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Preferences for Redistribution among Emigrants from a Welfare State

Abstract

We study attitudes towards income redistribution in the country of origin among emigrants from a welfare state, and those who stay there. We find a striking gender difference among Danish emigrants. Majority of men opposes increasing income redistribution in Denmark, while majority of women supports it. Also among non-migrants, women are somewhat more positive towards redistribution, but the gender difference is much smaller. We study to what extent differences in attitudes towards redistribution are driven by beliefs about the determinants of individual success, generalized trust, assimilation to the new home country, and self-selection of emigrants.

Keywords: Migration; Emigration; Welfare state; Redistribution; Political preferences

JEL Codes: F22; J61; H2

1. Introduction

Economists usually assume that international migration is motivated by earnings differentials across countries. Economic analysis of internal migration dates back at least to 1776. In *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, Adam Smith notes that the wage differences in the United Kingdom were much larger than price differences, concluding that “it appears evidently from experience that a man is of all sorts of luggage the most difficult to be transported.” Subsequently, Hicks (1932) concluded that the differences in economic advantages are the main causes for migration. Sjaastad (1962) made a connection between migration and investment in human capital, arguing that the prospective migrant should choose the destination that maximizes the net present value of lifetime earnings, net of the migration costs. Tiebout (1956) argued that if there are many jurisdictions and migration is costless, migrants tend to sort into jurisdictions that provide their preferred mix of public goods. This Tiebout equilibrium is derived under a number of restrictive assumptions, including that the governments can levy lump-sum taxes to finance public goods and that there are no economies of scale or mobility costs. In a Tiebout framework, net contributors to redistribution could always emigrate to jurisdictions that do not redistribute income.

In a seminal contribution, Borjas (1987) analyzed the effect of cross-country differences in income distribution on the self-selection and earnings of immigrants. His main thesis was that immigrants to the United States tend to come from the upper end of the income distribution if there is sufficiently high correlation between individual earnings in the country of origin and expected earnings in the United States, in case of migrating there, and if the country of origin has more equal income distribution than the United States. Subsequently, Dahl (2002) has analyzed self-selected migration inside the United States and Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) migration from Mexico to the United States.

Denmark and other Scandinavian welfare states have relatively high taxes, generous welfare services and small income differences. Borjas (1987) hypothesis predicts that Danes with high earnings capability should be more likely to migrate to rich countries with lower taxes and wider income distribution, like the United States and the United Kingdom. This suggests that emigration decisions and preferences for redistribution might also be related. High-earners have self-interest to oppose redistribution, and to choose less redistributive countries.

The causality could also go the other way. Besides wider income differences than in European welfare states, the United States also has a culture that is more oriented towards risk-taking and personal responsibility. (Alesina and Angeletos 2005; Piketty 1995). This may attract high-achievers, independently of their attitude towards redistribution. It could be that having lived in the United States results, on average, in more American attitudes towards redistribution. Or the other way round: Danes living in the United States might become more leftist if they find the income differences unfair.

In this paper, we analyze the attitudes of Danish emigrants towards income redistribution, and compare this to the attitudes of Danes living in Denmark, measured in the European Social Survey (ESS). We use unique survey data on Danes who had emigrated in selected years between 1987 and 2002 and had not returned to Denmark by 2007. The survey was implemented by Statistics Denmark, with help of administrative data. It

asked respondents to state their attitudes towards income redistribution and the determinants of individual success. We study how attitudes towards redistribution differ among Danes who migrated to other Nordic countries, the United States, other English-speaking countries, the rest of Western Europe and the rest of the world, and whether such differences are robust to adding socioeconomic and demographic controls, opinions about the determinants of individual success, and generalized trust.

There is a body of both theoretical and empirical economic literature on how preferences for redistribution are formed. The standard theoretical approach is to assume that individual preferences for redistribution are determined by whether the individual would gain or lose from it, following the seminal contribution by Meltzer and Richards (1981). The static model was extended by Benabou and Ok (2001), whose dynamic model allows for social mobility. Whereas in the former model individuals only care about their current income, they also take their future income into account in the latter.

A further extension is to assume that individuals do not only care about their own consumption, but that there is some measure of income inequality as an argument in the utility function. Alesina and Giuliano (2011) distinguish between two cases. First, some measure of income inequality can be in the utility function indirectly. In this case individuals do not care about inequality per se but only about its effect on one's own consumption. Externalities in education and crime have been proposed as channels through which people in the upper end of the income distribution could be negatively affected by inequality. It can also be argued that more inequality creates incentives to exercise more effort, and this can work in favour of society as a whole. Second, a measure of income distribution can be in the utility function directly. In that case, individuals have preferences on distribution of income per se instead of caring only about how it affects their own consumption.

People can make a distinction between income that is acquired by luck and income acquired by own work and effort, and this distinction can be related to preferences of redistribution of income (Alesina and Angeletos 2005). Using survey data, Fong (2001) finds that preferences for redistribution are indeed strongly correlated with individual beliefs about the extent to which individuals have control over their material well-being. It has also been found that preferences for redistribution vary across countries in a systematic way. People in European countries tend to prefer more redistribution than those in the United States (Alesina et. al. 2001, Alesina and Glaeser 2004), and people in former socialist countries prefer more redistribution than those in Western countries (Corneo and Grüner 2002). This finding suggests that there might be an important cultural component in preferences for redistribution (Corneo 2001, Alesina and Glaeser 2004).

Studying the determinants of preferences for redistribution among immigrants has been a way to separate the effect of culture from the economic and institutional context (Alesina and Giuliano 2011, Luttmer and Singhal 2011). Using survey evidence Luttmer and Singhal (2011) found a strong and positive relationship between immigrants' redistributive preferences and the preference in the country of origin. The effect is robust to a set of controls and persists into the second generation. Unlike these previous papers, we study migrants who come from the same country of origin but live in several destination countries. Although we are not able to draw causal conclusions, our findings

shed light on whether it is reasonable to assume that migrants with different attitudes are self-selected to different destinations.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sketches the economic theory underlying the analysis and derives some theoretical predictions. Section 3 introduces the data sets that will be used in the empirical analysis. Section 4 introduces the variable used to measure preferences for redistribution of income and presents the distributions of the variable for different groups of migrants, and section 5 does the same for the measures of beliefs about what determines individual success and generalized trust. The econometric analysis is reported in section 6, and section 7 concludes.

