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## The Effects of a Universal Child Care Reform on Child Health – Evidence from Sweden

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# The Effects of a Universal Child Care Reform on Child Health – Evidence from Sweden

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**Abstract:** This paper studies the effect of a Swedish universal, public child care reform on child health outcomes. We draw on a unique set of merged population register data from the province of Skåne, following over the period 1999–2008. It contains merged information at the individual level from the population register, the income tax register, the medical birth register and the inpatient and outpatient registers. The outpatient register contains all ambulatory care contacts including all contacts with physicians and therapists. Visits are recorded by day, and diagnoses are recorded for each visit. Our identification strategy relies on a sibling sample design that allows to compare the impact of the reform across siblings within households. Despite exploiting a rather general measure of the reform impact, we additionally make use of detailed information on household-specific monthly child care fee. Our results suggest that children being fully affected by the reform have better physical health at ages 4–5 and 6–7, are significantly better off in development and psychological conditions at age 6–7. These effects are particularly distinct for children from low income families, being in line with the literature on early child interventions. Changes in child care prices also predict better physical health for younger children. The results are mainly driven by two mechanisms, a crowding out effect of informal care and an income effect, and are strongly supported by the so called hygiene hypothesis. The findings suggest that the availability of affordable high quality and universal, public child care plays a crucial role for health development throughout childhood. An analysis of children's health costs moreover provides important implications for public health expenditures.

**JEL classification:** I12, J13, J14, C23, C25, C83

**Keywords:** child health, universal child care reform Sweden, register data, child care fees

# 1 Introduction

In the last decade, European countries have started to expand child care programs in order to influence children's development and well-being at an early stage, and to stimulate maternal labor supply. Early life conditions are very important for the development of human capabilities, as they do not only have short-run effects on human development but persist into the future by determining educational attainment, earnings and health. While small scaled child care programs targeting at children from disadvantaged families, such as Head Start or the Perry Preschool Program, are favored in the US, more and more European countries are implementing universal, public child care arrangements. The idea of the latter concept is that all children benefit from attending an universal child care program in terms of social, physical, cognitive and noncognitive development, regardless of the family background.

A large body of literature studies the importance of child investment through universal preschooling for early child development. For Germany, Felfe and Lalive (2014) find significant positive effects of center-based child care before age of three on school readiness indicators for children with foreign parents or less educated mothers. Dustman *et al.* (2013) find similar results for children of immigrant ancestry in Germany. In contrast, Baker *et al.* (2008) provide evidence for negative short run effects of the introduction of highly-subsidized universal child care on children's behavior in Quebec, Canada. Using Danish data, Gupta and Simonsen (2010) do not find any effects of child care enrollment at age three on child outcomes at age seven. Exploiting a major child care reform in the 1970s in Norway, Havnes and Mogstad (2011) find large, positive effects on children's long term education and labor market outcomes. In a follow-up study they moreover show that long-term reform effects are heterogeneous along the earnings distribution (Havnes and Mogstad (2014)). Using a regression discontinuity approach, Black *et al.* (2014) estimate the effect of lower child care prices on child outcomes in Norway. They find a significant positive effect of lower child care prices on children's schooling performance, being mainly driven by a positive income effect. Despite the mixed results found in the literature, almost all of these studies exclusively focus on cognitive and noncognitive measures of child development. Evidence on child health however is scarce.

In this paper we examine the impact of a major reform of universal child care in Sweden in January 2002 on physical and non-physical child health<sup>1</sup>. The centerpiece of the Swedish child care reform is the introduction of a maximum fee rule which led to considerable cuts in the child care fees for public formal care (Brink *et al.* (2007)). Before the reform each municipality was eligible to set its own child care price level, given the price was reasonable. The introduction of the maximum fee rule imposed a cap on child care prices and set a fixed price structure common to all municipalities. As a main consequence, child care prices significantly dropped and the price variation across municipalities collapsed (Mörk *et al.* (2013)).

Our identification strategy exploits the maximum fee rule reform as an exogenous source of variation in child care prices within the household. More precisely, we compare health outcomes of siblings at the same age being subject to the reform or not within households. The empirical analysis provides us with the sibling-specific health effect of being exposed to the reform. In addition, we use household-level child care prices to assess the impact of the price drop generated by the reform. To eliminate endogeneity issues, we instrument the child care prices

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<sup>1</sup> We use the terms non-physical, psychological and mental health interchangeably.

with the introduction of the maximum fee rule. Thus, our empirical strategy allows not only to explore a general reform exposure effect, but also shows the relative importance of a reduction in child care fees for children's health development.

The empirical analysis is based on a unique set of merged register data from the region of Skåne, the southernmost and third most populous province in Sweden. It contains merged individual level information from the population register, the income tax register, the medical birth register, intergenerational register, the inpatient and outpatient register. The health registers are administrated by the Regional Council of Skåne and contain detailed records of all occurrences of inpatient and outpatient care for all inhabitants of the region, covering over 1 million of individuals for 1999–2008. They provide us with detailed information on diagnoses which are recorded for each contact by the ICD-10 disease classification system at the highest level of detail. The ICD-10 codes cover a large range of physical and mental health diagnoses, injuries as well as health care utilization. In addition, the data contain individual health costs per medical contact. Despite the register data, our analysis relies on child care formulas which have been collected from the municipalities before and after the reform. Since child care prices depend on a few characteristics which we observe in the register data we can calculate household-specific child care fees throughout the observation period, allowing us to isolate a potential income effect from other channels.

