen in March 1995, provides an important opportunity for the world community to focus attention on current social problems and to analyse the dimensions, roots and directions of social trends. In particular, the agenda of the Summit specifies three areas of concern: the reduction of poverty, the generation of productive employment and the enhancement of social integration. UNRISD work in preparation for the Summit focuses on the last of these: as countries confront the seemingly intractable problems of social conflict, institutional breakdown and mass alienation, the topic of social integration has assumed increasing importance in public debate.

The UNRISD Occasional Paper series brought out as part of the Social Summit preparatory process takes up a range of issues relating to social integration. This paper examines the impact of human migration and displacement on social integration within the context of globalization, and economic and political restructuring.

Three novel features of the post-Cold War era are adding to longer established pressures generating migration: first, technological change, which has radically altered global communications and made long-distance travel cheaper and easier; second, looser exit procedures in the countries of the former Eastern bloc and the consequent enlargement of the “pool” of potential migrants; and, third, the resurgence of ethnic, religious and nationalist aspirations and conflicts, generating instability within many nation states and resulting in the disintegration and reconstitution of several of them. While more and more potential migrants are emerging, many of the countries and regions that have accommodated migrants in the past are now proving unable or unwilling to welcome newcomers.

These pressures are bringing into play new arenas of international migration and transforming longer established ones. While both economic migration and refugee movements have become major issues of public concern in the developed world, movements to these countries are proportionately much smaller than those within the developing world. In addition to these spatial transformations, this paper also discusses the diversity and fluidity of migration: new forms of migration have emerged (e.g. family reunion, illegal entry) often in response to government attempts to halt, stem or curtail a particular form of migration (temporary labour migration, for example). Significant tendencies gathering momentum in recent years are more
permanent settlement (as opposed to temporary labour migration), the feminization of migration, burgeoning illegal entry and socio-economic differentiation among migrants.

In the second part of the paper, the implications of migration for social integration are examined by considering the social, political and economic dimensions of three sets of relationships: those between migrants and their “home” community; those between migrants and their “host” community; and those located within the “transnational” arena between the country of origin and the country of destination. Under the first set of relationships, migration seems to have both integrative and disintegrative dimensions: as old forms of integration become less important, new forms may be generated with potentially liberating implications for some household members (e.g. women) and the emergence of what has been termed “cultural capital” that can be passed on, contributing to shared values and social cohesion. As for the relationships between migrants and their host communities, immigration impacts on national integrity through the formation and transformation of rules of citizenship, the development and transformation of immigration policy, and the formation and transformation of national identity or self-image.

Three models of citizenship, immigration régime and national identity are considered. These consist of the “folk” or “ethnic” model represented by Germany; the republican model illustrated by France and the “multicultural” model represented by Australia and Canada. These models, however, are neither static nor exclusive to a particular country. Furthermore, the diversity of approaches has not prevented the emergence of a marginalized class of migrants in all industrialized and newly industrializing countries. Migrants, it is argued, are perhaps becoming the quintessential post-industrial workers, servicing the consumption requirements of the “contented” majority. Even though not all migrants are locked into the “underclass”, the possibility of upward mobility for most of them into the ranks of the “contented” seems bleak.

The social, political and economic marginalization of migrants challenges one of the main principles upon which democracies are founded: that all members of civil society should belong to the political community. But it also challenges this principle in a more creative way. As growing numbers of migrants hold multiple identities, affiliation and membership or citizenship, such affiliation itself may change in the direction of some form of “transnational” citizenship (the third set of relationships noted above). Like national identity, collective transnational identity is imagined. In the context of world economic restructuring and of nation state disintegration and reconstitution, such persons may find themselves to be advantaged over those with a single affiliation.

The concluding part of the paper evokes some recent policy initiatives. In particular, it considers the mitigation of migratory pressures through aid and
the containment of refugee movements through the creation of safe zones, regions or countries.

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Dharam Ghai
Director
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From being a relatively peripheral concern, migration has since the late 1980s moved swiftly up the policy-making agenda to become an issue of public debate. International conferences on migration issues have proliferated, and newspapers and magazines carry lengthy features on migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers almost daily. At the same time, xenophobia and racism have become prominent once again. Migration, however, has long been a feature of the world stage, and during many periods it has been seen as a beneficial phenomenon. Moreover, despite the current anxieties, many still think that migration makes a positive contribution.

This paper places human migration and displacement within the context of globalization, economic and political restructuring, and social integration. It demonstrates the ambiguous impact of migration on social integration: the paradox of today’s migration is that it is — or may be — both disintegrative and integrative, both in migrants’ countries of origin and destination.

The paper is divided into three parts. The first takes up the theme of globalization, examining transformations in the volume and pattern of migration in the last quarter of the twentieth century, and relating them to trends in global economic restructuring and the disintegration and reconstitution of nation states. These shifts are manifested in spatial terms — migration is both a part and a consequence of the process of globalization — and in terms of emerging types of migrants. The paper then turns to the social, political and economic issues of integration/disintegration and inclusion/exclusion that these changes in migration trends give rise to. In conclusion, the paper looks at some of the policy implications of the integration/disintegration issues raised by migration and displacement, and draws attention to a number of seemingly intractable contradictions surrounding migration and social integration.
Migration within and between countries has long been a manifestation of wide disparities in socio-economic circumstances and perceived life-chances, but in the post-Cold War period it appears to be taking on new dimensions and a new character. Three novel features of the current era are adding to pressures generating migration, shaping patterns of movement and increasing anxiety about the issue.

First, technological change has generated a revolution in global communications. One consequence of this is that images of life in the developed world — often heavily distorted ones — have spread wider and wider through electronic media, so that information or misinformation about new opportunities (real or imagined) has become much more accessible to a significant proportion of the world’s population. Another consequence of the technological revolution is that long-distance travel has become easier and cheaper; these changes seem to have had a particularly significant impact on migration from the South. Second, looser exit procedures in the countries of the former Eastern bloc mean that a huge population — around 450 million people — has been brought into the pool of potential migrants; this pool is set to enlarge even further if and when the People’s Republic of China relaxes its emigration controls. This development is shaping new patterns of East-West migration. Third, the resurgence of ethnic, religious and nationalist aspirations and tensions, in part a consequence of the collapse of the communist bloc, has generated considerable instability within many nation states, resulting in the disintegration and reconstitution of a large number of them, thereby fuelling further forced migration.

