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Working Paper Does Federally-Funded Job Training Work? Nonexperimental Estimates of WIA Training Impacts Using Longitudinal Data on Workers and Firms

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Does Federally-Funded Job Training Work? Nonexperimental Estimates of WIA Training Impacts Using Longitudinal Data on Workers and Firms

Abstract

We study the job training provided under the US Workforce Investment Act (WIA) to adults and dislocated workers in two states. Our substantive contributions center on impacts estimated non-experimentally using administrative data. These impacts compare WIA participants who do and do not receive training. In addition to the usual impacts on earnings and employment, we link our state data to the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) data at the US Census Bureau, which allows us to estimate impacts on the characteristics of the firms at which participants find employment. We find moderate positive impacts on employment, earnings and desirable firm characteristics for adults, but not for dislocated workers. Our primary methodological contribution consists of assessing the value of the additional conditioning information provided by the LEHD relative to the data available in state Unemployment Insurance (UI) earnings records. We find that value to be zero.

JEL-Codes: I380, J080, J240.

Keywords: job training, active labor market program, program evaluation, Workforce Investment Act, administrative data.

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1. Introduction

Experimental evaluations of large-scale active labor market programs have great value, but occur mostly in the United States and, even there, only rarely. In other times, in other places, and for many other programs, both policymakers and scholars must continue to rely on non-experimental evaluations.¹ As such, improving our stock of non-experimental evidence based on current methods and the best available data, as well as continuing to advance the methodological frontier, have great value. In that spirit, this paper provides new substantive findings on the training provided under the Workforce Investment Act (WIA), until recently the largest federal employment and training program in the US.² We also provide important new evidence on several open methodological questions in the literature.³

Our first substantive contribution consists of estimating the earnings and employment impacts of receiving WIA training (and possibly other services) rather than just WIA non-training services using administrative data from two states. Building on the rich set of relevant conditioning variables in our data, particularly the pre-program labor market outcomes shown by the literature to matter in this context, most of our estimates rely on a "selection on observed variables"

¹ Experiments have issues too; see e.g. Heckman and Smith (1995), Heckman et al. (1999) and Rothstein and von Wachter (2015).

 $^{^2}$ The Census Bureau initially granted us access to the data for 15 months. Because of the complexity of the data, the large amount of data cleaning it required, the lags inherent in the important process of review and disclosure of results, and the coordination delays associated with four authors at different institutions (only one of whom had access to the data), we were not able to complete all of our analysis during that time interval. Census Bureau policy provides for extensions of access when a paper receives a "revise and resubmit" from a refereed journal; we hope to complete our analyses at that time.

³ Relatively recent reviews of this literature include Lalonde (1995), Friedlander et al. (1997), Heckman et al. (1999), King (2004), Bergemann and van den Berg (2008), Holzer (2009), Card et al. (2010), Heinrich and King (2010), Decker (2011), Barnow and Smith (2016) and McCall, Smith and Wunsch (2016).

identification strategy. Moreover, because we focus on the impact of service type conditional on WIA participation, rather than the impact of WIA versus no WIA that receives most of the attention in the literature, we do not have to worry about selection into WIA, just selection into training conditional on selection into WIA. Our data, and the WIA institutional setup, suggest that this constitutes a less challenging identification problem.

More broadly, we read the literature that uses experiments as benchmarks to study the performance of alternative non-experimental sources of identification as indicating that high quality non-experimental evaluations, where quality refers to *both* data and methods, can successfully replicate the broad conclusions obtained with experimental methods. See in particular the evidence on the importance of what goes in the conditioning set in Heckman et al. (1998) and the comparison of experimental and high quality (mostly European) non-experimental evaluations in the meta-analysis of Card et al. (2010). The US-focused meta-analysis of Greenberg et al. (2006) reaches a similar conclusion.

Our preferred estimates show positive, substantively relevant and statistically significant impacts of WIA training on earnings and employment over the 12 calendar quarters following WIA registration for workers served under the adult funding stream. In contrast, for workers served under the dislocated worker funding stream, we find persistently negative impacts in one state and initially negative and later marginally positive impacts in the other. These findings parallel those in earlier work by Heinrich et al. (2013) and Hollenbeck (2009). Though they comport with the literature, they nonetheless represent a puzzle, as the characteristics of the workers served by the two streams do not differ as dramatically as their impact estimates. These estimates have important implications for efforts at program reform and for decisions about which registrants should receive scarce training opportunities.

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For our second (and most innovative) substantive contribution, we estimate impacts on the types of firms at which WIA participants obtain jobs. We can do this because, for the first time in the literature, we link administrative data from the WIA programs in our two states to the rich Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) data maintained by the US Census Bureau. Motivating this analysis is the well-known fact that, controlling for worker characteristics, employer characteristics contribute importantly to worker earnings and other employer outcomes; see e.g. Abowd and Kramarz (2002), Andersson et al. (2005) and Holzer et al. (2011). If WIA and other training programs can improve the quality of the firms to which workers are "matched," then we have identified an important mechanism through which job training programs might work, over and above their effects on the worker's stock of human capital. At the same time, we may have increased our worries about upward bias in partial equilibrium impact estimates due to displacement. Empirically, our data yield quite modest positive impacts of WIA training on the propensity of adult workers to get jobs at firms with desirable characteristics and some small negative impacts on the parallel propensity for dislocated workers.

Our final substantive contribution centers on our analysis of the determinants of training receipt conditional on WIA registration. We find standard patterns for age and schooling, with younger workers more likely to receive training, along with those in the middle of the educational distribution. These patterns appear in both our univariate and multivariate analyses, and suggest that WIA allocates training in reasonable ways along these dimensions. In contrast, we find large unconditional differences by race / ethnicity but only very small conditional differences. Here, our multivariate analysis sheds important light on the source of univariate disparities.

Our primary methodological contribution lies in the examination of alternative sets of conditioning variables in the context of our preferred "selection on observed variables" identification strategy. Once again, the greatest novelty arises in our examination of variables related to the firm at which the worker last worked prior to WIA participation. We expected, based on the literature, that firm characteristics might proxy for otherwise unobserved worker characteristics and so have an effect on our estimates by reducing any remaining selection bias. In fact, we find to our surprise that the firm characteristics add essentially no value to the conditioning variables available from state UI wage record data. We also examine the value of conditioning on an additional year of pre-program earnings data relative to Heinrich et al. (2013) and the value of conditioning on a proxy for local labor markets. The former does not move the estimates, somewhat to our surprise. In contrast, local labor markets do matter.

Our second methodological contribution arises from comparing our estimates based on "selection on observed variables" with estimates based on the (conditional) bias stability assumption, which underlies difference-in-differences estimators. Broadly, we find little qualitative difference, which suggests either little selection into training based on time invariant unobserved variables or that the pre-program outcomes in our conditioning set do an adequate job of capturing stable factors like motivation and ability that we do not directly observe.

The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Sections 2 and 3 describe the WIA program and our data, respectively. Section 4 defines the treatment, and Sections 5 and 6 lay out our identification strategies and the econometric estimators that build upon them. Sections 7-9 present our empirical findings on the determinants of training receipt, as well as impacts on earnings, employment and firm characteristics. Section 10 considers the sensitivity of the

estimates to alternative identification strategies. Section 11 embeds our findings in a cost-benefit framework and Section 12 concludes.

2. The WIA program

The Workforce Investment Act (WIA) was passed by Congress and signed into law by President Clinton in 1998, and became operational in 1999-2000; Besharov and Cottingham (2011) provide a detailed history. It was replaced in 2015 by the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act (WIOA). As noted in Barnow and Smith (2016), WIOA changes very little of substance relative to WIA, with the implication that our findings should generalize to the new program.

Title I of WIA provided general funding streams for services to adults, dislocated workers, and youth. Adults comprise individuals 18 years and over meeting various broad criteria. Dislocated workers comprise adults who have recently lost a job or are about to lose a job. WIA youth programs serve in-school and out-of-school youth ages 18-21. The target populations for these three streams partly overlap; in particular, almost all clients served as dislocated workers could be served as adults while some adult clients could be served as dislocated workers.⁴ In fiscal year 2011, these three streams received just \$2.8B in funds, a dramatic decline in real dollars relative to peak funding for federal job training in 1980 (Holzer, 2009). Because youth receive different services from other participants, we restrict our attention, and our data, to individuals served under the adult and dislocated worker programs.

⁴ As noted in Barnow and Smith (2016), the DOL provided surprisingly vague eligibility rules. Caseworkers assigned individuals eligible for both the adult stream and the dislocated worker stream to one or the other based on their employment histories and on the funds remaining in the two streams.

Participation in WIA often begins at a "one-stop" office. These offices aim to (and sometimes actually do) provide workers with access to a variety of programs including WIA, Unemployment Insurance (UI) and the US Employment Service (ES) in a single location. Workers may find the one-stop on their own or via a referral from another agency or service provider. Unlike some European programs, WIA participants enroll as volunteers. As described in Blank et al. (2011), WIA-funded services for adults and dislocated workers fall into four categories: self-service core services, staff-assisted core services, intensive services and training services. Recipients of self-service core services typically use computers or other resources related to job search and do not formally register for the program. As a result, they do not appear in our data. Staff-assisted core services (hereinafter just core services) consist of low-intensity interventions such as assisted job search or provision of labor market information. Intensive services include assessment, case management, and short courses in topics not specific to a particular occupation such as anger management. Finally, training services include basic skills training, classroom training in occupational skills (CT-OS) and subsidized on-the-job training at private firms; as shown in e.g. Table II-12 of Social Policy Research Associates (2005), the vast majority (over 85 percent in 2003) receive CT-OS. WIA explicitly imposes no eligibility rules on core services. Low-income individuals and individuals on public assistance receive priority for intensive and training services but WIA imposes no income-based eligibility rules (Blank et al. 2011).

Individual Training Accounts (ITA) fund most training under WIA; on-the-job training constitutes the key exception. ITAs represent vouchers that participants can use to purchase training at certain providers; King and Barnow (2011) document the provider pre-approval process and its variation over time and space. In addition to restrictions on providers and on

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expenditures, participants typically make their decision in consultation with a caseworker, who may encourage some choices and discourage (or even prohibit) others. This feature of WIA also varies widely in implementation; see e.g. Perez-Johnson et al. (2011) and Van Horn and Fichtner (2011). While caseworkers affect the services offered to WIA enrollees, they do not, unlike some of their European counterparts, have the power to sanction participants. Most of the training funded under ITAs consists of relatively short occupational training courses provided by community colleges, other non-profit institutions or (less often) by for-profit providers.

Normatively, WIA participants follow a path from core services to intensive services to training, where each succeeding step only occurs when the prior step fails to yield employment. In practice, as described in e.g. D'Amico et al. (2004), there exists tremendous variation across states, across local offices (called WIBs for Workforce Investment Boards) within states, and even across caseworkers within WIBs, as well as over time at all of these levels, in how registrants select into specific services including training. Some states structure their programs to train almost everyone who registers. Others, as documented for Wisconsin in Almandsmith et al. (2006), rely in part on the information provided by the Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services (WPRS) system, which includes predictions of likely benefit exhaustion or benefit receipt duration among UI claimants. Other states, including the states in our study, have a more ad hoc approach. Some claimants follow the normative sequence while others do not, perhaps because they have a referral from a training provider or because a caseworker identifies job skills as their key deficiency. Exhibit II-1 in D'Amico et al. (2009) illustrates this type of system. Even those enrollees who follow the normative sequence typically do so relatively quickly, i.e. over a few days or weeks rather than many months as in some European programs, which lessens concerns about dynamic selection.

Lurking in the background of this complex and hetereneous program we find the WIA performance management system. This system provides rewards and punishments to states and WIBs primarily on the basis of the measured outcome levels of registrants. Through its focus on outcomes rather than value-added it may lead to "cream-skimming" (i.e. selection based on expected labor market performance) at the registration stage as well as leading WIBs to focus expensive training services on those they deem unlikely to realize good labor market outcomes without them.⁵

3. Data

3.1 Data

Despite a substantial recruiting effort on our part and despite offering what amounts to a free evaluation of the state's WIA training program, we obtained the cooperation, and thus the data, of only two states. One, State A, is a medium-sized state on the Atlantic seaboard; the other, State B, is a large, Midwestern state.⁶

Individual records from the Workforce Investment Act Standard Record Data (WIASRD) constitute our first major data source. The WIASRD files contain data on every individual who

⁵ For more on the tainted glories of the WIA performance system, see e.g. Barnow and Smith (2004), Barnow (2011), and Heckman et al. (2011).

⁶ Our recruiting performance parallels that of Heinrich et al. (2013) but on a smaller scale. They attempted to recruit all 50 states with the assistance of the US Department of Labor and ended up with 12. We attempted to recruit nine without the formal assistance of the US Department of Labor and ended up with two. In both cases, none of the participating states would allow public links between state-level impacts and state identities.

registered for WIA services in each state.⁷ For each registrant, the micro data contain the following: dates of WIA registration and exit, location of WIA service receipt, demographics (including age, education, race and sex), membership in certain categories (e.g. disabled or veteran), specific services received (with starting and ending dates in state A), and employment and earnings for quarters before and after services were received, drawn from state Unemployment Insurance (UI) records.

The Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) Data constitutes our other primary data source. State Unemployment Insurance (UI) wage records sit at the core of these data. These records consist of quarterly reports filed by employers for each individual in covered employment, which includes roughly 96% of private non-farm wage and salary employment (Stevens 2007). The LEHD data is matched to the long-form Decennial Census data, from which we obtain basic demographic information including date of birth, place of birth, sex and a crude measure of race and ethnicity.

In addition to the large samples and long earnings histories, the matched employer data represents a marquee advantage of the LEHD data. It enables us to observe several important fixed and time-varying characteristics of workers and their firms. For workers, these include a measure of overall experience and job tenure with each employer; for firms, they include industry, firm size, average earnings paid per quarter, and measures of turnover. Furthermore, LEHD researchers have estimated person and firm "fixed effects" based on the quarterly earnings for each; see e.g. Abowd et al. (2002).

⁷ See http://www.doleta.gov/Performance/results/Reports.cfm?#wiastann for tabulations of the WIASRD data. These reports are tabulated each year for DOL by Social Policy Research Associates (SPRA) and appear on DOL's website as SPRA reports.

We limit our WIASRD data to all program participants in each state who registered between 1999 and 2005, with a valid exit date. The Census Bureau matched the individuals in this group to the LEHD. For each individual included in the data, we retain employment and earnings in the LEHD data for 25 calendar quarters including the quarter of registration and 12 quarters before and after that quarter. We adjust the earnings values into 2008 constant dollars using the CPI-U-RS. Characteristics of employers, including industry, size and turnover rates, refer to the last employer prior to registration (when used as conditioning variables) and to the last employer in our data (when used as outcomes). Appendix 1 provides more details about the LEHD and the construction of our sample as well as variable definitions.

In all, we have a total of over 26,000 WIA registrants for state A, with nearly 16,000 in the adult program and nearly 11,000 among the dislocated; comparable sample sizes for state B are over 50,000 for the state, with 23,000 and 28,000 in the adult and dislocated streams, respectively.

3.2 Descriptive statistics

Tables 1 and 2 describe our samples of WIA registrants. Table 1 presents a subset of our conditioning variables (registration year, sex, race / ethnicity, age and education), while Table 2 presents quarterly earnings and employment. Statistics on the remaining variables used in the analysis appear in Appendix Table A-3.

In terms of timing, roughly three-fourths of the sample registered during the labor market downturn in 2001-03, but the sample also includes many participants before and after that period. Overall, the patterns in our two states broadly comport with the national WIASRD summaries published by DOL for the years 2001-05. In terms of who receives training and who does not, Table 1 reveals several important patterns: First, in both states and for both funding streams, whites have a higher probability of receiving training than non-whites. Second, women receive more training among adults while men receive more among the dislocated. Third, WIA participants in the middle of the education distribution (i.e. those with high school or some college) receive training more often in both funding streams. Fourth, relatively younger participants differentially sort into training.

At least some of these distinctions make sense in terms of who might make a good candidate for an investment in skills training. For instance, as in the standard human capital model, training likely makes more sense for younger workers, who have a longer time horizon over which to realize the returns from their investment. As suggested in Jacobson et al. (2003), workers in the middle of the education distribution likely have the basic skills to master somewhat technical occupational training, while those with less than high school may lack them. At the same time, workers with a college education likely already have sufficient skills or will learn what they need on the job, as in Barron et al. (1997).

The quarterly earnings and employment data tabulated in Table 2 and graphed in Figures 1 and 2 also has stories to tell. We focus on three patterns here: First, in both states, WIA participants served as dislocated workers have substantially higher pre-program mean earnings and employment than those served as adults. This signals that even the relatively vague eligibility rules for the dislocated funding stream have real-world bite. Second, particularly in State A, trainees have about the same earnings as non-trainees within each funding stream. This suggests relatively little selection into training based on time-invariant outcome differences, consistent with our finding that impact estimates based on difference-in-differences methods differ little from those based on cross-sectional methods. Third, the mean earnings and employment of WIA participants in our states decline in the period leading up to registration. This literature calls this

oft-observed pattern the Ashenfelter (1978) dip; see also Heckman and Smith (1999). In this population, the dip begins about four quarters prior to registration. The dip indicates strong selection *into WIA* based on transitory outcome shocks but the quite modest differences in the nature and extent of the dip between trainees and non-trainees within each funding stream and state suggest little selection *into training* based on differences in transitory labor market shocks among registrants, especially in State A.

4. Treatment and the parameter of interest

This study compares WIA participants who receive training, and perhaps also core and/or intensive services, to WIA participants who receive only core and/or intensive services. Our estimates, combined with data on costs, allow us to determine whether the additional resources spent on training services, on average, have labor market effects that cover their costs. This represents an important policy question; the wide divergence across states in the fraction of WIA participants receiving training documented in Heinrich et al. (2013) suggests that policymakers do not perceive a clear consensus on this question in the literature.

As shown in Table 1, many WIA participants in both our states and both funding streams receive training, and many do not. Median WIA enrollment duration for trainees is around three quarters in State A and around 4 quarters in State B. In contrast, the median enrollment duration for registrants receiving only core and/or intensive services is typically about a quarter shorter. These values provide only a crude (and upward biased for most registrants) guide to treatment intensity for several reasons, including data quality issues (e.g. we observe large spikes in enrollment durations at particular values in one state), the potential for strategic manipulation for performance management reasons as in Courty and Marschke (2004), and because training

participants may have to wait for a course to start and may also receive job search assistance following training completion.

Unlike Hollenbeck (2009) and Heinrich et al. (2013), we do not attempt to estimate the impact of participating in WIA versus not participating, instead leaving this question to future work. We prioritized the training analysis because we think it represents a simpler non-experimental evaluation problem. First, WIA core/intensive participants represent a natural comparison group for trainees in a way that ES recipients and/or UI claimants do not for all WIA participants. Second, given the common earnings patterns for trainees and non-trainees shown in Table 2, combined with the substantial amount of caseworker discretion and local heterogeneity in the WIA program, we think that a selection on observed variables identification strategy has greater plausibility in the training context. Finally, focusing on training allows us to avoid difficult questions of temporal alignment that arise when comparing WIA enrollees to other groups.

To represent our parameter of interest more formally, consider the standard potential outcomes framework wherein Y_1 denotes the treated outcome, in this case the outcome with training and Y_0 denotes the outcome without training. In the usual jargon, we estimate the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATET) given by $E(Y_1 - Y_0 | D = 1)$, where D = 1 indicates receipt of WIA training. When combined with data on the average incremental cost of training, the ATET allows the analyst to perform a cost-benefit analysis on the training for the trainees who currently receive it. We do not purport to provide evidence on the effect of training on those not currently receiving it.⁸

5. Identification

5.1 Conditional independence

Our primary identification strategy builds on the conditional (mean) independence assumption (CIA) and assumes that, conditional on a set of observed characteristics *X*, the untreated outcome does not depend on treatment status. The literature also calls this "selection on observed variables." Informally, this identification strategy assumes we can condition our way out of the problem of non-random selection into training among WIA enrollees. In notation, we assume $E(Y_0 | X, D = 1) = E(Y_0 | X, D = 0)$. In words, we assume that, conditional on the correct collection of conditioning variables, treatment is mean independent of the untreated outcome. This (very strong) assumption suffices to identify the ATET of training in our context; we offer a defense of it shortly. Following standard practice in the literature we match on the scalar propensity score, which in our context corresponds to the conditional probability of training receipt given WIA enrollment. In notation, the propensity score equals P(X) = Pr(D = 1 | X). Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that if the CIA holds for *X* then a version based on the propensity score holds as well, i.e. $E(Y_0 | P(X), D = 1) = E(Y_0 | P(X), D = 0)$. We estimate the

⁸ We applied the dynamic treatment effects framework introduced in Sianesi (2004) and Fredriksson and Johansson (2008) and recently considered in detail by Biewen et al. (2014). Because, unlike many European programs, nearly all trainees start training in the quarter of WIA registration or (less often) the following quarter, and because we lack the data to proceed at the monthly rather than the quarterly level, this analysis did not add much to what we report here.

propensity score using a flexible probit model, promising to increase its flexibility (but not too quickly!) on that magic day when our sample size increases.

