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THE CO-BENEFITS OF CLIMATE POLICY: EVIDENCE FROM THE EU EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME

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THE CO-BENEFITS OF CLIMATE POLICY: EVIDENCE FROM THE EU EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME

March 1, 2016

Still preliminary and incomplete

Abstract

Carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions are known to cause global climate change but no damage to the local environment. However, because CO₂ is often jointly produced with other substances that pollute the environment, CO₂ abatement may generate ancillary benefits, especially for human health. Previous research suggests that these co-benefits can offset a substantial share of the economic costs of mitigation policies. This paper conducts the first empirical test of this hypothesis in the context of the European Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) for CO₂. The econometric analysis exploits comprehensive microdata on discharges of more than 90 different pollutants into air, water and soil, at more than 28,000 commercial installations in 31 European countries. It is found that the EU ETS decreased air releases of some pollutants while increasing water releases of other pollutants. Moreover, in some cases the patterns of spatial redistribution are strongly correlated with income, population size or age. The implications for the efficiency and environmental justice of the EU ETS are discussed.

Keywords: climate change; ancillary benefits; pollution; firm data

JEL Classifications: H23, H25, Q52, Q54

In making the case for the [EPA coal-fired power plants] rule, the Obama administration has highlighted its indirect health benefits. Mr. Obama's political advisers have made the bet that a policy presented as a move to reduce childhood asthma and other diseases will gain more public traction than a complex new energy policy designed to reduce global warming in the long term.

The New York Times, May 4, 2015.

1 Introduction

Climate change – the “ultimate commons problem” (Stavins, 2011) – is caused by anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG) such as carbon dioxide (CO₂) and is expected to have severe ecological and economic consequences (IPCC, 2014a). Mitigating climate change will require substantial abatement of GHG emissions from all core economic sectors, mainly through curbing fossil fuel consumption (Pacala and Socolow, 2004). Fossil fuel combustion is also a principle source of local and regional air and water pollution, because it sets free sulphur dioxide (SO₂), nitrogen oxides (NO_x), carbon monoxide (CO), particulate matter (PM₁₀), and other harmful pollutants. Curbing fossil fuel consumption is therefore likely to create ancillary benefits in terms of reduced damages to human, animal and plant health, thanks to better air and water quality.

Previous research has concluded, based on simulations, that the ancillary benefits of greenhouse gas mitigation policies offset a substantial fraction of the economic costs (IPCC, 2014b,c). This paper conducts the first empirical test of this hypothesis based on ex-post data from the world's largest cap-and-trade system for CO₂ emissions, the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). Quasi-experimental techniques are employed to test whether the EU ETS decreased emissions of pollutants other than CO₂. The econometric analysis draws upon comprehensive microdata on discharges of more than 90 different pollutants into air, water and soil, at 28,000 commercial facilities in 31 European countries.

On theoretical grounds, economists favor market-based instruments such as taxes and tradable permit schemes over quantity regulation because the former minimize the aggregate abatement costs and incentivize the adoption of cleaner technologies (Montgomery, 1972; Milliman

and Prince, 1989; Montero, 2002). The EU ETS is the most ambitious such policy implemented to date. Introduced in 2005, the policy has been covering more than 2 billion tons of CO₂ emitted at roughly 12,000 installations in up to 30 countries. Emission permits are fully tradable across installations and countries. Creating a multi-billion Euro market for emission permits, the EU ETS is widely regarded as the prototype for a future global carbon market. In spite of this, very little research so far has tried to evaluate the impacts of the EU ETS on CO₂ emissions and other outcomes. Applying quasi-experimental techniques to plant-level data on CO₂ emissions from administrative sources in Germany and France, respectively, Petrick and Wagner (2014) and Wagner et al. (2013) find that the EU ETS substantially reduced manufacturing emissions during the first half of trading phase II (2008 through 2010). Although this finding speaks directly to the environmental benefits of the EU ETS, a complete picture of the analysis must account for ancillary benefits – or co-benefits – of abating CO₂ emissions, which is the objective of this paper.

The ancillary benefits of climate policy have been the subject of a sizable literature (Aunan et al., 2007; Burtraw et al., 2003; Ekins, 1996; Ekin, 1996; Pittel and Rübhelke, 2008; Rypdal et al., 2007; van Vuuren et al., 2006; Driscoll et al., 2015) which estimates that between 30% to over 100% of the private costs of carbon abatement (Davis et al., 2000) can be recouped in terms of co-benefits, depending on the policy measure, sector and country under study. These large estimates are driven to a large extent by highly valued health benefits from better air and water quality. A common feature of these studies is that they are based on model simulations which are fairly complex and involve multiple steps. First, an economic model is used to forecast the economic development both with and without the policy under consideration. Next, the economic forecast is translated into an emission forecast for both CO₂ and local air pollutants using technological relationships. These numbers are subsequently fed into an atmospheric model that simulates the dispersion of pollution in space. For a given population distribution, this determines the exposure to air pollution for each pollutant. Finally, the physical health impact of a reduction in exposure is evaluated using dose-response functions and subsequently monetized using values from the health economics literature.

The principle shortcoming of the simulation approach is that the estimated ancillary bene-

fits of a policy depend critically on the counterfactual emissions path, which is influenced by new regulation, compliance with regulations, technology, economic development, demography and natural activities (Davis et al., 2000). The ex-post evaluation proposed here seeks to overcome this issue by using the actual observed outcomes at installations in the control group as a baseline against which to compare the outcomes of the treatment group (EU ETS installations), and by employing quasi-experimental methods which have become the gold standard for the evaluation of environmental policies (e.g. Henderson, 1996; Becker and Henderson, 2000; Greenstone, 2002; Martin et al., 2014).

The second fundamental weakness of simulations is owed to the decentralized nature of emissions trading. Market forces shift emissions to the installations with the highest marginal abatement costs, but the computable general equilibrium models used in the simulations are not designed to make explicit predictions as to how the emissions of CO₂ and local pollutants will change at each of the roughly 12,000 installations regulated under the EU ETS. However, the spatial distribution of local pollutants is highlighted by two recent studies that analyze the unintended consequences of permit trading across facilities in the context of conventional pollution markets in the US. First, the trading of permits on a one-for-one basis across air sheds with different marginal damages of pollution gives rise to large inefficiencies, unless an appropriate exchange rates is applied to the transfer of permits from one air shed to another (Mauzerall et al., 2005; Muller and Mendelsohn, 2009). Second, public acceptance of emissions trading programs may be jeopardized if the spatial distribution of pollution shifts in a way that makes minorities and low-income populations suffer most of the associated damages to human health and the environment (Fowlie et al., 2012). So far, none of these aspects has been studied in the context of the EU ETS.

In this paper we use installation-level data to conduct the first ex-post analysis of the co-benefits of the EU ETS. The use of microdata allows us both to estimate the regulation-induced average change in pollution, and to characterize the spatial distribution of this change. The next section explains the principal aspects of the policy in question, the EU ETS. Section 3 presents the research design and Section 4 describes the data set. The estimation results are discussed in Section 5. Section 7 concludes.

2 The EU Emissions Trading Scheme

The EU ETS is a classical cap-and-trade system for CO₂ emissions, focussed mainly on power generation and energy-intensive manufacturing industries. According to the Emissions Trading Directive¹ participation in the EU ETS is mandatory for all combustion installations with a rated thermal input exceeding 20MWh, which includes conventional power plants. In addition, the scheme covers large installations engaging in activities that are intensive in CO₂ emissions such as mineral oil refineries, coke ovens, iron and steel, and factories producing cement, glass, lime, bricks, ceramics, and pulp and paper. Recent years have seen an expansion of sectoral coverage to include airlines and aluminium manufacturing installations, as well as the coverage of other GHG emissions.

Participating installations are required to surrender a pollution permit, known as an EU allowance (EUA), for each metric ton of CO₂ emitted per year. These allowances are distributed to firms in part for free or through an auctioning system. The number of permits – the “cap” – is chosen to limit the total amount of pollution below the levels that would otherwise arise – “business-as-usual” (BAU) emissions. Consequently, a scarcity of pollution permits arises resulting in an increase in the price for emission permits as firms trade on the carbon market. The EU ETS has established a uniform carbon price signalling the opportunity cost of emitting CO₂ to all market participants, providing an incentive to reduce emissions up until the point at which each participant is indifferent between buying one permit at the market price and paying the cost of reducing its emissions by one additional ton of carbon.