These new forces facilitating or generating migration are combining with longer established ones to alter global patterns of migration. But, while the cumulative effect of these forces is substantial, there are also countervailing pressures constraining migration, particularly as many of the countries and regions that have accommodated migrants in the past are now proving unable or unwilling to admit more newcomers. Because of technological change, many of these economies have become less absorptive of labour. More significantly though, perceptions of the negative political, social and security impacts of immigration increasingly hold sway. A potent cocktail of increased pressure to migrate set against hardening barriers to immigration is thus developing: more and more potential migrants are emerging but there is nowhere for them to go. The consequences could be explosive, with profound implications for social integration and cohesion both in regions of
migrants’ origin and in those of their of destination — not to mention the areas in between.

Accelerated rural-urban migration and the growth of mega cities are both a consequence and a manifestation of the process of globalization. New arenas of international migration are likewise being brought into play and longer established ones transformed. The sections which follow outline the dimensions and character of rural-urban and international migration, and review changes in spatial patterns of migration both in regions with long-established migration streams and in those where new migratory flows are emerging.

Urbanization appears to be accelerating inexorably. In the middle of this century more than four fifths of the world’s population lived in the countryside; by 1975 three quarters still did so, but by the early years of the next century the proportion will be down to half. Another significant feature of urbanization in recent decades has been the growth of “mega cities” of more than 10 million inhabitants, particularly in the developing world. Urbanization has of course been associated historically with economic growth and industrialization, but rapid urban growth in many developing countries is outstripping the capacity of cities to provide economic opportunities and even minimal services for their existing populations, let alone the newcomers.

Pressures impelling rural-urban migration include population growth in rural areas, particularly among those of working age, relative to diminishing resources; inequitable land distribution and the erosion or enclosure of the commons; the bias of agrarian investment away from labour-intensive small-scale farming to capital-intensive agriculture, decreasing agricultural employment; the effect of rural infrastructural development, such as roads, which ironically make migrants’ access to cities easier; the bias in favour of urban investment, so that amenities and services in towns are superior to those in the countryside; and the attraction of higher earnings in the cities than in the countryside, certainly in the formal sector and often in the informal sector — although informal social security networks like the extended family may remain stronger in the rural areas. These factors and developments have had the effect of reducing farmers’ incomes, increasing the numbers of landless, shrinking means of livelihood, increasing overall poverty and disrupting the social and economic networks that bind rural
societies together. Their net effect is to reinforce the attraction of the city for rural dwellers.

It is not, however, only economic factors that are at play. People certainly leave rural areas for economic reasons, but they also do so because they find life boring there, and think, rightly or wrongly, that it will be more stimulating in the towns or abroad. It is believed that town life will offer opportunities for improving social status. “Pull” factors thus include powerful images of life abroad and in the towns, which are being reinforced through advertising, television and video. While most consumers in industrialized countries realize that these images are fantasies, those who consume them at a distance have less capacity to make such a judgement. While superficially “integrative”, globalization of culture, principally through electronic media, is thus profoundly disintegrative of rural culture and communities.

These pressures in aggregate drive millions of people to towns and cities each year. Migration provides an escape route, which, as will be shown below, may either further damage or help to sustain the integrity of migrants’ communities of origin. Despite measures to control the size and distribution of rural and urban populations by stimulating rural development or by diverting migrants to secondary cities, urbanization seems unrelenting. Secondary cities have themselves been transformed into large agglomerations, without stemming flows into mega cities. Even in China, where attempts to regulate population growth by social engineering have perhaps been the most far-reaching, millions of people from poor rural areas have made for the towns where they eke out a marginal existence — if they are lucky they find work in construction, waste disposal or sweat shops.

Internal migration and international migration are often considered separately, but can be part of a single overall migration system; the pressures to migrate are the same. The “push” and “pull” factors outlined above, and others, may first generate movement from the countryside to the cities, leading later to migration further afield. That first move may indeed affect a greater transformation in the migrant than subsequent international migration: “Leaving traditional forms of production and social relationships to move into burgeoning cities is the first stage of fundamental social,
psychological and cultural changes, which create the predispositions for further migrations. To move from peasant agriculture into a city like Manila, Sao Paulo or Lagos may be a bigger step for many than the subsequent move to a ‘global city’ like Tokyo, Los Angeles or Sydney.\(^2\)

There are other connections between rural-urban and international migration. Rural people drawn into the cities may find employment in sectors vacated by urban dwellers who have in turn moved up a notch to replace those who have gone to work abroad. In some parts of the world, such as in South-East Asia, the departure of rural migrants for the towns creates labour shortages which are filled by new rural migrants — either from within the country or from across borders, thus creating new international migration streams and new patterns of integration and disintegration.

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forced migration

In addition to the routine pressures outlined above which drive migration within and between countries, natural and human catastrophes — such as famine, drought, flood, war, civil conflict, mass persecution, environmental degradation and misguided development projects — have also generated involuntary movements of population within countries and across borders, and they continue to do so. Recent estimates suggest that there were some 16,250,000 refugees and asylum-seekers worldwide at the end of 1993.\(^3\) This total has decreased by roughly one million compared to the year before, but it obscures an increase in the number of individuals in “refugee-like situations” — those who are forced to flee but are not considered refugees under the United Nations 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol. The nominal decrease in refugee numbers also reflects increasing restrictions in the developed countries that have hitherto taken in asylum-seekers, and emergent policies of containing refugees within or near the countries or regions of the conflict or persecution which precipitates their flight. As for the distribution of refugees, despite the noise made, particularly in Europe and North America, about increasing numbers of asylum-seekers in the developed world, the developing world — including many of the poorest countries — hosts by far the largest proportion of refugees. In addition to those who flee across borders, there were conservatively estimated to be 25 million people displaced within their own countries at the end of 1993.

War and civil conflict constitute major causes of forced migration. In the current era some conflicts that were wholly or partly the product of the Cold War have been settled or are on their way to resolution — former Cold War hot-spots such as the Caribbean and Central America (with the exception of
Haiti), southern Africa (with the exception of Angola) and Indo-China are regions in which lessening conflict has resulted in the resolution of refugee issues by repatriation (Cambodia, Mozambique, Namibia) or by a combination of repatriation and resettlement (Viet Nam). However, many other conflicts that derive from the Cold War era are lingering on after its demise, exasperating hopes of resolution; these die-hard conflicts persist for example in Afghanistan, Angola and Somalia (and seemingly Cambodia). The Horn of Africa presents a mixed case, with conflict in Ethiopia on its way to resolution — seen for example in the emergence of Eritrea — but stubborn and escalating conflict persisting in Somalia and the Sudan.

In a third category are the conflicts that have their roots in nation state realignment in the post-colonial era and are only tangentially related to the Cold War. Many of today’s conflicts in South Asia might be placed here, as might some of those in Africa — Burundi, Liberia and Rwanda. Finally, there are the new conflicts of the post-Cold War era, which are either part of its legacy — such as the conflicts in the Balkans, the Caucasus and Central Asia — or are a consequence of realignments since its demise — such as the Gulf conflict and its fall-out.