2. Theoretical Framework

As was discussed in the introduction, individual preferences towards income redistribution are likely to reflect a variety of factors, ranging from self-interest and altruistic considerations towards one's family to social preferences on what constitutes a just society. We take the degree of redistribution in each country as given, and focus on the preferences concerning the extent of income redistribution, captured by the wage tax rate τ_n , $\tau_n \in [0,1]$ in country n . There are N , $N \in \{2,3,4 \dots\}$ countries. Tax revenue is used to finance income redistribution towards low-income people in the country where the tax is collected.

We denote individual i 's wage rate in period t by w_{it} . Note that the individual's wage rate does not have a country index; instead, country of residence is a characteristic of individual i . This allows us to present the model so that it covers both the case in which individual i lives in his or her country of origin ($n=H$ for home), as well as a case in which the individual has migrated and has preferences towards taxation both in the country of origin ($n=O$) and in the country of residence ($n=R$). We use separate indices H and O to capture different incentives facing those who stay in their country of origin and those who have emigrated. Vector $\boldsymbol{\tau}$ denotes the tax rates in different countries, including H for those who have not migrated and R and O for those who have migrated.

Taking into account government's budget constraint and the fact that taxes may distort labor supply, we can write individual's expected lifetime utility as

$$EU_i = \sum_{t=0}^{T_i} \beta^t Eu(w_{it}, \boldsymbol{\tau}) + \sum_{t=0}^{T_i^F} \sum_{k=1}^K \beta^t \alpha_k Eu(w_{kt}, \boldsymbol{\tau}) + SWF_i(\boldsymbol{\tau}). \quad (1)$$

Here, β denotes the individual discount factor, T_i denotes the number of periods of remaining lifetime for individual i after the current period 0, and $u(w_{it}, \boldsymbol{\tau})$ is the periodic utility from own consumption and leisure that depends on the current wage rate and the wage tax rate in the country of residence. Therefore, the first term reflects the net present value of individual's utility from own consumption and leisure. The effects of increasing the wage tax rate are positive to those whose net gains from additional income redistribution exceed distortions associated with higher wage taxation. The welfare effect of higher taxes through own consumption is always negative to net payers to the redistribution, but also net recipients from income redistribution have to balance gains from additional redistribution against additional distortions from ever higher tax

rates, meaning that also for net recipients from income redistribution, preferred tax rate is limited.

The second term is related to altruistic considerations towards one's family and close friends, with T_i^F denoting how many periods into the future individual's altruistic considerations towards one's family and friends extend. In case of no migration, family and friends live in one's home country. In case of migration, an individual may have family and friends both in the country of origin and the country of residence. Individual i cares about expected private utility of K , $K \in \{0,1,2, \dots\}$ other persons, attaching utility weight α_k , $\alpha_k \geq 0$ to their utility from private consumption and leisure. $K=0$ would refer to an individual who does not attach a positive weight to any other individual person.

Finally, the last term refers to social preferences, related to one's views about what constitutes a just society. Social welfare function discounts the future that the individual cares about with respect to each country; this allows individuals to care also about future beyond their lifetime, as well as to have a different discount rate with respect to social welfare than with respect to their own utility.

We denote the expected net present value of taxation and redistribution to individual i in terms of private consumption by $B_i(\boldsymbol{\tau})$. Note that only the tax rate of the country of residence counts; tax rates in other countries have no effect on i 's income. A positive value implies that the individual is net beneficiary from redistribution, a negative value that the sum of tax payments and distortions exceeds the value of benefits. The private valuation of the effects of redistribution on family and close friends is denoted by $F_i(\boldsymbol{\tau})$. We assume that B , F and SWF are concave and single-peaked with respect to each tax rate the individual cares about, and flat with respect to tax rates the individual does not care about. The expected total utility from redistribution is given by $EU_i = B_i(\boldsymbol{\tau}) + F_i(\boldsymbol{\tau}) + SWF_i(\boldsymbol{\tau})$. The welfare effect of an increase in taxation in country n is given by

$$(2) \quad \frac{\partial EU_i}{\partial \tau_n} = \frac{\partial B_i(\boldsymbol{\tau})}{\partial \tau_n} + \frac{\partial F_i(\boldsymbol{\tau})}{\partial \tau_n} + \frac{\partial SWF_i(\boldsymbol{\tau})}{\partial \tau_n}.$$

Our model allows preferences towards redistribution to enter the individual utility function both through pecuniary concerns and directly, along the lines discussed in the introduction. However, we also extend the model in Alesina and Giuliano (2011) by allowing individuals to care directly about the welfare of a subgroup of other individuals close to them (term F), instead of caring just about their own utility (term B), and that of the society as a whole (term SWF).

Individual's preferred level of taxation in country n is found by setting the right-hand side of (2) equal to zero and solving for τ_n ; the second-order condition is satisfied by the concavity of B , F and SWF .

Individual's preferred level of taxation in country n is found by setting $\frac{\partial EU_i}{\partial \tau_n}$ equal to zero and solving for τ_n ; the second-order condition is satisfied by the concavity of B , F and SWF .

In case of no migration, the first-order condition for individual's preferred tax rate with respect to τ_R is

$$(3) \quad \frac{\partial EU_i}{\partial \tau_R} = \frac{\partial B_i(\tau)}{\partial \tau_R} + \frac{\partial F_i(\tau)}{\partial \tau_R} + \frac{SWF_i(\tau)}{\partial \tau_R} = 0.$$

As taxes are paid and transfers received only in the country of residence, for migrants $B_i^O(\tau_O) = 0$ and the relevant first-order conditions are

$$(4) \quad \frac{\partial EU_i}{\partial \tau_O} = \frac{\partial F_i(\tau)}{\partial \tau_O} + \frac{\partial SWF_i(\tau)}{\partial \tau_O} = 0;$$

$$(5) \quad \frac{\partial EU_i}{\partial \tau_R} = \frac{\partial B_i(\tau)}{\partial \tau_R} + \frac{\partial F_i(\tau)}{\partial \tau_R} + \frac{SWF_i(\tau)}{\partial \tau_R} = 0.$$

Equations (3) (after setting $n=H$), (4) and (5) generate a number of testable predictions.