The EU ETS came into effect in 2005 with a three-year pilot period (phase 1). Phase 2 of the EU ETS ran from 2008-2012 and saw an expansion in the coverage of both countries and sectors. In the current trading period, phase 3, more than 12,000 installations in 31 countries take part in the scheme. Over the life cycle of the EU ETS the price has varied considerably.

While phase 3 is scheduled to end in 2020, the cap on total emissions is set to decline at a rate of 1.74% per year up until 2020 and 2.2% per year until 2030, reducing EU CO₂ emissions by 43% compared to 2005.

¹Directive 2009/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to improve and extend the greenhouse gas emission allowance trading scheme of the Community (2009) OJ L 140, 5.6.2009, p. 63–87 (Emissions Trading Directive).

Independently of international efforts to curb greenhouse gas emissions beyond the EU, the ETS is the centerpiece of the EU’s unilateral climate policy, which stipulates a 20% reduction of GHG emissions in 2020 relative to 1990. A comprehensive review of the history and structure of the EU ETS can be found in Ellerman et al. (2016).

In their survey of the empirical literature on the EU ETS, Martin et al. (2016) report that the EU ETS has had a robust negative impact on carbon emissions compared to business-as-usual emissions, but only in phase 2 of the policy. In spite of this, the empirical evidence did not support the view that the EU ETS had strong detrimental effects, despite some heterogeneity across studies and outcomes. This hints at the possibility of substantial co-benefits, but this issue has not been studied yet in the literature.

3 Research Design

We seek to estimate the impact of the EU ETS, which regulates a single pollutant, CO₂, on the emissions of pollutants that are co-produced with CO₂. To this end, we adopt the Null hypothesis that the implementation of the EU ETS has not induced regulated facilities to change their emissions of pollutants other than CO₂. This hypothesis is tested against the two-sided alternative that emissions have increased or decreased. The implementation of this test follows the program evaluation literature with the objective to identify the causal impact of the EU ETS on pollution emissions.

Differences-in-Differences In line with the potential outcome framework, denote by $Y_i(1)$ the emissions at installation i when subject to the EU ETS and by $Y_i(0)$ the emissions when the installation is not subject to the EU ETS. Denote by D_i the treatment indicator. The average treatment effect on the treated is given by

$$\alpha_{ATT} = E(Y_{it}(1) - Y_{it}(0) | X, D = 1) \quad (1)$$

In a non-experimental setup such as the EU ETS, requiring conditional independence of treatment status and pre-treatment outcomes may be too strong an assumption. By focusing on

differences-in-differences (DID) of emissions

$$\Delta_{t,0} = E(Y_{it}(1) - Y_{it}(0)|X, D = 1) - E(Y_{it}(1) - Y_{it}(0)|X, D = 0) \quad (2)$$

where the index denotes a pre-treatment period – one can purge the estimate from selection on both observable and unobservable characteristics that persist over time. We use linear regression to implement the DID estimator as follows:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha ETS_i \times Post2004_t + \gamma_1 ETS_i + \gamma_2 Post2004_t + X'_{it}\beta + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (3)$$

where ETS_i is a (time-invariant) dummy indicating that an installation is regulated under the EU ETS, $Post2004_t$ is a dummy variable that equals 1 during the treatment phase and X_{it} is a vector of control variables including dummy variables for the country, year and 2-digit NACE industry code. Estimation is by ordinary least squares with robust standard errors clustered at the installation level. We estimate this model both in levels and natural logs of the dependent variable.

Heterogeneous Effects One of the key objectives of this study is to analyze how trading of CO₂ permits has shifted around conventional air pollution across Europe, and whether particular groups of countries or people have been systematically affected by this dynamic. In order to examine this empirically, we augment eq. (3) by including an interaction term of the treatment effect with a variable Z that measures socio-economic and demographic attributes of the region in which the installation is located:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha ETS_i \times Post2004_t + \delta ETS_i \times Post2004_t \times Z_i + \gamma_1 ETS_i + \gamma_2 Post2004_t + \gamma_3 Z_i + X'_{it}\beta + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (4)$$

The estimated parameter on this interaction term, δ , indicates whether the treatment effect varies systematically with income, education, age, or other local attributes.

4 Data

The analysis is based on two principal sources of data. First, the treatment indicator is available from the European Union Transaction Log (EUTL), the official registry of the EU ETS.² The EUTL also contains annual data on CO₂ emissions at approximately 12,000 treated installations since 2005.

Second, the European Pollution Release and Transfer Register (E-PRTR) provides data on emissions of up to 91 different pollutants for approximately 28,000 industrial installations in Europe.³ Pollution discharges into different environmental media are reported separately for air, water and soil. The broad groups of pollutants covered are: greenhouse gases, other gases, heavy metals, pesticides, chlorinated organic substances, other organic substances and inorganic substances. Data for two pre-treatment years, 2001 and 2004, are available from the European Pollution Emissions Register (EPER), the pre-decessor of the E-PRTR.⁴ The E-PRTR Regulation was passed in 2006.⁵ Among other improvements, the E-PRTR database provides annual coverage starting in year 2007. In most countries, the same installation identifiers are used in both data sets, so that linking pre- and post treatment observations for each plant is straightforward. In some countries the link is not perfect, however, and in the case of Germany, the link is broken. In these cases, we establish the match by hand using the installation name, postcode, and GPS coordinates.

A substantial amount of work has gone into the matching of EUTL installations to their counterparts in the combined EPER/E-PRTR data. Since the national identifiers are not standardized across data sources, automatic linking installations across data bases is not possible. Therefore, we link EUTL installations by hand to their counterparts in the E-PRTR. This has the added benefit that we can deal with issues arising from slightly different definitions of what an installation means in either data set. Whenever such ambiguities arise, we consider as the

²Available for download from <http://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/data/european-union-emissions-trading-scheme-eu-ets-data-from-citl-6>

³Available for download from <http://prtr.ec.europa.eu/>

⁴Available for download from <http://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/data/eper-the-european-pollutant-emission-register-4>

⁵REGULATION (EC) No 166/2006 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 18 January 2006 concerning the establishment of a European Pollutant Release and Transfer Register and amending Council Directives 91/689/EEC and 96/61/EC (2006) OJ L 33/1 (E-PRTR Regulation).

unit of analysis all installations that are in the same location and that belong to the same firm.

A 100% matching rate cannot be expected because not all EUTL installations are required to report under the E-PRTR regulation. For an installation to appear in the E-PRTR it must (i) exceed a capacity threshold specified for the industry and (ii) emit more of a given pollutant than the reporting threshold that applies to it.⁶ Therefore, an EU ETS installation may not appear in E-PRTR if it is too small or emits too little of a given pollutant. For example, combustion installations with a thermal rated input of at least 20 MW are required to participate in emissions trading, but only those with a thermal rated input of at least 50 MW will also appear among the E-PRTR installations. It is for this reason that, even with unique identifiers and definitions across data sets, the matching rate would not be 100%. In practice, an average matching rate of 55.2% is achieved. The rate of success varies across countries, and is presented in detail in Table 1.

The final sample contains 75,252 observations reported by 24,370 installations. The largest proportion of pollutants is released into the air, followed by water and land. The number of different pollutants that an installation reports varies greatly and ranges from 1 to 50. Among non-agricultural installations, the most frequently reported pollutant is nitrogen oxide (NO_x), accounting for 12,668 observations (3,551 installations) in the final sample. Releases of gases and metals are generally reported by more than one thousand installations. Some types of pollutant groups are reported only by very few installations – too few for a meaningful statistical analysis. All pollutant releases are reported in kilograms (kg) per year. Summary statistics are presented along with the estimation results in Section section §5.

The pollution data are augmented with socio-economic and demographic variables at the NUTS-2 level which we obtained from EUROSTAT.⁷ In particular, we use log per-capita income, log population and the share of the population aged 66 years and older. These variables are summarized in Table 2.

⁶Appendix A contains the complete list of pollutants along with their reporting thresholds. The capacity thresholds are listed in Appendix B.