Other causes of forced migration include mixtures of economic deterioration and large-scale human rights violations — seen notably in the much-publicized boat-people exoduses from Cuba, Haiti, Indo-China and the People’s Republic of China. To these sources should be added famine, drought, flood, environmental degradation and misguided development projects, as mentioned above. While much of the motivation for migration is laid at the door of “underdevelopment” or structural imbalances between rich and poor parts of the world, ironically, “development” can itself be another source of involuntary displacement. The World Bank estimates that every year at least 10 million people are displaced as a result of infrastructural programmes such as dam construction and urban and transportation development. The cumulative total of people displaced by such projects over the past decade stands at about 80-90 million.
While anxiety about international migration has risen, particularly among the richer nations that are the destination of many migrants, the number of migrants crossing borders is actually quite small relative to the total world population. Reliable statistics are hard to come by, but in the early 1990s the number of international migrants (including economic migrants and refugees) living outside their countries of citizenship was estimated at 100 million, somewhat less than 2 per cent of the world population. Although it takes place on a smaller scale than rural-urban migration, the impact of international migration is proportionately greater than its numbers might suggest. Among the reasons for this are the often profound consequences of migrants’ departure for their places of origin; the tendency for migrants to be in peak periods of fertility and activity; and their tendency to concentrate and be visible in particular localities, particularly industrial areas and urban neighbourhoods. Migration therefore impinges on most people’s experience in both sending and receiving countries.

The pressures outlined above are bringing into play new arenas of international migration and transforming longer established ones. The classical countries of immigration — like Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States — whose populations have hitherto comprised mainly European immigrants and their descendants (the aboriginal populations having been decimated, dispossessed and marginalized), have over recent decades experienced large-scale immigration from new sources, particularly Asia. The United States has also attracted many migrants from Mexico, elsewhere in Latin America and the Caribbean, and from further afield; by the late 1980s, 90 per cent of immigrants to the United States were from developing countries. Large numbers enter illegally. Australia and Canada witnessed similar changes in the composition of their migrant populations.

Having long been a region of net emigration, North-West Europe has since 1945 become an area of immigration. While primary economic immigration has diminished, family reunion, refugee movements, illegal entry and other forms of migration have continued the inflows. By the 1980s the number of foreign residents in Western Europe had topped 15 million, equivalent to the population of a medium-sized European state, and dubbed the “thirteenth state” of the (then) EEC. Southern European states like Greece, Italy and Spain have meanwhile been transformed from emigration countries to those of immigration — mainly of migrants from North and West Africa. Since 1989, the profound changes in Eastern Europe and what was the Soviet Union have engendered large population movements, and transformed some Central European states, such as Hungary, Poland and the Czech and Slovak...
republics, into immigration countries. Germany and Greece have become the focus of “in-gatherings” of co-ethnics long-settled in Eastern Europe and the former USSR. The disintegration of Yugoslavia has generated large refugee movements within Europe for the first time since the Second World War; conflict in the Caucasus has likewise displaced large populations.

Transformations of migration patterns have likewise occurred in the Middle East. The oil-rich states of the Arabian Gulf, particularly Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and also Iraq and Libya, have attracted large numbers of contract migrant workers since the 1970s oil boom, first from other Arab states and later increasingly from South and South-East Asia. This pattern was profoundly disrupted by the Gulf crisis, which led to the uprooting of perhaps two million migrant workers and their families, after which the volume and composition of the migrant population were transformed. Another major determinant of population distribution has been the displacement of Palestinians to make new lives in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Egypt and, until the Gulf crisis, Kuwait. Jordan also hosts substantial numbers of migrant workers from Egypt and elsewhere, and supplies skilled labour to the region and beyond. Israel is, controversially, the focus for the in-gathering of Jewish populations from around the world. Turkey was the source of much emigration to Germany in the 1960s and 1970s, but has also received large numbers of ethnic Turks from Bulgaria. Iranians, Kurds and other refugees from the Middle East are involved in other forced migratory movements around the region and beyond.

Migration has long been a routine feature in Africa, following trade routes and pre-dating the establishment of borders. The slave trade constituted one of the world’s largest and most far-reaching forced migrations. In post-colonial times, Côte d’Ivoire and Nigeria replaced Ghana as the main poles of attraction for — largely undocumented — economic migrants in West Africa, though by the early 1990s there were signs that this pattern was reversing. Substantial numbers of West Africans from former French colonies seek work in the ex-colonial metropole. Indeed, the most significant movement out of the continent is from the Maghreb to France and other European countries bordering the Mediterranean Sea. South Africa has attracted labour flows from surrounding southern African states, and continues to do so. The other important movement is of refugees and displaced people — in the Horn of Africa and the Sudan; in Central Africa, including Burundi, Rwanda and Zaire; in southern Africa, particularly from Angola and Mozambique; and in West Africa, principally from Liberia and Sierra Leone.

South Asian countries have long been the source of migrant workers, traders and professionals, first through migration in the colonial period, then to former colonial metropoles, and more recently to East Asia and the Middle East. Bangladesh, India and Pakistan have also received large numbers of migrants and refugees, first as a consequence of the sub-continent’s partition, but more recently from Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Afghanistan,
respectively. The Afghan refugee population still remains substantial as renewed fighting in their country of origin has engendered new outflows and discouraged repatriation from Iran and Pakistan.

Significant new patterns of migration have recently emerged in South-East and East Asian countries as their economies have rapidly expanded. This has been reflected in a turnaround in migration policy for some countries and territories that have hitherto not admitted significant foreign labour. Having exhausted domestic sources of labour, Japan and the newly industrialized economies of Asia have turned to foreign workers. This has usually been tightly controlled, but as elsewhere has inevitably involved illegal migration and the prospect of permanent, if unacknowledged, settlement. Countries in the second wave of newly industrializing economies, such as Malaysia and Thailand, have also recently attracted much migration. Malaysia’s foreign population was estimated at one million in the early 1990s, when its total population was 18 million; about half the immigrants were estimated to be illegal entrants. Both Malaysia and Thailand are also sources of migrants moving within the region and beyond. The major sources of migrant labour for destinations both within the region and elsewhere are Indonesia, the Philippines and Viet Nam — although the flow of Vietnamese to communist bloc countries has reversed since the upheavals of 1989 (Vietnamese are now being recruited to new destinations). All of these countries also supply migrants, often professionals and business people, for permanent settlement in Australasia and North America. While Myanmar has emerged as a major source of refugee flows in the region, the outflow of Indochinese refugees has greatly diminished, and large repatriations have taken place. At the same time, the impending opening-up of China to emigration presents the prospect of great changes in migration patterns both in the region and beyond.