For the CIA to hold in practice requires that *X* include all the variables that affect both training receipt and outcomes in the absence of training receipt – a tall order, indeed! Many researchers implicitly adopt the view that there exists a benevolent identification deity that ensures that the available data always include some set of covariates that lead the CIA to hold, so that no justification of the conditioning variables is required. We do not hold this view. Instead, we find it helpful to think about what we know from theory, the institutional context, and existing empirical evidence about the determinants of training participation and of labor market outcomes in this population, list the desired conditioning variables they imply, and then argue that our data do (or do not) contain them and/or reasonable proxies for them.

The first thing to recognize about this institutional context is that it is a two-sided selection problem. In order for training to happen, the WIA participant has to want training and the WIA caseworker has to want to give them training. WIA participants' desires for training will depend on things like their perception of the job market for their current skill set, their age, their motivation, their ability to learn in a classroom setting (and their disutility from doing so), their beliefs about the value of training on offer in their community, the availability of government transfers or helpful family members to provide the basics of life during training, and so on. Many of these factors, such as motivation, ability and inclination to learn, and the market value of their skills, also affect outcomes in the absence of training. Indeed, the short-term outcome in the absence of training represents the opportunity cost of training. The caseworker will have beliefs about all these factors as well. In addition, the caseworker will have information about the budget set of the local WIB and about local training providers. We observe some of these variables directly, such as age and the most recent industry of employment, and so can enter them into the conditioning set. For others, such as motivation and ability, we have to rely on proxies; in our case, realized pre-program labor market outcomes serve as the proxies. Motivated workers, and high ability workers, should do persistently well in the labor market; if so, conditioning on earlier labor market outcomes will remove any selection bias that results from motivation and ability also helping to determine training receipt. The extant literature clearly shows the importance of conditioning on pre-program labor market outcomes; it is less clear about whether they can serve as all or just part of a successful identification strategy. In addition to lagged outcomes, we can use geographic indicators to proxy for both the state of the local economy as well as differences in local training emphasis, opportunity, and quality.

The broader literature claims that we have most of what we need. In particular, the important study of Lechner and Wunsch (2013) compares alternative sets of conditioning variables in the context of über-rich German administrative data and identifies those that solve the selection problem in their context.⁹ Of the variables they identify, we lack variables related to family status, part-time work, occupation in last job and more detailed information on past qualifications than the simple years of schooling variable present in our data. Also worth noting are variables that do not make a difference in their study, which include firm characteristics (just as we find below), industry- and occupation-specific experience, health-related variables, openness to mobility and various caseworker-related variables, job-search behavior, and local labor markets. Along this same line, Caliendo and Mitnik (2013) link survey data on various non-cognitive skills to the German administrative data and find that they do not make a

 $^{^{9}}$ This list includes control variable sets 0-6 and 8a in their Table 2; see also the discussion in their Section 5.3.

difference to their impact estimates. While we advocate further work along the lines of Lechner and Wunsch (2013) and Caliendo and Mitnik (2013) and we generalize from Germany to the US only very cautiously, these studies increase our confidence in our identification strategy and in the conclusions we draw from comparing estimates based on different conditioning variables.

We consider six different sets of conditioning variables *X*.¹⁰ Model 1, inspired by Dehejia and Wahba (1999, 2002), contains only sex, race, age, education and two calendar years of preenrollment earnings. It serves as a minimalist baseline that incorporates only variables available in commonly used datasets such as the US Current Population Survey. Our prior, given the performance of similar specifications in other contexts in Smith and Todd (2005) and Heckman et al. (1997, Table 6a), is that this conditioning set does not suffice for the CIA.

Model 2 represents our approximation of the specification employed in Heinrich et al. (2013), but leaving aside indicators for geographic location. Relative to Model 1, it includes calendar year and calendar quarter indicators, a more flexible age specification, disability and veteran status indicators, flexible employment and earnings histories over the eight calendar quarters prior to registration including the industry of the most recent employer, and UI benefit receipt and Employment Service (ES) participation over the same period.

Model 3 adds indicator variables for the local one-stop office at which the participant enrolled. These approximately represent indicators for counties. Model 4 adds a range of characteristics of the firms for which each worker most recently worked, including indicators for quintiles of the

¹⁰ Table A-4 gives the exact specification for each model and the corresponding estimates. In choosing the specifications we did not undertake a formal regime of balance tests but instead relied on the literature plus informal tests of balance in pre-program earnings; we intend to do a more formal analysis when we again have access to the data. There are no issues of common support for any of the specifications.

firm "fixed effect" from the LEHD, which captures the firm wage premium after conditioning on various firm and worker characteristics (with a separate category for those not employed in the pre-program period). Model 4 also adds variables related to worker turnover at the most recent employer, as well as firm size and proportion of low wage workers.

Model 5 conditions on an extra four quarters of pre-program earnings and employment information relative to Model 3. Finally, Model 6, our preferred specification, starts with Model 3 and adds both the LEHD firm variables included in Model 4 and the additional quarters of preprogram earnings included in Model 5 to create one grand propensity score model.

To evaluate the importance of including particular variables in the conditioning set, we compare the non-experimental impacts they imply because we do not have an experimental benchmark. This strategy, which loosely says that if you keep adding conditioning variables and the estimates do not change, then probably you have solved the selection problem, is not an uncommon one in the literature; see e.g. Black, Daniel and Smith (2005, Tables 2-4).¹¹ Heckman and Navarro-Lozano (2004) provide a very useful formalization of this strategy that makes clear that it requires the absence of a variable or variables affecting both treatment and outcomes unrelated to the conditioning sets under consideration; see also Oster (2013). We cannot rule this out with certainty, but we think it is implausible, as we have trouble thinking of variables that would affect post-program labor market outcomes while not affecting the pre-program outcomes we condition on.

5.2 Conditional bias stability

¹¹ From the narrower perspective of whether or not it passes a researcher cost-benefit test to go to the time and trouble of linking to the LEHD for the additional conditioning variables it provides, what really matters is whether the estimates change rather than their bias.

The conditional Bias Stability Assumption (BSA) assumes that unconfoundness holds but only conditional on a person-specific fixed effect. Put differently, BSA assumes that the available conditioning variables do not suffice to solve the selection problem on their own, but do suffice once the fixed effect has been removed, as we do by differencing. The propensity score version of the BSA corresponds to:

$$E(Y_{0t} - Y_{0t'} | P(X), D = 1) = E(Y_{0t} - Y_{0t'} | P(X), D = 0)$$

where *t* denotes an "after" period and *t'* denotes a "before" period. Written in this way the BSA is sometimes called the "common trends" assumption, as it implies that, conditional on *X*, the mean of the untreated outcome has the same time trend for the treated and untreated units. See e.g. Heckman et al. (1998), Rosenbaum (2001) or Lechner (2010) for more on the BSA.

Substantively, the motivation for the BSA relative to the CIA comes from the concern that some relatively stable unobserved characteristic, such as ability or motivation or attractiveness, may persistently affect labor market outcomes, but not get fully captured by conditioning on the available pre-program labor market outcomes. The literature suggests that this issue may arise in some contexts but not others. For example, Smith and Todd (2005) find that difference-in-differences matching, motivated by the BSA, comes closer to the experimental estimates in the context of the National Supported Work (NSW) Demonstration data studied in LaLonde (1986) than does cross-sectional matching motivated by the CIA, but argue that it largely solves problems related to using different outcome measures for the treated and untreated units as well as severe geographic mismatch. In contrast, while Heckman and Smith (1999) find selection on transitory shocks to labor market outcomes and on persistent differences in the unconditional earnings patterns in the National Job Training Partnership Act Study data, they find no strong

differences between their cross-sectional and conditional difference-in-differences estimates, indicating that conditioning on pre-program outcomes suffices in that context to capture the notdirectly-observed time invariant characteristics. Chabé-Ferret (2015) compares matching estimators motivated by the CIA and the BSA and describes the earnings processes under which each estimator performs better. Given the uncertain state of the literature, we examine estimators based on the BSA in addition to our preferred estimation strategy based on the CIA.

6. Estimation

The literature offers a wide variety of estimators for use with our identification strategies. In this paper, we employ inverse propensity weighting (IPW) for both the estimates that assume "selection on observed variables" and those that assume bias stability. As in Smith and Todd (2005), in the first case, we use an outcome level as the dependent variable, in the second case the "post" minus "pre" difference in outcomes. Appendix 3 justifies our choice of estimators, and provides implementation details and estimates using alternative estimators.

7. Results: determinants of training receipt

Tables 3a to 3d present average derivatives for select covariates from propensity score Model 6 described in Section 5.1; estimates for the other models, and for the remaining covariates in Model 6, are discussed in Appendix 2 and appear in Appendix Table A-4. As we do throughout the paper, we present completely separate estimates for each funding stream (i.e. adult and dislocated worker) in each state.

Many of the univariate differences between trainees and non-trainees prove robust to conditioning. In particular, differences in the incidence of training by age (younger participants get more) and education (participants in the middle of the education distribution get more)

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generally persist as we enrich the conditioning set. The large unconditional differences we observe by race represent the partial exception to this broader pattern. In the models with the richest covariate sets the conditional difference falls dramatically.

8. Results: impacts on earnings and employment

8.1 Full sample

Tables 4a and 4b present estimates from Model 6, our preferred specification, obtained using our preferred IPW estimators.¹² In each table, we present impacts on earnings and employment for the first 12 calendar quarters after registration. We also present two summary measures of earnings impacts: the sum over all 12 quarters and the sum over quarters 9-12. The latter measure completely avoids the "lock-in" period when trainees are receiving training.

Our estimates display several important patterns. First, in both states and both streams we observe lock-in effects in the form of negative impacts in the initial quarters after WIA registration. This results from trainees reducing or eliminating job search during their training while the comparison group actively engages the job market during and after their receipt of core and/or intensive services. Second, we find for both states and streams that the quarterly impacts gradually increase until they appear to stabilize, usually around eight quarters after registration.

Third, we find substantively important and surprisingly large differences in impacts between the adult and dislocated worker funding streams. In State A, the impacts for adults stabilize around \$300 per quarter while those for dislocated workers stabilize at around -\$150; similarly, in State

¹² When we regain access to the data, we will add a line for the reweighted comparison group to Figures 1 and 2, providing a graphical display of the temporal pattern of the impacts.

B the adults stabilize at \$450 or so while the dislocated workers, who start out with large negative impacts, have positive and significant impacts of over \$300 in the last two quarters of the data. Given that essentially all the dislocated worker participants could have received services under the adult funding stream and that many of the adults could have received services under the dislocated worker stream, this difference puzzles us.¹³ Fourth, the employment impacts track the earnings impacts except for the dislocated worker stream in State A, where negative earnings impacts in later quarters coincide with positive employment impacts, suggesting that training in State A leads to lower-paying jobs but more of them. Fifth, we find modest differences across states, with larger impacts in State B than in State A for both funding streams.

8.2 Men and women

As discussed in e.g. LaLonde (1995) and Greenberg et al. (2003), earlier evaluations of employment and training programs in the US have typically found larger impacts for women than for men. Table 5 presents separate estimates for men and women in our context for the two cumulative earnings impact measures: one for quarters 9-12 and one for all 12 calendar quarters after registration. The point estimates for the adult stream match the usual finding, with women having larger impacts than men over the full 12 quarters. However, the close similarity of the estimates for men and women in the four final quarters suggests that the overall difference derives mainly from differences in opportunity cost, with men giving up higher earnings while in training. In contrast, for the dislocated worker stream, women have more negative impacts overall but, as with the adult stream, a much smaller difference in quarters 9 to 12. None of these

¹³ We plan to explore these differences in depth in future work.

differences attain conventional levels of statistical significance. Given the lack of clear evidence of impact differences, we pool men and women in our remaining analyses.¹⁴

8.3 Comparisons to the literature

How do our findings comport with those in Heinrich et al. (2013) and Hollenbeck (2009)? Though they provide similar analyses, we should note a few differences. First, the different studies look at different states. Our states do not constitute a proper subset of those considered in Heinrich et al. (2013) nor is Indiana, the state considered by Hollenbeck (2009), one of our two states. Second, the time periods differ, with Heinrich et al. (2013) considering participants who exited between July 2003 and June 2007, and Hollenbeck (2009) considering exits from program year 2006. Third, though both studies assume a selection on observed variables identification strategy and rely on administrative data for the conditioning variables, the exact propensity score specifications and matching / weighting estimators differ in the details. Finally, Hollenbeck (2009) measures outcomes relative to program exit rather than relative to registration.¹⁵

Figures 5 and 8 of Heinrich et al. (2013) present estimates of the impact of training versus core / intensive services for adults and dislocated workers, respectively. They pool the data from the states in their analysis but present separate impacts for men and women. At a broad level, they find the same patterns that we do, including a substantial lock-in effect in the initial quarters (other than male adults), impacts that increase in relative time and then stabilize (other than male adults), slightly more positive impacts for women than men, and much more positive impacts for adults than for dislocated workers. As shown in their Table 4, in their WIA versus no-WIA

¹⁴ We also produced subgroup estimates broken down by race/ethnicity and by years of schooling. We did not observe substantively important impact differences for these subgroups.
¹⁵ In an e-mail, Kevin Hollenbeck indicated that this choice did not make much difference.

analysis they also find cross-state variation in impacts, which lends some support to our finding of differential impacts of WIA training versus core / intensive services in our two states.

Hollenbeck (2009) focuses almost exclusively on WIA versus no-WIA treatment effects; the sole exception comes in his Table 6, where he separately compares WIA training to no-WIA and WIA-without-training to no-WIA. The difference between these provides an indirect estimate of the impact of training versus core/intensive. Read this way, for adults he finds surprisingly large employment effects of around 10 percentage points in Q+3 and Q+7, along with modest earnings effects of around \$450. For dislocated workers, he finds negative employment effects of about 2-3 percentage points combined with positive earnings effects of about \$150. The information he provides does not allow the calculation of standard errors for these estimates.

In sum, our estimates generally tell the same stories about WIA training impacts as other studies applying roughly the same methods to similar data in other times and places. Perhaps most importantly, our brief sojourn into the literature strongly suggests that the poor performance of the displaced worker stream does not represent an anomaly that affects only one or two states.

9. Results: Firm characteristics

From a long list of possible (and interesting!) candidate firm-related outcomes, we confine ourselves to just six to avoid concerns about multiple comparisons. We chose our six based on the prior literature and before looking at any impact estimates. Three of our outcome measures relate to the firm "fixed effect" contained in the LEHD data. These fixed effects, described in detail in Abowd and Kramarz (1999), condition on fixed effects of the workers as well as some firm characteristics, and so represent a relatively clean measure of firm "quality". We include three outcomes related to the fixed effect: (1) an indicator for having a job at a firm with a fixed

effect above the median; (2) an indicator for having no available firm fixed effect, which implies either having no job in the twelve calendar quarters after registration or only jobs at firms with fewer than 25 employees; and (3) the (continuous) firm fixed effect itself. Note that we code the first indicator as zero for observations with the second indicator equal to one, so that both indicators are defined for all sample members. As a result, we do not have to deal with selection into employment (or employment at a firm with at least 25 workers) when analyzing those variables. When using the continuous fixed effect as an outcome, we simply drop the observations without a fixed effect; the resulting selection problem, a non-trivial one given the treatment effects on employment described above, renders the corresponding estimates merely suggestive.

Our fourth firm-related outcome consists of an indicator for working at a firm with at least 100 employees. A large literature, e.g. Brown et al. (1990), links firm size and compensation levels. The fifth measure consists of an indicator for working at a high turnover firm, defined as having a turnover rate above the median, as the literature has found that employment at high turnover firms is systematically associated with lower compensation (Holzer et al., 2004). The sixth measure indicates a change in industries between the last pre-registration employer and the last post-registration employer. This last represents an ambiguous measure in the sense that changing industries may represent a good thing, as when moving from a declining to a growing industry, or a bad thing, due to leaving behind industry-specific human capital, or some combination of the two. As with the indicators related to the firm fixed effects, for all three of these variables we code workers without post-registration employment as zeros. Andersson et al. (2005) and Holzer et al. (2011) provide evidence on the correlations among the firm-related variables in the LEHD.

All six measures refer to the last firm that employed the worker in our 12 quarters of postregistration data. While WIA might arguably have the largest direct effect on the first firm with which the worker matches, we thought it more important to focus on longer-run outcomes. By looking at the last firm we may capture the result of a sequence of jobs induced by the program, while missing potentially promising job matches that end quickly.

Tables 6a and 6b present impacts on the firm-related outcomes. For adults, the pattern of point estimates shows a desirable effect on every outcome measure (e.g. a higher probability of working at a high fixed effect firm, a lower probability of working at a high turnover firm and so on). In State A, the effects are all quite small and not statistically different from zero. In State B, we find larger, though still modest, effects, some of which attain conventional levels of statistical significance. Given the earnings impacts presented above, it will perhaps not startle the reader to learn that the estimates for dislocated workers tell a more negative story. In both states, all of the point estimates on the variables related to the firm fixed effect, as well as the firm size and turnover indicators, suggest that training leads workers to worse firms on average, though in this case none of the estimates differ statistically from zero.

In regard to the more ambiguous industry switching outcome, we find positive and substantively large impacts for adults in State B and dislocated workers in both states, with a fairly precise zero impact for adults in State A. Though the data speak louder about switching industries than about any of the other firm outcomes we examine, they do not speak clearly, both in the sense of imprecision and in the sense that it is hard to interpret these impacts when they coincide with moves to better firms (measured both in terms of earnings and other characteristics) for adults and to worse firms for dislocated workers.

How should we think about these estimates? First, we can think about them as illustrating mechanisms through which WIA generates impacts on earnings. Larger firms pay higher wages; for adults, WIA training generates earnings impacts in part because trainees get jobs at larger firms. Second, we can think about them as providing information relative to the likely duration of impacts. The literature on worker-firm matches suggests that the more frequent placements at larger, lower turnover firms likely bodes well for the persistence of the adult impacts we find. Third, we can think about them as informative of the potential for general equilibrium effects, particularly displacement, to lead our partial equilibrium estimates to overstate the social benefits of WIA training. If WIA training only changes who gets the "good jobs" at the larger, lower turnover, higher fixed effect firms, then it may have some equity benefits, but it will not increase efficiency. Finally, the firm fixed effects results have an ambiguous interpretation to the extent that higher wages mean fewer other forms of remuneration, e.g. lower fringes or less pleasant work, as in a compensating differences world, rather than functioning as a one-dimensional measure of overall firm quality as in the standard search literature.

10. Results: Alternative identification strategies

10.1. CIA with alternative conditioning sets

This section addresses one of our primary questions of interest: does having information on the firms at which WIA participants worked prior to participation move the estimates relative to the conditioning variables available only from the union of the WIASRD and UI administrative datasets? It does so by comparing estimates obtained with propensity scores containing the sets of conditioning variables described in Section 5.1. Doing so also allows us to address other substantive questions from the literature related to the value of administrative data from UI

records, to the number of years of pre-program earnings to condition on and to the importance of local labor markets.¹⁶

Table 7 presents the impact estimates associated with the different specifications. To save space, we focus solely on the aggregated impacts for the 12 quarters after enrollment and for quarters 9-12 after enrollment. The estimates differ substantially between the rather sparse specification of Model 1 and the richer conditioning sets in the other models. In the case of the adults, Model 1 produces less positive estimates while in the case of the dislocated workers they turn out more negative. Given our earlier arguments regarding the variables required for credibility of the CIA, we interpret these differences as bias. Thus, in substantive terms, we conclude that producing credible impact estimates for WIA training requires (at least) conditioning relatively flexibly on the information available from the UI administrative data.