First, the preferred tax rate in one's country of residence, whether the home country in case of no migration or the destination country in case of migration, should be decreasing in one's income and increasing in one's age. The positive effect of age on support for redistribution arises as many of the benefits that the welfare state provides are received after retirement, while remaining working life during which costs are paid is shorter for older individuals. Furthermore, net payers to the redistribution who think that a more redistributive society would be more just attach a lower weight on B_i relative to SWF_i as they become older, pushing towards higher preferred tax rate. We also expect women to support higher taxes in their country of residence, given that women earn typically less than men. If not controlling for income, we expect the support for redistribution to be lower among the high-skilled, who are typically those with higher education.¹ Relatedly, it can be expected that one's support for redistribution in one's country of residence is lower in case one's partner's income is higher. Such an effect can be expected to be especially strong for women, given that men still usually earn more than women. In case of migrants in the survey data, this effect should be further amplified by the fact that women are most often tied migrants. Based on this, we expect that having a partner should reduce women's support for redistribution, while it is not clear whether there should be an effect for men. Junge et al. (2014) find that the likelihood that a dual-earner couple emigrates from Denmark is strongly responsive to the primary earner's income, regardless of whether the primary earner is male or female. However, in most cases the primary earner is male.

Second, high-income individuals should prefer a higher tax rate for their country of origin in case of emigrating than in case of staying. The reason for this is that in case of staying, they would have to pay for redistribution, which results in balancing one's private costs of redistribution with potential benefits to one's family and society at large.

¹ Education can serve as a proxy for income and hence as a measure of self-interest. However, the relationship between education and preferences for redistribution is more complex, and education may also make people more positive towards redistribution. See Alesina and Giuliano (2011).

Third, having family members or relatives who benefit from income transfers can be expected to increase one's support for redistribution in the country in which they live.

Fourth, we expect that those highlighting the role of own work and choices are more negative towards redistribution, while those viewing also luck and family background to play an important role are more positive. This should hold both in the country or residence, as well as in the case of migration with respect to one's country of origin. Already Fong (2001) provides support for such a view in the absence of migration. Furthermore, we expect those with lower trust to be more negative towards redistribution as they are likely to be more worried about fraudulent behavior among transfer recipients.

Fifth, in the presence of multiple destinations, we expect high-income earners and those who are more negative towards redistribution to be more likely to be living in countries with lower taxation and higher returns to skills. The idea of the high-skilled choosing countries with higher returns to skills is in line with Borjas (1987); Borjas et al. (2015) present evidence that the emigrants from Denmark are strongly positively self-selected not only in terms of their earnings, but also in terms of residual earnings. As that paper relies on administrative data, it cannot shed light on the role that preferences towards redistribution may play in the self-selection of emigrants. Those preferring a lower level of redistribution than in their country of origin may vote with their feet, migrating to less redistributive countries. This suggests that countries like the United States may succeed in attracting emigrants with especially high earnings, while relatively egalitarian countries are likely to suffer from the emigration of the high-income earners.

Sixth, those planning to return to their country of origin should have more negative views towards redistribution there in case they expect to be net payers towards redistribution at the time of returning.

Seventh, among migrants who do not plan to return to their country of origin and do not differ with respect to their concerns for family and friends, attitudes towards taxation in the country of origin should depend only on views towards a just society, and not on their own income (any link between own income and attitudes towards redistribution should reflect a correlation between income and those views).

3. Data

Statistics Denmark used full population registers from 1987 to 2007 to identify all Danish citizens who had emigrated in 1987, 1988, 1992, 1993, 1997, 1998, 2001 or 2002 and who were still abroad in 2007.² Emigrants had to be aged 18 or more when they emigrated, and at most 59 in 2007. They also had to have at least one parent who was born in Denmark. Statistics Denmark contacted first their parents or siblings to request their contact information abroad. Subsequently, they were asked to answer a web

² This effectively limits the analysis to migrants who have stayed abroad for at least five years. Having stayed abroad for five years predicts longer migration spells. For example, according to Danish population registers 72% of men and 71% of women who left Denmark in 1996 and were still abroad after five years were also abroad after ten years.

scheme in a survey that took place in June 2008. The overall response rate among stayers who could be contacted was 62 percent. In the analysis of migrants we concentrate on Danes who migrated to destinations outside Greenland and the Faroe Islands.³ We also drop survey respondents who report having returned to Denmark when the survey took place. With these restrictions, we ended up with a sample of 1979 male and 2089 female migrants.⁴ In the following analysis the number of observations changes slightly due to missing observations in different survey questions.

Table 1 reports the number of respondents who stay abroad, according to the destination country group.

The five most important residence countries for men are the United States, the United Kingdom, Norway, Sweden and Germany. For Danish women, the order is slightly different: the United Kingdom, the United States, Norway, Germany, and Sweden. Together, these five countries account for 60 percent of respondents. Of these five countries, Sweden and Norway are culturally, economically and politically by far closest to Denmark. The languages are closely related and present-day Southern Sweden was part of Denmark for centuries. All three are highly redistributive and rich welfare states. All in all, this means that migrating to Sweden or Norway is very easy even for the less educated. The societies in the United States and the United Kingdom, on the other hand, place a much higher responsibility on individuals themselves, and have lower taxes, less generous transfers, and wider income differences. One can also argue that work is more central in the Anglo-Saxon countries.

Based on these considerations, we classify destination countries into other Nordic countries, the United States, the United Kingdom or Ireland, Canada, Australia or New Zealand, rest of Western Europe and rest of the world. We study different English-speaking countries in most analyses separately, in order to identify whether the United States stands out as the land of opportunities, and whether migrants to the United Kingdom and Ireland differ in their attitudes from migrants to other European countries less than migrants to the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Most respondents are living in English-speaking countries that account for 38 percent of men and 40 percent of women. Other Nordic countries accommodate 21 percent of both men and women, and rest of Europe 28 percent of men and 33 percent of women. Only 6 percent of women and 13 percent of men live in the rest of the world.

To compare emigrants with Danes living in Denmark, we use data from round 4 of the European Social Survey (ESS), conducted in 2008/2009. The response rate for the survey in Denmark was 53.8%. We restrict our sample to those who were at least 24 or at most 60 years old when the survey took place, to have the same age group as respondents in the survey to emigrants. With this restriction, we end up with a sample of 939 ESS respondents.

³ Greenland and the Faroe Islands are autonomous regions but still part of Denmark. We have excluded these destinations as many of these migrants could have originated in Greenland or the Faroe Islands, and many would actually be returning home rather than emigrating from Denmark.

⁴ It should be noted that the observations are unweighted in the following analysis, and their distributions do not reflect the distributions in the underlying target population directly. However, as the target population can be identified in the Danish population registers, it can be confirmed that the distributions of the main individual sociodemographic characteristics from the year before emigration reflect those of the target population fairly well.