Mexico is the largest source of migrants in Latin America, with an estimated 3 million entering the United States in the 1980s. Colombia has been another major source of out-migration. Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela are the principal poles of attraction in Latin America, but there is also significant out-migration from Brazil. Migration from the Caribbean is now predominantly to the United States (and to a lesser extent Venezuela) rather than to former colonial metropoles, but there is also substantial migration within the region, particularly from Haiti to the Dominican Republic (which like others is a country of both immigration and emigration). With the exception of Haitians and to a lesser extent Cubans, refugee outflows have diminished in recent years.

Thus few areas of the world remain untouched by migration streams of one kind or another. While both economic migration and refugee movements have become major issues of public debate recently in the developed world, movements to these countries are proportionately much less than within the developing world — albeit among countries in the latter category of greatly varying economic development. Increasing constraints on migration to
traditional destinations such as Australia, Europe and North America may well accentuate this redistribution of migratory streams.

forms of international migration

Transformations in migration patterns are not only manifested in spatial terms. Global economic and political restructuring has also generated diverse and fluid types of migration and of migrant. Often as a result of government policies to halt, stem or curtail migration, forms of migration may transmute; people may enter as tourists, students or visitors, for example, but then illegally overstay, ask for asylum or seek permanent settlement.

Socio-economic differentiation is also sharpening among migrants. While movements of refugees and displaced people may include many of the world’s poor and powerless, migrants who are primarily economically motivated tend not to be the poorest of the poor, but those with the economic, social and cultural resources to move. Indeed, in the course of both voluntary and forced migrations, it is often the better-endowed who leave while the poorest are left behind. As was indicated above and is explored further below, migrants include increasing numbers of relatively well-off business people and professionals drawn from the world’s élites.

A further significant tendency gathering momentum is the “feminization of migration”, reflecting the increasing participation of women in all forms of migration and in all regions. Whereas in the past labour migration was largely of men, and women tended to feature mainly in family reunion movements, women now figure largely in labour migration, particularly as demand for service and domestic workers has risen. Women are also prominent in refugee movements: it is estimated that 80 per cent of refugees and displaced people are women and children, many of them living in female-headed households.

Finally, an upshot of increasing restrictions in the developed countries that have until recently been important destinations for many migrants has been and will continue to be burgeoning illegal migration — and the clandestine industry of recruiters, agents, touts and traffickers that service illegal or unofficial migratory flows. Driving migration into this nether-world again has profound implications for social integration and cohesion — not least the convergence of the migrant and the criminal worlds.
These changes in migration forms and migrant types are driven by two sets of forces. In the geo-political arena, as was noted above, contrary to expectations, the end of the Cold War has spawned new political pressures driving people to move. Resurgent ethnic, religious and nationalist forces have precipitated or emerged from the often violent disintegration of nation states or their reconstitution, adding to conflicts that are the detritus of the Cold War. Unwanted populations flee or are expelled, and dispersed populations regroup in the wake of the restructuring of nation states. These disintegrative trends are occurring not only in the former communist bloc, but are also being given impetus among former client states on the bloc’s periphery. The outcome has been large new involuntary migratory flows from these areas since the end of the Cold War, adding to the already large and often long-established refugee populations generated by Cold War-related conflicts in the developing world.

In the economic arena, temporary labour migration, often for short contracts of one or two years and mainly of young men, is being superseded by patterns of more permanent settlement, both as a result of states’ policies and of migrants’ own strategies. As economic restructuring has proceeded and accelerated in recent decades, demand for new primary labour migration has diminished in many industrialized countries — although the legacies of the previous period of immigration are very much present in them. In other countries, notably those of the Middle East and parts of South-East and East Asia, temporary contract migration is still very much the order of the day; indeed some governments have explicitly stated that they intend to avoid the “mistakes” of Europe and elsewhere in allowing permanent settlement of supposedly temporary workers. In such circumstances the scope for integrating migrants is of course limited, although even countries which are set against permanent settlement of migrants are likely to accumulate substantial long-term populations of illegal migrants.

At the same time, the role and position of migrants and settlers in developed or industrialized economies have become increasingly diverse and polarized, reflecting the decline of manufacturing employment, the growth of the service sector and casualization of employment. Many migrants entering through family reunion, as refugees or as illegals, are employed in low-paid service jobs with Third World-like conditions, often alongside redundant rust-belt workers from the established or long-settled community. It is often argued that developed economies would collapse without migrant labour in this “3-D” (dirty, dangerous, demanding) sector. Meanwhile a smaller number of highly qualified migrants are admitted temporarily or permanently to take up professional, technical and managerial positions. The immigrant manufacturing and construction worker has thus often given way to the poorly paid migrant service or domestic worker and the well-remunerated, transient or permanently settled professional. But for the majority the upshot of economic restructuring has been the segmentation of employment as people of migrant origin find themselves confined to certain
categories of employment from which they are unable to progress. This may have obvious negative implications for social integration and coherence.

**Return Migration**

This section has so far concentrated on the pressures generating forms of outward migration; but there are also smaller though significant streams of return migration worthy of consideration, which have particular consequences for socio-economic integration. “Repatriation”, “reintegration” and “reinsertion” constitute the vocabulary by which this form of movement is known. Distinctions may be drawn once more between internal and international migration; between voluntary migration or movement by choice and forced or involuntary migration; and between organized, instituted or facilitated repatriations and self-organized return movements set in motion by returnees themselves. Further distinctions may be drawn in terms of time — whether return is temporary or permanent, for example, has important implications for social integration.

As has already been noted, while circular, seasonal or temporary migration appears to be giving way to more permanent settlement in both rural-urban and international migratory contexts, these temporary forms are still important — and it is by no means impossible that they may experience a resurgence, especially if restrictions increase on both internal and international migration. Flight from the cities — or return to the countryside, known as “counter-urbanization” — is as yet largely a feature of the developed world, and of the more prosperous classes within it.

Turning to the distinction between voluntary and involuntary movements, there are four repatriation possibilities — voluntary return of voluntary or “economic” migrants; voluntary return or repatriation of refugees, displaced people or other forced migrants; forced return or repatriation of “economic” migrants; and forced repatriation of refugees.