The data also provide pretty clear responses to the other substantive questions that motivated our investigation of alternative specifications. The value of investing in obtaining the firm variables from the LEHD to use as conditioning variables shows up in the differences in estimates, if any, between Model 4 and Model 3 and between Model 6 and Model 5. In all but one case, those differences turn out quite minor indeed. For example, looking at the sum of earnings over Q+9 to Q+12, the changes are quite small (just eight dollars in one case) except for dislocated workers in State A. The additional firm variables in the LEHD data clearly do not pass a researcher costbenefit test in this context based on what they add in terms of the credibility of the CIA.

¹⁶ Appendix Table A-5 presents the correlation matrix of the six sets of propensity scores. Consistent with our estimated impacts, the scores from Models 1 and 2 differ both from each other and from Models 3 to 6, while the correlations among Models 3 to 6 all exceed 0.99.

A comparison of Model 5 with Model 4 provides evidence on the importance of adding an additional year of quarterly pre-program earnings (from Q-9 to Q-12) to the conditioning set we modeled on that of Heinrich et al. (2013). In our data, the additional year of quarterly earnings barely moves the estimates. We conclude that the additional pre-program earnings variables do not add anything to the credibility of the CIA in this context.

Finally, a comparison of Model 3 with Model 2 signals the value of adding indicators for the local one-stop at which the participant enrolled in WIA. As noted above, we interpret these primarily as indicators for local labor markets. Our states each contain multiple urban labor markets as well as rural ones. As a result, we expected these variables to matter, though the ambivalent findings in the literature muted our prior: while e.g. Heckman et al. (1998) and Friedlander and Robins (1995) find that local labor markets matter a lot, Dolton and Smith (2011) do not. In our data, even given the conditioning already present in Model 2, additional conditioning on local labor markets moves the impact estimates substantially. This finding reflects substantial geographic heterogeneity in training receipt within our states.

10.2 Conditional bias stability

Table 8 presents the estimates that assume conditional bias stability. We again report estimates for two after periods: Q+1 to Q+12 and Q+9 to Q+12. In both cases, we use the symmetric preprogram period as the before period for the difference-in-differences estimator; that is, we use Q-1 to Q-12 as the before period in the first case and Q-9 to Q-12 in the second case. An alternative strategy would avoid the Ashenfelter dip by using Q-9 to Q-12 as the before period in both cases; Heckman and Smith (1999) document that grave problems result from including the period of the dip in their context. We do not adopt this alternative strategy here due to the lack of apparent selection into training based on transitory shocks shown in Figure 1.

Somewhat to our surprise, the difference-in-differences estimates in Table 8 differ only modestly from the cross-sectional estimates discussed above and shown in Table 6. The impacts are just a bit more positive among the dislocated in both states. This similarity suggests that our conditioning variables do a very fine job indeed of capturing time-invariant differences in outcome levels between the trainees and the non-trainees in our sample of WIA enrollees.

11. WIA Costs and benefits

This section performs relatively crude cost-benefit calculations for WIA training versus no training using our preferred estimates from Table 4; using the estimates from Table 8 does not change the qualitative story. The relatively low average social costs of core and intensive services imply that our qualitative conclusions roughly generalize to WIA versus no WIA for the trainees. Before presenting the results of our calculations we briefly discuss several issues that arise when performing them.¹⁷

First, WIA, like JTPA before it, stands out for its lack of serious data on program costs. As such, we use two quite different values for the costs, neither of them particularly satisfactory as an estimate of the difference in average social costs between WIA registrants who receive training and those who do not. The lower value of \$2500 draws on the Heinberg et al. (2005) and Heinrich et al. (2011). Heinberg et al. (2005) present estimates of the unit costs (to WIA, and in earlier dollars) of training in three states, two of which likely face lower costs than those in our

¹⁷ See e.g. Bloom et al. (1997), Heckman et al. (1999, Section 10.1), Schochet et al. (2006), and Hollenbeck (2012) for more detailed discussions.

study. Heinrich et al. (2012) cites average direct cost (to WIA) values for the twelve states in their study. Their numbers correspond to all WIA participants (i.e. to WIA services versus no WIA services), rather than to WIA trainees versus WIA non-trainees, which implies a modest upward bias. On the other hand, their number omits the large public subsidy implicit in the prices that WIA programs pay community colleges for training courses, which implies a large downward bias. Taken together, we view this value as a lower bound on the true difference in social costs.

The higher value of \$7500 draws on Table 4 in Hollenbeck (2012). It reflects data from Washington State on the cost of providing career and technical education inclusive of the large state subsidies to the community colleges providing the training. We have trimmed down Hollenbeck's numbers a bit to account for the fact that we seek the difference in costs between training and other services, rather than the difference between training and no services, and because receiving training from WIA may reduce the costs to the public of subsidized training provided via other programs (e.g. Pell grants). Our calculations assume that all direct costs occur in the first quarter following enrollment.

Second, our data limit us to estimating impacts for 12 quarters following WIA enrollment. Yet the impacts of WIA training may last far longer than that. The literature has too few studies with long-term follow-up data to confidently sort out what factors predict persistent impacts; Smith (2011) and Greenberg et al. (2004) provide further discussion. To account for the uncertainty about the persistence of the impacts, our calculations embody three scenarios: (1) zero impacts after the data run out; (2) the impacts in Q+12 persist for an additional eight quarters then fall to zero; and (3) the impacts in Q+12 continue indefinitely.

Third, we need to say something about the social discount rate and the marginal social cost of public funds (MSCPF). We follow Heckman et al. (1999) and use 0.05 and 0.10 as annual discount rates; these rates bracket the 0.07 rate called for in US Office of Management and Budget (1992). The MSCPF includes the direct costs of operating the tax system (e.g. the IRS) and the lost output due to the use of distortionary rather than lump-sum taxes. Estimates of the MSCPF vary widely across studies; see Auerbach and Hines (2002) and Dahlby (2008) for overviews. To account for this variability, we consider values of 1.00, 1.25 and 1.50, where e.g. 1.25 means that each dollar of government funds costs society \$1.25 in output.

Finally, our cost-benefit calculations omit both general equilibrium effects and effects on outcomes other than earnings. General equilibrium effects can result from displacement, wherein the trained worker takes a job that otherwise would have gone to someone else (who is likely not in our comparison group) or from changes in relative skill prices. We expect our failure to consider equilibrium effects to lead us to overstate the social benefits of WIA training; see e.g. Lise et al. (2004) or Cahuc and Le Barbanchon (2010) for more on these issues. Effects on other outcomes, such as crime or the well-being of children could in principal go either way; for example, Job Corps' negative effects on crime represent a large portion of its benefits, as shown in Schochet et al. (2008), while Morris and Michalopoulos (2003) find that Canada's Self-Sufficiency Project had mixed effects on child outcomes that depend on child age. On net, we think our failure (a direct result of the limitations imposed by our data) to take other outcomes into consideration likely leads us to understate the social benefits of WIA training. Though it would make life easier for us and for the reader, the literature provides no reason for thinking the biases from these two omissions cancel each other out.
With all the foregoing in mind, turn now to Tables 9a and 9b, which present the results of our calculations for State A and State B, respectively. In each table, the first column indicates the assumed duration of the program impacts, the second the assumed MSCPF, and the third the assumed discount rate. The next two present discounted net present values per participant from the perspective of society for adults and dislocated workers assuming \$2500 in direct costs, while the final two columns repeat the exercise under the assumption of \$7500 in direct costs.

For the adult stream, the assumptions make a difference. In both states, the adult stream always passes a cost-benefit test when the impacts last forever and never passes when the benefits last only three years. When the benefits last five years, it passes only under the most optimistic assumptions about the discount rate and MSCPF. On the other hand (and not at all surprisingly given the impact estimates) the dislocated worker stream essentially never passes a cost-benefit test except for State B under the optimistic assumption that program impacts never fade out and even then only for certain low values of the discount rate and MSCPF.

12. Conclusions

Our examination of the impacts of receiving WIA training rather than solely core and/or intensive services in two anonymous states has yielded a wealth of important findings both substantive and methodological. We start by reviewing our substantive findings.

We find reasonable differences in probabilities of training as a function of age and education. Substantial unconditional differences by race largely, but not entirely, disappear with conditioning. Our preferred estimates indicate positive earnings and employment effects for the adult funding stream and mostly negative estimates for the dislocated worker stream. This difference, for which we currently lack a good explanation, parallels findings in the broader literature and represents an important (and highly policy-relevant) open question in this area. Surprisingly, we do not find statistically different impacts for men and women, though our point estimates generally show larger impacts for women, in line with the literature. Using the linked LEHD data, we find modest impacts on the characteristics of firms where workers get jobs, in directions consistent with the impacts on earnings. We also find modest impacts for most groups on switching industries relative to the last pre-WIA employer. The impacts on firm characteristics illustrate one mechanism through which WIA training affects earnings, but also raise concerns about general equilibrium effects. Our estimates imply that training provided to WIA registrants in the dislocated worker programs in our states does not pass a social costbenefit test, while training provided to adult registrants does so only when the impacts extend beyond our data and, even then, only under certain assumptions regarding discount rates and the marginal social cost of public funds.

Our data cover WIA participants who entered the program between 1999 and 2005, inclusive, in two states. To what extent would we expect our findings to generalize to later years under WIA and WIOA and/or to other states and countries? Temporally, the institutional framework of WIA did not change much between 2005 and the advent of WIOA in 2015. As noted above, it did not change much when WIOA replaced WIA either. As such, external validity over time hinges on changes in the participant population and on changes in program impacts with the business cycle. Published WIASRD data show some important changes in the participant population since 2005. For one thing, the sizes of the adult and dislocated enrollee populations grew quite dramatically during the Great Recession; in program years 2001-05, the adults and dislocated worker populations nationwide average about 230,000 and 185,000 respectively. But in PY 2006 the number of adults rose to over 500,000, and in PY 2009 it rose to over 1.1 million. During the

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Great Recession, the WIA population contained relatively fewer minority, less-educated and/or low-earning workers. Given our finding of no substantively important subgroup differences by sex, race or education, changes in the mix of participants along these variables should not lead to concerns about generalizability. The literature – see Lechner and Wunsch (2009) and Heinrich and Mueser (2014) and the references therein – suggests that partial equilibrium impacts of active labor market programs increase modestly during downturns for some groups. Finally, expanding the scale of the program dramatically, as was done with WIA via the "stimulus" at the start of the Great Recession, may change the nature of any general equilibrium effects, on which point one could tell stories in either direction, and may result (in the short run) in reduced attention to matching registrants to training due to inexperienced caseworkers and a desire to serve many registrants quickly, leading to lower impacts.

Spatially, while Barnow and King (2005) and D'Amico et al. (2009) show that WIA implementation varied meaningfully among states, the broad institutional commonalities as well as the similarity of our findings to those in the Heinrich et al. (2013) paper for many other states lead us to think that our results generalize to other states in the aggregate and, with more uncertainty, to other individual states, particularly in periods outside the height of the Great Recession. We would not generalize our substantive findings to other countries, due to large differences in data and active labor market program institutions.

On the methodological side, our most important (and, to us, surprising) conclusion is that adding variables related to the last employer prior to WIA participation to the conditioning set does not budge our "selection on observed variables" estimates. Nor does adding an additional four quarters of lagged earnings move the estimates. In contrast, conditioning on indicators for local labor markets does move the estimates. In our view, these findings complement (rather than just

repeating) those from the analyses by Biewen et al. (2014), Caliendo and Mitnik (2013), and Lechner and Wunsch (2013) in the (rather different) German institutional and data context.

Comparing our cross-sectional estimates to the difference-in-differences estimates also shows little qualitative change, suggesting either that selection into training occurs mainly on something other than relatively time-invariant differences in labor market performance and/or that the conditioning set available in the UI administrative data does a good job of capturing the time invariant differences that matter. While further research linking the UI administrative data to other data sets that would provide alternative conditioning variables, such as psychometric tests, information on other household members and more detailed educational histories remains of great value, we think that taken together, our methodological findings suggest that current practice, as embodied particularly in this paper and in Heinrich et al. (2013), likely removes much of the bias for this estimand.

We conclude with a final point on evaluation policy: why does the federal government, which provides the funding for WIA, not require states to cooperate with serious, policy-relevant research efforts in exchange? In our view, important opportunities for program improvement via research remain largely unexploited because current law allows state administrators too much leeway in restricting access to data over privacy concerns that are not always compelling. We would like to see this change in the future.

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TABLE 1a: Descriptive Statistics for Characteristics, State A

		Ad	lult	Dislo	cated
	-	Treated	Untreated	Treated	Untreated
Year of Registration	1999	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	2000	0.08	0.11	0.07	0.08
	2001	0.32	0.31	0.24	0.28
	2002	0.23	0.26	0.28	0.28
	2003	0.20	0.17	0.28	0.19
	2004	0.11	0.09	0.09	0.13
	2005	0.06	0.06	0.04	0.05
Sex	Male	0.38	0.41	0.44	0.40
Race	White	0.36	0.24	0.51	0.47
	Other	0.06	0.07	0.09	0.12
	Black	0.58	0.70	0.40	0.41
Age at Registration (years)		35.32	36.20	42.01	42.65
Age at Registration	<20	0.08	0.08	0.01	0.01
	21-25	0.17	0.16	0.05	0.05
	26-30	0.14	0.13	0.08	0.08
	31-35	0.14	0.13	0.13	0.12
	36-40	0.14	0.14	0.17	0.15
	41-45	0.12	0.14	0.18	0.18
	46-50	0.09	0.10	0.16	0.16
	51-55	0.06	0.07	0.12	0.13
	56-60	0.03	0.04	0.07	0.08
	61+	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.03
Education	Less than High School	0.10	0.25	0.04	0.08
	High School	0.60	0.54	0.53	0.43
	Some College	0.20	0.11	0.24	0.23
	College or More	0.09	0.08	0.20	0.25
	Missing	0.01	0.03	0.00	0.02

TABLE 1b: Descriptive Statistics for Characteristics, State B

		Ad	lult	Dislo	cated
	-	Ireated	Untreated	Ireated	Untreated
Year of Registration	1999	0.07	0.04	0.08	0.05
	2000	0.09	0.12	0.09	0.11
	2001	0.26	0.25	0.26	0.25
	2002	0.30	0.22	0.32	0.25
	2003	0.20	0.20	0.19	0.18
	2004	0.08	0.14	0.06	0.13
	2005	0.01	0.03	0.00	0.02
Sex	Male	0.37	0.41	0.57	0.52
Race	White	0.48	0.22	0.72	0.46
	Other	0.11	0.20	0.14	0.23
	Black	0.40	0.57	0.14	0.32
Age at Registration (years)		33.10	35.73	40.60	42.66
Age at Registration	<20	0.07	0.05	0.01	0.01
	21-25	0.22	0.17	0.06	0.06
	26-30	0.18	0.15	0.11	0.09
	31-35	0.15	0.14	0.14	0.11
	36-40	0.13	0.14	0.16	0.14
	41-45	0.10	0.13	0.18	0.18
	46-50	0.07	0.10	0.16	0.18
	51-55	0.04	0.06	0.11	0.14
	56-60	0.02	0.03	0.05	0.08
	61+	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02
Education	Less than High School	0.11	0.22	0.05	0.13
	High School	0.58	0.49	0.53	0.51
	Some College	0.24	0.22	0.24	0.23
	College or More	0.07	0.08	0.18	0.12
	Missing	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

TABLE 2a: Descriptive Statistics for Earnings & Employment, State A

	Adult				Dislocated			
	Trea	ted	Untre	ated	Trea	ted	Untre	ated
Number of Participants	464	40	108	392	434	47	648	39
	Earnings	Employment	Earnings	Employment	Earnings	Employment	Earnings	Employment
t-12	3120	0.57	3117	0.55	6408	0.72	6406	0.70
t-11	3248	0.58	3173	0.56	6718	0.74	6670	0.72
t-10	3223	0.59	3271	0.57	6760	0.74	6853	0.73
t-9	3391	0.60	3353	0.58	6993	0.75	7064	0.74
t-8	3386	0.61	3341	0.59	7059	0.76	7120	0.74
t-7	3549	0.62	3472	0.61	7309	0.78	7491	0.78
t-6	3518	0.63	3480	0.61	7461	0.80	7632	0.79
t-5	3559	0.63	3544	0.61	7644	0.81	7865	0.80
t-4	3558	0.64	3431	0.62	7753	0.82	7766	0.81
t-3	3557	0.64	3218	0.60	7806	0.83	7723	0.81
t-2	3364	0.63	3018	0.59	7449	0.80	7558	0.80
t-1	2877	0.60	2682	0.58	6610	0.75	6576	0.73
t	1942	0.55	2150	0.64	3985	0.57	3845	0.58
t+1	2072	0.58	2879	0.69	2658	0.49	3758	0.60
t+2	2796	0.65	3353	0.70	3457	0.60	4883	0.69
t+3	3381	0.68	3575	0.70	4228	0.65	5390	0.72
t+4	3678	0.69	3631	0.69	4713	0.68	5479	0.71
t+5	3875	0.70	3754	0.68	4921	0.69	5668	0.71
t+6	4092	0.70	3714	0.67	5271	0.70	5783	0.71
t+7	4109	0.69	3777	0.67	5381	0.71	5859	0.70
t+8	4137	0.68	3801	0.66	5439	0.70	5811	0.70
t+9	4196	0.68	3838	0.66	5507	0.70	5951	0.69
t+10	4247	0.68	3811	0.65	5591	0.70	5967	0.69
t+11	4259	0.67	3881	0.64	5681	0.70	6021	0.68
t+12	4286	0.66	3902	0.64	5644	0.69	5978	0.68

Source: Authors' calculations from WIA and LEHD data.

Notes: Earnings are in 2008\$. Employment is proportion employed.

TABLE 2b: Descriptive Statistics for Earnings & Employment, State B

	Adult Disloca			ated				
	Trea	ated	Untre	ated	Trea	ited	Untre	ated
Number of Participants	113	380	118	802	161	87	120	59
	Earnings	Employment	Earnings	Employment	Earnings	Employment	Earnings	Employment
t-12	3015	0.60	2594	0.54	9324	0.88	8523	0.88
t-11	3104	0.62	2631	0.55	9448	0.88	8681	0.89
t-10	3108	0.62	2622	0.55	9504	0.89	8690	0.89
t-9	3107	0.62	2604	0.55	9579	0.89	8759	0.90
t-8	3066	0.62	2582	0.55	9730	0.90	8839	0.90
t-7	3081	0.63	2583	0.55	9837	0.91	8869	0.91
t-6	3015	0.63	2516	0.55	9933	0.91	8833	0.91
t-5	2931	0.63	2408	0.54	9818	0.91	8802	0.91
t-4	2785	0.62	2286	0.52	9655	0.90	8557	0.90
t-3	2572	0.61	2052	0.51	9478	0.89	8278	0.88
t-2	2180	0.59	1729	0.48	8635	0.85	7550	0.83
t-1	1738	0.56	1345	0.45	7352	0.76	6190	0.73
t	1296	0.53	1214	0.55	4198	0.59	3922	0.64
t+1	1618	0.55	2351	0.66	2369	0.48	3658	0.66
t+2	2216	0.61	2766	0.67	3346	0.57	4695	0.73
t+3	2595	0.64	2878	0.65	4203	0.63	5306	0.75
t+4	2835	0.65	2901	0.64	4762	0.67	5405	0.76
t+5	3117	0.66	2960	0.63	5187	0.70	5584	0.76
t+6	3238	0.66	2948	0.61	5484	0.71	5696	0.76
t+7	3316	0.65	2951	0.60	5776	0.72	5747	0.75
t+8	3445	0.65	2967	0.59	5953	0.73	5705	0.75
t+9	3547	0.65	2998	0.59	6207	0.74	5843	0.74
t+10	3574	0.64	2954	0.58	6375	0.74	5835	0.74
t+11	3699	0.64	2971	0.57	6532	0.74	5862	0.73
t+12	3686	0.64	2984	0.57	6585	0.74	5839	0.73

Source: Authors' calculations from WIA and LEHD data.

Notes: Earnings are in 2008\$. Employment is proportion employed.