⁷Available for download at <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database>

5 Results

This section reports on the empirical results obtained with the research design described in Section 3. Subsections 5.1 and 5.2 report the estimation results for pollution releases to air and water, respectively. Subsection 5.3 presents the results of the heterogeneous effects equation (4). All equations control for year, country and 2-digit NACE industry. Results are reported only for those substances which were reported at least 50 times in the data set.

5.1 Air pollution

Table 3 summarizes the results for the principal (“criteria”) air pollutants, both in levels (Panel A) and in logs (Panel B). Statistically significant findings arise for nitrous oxide (N_2O) and for Non-Methane Volatile Organic Compounds (NMVOC), both of which are substantially reduced at EU ETS installations once the policy is introduced. In particular, nitrous oxide emissions fell by approximately 500 tons or .74 log points, and Non-Methane VOCs fell by 270 tons or .28 log points. These reductions are both economically and statistically significant. In addition, the EU ETS is associated with a significant reduction in sulfur oxide (SO_x) by 0.38 log points. This reduction is not statistically significant in the linear specification, however, which might be due to the highly skewed distribution of the pollution releases across installations. Taking logs leads to a more even distribution and yields a better fit. It is thus the preferred specification.

Table 4 reports the estimates obtained for releases of heavy metals to the air. While negative point estimates are obtained for most substances including arsenic (As), cadmium (Cd), chromium (Cr) and mercury (Hg), only the one for nickel (Ni) is statistically significant when the regression equation is estimated in levels. This result does not hold up in the logarithmic specification which fits the data better, however. In contrast, the EU ETS is associated with a statistically significant increase in copper (Cu) releases to air, by an average of 480 kg per year or .37 log points. This result suggests that emitters can substitute across pollutants. Since copper releases are reported by much fewer installations than nickel or NO_x releases to air, such a substitution effect can hardly be generalized.

Table 5 reports the impact estimates for chlorinated organic substances and other gases. The impact on Dichloromethane (DCM) is positive and statistically significant in the logarithmic

specification. Again, the number of observations is lower than that of other gases such as chlorine or fluorine. Finally, Table 6 summarizes the results obtained for the releases of other organic chemicals to the air. The effect that stands out here is a strong negative impact of the EU ETS on the releases of benzene. On average, ETS installations reduced their benzene releases on average by 13 tons (.57 log points) compared to non ETS installations. The estimate for naphthalene is of very similar magnitude but not statistically significant in the regression in levels, due to a much lower number of observations.

5.2 Water pollution

Overall, E-PRTR facilities release fewer pollutants into water than into air. Table 7 summarizes the treatment effect of the EU ETS on the release of those pollutants that are most frequently released into water. A strong positive effect is found for releases of chlorides, nitrogen and phosphorous into water. These increases are both statistically and economically significant, and they arise in both specifications. Regarding the releases of heavy metals into water, the results in Table 8 also indicate a positive impact positive for arsenic, copper and nickel, although the last two only arise in the specification in logs. Overall, there is no evidence that the EU ETS has produced any co-benefits in terms of improved water quality. Rather, the contrary seems to be the case as water pollution has increased at installations that belong to the EU ETS.

5.3 Spatial analysis of co-benefits

This section reports on the results obtained with the regression equation (4), which interacts the treatment effect with socio-economic and demographic attributes of the region (NUTS level 2) in which the installation is located. This is revealing of whether the impact of emissions trading on the spatial distribution of the co-pollutants of CO₂ affects certain groups of the EU population in a particular, systematic fashion. This is interesting from the point of view of “environmental justice”, but it also serves to uncover heterogeneities in the treatment effect that may cancel out when estimating a homogenous effect as in the previous model.

The results in Table 9 highlight this for methane in column 2. While the homogenous treatment effect estimate reported in Table 3 was not statistically significant, column 2 shows

that per-capita income and population are important sources of heterogeneity. In particular, the impact of the EU ETS on methane emissions are now positive and significant, but less so in NUTS-2 regions that exhibit per-capita incomes and population sizes above the EU average.

Regarding heavy metals released to air, the earlier finding of a positive impact on copper emissions holds up in Table 10, and is much more pronounced in regions with below-average per-capita income. Contrary to the earlier finding, the impact estimate Nickel in column 6 turns positive but its interaction with population size is negative. A novel finding arises when interacting the treatment effect for mercury (column 5) with the share of the elderly population (aged 66 and older). This estimate implies that the EU ETS reduced mercury emissions to the air except in regions with an older-than-average population. A similar pattern arises for releases of HCFCs to the air, as is reported in column 6 of Table 11.

Table 12 shows that heterogeneous treatment effects are not found for Benzene, but for both naphthalene and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs). For both substances, the treatment effect is negative in richer areas, and for PAHs it is also negative in regions with an above-average share of elderly people.

In regards to heterogenous effects of the EU ETS on pollution releases into water, the results reported in Table 13 indicate that heterogeneity in the age distribution of the population matters in that the treatment effect on nitrogen releases is negative for regions with an older population. What is more, column 4 indicates that the EU ETS increases releases of total organic carbon to water more strongly in less populated regions. Finally, Table 14 summarizes the results for metals released to water. The EU ETS is associated with a reduction in arsenic releases in regions with a higher share of the elderly (column 1) as well as with an increase of zinc releases to water in the more populated regions.

6 Health benefits

This section uses an integrated assessment model to translate the regulation-induced changes in co-pollution of CO₂ estimated above into (avoided) health damages. To be completed.

7 Discussion and conclusion

Climate change mitigation is often likened to the voluntary provision of a global public good in as much as the benefits of abating GHG emissions are reaped by many countries whereas the costs are borne by individual countries. Economic theory predicts that abatement will be inefficiently low under these circumstances, because countries fail to internalize the external benefits of their abatement efforts. Moreover, the incentive to free ride makes it difficult for countries to coordinate on the globally efficient level of abatement. In fact, the United Nations' initiative to establish mitigation targets and timetables under the Kyoto Protocol has failed miserably. Because co-benefits make unilateral mitigation efforts more worthwhile even in the absence of a global agreement, they are bound to play a prominent role in climate policy going forward, as is alluded to in the article quoted in the introduction.⁸

As part of its unilateral climate change policy, the EU has established a series of policy targets it aims to meet over the coming decades. What is more, the EU is determined to keep its emissions trading scheme for CO₂ as its flagship climate policy instrument. Over the past two decades, tradable permit systems have become a well-established policy instrument for regulating environmental externalities. Emissions trading has been credited with substantially reducing the costs of environmental regulation (Ellerman et al., 2010). However, practical experiences with trading schemes for conventional pollutants have revealed some unintended consequences that arise from the spatial distribution of pollution. With a uniform permit price, the single criterion for the allocation of pollution in space is the marginal abatement cost. If the market shifts pollution from low-damage regions to high-damage regions, this may create large inefficiencies that interfere with the goal of efficient environmental regulation (Muller and Mendelsohn, 2009). Moreover, the redistribution of pollution to places with low-income populations may exacerbate inequality (Fowlie et al., 2012). At a glance, these issues may seem irrelevant for the EU ETS because CO₂ is a harmless gas with no known local impacts. However, if ancillary effects matter and CO₂ trading changes the spatial distribution of conventional pollutants, then those issues do matter in the context of the EU ETS as well. Given the vast geographic scope of

⁸Co-benefits of mitigation per se do not solve the free riding problem in international climate negotiations (Finus and Rübbelke, 2012).

this policy and its model character for many other regional carbon trading schemes worldwide, those issues deserve to be carefully evaluated, and the analysis in this paper takes a first step into this direction.

The empirical results support the view that the EU ETS has reduced some of the airborne pollution that, similar to CO₂, arises from combustion activities. This creates benefits at both the global and the local level. The former is true because nitrous oxide is a greenhouse gas itself and contributes to stratospheric ozone depletion - both are global public bads. At the local scale, the reduction in SO₂ and Non-Methane VOCs prevents the formation of smog and ground-level ozone, both of which are damaging to human health. Such avoided health damages constitute a co-benefit of the EU ETS. The same is true of avoided health damages from exposure to Benzene, the emissions of which were also found to be reduced at EU ETS installations following the introduction of the policy.