Forms of return by choice by economic migrants include temporary returns such as visits and holidays, as well as permanent return of migrants after target earnings have been satisfied, or on retirement; with the exception perhaps of return for retirement, permanent return of migrants has tended to diminish as settlement in the country of migration has become more common — although this trend may not be irreversible. Voluntary return by refugees or displaced peoples may occur when the reason for flight is removed, as when a persecutory régime is overthrown, when a conflict is over or dies down, or when drought, famine or flood abates; such returns may be
officially instigated by governments or international agencies, or, more commonly, set in motion by returnees themselves. Less common, but also significant, are involuntary repatriations or expulsions of both economic migrants and refugees, individually as well as en masse; such expulsions range from mass departure by decree or order to softer versions under which life for the targeted group is made increasingly intolerable in the host country. Finally, migrants may return, by choice or involuntarily, to their home communities, stay a while, but then move on to some other new destination, thereby contributing to the formation of diaspora populations and transnational communities. These phenomena are discussed further below.
Shifting patterns of outward, return and onward migration have profound implications for social integration and present new challenges for policymakers. Consideration of the impact of migration on social integration prompts examination of the relationship between migrants and their “home” community or their country of origin, and between migrants and their “host” community or their country of destination. There is also a third nexus of relationships worthy of consideration, located between the country of origin and the country of destination, which might be termed the “transnational” arena. Each of these has social, economic and political dimensions, and each has contradictory implications for social integration.

Internal migrations of various kinds — rural to rural movements, rural-urban migration, displacement resulting from development and environmental change, and internal displacement because of conflict or persecution — have disintegrative but also potentially integrative dimensions. They may mark the disintegration of households and communities, but they may also generate new and wider forms of community. International migration likewise has both integrative and disintegrative dimensions, some of which have already been noted.

While the urban informal sector has shown an unexpected and extraordinary capacity to absorb newcomers, and may continue to do so, standards of living, the quality of life and life-chances or choices seem to be steadily
diminishing in many urban centres, particularly in the developing world. Squatter communities are becoming increasingly vulnerable to life-threatening pollution, fire, flood and poor sanitation. The deleterious implications for social integration are obvious. However, the impact of rural-urban migration on social integration is not all one-way. While out-migration appears inexorably damaging to the cohesiveness of rural communities, new forms of integration may be generated. As rural socio-economic networks grow weaker, those linking rural with urban communities grow stronger; ironically though, this may in turn further weaken social cohesion in the countryside, by lessening the risks associated with migrating to new locations and encouraging further out-movement.

Migration may not be wholly disintegrative at the household level; it may indeed be a conscious, purposive and collective household strategy for survival, insurance or getting ahead. Migration decisions are often made as part of a strategy to spread risk and ensure household survival; decisions may be driven by necessity but involve a greater or lesser degree of choice. The dominance in the past of migration by single men led to disintegrative trends in the communities they left behind, with the resulting preponderance in them of elderly males and the emergence of female-headed households. While in such contexts the demands placed on women’s labour time and resources were accentuated, in some cases, the absence of adult men has set in motion positive change, as some women were given the opportunity to take over decision-making and management roles hitherto dominated by men. Similarly, although the feminization of migration may have disintegrative impacts at the household level, it may also produce potentially liberating impacts on women migrants’ life chances and horizons (although the reality may of course be different, as with women drawn into urban prostitution).

Again on the positive side of the balance sheet, migrations may generate new forms of social interaction and knowledge. Migrants develop elaborate informal networks to facilitate migration and settlement. Seasoned migrants are seen as repositories of knowledge of other countries, developing the capacity to organize travel, find work and adapt to new environments; this “cultural capital” can be passed on, contributing to shared values and social coherence. Migrants’ informal networks draw on personal, household, family and kin relationships, wider friendship and community links, and an ethic of mutual aid and solidarity. Integration is best served when these links develop not just within migrant communities, but also with the established population (which of course may include former migrants); otherwise relations with them may be competitive or conflictual.
Global remittances approached 70 billion US dollars a year in the 1990s, representing a large proportion of world financial flows, second in value only to oil among aggregate international trade and financial transactions. Remittances have for long been essential components of many states’ foreign exchange earnings, a vulnerability exposed recently during the mass repatriation of migrant workers to Arab and Asian countries in the wake of the Gulf crisis.

The impact of remittances on economic development — or on human or social development — has long been a matter of debate; many observers challenge whether these financial resources are used productively, let alone equitably. Large amounts of remittances are certainly consumed in private necessities or in house building, and the living standards of those receiving remittances are thereby improved. Some economists argue that the impact of this in terms of economic growth is limited, pointing to the paucity of remittance investment in productive activity that stimulates local employment. Others point to the multiplier effects of construction activity, and its capacity to kick-start an ailing or stagnant economy. Arguments for the integrative impacts of such investment are perhaps harder to sustain, since the main beneficiaries are the households of migrants. However, other impacts have less equivocally positive impacts on social development and integration; among these are investment of remittance income in education and health services — including schools and hospitals, which benefit not just households with migrants as members, but the wider community. Such investment may help to reduce the pressures which have in the past impelled migration.

Remittances from migrants abroad or from migrants in the cities to their rural communities may thus help to alleviate poverty. But they do little to redress the imbalances between countries and may even reinforce them, since migrants are often the young, educated, able and resourceful people that developing countries need. Arguably, immigration fuelled Western Europe’s economic boom in the 1960s and that of the Gulf states in the 1970s and 1980s, while, on the whole, despite the impact of remittances, migrants’ regions of origin did not benefit as much as they might have done had migrants invested their skills at home. Such regions have lost many of their most skilled workers and professionals, and forgone the costs of training them; according to one United Nations Development Programme estimate, Africa lost one third of its highly educated labour in recent decades.
Most of the socio-economic consequences of migration are double-edged as far as social integration is concerned. The relationship between migration and development (and thus between migration and socio-economic integration) is not straightforward. Movements of professionals and students to industrialized countries may contribute to brain drain in developing countries, but may also encourage new links, technology transfer, and even create new kinds of communities. Similarly, migrants’ remittances may stimulate development in home areas, notably through construction and housing improvements and their multiplier effects. Migration to cities or abroad can thus stimulate growth at home; but this growth is not necessarily translated into development and certainly not into human development — on the contrary, quality of life may decline and disintegrative pressures may increase (see box on facing page).