TABLE 3a: Probit Models of WIA Training Receipt, State A, Adult Classification

		Model	6
Omitted		Avg. Marginal	
Category	Variable	Effect	Std. Error
26-30	Age <20	-0.012	0.000
26-30	21-25	0.000	0.000
26-30	31-35	-0.010	0.000
26-30	36-40	-0.017	0.000
26-30	41-45	-0.046	0.000
26-30	46-50	-0.054	0.000
26-30	51-55	-0.060	0.000
26-30	56-60	-0.099	0.000
26-30	61+	-0.060	0.000
High School	Less than HS	-0.167	0.001
High School	Some College	0.045	0.000
High School	College or More	-0.015	0.000
High School	Education Missing	-0.044	0.000
White	Other	-0.018	0.000
White	Black	0.014	0.000
	Model 1 Earnings variables Model 1 Demographic variables		
	Model 2 Demographic variables	Include	ed
	Industry of Employing Firm	Include	ed
	No Employment in guarters t-1 to t-8	Include	ed
	Earnings in quarters t-1 to t-8	Include	ed
	Square of Earnings in guarters t-1 to t-8	Include	ed
	Employment Transitions	Include	ed
	Positive Earnings in certain periods	Include	ed
	Zero Earnings in certain periods	Include	ed
	TANF Benefits in certain periods (women only)	Include	ed
	WIA Location	Include	ed
	Firm Variables	Include	ed
	Extra Earnings variables	Include	ed

Source: Authors' calculations from WIA and LEHD data. Notes: Model 1 earnings variables are earnings in year before WIA registration, a dummy variable for zero earnings in year before WIA registration, earnings in 2nd year before WIA registration, and a dummy variable for zero earnings in 2nd year before WIA registration. Model 1 demographic variables are sex, age at time of WIA registration, square of age at time of WIA registration. Model 2 demographic variables are year of registration, quarter of registration, disabled status, veteran status, and never employed status. Firm variables are Firm Size >=100, Low-Wage Proportion, High Turnover, and a series of dummy variables for Firm Fixed Effects Quintile. Extra earnings variables are mean earnings in quarters t-12 through t-5, the standard deviation of earnings in quarters t-12 through t-5, and a series of dummy variables for the number of quarters with zero earnings.

TABLE 3b: Probit Models of WIA Training Receipt, State A, Dislocated Classification

		Model	6
Omitted		Avg. Marginal	
Category	Variable	Effect	Std. Error
~~ ~~		o / / =	
26-30	Age <20	-0.117	0.000
26-30	21-25	-0.006	0.000
26-30	31-35	0.012	0.000
26-30	36-40	0.016	0.000
26-30	41-45	-0.010	0.000
26-30	46-50	-0.006	0.000
26-30	51-55	-0.036	0.000
26-30	56-60	-0.055	0.000
26-30	61+	-0.061	0.000
High School	Less than HS	-0.141	0.000
High School	Some College	-0.006	0.000
High School	College or More	-0.047	0.000
High School	Education Missing	-0.406	0.001
White	Other	0.004	0.000
White	Black	0.035	0.000
	Model 1 Earnings variables Model 1 Demographic variables		
	Model 2 Demographic variables	Include	ed
	Industry of Employing Firm	Include	ed
	No Employment in quarters t-1 to t-8	Includ	ed
	Earnings in guarters t-1 to t-8	Include	ed
	Square of Earnings in guarters t-1 to t-8	Includ	ed
	Employment Transitions	Includ	ed
	Positive Earnings in certain periods	Includ	ed
	Zero Earnings in certain periods	Includ	ed
	TANF Benefits in certain periods (women only)	Include	ed
	WIA Location	Include	ed
	Firm Variables	Includ	ed
	Extra Earnings variables	Include	ed

Source: Authors' calculations from WIA and LEHD data. Notes: Model 1 earnings variables are earnings in year before WIA registration, a dummy variable for zero earnings in year before WIA registration, earnings in 2nd year before WIA registration, and a dummy variable for zero earnings in 2nd year before WIA registration. Model 1 demographic variables are sex, age at time of WIA registration, square of age at time of WIA registration. Model 2 demographic variables are year of registration, quarter of registration, disabled status, veteran status, and never employed status. Firm variables are Firm Size >=100, Low-Wage Proportion, High Turnover, and a series of dummy variables for Firm Fixed Effects Quintile. Extra earnings variables are mean earnings in quarters t-12 through t-5, the standard deviation of earnings in quarters t-12 through t-5, and a series of dummy variables for the number of quarters with zero earnings.

TABLE 3c: Probit Models of WIA Training Receipt, State B, Adult Classification

		Model	6
Omitted		Avg. Marginal	
Category	Variable	Effect	Std. Error
26-30	Age <20	0.032	0.000
26-30	21-25	0.028	0.000
26-30	31-35	0.005	0.000
26-30	36-40	-0.015	0.000
26-30	41-45	-0.042	0.000
26-30	46-50	-0.042	0.000
26-30	51-55	-0.050	0.000
26-30	56-60	-0.073	0.000
26-30	61+	-0.184	0.000
High School	Less than HS	-0.071	0.000
High School	Some College	0.006	0.000
High School	College or More	-0.008	0.000
High School	Education Missing		
White	Other	-0.045	0.000
White	Black	-0.011	0.000
	Model 1 Earnings variables Model 1 Demographic variables		
	Model 2 Demographic variables	Include	ed
	Industry of Employing Firm	Include	ed
	No Employment in quarters t-1 to t-8	Include	ed
	Earnings in quarters t-1 to t-8	Include	ed
	Square of Earnings in quarters t-1 to t-8	Include	ed
	Employment Transitions	Include	ed
	Positive Earnings in certain periods	Include	ed
	Zero Earnings in certain periods	Include	ed
	UI Experience in certain periods	Include	ed
	ES Service Events in certain periods	Include	ed
	WIA Location	Include	ed
	Firm Variables	Include	ed
	Extra Earnings variables	Include	ed

Source: Authors' calculations from WIA and LEHD data.

Notes: Model 1 earnings variables are earnings in year before WIA registration, a dummy variable for zero earnings in year before WIA registration, earnings in 2nd year before WIA registration, and a dummy variable for zero earnings in 2nd year before WIA registration. Model 1 demographic variables are age at time of WIA registration, square of age at time of WIA registration, and sex. Model 2 demographic variables are year of registration, quarter of registration, disabled status, veteran status, and never employed status. Firm variables are Firm Size >=100, Low-Wage Proportion, High Turnover, and a series of dummy variables for Firm Fixed Effects Quintile. Extra earnings variables are mean earnings in quarters t-12 through t-5, the standard deviation of earnings in quarters t-12 through t-5, and a series of dummy variables for the number of quarters with zero earnings.

TABLE 3d: Probit Models of WIA Training Receipt, State B, Dislocated Classification

		Model	6
Omitted		Avg. Marginal	
Category	Variable	Effect	Std. Error
26.20	Ago20	0.001	0.000
20-30	Age <20	0.001	0.000
20-30	21-20	0.011	0.000
20-30	31-33	-0.005	0.000
20-30	30-40 41 4E	-0.021	0.000
20-30	41-45	-0.032	0.000
20-30	40-50 51 FE	-0.076	0.000
20-30	51-55	-0.117	0.000
20-30	50-00	-0.150	0.000
20-30	bit	-0.172	0.000
High School	Less than HS	-0.058	0.000
High School		0.014	0.000
High School	College or More	0.023	0.000
High School	Education Missing		
White	Other	-0.024	0.000
White	Black	-0.045	0.000
	Model 1 Earnings variables		
	Model 1 Demographic variables		
	Model 2 Demographic variables	Include	ed
	Industry of Employing Firm	Include	ed
	No Employment in quarters t-1 to t-8	Include	ed
	Earnings in quarters t-1 to t-8	Include	ed
	Square of Earnings in quarters t-1 to t-8	Include	ed
	Employment I ransitions	Include	ed
	Positive Earnings in certain periods	Include	ed
	Zero Earnings in certain periods	Include	ed
	UI Experience in certain periods	Include	ed
	ES Service Events in certain periods	Include	ed
	WIA Location	Include	ed
	Firm Variables	Include	ed
	Extra Earnings variables	Include	ed

Source: Authors' calculations from WIA and LEHD data.

Notes: Model 1 earnings variables are earnings in year before WIA registration, a dummy variable for zero earnings in year before WIA registration, earnings in 2nd year before WIA registration, and a dummy variable for zero earnings in 2nd year before WIA registration. Model 1 demographic variables are age at time of WIA registration, square of age at time of WIA registration, and sex. Model 2 demographic variables are year of registration, quarter of registration, disabled status, veteran status, and never employed status. Firm variables are Firm Size >=100, Low-Wage Proportion, High Turnover, and a series of dummy variables for Firm Fixed Effects Quintile. Extra earnings variables are mean earnings in quarters t-12 through t-5, the standard deviation of earnings in quarters t-12 through t-5, and a series of dummy variables for the number of quarters with zero earnings.

		Adu	It Classificat	ion	Disloc	Dislocated Classification		
		Treatment	Standard		Treatment	Standard		
		Effect	Error	P-value	Effect	Error	P-value	
Farnings Differen	ICES							
Lannigo, Dinoron	t+1	-597	55	<.0001	-939	104	<.0001	
	t+2	-464	59	<.0001	-1121	102	<.0001	
	t+3	-276	67	<.0001	-969	105	<.0001	
	t+4	-39	67	0.597	-546	104	<.0001	
	t+5	-11	69	0.887	-478	105	<.0001	
	t+6	214	74	0.009	-281	112	0.014	
	t+7	245	69	0.001	-180	110	0.103	
	t+8	274	70	0.000	-154	112	0.174	
	t+9	304	72	0.000	-491	161	0.002	
	t+10	393	72	<.0001	-155	114	0.179	
	t+11	261	74	0.001	-123	124	0.330	
	t+12	299	75	0.000	-129	118	0.281	
	Total, t+1 to t+12	602	641	0.387	-5567	1047	<.0001	
	Total, t+9 to t+12	1257	270	<.0001	-899	447	0.045	
Employed								
	t+1	-0.070	0.008	<.0001	-0.067	0.010	<.0001	
	t+2	-0.030	0.008	0.000	-0.055	0.009	<.0001	
	t+3	-0.013	0.007	0.121	-0.030	0.009	0.001	
	t+4	-0.003	0.007	0.729	-0.001	0.009	0.886	
	t+5	0.012	0.007	0.126	0.009	0.009	0.316	
	t+6	0.022	0.007	0.007	0.026	0.009	0.004	
	t+7	0.021	0.007	0.009	0.043	0.009	<.0001	
	t+8	0.007	0.007	0.366	0.039	0.009	<.0001	
	t+9	0.018	0.008	0.032	0.035	0.009	0.000	
	t+10	0.028	0.008	0.001	0.036	0.009	<.0001	
	t+11	0.018	0.008	0.028	0.051	0.009	<.0001	
	t+12	0.022	0.008	0.008	0.037	0.009	<.0001	

TABLE 4a: Impacts on Earnings & Employment, Inverse Propensity Score Weighting, Model 6, State A

	A	dult Classific	ation	Disloc	Dislocated Classification		
	Treatmer	nt Standard		Treatment	Standard		
	Effect	Error	P-value	Effect	Error	P-value	
Farnings Differences							
t+1	-68	38 37	7 <.0001	-1258	63	<.0001	
t+2	-63	33 43	3 <.0001	-1295	62	<.0001	
t+3	-37	4 4	5 <.0001	-1179	66	<.0001	
t+4	-18	34 46	6 <.0001	-852	65	<.0001	
t+5	2	<u>2</u> 4 49	0.630	-662	66	<.0001	
t+6	8	31 50	0.105	-399	67	<.0001	
t+7	15	57 50	0.002	-262	69	0.000	
t+8	24	5 5	3 <.0001	-134	68	0.051	
t+9	36	68 53	3 <.0001	-26	71	0.713	
t+10) 40)5	4 <.0001	163	71	0.022	
t+11	48	36 55	5 <.0001	310	71	<.0001	
t+12	2 44	5 50	6 <.0001	368	72	<.0001	
Tota	al, t+1 to t+12 32	9 46	7 0.480	-5227	653	<.0001	
Tota	al, t+9 to t+12 170)3 20 ⁻	l <.0001	815	265	0.002	
Employed							
t+1	-0.08	.000	6 <.0001	-0.120	0.006	<.0001	
t+2	-0.04	9 0.00	6 <.0001	-0.105	0.006	<.0001	
t+3	-0.01	7 0.000	6 0.007	-0.086	0.006	<.0001	
t+4	0.01	0 0.000	6 0.106	-0.066	0.005	<.0001	
t+5	0.01	8 0.000	6 0.004	-0.046	0.005	<.0001	
t+6	0.02	0.006	6 <.0001	-0.025	0.005	<.0001	
t+7	0.02	0.006	6 0.000	-0.019	0.005	0.000	
t+8	0.04	6 0.006	6 <.0001	-0.003	0.005	0.559	
t+9	0.04	7 0.006	6 <.0001	0.001	0.005	0.862	
t+10) 0.04	9 0.00	6 <.0001	0.007	0.005	0.191	
t+11	0.05	6 0.000	6 <.0001	0.016	0.005	0.003	
t+12	2 0.05	5 0.000	6 <.0001	0.017	0.005	0.002	

TABLE 4b: Impacts on Earnings & Employment, Inverse Propensity Score Weighting, Model 6, State B

TABLE 5a: Impacts on Earnings, Inverse Propensity Score Weighting, Model 6, State A

		Adult Classification Treatment Standard			Dislocated Classification Treatment Standard		
		Effect	Error	P-value	Effect	Error	P-value
Women	Total, t+1 to t+12	625	761	0.444	-7,254	1229	<.0001
	Total, t+9 to t+12	1,204	318	0.001	-1,119	504	0.029
Men	Total, t+1 to t+12	382	1123	0.758	-5,254	1805	0.004
	Total, t+9 to t+12	1,256	477	0.019	-1,316	792	0.096

TABLE 5b: Impacts on Earnings, Inverse Propensity Score Weighting, Model 6, State B

		Adult Classification Treatment Standard			Disloca Treatment	cation	
		Effect	Error	P-value	Effect	Error	P-value
Women	Total, t+1 to t+12	1,355	525	0.010	-5,074	824	<.0001
	Total, t+9 to t+12	2,238	228	<.0001	566	338	0.096
Men	Total, t+1 to t+12	236	861	0.784	-3,675	949	0.000
	Total, t+9 to t+12	2,056	363	<.0001	1,756	383	<.0001

		Adult Classification Treatment Standard		Disloca Treatment	Dislocated Classific Treatment Standard		
		Effect	Error	P-value	Effect	Error	P-value
High Fixed Effect	t t+12	0.006	0.007	0.401	-0.001	0.008	0.892
No Fixed Effect	t+12	0.008	0.006	0.186	0.010	0.007	0.179
Continuous Fixed	d Effect t+12	0.003	0.005	0.477	-0.011	0.005	0.053
Firm Size >= 100) t+12	0.005	0.009	0.637	-0.015	0.011	0.167
High Turnover	t+12	-0.009	0.008	0.301	0.006	0.009	0.481
Switched Industr	y t+12	-0.001	0.009	0.909	0.054	0.010	<.0001

TABLE 6a: Impacts on Firm Characteristics, Inverse Propensity Score Weighting, Model 6, State A

		Adult Classification Treatment Standard		Disloc Treatment	Dislocated Classific Treatment Standard		
		Effect	Error	P-value	Effect	Error	P-value
High Fixed Effect	t+12	0.036	0.006	<.0001	-0.005	0.005	0.336
No Fixed Effect	t+12	-0.006	0.004	0.172	0.014	0.004	0.001
Continuous Fixed	d Effect t+12	0.002	0.004	0.530	-0.001	0.003	0.850
Firm Size >= 100	t+12	0.030	0.007	<.0001	-0.011	0.006	0.075
High Turnover	t+12	-0.012	0.006	0.073	0.004	0.005	0.398
Switched Industry	y t+12	0.050	0.008	<.0001	0.065	0.006	<.0001

TABLE 6b: Impacts on Firm Characteristics, Inverse Propensity Score Weighting, Model 6, State B

	Adult Classification			Dislocated Classification		
	Treatment	Standard		Treatment	Standard	
	Effect	Error	P-value	Effect	Error	P-value
Impact over t+1 through t+12						
Model 1	-1703	655	0.016	-8819	1024	<.0001
Model 2	-603	648	0.388	-8994	1025	<.0001
Model 3	622	641	0.371	-5671	1047	<.0001
Model 4	626	641	0.368	-5544	1048	<.0001
Model 5	596	641	0.391	-5679	1047	<.0001
Model 6	602	641	0.387	-5567	1047	<.0001
Impact over t+9 through t+12						
Model 1	502	274	0.093	-1777	431	<.0001
Model 2	747	272	0.012	-2048	433	<.0001
Model 3	1277	270	<.0001	-935	449	0.038
Model 4	1263	270	<.0001	-901	448	0.045
Model 5	1270	270	<.0001	-927	447	0.039
Model 6	1257	270	<.0001	-899	447	0.045

TABLE 7a: Impacts on Earnings, Inverse Propensity Score Weighting, Alternative Conditioning Variables, State A

	Adult Classification			Dislocated Classification		
	Treatment	Standard		Treatment	Standard	
	Effect	Error	P-value	Effect	Error	P-value
Impact over t+1 through t+12						
Model 1	-1293	463	0.005	-9684	658	<.0001
Model 2	-82	463	0.860	-7510	661	<.0001
Model 3	704	465	0.130	-5308	654	<.0001
Model 4	668	465	0.151	-5247	653	<.0001
Model 5	347	467	0.457	-5292	654	<.0001
Model 6	329	467	0.480	-5227	653	<.0001
Impact over t+9 through t+12						
Model 1	1378	198	<.0001	-520	270	0.056
Model 2	1621	199	<.0001	67	272	0.807
Model 3	1826	200	<.0001	784	266	0.003
Model 4	1801	200	<.0001	804	265	0.003
Model 5	1716	201	<.0001	797	265	0.003
Model 6	1703	201	<.0001	815	265	0.002

TABLE 7b: Impacts on Earnings, Inverse Propensity Score Weighting, Alternative Conditioning Variables, State B

		Adult Classification		Disloca	Dislocated Classification		
		Effect	Error	P-value	Effect	Error	P-value
Differences-in-	Differences, t+1 to t	+12					
Difference in	Prior Earnings	-128	722	0.872	-2562	1273	0.047
	Total Change	729	738	0.373	-3005	1329	0.026
	t+1	-587	69	<.0001	-726	125	<.0001
	t+2	-453	70	<.0001	-908	125	<.0001
	t+3	-266	75	0.001	-756	127	<.0001
	t+4	-29	74	0.728	-332	126	0.010
	t+5	0	76	0.999	-264	126	0.041
	t+6	224	79	0.011	-68	130	0.613
	t+7	255	74	0.002	33	129	0.801
	t+8	285	76	0.001	59	129	0.653
	t+9	315	77	0.000	-278	175	0.104
	t+10	403	76	<.0001	59	132	0.662
	t+11	271	78	0.002	90	141	0.531
	t+12	310	79	0.000	84	135	0.540
Differences-in-	Differences, t+9 to t	+12					
Difference in	Prior Earnings	-81	273	0.787	-807	475	0.093
	Total Change	1337	321	0.000	-92	568	0.873
	t+9	324	85	0.001	-290	185	0.109
	t+10	413	84	<.0001	47	143	0.748
	t+11	281	86	0.003	79	152	0.612
	t+12	319	86	0.001	73	146	0.625

TABLE 8a: Differences-in-Differences Impacts on Earnings, Inverse Propensity Score Weighting, Model 6, State A

Source: Authors' calculations from WIA and LEHD data.

Notes: For differences-in-differences analysis, the pre-period is t-12 through t-1 when using t+1 to t+12 as the post-period, and is t-12 through t-9 when using t+9 through t+12 as the post-period.

		Adult Classification		Disloca	Dislocated Classification		
		Treatment	Standard		Treatment	Standard	
		Effect	Error	P-value	Effect	Error	P-value
Differences-in-D	Differences, t+1 to t	+12					
Difference in	Prior Earnings	836	493	0.091	-1018	812	0.215
	Total Change	-506	525	0.335	-4209	805	<.0001
	t+1	-758	47	<.0001	-1174	78	<.0001
	t+2	-703	50	<.0001	-1211	77	<.0001
	t+3	-444	51	<.0001	-1094	79	<.0001
	t+4	-254	51	<.0001	-767	76	<.0001
	t+5	-46	53	0.387	-578	76	<.0001
	t+6	11	53	0.830	-315	77	<.0001
	t+7	87	53	0.102	-177	78	0.025
	t+8	175	55	0.001	-49	77	0.529
	t+9	298	55	<.0001	59	80	0.468
	t+10	335	56	<.0001	248	79	0.002
	t+11	416	57	<.0001	395	80	<.0001
	t+12	375	59	<.0001	452	81	<.0001
Differences-in-D	Differences, t+9 to t	+12					
Difference in	Prior Earnings	291	217	0.180	-251	304	0.414
	Total Change	1412	250	<.0001	1066	328	0.001
	t+9	295	64	<.0001	37	86	0.673
	t+10	332	66	<.0001	226	86	0.009
	t+11	413	66	<.0001	373	86	<.0001
	t+12	372	67	<.0001	430	88	<.0001

TABLE 8b: Differences-in-Differences Impacts on Earnings, Inverse Propensity Score Weighting, Model 6, State B

Source: Authors' calculations from WIA and LEHD data.