No evidence was found in support of co-benefits from reduced toxic pollution. Heavy metals emissions mostly remain unchanged or, in the case of nickel, increase as a result of the implementation of emissions trading. This means that the impact of emissions trading on local pollution is not entirely beneficial. This also becomes evident when looking at the positive association between certain types of water pollution and the launch of the EU ETS. The overall effect on co-benefits thus cannot be determined in a straightforward way on the basis of the estimates. This is because the net effect depends not just on the aggregate changes in emissions for different pollutants but also on their spatial distribution, and it requires a valuation exercise that translates these changes into exposure and impacts on human health. The latter is beyond the scope of the econometric exercise presented here and is left as a topic for future research.

However, the econometric method is useful to test for systematic ways in which the spatial redistribution affects certain groups of the population across Europe. For instance, it was found that the EU ETS changed emissions of ozone precursors (such as methane) or of toxic pollutants (such as mercury) in ways that systematically correlate with income, population size or age. This has important implications for the efficiency and the environmental justice of carbon trading under the auspices of the EU ETS. For example, if pollution emissions shift to more densely populated areas then exposure will be higher, resulting in higher health damages. Be-

cause an elderly population is more prone to suffering from bad air quality, increasing their pollution exposure leads to stronger health impacts than in areas with a younger population. In both examples, the spatial distribution of local pollutants leads to additional health costs, thus taking away from the economic efficiency of the emissions trading scheme. Finally, when pollution increases in areas with below-average incomes and decreases in areas with above-average income then the EU ETS becomes a regressive policy, and this poses a problem from the point of view of environmental justice.

The evidence presented in this paper highlights the importance of the spatial distribution of conventional pollution induced by the EU ETS, and sets the stage for a new line of research that empirically analyzes this subject from the perspective of ex-post evaluation.

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Tables and Figures

Table 1: Matching rate

Country	Number of EU ETS installations matched	Total number of EU ETS installations	Matching rate
Austria	108	234	46.2%
Belgium	260	390	66.7%
Bulgaria	73	162	45.1%
Cyprus	5	20	25.0%
Czech Republic	221	429	51.5%
Denmark	118	415	28.4%
Estonia	25	56	44.6%
Finland	182	644	28.3%
France	2874	3747	76.7%
Germany	1013	2367	42.8%
Greece	92	180	51.1%
Hungary	144	267	53.9%
Iceland	4	35	11.4%
Ireland	82	194	42.3%
Italy	768	1392	55.2%
Latvia	25	110	22.7%
Liechtenstein	1	2	50.0%
Lithuania	39	110	35.5%
Luxembourg	17	24	70.8%
Malta	2	6	33.3%
Netherlands	254	537	47.3%
Norway	117	158	74.1%
Poland	506	860	58.8%
Portugal	179	288	62.2%
Romania	141	272	51.8%
Slovakia	94	209	45.0%
Slovenia	58	98	59.2%
Spain	954	1365	69.9%
Sweden	245	772	31.7%
United Kingdom	733	1555	47.1%
<i>Total</i>	<i>9334</i>	<i>16898</i>	<i>55.2%</i>

Table 2: Eurostat variables

	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Household income 2011 (log)	9.61	0.45	7.74	10.33
Total population 2014 (log)	14.73	0.96	11.34	17.92
66 or older in 2014, proportions	0.20	0.02	0.09	0.28
Number of observations	7,914			

Table 3: Principle air pollutants

Pollutant	(1) PM ₁₀	(2) CH ₄	(3) N ₂ O	(4) CO	(5) NH ₃	(6) NMVOC	(7) NO _x	(8) SO _x
<i>A. Regression in levels</i>								
ETSxPost2004	-298,044 (303,967)	479,190 (530,296)	-499,812*** (134,195)	-496,115 (2.220e+06)	-5,615 (22,943)	-270,308*** (80,640)	-190,980 (121,686)	-999,857 (707,713)
R-squared	0.048	0.277	0.119	0.125	0.077	0.206	0.085	0.100
<i>B. Regression in logs</i>								
ETSxPost2004	0.00580 (0.0847)	0.128 (0.136)	-0.739*** (0.147)	-0.122 (0.115)	-0.0718 (0.119)	-0.282*** (0.0631)	-0.0711 (0.0509)	-0.381*** (0.0804)
R-squared	0.178	0.337	0.368	0.182	0.232	0.249	0.161	0.268
<i>C. Descriptive Statistics</i>								
Mean	367,915	1.332e+06	250,250	6.397e+06	34,588	617,531	1.088e+06	3.056e+06
Std. Dev.	(67,716)	(66,138)	(39,528)	(822,519)	(979.2)	(29,346)	(44,923)	(273,487)
Treated	3169	1416	2407	2828	1691	2977	12833	7096
Controls	716	7877	1104	681	27754	2596	3132	1411
Observations	3,885	9,293	3,511	3,509	29,445	5,573	15,965	8,507

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 4: Heavy Metals released to air

Pollutant	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	As	Cd	Cr	Cu	Hg	Ni	Pb	Zn
<i>A. Regression in levels</i>								
ETSxPost2004	-129.6 (166.6)	-44.12 (42.67)	-303.7 (204.3)	479.6** (196.6)	-29.41 (28.97)	-342.1** (157.2)	62.79 (554.6)	227.2 (853.7)
R-squared	0.139	0.074	0.158	0.168	0.103	0.203	0.131	0.178
<i>B. Regression in logs</i>								
ETSxPost2004	-0.121 (0.165)	-0.165 (0.148)	-0.198 (0.165)	0.365** (0.151)	-0.00580 (0.122)	-0.197 (0.128)	0.113 (0.146)	-0.0367 (0.125)
R-squared	0.205	0.223	0.161	0.186	0.208	0.318	0.204	0.299
<i>C. Descriptive Statistics</i>								
Mean	164.6 (31.31)	70.74 (8.759)	610.1 (67.70)	738.5 (94.75)	67.79 (4.561)	717.6 (59.48)	2,014 (246.4)	2,768 (216.8)
Std. Dev.	1374	1309	1000	822	2122	2525	1059	1740
Treated	278	410	267	363	720	563	527	969
Observations	1,652	1,719	1,267	1,185	2,842	3,088	1,586	2,709

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 5: Other Air Pollutants

Pollutant	(1) DCM	(2) DIOXFURAN	(3) CFCs	(4) CHLORINE	(5) FLUORINE	(6) HCFCs
<i>A. Regression in levels</i>						
ETSxPost2004	20,534 (17,800)	-0.00196 (0.00509)	-121.6 (1,801)	27,192 (55,894)	3,168 (8,388)	-1,114 (926.9)
R-squared	0.221	0.186	0.208	0.140	0.266	0.069
<i>B. Regression in logs</i>						
ETSxPost2004	0.709** (0.329)	0.104 (0.267)	0.431 (0.382)	-0.0375 (0.123)	0.0822 (0.129)	0.194 (0.176)
R-squared	0.286	0.347	0.252	0.302	0.334	0.264
<i>C. Descriptive Statistics</i>						
Mean	26,482	0.00667	404.3	88,921	35,822	1,206
Std. Dev.	(2,988)	(0.00109)	(171.4)	(8,617)	(2,348)	(245.3)
Treated	192	750	82	2206	1559	905
Controls	697	321	1077	668	408	1907
Observations	889	1,071	1,159	2,874	1,967	2,812

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 6: Other Organic Chemicals released to air

Pollutant	(1) BENZENE	(2) DEHP	(3) NAPHTHALENE	(4) PAH	(5) TOC
<i>A. Regression in levels</i>					
ETSxPost2004	-13,188** (5,994)	-265.8 (183.0)	-12,860 (11,733)	76.60 (935.7)	-1,060 (707.5)
R-squared	0.184	0.779	0.106	0.094	0.227
<i>B. Regression in logs</i>					
ETSxPost2004	-0.566*** (0.173)	-0.811 (0.560)	-0.536** (0.242)	0.0365 (0.295)	0.603 (0.903)
R-squared	0.357	0.664	0.503	0.243	0.243
<i>C. Descriptive Statistics</i>					
Mean	14,627	486.2	4,662	1,037	2,557
Std. Dev.	(1,659)	(186.0)	(2,720)	(221.0)	(1,432)
Treated	1207	89	223	332	45
Controls	462	29	90	164	39
Observations	1,669	118	313	496	85

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 7: Principle Water Pollutants