Remittances are one manifestation of the continuing attachment of the migrant to his/her home community. Letters and messages, holidays and visits home might also be placed in this category. Some of the activities of migrants in the host country fulfils a similar purpose — the maintenance of cultural activities, the provision of country-of-origin language classes, the distribution and consumption of country-of-origin news media, and participation from abroad in the political activity of the homeland might be mentioned as relevant examples. All of these contribute to the continuing attachment — the long distance “integration” — of the migrant in the home community, and at the same time condition the “integration” of migrants in the host community.

models of migrant integration in host or destination societies

Different types of nation state give rise to different models of incorporation or integration of migrants. Openness to migration and settlement, the granting of citizenship and acceptance of cultural diversity can lead to the formation of ethnic communities within a multicultural or pluralistic society; indeed they are integral to such societies. Denial of settlement, refusal of
citizenship rights and rejection of diversity can lead to the formation of ethnic minorities, excluded and marginalized and perceived by the wider population as undesirable. Elements of these two ideal types are found among classical countries of immigration, among former colonial powers, among guest-worker régimes, and among the new destinations for migrants outlined above. But each of these régimes has recently been undergoing transformations which are resulting in a general convergence towards a hardening of barriers to new migration and settlement.

Immigration can and does present a fundamental challenge to established notions of national identity and integrity, for it poses a fundamental question: how are core values and identities to be maintained in a milieu of plural and disparate cultures and traditions? This involves “defining who is a citizen, how newcomers can become citizens and what citizenship means.” Such a challenge is particularly sensitive because of the other regional and global pressures that nation states confront in the closing years of this century. Immigration impacts on national integrity in three related ways — in the formation and transformation of rules of citizenship or membership, in the development and transformation of migration policy, and in the arena of national identity or self-image.

Three ideal types of citizenship can currently be identified. Under the “folk” or “ethnic” model, membership derives from (often idealized or imaginary) common descent, language and culture, often excluding migrant minorities from citizenship; Germany is perhaps closest to this model. In the “republican” model members adhere to constitutional rules which define citizenship and newcomers may be admitted provided they conform to these rules and assimilate; France conforms most closely to this model. In the third ideal type, the “multicultural” model, adherence to common values is required, but cultural difference is recognized and the formation of ethnic communities acknowledged as legitimate; Australia and Canada are the closest to this model, while Britain, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United States also share significant elements of it.

These models are neither static nor exclusive to a particular country. For example, three approaches to ethnic diversity might be identified in the United States — assimilation into a purportedly homogeneous Anglo-Celtic culture; fusing of different cultures in a “melting pot” to produce a new American identity; and maintenance of diverse cultures and identities within a pluralistic “salad bowl”. As well as encompassing diverse models of citizenship among its member states, the European Union features other kinds of diversity of citizenship: nationals of its member states are at the same time community or “EU nationals” who enjoy rights short of full citizenship in the EU countries to which they may move; outside these categories are “third country” nationals, some of whom may enjoy quasi- or limited citizenship. This type of partial membership has been termed “denizenship.” This diversity raises the question of whether democracies can sustain this differentiation for long, since they are ostensibly founded on
the principle that all members of civil society should belong to the political community. Migration is challenging this principle, as more migrants hold multiple identities, affiliation, membership or citizenship, so that citizenship itself may change in the direction of some form of what has been called “transnational citizenship”. This is discussed further below.

Immigration policy — which includes rules of entry, treatment of migrants and provision of services for newcomers — is intrinsically linked to different experiences of nation state formation and types of citizenship. Three types can be identified. The classical immigration countries, including the United States, Canada and Australia, have encouraged permanent settlement, treated migrants as future citizens, and allowed family reunion. Former colonial powers, like Britain, France and the Netherlands, have allowed former colonial subjects permanent settlement, citizenship and family reunion, while restricting these rights for other immigrants, some of whom nonetheless have been granted permanent settlement, family reunion and naturalization. Third are the “guest-worker” régimes, like Germany, Switzerland and many of the new destinations for migrants in Asia and the Middle East, that have tried to discourage permanent settlement and family reunion, and make naturalization very difficult. Like citizenship rules, these régimes are neither static nor exclusive. The same country may operate relatively liberal and restrictive policies in different circumstances. Moreover, policies are tending to converge, particularly in Europe, as the former colonial powers become as restrictive as the guest-worker régimes. This has occurred against the background of other developments — the emergence of a new status of EU national (see above) and the increase in the number of migrants seeking asylum from the South and East.

Consideration of types of citizenship and of immigration régimes yields three categories of immigration country and, by extension, national identity. In the “exclusionary” model — which often corresponds with the “folk” or “ethnic” model of citizenship described above — the nation is conceived as a community of common descent and unwilling to accept newcomers as members. Such countries restrict rights of residence, limit family reunion and make naturalization difficult. In the “assimilation” model — which may embrace the “republican” model of citizenship outlined above — people who have become members of civil society (through immigration or birth) may join the nation, but at the price of a degree of cultural assimilation. In the “multicultural” model, which includes the classical immigration countries but also some others, residence and acceptance of core shared values are the basis of membership of the nation, but with room allowed for cultural diversity.

It is of course not only state policies that determine the possibilities for and extent of integration of newcomers. The attitudes of host populations — which may and often do include many past migrants — to newcomers are highly significant in delineating the parameters of integration. Such attitudes may be in tune or out of step with prevalent state policies; they may shape
them, or may be shaped by those in power or aspiring to it. Growing racism and xenophobia — often manipulated by demagogic power-seekers, sometimes well-organized and with political power — have, in many countries with significant immigrant populations, recently reduced the scope for social integration and weakened states’ resolve to enhance it through administrative means.

Transformations in citizenship patterns, immigration policies and national self-image are also of course reflected in, as well as determined by, patterns of migrant activity and identity. As various “gates of entry” in states receiving migrants have successively been closed, migrants have sought other access; thus as temporary labour migration has diminished in many Western states, other means of entry have increasingly been used, such as family reunion, or, more controversially, asylum-seeking or illegal entry. The forms of entry help shape the possibilities for integration and the character of ethnic identity itself. The form and extent of integration are also conditioned by the presence or absence of strong, already existing ethnic communities or enclaves, and by the level of organization of community groups and of workplace or business associations. Changes in identity are apparent in long-settled communities of migrant origin. In recent years, assimilationist and multicultural notions of migrant identity appear to be giving way to the proliferation of “hyphenated” identities — the African-American, the Asian-Australian, the Vietnamese-Canadian, and so on — and even to new “hybrid”, diasporic identities and cultures, explored further below.