Notes: For differences-in-differences analysis, the pre-period is t-12 through t-1 when using t+1 to t+12 as the post-period, and is t-12 through t-9 when using t+9 through t+12 as the post-period.

TABLE 9a:	Cost-Benefit	Analysis,	State A
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			Net Benefit per Participant				
			\$2500 Direc	t Costs	\$7500 Direc	t Costs	
	A	nnual Discount					
Benefit Duration	MSCPF	Rate	Adult	Dislocated	Adult	Dislocated	
As Long as in the Data							
	1.00	0	-1898	-8067	-6898	-13067	
	1.00	0.05	-2057	-7925	-7057	-12925	
	1.00	0.1	-2209	-7787	-7209	-12787	
	1.25	0	-2523	-8692	-8773	-14942	
	1.25	0.05	-2682	-8550	-8932	-14800	
	1.25	0.1	-2834	-8412	-9084	-14662	
	1.50	0	-3148	-9317	-10648	-16817	
	1.50	0.05	-3307	-9175	-10807	-16675	
	1.50	0.1	-3459	-9037	-10959	-16537	
5 Years							
	1.00	0	80	-10059	-4920	-15059	
	1.00	0.05	-415	-9594	-5415	-14594	
	1.00	0.1	-859	-9173	-5859	-14173	
	1.25	0	-545	-10684	-6795	-16934	
	1.25	0.05	-1040	-10219	-7290	-16469	
	1.25	0.1	-1484	-9798	-7734	-16048	
	1.50	0	-1170	-11309	-8670	-18809	
	1.50	0.05	-1665	-10844	-9165	-18344	
	1.50	0.1	-2109	-10423	-9609	-17923	
Indefinite		-					
	1.00	0	+inf	-inf	+inf	-inf	
	1.00	0.05	19491	-23333	14491	-28333	
	1.00	0.1	6951	-14338	1951	-19338	
	1.25	0	+inf	-inf	+inf	-inf	
	1.25	0.05	18866	-23958	12616	-30208	
	1.25	0.1	6326	-14963	76	-21213	
	1.50	0	+inf	-inf	+inf	-inf	
	1.50	0.05	18241	-24583	10741	-32083	
	1.50	0.00	5701	-15588	-1799	-23088	
		0.1	0.01			20000	

Source: Authors' calculations from WIA and LEHD data.

Notes: Estimates are drawn from Table 4. With an annual discount rate of 0, the benefits under the assumption of indefinite benefit duration become infinite, whether positive ("+inf") or negative ("-inf"). Costs are assumed to entirely occur in the first quarter after WIA registration. MSCPF is the marginal social cost of public funds.

TABLE 9b:	Cost-Benefit	Analysis,	State B
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			Net Benefit per Participant				
			\$2500 Direc	t Costs	\$7500 Direct Costs		
	A	nnual Discount					
Benefit Duration	MSCPF	Rate	Adult	Dislocated	Adult	Dislocated	
As Long as in the Data							
	1.00	0	-2170	-7727	-7170	-12727	
	1.00	0.05	-2362	-7733	-7362	-12733	
	1.00	0.1	-2545	-7736	-7545	-12736	
	1.25	0	-2795	-8352	-9045	-14602	
	1.25	0.05	-2987	-8358	-9237	-14608	
	1.25	0.1	-3170	-8361	-9420	-14611	
	1.50	0	-3420	-8977	-10920	-16477	
	1.50	0.05	-3612	-8983	-11112	-16483	
	1.50	0.1	-3795	-8986	-11295	-16486	
5 Years							
	1.00	0	39	-8369	-4961	-13369	
	1.00	0.05	-541	-8319	-5541	-13319	
	1.00	0.1	-1058	-8263	-6058	-13263	
	1.25	0	-586	-8994	-6836	-15244	
	1.25	0.05	-1166	-8944	-7416	-15194	
	1.25	0.1	-1683	-8888	-7933	-15138	
	1.50	0	-1211	-9619	-8711	-17119	
	1.50	0.05	-1791	-9569	-9291	-17069	
	1.50	0.1	-2308	-9513	-9808	-17013	
Indefinite							
	1.00	0	+inf	+inf	+inf	+inf	
	1.00	0.05	26842	6236	21842	1236	
	1.00	0.1	9871	-1797	4871	-6797	
	1.25	0	+inf	+inf	+inf	+inf	
	1.25	0.05	26217	5611	19967	-639	
	1.25	0.1	9246	-2422	2996	-8672	
	1.50	0	+inf	+inf	+inf	+inf	
	1.50	0.05	25592	4986	18092	-2514	
	1.50	0.1	8621	-3047	1121	-10547	

Source: Authors' calculations from WIA and LEHD data.

Notes: Estimates are drawn from Table 4. With an annual discount rate of 0, the benefits under the assumption of indefinite benefit duration become infinite, whether positive ("+inf") or negative ("-inf"). Costs are assumed to entirely occur in the first quarter after WIA registration. MSCPF is the marginal social cost of public funds.
















Does Federally-Funded Job Training Work? Nonexperimental Estimates of WIA Training Impacts Using Longitudinal Data on Workers and Firms

Fredrik Andersson, Harry Holzer, Julia Lane, David Rosenblum, and Jeffrey Smith

August 18, 2016

Appendices

Appendix 1: Data and Samples

LEHD

The LEHD program was established at the Census Bureau in 1998 to provide information on employer and employee dynamics and the link between the two. The program draws on already existing survey and administrative data from both the demographic and economics directorates at the Bureau, and integrates them with Unemployment Insurance wage record data from its partner states.¹

State Unemployment Insurance (UI) wage records sit at the core of the LEHD data. These records consist of quarterly reports filed by employers for each individual in covered employment, which includes roughly 96% of private non-farm wage and salary employment (Stevens 2007). The UI data provide less comprehensive coverage of agricultural employment and completely exclude federal government employees, self-employed individuals and independent contractors, and workers in the informal sector. According to US Department of Labor (1997) UI wage records measure "gross wages and salaries, bonuses, stock options, tips, and other gratuities, and the value of meals and lodging, where supplied." They do not include employer contributions to Social Security, health insurance, workers compensation,

¹ For more on the LEHD, see the Census program website: <u>http://lehd.ces.census.gov/</u>.

unemployment insurance, and private pension and welfare funds. Although UI administrative records contain some errors, staff at the LEHD program has invested substantial resources in cleaning the records and making them internally consistent; see e.g. Abowd et al. (2009).

The LEHD necessarily inherits some limitations from the underlying UI earnings data. Most states (including our two) do not require employers to report hours or weeks worked; as a result, we cannot measure hourly or weekly earnings and thus cannot easily distinguish between low wages and few hours worked as sources of low quarterly earnings. The data contain no information on employment separate from earnings; as such, we code employment in a calendar quarter as an indicator for non-zero earnings in a quarter, a process that will miss some extended leaves. In addition, for workers holding multiple jobs in a given calendar quarter the data provide no way to determine whether they hold them sequentially or in parallel. Finally, we have no direct information on why workers leave jobs, or on a range of personal characteristics (beyond basic demographics) typically captured in survey data. See Kornfeld and Bloom (1999), Hotz and Scholz (2002), Wallace and Haveman (2007) and Barnow and Greenberg (2015) for discussions comparing administrative and survey outcome measures.

The LEHD data is matched to the long-form Decennial Census data, from which we obtain basic demographic information including date of birth, place of birth, sex and a crude measure of race and ethnicity. The LEHD is also matched to a number of other Census survey data sets, but because they have relatively small samples, and we have only two states, the intersection provides too little information for us to effectively utilize.

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The primary limitation of the employer data centers on the reporting unit. Although we often refer to the employer as a "firm," the actual reporting unit is an administrative, rather than an economic entity; in other words, the filing unit reflects an "Employer Identification Number," or EIN, rather than a specific establishment. This represents a distinction without a difference for the approximately 70% of workers with a single establishment employer, but for those who work for a multiple establishment employer, we cannot identify the exact employing establishment within the firm.

Sample

Table A-1 describes the sample loss associated with the exclusions that led us from the raw data to our analysis sample. For State A, the sample loss associated with not having an exit date is the result of missing data on exit dates for registrants who leave before the end of our data rather than the result of individuals exiting after the end of our data.

Variables

Table A-2 provides detailed variable definitions for both the outcomes we consider and the conditioning variables we use. Table A-3 offers descriptive statistics. For completeness, it includes the variables discussed in the text whose descriptive statistics we also presented in Table 1.

Appendix 2: Determinants of Training

Table A-4 presents mean derivatives (a.k.a. average marginal effects) from our six models of the conditional probability of receiving training among WIA enrollees. Table A-5 presents the correlations of the estimated propensity scores from the six models.

Appendix 3: Estimators

As noted in the main text, we consider two econometric estimators that rely on our "selection on observed variables" assumption. We view these estimators as complements because of their contrasting costs and benefits. Inverse propensity weighting (IPW), despite an academic pedigree dating back to Horvitz and Thompson (1952), has become popular in the treatment effects literature only recently. Key papers in the literature are Hirano, Imbens and Ridder (2003) and Hirano and Imbens (2001). IPW has three primary benefits for our purposes: First, it does very well relative to other estimators in recent Monte Carlo horseraces run by Huber, Lechner and Wunsch (2013) and Busso, DiNardo and McCrary (2014). Second, it has the desirable asymptotic property that it attains the "semi-parametric efficiency bound", which means that (under certain conditions) it attains minimum asymptotic variance within the class of semi-parametric estimators; see Hirano, Imbens and Ridder (2003) on this point. Third, unlike many other semi-parametric treatment effects estimators, it does not require the choice of a bandwidth or other tuning parameter. In terms of our notation, the IPW estimator is given by

$$\hat{\Delta}_{TT} = \frac{1}{n_1} \sum_{i=1}^n Y_i D_i - \frac{1}{n_0} \sum_{i=1}^n \left(\frac{1}{n_0} \sum_{i=1}^n \frac{\hat{P}(X)(1-D_i)}{1-\hat{P}(X)} \right)^{-1} \frac{\hat{P}(X_i)Y_i(1-D_i)}{1-\hat{P}(X_i)}$$

where n_0 denotes the number of untreated units and n_1 the number of treated units. The downside to IPW lies in its sensitivity to estimated propensity scores close to zero or one in finite samples. A quick look at the estimator makes the source of the trouble clear enough: the

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estimator divides by both P(X) and 1-P(X). As a result, when the propensity score lies very near zero, small changes in the value of the propensity score can move the estimate a lot. In our application, we do not have this problem. The Monte Carlo literature, in particular Busso, DiNardo and McCrary (2014), emphasizes the importance of normalizing the weights to sum to one in the sample for the finite sample performance of the estimator. The formula given here embodies that normalization. We obtain estimated standard errors by bootstrapping.²

We utilize single nearest neighbor matching on the propensity score as our secondary estimator of choice. We do so despite its uniformly poor performance in terms of mean squared error in the Monte Carlo studies just cited, as well as in Frölich (2004). That poor performance in mean squared error terms masks a combination of quite good performance on bias, and truly awful performance on variance. The latter is perhaps not surprising given that nearest neighbor matching, particularly the most common variant with a single nearest neighbor used with replacement, completely ignores the information available in the data from comparison observations close to, but not closest to, particular treated units. The low bias, combined with relative insensitivity to propensity scores close to zero and one makes nearest neighbor matching, in our view, a good complement to IPW. We present nearest neighbor estimates using one, three and five nearest neighbors as a sensitivity analysis. Increasing the number of neighbors trades off bias (due to using more distant matches) and variance (which decreases in the number of untreated units used to construct the counterfactual). We chose these bandwidths on a priori grounds rather than, say, via cross-validation as in Black and Smith (2004). Abadie and Imbens

 $^{^{2}}$ In the current version of the paper, the bootstrap standard errors for the IPW estimator do not include the estimation of the scores and so likely have a marginal downward bias. We will fix this at revision time when we regain access to the data.

(2008) show that the bootstrap fails to provide consistent standard error estimates for the nearest neighbor estimator. Instead, we employ the consistent estimator in Abadie and Imbens (2015).³

We use the same set of estimators when relying on the conditional bias stability assumption for identification, but instead of an outcome level as the dependent variable, we have a pre-post difference in outcomes as the dependent variable, as in Smith and Todd (2005).

Table A-6 compares our preferred IPW estimator to estimates obtained using nearest neighbor matching with replacement on the estimated propensity score with one, three and five nearest neighbors. The table reveals little substantive difference between the estimates generated by the different estimators. We do not find this particularly surprising given our relatively large sample sizes and given that our estimated propensity scores do not stray too close to zero and one.⁴

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³ In the current version of the paper, we report bootstrap standard errors for the nearest neighbor estimator. The Monte Carlo analysis in Abadie and Imbens (2008) suggests that while not zero, the inconsistency in the bootstrap will generally not lead to severely misleading inferences. When we regain access to the data, we will construct consistent estimates based on Abadie and Imbens (2015).

⁴ At revision time, when we again have access to the data, we will examine three additional estimators: pooled OLS, OLS estimated using only the untreated units, and pooled median regression to examine sensitivity to outliers. We also doubt the current nearest neighbor estimates (and so do not say much about them in this version) and look forward to re-generating them using the new routines in Stata 14 rather than the old routines in SAS.

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TABLE A-1: Variable Definitions

Variable	Description
Male White Black Other Age Education Disabled Veteran	 (WIA) Dummy variable equal to 1 if the participant is male, and 0 otherwise (WIA) Dummy variable equal to 1 if the participant lists white only as racial category and non-Hispanic, and 0 otherwise (WIA) Dummy variable equal to 1 if the participant lists black only as racial category and non-Hispanic, and 0 otherwise (WIA) Dummy variable equal to 1 if the values for White and Black are both 0, and 0 otherwise (WIA) Age in years at time of WIA registration (WIA) Series of dummy variables equal to 1 if the participant has years of education in the relevant range, and 0 otherwise (WIA) Dummy variable equal to 1 if the participant has disabled status, and 0 otherwise (WIA) Dummy variable equal to 1 if the participant has veteran status, and 0 otherwise
Year of Registration Quarter of Registration Age at Registration WIA Location	 (WIA) Series of dummy variables equal to 1 if the participant registered in that year and 0 otherwise (WIA) Series of dummy variables equal to 1 if the participant registered in that quarter and 0 otherwise (WIA) Series of dummy variables equal to 1 if participant's age at time of WIA registration was within the range of the dummy variable, and 0 otherwise (WIA) Series of dummy variables equal to 1 if the participant registered in that quarter and 0 otherwise (WIA) Series of dummy variables equal to 1 if participant's age at time of WIA registration was within the range of the dummy variable, and 0 otherwise (WIA) Series of dummy variables equal to 1 if the participant registered in that area, and 0 otherwise
Earnings in 1st Previous Year Zero Earnings in 1st Previous Year Earnings in 2nd Previous Year Zero Earnings in 2nd Previous Year No Employment Quarterly Earnings Square of Quarterly Earnings	(LEHD) Total earnings in year before quarter of WIA registration (quarters t-4 through t-1) in 2008\$ (LEHD) Dummy variable equal to 1 if participant had zero earnings in quarters t-4 through t-1, and 0 otherwise (LEHD) Total earnings in 2nd-to-last year before quarter of WIA registration (quarters t-8 through t-5) in 2008\$ (LEHD) Dummy variable equal to 1 if participant had zero earnings in quarters t-8 through t-5, and 0 otherwise (LEHD) Series of dummy variables equal to 1 if the participant was not employed in that quarter, and 0 otherwise (LEHD) Participant's earnings in that quarter in 2008\$ (LEHD) Square of participant's earnings in that quarter in 2008\$
Employment Transitions Positive Earnings in certain periods	WIA entry and all five previous quarters. A participant is considered employed / employed if earnings were positive during the quarter of WIA entry but were zero in at least one of the five previous quarters. A participant is considered employed / not employed if earnings were zero during the quarter of WIA entry but were zero during the quarter of WIA entry but were positive in at least one of the previous five quarters. A participant is considered not employed if earnings were zero during the quarter of WIA entry but were positive in at least one of the previous five quarters. A participant is considered not employed / not employed if earnings were zero during the quarter of WIA entry and all five previous quarters. (LEHD) Series of dummy variables equal to 1 if participant had positive earnings in relevant period, and 0 otherwise
Zero Earnings in certain periods	(LEHD) Series of dummy variables equal to 1 if participant had zero earnings in relevant period, and 0 otherwise
TANF Benefits in certain periods (women only UI Experience in certain periods ES Service Events	(WIA) Series of dummy variables equal to 1 if participant received TANF benefits during relevant period, and 0 otherwise (State A (WIA) Series of dummy variables equal to 1 if participant had received UI benefits during relevant period, and 0 otherwise (State B (WIA) Series of dummy variables equal to 1 if participant received ES services during relevant period, and 0 otherwise (State B only)
Firm Industry	(LEHD) Series of dummy variables equal to 1 if the participant's last employer before quarter of WIA registration was in that industry (by NAICS code), and 0 otherwise
Firm Size >=100	(LEHD) Dummy variable equal to 1 if the participant's employer had at least 100 employees, and 0 otherwise (LEHD) Continuous variable equal to the percentage of workers at participant's employer who had annual earnings below \$15,000
Low-Wage Proportion	and 0 otherwise
High Turnover Firm Fixed Effects Quintile	(LEHD) Dummy variable equal to 1 if the participant's employer had annual turnover of at least 75%, and 0 otherwise (LEHD) Series of dummy variables equal to 1 if participant's employer was within the relevant fixed effects quintile, and 0 otherwise
Switched Industry	(LEHU) Dummy variable equal to 1 if the participant's employer post-WIA is in different industry than most-recent pre-registration employer

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Table A-2: # Sample Loss in the Analysis Sample

	Stat	e A	Stat	e B
	Adult	Dislocated	Adult	Dislocated
Before Eliminations	29267	19376	24362	30025
Duplicate observations	20970	13727	24362	30025
No registration date	20970	13727	24362	30025
No exit date	16851	11512	24362	30025
Exit before entrance	16851	11512	24362	30025
Entrance before 1999	16851	11512	23822	28962
Earnings restrictions	15532	10836	23182	28246

Source: Authors' calculations from WIA and LEHD data.

Notes: Earnings restrictions mean dropping participants in the top half percent of total earnings summed over the 12 quarters before WIA registration or in the top half percent of total earnings summed over the 12 quarters after WIA registration. In accordance with Census Bureau rules on reporting small differences, some cells where a very small number of participants were dropped are instead reported as no participants being dropped.