Pollutant	(1) CHLORIDES	(2) NITROGEN	(3) PHOSPHORUS	(4) TOC
<i>A. Regression in levels</i>				
ETSxPost2004	7.261e+07*** (2.077e+07)	422,316** (169,874)	62,302** (31,694)	222,269 (144,065)
R-squared	0.107	0.104	0.054	0.025
<i>B. Regression in logs</i>				
ETSxPost2004	0.794*** (0.213)	0.352*** (0.130)	0.410*** (0.156)	-0.0195 (0.105)
R-squared	0.206	0.303	0.275	0.181
<i>C. Descriptive Statistics</i>				
Mean	3.609e+07	297,453	33,423	490,942
Std. Dev.	(4.948e+06)	(14,778)	(2,501)	(34,348)
Treated	945	1327	1048	2608
Controls	1632	5164	5420	6183
Observations	2,577	6,491	6,468	8,791

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 8: Heavy Metal Release to Water

Pollutant	(1) As	(2) Cd	(3) Cr	(4) Cu	(5) Hg	(6) Ni	(7) Pb	(8) Zn
<i>A. Regression in levels</i>								
ETSxPost2004	69.84* (41.12)	12.68 (32.76)	-1,335 (1,947)	5.602 (178.2)	-0.381 (9.007)	105.7 (97.67)	-48.35 (213.4)	909.6 (634.5)
R-squared	0.087	0.061	0.042	0.110	0.055	0.068	0.064	0.048
<i>B. Regression in logs</i>								
ETSxPost2004	0.377** (0.183)	0.0363 (0.187)	0.135 (0.179)	0.343*** (0.133)	-0.0459 (0.183)	0.276** (0.122)	0.106 (0.158)	0.174* (0.101)
R-squared	0.119	0.136	0.160	0.172	0.202	0.121	0.104	0.172
<i>C. Descriptive Statistics</i>								
Mean	82.15 (6.443)	59.18 (7.061)	1,773 (1,169)	478.8 (39.58)	16.63 (2.714)	303.3 (28.97)	335.2 (54.70)	1,338 (107.7)
Treated	1396	805	852	1430	785	2136	1184	2287
Controls	1857	1013	1291	3023	1261	3374	1871	6292
Observations	3,253	1,818	2,143	4,453	2,046	5,510	3,055	8,579

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 9: Principal Air Pollutants: Interaction Effects

Pollutant	(1) PM ₁₀	(2) CH ₄	(3) N ₂ O	(4) CO	(5) NH ₃	(6) NMVOC	(7) NO _x	(8) SO _x
<i>A. Interaction with per capita income</i>								
ETSxPost2004	-0.451 (1.037)	5.547** (2.161)	-2.156 (2.148)	1.040 (1.170)	-0.759 (1.313)	-1.663 (1.194)	-0.654 (0.688)	-1.733* (0.896)
ETSxPost2004xpcy	0.0490 (0.107)	-0.563** (0.223)	0.142 (0.222)	-0.117 (0.122)	0.0703 (0.137)	0.144 (0.123)	0.0645 (0.0706)	0.148 (0.0921)
R-squared	0.185	0.310	0.366	0.192	0.246	0.254	0.144	0.258
Treated	2920	1317	2255	2668	1659	2859	12219	6786
Controls	686	7323	1072	643	25656	2483	2960	1335
<i>B. Interaction with population</i>								
ETSxPost2004	0.714 (0.552)	1.908*** (0.702)	0.365 (0.832)	0.261 (0.601)	0.866 (0.821)	0.588 (0.632)	0.504* (0.284)	0.477 (0.478)
ETSxPost2004xpop	-0.0478 (0.0376)	-0.118** (0.0463)	-0.0771 (0.0555)	-0.0244 (0.0399)	-0.0662 (0.0560)	-0.0581 (0.0431)	-0.0359* (0.0189)	-0.0555* (0.0321)
R-squared	0.181	0.314	0.363	0.192	0.243	0.256	0.147	0.265
Treated	2970	1320	2270	2695	1659	2868	12290	6847
Controls	688	7400	1084	674	25992	2520	3016	1368
<i>C. Interaction with elderly share</i>								
ETSxPost2004	0.0405 (0.317)	0.883 (0.645)	-1.209** (0.502)	0.294 (0.434)	0.708 (0.462)	-0.635* (0.339)	0.193 (0.198)	-0.248 (0.281)
ETSxPost2004xold	-0.0699 (1.496)	-3.842 (3.187)	2.166 (2.457)	-1.941 (2.116)	-4.181* (2.198)	1.814 (1.665)	-1.127 (0.940)	-0.433 (1.327)
R-squared	0.183	0.312	0.361	0.194	0.244	0.253	0.145	0.267
Treated	2970	1320	2270	2695	1659	2868	12290	6847
Controls	688	7400	1084	674	25992	2520	3016	1368

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 10: Heavy Metals Released to Air: Interaction Effects

Pollutant	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	As	Cd	Cr	Cu	Hg	Ni	Pb	Zn
<i>A. Interaction with per capita income</i>								
ETSxPost2004	1.617 (2.076)	0.275 (1.271)	1.452 (1.718)	5.355** (2.201)	0.00664 (1.921)	-1.026 (1.475)	0.347 (2.020)	1.104 (1.620)
ETSxPost2004xpcy	-0.189 (0.215)	-0.0459 (0.134)	-0.172 (0.179)	-0.525** (0.226)	0.00133 (0.196)	0.0852 (0.154)	-0.0213 (0.210)	-0.113 (0.168)
R-squared	0.208	0.224	0.166	0.207	0.195	0.275	0.201	0.301
Treated	1297	1236	939	766	2019	2415	1030	1630
Controls	269	400	258	360	638	546	502	902
<i>B. Interaction with population</i>								
ETSxPost2004	-1.317 (1.088)	0.197 (1.009)	-0.426 (0.991)	-0.331 (1.336)	1.081 (0.772)	1.906** (0.814)	-0.152 (1.065)	0.772 (0.812)
ETSxPost2004xpop	0.0775 (0.0724)	-0.0241 (0.0670)	0.0154 (0.0657)	0.0450 (0.0895)	-0.0726 (0.0518)	-0.143*** (0.0544)	0.0204 (0.0716)	-0.0536 (0.0536)
R-squared	0.209	0.226	0.166	0.194	0.205	0.294	0.202	0.305
Treated	1331	1258	943	773	2040	2446	1034	1671
Controls	274	406	262	361	715	558	518	958
<i>C. Interaction with elderly share</i>								
ETSxPost2004	-0.655 (0.596)	-0.640 (0.465)	-0.512 (0.474)	0.227 (0.675)	-1.255** (0.513)	0.118 (0.439)	0.0198 (0.699)	0.313 (0.485)
ETSxPost2004xold	2.387 (2.709)	2.445 (2.207)	1.574 (2.156)	0.556 (3.218)	6.385*** (2.431)	-1.614 (2.014)	0.708 (3.394)	-1.681 (2.353)
R-squared	0.209	0.230	0.167	0.197	0.211	0.292	0.203	0.303
Treated	1331	1258	943	773	2040	2446	1034	1671
Controls	274	406	262	361	715	558	518	958

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 11: Other Air Pollutants: Interaction Effects

Pollutant	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	DCM	DIOXFURAN	CFCs	CHLORINE	FLUORINE	HCFCs
<i>A. Interaction with per capita income</i>						
ETSxPost2004	-2.901 (5.101)	2.123 (2.726)	40.33 (32.63)	-1.082 (1.332)	0.818 (1.398)	3.009 (4.253)
ETSxPost2004xpcy	0.375 (0.524)	-0.203 (0.281)	-4.075 (3.323)	0.108 (0.139)	-0.0794 (0.146)	-0.292 (0.439)
R-squared	0.280	0.360	0.258	0.303	0.341	0.266
Treated	192	738	82	2172	1500	897
Controls	656	313	1060	663	407	1864
<i>B. Interaction with population</i>						
ETSxPost2004	-3.182 (5.239)	0.859 (1.885)	2.394 (4.938)	-0.699 (0.776)	0.128 (1.082)	4.668 (2.986)
ETSxPost2004xpop	0.266 (0.360)	-0.0521 (0.125)	-0.135 (0.342)	0.0434 (0.0522)	-0.00599 (0.0717)	-0.304 (0.203)
R-squared	0.287	0.351	0.261	0.304	0.353	0.267
Treated	192	744	82	2176	1516	897
Controls	680	319	1074	665	407	1900
<i>C. Interaction with elderly share</i>						
ETSxPost2004	-2.110 (1.296)	0.245 (1.029)	3.181 (4.005)	-0.0171 (0.409)	0.488 (0.542)	-2.293* (1.242)
ETSxPost2004xold	14.76** (6.448)	-0.597 (4.842)	-14.46 (20.64)	-0.228 (1.940)	-2.253 (2.665)	12.94** (6.449)
R-squared	0.294	0.348	0.257	0.304	0.349	0.267
Treated	192	744	82	2176	1516	897
Controls	680	319	1074	665	407	1900