Diverse patterns of migrant integration can be generated by the impact of rules of citizenship or membership, immigration policy, perceptions of national identity, the composition and attitudes of the host (prior or established) community, and not least the activity of migrants themselves. The social psychologist, John Berry, has proposed a useful framework for considering the encounter between minority groups and a larger society, which he terms “acculturation”. He sees four possible outcomes from this encounter, determined by a minority’s relations with other groups, on the one hand, and the maintenance of cultural identity, on the other. Submersion within the dominant society he calls “assimilation”. Maintenance of identity, but with minimal relations with the larger society, he terms “separation” — or “segregation”, where it is imposed. “Marginalization” occurs when a group loses its own identity, but does not become part of the larger society. Finally, Berry defines “integration” to be participation in the larger society while maintaining self-identity. While suggested primarily for the investigation of psycho-social dimensions of the encounter between minorities and the larger society, this framework has a wider application, and points to issues of inclusion and exclusion considered in the next section.
Recent writings in sociology suggest that, in developed countries at least, a defining characteristic of societies in the 1990s is the exclusion of certain groups from society’s mainstream. It is argued that there is an essential division between the “two-thirds society”, comprising those included in society, in Galbraith’s “contented”, “comfortable” or “fortunate” majority, and the remaining one third that is excluded from it or rendered an underclass. The one third — Galbraith’s “functional underclass” — is marginalized in three interrelated ways: economically, through unemployment or low-status work that is insecure; socially, through poor education and vulnerability to crime, drugs and household disintegration; and politically, by their powerlessness to influence decision-making. This marginalization is very often manifested by ghettoization — various minorities living in particular localities in varying degrees of isolation from the rest of society. Migrants figure largely in these excluded communities, often suffering the additional irony of being blamed for the circumstances which render them excluded.

In the newly industrializing countries the “contented” may be smaller in number, and may indeed not yet constitute a majority, but society’s structure is heading in a similar direction in terms of consumption patterns, living standards, and civil and political rights for a significant portion of the population. At the same time an underclass is consolidating in the newly industrializing countries, partly composed of impoverished citizens, often migrants from the countryside, but increasingly also of foreign immigrants.

Not all migrants are locked into the underclass; indeed some are definitely included among the “contented”. Existing host communities in countries receiving migrants comprise not only (or no longer) the established or prior inhabitants (commonly themselves people of migrant origin who may have exterminated or displaced the aboriginal population), but long-settled and often well-established former migrants, who are now, incidentally and ironically, often opposed to newcomers. Migrant professionals or business persons from Brazil, India or Malaysia probably have more in common in terms of lifestyle and outlook with their counterparts in London, New York or Tokyo than with their compatriots in their towns or villages of origin. But, as Galbraith points out, the possibility of upward mobility for most migrants
into the ranks of the “contented” has largely disappeared, for the foreseeable future at least. Migrants are thus becoming perhaps quintessential post-industrial workers, servicing the consumption requirements of the “contented” majority in both old and newly industrialized political economies alike; they are integral, in this sense, to the functioning of these societies.

While much of the basis of inclusion and exclusion is located in social and economic structures, and is therefore not amenable to rapid change, the level of inclusion or exclusion may be ameliorated or exacerbated by states’ policies — by their interventions or their inactivity. Inclusion or improvement of the position of migrants may be enhanced through basic education, language and vocational training, and through legislation against discrimination and for equal opportunities. Australia, Canada and Sweden have perhaps the best records in these areas, while Britain, France and the Netherlands are implementing some of these measures. In the United States legislation for equal opportunities, against discrimination and for affirmative action, exists, but education and training measures are less prominent. In guest-worker régimes, such as Germany and Switzerland, education and training have until recently been largely labour market-oriented, rather than aimed at promoting social integration. Similar observations may be made of access to housing, welfare services and other social policies, and of measures to combat racism. Special social policies for immigrants linked to multicultural models have been pursued in Australia, Canada, the Netherlands and Sweden, with a view to promoting integration — although they have sometimes unintentionally resulted in segregation. Where the assimilationist model holds sway — as in France — social policies for immigrants are eschewed on the basis that special treatment militates against equality of citizenship. In the guest-worker régimes, there is little in the way of special social services (although as elsewhere these may be provided by non-governmental organizations), nor is there much anti-racist, anti-discrimination or affirmative action legislation — although governments in this category have pursued inconsistent policies.22
While some issues relating to integration are common to both outward and return migration, others are specific to the situation of returning migrants. The degree and ease of returnee reintegration depend on the circumstances of return; the extent to which links with the home community have been sustained while abroad; the returnees’ demographic and socio-economic status, and the resources that can be called upon; and, not least, the state of the society that receives the returnees.

The circumstances of return were touched upon above. The implications for integration in the country of return hinge on the degree of choice in the process of return, and hence whether or not it is planned, or at least the extent to which it is anticipated. Reintegration also depends on the volume and timing of migrants’ return: individual or small-scale returns, continuous but manageable streams, or unanticipated, massive and sudden returns each have different impacts on societies receiving returnees. Sudden, massive repatriations can have potentially profound disintegrative effects on the societies experiencing them, although in the longer term all impacts may not be negative.

The second set of factors — the extent to which links with the home community have been sustained while abroad — was also noted above. These “transactions with home” contribute to the continuing attachment — the long distance “integration” — of the migrant to the home community, and their presence or absence conditions their reintegration on return. Ease of reintegration also depends on migrants’ length of stay abroad, their stage in the lifecycle, their socio-economic status and their access to resources on return. Those long abroad may find it difficult to reintegrate, especially the children of returnees or those born and raised abroad; this may raise issues of what constitutes “home” for these so-called returnees. Socio-economic status and available resources — brought back, previously invested or mobilizable on return — have a strong bearing on the degree and speed of reintegration.

Finally, and not least, reintegration hinges on the capacity of the society of return to accommodate the returnees. Much depends on that society’s security and stability, the state of its economy, and its capacity to mobilize resources (internally or from abroad) to assist or facilitate reintegration. At the community or household level, much depends on the presence of extended families, kin or co-ethnics in the communities receiving returnees.
It is often assumed that returning migrants — both economic migrant returnees and refugee repatriates — will fare reasonably well if they are received by their extended families. It is not safe, however, to make such an assumption, for although the extended family has almost universally demonstrated great capacity to absorb returnees, even in emergencies, its capacity to do so is not unlimited. Accommodation is not without great strains, cost and pain for the members of extended families — and may sometimes lead to their disintegration.

The third nexus of relationships with implications for social integration identified in the introduction to this section is located at the transnational level. As indicated above, migrations may contribute to the emergence or consolidation of transnational communities or diasporas which transcend allegiance to a single home; these feature networks which contribute to the construction of transnational “homes” or communities. Integration with or within the community of migrant origin or the community of migrant settlement may thus give way to a new form of “transnational” integration — that of the diaspora.

Social and ethnic groups which have experienced uprooting perhaps illustrate this most clearly. For example, while Ugandan Asians expelled by President Idi Amin consolidated their presence in their new European or North American homes, the basis of a transnational community was also established or extended. Indeed, before the expulsion from Uganda, as Asians generally had grown less secure in East Africa, they had developed a form of transnational insurance: “the most highly skilled would try to go to North America; the other working family members would head for Britain; while the old, the retired and the wealthy would probably decide to return to India or Pakistan”.34 Palestinians, overseas Chinese, and other diaspora populations have also developed such intricate networks.