4. Attitudes towards Income Redistribution

In this section, we show how Danish emigrants compare with Danes who live in Denmark in their attitudes towards income redistribution. We also study how attitudes differ between migrants to different destinations. Our hypothesis is that migrants would, on average, self-select themselves into different countries also according to their redistributive preferences. This would imply that those migrating to less redistributive countries would have more negative attitudes towards redistribution, even after controlling for education and socio-economic status.

As discussed in the previous sections, preferences for redistribution are likely to reflect both self-interest and fairness considerations. In order to focus on fairness considerations, we asked in our survey Danes living abroad to state their opinion regarding the suggestion to increase income redistribution in Denmark. Another advantage from focusing on Denmark is that this guarantees a common point of reference to respondents living in various countries, and allows a comparison with attitudes of Danes living in Denmark. In the European Social Survey, attitudes towards income redistribution were measured by asking respondents to state whether they agree strongly, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree or disagree strongly with the statement “The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels.” Table 2 presents the distribution of answers separately for men and women.

Table 2 shows that 39 percent of men and 45 percent of women are in favor of government taking measures to reduce income differences, and 42 percent of men and 34 percent of women are against. Therefore, women are more left-wing, in line with findings by Edlund and Pande (2002), although differences are not very big.

In our survey for Danes living abroad, preferences for redistribution in Denmark were measured with the following question: “What is your opinion of a suggestion to increase taxes on those with high incomes in Denmark, and distribute the money to those with low incomes?” We used a 5-point scale from “Strongly in favor” to “Strongly against”. Table 3 a below reports the answers by men and table 3 b answers by women, according to the destination country group.

Tables 3a and 3b reveal that there is a big gender difference in attitudes towards income redistribution. The majority of men oppose a suggestion to increase income redistribution in Denmark, and majority of women support it. Majority of Danish men in all other destinations than other Nordic countries are against a suggestion to increase redistribution in Denmark. The majority of women in all destinations are in favor of increasing redistribution in Denmark. Among both men and women, those living in other Nordic countries are most positive towards increasing redistribution in Denmark. This is not too surprising: one would expect that those who are most in favor of redistribution to be more likely to live in a highly redistributive country.

Both men and women living abroad are more polarized in their opinions than Danes living in Denmark. Although part of this may reflect subtle differences in the formulation of questions (our survey asked directly about redistributing income, ESS about

“taking measures to reduce differences in income levels”), there is also a general pattern that women living abroad are more positive towards increasing redistribution in Denmark than women who live in Denmark, while men living abroad are more negative than men living in Denmark.

5. Opinions about the Determinants of Success and General Trust in People

Fong (2001) finds that individuals prefer more redistribution if they believe that poverty is exogenously determined, and Corneo and Grüner (2002) find that individuals who believe that hard work is important for getting ahead in life are less in favor of redistribution. Also trust can be expected to affect attitudes towards income redistribution. Those with a low level of generalized trust are likely to view also welfare benefit claimants more suspiciously, and thus have a more negative attitude towards redistribution. To account for these links, our survey asked for opinions about the determinants of individual success and also an attitude question measuring generalized trust. This allows us to test later whether different attitudes towards redistribution in different destinations reflect different opinions about the determinants of individual success, or differences in generalized trust.

The measure of beliefs on the determinants of success is based on the survey question: *“Which of the following describes your standpoint when it comes to the determinants of material success?”* The answer alternatives were *“Success is mainly determined by own work and choices”*, *“Success is about equally determined by own work and choices as well as luck or parental background”*, *“Success is mainly determined by luck”*, and *“Success is mainly determined by parental background.”* As the last two categories had only few respondents, they are combined in the subsequent analysis.

The measure of perceptions on general trustworthiness of people is based on the question: *“Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?”* The answer alternatives were *“Most people can be trusted”*, *“Don’t know”*, and *“Need to be very careful”*.

Tables 4a and 4b report findings concerning opinions on what determines individual success. Majority of Danes in all destinations replied that success depends about equally on own work and choices, as well as luck or parental background. 37 to 48 percent of men and 29 to 44 percent of women were of the opinion that success is determined primarily by own work and choices, and only 0-2 percent that it depends mainly on luck and parental background. Overall, men highlighted own work and choices somewhat more than women. Those who migrated to United States highlighted own work and choices most, followed by those going to other Anglo-Saxon countries and to other Nordic countries. The emphasis on own work and choices in English-speaking countries is in line with Alesina and Angeletos (2005) who studied differences between the United States and Europe, finding that the United States is also perceived as a land of opportunities.

Tables 5a and 5b report generalized trust in people. Respondents living in other Nordic countries seem to be more trustful than those living in other destinations.

6. Explaining Attitudes

6.1 Preferences for redistribution

The descriptive statistics in previous sections suggest that women are more positive towards redistribution than men, and that those who migrated to other Nordic countries are more positive than others. We next study to what extent attitudes towards redistribution can be explained by the residence country group, when controlling for characteristics that have been shown earlier to affect attitudes towards redistribution. To do this we run ordered logit regression models⁵ controlling for gender, age, family situation and education.

As a point of comparison, we first report as table 6 ordered logit analysis on to what extent age, family situation (measured by an indicator variable for being married or having a registered partner, and an indicator for having children) and dummies for two education categories (*short or medium higher education* and *master's degree or higher*) explain attitudes towards income equalization among Danes living in Denmark. Among men, only age has an effect that is statistically significant at the 5-percent level, with support for redistribution increasing in age (in the age group 24 to 60). The point estimate for the effect of having a master's degree or more is clearly negative, but does not reach statistical significance. Among women, being married reduced support for redistribution.

Table 7 presents a corresponding analysis for Danish emigrants with the same explanatory variables. Among men who have emigrated, both short and medium degree higher education and master's degree or more clearly and statistically significantly reduce support for redistribution. The broad gender differences are similar among Danes who have stayed in Denmark and among emigrants: being more educated reduces support for redistribution among men, and being married among women.

Table 8 introduces migration related variables by including destination country group dummies with *Nordic Countries* as the omitted category, dummies *family related* and *work related* for the purpose of migration and additional controls for occupational category (*medium skilled* and *high skilled*)⁶.

The coefficients for controls in the regression for men are in line with earlier results known from the literature. The coefficient for the occupation category *high skilled* is large and negative, and those with higher education are more negative. Further, men migrating for work-related reasons are more negative towards redistribution and male migrants to Anglo-Saxon countries, the rest of Western Europe and the rest of the world are more negative towards increasing redistribution in Denmark than migrants to other Nordic countries. Surprisingly, the negative coefficients for other English-speaking countries (Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand and the United Kingdom) are bigger than the coefficient for the United States. If migrants self-select to countries that offer

⁵ Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are used in all the regressions in the paper. We report regression coefficients in tables and refer to marginal effects in the discussion where appropriate.