		Ac	lult	Dislo	cated
		Treated	Untreated	Treated	Untreated
	4	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.07
Quarter of Registration	1	0.29	0.23	0.26	0.27
	2	0.23	0.24	0.20	0.20
	3	0.20	0.31	0.20	0.20
	4	0.20	0.21	0.20	0.21
Earnings in 1st Previous Year		13355	12349	29618	29623
Zero Earnings in 1st Previous	Year	0.21	0.21	0.10	0.10
Earnings in 2nd Previous Year	r	14012	13837	29474	30108
Zero Earnings in 2nd Previous	s Year	0.24	0.24	0.13	0.13
Firm Industry	Construction	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03
	Manufacturing	0.09	0.07	0.22	0.13
	Wholesale	0.03	0.03	0.06	0.05
	Retail	0.15	0.13	0.12	0.12
	Iransportation	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
	Finance	0.02	0.02	0.04	0.04
	Professional	0.03	0.03	0.05	0.00
	Support	0.04	0.05	0.09	0.11
	Education	0.13	0.10	0.10	0.12
	Health Care	0.00	0.00	0.06	0.00
	Hotels/Food	0.12	0.12	0.03	0.04
	Public Administration	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.02
	Other	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03
	Other Services	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03
	Unemployed	0.12	0.11	0.07	0.06
Disabled		0.06	0.03	0.03	0.03
Veteran		0.06	0.05	0.08	0.07
Transition: Employed to Emplo	byed	0.29	0.26	0.43	0.41
Transition: Employed to Not E	mployed	0.30	0.25	0.35	0.35
Transition: Not Employed to E	mployed	0.26	0.38	0.14	0.17
Transition: Not Employed to N	ot Employed	0.15	0.11	0.08	0.07
TANF in Quarter t		0.06	0.08	0.00	0.01
TANF in Quarter t-1		0.05	0.07	0.00	0.01
TANF in Quarter t-2		0.04	0.07	0.00	0.01
TANF in Quarter t-3 or t-4		0.05	0.07	0.00	0.01
TANE in Quarters t-1 to t-2		0.06	0.09	0.01	0.02
TANE IN Quarters t-1 to t-4		0.06	0.09	0.01	0.02
Firm Size >= 100		0.65	0.68	0.67	0.64
Low-Wage Proportion		0.20	0.21	0.10	0.11
High Lurnover		0.23	0.24	0.28	0.27
FILTH FIXED Effects QUINTILE 1		0.08	0.10	0.21	0.23
Firm Fixed Effects Quintile 2		0.10	0.10	0.18	0.14
Firm Fixed Effects Quintile 3		0.13 0.19	0.11	0.15	0.14
Firm Fixed Effects Quintile 5		0.75	0.27	0.13	0.13
No Firm Fixed Effects Quintile		0.14	0.13	0.15	0.17

Source: Authors' calculations from WIA and LEHD data. Notes: The industry labeled 'Other' comprises agriculture, utilities, mining, real estate, management of companies, and entertainment. Previous year refers to the four quarters prior to the quarter of WIA registration. Firm industry refers to the most recent job prior to quarter of WIA registration.

		Ad	lult	Dislo	cated
		Treated	Untreated	Treated	Untreated
Quarter of Registration	4	0.27	0.29	0.00	0.22
	2	0.27	0.20	0.20	0.32
	2	0.20	0.22	0.23	0.23
	3 4	0.00	0.27	0.20	0.20
	7	0.21	0.25	0.22	0.21
Earnings in 1st Previous Year		9275	7412	35120	30573
Zero Earnings in 1st Previous	Year	0.22	0.30	0.05	0.05
Earnings in 2nd Previous Year	r	12094	10089	39318	35343
Zero Earnings in 2nd Previous	s Year	0.23	0.31	0.05	0.04
Firm Industry	Construction	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01
	Manufacturing	0.11	0.11	0.39	0.39
	Wholesale	0.03	0.02	0.05	0.04
	Retail	0.13	0.11	0.08	0.09
	Transportation	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04
	Information	0.02	0.02	0.05	0.04
	Finance	0.02	0.03	0.04	0.06
	Professional	0.03	0.03	0.08	0.04
	Support	0.16	0.19	0.08	0.08
	Education	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.01
	Health Care	0.13	0.09	0.04	0.05
	Hotels/Food	0.12	0.10	0.02	0.04
	Public Administration	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.02
	Other	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.04
	Other Services	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
	Unemployed	0.10	0.16	0.03	0.02
Disabled		0.05	0.08	0.03	0.02
Veteran		0.05	0.00	0.03	0.02
Veterali		0.00	0.00	0.10	0.00
Transition: Employed to Emplo	byed	0.26	0.19	0.49	0.48
Transition: Employed to Not E	mployed	0.32	0.28	0.37	0.33
Transition: Not Employed to E	mployed	0.27	0.36	0.10	0.16
Transition: Not Employed to N	ot Employed	0.15	0.17	0.04	0.03
No III Experience in Quarter t	-1 or t-2	0.04	0.02	0.87	0 820
No UI Experience in Quarter t	$-3 \text{ or } t_{-4}$	0.94	0.92	0.07	0.020
No UI Experience in Quarters	-5 01 (-4 t-5 to t-8	0.97	0.95	0.97	0.933
Any III Experience in Quarters	t-1 to t-4	0.03	0.30	0.33	0.370
Any ULExperience in Quarters	s t-1 to t-9	0.07	0.10	0.13	0.107
Any ES Service Events in Ous	$r_{1} = 1$ or t_{2}	0.07	0.11	0.13	0.100
Any ES Service Events in Que	arter t-3 or t-4	0.04	0.00	0.03	0.040
Any ES Service Events in Qua	11011-3011-4	0.03	0.03	0.01	0.018
Any ES Service Events In Qua	ate in Querters t 1 to t 1	0.03	0.03	0.01	0.013
Received any ES Service Eve	nts in Quarters t-1 to t-4	0.05	0.07	0.04	0.040
		0.00	0.00	0.04	0.000
Firm Size >= 100		0.69	0.69	0.78	0.81
Low-Wage Proportion		0.26	0.24	0.09	0.10
High Turnover		0.17	0.17	0.26	0.26
Firm Fixed Effects Quintile 1		0.07	0.06	0.31	0.23
Firm Fixed Effects Quintile 2		0.08	0.09	0.21	0.23
Firm Fixed Effects Quintile 3		0.11	0.11	0.12	0.17
Firm Fixed Effects Quintile 4		0.21	0.20	0.12	0.15
Firm Fixed Effects Quintile 5		0.29	0.28	0.09	0.12
No Firm Fixed Effects Quintile		0.13	0.10	0.10	0.08

Source: Authors' calculations from WIA and LEHD data. Notes: The industry labeled 'Other' comprises agriculture, utilities, mining, real estate, management of companies, and entertainment. Previous year refers to the four quarters prior to the quarter of WIA registration. Firm industry refers to the most recent job prior to quarter of WIA registration.

TABLE A-4a: Probit Models of WIA Training Receipt, State A, Adult Classification

Omitted		Mode Avg. Marginal	el 1	Mode Avg. Marginal	12	Mode Avg. Marginal	13	Mode Avg. Marginal	4	Mode Avg. Marginal	15	Mode Avg. Marginal	16
Category	Variable	Effect	Std. Error										
Quarter 1 Quarter 1	Registered in Quarter 2 Registered in Quarter 3			-0.042	0.000	-0.017 -0.044	0.000	-0.017 -0.044	0.000	-0.017 -0.044	0.000	-0.017 -0.044	0.000
Quarter 1	Registered in Quarter 4			-0.039	0.000	-0.043	0.000	-0.043	0.000	-0.043	0.000	-0.043	0.000
2002	Registered in 2000			0.024	0.000	0.016	0.000	0.016	0.000	0.017	0.000	0.016	0.000
2002	Registered in 2001			0.040	0.000	0.029	0.000	0.029	0.000	0.029	0.000	0.029	0.000
2002	Registered in 2003			0.058	0.000	-0.003	0.000	-0.004	0.000	-0.005	0.000	-0.004	0.000
2002	Registered in 2005			0.025	0.000	-0.044	0.000	-0.043	0.000	-0.044	0.000	-0.043	0.000
Female	Male	-0.012	0.000	-0.025	0.000	0.023	0.000	0.023	0.000	0.023	0.000	0.023	0.000
White	Other	-0.103	0.000	-0.097	0.000	-0.018	0.000	-0.019	0.000	-0.018	0.000	-0.018	0.000
High School	Black Less than HS	-0.121	0.000	-0.104	0.000	-0.168	0.000	-0.168	0.000	-0.168	0.000	-0.167	0.000
High School	Some College	0.094	0.000	0.087	0.000	0.045	0.000	0.045	0.000	0.045	0.000	0.045	0.000
High School	College or More	-0.004	0.000	0.001	0.000	-0.015	0.000	-0.015	0.000	-0.015	0.000	-0.015	0.000
High School	Education Missing	-0.135	0.000	-0.151	0.000	-0.044	0.000	-0.044	0.000	-0.044	0.000	-0.044	0.000
26-30	Age <20			-0.027	0.000	-0.013	0.000	-0.012	0.000	-0.012	0.000	-0.012	0.000
26-30	31-35			-0.011	0.000	-0.010	0.000	-0.010	0.000	-0.010	0.000	-0.010	0.000
26-30	36-40			-0.030	0.000	-0.016	0.000	-0.017	0.000	-0.016	0.000	-0.017	0.000
26-30	41-45			-0.081	0.000	-0.047	0.000	-0.047	0.000	-0.046	0.000	-0.046	0.000
26-30	46-50			-0.090	0.000	-0.054	0.000	-0.054	0.000	-0.054	0.000	-0.054	0.000
26-30	56-60			-0.116	0.000	-0.061	0.000	-0.061	0.000	-0.060	0.000	-0.060	0.000
26-30	61+			-0.062	0.000	-0.060	0.000	-0.061	0.000	-0.060	0.000	-0.060	0.000
	Disabled			0.128	0.000	0.094	0.000	0.094	0.000	0.094	0.000	0.094	0.000
	Veteran			0.037	0.000	0.005	0.000	0.005	0.000	0.005	0.000	0.005	0.000
	Never Employed	0.000	0.000	-0.066	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.005	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.004	0.000
	Zero Earnings in previous year	0.000	0.000										
	Earnings in second year	0.000	0.000										
	Zero Earnings in second year	-0.015	0.000										
	Age at Registration	-0.004	0.000										
	Previous Industry: Construction	0.000	0.000	-0.005	0.000	0.052	0.000	0.052	0.000	0.051	0.000	0.052	0.000
	Previous Industry: Wholesale Trade			-0.067	0.000	0.004	0.000	0.004	0.000	0.004	0.000	0.004	0.000
	Previous Industry: Retail Trade			-0.047	0.000	0.005	0.000	0.007	0.000	0.005	0.000	0.006	0.000
	Previous Industry: Transportation			-0.067	0.000	0.014	0.000	0.013	0.000	0.014	0.000	0.013	0.000
	Previous Industry: Finance			-0.068	0.000	-0.010	0.000	-0.009	0.000	-0.011	0.000	-0.009	0.000
	Previous Industry: Professional			-0.089	0.000	-0.002	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.003	0.000	-0.001	0.000
	Previous Industry: Administrative			-0.086	0.000	-0.005	0.000	-0.004	0.000	-0.005	0.000	-0.004	0.000
	Previous Industry: Education			-0.068	0.000	0.005	0.000	0.007	0.000	0.003	0.000	0.005	0.000
	Previous Industry: Healthcare Previous Industry: Hospitality			-0.055	0.000	-0.015	0.000	-0.015	0.000	-0.014	0.000	-0.015	0.000
	Previous Industry: Public Administration			-0.095	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.004	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.003	0.000
	Previous Industry: Other			-0.069	0.000	0.003	0.000	0.005	0.000	0.002	0.000	0.004	0.000
	Previous Industry: Other Services			-0.025	0.000	0.037	0.000	0.039	0.000	0.037	0.000	0.038	0.000
	Previous industry: None			-0.066	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.005	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.004	0.000
	No Employment: Quarter t-2			-0.020	0.000	-0.008	0.000	-0.003	0.000	-0.003	0.000	-0.003	0.000
	No Employment: Quarter t-3			0.029	0.000	0.024	0.000	0.023	0.000	0.024	0.000	0.024	0.000
	No Employment: Quarter t-4			-0.023	0.000	-0.017	0.000	-0.017	0.000	-0.017	0.000	-0.017	0.000
	No Employment: Quarter t-5			-0.005	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.003	0.000	0.004	0.000
	No Employment: Quarter t-7			-0.001	0.000	0.004	0.000	0.004	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	No Employment: Quarter t-8			-0.011	0.000	-0.015	0.000	-0.015	0.000	-0.011	0.000	-0.011	0.000
	Earnings: Quarter t-1			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	Earnings: Quarter t-2			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	Earnings: Quarter t-3 Farnings: Quarter t-4			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	Earnings: Quarter t-5			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	Earnings: Quarter t-6			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	Earnings: Quarter t-7			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

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TABLE A-4a: Probit Models of WIA Training Receipt, State A, Adult Classification

Omitted		Moc Avg. Margina	lel 1	Mode Avg. Marginal	12	Mode Avg. Marginal	13	Mode Avg. Marginal	4	Mode Avg. Marginal	15	Mode Avg. Marginal	16
Category	Variable	Effect	Std. Error	Effect	Std. Error	Effect	Std. Error	Effect	Std. Error	Effect	Std. Error	Effect	Std. Error
	Farnings: Quarter t-8			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	Square Earnings: Quarter t-1			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	Square Earnings: Quarter t-2			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	Square Earnings: Quarter t-3			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	Square Earnings: Quarter t-4			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	Square Earnings: Quarter t-5			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	Square Earnings: Quarter t-6			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	Square Earnings: Quarter t-7			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	Square Earnings: Quarter t-8			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	Transition: Employed to Employed			-0.116	0.000	-0.089	0.000	-0.088	0.000	-0.089	0.000	-0.088	0.000
	Transition: Employed to Not Employed			-0.060	0.000	-0.037	0.000	-0.037	0.000	-0.037	0.000	-0.037	0.000
	Transition: Not Employed to Employed			-0.160	0.000	-0.109	0.000	-0.109	0.000	-0.109	0.000	-0.109	0.000
	PositiveEarnings2			-0.004	0.000	-0.005	0.000						
	PositiveEarnings3			0.047	0.000	0.028	0.000	0.028	0.000	0.029	0.000	0.029	0.000
	PositiveEarnings4			-0.032	0.000	-0.018	0.000	-0.018	0.000	-0.018	0.000	-0.018	0.000
	ZeroEarnings2			0.018	0.000	0.010	0.000	0.005	0.000	0.005	0.000	0.005	0.000
	ZeroEarnings3			-0.064	0.000	-0.035	0.000	-0.034	0.000	-0.036	0.000	-0.035	0.000
	ZeroEarnings4			0.027	0.000	0.014	0.000	0.013	0.000	0.014	0.000	0.013	0.000
	TANFDuringQuarter			0.005	0.000	-0.005	0.000	-0.005	0.000	-0.005	0.000	-0.004	0.000
	TANFBeforeQuarter1			0.046	0.000	0.045	0.000	0.044	0.000	0.044	0.000	0.043	0.000
	TANFBeforeQuarter2			-0.090	0.000	-0.062	0.000	-0.062	0.000	-0.062	0.000	-0.062	0.000
	TANFBeroreQuarter34			-0.016	0.000	0.022	0.000	0.023	0.000	0.022	0.000	0.022	0.000
	TANFPrevious real 1			-0.015	0.000	-0.017	0.000	-0.016	0.000	-0.017	0.000	-0.017	0.000
	Lantine: 1			0.000	0.000	0.027	0.000	0.027	0.000	0.027	0.000	0.027	0.000
	Location: 2					0.143	0.000	0.143	0.000	0.143	0.000	0.143	0.000
	Location: 2					0.133	0.000	0.132	0.000	0.134	0.000	0.133	0.000
	Location: 4					0.127	0.000	0.127	0.000	0.127	0.000	0.127	0.000
	Location: 5					0.200	0.002	0.498	0.002	0.498	0.002	0.498	0.002
	Location: 6					0.656	0.002	0.656	0.002	0.656	0.002	0.656	0.002
	Location: 7					0.246	0.001	0.245	0.001	0.246	0.001	0.245	0.001
	Location: 8					0.334	0.001	0.333	0.001	0.334	0.001	0.333	0.001
	Location: 9					0.228	0.001	0.228	0.001	0.228	0.001	0.228	0.001
	Location: 10					0.094	0.000	0.095	0.000	0.094	0.000	0.095	0.000
	Location: 12					0.317	0.001	0.317	0.001	0.317	0.001	0.317	0.001
	Firm Size >= 100							-0.007	0.000			-0.007	0.000
	Low Wage Proportion							-0.026	0.000			-0.026	0.000
	Firm Fixed Effects Quintile 2							0.019	0.000			0.019	0.000
	Firm Fixed Effects Quintile 3							0.021	0.000			0.021	0.000
	Firm Fixed Effects Quintile 4							0.011	0.000			0.011	0.000
	Firm Fixed Effects Quintile 5							0.024	0.000			0.024	0.000
	Firm Fixed Effects No Quintile							-0.001	0.000			-0.001	0.000
	Employment Change							0.000	0.000			0.000	0.000
	High Lurnover							-0.001	0.000	0.000	0.005	-0.001	0.000
	Mean Earnings t-12 to t-5									0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	Std. Dev.of Earnings t-12 to t-5									0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	Zero Earnings Dummy 1									-0.010	0.000	-0.010	0.000
	Zero Earnings Dummu 2									-0.007	0.000	-0.007	0.000
	Zero Lamings Duminy 3									-0.015	0.000	-0.015	0.000

TABLE A-4b: Probit Models of WIA Training Receipt, State A, Dislocated Classification

Omitted		Mode Avg Marginal	1	Mode Avg Marginal	12	Mode Avg Marginal	el 3	Mode Avg Marginal	4	Mode Avg Marginal	15	Mode Avg Marginal	16
Category	Variable	Effect	Std. Error										
Quarter 1	Registered in Quarter 2			0.003	0.000	0.003	0.000	0.005	0.000	0.004	0.000	0.004	0.000
Quarter 1	Registered in Quarter 3			-0.013	0.000	-0.013	0.000	-0.015	0.000	-0.015	0.000	-0.015	0.000
Quarter 1	Registered in Quarter 4			-0.010	0.000	-0.010	0.000	-0.014	0.000	-0.013	0.000	-0.015	0.000
2002	Registered in 2000			0.054	0.000	0.054	0.000	0.054	0.000	0.055	0.000	0.055	0.000
2002	Registered in 2001			-0.023	0.000	-0.023	0.000	-0.022	0.000	-0.024	0.000	-0.022	0.000
2002	Registered in 2003			0.034	0.000	0.034	0.000	0.032	0.000	0.034	0.000	0.032	0.000
2002	Registered in 2004			-0.074	0.000	-0.074	0.000	-0.074	0.000	-0.073	0.000	-0.074	0.000
Female	Male	0.048	0.000	0.040	0.000	0.040	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.041	0.000	0.000	0.000
White	Other	-0.073	0.000	0.005	0.000	0.005	0.000	0.004	0.000	0.005	0.000	0.004	0.000
White	Black	-0.028	0.000	0.039	0.000	0.039	0.000	0.035	0.000	0.038	0.000	0.035	0.000
High School	Less than HS	-0.190	0.000	-0.140	0.000	-0.140	0.000	-0.140	0.000	-0.141	0.000	-0.141	0.000
High School	College or More	-0.042	0.000	-0.006	0.000	-0.006	0.000	-0.007	0.000	-0.006	0.000	-0.006	0.000
High School	Education Missing	-0.602	0.001	-0.404	0.001	-0.404	0.001	-0.406	0.000	-0.404	0.000	-0.406	0.001
26-30	Age <20			-0.117	0.000	-0.117	0.000	-0.120	0.000	-0.114	0.000	-0.117	0.000
26-30	21-25			-0.005	0.000	-0.005	0.000	-0.007	0.000	-0.005	0.000	-0.006	0.000
26-30	31-35			0.012	0.000	0.012	0.000	0.012	0.000	0.012	0.000	0.012	0.000
26-30	36-40			0.015	0.000	0.015	0.000	0.015	0.000	0.015	0.000	0.016	0.000
26-30	41-45			-0.012	0.000	-0.012	0.000	-0.011	0.000	-0.011	0.000	-0.010	0.000
26-30	51-55			-0.039	0.000	-0.039	0.000	-0.037	0.000	-0.038	0.000	-0.036	0.000
26-30	56-60			-0.057	0.000	-0.057	0.000	-0.055	0.000	-0.057	0.000	-0.055	0.000
26-30	61+			-0.065	0.000	-0.065	0.000	-0.063	0.000	-0.063	0.000	-0.061	0.000
	Disabled			0.013	0.000	0.013	0.000	0.012	0.000	0.013	0.000	0.012	0.000
	Veteran Never Employed			-0.004	0.000	-0.004	0.000	-0.005	0.000	-0.004	0.000	-0.005	0.000
	Earnings in previous year	0.000	0.000	-0.034	0.000	-0.034	0.000	0.001	0.000	-0.023	0.000	0.002	0.000
	Zero Earnings in previous year	0.031	0.000										
	Earnings in second year	0.000	0.000										
	Zero Earnings in second year	-0.013	0.000										
	Age at Registration	0.010	0.000										
	Previous Industry: Construction	0.000	0.000	-0.016	0.000	-0.016	0.000	-0.012	0.000	-0.017	0.000	-0.012	0.000
	Previous Industry: Wholesale Trade			-0.006	0.000	-0.006	0.000	-0.002	0.000	-0.007	0.000	-0.003	0.000
	Previous Industry: Retail Trade			-0.032	0.000	-0.032	0.000	-0.030	0.000	-0.032	0.000	-0.029	0.000
	Previous Industry: Transportation			-0.085	0.000	-0.085	0.000	-0.083	0.000	-0.085	0.000	-0.083	0.000
	Previous Industry: Information			0.010	0.000	0.010	0.000	0.007	0.000	0.010	0.000	0.007	0.000
	Previous Industry: Professional			-0.031	0.000	-0.031	0.000	-0.030	0.000	-0.031	0.000	-0.034	0.000
	Previous Industry: Administrative			-0.052	0.000	-0.052	0.000	-0.051	0.000	-0.052	0.000	-0.050	0.000
	Previous Industry: Education			-0.012	0.000	-0.012	0.000	-0.009	0.000	-0.011	0.000	-0.009	0.000
	Previous Industry: Healthcare			-0.072	0.000	-0.072	0.000	-0.072	0.000	-0.072	0.000	-0.072	0.000
	Previous Industry: Hospitality Provious Industry: Public Administration			-0.046	0.000	-0.046	0.000	-0.043	0.000	-0.046	0.000	-0.042	0.000
	Previous Industry: Other			-0.023	0.000	-0.023	0.000	-0.024	0.000	-0.018	0.000	-0.021	0.000
	Previous Industry: Other Services			-0.019	0.000	-0.019	0.000	-0.014	0.000	-0.018	0.000	-0.013	0.000
	Previous Industry: None			-0.034	0.000	-0.034	0.000	0.001	0.000	-0.029	0.000	0.002	0.000
	No Employment: Quarter t-1			0.032	0.000	0.032	0.000	0.038	0.000	0.036	0.000	0.038	0.000
	No Employment: Quarter t-2			0.085	0.000	0.085	0.000	0.090	0.000	0.088	0.000	0.088	0.000
	No Employment: Quarter t-4			0.036	0.000	0.036	0.000	0.003	0.000	0.036	0.000	0.002	0.000
	No Employment: Quarter t-5			-0.007	0.000	-0.007	0.000	-0.008	0.000	-0.008	0.000	-0.009	0.000
	No Employment: Quarter t-6			-0.006	0.000	-0.006	0.000	-0.007	0.000	-0.006	0.000	-0.008	0.000
	No Employment: Quarter t-7			0.004	0.000	0.004	0.000	0.002	0.000	0.002	0.000	-0.001	0.000
	No Employment: Quarter t-8			-0.027	0.000	-0.027	0.000	-0.026	0.000	-0.031	0.000	-0.031	0.000
	Earnings. Quarter t-2			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	Earnings: Quarter t-3			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	Earnings: Quarter t-4			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	Earnings: Quarter t-5			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	Earnings: Quarter t-6			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	Earnings. Quarter t-7			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