The emergence of transnational populations maintaining links with several “homes” has been noted in other contexts. Striking a chord with Tinker’s depiction of the dispersal strategy of East African Asians, Stark contemplates what he calls the “portfolio” strategy of migrant households:
“migration decisions are ordered by family needs for stable income levels, provided by a diversified portfolio of labourers, both male and female, and the need to insure the family’s well-being”. This perspective may be overly economistic, overstating the notion of “family as firm”, but it facilitates understanding of the formation of some transnational populations and of decision-making among them. Other recent commentary casts this phenomenon in different terms. Baubock sees multiple membership in different societies deriving from migration as a decisive contribution to what he calls the “slow emergence of interstate societies”.

Arguably, such populations are emerging as a new form of migrant, with roots not in a particular community, but in transnational social space. Like national identity, collective transnational identity is imagined; it may have a cultural manifestation, but it may also have a material basis in diaspora or transnational networks. Acknowledgement of the emergence of this pattern of migration and type of migrant points to a somewhat heretical conclusion: that populations without a definitive “home” but with multifarious global links and forms of integration may well be better placed than people with more conventional roots in the face of world economic restructuring and of nation state disintegration and reconstitution. In other words, such populations might be well advised to maintain or extend their diaspora or transnational character than to diminish it by commitment to a single homeland, however appealing the notion of such a “home” may seem.
part 3: conclusion: reconciling the contradictions between migration and integration

The paradox of today’s migration is that it is — or may be — both integrative and disintegrative, at different levels and locations, and sometimes simultaneously. Migration may have disintegrative effects on migrants’ communities of origin and on the communities accommodating them; at best the local impact on both sending and receiving communities may be ambiguous. At the same time, migration, particularly between countries and regions, may have an integrative effect, both contributing to and a consequence of the tendency towards globalization. It is regrettably the disintegrative features of migration that have held sway in public debate and, with exceptions, among policy makers — not least, perhaps, because it is one among several current challenges to national identity and to the integrity of the nation state.

Most commentators recognize that migration cannot be wholly controlled, is here to stay and will have to be lived with, and ideas of how to make it more manageable are increasingly discussed. A particular policy trend that has emerged recently is that of the mitigation of migratory pressures or, more controversially, their containment. In economic terms this may mean the direction of assistance towards the source of migrant flows (both internal and international) in a bid to contain them. However, recent experience suggests that such aid may stimulate rather than stem migration in the short term by raising potential migrants’ expectations and by enhancing the resources they need to migrate. Containment of refugee movements has meant the direction of assistance to keep the displaced within or near arenas of conflict, giving rise to discussion of controversial notions of safe zones, countries or regions; from the point of view of developed countries increasingly hostile to new migration, such measures conveniently obviate the need for asylum or third country resettlement. Such policies have serious implications for the integrity of communities in which would-be migrants and refugees are contained, since they increase the internal pressures on such communities and remove the “safety valve” function of out-migration.

Whatever polices are devised, there remain a number of seemingly intractable contradictions surrounding migration and social integration. On one hand, as indicated above, increased migration looks inevitable given the growing pressures worldwide for people to move and the impossibility of complete regulation of such movement; states will therefore have to learn to
live with or make the best of both internal and international migration. On the other hand, constraints on the absorption of migrants — political, economic and not least ecological — are growing inexorably. Such contradictions are paralleled at the nation state level by the simultaneous breakdown of some borders and the reinforcement of others. The upshot of these contradictory trends is likely to be greatly increased illegal migration, with many disintegrative implications, and the bringing into play of more alternative destinations — making for more migration, for example, within East and South-East Asia, until these new destinations shut their doors, as indeed some are already beginning to do. A further contradiction, this time in the moral arena, is that between the right to move and the rights of newcomers on the one hand, and on the other the right of host, prior or established communities (which as noted above may often include former migrants) to determine who may join them. The right of the greatest free movement possible (or the greatest possible choice as to whether to move or stay put) has to be balanced against the right of a community to determine its own composition and values.

Those who take the perspective of the state and see migration largely as a threat have elevated to pre-eminence the rights of the host, prior or established community; some have exploited their fears. On the other hand, liberal commentators and the advocates of migrants’ and refugees’ rights have focused attention on the rights of newcomers and migrants — understandably and rightly, since in many cases migrants have unjustly been denied such rights. But the perspective of the host population — in both countries of migrants’ destination and communities to which they return — perhaps also needs to be given greater consideration among those who aspire to pluralistic, tolerant and multicultural societies. In liberal considerations of migration the host population tends to be seen implicitly as an entity to be badgered or cajoled from its at best stubbornly inert position into accepting newcomers, or at worst its overtly racist, hostile and violent stance against accommodating them. This does injustice to the fund of goodwill that most host communities hold, and which, provided that principles of justice and equity are upheld, they will usually extend. A perspective which is more sympathetic to the legitimate concerns of the host population may help counteract those in power and aspirants to it, who play upon the fears of host, prior or established communities.

As this paper has shown, migration raises issues of social, political and economic participation that have a profound bearing on social integration and cohesion. Not least are the issues of equity raised by the outcomes of migration. While migration may have increased the life-chances and fostered the integration of some, economic and political restructuring has resulted in the social, political and economic marginalization of many other migrants, deepening the gulf between those “included” and those “excluded”. Most migrants’ social and political integration in their host society is not commensurate with their economic participation, which is manifested in
their generally positive — and arguably essential — contribution to the host economy.

Ostensibly, democracies are founded on the principle that all members of civil society should belong to the political community. Migration is challenging this principle in two ways, one negative, the other creative. As has been shown above, migrants form a significant proportion of the politically, socially and economically excluded underclass in the advanced countries, and increasingly in newly industrializing societies. At the same time, more and more migrants hold multiple identities, affiliation, membership or citizenship, so that such affiliation itself may change in the direction of some form of “transnational” citizenship; such persons may well find themselves to be advantaged over those with a single affiliation as globalization accelerates.
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1. This section draws on UNFPA (1993, pp. 11-15).
6. This section on the spatial dimensions of migration draws on UNFPA (1993, pp. 16-20), Castles and Miller (1993, pp. 5-8), UNHCR (1993), USCR (1993).
11. See Stalker (1994) for a recent restatement of this argument.
15. The following draws on Castles and Miller (1993, pp. 39-40, 196-198 and 223-227).
21. See, for example, Bach (1993).
30. See Böhning and Schloeter-Paredes (1994).
31. See, for example, Ascencio (1990).