⁶ The category *high skilled* includes those who are self-employed in a profession (e.g. doctor, dentist, lawyer), working in top management and high skilled workers (e.g. physicists, engineers, doctors and architects).

the highest after-tax income level, one would expect those most negative toward redistribution to be more likely to migrate to the United States. Since comparison of coefficient sizes can be misleading due to non-linearity of the ordered logit model we also calculated marginal effects. Residing in the United States makes the latent support for redistribution variable 0.06 standard deviations smaller than residing in the Nordic countries, holding all other variables constant. For comparison, residing in UK or Ireland makes the latent variable 0.09 standard deviations smaller. Work-related reason for migrating makes the latent variable 0.11 standard deviations smaller holding all other variables constant. Having a high-skilled occupation is the most significant determinant of preferences as having a high-skilled occupation instead of a low-skilled one makes the latent variable 0.17 standard deviations smaller in comparison to having a low-skilled occupation. The main finding is that the men migrating for work-related reasons and men residing in destinations outside Nordic countries are more negative towards redistribution of income, but this effects are smaller in size than the effects of own occupation.

In the regression for women in the second column of table 8 age of the respondent has a significant positive coefficient as was the case in the regression for men. Being married is associated with more negative attitudes towards redistribution. As in the regression for men the occupation category *high skilled* has a large and highly significant negative coefficient and being a *medium skilled* worker has a positive coefficient. In general, the estimated effects for women are much weaker than in the corresponding regression for men. The dummies for the educational level have insignificant coefficients, and more importantly, the coefficients for destination country group are all insignificant.

A possible explanation for the gender differences in destination country dummies is that many of the women in the data are so called tied migrants who have migrated because their spouse obtained a job abroad. A possible interpretation could then be that their occupation does not reflect their education as well as with men. It is also possible that their migration decisions are not related to their attitudes towards redistribution for the same reason. If this is the case, then occupation of the spouse could perform better in predicting their attitudes than their individual characteristics. Table 9 extends the set of explanatory variables to include indicator variables for the occupation of the spouse. The estimated effects of spousal occupation for men's attitude towards redistribution do not differ statistically significantly from zero. In the regression for women the estimated coefficient for having a *high skilled* spouse is negative, large and highly significant, and the coefficient for *medium skilled* spouse is positive and significant. The estimated effect of spousal high-skilled occupation is for women larger than the effect of their own high-skilled occupation, which even loses its statistical significance among married women when spousal occupation is controlled for.

In order to test directly the effect of being a tied migrant, we ran regressions separately for women who migrated for work reasons, and for women who migrated for family reasons. The results, that are reported in table 10 reveal that own occupation is more important for women who migrated for work reasons and spousal occupation for those who migrated for family reasons. It should be noted that the coefficients for spousal occupations include also the general effect of having a spouse, with reference category being those without a spouse.

6.2 The effects of trust and opinions on the determinants of success

As beliefs on the determinants of success and trust on people can be related to preferences for redistribution, we include controls for these attitudes to the analysis. This allows to test whether differences between different destinations are driven by such attitude differences, or persist even after controlling for them. For example, it could be that those who are most convinced that individual success is determined by individual effort would be most likely to migrate to the United States and other English-speaking countries, resulting in more negative attitudes towards income redistribution there even if attitudes towards redistribution would not be directly related to the destination choice.

The variables measuring these beliefs and attitudes are based on the corresponding survey questions that were discussed in section 5. To control for beliefs on the determinants of success we include a dummy variable for the option “*Success is mainly determined by own work and choices*”, and to control for general trust on people we include a dummy variable for the option “*Need to be very careful*”.

Table 11 presents the regression results. Comparing tables 8 and 11, we see that most of the coefficients in the regressions seem to be robust for the new explanatory variables. The most notable change is that the destination country dummy for the United States loses statistical significance in the regression for men. A possible interpretation could be that migrants who trust in own work and effort as determinants of success tend to self-select to the United States.

In line with Fong (2001), both men and women are more likely to be against increasing redistribution if they are of the opinion that individual success depends mainly on own work and choices. For men, looking at the marginal effects the effect is of the same magnitude as the effect of migrating for work-related reasons. For women, the coefficient is larger than the coefficient of being married or differences between different destinations. Looking at marginal effects for women, the belief that own work and choices determine success makes the latent preference variable 0.13 standard deviations smaller holding other variables constant, which makes the belief the most important determinant of preferences for redistribution for women. Those with high level of generalized trust are more positive towards redistribution, the difference being somewhat larger for women.

6.3 The effect altruism towards siblings in Denmark

Since the respondents are themselves living abroad, the level of redistribution in Denmark does not affect their own economic situation directly. However, the respondents could care more deeply about the economic situation of their relatives than about non-relatives. We expect persons whose close ones benefit from income redistribution to be more positive towards it. One possible explanation for this is evolutionary biological. Hamilton (1964a, b) argues that individuals compare benefits of their actions to their kin with the private cost, weighting the benefit by genetic closeness. To test this, we study whether those who have a sibling who clearly benefits from redistribution prefer more redistribution in Denmark. We searched respondents’ siblings from the Danish population register, and ran regression using an indicator variable *benefit* for having a

sibling who resided in Denmark and was unemployed or on early retirement in 2007. Unemployment and retirement status are measured at the end of November each year, so the last calendar year before the survey took place was used. As reported in table 12, the coefficient for the indicator variable *benefit* is statistically insignificant for men, but large and significant for women. The findings suggest that women's support for redistribution is to a greater extent driven by the interest of their kin than men's support. Possible interpretation could be that women are in more general more altruistic than men, even though it is not obvious from evolutionary perspective whether kin selection should be viewed as altruism.

6.4 Selection or assimilation?

Different attitudes towards redistribution among emigrants in different destination countries may result from migrant selection or from migrants assimilating and adapting to values that are prevalent in their new home country. To shed light on the issue of causality we study whether age at migration and time spent in the destination country are related to preferences for redistribution.

Alesina and Giuliano (2011) point out, that according to psychological literature, political and economic beliefs are formed mostly during youth and early adulthood and are resistant to change afterwards. Krosnick and Alwin, (1989) have found evidence of significant socialization between 18 and 25 years of age. If assimilation is more important than selection, and if younger migrants are more prone to assimilate, we would expect to find stronger association between preferences and destination countries for those who have migrated at a young age. A testable implication of this hypothesis is that those who migrated to the United States and to other English-speaking countries at young age should have more negative attitudes towards redistribution than those who migrated at an older age. To see if this is the case we fit separate regression models for emigrant men in different destination country groups and include an indicator variable for young migration age.