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TABLE A-4b: Probit Models of WIA Training Receipt, State A, Dislocated Classification

Omitted		Model 1 Avg. Marginal Effect Std Error		Mode Avg. Marginal	12	Mode Avg. Marginal	13	Mode Avg. Marginal	el 4	Mode Avg. Marginal	15	Mode Avg. Marginal	16
Category	Variable	Effect	Std. Error	Effect	Std. Error	Effect	Std. Error	Effect	Std. Error	Effect	Std. Error	Effect	Std. Error
	Earnings: Quarter t-8			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	Square Earnings: Quarter t-1			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	Square Earnings: Quarter t-2			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	Square Earnings: Quarter t-3			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	Square Earnings: Quarter t-4			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	Square Earnings: Quarter t-5			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	Square Earnings: Quarter t-6			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	Square Earnings: Quarter t-7			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	Square Earnings: Quarter t-8			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	Transition: Employed to Employed			-0.076	0.000	-0.076	0.000	-0.078	0.000	-0.078	0.000	-0.079	0.000
	Transition: Employed to Not Employed			-0.037	0.000	-0.037	0.000	-0.035	0.000	-0.037	0.000	-0.035	0.000
	Transition: Not Employed to Employed			-0.084	0.000	-0.084	0.000	-0.084	0.000	-0.084	0.000	-0.084	0.000
	PositiveEarnings2												
	PositiveEarnings3			0.016	0.000	0.016	0.000	0.019	0.000	0.015	0.000	0.018	0.000
	PositiveEarnings4			0.018	0.000	0.018	0.000	0.023	0.000	0.024	0.000	0.023	0.000
	ZeroEarnings2			-0.083	0.000	-0.083	0.000	-0.087	0.000	-0.087	0.000	-0.087	0.000
	ZeroEarnings3			-0.004	0.000	-0.004	0.000	-0.008	0.000	-0.003	0.000	-0.007	0.000
	ZeroEarnings4			0.007	0.000	0.007	0.000	0.008	0.000	0.005	0.000	0.007	0.000
	TANFDuringQuarter			-0.091	0.000	-0.091	0.000	-0.097	0.000	-0.093	0.000	-0.096	0.000
	TANFBeforeQuarter1			0.144	0.000	0.144	0.000	0.158	0.000	0.151	0.000	0.162	0.000
	TANFBeforeQuarter2			-0.123	0.000	-0.123	0.000	-0.132	0.000	-0.129	0.000	-0.135	0.000
	TANFBeforeQuarter34			0.012	0.000	0.012	0.000	0.012	0.000	0.010	0.000	0.008	0.000
	TANFPreviousYear1			-0.157	0.000	-0.157	0.000	-0.151	0.000	-0.154	0.000	-0.149	0.000
	TANFPreviousYear2			0.075	0.000	0.075	0.000	0.068	0.000	0.077	0.000	0.071	0.000
	Location: 1					0.060	0.000	0.061	0.000	0.059	0.000	0.061	0.000
	Location: 2					0.198	0.000	0.194	0.000	0.197	0.000	0.194	0.000
	Location: 3					0.051	0.000	0.053	0.000	0.050	0.000	0.052	0.000
	Location: 4					0.258	0.001	0.261	0.001	0.258	0.001	0.261	0.001
	Location: 5					0.572	0.001	0.566	0.001	0.571	0.001	0.565	0.001
	Location: 6					0.732	0.002	0.732	0.002	0.732	0.002	0.733	0.002
	Location: 7					0.197	0.000	0.198	0.000	0.197	0.000	0.198	0.000
	Location: 8					0.208	0.000	0.210	0.000	0.207	0.000	0.209	0.000
	Location: 9					0.301	0.001	0.303	0.001	0.301	0.001	0.303	0.001
	Location: 10					0.138	0.000	0.140	0.000	0.137	0.000	0.139	0.000
	Elocation: 12					0.332	0.001	0.334	0.001	0.551	0.001	0.333	0.001
	Fillin Size >= 100							0.040	0.000			0.041	0.000
	Eirm Eixed Effects Quintile 2							0.007	0.000			0.007	0.000
	Firm Fixed Effects Quintile 3							-0.015	0.000			-0.016	0.000
	Firm Fixed Effects Quintile 4							-0.015	0.000			-0.016	0.000
	Firm Fixed Effects Quintile 5							-0.013	0.000			-0.013	0.000
	Firm Fixed Effects No Quintile							0.018	0.000			0.010	0.000
	Employment Change							0.000	0.000			0.000	0.000
	High Turnover							0.000	0.000			0.018	0.000
	Mean Earnings t-12 to t-5							0.010	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	Std. Dev.of Earnings t-12 to t-5									0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	Zero Earnings Dummy 1									-0,024	0.000	-0.024	0.000
	Zero Earnings Dummy 2									-0.011	0.000	-0.010	0.000
	Zero Earnings Dummy 3									0.006	0.000	0.007	0.000
	5												

TABLE A-4c: Probit Models of WIA Training Receipt, State B, Adult Classification

Omitted		Mode Ava Marginal	1	Mode	12	Mode	13	Mode	14	Mode	15	Model	6
Category	Variable	Effect	Std. Error	Effect	Std. Error	Effect	Std. Error	Effect	Std. Error	Effect	Std. Error	Effect	Std. Error
					0.000		0.000		0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Quarter 1	Registered in Quarter 2 Registered in Quarter 3			0.023	0.000	0.023	0.000	0.023	0.000	0.023	0.000	0.023	0.000
Quarter 1	Registered in Quarter 4			0.014	0.000	0.014	0.000	0.013	0.000	0.013	0.000	0.014	0.000
2002	Registered in 1999			-0.103	0.000	-0.103	0.000	-0.103	0.000	-0.102	0.000	-0.102	0.000
2002	Registered in 2000			-0.175	0.000	-0.175	0.000	-0.175	0.000	-0.174	0.000	-0.174	0.000
2002	Registered in 2001			-0.093	0.000	-0.093	0.000	-0.093	0.000	-0.092	0.000	-0.092	0.000
2002	Registered in 2003			-0.018	0.000	-0.018	0.000	-0.018	0.000	-0.018	0.000	-0.018	0.000
2002	Registered in 2005			-0.302	0.001	-0.302	0.000	-0.302	0.000	-0.309	0.000	-0.298	0.000
Female	Male	-0.022	0.000	0.013	0.000	0.013	0.000	0.012	0.000	0.011	0.000	0.010	0.000
White	Other	-0.296	0.000	-0.045	0.000	-0.045	0.000	-0.045	0.000	-0.045	0.000	-0.045	0.000
White	Black	-0.254	0.000	-0.012	0.000	-0.012	0.000	-0.010	0.000	-0.013	0.000	-0.011	0.000
High School	Some College	-0.141	0.000	-0.073	0.000	-0.073	0.000	-0.072	0.000	-0.072	0.000	-0.071	0.000
High School	College or More	-0.046	0.000	-0.006	0.000	-0.006	0.000	-0.006	0.000	-0.008	0.000	-0.008	0.000
High School	Education Missing												
26-30	Age <20			0.028	0.000	0.028	0.000	0.028	0.000	0.032	0.000	0.032	0.000
26-30	21-25			0.026	0.000	0.026	0.000	0.027	0.000	0.028	0.000	0.028	0.000
26-30	31-35			-0.007	0.000	-0.007	0.000	-0.006	0.000	-0.006	0.000	-0.005	0.000
26-30	41-45			-0.040	0.000	-0.040	0.000	-0.040	0.000	-0.042	0.000	-0.042	0.000
26-30	46-50			-0.040	0.000	-0.040	0.000	-0.041	0.000	-0.042	0.000	-0.042	0.000
26-30	51-55			-0.048	0.000	-0.048	0.000	-0.049	0.000	-0.050	0.000	-0.050	0.000
26-30	56-60			-0.069	0.000	-0.069	0.000	-0.069	0.000	-0.074	0.000	-0.073	0.000
26-30	01+ Disabled			-0.184	0.000	-0.184	0.000	-0.185	0.000	-0.183	0.000	-0.184	0.000
	Veteran			0.007	0.000	0.007	0.000	0.007	0.000	0.007	0.000	0.007	0.000
	Never Employed			-0.022	0.000	-0.022	0.000	-0.049	0.000	-0.003	0.000	-0.028	0.000
	Earnings in previous year	0.000	0.000										
	Zero Earnings in previous year	-0.034	0.000										
	Zero Earnings in second year	-0.023	0.000										
	Age at Registration	-0.003	0.000										
	Age at Registration squared	0.000	0.000										
	Previous Industry: Construction			0.066	0.000	0.066	0.000	0.060	0.000	0.064	0.000	0.060	0.000
	Previous Industry: Wholesale Trade			0.044	0.000	0.044	0.000	0.043	0.000	0.045	0.000	0.044	0.000
	Previous Industry: Transportation			0.015	0.000	0.015	0.000	0.018	0.000	0.021	0.000	0.023	0.000
	Previous Industry: Information			0.070	0.000	0.070	0.000	0.069	0.000	0.069	0.000	0.068	0.000
	Previous Industry: Finance			-0.007	0.000	-0.007	0.000	-0.007	0.000	-0.007	0.000	-0.006	0.000
	Previous Industry: Professional			0.054	0.000	0.054	0.000	0.053	0.000	0.053	0.000	0.052	0.000
	Previous Industry: Administrative Previous Industry: Education			0.004	0.000	0.004	0.000	0.007	0.000	0.010	0.000	0.013	0.000
	Previous Industry: Healthcare			0.030	0.000	0.030	0.000	0.032	0.000	0.035	0.000	0.037	0.000
	Previous Industry: Hospitality			0.008	0.000	0.008	0.000	0.012	0.000	0.015	0.000	0.018	0.000
	Previous Industry: Public Administration			0.020	0.000	0.020	0.000	0.020	0.000	0.021	0.000	0.022	0.000
	Previous Industry: Other Provious Industry: Other Services			0.008	0.000	0.008	0.000	0.009	0.000	0.011	0.000	0.012	0.000
	Previous Industry: None			-0.022	0.000	-0.022	0.000	-0.049	0.000	-0.003	0.000	-0.028	0.000
	No Employment: Quarter t-1												
	No Employment: Quarter t-2			0.032	0.000	0.032	0.000	0.033	0.000	0.033	0.000	0.033	0.000
	No Employment: Quarter t-3			-0.013	0.000	-0.013	0.000	-0.014	0.000	-0.013	0.000	-0.013	0.000
	No Employment: Quarter t-4			-0.036	0.000	-0.036	0.000	-0.037	0.000	-0.036	0.000	-0.036	0.000
	No Employment: Quarter t-6			0.003	0.000	0.003	0.000	0.003	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.004	0.000
	No Employment: Quarter t-7			-0.008	0.000	-0.008	0.000	-0.008	0.000	-0.008	0.000	-0.009	0.000
	No Employment: Quarter t-8			0.002	0.000	0.002	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.003	0.000	0.003	0.000
	Earnings: Quarter t-1			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	Earnings: Quarter t-2 Earnings: Quarter t-3			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	Earnings: Quarter t-4			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	Earnings: Quarter t-5			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	Earnings: Quarter t-6			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	Earnings: Quarter t-7			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	Square Earnings: Quarter t-1			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	Square Earnings: Quarter t-2			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	Square Earnings: Quarter t-3			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	Square Earnings: Quarter t-4			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	Square Earnings: Quarter t-5			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	Square Earnings. Quarter t-7			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	Square Earnings: Quarter t-8			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

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TABLE A-4c: Probit Models of WIA Training Receipt, State B, Adult Classification

		Mod	el 1	Mode	12	Mode	el 3	Mode	14	Mode	15	Mode	16
Omitted		Avg. Marginal		Avg. Marginal		Avg. Marginal		Avg. Marginal		Avg. Marginal		Avg. Marginal	
Category	Variable	Effect	Std. Error										
	Transition: Employed to Employed			-0 115	0.000	-0 115	0.000	-0 113	0.000	0.012	0.000	-0 111	0.000
	Transition: Employed to Not Employed			-0.052	0.000	-0.052	0.000	-0.052	0.000	0.076	0.000	-0.050	0.000
	Transition: Not Employed to Employed			-0.127	0.000	-0.127	0.000	-0.127	0.000			-0.125	0.000
	PositiveEarnings2			0.019	0.000	0.019	0.000	0.021	0.000	0.019	0.000	0.021	0.000
	PositiveEarnings3			0.018	0.000	0.018	0.000	0.018	0.000	0.019	0.000	0.019	0.000
	PositiveEarnings4			-0.013	0.000	-0.013	0.000	-0.013	0.000	-0.012	0.000	-0.012	0.000
	ZeroEarnings2			-0.069	0.000	-0.069	0.000	-0.072	0.000	-0.069	0.000	-0.071	0.000
	ZeroEarnings3			0.005	0.000	0.005	0.000	0.004	0.000	0.003	0.000	0.003	0.000
	ZeroEarnings4			0.018	0.000	0.018	0.000	0.018	0.000	0.015	0.000	0.016	0.000
	BeforeQuarter12NoUI			0.002	0.000	0.002	0.000	0.003	0.000			0.003	0.000
	BeforeQuarter34NoUI			0.010	0.000	0.010	0.000	0.010	0.000			0.010	0.000
	Previous Year2NoUI			0.044	0.000	0.044	0.000	0.044	0.000			0.049	0.000
	UIExperiencePrevious Year1			0.034	0.000	0.034	0.000	0.034	0.000	0.004	0.000	0.030	0.000
	DiExperiencerrevious rearz			-0.012	0.000	-0.012	0.000	-0.012	0.000	0.020	0.000	-0.010	0.000
	BeforeQuarter34SE			-0.004	0.000	-0.004	0.000	-0.005	0.000	0.015	0.000	-0.000	0.000
	Previous Vear 2SE			0.024	0.000	0.020	0.000	0.027	0.000	-0.025	0.000	0.020	0.000
	Received Service Previous Vear1			0.024	0.000	0.024	0.000	0.020	0.000	-0.020	0.000	0.022	0.000
	ReceivedServicePreviousYear2			-0.054	0.000	-0.054	0.000	-0.054	0.000	0.038	0.000	-0.054	0.000
	Location: 1					0.237	0.001	0.238	0.001	0.235	0.000	0.236	0.001
	Location: 2					0.281	0.001	0.282	0.001	0.280	0.001	0.281	0.001
	Location: 3					0.058	0.000	0.060	0.000	0.058	0.000	0.060	0.000
	Location: 4					0.619	0.001	0.620	0.001	0.618	0.001	0.619	0.001
	Location: 5					0.042	0.000	0.043	0.000	0.040	0.000	0.042	0.000
	Location: 6					0.373	0.001	0.373	0.001	0.368	0.001	0.369	0.001
	Location: 7					0.059	0.000	0.060	0.000	0.059	0.000	0.059	0.000
	Location: 8					0.419	0.001	0.420	0.001	0.417	0.001	0.418	0.001
	Location: 10					0.376	0.001	0.377	0.001	0.375	0.001	0.375	0.001
	Location: 11					0.494	0.001	0.493	0.001	0.492	0.001	0.492	0.001
	Location: 12					0.573	0.001	0.574	0.001	0.572	0.001	0.574	0.001
	Location: 13					0.445	0.001	0.445	0.001	0.446	0.001	0.446	0.001
	Location: 14					0.445	0.001	0.443	0.001	0.443	0.001	0.440	0.001
	Location: 16					0.070	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.075	0.001	0.000	0.001
	Location: 17					0.134	0.000	0.135	0.000	0.135	0.000	0.136	0.000
	Location: 18					0.284	0.001	0.286	0.001	0.284	0.001	0.286	0.001
	Location: 19					0.482	0.001	0.482	0.001	0.482	0.001	0.483	0.001
	Location: 20					0.452	0.001	0.451	0.001	0.451	0.001	0.451	0.001
	Location: 21					0.494	0.001	0.496	0.001	0.495	0.001	0.496	0.001
	Location: 22					0.253	0.001	0.253	0.001	0.254	0.001	0.255	0.001
	Location: 23					0.573	0.001	0.574	0.001	0.573	0.001	0.574	0.001
	Location: 24					0.489	0.001	0.490	0.001	0.489	0.001	0.490	0.001
	Location: 25					0.174	0.000	0.176	0.000	0.176	0.000	0.178	0.000
	Location: 26					0.622	0.001	0.622	0.001	0.624	0.001	0.623	0.001
	Location: 27												
	FIIII Size >= 100							-0.016	0.000			-0.010	0.000
	Firm Fixed Effects Quintile 2							-0.033	0.000			-0.032	0.000
	Firm Fixed Effects Quintile 3							-0.010	0.000			-0.007	0.000
	Firm Fixed Effects Quintile 4							-0.006	0.000			-0.003	0.000
	Firm Fixed Effects Quintile 5							-0.004	0.000			-0.001	0.000
	Firm Fixed Effects No Quintile							-0.004	0.000			-0.002	0.000
	Employment Change							0.000	0.000			0.000	0.000
	High Turnover							-0.003	0.000			-0.003	0.000
	Mean Earnings t-12 to t-5									0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	Std. Dev.of Earnings t-12 to t-5									0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	Zero Earnings Dummy 1									0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	Zero Earnings Dummy 2									0.002	0.000	0.002	0.000
	Zero Earnings Dummy 3									0.003	0.000	0.002	0.000

TABLE A-4d: Probit Models of WIA Training Receipt, State B, Dislocated Classification