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 12: Other Organic Chemicals Released to Air: Interaction Effects

Pollutant	(1) BENZENE	(2) DEHP	(3) NAPHTHALENE	(4) PAH
<i>A. Interaction with per capita income</i>				
ETSxPost2004	-1.038 (1.836)		10.39* (5.300)	11.16** (4.922)
ETSxPost2004xpcy	0.0484 (0.190)		-1.129** (0.548)	-1.188** (0.524)
R-squared	0.364		0.516	0.271
Treated	1169		216	319
Controls	435		84	161
<i>B. Interaction with population</i>				
ETSxPost2004	-0.891 (1.139)	-13.46 (29.57)	2.433 (3.732)	-0.363 (3.825)
ETSxPost2004xpop	0.0225 (0.0760)	0.893 (2.097)	-0.202 (0.246)	0.0266 (0.252)
R-squared	0.361	0.665	0.507	0.242
Treated	1172	89	223	330
Controls	459	29	90	164
<i>C. Interaction with elderly share</i>				
ETSxPost2004	-0.758 (0.689)	-0.425 (3.182)	1.948 (1.746)	4.619** (1.847)
ETSxPost2004xold	0.966 (3.283)	-2.427 (16.99)	-12.41 (8.863)	-24.10** (9.540)
R-squared	0.355	0.677	0.518	0.277
Treated	1172	89	223	330
Controls	459	29	90	164

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 13: Principal Water Pollutants: Interaction Effects

Pollutant	(1) CHLORIDES	(2) NITROGEN	(3) PHOSPHORUS	(4) TOC
<i>A. Interaction with per capita income</i>				
ETSxPost2004	-0.367 (2.314)	1.818 (1.120)	-0.305 (1.210)	0.963 (1.331)
ETSxPost2004xpcy	0.125 (0.239)	-0.155 (0.117)	0.0760 (0.128)	-0.109 (0.138)
R-squared	0.213	0.307	0.274	0.177
Treated	939	1301	1024	2551
Controls	1593	5012	5288	6061
<i>B. Interaction with population</i>				
ETSxPost2004	1.584 (1.633)	-0.0803 (0.791)	-0.317 (0.947)	2.234*** (0.640)
ETSxPost2004xpop	-0.0517 (0.109)	0.0266 (0.0542)	0.0467 (0.0655)	-0.157*** (0.0430)
R-squared	0.207	0.306	0.275	0.183
Treated	939	1306	1026	2558
Controls	1630	5134	5382	6148
<i>C. Interaction with elderly share</i>				
ETSxPost2004	0.839 (0.867)	1.268** (0.516)	1.148* (0.624)	0.186 (0.526)
ETSxPost2004xold	-0.249 (4.244)	-5.038** (2.468)	-4.143 (2.986)	-1.317 (2.526)
R-squared	0.209	0.312	0.283	0.180
Treated	939	1306	1026	2558
Controls	1630	5134	5382	6148

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 14: Heavy Metals Released To Water: Interaction Effects

Pollutant	(1) As	(2) Cd	(3) Cr	(4) Cu	(5) Hg	(6) Ni	(7) Pb	(8) Zn
<i>A. Interaction with per capita income</i>								
ETSxPost2004	2.342 (2.010)	-1.587 (2.179)	0.296 (2.220)	-1.511 (1.496)	-0.933 (2.251)	-1.913 (1.480)	-1.707 (1.578)	-1.116 (1.452)
ETSxPost2004xpcy	-0.198 (0.208)	0.160 (0.225)	-0.0167 (0.227)	0.192 (0.154)	0.0886 (0.232)	0.223 (0.152)	0.186 (0.164)	0.131 (0.149)
R-squared	0.115	0.137	0.155	0.175	0.213	0.121	0.106	0.172
Treated	1353	793	825	1399	760	2081	1159	2240
Controls	1818	988	1268	2978	1226	3325	1832	6204
<i>B. Interaction with population</i>								
ETSxPost2004	2.050* (1.058)	1.591* (0.955)	1.254 (1.069)	-0.648 (0.884)	0.888 (1.077)	1.286 (0.804)	1.843* (0.949)	2.056** (0.828)
ETSxPost2004xpop	-0.111 (0.0704)	-0.107* (0.0613)	-0.0756 (0.0699)	0.0677 (0.0593)	-0.0609 (0.0698)	-0.0697 (0.0533)	-0.117* (0.0619)	-0.128** (0.0555)
R-squared	0.117	0.139	0.158	0.175	0.206	0.122	0.110	0.177
Treated	1363	796	827	1410	761	2091	1162	2249
Controls	1831	1005	1281	3014	1252	3352	1859	6247
<i>C. Interaction with elderly share</i>								
ETSxPost2004	1.408** (0.648)	-0.0549 (0.654)	0.537 (0.706)	0.987* (0.584)	0.555 (0.679)	0.116 (0.483)	-0.456 (0.608)	-0.495 (0.509)
ETSxPost2004xold	-5.209* (3.126)	0.189 (3.272)	-2.075 (3.514)	-3.306 (2.858)	-3.184 (3.303)	0.598 (2.302)	2.740 (2.887)	3.253 (2.475)
R-squared	0.125	0.137	0.156	0.175	0.206	0.123	0.108	0.174
Treated	1363	796	827	1410	761	2091	1162	2249
Controls	1831	1005	1281	3014	1252	3352	1859	6247

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

A List of Pollutants Reported in E-PRTR and Reporting Thresholds by Environmental Medium

ANNEX II

Pollutants (*)

No	CAS number	Pollutant (1)	Threshold for releases (column 1)		
			to air (column 1a) kg/year	to water (column 1b) kg/year	to land (column 1c) kg/year
1	74-82-8	Methane (CH ₄)	100 000	— (2)	—
2	630-08-0	Carbon monoxide (CO)	500 000	—	—
3	124-38-9	Carbon dioxide (CO ₂)	100 million	—	—
4		Hydro-fluorocarbons (HFCs) (3)	100	—	—
5	10024-97-2	Nitrous oxide (N ₂ O)	10 000	—	—
6	7664-41-7	Ammonia (NH ₃)	10 000	—	—
7		Non-methane volatile organic compounds (NMVOC)	100 000	—	—
8		Nitrogen oxides (NO _x /NO ₂)	100 000	—	—
9		Perfluorocarbons (PFCs) (4)	100	—	—
10	2551-62-4	Sulphur hexafluoride (SF ₆)	50	—	—
11		Sulphur oxides (SO _x /SO ₂)	150 000	—	—
12		Total nitrogen	—	50 000	50 000
13		Total phosphorus	—	5 000	5 000
14		Hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs) (5)	1	—	—
15		Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) (6)	1	—	—
16		Halons (7)	1	—	—
17		Arsenic and compounds (as As) (8)	20	5	5
18		Cadmium and compounds (as Cd) (8)	10	5	5
19		Chromium and compounds (as Cr) (8)	100	50	50
20		Copper and compounds (as Cu) (8)	100	50	50
21		Mercury and compounds (as Hg) (8)	10	1	1
22		Nickel and compounds (as Ni) (8)	50	20	20
23		Lead and compounds (as Pb) (8)	200	20	20
24		Zinc and compounds (as Zn) (8)	200	100	100
25	15972-60-8	Alachlor	—	1	1
26	309-00-2	Aldrin	1	1	1
27	1912-24-9	Atrazine	—	1	1
28	57-74-9	Chlordane	1	1	1

(*) Releases of pollutants falling into several categories of pollutants shall be reported for each of these categories.