Tables 13a and 13b present regression results for men and women who have emigrated to other Nordic countries, to United States, to UK or Ireland, or to Canada, Australia, or New Zealand.

Overall, the results do not offer support for the hypothesis that younger migrants would be assimilating to political values prevalent in the host country. The coefficients for age at migration in the regression for the United States are statistically insignificant for both men and women, although the signs for the point estimates are negative as the hypothesis suggests. Moreover, the coefficients for young migration age are positive and significant for male migrants to UK or Ireland.

6.5 Plans to return to Denmark

As was discussed in the theory section, among migrants who do not plan to return, attitudes towards taxation in the country of origin should depend only about views towards a just society, and not on self-interest or pecuniary considerations. And the other way around, among those who plan to return self-interest considerations should be more important. We study whether this is the case by running separate regressions for those who plan to return to Denmark.

In the survey, the respondents were asked about possible plans of returning to Denmark with a question “Do you plan to go back to Denmark within the next decade?”. The answer options were “no”, “probably no”, “uncertain”, “yes”, “probably yes” and “don’t know”. We run our regression model separately for those who chose “yes” or “probably yes” and for those who chose other options. The regression results for men are reported in table 14a and the results for women in table 14b. As expected, the coefficients for age and having a high skilled occupation are significant for both men and women who plan to return to Denmark, but insignificant for those who do not plan to return. For men, the coefficients for the destination country groups are significant for both those who are planning to return and those who don’t. A possible interpretation for this finding could be that self-interest considerations are indeed more important in determining the preferences for those who plan to return to Denmark.

7. Conclusions

In this paper, we have studied the attitudes towards income redistribution among Danes living in Denmark and Danish emigrants. Our empirical findings are in line with the earlier literature and with our theoretical considerations.

We found a remarkable gender difference among emigrants: the majority of men are against increasing redistribution, and the majority of women are in favor. Women are somewhat more positive towards redistribution also in Denmark, but the gender difference is much smaller than among emigrants. Among men, support for redistribution is stronger among those who migrate to other Nordic countries and weaker among those who migrate to other destinations and the support is weaker among men who have migrated for work-related reasons. However, destination country group or purpose of migration do not have a significant effect for women. A priori, the difference between destination country groups among men could be caused by self-selection of migrants according to their preferences for redistribution, or it could be that migrants assimilate to values and opinions prevalent in their countries of residence. However, we do not find evidence of assimilation to political values prevalent in the new home country. Women who had a sibling who benefited from redistribution are more positive towards redistribution than women who did not have such a sibling, but similar effect is not found for men. Further, we find evidence that pecuniary self-interest factors are associated with preferences for redistribution in Denmark only for those who plan to return to the country.

We also examined individual opinions on the determinants of individual success. The majority of respondents were of the opinion that both own work and choices as well as

luck and family background play an important role. More than a third credited success to own work and choices, and less than two percent primarily to luck or family background. As one would expect, those who highlighted the role of individual choices and effort as determinants of individual success are more negative towards redistribution, as are those who have a lower trust in people in general. Still, even after controlling for different attitudes, we find that Danes who migrate to other Nordic countries are more positive towards increasing income redistribution than Danish men who migrate to any other destination. Among women, the association between redistributive preferences and destination choice is much weaker. Instead, spousal occupation plays a big role, with women whose spouse is high skilled being much more negative towards income redistribution.

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Table 1: Number of respondents according to destination country group

destination country group	men	women
	No.	No.
Other Nordic countries	409	445
United States	338	285
UK or Ireland	285	418
Canada, Australia, or New Zealand	128	128
Rest of Western Europe	561	700
Rest of the world	258	113
total	1979	2089

Source: stayers survey

Table 2: Attitudes towards increasing redistribution among men and women living in Denmark

	strongly against Row %	somewhat against Row %	neutral Row %	somewhat in favor Row %	strongly in favor Row %
Men	10	32	19	28	11
Women	4	30	21	32	13

Source: European Social Survey

Table 3a: Men's attitudes towards increasing redistribution in Denmark

	strongly against Row %	somewhat against Row %	neutral Row %	somewhat in favor Row %	strongly in favor Row %
Other Nordic countries	25	17	11	29	17
United States	32	23	12	22	11
UK or Ireland	40	19	10	19	12
Canada, Australia, or New Zealand	34	19	12	20	15
Rest of Western Europe	38	22	8	23	9
Rest of the world	40	26	6	15	12

Source: stayers survey

Table 3b: Women's attitudes towards increasing redistribution in Denmark

	strongly against Row %	somewhat against Row %	neutral Row %	somewhat in favor Row %	strongly in favor Row %
Other Nordic countries	15	16	11	33	25
United States	19	19	11	29	21
UK or Ireland	15	17	13	32	23
Canada, Australia, or New Zealand	12	19	11	38	20
Rest of Western Europe	15	20	13	33	19
Rest of the world	16	24	10	29	22

Source: stayers survey

Table 4a: Men's opinions on the determinants of material success

	own work and choices Row %	both Row %	luck or parental background Row %
Other Nordic countries	39	58	2
United States	48	51	0
UK or Ireland	41	59	0
Canada, Australia, or New Zealand	47	53	0
Rest of Western Europe	37	62	1
Rest of the world	37	63	0

Source: stayers survey

Table 4b: Women's opinions on the determinants of material success

	own work and choices Row %	both Row %	luck or parental background Row %
Other Nordic countries	36	62	2
United States	39	61	0
UK or Ireland	37	63	0
Canada, Australia, or New Zealand	44	56	0
Rest of Western Europe	29	70	2
Rest of the world	32	66	2

Source: stayers survey

Table 5a: General trust in people among men

	need to be very careful Row %	don't know Row %	most people can be trusted Row %
Other Nordic countries	11	3	86
United States	17	6	78
UK or Ireland	17	5	78
Canada, Australia, or New Zealand	20	4	77
Rest of Western Europe	17	5	78
Rest of the world	23	3	74

Source: stayers survey

Table 5b: General trust in people among women

	need to be very careful Row %	don't know Row %	most people can be trusted Row %
Other Nordic countries	9	3	88
United States	16	7	77
UK or Ireland	14	5	81
Canada, Australia, or New Zealand	17	5	78
Rest of Western Europe	16	7	77
Rest of the world	15	8	77