Omitted		Model	1	Model	2	Mode	13	Mode	4	Mode	el 5	Mode	16
Category	Variable	Effect	Std. Error	Avg. Marginal Effect	Std. Error	Effect	Std. Error						
Quarter 1	Registered in Quarter 2			0.028	0.000	0.028	0.000	0.026	0.000	0.027	0.000	0.026	0.000
Quarter 1	Registered in Quarter 3 Registered in Quarter 4			0.043	0.000	0.043	0.000	0.044	0.000	0.044	0.000	0.045	0.000
2002	Registered in 1999			-0.066	0.000	-0.066	0.000	-0.066	0.000	-0.064	0.000	-0.065	0.000
2002	Registered in 2000			-0.129	0.000	-0.129	0.000	-0.130	0.000	-0.129	0.000	-0.130	0.000
2002	Registered in 2001			-0.067	0.000	-0.067	0.000	-0.065	0.000	-0.065	0.000	-0.065	0.000
2002	Registered in 2003			-0.029	0.000	-0.029	0.000	-0.028	0.000	-0.029	0.000	-0.028	0.000
2002	Registered in 2004 Registered in 2005			-0.136	0.000	-0.136	0.000	-0.134	0.000	-0.135	0.000	-0.133	0.000
Female	Male	0.011	0.000	0.020	0.000	0.020	0.000	0.019	0.000	0.018	0.000	0.018	0.000
White	Other	-0.203	0.000	-0.025	0.000	-0.025	0.000	-0.024	0.000	-0.026	0.000	-0.024	0.000
White	Black	-0.285	0.000	-0.047	0.000	-0.047	0.000	-0.046	0.000	-0.047	0.000	-0.045	0.000
High School	Less than HS	-0.143	0.000	-0.060	0.000	-0.060	0.000	-0.059	0.000	-0.059	0.000	-0.058	0.000
High School	Some College	0.012	0.000	0.015	0.000	0.015	0.000	0.014	0.000	0.015	0.000	0.014	0.000
High School	Education Missing	0.003	0.000	0.020	0.000	0.026	0.000	0.025	0.000	0.023	0.000	0.023	0.000
26-30	Age <20			-0.009	0.000	-0.009	0.000	-0.005	0.000	-0.002	0.000	0.001	0.000
26-30	21-25			0.010	0.000	0.010	0.000	0.010	0.000	0.011	0.000	0.011	0.000
26-30	31-35			-0.005	0.000	-0.005	0.000	-0.004	0.000	-0.006	0.000	-0.005	0.000
26-30	36-40			-0.021	0.000	-0.021	0.000	-0.020	0.000	-0.022	0.000	-0.021	0.000
26-30	46-50			-0.052	0.000	-0.032	0.000	-0.051	0.000	-0.053	0.000	-0.032	0.000
26-30	51-55			-0.119	0.000	-0.119	0.000	-0.116	0.000	-0.120	0.000	-0.117	0.000
26-30	56-60			-0.151	0.000	-0.151	0.000	-0.148	0.000	-0.152	0.000	-0.150	0.000
26-30	61+			-0.175	0.000	-0.175	0.000	-0.172	0.000	-0.175	0.000	-0.172	0.000
	Disabled			-0.023	0.000	-0.023	0.000	-0.023	0.000	-0.024	0.000	-0.023	0.000
	Never Employed			-0.007	0.000	-0.007	0.000	-0.007	0.000	-0.007	0.000	-0.008	0.000
	Earnings in previous year	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.010	0.000	0.021	0.000
	Zero Earnings in previous year	0.044	0.000										
	Earnings in second year	0.000	0.000										
	Zero Earnings in second year	0.050	0.000										
	Age at Registration squared	0.007	0.000										
	Previous Industry: Construction	0.000	0.000	0.018	0.000	0.018	0.000	0.009	0.000	0.017	0.000	0.008	0.000
	Previous Industry: Wholesale Trade			0.011	0.000	0.011	0.000	0.008	0.000	0.013	0.000	0.009	0.000
	Previous Industry: Retail Trade			-0.024	0.000	-0.024	0.000	-0.012	0.000	-0.021	0.000	-0.010	0.000
	Previous Industry: Transportation			0.034	0.000	0.034	0.000	0.040	0.000	0.035	0.000	0.041	0.000
	Previous Industry: Finance			0.028	0.000	0.028	0.000	0.032	0.000	0.028	0.000	0.030	0.000
	Previous Industry: Professional			0.098	0.000	0.098	0.000	0.090	0.000	0.098	0.000	0.090	0.000
	Previous Industry: Administrative			0.028	0.000	0.028	0.000	0.031	0.000	0.031	0.000	0.034	0.000
	Previous Industry: Education			0.075	0.000	0.075	0.000	0.082	0.000	0.076	0.000	0.084	0.000
	Previous Industry: Healthcare Previous Industry: Hospitality			-0.052	0.000	-0.052	0.000	-0.045	0.000	-0.050	0.000	-0.043	0.000
	Previous Industry: Public Administration			-0.012	0.000	-0.012	0.000	-0.024	0.000	-0.029	0.000	-0.021	0.000
	Previous Industry: Other			0.005	0.000	0.005	0.000	0.005	0.000	0.005	0.000	0.005	0.000
	Previous Industry: Other Services			0.045	0.000	0.045	0.000	0.044	0.000	0.048	0.000	0.046	0.000
	Previous Industry: None			-0.001	0.000	-0.001	0.000	-0.039	0.000	0.010	0.000	-0.024	0.000
	No Employment: Quarter t-1			-0.051	0.000	-0.051	0.000	-0.059	0.000	-0.053	0.000	-0.059	0.000
	No Employment: Quarter t-3			-0.034	0.000	-0.034	0.000	-0.035	0.000	-0.035	0.000	-0.036	0.000
	No Employment: Quarter t-4			0.017	0.000	0.017	0.000	0.016	0.000	0.014	0.000	0.014	0.000
	No Employment: Quarter t-5			0.017	0.000	0.017	0.000	0.019	0.000	0.022	0.000	0.022	0.000
	No Employment: Quarter t-6			0.008	0.000	0.008	0.000	0.006	0.000	0.007	0.000	0.006	0.000
	No Employment: Quarter t-8			-0.007	0.000	-0.022	0.000	-0.021	0.000	-0.020	0.000	-0.019	0.000
	Earnings: Quarter t-1			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	Earnings: Quarter t-2			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	Earnings: Quarter t-3			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	Earnings: Quarter t-4			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	Earnings: Quarter t-6			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	Earnings: Quarter t-7			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	Earnings: Quarter t-8			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	Square Earnings: Quarter t-1			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	Square Earnings: Quarter t-2			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	Square Earnings. Quarter t-3			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	Square Earnings: Quarter t-5			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	Square Earnings: Quarter t-6			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	Square Earnings: Quarter t-7			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	Square Earnings: Quarter t-8			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

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TABLE A-4d: Probit Models of WIA Training Receipt, State B, Dislocated Classification

		Mode	el 1	Mode	12	Mode	el 3	Mode	14	Mode	15	Mode	16
Omitted		Avg. Marginal		Avg. Marginal		Avg. Marginal		Avg. Marginal		Avg. Marginal		Avg. Marginal	
Category	Variable	Effect	Std. Error										
	Transition: Freedowed to Freedowed			0.005	0.000	0.005	0.000	0.020	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	Transition: Employed to Employed			-0.035	0.000	-0.035	0.000	-0.032	0.000	-0.029	0.000	-0.029	0.000
	Transition: Employed to Not Employed			0.028	0.000	0.028	0.000	0.026	0.000	0.031	0.000	0.029	0.000
	Desitive Ferrie and			-0.062	0.000	-0.062	0.000	-0.062	0.000	-0.059	0.000	-0.039	0.000
	PositiveEarnings2												
	PositiveEarnings3			-0.015	0.000	-0.015	0.000	-0.019	0.000	-0.016	0.000	-0.020	0.000
	PositiveEarnings4			-0.027	0.000	-0.027	0.000	-0.029	0.000	-0.028	0.000	-0.027	0.000
	ZeroEarnings2			0.033	0.000	0.033	0.000	0.035	0.000	0.036	0.000	0.034	0.000
	ZeroEarnings3			0.029	0.000	0.029	0.000	0.031	0.000	0.031	0.000	0.032	0.000
	ZeroEarnings4			0.008	0.000	0.008	0.000	0.004	0.000	0.004	0.000	0.001	0.000
	BeforeQuarter12NoUI			-0.001	0.000	-0.001	0.000	-0.005	0.000	-0.002	0.000	-0.007	0.000
	BeforeQuarter34NoUI			0.044	0.000	0.044	0.000	0.042	0.000	0.044	0.000	0.042	0.000
	Previous Year2NoUI			0.027	0.000	0.027	0.000	0.025	0.000	0.029	0.000	0.027	0.000
	UIExperiencePrevious Year1			0.053	0.000	0.053	0.000	0.055	0.000	0.056	0.000	0.056	0.000
	UIExperiencePrevious Year2			-0.022	0.000	-0.022	0.000	-0.030	0.000	-0.027	0.000	-0.033	0.000
	BeforeQuarter12SE			-0.028	0.000	-0.028	0.000	-0.024	0.000	-0.025	0.000	-0.022	0.000
	BeforeQuarter34SE			-0.023	0.000	-0.023	0.000	-0.021	0.000	-0.022	0.000	-0.022	0.000
	PreviousYear2SE			0.097	0.000	0.097	0.000	0.095	0.000	0.093	0.000	0.093	0.000
	ReceivedServicePreviousYear1			0.150	0.000	0.150	0.000	0.143	0.000	0.142	0.000	0.138	0.000
	ReceivedServicePreviousYear2			-0.105	0.000	-0.105	0.000	-0.101	0.000	-0.099	0.000	-0.098	0.000
	Location: 1					0.365	0.001	0.361	0.001	0.363	0.001	0.361	0.001
	Location: 2					0.243	0.000	0.239	0.000	0.243	0.000	0.240	0.000
	Location: 3					0.117	0.000	0.115	0.000	0.116	0.000	0.115	0.000
	Location: 4					0.559	0.001	0.558	0.001	0.559	0.001	0.556	0.001
	Location: 5					0.249	0.000	0.244	0.000	0.247	0.000	0.244	0.000
	Location: 6					0.305	0.001	0.299	0.001	0.303	0.001	0.299	0.001
	Location: 7					0.007	0.000	0.008	0.000	0.007	0.000	0.008	0.000
	Location: 8					0.498	0.001	0.495	0.001	0.497	0.001	0.495	0.001
	Location: 10					0.649	0.001	0.645	0.001	0.646	0.001	0.644	0.001
	Location: 11					0.286	0.001	0.290	0.001	0.286	0.001	0.290	0.001
	Location: 12					0.263	0.001	0.261	0.001	0.265	0.001	0.262	0.001
	Location: 13					0.350	0.001	0.355	0.001	0.352	0.001	0.355	0.001
	Location: 14					0.489	0.001	0.495	0.001	0.493	0.001	0.497	0.001
	Location: 15					0.535	0.001	0.537	0.001	0.533	0.001	0.536	0.001
	Location: 16					0.563	0.001	0.563	0.001	0.564	0.001	0.564	0.001
	Location: 17					0.158	0.000	0.156	0.000	0.160	0.000	0.158	0.000
	Location: 18					0.343	0.001	0.338	0.001	0.346	0.001	0.341	0.001
	Location: 19					0.509	0.001	0.505	0.001	0.509	0.001	0.506	0.001
	Location: 20					0.479	0.001	0.480	0.001	0.478	0.001	0.480	0.001
	Location: 21					0.519	0.001	0.513	0.001	0.520	0.001	0.514	0.001
	Location: 22					0.292	0.001	0.289	0.001	0.293	0.001	0.290	0.001
	Location: 23					0.261	0.001	0.261	0.001	0.261	0.001	0.262	0.001
	Location: 24					0.387	0.001	0.385	0.001	0.392	0.001	0.389	0.001
	Location: 25					0.238	0.000	0.242	0.000	0.237	0.000	0.243	0.000
	Location: 26					0.612	0.001	0.618	0.001	0.614	0.001	0.619	0.001
	Location: 27						•						
	Firm Size >= 100							-0.018	0.000			-0.018	0.000
	Low Wage Proportion							-0.040	0.000			-0.036	0.000
	Firm Fixed Effects Quintile 2							-0.023	0.000			-0.022	0.000
	Firm Fixed Effects Quintile 3							-0.034	0.000			-0.034	0.000
	Firm Fixed Effects Quintile 4							-0.036	0.000			-0.035	0.000
	Firm Fixed Effects Quintile 5							-0.021	0.000			-0.020	0.000
	Firm Fixed Effects No Quintile							0.000	0.000			0.000	0.000
	Employment Change							0.000	0.000			0.000	0.000
	High Turnover							-0.019	0.000		0.00-	-0.019	0.000
	mean Earnings t-12 to t-5									0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	Std. Dev.or Earnings t-12 to t-5									0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	Zero Earnings Dummy 1									-0.021	0.000	-0.020	0.000
	Zero Earnings Dummy 2									-0.019	0.000	-0.020	0.000
	Zero Earnings Dummy 3									0.012	0.000	0.009	0.000

TABLE A-5: Correlation matrix of predictions from six propensity score models

State A						
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6	Adult Model 1 1.0000	Model 2 0.7993 1.0000	Model 3 0.4563 0.5681 1.0000	Model 4 0.4560 0.5677 0.9993 1.0000	Model 5 0.4562 0.5681 0.9999 0.9991 1.0000	Model 6 0.4559 0.5677 0.9991 0.9999 0.9993 1.0000
Model 1	Dislocated Model 1 1 0000	Model 2 0 6753	Model 3 0 3712	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6 0 3692
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6		1.0000	0.5547	0.5522 0.9958 1.0000	0.5542 0.9989 0.9947 1.0000	0.5517 0.9947 0.9989 0.9958 1.0000
State B	Adult					
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6	Model 1 1.0000	Model 2 0.8599 1.0000	Model 3 0.6144 0.7148 1.0000	Model 4 0.6141 0.7143 0.9993 1.0000	Model 5 0.6140 0.7141 0.9989 0.9983 1.0000	Model 6 0.6137 0.7136 0.9982 0.9990 0.9994 1.0000
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6	Dislocated Model 1 1.0000	Model 2 0.8813 1.0000	Model 3 0.6132 0.6949 1.0000	Model 4 0.6117 0.6931 0.9973 1.0000	Model 5 0.6126 0.6942 0.9990 0.9963 1.0000	Model 6 0.6111 0.6926 0.9963 0.9991 0.9974 1.0000

	Adult Classification			Dislocated Classification		
	Treatment	Standard		Treatment	Standard	
	Effect	Error	T-value	Effect	Error	T-value
Combined change over t+1 through	t+12					
1 Neighbor	7923	3993	1.98	-3374	4595	-0.73
3 Neighbors	6541	3555	1.84	-3268	3992	-0.82
5 Neighbors	6651	3382	1.97	-3648	3727	-0.98
IPW	729	738	0.99	-3005	1329	2.30
Combined change over t+9 through	i t+12					
1 Neighbor	3302	1813	1.82	-794	2032	-0.39
3 Neighbors	1393	807	1.73	-23	908	-0.02
5 Neighbors	3452	1480	2.33	-930	1657	-0.56
IPW	1337	321	4.20	-92	568	0.16

TABLE A-6a: Impacts on Earnings, Model 6, Alternative Matching and Weighting Estimators, State A

	Adult Classification			Dislocated Classification		
	Treatment	Standard		Treatment	Standard	
	Effect	Error	T-value	Effect	Error	T-value
Combined change over t+1 through	t+12					
1 Neighbor	-4400	3437	-1.28	-1620	2844	-0.57
3 Neighbors	-5067	2980	-1.70	296	2386	0.12
5 Neighbors	-4706	2766	-1.70	1648	2255	0.73
IPW	-506	525	0.96	-4209	805	5.23
Combined change over t+9 through	t+12					
1 Neighbor	557	1496	0.37	979	1185	0.83
3 Neighbors	577	682	0.85	585	513	1.14
5 Neighbors	642	1236	0.52	1877	937	2.00
IPW	1412	250	5.66	1066	328	3.25

TABLE A-6b: Impacts on Earnings, Model 6, Alternative Matching and Weighting Estimators, State B

TABLE A-7a: Cost-Benefit Analysis.	State A
	olulo / l

			Net Benefit per Participant				
			\$2500 Direc	t Costs	\$7500 Direc	ct Costs	
	A	nnual Discount					
Benefit Duration	MSCPF	Rate	Adult	Dislocated	Adult	Dislocated	
As Long as in the Data							
	1.00	0	-1771	-5505	-6771	-10505	
	1.00	0.05	-1936	-5489	-6936	-10489	
	1.00	0.1	-2094	-5472	-7094	-10472	
	1.25	0	-2396	-6130	-8646	-12380	
	1.25	0.05	-2561	-6114	-8811	-12364	
	1.25	0.1	-2719	-6097	-8969	-12347	
	1.50	0	-3021	-6755	-10521	-14255	
	1.50	0.05	-3186	-6739	-10686	-14239	
	1.50	0.1	-3344	-6722	-10844	-14222	
5 Years							
	1.00	0	292	-5789	-4708	-10789	
	1.00	0.05	-223	-5730	-5223	-10730	
	1.00	0.1	-685	-5676	-5685	-10676	
	1.25	0	-333	-6414	-6583	-12664	
	1.25	0.05	-848	-6355	-7098	-12605	
	1.25	0.1	-1310	-6301	-7560	-12551	
	1.50	0	-958	-7039	-8458	-14539	
	1.50	0.05	-1473	-6980	-8973	-14480	
	1.50	0.1	-1935	-6926	-9435	-14426	
Indefinite		••••					
	1.00	0	+inf	-inf	+inf	-inf	
	1.00	0.05	20339	-6253	15339	-11253	
	1.00	0.1	7375	-5798	2375	-10798	
	1 25	0	+inf	-inf	+inf	-inf	
	1.25	0.05	19714	-6878	13464	-13128	
	1 25	0.00	6750	-6423	500	-12673	
	1.50	0.1	+inf	-inf	+inf	-inf	
	1.50	0.05	19089	-7503	11589	-15003	
	1.50	0.00	6125	-7048	-1375	-14548	
	1.00	0.1	0120	1010	1010	1 10 10	

Source: Authors' calculations from WIA and LEHD data.

Notes: Estimates are drawn from Table 8. With an annual discount rate of 0, the benefits under the assumption of indefinite benefit duration become infinite, whether positive ("+inf") or negative ("-inf"). Costs are assumed to entirely occur in the first quarter after WIA registration. MSCPF is the marginal social cost of public funds.

			Net Benefit per Participant				
			\$2500 Direc	t Costs	\$7500 Direc	ect Costs	
	Annual Discount						
Benefit Duration	MSCPF	Rate	Adult	Dislocated	Adult	Dislocated	
As Long as in the Data							
	1.00	0	-3006	-6709	-8006	-11709	
	1.00	0.05	-3156	-6766	-8156	-11766	
	1.00	0.1	-3300	-6816	-8300	-11816	
	1.25	0	-3631	-7334	-9881	-13584	
	1.25	0.05	-3781	-7391	-10031	-13641	
	1.25	0.1	-3925	-7441	-10175	-13691	
	1.50	0	-4256	-7959	-11756	-15459	
	1.50	0.05	-4406	-8016	-11906	-15516	
	1.50	0.1	-4550	-8066	-12050	-15566	
5 Years							
	1.00	0	-1354	-6673	-6354	-11673	
	1.00	0.05	-1801	-6784	-6801	-11784	
	1.00	0.1	-2199	-6875	-7199	-11875	
	1.25	0	-1979	-7298	-8229	-13548	
	1.25	0.05	-2426	-7409	-8676	-13659	
	1.25	0.1	-2824	-7500	-9074	-13750	
	1.50	0	-2604	-7923	-10104	-15423	
	1.50	0.05	-3051	-8034	-10551	-15534	
	1.50	0.1	-3449	-8125	-10949	-15625	
Indefinite							
	1.00	0	+inf	+inf	+inf	+inf	
	1.00	0.05	21274	13020	16274	8020	
	1.00	0.1	7086	1595	2086	-3405	
	1.25	0	+inf	+inf	+inf	+inf	
	1.25	0.05	20649	12395	14399	6145	
	1.25	0.1	6461	970	211	-5280	
	1.50	0	+inf	+inf	+inf	+inf	
	1.50	0.05	20024	11770	12524	4270	
	1.50	0.1	5836	345	-1664	-7155	

Source: Authors' calculations from WIA and LEHD data.

Notes: Estimates are drawn from Table 8. With an annual discount rate of 0, the benefits under the assumption of indefinite benefit duration become infinite, whether positive ("+inf") or negative ("-inf"). Costs are assumed to entirely occur in the first quarter after WIA registration. MSCPF is the marginal social cost of public funds.