No	CAS number	Pollutant (1)	Threshold for releases (column 1)		
			to air (column 1a) kg/year	to water (column 1b) kg/year	to land (column 1c) kg/year
29	143-50-0	Chlordecone	1	1	1
30	470-90-6	Chlorfenvinphos	—	1	1
31	85535-84-8	Chloro-alkanes, C ₁₀ -C ₁₃	—	1	1
32	2921-88-2	Chlorpyrifos	—	1	1
33	50-29-3	DDT	1	1	1
34	107-06-2	1,2-dichloroethane (EDC)	1 000	10	10
35	75-09-2	Dichloromethane (DCM)	1 000	10	10
36	60-57-1	Dieldrin	1	1	1
37	330-54-1	Diuron	—	1	1
38	115-29-7	Endosulphan	—	1	1
39	72-20-8	Endrin	1	1	1
40		Halogenated organic compounds (as AOX) (2)	—	1 000	1 000
41	76-44-8	Heptachlor	1	1	1
42	118-74-1	Hexachlorobenzene (HCB)	10	1	1
43	87-68-3	Hexachlorobutadiene (HCBD)	—	1	1
44	608-73-1	1,2,3,4,5,6- hexachlorocyclohexane(HCH)	10	1	1
45	58-89-9	Lindane	1	1	1
46	2385-85-5	Mirex	1	1	1
47		PCDD + PCDF (dioxins + furans) (as Teq) (10)	0,0001	0,0001	0,0001
48	608-93-5	Pentachlorobenzene	1	1	1
49	87-86-5	Pentachlorophenol (PCP)	10	1	1
50	1336-36-3	Polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs)	0,1	0,1	0,1
51	122-34-9	Simazine	—	1	1
52	127-18-4	Tetrachloroethylene (PER)	2 000	10	—
53	56-23-5	Tetrachloromethane (TCM)	100	1	—
54	12002-48-1	Trichlorobenzenes (TCBs) (all isomers)	10	1	—
55	71-55-6	1,1,1-trichloroethane	100	—	—
56	79-34-5	1,1,2,2-tetrachloroethane	50	—	—
57	79-01-6	Trichloroethylene	2 000	10	—
58	67-66-3	Trichloromethane	500	10	—
59	8001-35-2	Toxaphene	1	1	1
60	75-01-4	Vinyl chloride	1 000	10	10
61	120-12-7	Anthracene	50	1	1

No	CAS number	Pollutant ⁽¹⁾	Threshold for releases (column 1)		
			to air (column 1a) kg/year	to water (column 1b) kg/year	to land (column 1c) kg/year
62	71-43-2	Benzene	1 000	200 (as BTEX) ⁽¹¹⁾	200 (as BTEX) ⁽¹¹⁾
63		Brominated diphenylethers (PBDE) ⁽¹²⁾	—	1	1
64		Nonylphenol and Nonylphenol ethoxylates (NP/NPEs)	—	1	1
65	100-41-4	Ethyl benzene	—	200 (as BTEX) ⁽¹¹⁾	200 (as BTEX) ⁽¹¹⁾
66	75-21-8	Ethylene oxide	1 000	10	10
67	34123-59-6	Isoproturon	—	1	1
68	91-20-3	Naphthalene	100	10	10
69		Organotin compounds(as total Sn)	—	50	50
70	117-81-7	Di-(2-ethyl hexyl) phthalate (DEHP)	10	1	1
71	108-95-2	Phenols (as total C) ⁽¹³⁾	—	20	20
72		Polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) ⁽¹⁴⁾	50	5	5
73	108-88-3	Toluene	—	200 (as BTEX) ⁽¹¹⁾	200 (as BTEX) ⁽¹¹⁾
74		Tributyltin and compounds ⁽¹⁵⁾	—	1	1
75		Triphenyltin and compounds ⁽¹⁶⁾	—	1	1
76		Total organic carbon (TOC) (as total C or COD/3)	—	50 000	—
77	1582-09-8	Trifluralin	—	1	1
78	1330-20-7	Xylenes ⁽¹⁷⁾	—	200 (as BTEX) ⁽¹¹⁾	200 (as BTEX) ⁽¹¹⁾
79		Chlorides (as total Cl)	—	2 million	2 million
80		Chlorine and inorganic com- pounds (as HCl)	10 000	—	—
81	1332-21-4	Asbestos	1	1	1
82		Cyanides (as total CN)	—	50	50
83		Fluorides (as total F)	—	2 000	2 000
84		Fluorine and inorganic com- pounds (as HF)	5 000	—	—
85	74-90-8	Hydrogen cyanide (HCN)	200	—	—
86		Particulate matter (PM ₁₀)	50 000	—	—
87	1806-26-4	Octylphenols and Octylphenol ethoxylates	—	1	—

No	CAS number	Pollutant ⁽¹⁾	Threshold for releases (column 1)		
			to air (column 1a) kg/year	to water (column 1b) kg/year	to land (column 1c) kg/year
88	206-44-0	Fluoranthene	—	1	—
89	465-73-6	Isodrin	—	1	—
90	36355-1-8	Hexabromobiphenyl	0,1	0,1	0,1
91	191-24-2	Benzo(g,h,i)perylene		1	

⁽¹⁾ Unless otherwise specified any pollutant specified in Annex II shall be reported as the total mass of that pollutant or, where the pollutant is a group of substances, as the total mass of the group.

⁽²⁾ A hyphen (—) indicates that the parameter and medium in question do not trigger a reporting requirement.

⁽³⁾ Total mass of hydrogen fluorocarbons: sum of HFC23, HFC32, HFC41, HFC4310mee, HFC125, HFC134, HFC134a, HFC152a, HFC143, HFC143a, HFC227ea, HFC236fa, HFC245ca, HFC365mfc.

⁽⁴⁾ Total mass of perfluorocarbons: sum of CF₄, C₂F₆, C₃F₈, C₄F₁₀, c-C₄F₈, C₅F₁₂, C₆F₁₄.

⁽⁵⁾ Total mass of substances including their isomers listed in Group VIII of Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 2037/2000 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 June 2000 on substances that deplete the ozone layer (OJ L 244, 29.9.2000, p. 1). Regulation as amended by Regulation (EC) No 1804/2003 (OJ L 265, 16.10.2003, p. 1).

⁽⁶⁾ Total mass of substances including their isomers listed in Group I and II of Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 2037/2000.

⁽⁷⁾ Total mass of substances including their isomers listed in Group III and VI of Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 2037/2000.

⁽⁸⁾ All metals shall be reported as the total mass of the element in all chemical forms present in the release.

⁽⁹⁾ Halogenated organic compounds which can be adsorbed to activated carbon expressed as chloride.

⁽¹⁰⁾ Expressed as I-TEQ.

⁽¹¹⁾ Single pollutants are to be reported if the threshold for BTEX (the sum parameter of benzene, toluene, ethyl benzene, xylenes) is exceeded.

⁽¹²⁾ Total mass of the following brominated diphenylethers: penta-BDE, octa-BDE and deca-BDE.

⁽¹³⁾ Total mass of phenol and simple substituted phenols expressed as total carbon.

⁽¹⁴⁾ Polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) are to be measured for reporting of releases to air as benzo(a)pyrene (50-32-8), benzo(b)fluoranthene (205-99-2), benzo(k)fluoranthene (207-08-9), indeno(1,2,3-cd)pyrene (193-39-5) (derived from Regulation (EC) No 850/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on persistent organic pollutants (OJ L 229, 29.6.2004, p. 5)).

⁽¹⁵⁾ Total mass of tributyltin compounds, expressed as mass of tributyltin.

⁽¹⁶⁾ Total mass of triphenyltin compounds, expressed as mass of triphenyltin.

⁽¹⁷⁾ Total mass of xylene (ortho-xylene, meta-xylene, para-xylene).