Source: stayers survey

Table 6: Attitudes of men and women living in Denmark

taste for redistribution in Denmark	Men b/se	Women b/se
age	0.018* (0.01)	0.020* (0.01)
married	0.074 (0.20)	-0.535** (0.19)
children	-0.124 (0.19)	0.108 (0.20)
short or medium higher education	0.078 (0.19)	-0.168 (0.18)
master's degree or higher	-0.398 (0.27)	0.068 (0.27)
N	457	480
pseudo R-squared		

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Source: European Social Survey

Table 7: Attitudes for men and women living abroad

taste for redistribution in Denmark	Men b/se	Women b/se
age	0.016* (0.01)	0.027*** (0.01)
married	-0.059 (0.10)	-0.302** (0.10)
children	-0.026 (0.10)	-0.023 (0.10)
short or medium higher education	-0.344*** (0.10)	0.013 (0.10)
master's degree or higher	-0.414*** (0.10)	-0.144 (0.11)
N	1891	1891
pseudo R-squared	0.0040	0.0045

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Source: stayers survey

Table 8: Explaining attitudes with migration variables

taste for redistribution in Denmark	Men b/se	Women b/se
age	0.021** (0.01)	0.032*** (0.01)
married	0.052 (0.10)	-0.263** (0.10)
children	-0.070 (0.10)	-0.036 (0.10)
short or medium higher education	-0.232* (0.11)	-0.006 (0.10)
master's degree or higher	-0.042 (0.11)	0.016 (0.12)
medium skilled	0.233 (0.13)	0.212 (0.12)
high skilled	-0.663*** (0.10)	-0.427*** (0.12)
US	-0.305* (0.13)	-0.214 (0.15)
UK or Ireland	-0.499*** (0.15)	-0.019 (0.13)
CA, AU or NZ	-0.584** (0.20)	0.017 (0.18)
Rest of Europe	-0.495*** (0.12)	-0.143 (0.12)
Rest of the World	-0.488** (0.15)	-0.161 (0.21)
work related	-0.433*** (0.10)	-0.118 (0.12)
partner or family related	0.216 (0.12)	-0.156 (0.10)
N	1891	1891
pseudo R-squared	0.0324	0.0091

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Source: stayers survey

Table 9: Explaining attitudes with skill level of the spouse

taste for redistribution in Denmark	Men b/se	Women b/se
age	0.028** (0.01)	0.033*** (0.01)
children	-0.163 (0.12)	-0.047 (0.15)
short or medium higher education	-0.190 (0.13)	-0.022 (0.13)
master's degree or higher	0.042 (0.13)	0.185 (0.15)
medium skilled	0.438** (0.16)	0.324* (0.15)
high skilled	-0.639*** (0.12)	-0.255 (0.15)
spouse medium skilled	0.290* (0.14)	0.304* (0.15)
spouse high skilled	-0.095 (0.13)	-0.424*** (0.12)
US	-0.318* (0.16)	-0.154 (0.18)
UK or Ireland	-0.428* (0.18)	-0.038 (0.17)
CA, AU or NZ	-0.627** (0.23)	0.200 (0.23)
Rest of Europe	-0.522*** (0.16)	-0.013 (0.14)
Rest of the World	-0.338 (0.18)	-0.035 (0.24)
work related	-0.464*** (0.13)	-0.064 (0.16)
partner or family related	0.114 (0.15)	-0.065 (0.12)
N	1268	1277
pseudo R-squared	0.0351	0.0146

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Source: stayers survey

Table 10: Women's attitudes by purpose of migration

taste for redistribution in Denmark	work related b/se	family related b/se
age	0.052** (0.02)	0.026* (0.01)
children	0.025 (0.20)	-0.096 (0.18)
short or medium higher education	-0.524* (0.24)	-0.013 (0.16)
master's degree or higher	0.012 (0.24)	-0.074 (0.18)
medium skilled	0.527* (0.26)	0.135 (0.17)
high skilled	-0.486* (0.22)	-0.371 (0.20)
spouse*spouse low skilled	-0.010 (0.22)	0.018 (0.18)
spouse*spouse medium skilled	-0.375 (0.30)	0.372 (0.21)
spouse*spouse high skilled	-0.316 (0.25)	-0.476** (0.17)
US	-0.141 (0.36)	-0.368 (0.22)
UK or Ireland	-0.509 (0.31)	-0.114 (0.19)
CA, AU or NZ	-0.854* (0.36)	0.207 (0.24)
Rest of Western Europe	-0.384 (0.23)	-0.183 (0.17)
Rest of the World	0.148 (0.37)	-0.513 (0.28)
N	436	899

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Source: stayers survey

Table 11: Explaining attitudes with opinion variables

taste for redistribution in Denmark	Men b/se	Women b/se
age	0.018* (0.01)	0.030*** (0.01)
married	0.041 (0.10)	-0.265** (0.10)
children	-0.057 (0.10)	-0.030 (0.10)
short or medium higher education	-0.270* (0.11)	-0.081 (0.11)
master's degree or higher	-0.121 (0.11)	-0.117 (0.12)
medium skilled	0.175 (0.13)	0.179 (0.12)
high skilled	-0.658*** (0.10)	-0.413*** (0.12)
own work and choices	-0.465*** (0.09)	-0.495*** (0.09)
low trust	-0.240* (0.11)	-0.425*** (0.12)
US	-0.244 (0.13)	-0.198 (0.15)
UK or Ireland	-0.496*** (0.15)	-0.019 (0.13)
CA, AU or NZ	-0.536** (0.20)	0.054 (0.18)
Rest of Western Europe	-0.504*** (0.12)	-0.168 (0.12)
Rest of the World	-0.488** (0.15)	-0.137 (0.21)
work related	-0.437*** (0.10)	-0.110 (0.12)
partner or family related	0.187 (0.12)	-0.179 (0.10)
N	1891	1891
pseudo R-squared	0.0384	0.0168

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Source: stayers survey

Table 12: Explaining attitudes with altruism towards a sibling

taste for redistribution in Denmark	Men b/se	Women b/se
age	0.021** (0.01)	0.032*** (0.01)
married	0.051 (0.10)	-0.260** (0.10)
children	-0.070 (0.10)	-0.035 (0.10)
short or medium higher education	-0.232* (0.10)	0.008 (0.10)
master's degree or higher	-0.043 (0.11)	0.031 (0.12)
medium skilled	0.231 (0.13)	0.215 (0.12)
high skilled	-0.662*** (0.10)	-0.431*** (0.12)
US	-0.304* (0.13)	-0.222 (0.15)
UK or Ireland	-0.494*** (0.15)	-0.015 (0.13)
CA, AU or NZ	-0.580** (0.20)	0.028 (0.18)
Rest of Europe	-0.493*** (0.12)	-0.143 (0.12)
Rest of the World	-0.486** (0.15)	-0.166 (0.21)
work related	-0.433*** (0.10)	-0.115 (0.12)
partner or family related	0.216 (0.12)	-0.152 (0.10)
benefit	0.131 (0.23)	0.540* (0.24)
N	1891	1891
pseudo R-squared	0.0325	0.0100

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Source: stayers survey

Table 13a: Explaining attitudes with age at migration for men

taste for redistribution in Denmark	Nordic b/se	US b/se	UK or IE b/se	CA, AU or NZ b/se	Other Western b/se
age	0.019 (0.01)	0.038* (0.02)	0.030 (0.02)	0.027 (0.03)	0.010 (0.02)
married	-0.117 (0.21)	-0.027 (0.26)	0.297 (0.26)	-0.196 (0.48)	-0.074 (0.19)
children	0.244 (0.24)	-0.119 (0.24)	-0.124 (0.25)	0.078 (0.40)	-0.013 (0.19)
short or medium higher education	-0.146 (0.23)	-0.545 (0.29)	-0.007 (0.30)	-0.514 (0.44)	-0.247 (0.21)
master's degree or higher	0.417 (0.25)	-0.097 (0.30)	-0.326 (0.27)	-0.363 (0.45)	0.031 (0.23)
medium skilled	0.001 (0.29)	0.285 (0.29)	0.657 (0.38)	1.039 (0.59)	0.066 (0.23)
high skilled	-1.057*** (0.24)	-0.757** (0.25)	-0.770** (0.26)	0.095 (0.40)	-0.605** (0.20)
work related	-0.681** (0.25)	0.034 (0.24)	-0.600* (0.30)	0.165 (0.40)	-0.473* (0.19)
partner or family related	0.043 (0.26)	0.895** (0.28)	0.073 (0.46)	0.561 (0.42)	0.324 (0.27)
migration at a young age	-0.313 (0.28)	-0.136 (0.32)	0.663* (0.31)	0.790 (0.61)	0.220 (0.26)
N	392	320	271	123	532
pseudo R-squared	0.0405	0.0398	0.0560	0.0241	0.0256

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Source: stayers survey

Table 13b: Explaining attitudes with age at migration for women

taste for redistribution in Denmark	Nordic b/se	US b/se	UK or IE b/se	CA, AU or NZ b/se	Other Western b/se
age	0.079*** (0.02)	0.034 (0.03)	0.010 (0.02)	0.012 (0.03)	0.027 (0.02)
married	-0.418* (0.20)	-0.313 (0.30)	-0.459* (0.19)	-0.228 (0.51)	0.007 (0.19)
children	0.091 (0.25)	-0.442 (0.27)	-0.102 (0.19)	0.544 (0.46)	-0.062 (0.21)
short or medium higher education	0.165 (0.26)	-0.022 (0.28)	0.016 (0.22)	-0.046 (0.40)	0.025 (0.18)
master's degree or higher	0.210 (0.29)	-0.078 (0.32)	0.018 (0.26)	0.602 (0.55)	-0.044 (0.21)
medium skilled	0.003 (0.24)	0.136 (0.40)	0.384 (0.26)	-0.621 (0.53)	0.460* (0.22)
high skilled	-0.947*** (0.26)	0.145 (0.33)	-0.513* (0.26)	-0.332 (0.49)	-0.247 (0.22)
work related	0.398 (0.26)	-0.069 (0.34)	-0.585* (0.29)	-1.018 (0.54)	-0.143 (0.21)
partner or family related	0.114 (0.23)	-0.264 (0.26)	-0.258 (0.21)	0.157 (0.46)	-0.099 (0.18)
migration at a young age	0.495 (0.27)	-0.060 (0.29)	0.347 (0.22)	-0.358 (0.54)	0.186 (0.17)
N	409	260	392	118	614
pseudo R-squared	0.0371	0.0108	0.0208	0.0345	0.0073

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Source: stayers survey

Table 14a: Explaining attitudes according to whether one plans to return to DK for men

taste for redistribution in Denmark	Plans to return b/se	No plans to return b/se
age	0.017* (0.01)	0.036 (0.02)
married	0.135 (0.11)	-0.363 (0.26)
children	-0.008 (0.11)	-0.469 (0.28)
short or medium higher education	-0.242* (0.11)	-0.256 (0.30)
master's degree or higher	0.025 (0.12)	-0.482 (0.29)
medium skilled	0.218 (0.13)	0.176 (0.49)
high skilled	-0.701*** (0.11)	-0.482 (0.25)
US	-0.308* (0.14)	-0.394 (0.40)
UK or Ireland	-0.408* (0.16)	-1.007* (0.40)
CA, AU or NZ	-0.461* (0.21)	-1.547* (0.65)
Rest of Europe	-0.447*** (0.13)	-0.904** (0.33)
Rest of the World	-0.450** (0.17)	-0.904* (0.42)
work related	-0.382*** (0.11)	-0.673* (0.28)
partner or family related	0.255 (0.13)	-0.048 (0.35)
N	1596	295
pseudo R-squared	0.0306	0.0592

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Source: stayers survey

Table 14b: Explaining attitudes according to whether one plans to return to DK for women

taste for redistribution in Denmark	Plans to return b/se	No plans to return b/se
age	0.034*** (0.01)	0.022 (0.02)
married	-0.217* (0.11)	-0.576* (0.24)
children	-0.015 (0.12)	-0.215 (0.25)
short or medium higher education	-0.047 (0.11)	0.277 (0.27)
master's degree or higher	0.063 (0.13)	-0.233 (0.32)
medium skilled	0.206 (0.13)	0.231 (0.32)
high skilled	-0.504*** (0.13)	0.116 (0.33)
US	-0.357* (0.17)	0.746 (0.40)
UK or Ireland	-0.117 (0.14)	0.543 (0.36)
CA, AU or NZ	0.059 (0.21)	-0.121 (0.40)
Rest of Europe	-0.167 (0.12)	0.013 (0.35)
Rest of the World	-0.383 (0.24)	0.625 (0.46)
work related	-0.129 (0.13)	-0.020 (0.35)
partner or family related	-0.165 (0.11)	-0.079 (0.27)
N	1593	298
pseudo R-squared	0.0107	0.0233

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Source: stayers survey