B Capacity Thresholds for Facilities Reporting in E-PRTR

ANNEX I

Activities

No	Activity	Capacity threshold
1.	Energy sector	
(a)	Mineral oil and gas refineries	* (1)
(b)	Installations for gasification and liquefaction	*
(c)	Thermal power stations and other combustion installations	With a heat input of 50 megawatts (MW)
(d)	Coke ovens	*
(e)	Coal rolling mills	With a capacity of 1 tonne per hour
(f)	Installations for the manufacture of coal products and solid smokeless fuel	*
2.	Production and processing of metals	
(a)	Metal ore (including sulphide ore) roasting or sintering installations	*
(b)	Installations for the production of pig iron or steel (primary or secondary melting) including continuous casting	With a capacity of 2,5 tonnes per hour
(c)	Installations for the processing of ferrous metals:	
	(i) Hot-rolling mills	With a capacity of 20 tonnes of crude steel per hour
	(ii) Smitheries with hammers	With an energy of 50 kilojoules per hammer, where the calorific power used exceeds 20 MW
	(iii) Application of protective fused metal coats	With an input of 2 tonnes of crude steel per hour
(d)	Ferrous metal foundries	With a production capacity of 20 tonnes per day
(e)	Installations:	
	(i) For the production of non-ferrous crude metals from ore, concentrates or secondary raw materials by metallurgical, chemical or electrolytic processes	*
	(ii) For the smelting, including the alloying, of non-ferrous metals, including recovered products (refining, foundry casting, etc.)	With a melting capacity of 4 tonnes per day for lead and cadmium or 20 tonnes per day for all other metals
(f)	Installations for surface treatment of metals and plastic materials using an electrolytic or chemical process	Where the volume of the treatment vats equals 30 m ³
3.	Mineral industry	
(a)	Underground mining and related operations	*
(b)	Opencast mining and quarrying	Where the surface of the area effectively under extractive operation equals 25 hectares
(c)	Installations for the production of:	
	(i) Cement clinker in rotary kilns	With a production capacity of 500 tonnes per day
	(ii) Lime in rotary kilns	With a production capacity of 50 tonnes per day
	(iii) Cement clinker or lime in other furnaces	With a production capacity of 50 tonnes per day
(d)	Installations for the production of asbestos and the manufacture of asbestos-based products	*

No	Activity	Capacity threshold
(e)	Installations for the manufacture of glass, including glass fibre	With a melting capacity of 20 tonnes per day
(f)	Installations for melting mineral substances, including the production of mineral fibres	With a melting capacity of 20 tonnes per day
(g)	Installations for the manufacture of ceramic products by firing, in particular roofing tiles, bricks, refractory bricks, tiles, stoneware or porcelain	With a production capacity of 75 tonnes per day, or with a kiln capacity of 4 m ³ and with a setting density per kiln of 300 kg/m ³
4.	Chemical industry	
(a)	Chemical installations for the production on an industrial scale of basic organic chemicals, such as:	
(i)	Simple hydrocarbons (linear or cyclic, saturated or unsaturated, aliphatic or aromatic)	*
(ii)	Oxygen-containing hydrocarbons such as alcohols, aldehydes, ketones, carboxylic acids, esters, acetates, ethers, peroxides, epoxy resins	*
(iii)	Sulphurous hydrocarbons	*
(iv)	Nitrogenous hydrocarbons such as amines, amides, nitrous compounds, nitro compounds or nitrate compounds, nitriles, cyanates, isocyanates	*
(v)	Phosphorus-containing hydrocarbons	*
(vi)	Halogenic hydrocarbons	*
(vii)	Organometallic compounds	*
(viii)	Basic plastic materials (polymers, synthetic fibres and cellulose-based fibres)	*
(ix)	Synthetic rubbers	*
(x)	Dyes and pigments	*
(xi)	Surface-active agents and surfactants	*
(b)	Chemical installations for the production on an industrial scale of basic inorganic chemicals, such as:	
(i)	Gases, such as ammonia, chlorine or hydrogen chloride, fluorine or hydrogen fluoride, carbon oxides, sulphur compounds, nitrogen oxides, hydrogen, sulphur dioxide, carbonyl chloride	*
(ii)	Acids, such as chromic acid, hydrofluoric acid, phosphoric acid, nitric acid, hydrochloric acid, sulphuric acid, oleum, sulphurous acids	*
(iii)	Bases, such as ammonium hydroxide, potassium hydroxide, sodium hydroxide	*
(iv)	Salts, such as ammonium chloride, potassium chlorate, potassium carbonate, sodium carbonate, perborate, silver nitrate	*
(v)	Non-metals, metal oxides or other inorganic compounds such as calcium carbide, silicon, silicon carbide	*

No	Activity	Capacity threshold
(c)	Chemical installations for the production on an industrial scale of phosphorous-, nitrogen- or potassium-based fertilisers (simple or compound fertilisers)	*
(d)	Chemical installations for the production on an industrial scale of basic plant health products and of biocides	*
(e)	Installations using a chemical or biological process for the production on an industrial scale of basic pharmaceutical products	*
(f)	Installations for the production on an industrial scale of explosives and pyrotechnic products	*
5.	Waste and wastewater management	
(a)	Installations for the recovery or disposal of hazardous waste	Receiving 10 tonnes per day
(b)	Installations for the incineration of non-hazardous waste in the scope of Directive 2000/76/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 December 2000 on the incineration of waste ⁽²⁾	With a capacity of 3 tonnes per hour
(c)	Installations for the disposal of non-hazardous waste	With a capacity of 50 tonnes per day
(d)	Landfills (excluding landfills of inert waste and landfills, which were definitely closed before 16.7.2001 or for which the after-care phase required by the competent authorities according to Article 13 of Council Directive 1999/31/EC of 26 April 1999 on the landfill of waste ⁽³⁾ has expired)	Receiving 10 tonnes per day or with a total capacity of 25 000 tonnes
(e)	Installations for the disposal or recycling of animal carcasses and animal waste	With a treatment capacity of 10 tonnes per day
(f)	Urban waste-water treatment plants	With a capacity of 100 000 population equivalents
(g)	Independently operated industrial waste-water treatment plants which serve one or more activities of this annex	With a capacity of 10 000 m ³ per day ⁽⁴⁾
6.	Paper and wood production and processing	
(a)	Industrial plants for the production of pulp from timber or similar fibrous materials	*
(b)	Industrial plants for the production of paper and board and other primary wood products (such as chipboard, fibreboard and plywood)	With a production capacity of 20 tonnes per day
(c)	Industrial plants for the preservation of wood and wood products with chemicals	With a production capacity of 50 m ³ per day
7.	Intensive livestock production and aquaculture	
(a)	Installations for the intensive rearing of poultry or pigs	(i) With 40 000 places for poultry (ii) With 2 000 places for production pigs (over 30 kg) (iii) With 750 places for sows
(b)	Intensive aquaculture	With a production capacity of 1 000 tonnes of fish or shellfish per year

No	Activity	Capacity threshold
8.	Animal and vegetable products from the food and beverage sector	
(a)	Slaughterhouses	With a carcass production capacity of 50 tonnes per day
(b)	Treatment and processing intended for the production of food and beverage products from: (i) Animal raw materials (other than milk) (ii) Vegetable raw materials	With a finished product production capacity of 75 tonnes per day With a finished product production capacity of 300 tonnes per day (average value on a quarterly basis)
(c)	Treatment and processing of milk	With a capacity to receive 200 tonnes of milk per day (average value on an annual basis)
9.	Other activities	
(a)	Plants for the pre-treatment (operations such as washing, bleaching, mercerisation) or dyeing of fibres or textiles	With a treatment capacity of 10 tonnes per day
(b)	Plants for the tanning of hides and skins	With a treatment capacity of 12 tonnes of finished product per day
(c)	Installations for the surface treatment of substances, objects or products using organic solvents, in particular for dressing, printing, coating, degreasing, waterproofing, sizing, painting, cleaning or impregnating	With a consumption capacity of 150 kg per hour or 200 tonnes per year
(d)	Installations for the production of carbon (hard-burnt coal) or electro-graphite by means of incineration or graphitisation	*
(e)	Installations for the building of, and painting or removal of paint from ships	With a capacity for ships 100 m long

(¹) An asterisk (*) indicates that no capacity threshold is applicable (all facilities are subject to reporting).

(²) OJ L 332, 28.12.2000, p. 91.

(³) OJ L 182, 16.7.1999, p. 1. Directive as amended by Regulation (EC) No 1882/2003.

(⁴) The capacity threshold shall be reviewed by 2010 at the latest in the light of the results of the first reporting cycle.