We find a significantly positive effect of the maximum fee rule reform on children's physical health at ages 4–7. Being fully effected by the reform decrease, for instance, the risk for respiratory diseases by 22% at ages 4–5, and by about 19% among children aged 6–7, given baseline risks. We moreover find positive long-term impacts of the reform on children's mental health. Among children aged 6–7 years, the incidence of developmental impairments decreases by about 25% in relative terms. For younger children, physical and psychological health effects of the reform are small and mostly close to zero. An analysis by income groups suggests that the almost all found health effects are predominantly driven by children from low income families.

We next investigate the direct impact of the cap in child care prices on children's health development. Decreasing child care prices by 1% leads to a lower risk for respiratory diseases and viral infections at age 1–3. In contrast, we find no statistically significant effect at later ages. For physical health, any impact of the cap in child care prices either fades out, or older siblings benefit to the same extent from lower child care prices. As a consequence, there are no significant differences left between siblings at later ages. In contrast, we find a positive effect of a price decrease on children's psychological health at ages 4–5 and 6–7. This finding is consistent with predictions from a model of human capital formation.

Given these findings, we assume that two mechanisms dominate the process of physical and non-physical health development. First, the introduction of the maximum fee rule leads to a crowding out of informal care arrangements. This mechanism is supported by a sharp increase in child care attendance rates in the region of Skåne around the introduction of the child care reform. According to our results, crowding out particularly takes place in low income families that could not afford child care before the maximum fee rule reform. Second, the price cap induced by the reform serves as a pure income transfer increasing disposable income for any given gross income. However, while this mechanism is likely to play a role for long-term psychological health development, it does only have short-run physical health gains.

Our results strongly suggest that physical and non-physical health are based different underlying processes. Psychological health development seems to follow the predictions made by Heckman's (2006) model of human capital production. Lower child care prices represent a positive investment shock to child development in a sensitive period. Dynamic complementarities and self-productivity produce multiplier effects that lead large psychological health gains at later stages. Health gains from the reform are achieved via crowding out and income transfers, depending on the children's socioeconomic background. The development physical health seems to be broadly in line with the so called hygiene hypothesis. This model states assumes that early exposure to germs and certain infections help to develop the immune system (Strachan (1989)). While the incidence of diseases increases at the beginning of the immunization process, the strong immune system protects against future diseases. Our results do not show strong negative health effects of the reform at ages 1–3. We therefore assume that the positive income transfer induced by the price cap on average cancels out the assumed negative physical health effect at early ages. To our knowledge, we are the first who analyze long-term consequences of an universal preschool reform on different dimensions of physical and psychological child health. There is only one study by Baker *et al.* (2008) that considers few indicators for child health obtained from parental survey reports. The authors find a negative effect of a universal child care reform in Quebec, Canada, on throat, nose and ear infections in the past 12 months at ages 1–2. While Baker *et al.* (2008) could only analyze children's health at a very early stage, our paper advances the understanding of child health development by analyzing child health up to age seven. This allows us to draw more comprehensive conclusions on the validity of the hygiene hypothesis. By using a rich set of register data, we can investigate a large number of distinct medical health diagnosis and compare the reform effects for physical health development with those obtained for psychological health. Finally, we explore potential channels that link the child care reform and child health by separating income effects, and we show its impact on public health care expenditures. Given these innovations, our study largely contributes to the literature on the importance of child investments in early life (Heckman (2006), Cunha and Heckman (2008), Almond and Currie (2011)), and the implementation of public policies, such as income transfers, to influence child development (for instance, Shea (2008), Tekin (2005), Dahl and Lochner (2012)).

The paper is organized as follows: section two documents the Swedish preschool reform that took effect in 2002. Section three discusses the theoretical considerations and channels to might be at work. The data and the empirical strategy for this study is provided in section four. We present the results in section five. Section six concludes.

## **2 Institutional Background**

### **2.1 Child care**

Sweden has a long tradition in universal child care, leading to very high levels of formal child care utilization compared to other European countries. More than 90 percentage of all children in the age group 3-5 attended

child care in 2010 (OECD (2010)). The rates are also very high for children aged 1-2 years (Mörk *et al.* (2013)). One reason for these number is the municipalities' obligations to provide highly subsidized, high quality care to children whose parents are working or studying (during regular office hours). As a result of this policy maternal labor supply in Sweden are very high; In 2000, 86% of mothers with pre-school children and 94% of mothers with school children were employed (Björnberg and Dahlgren (2005)), and the majority of Swedish mothers is working full-time (more than 35 hours/week).

IN the early 1990's, the Swedish government transferred the responsibility for the child care sector to the municipalities. The state government left a considerable leeway in the design and implementation of schedule for child care fees. Moreover, municipalities were allowed to freely set the child care fees to any level, as long as they were "reasonable".

In the mid 1990's, Sweden was hit by an economic crisis which led to considerable cutbacks in public spending, also in the child care sector. As a consequence municipalities raised the child care fees, and fixed them more and more to household income and the time children spent at child care. In addition, municipalities introduced different eligibility rules in order to reduce costs<sup>2</sup>. By 1998, child care fees were increased by about 10–15% and the variation in the average prices across municipalities was about 10,000–12,000 Swedish Crones (SEK) per year<sup>3</sup>.

In 1998, the Social Democrats published an article in a daily newspaper with the title "Halve the fee for day care centers!", proposing a large child care reform with the maximum fee rule as its centerpiece. At the same year, the Social Democrats won the election and the reform bill was passed by parliament in November 2000. They aimed at providing access to child care for all children, improving the economic situation for families with young children and increasing labor supply among parents (Brink *et al.* (2007)). The reform consisted of four parts which have been gradually introduced between January 2001 and January 2003. In a first step, children of unemployed parents received the right for a child care slot for at least 15 hours per week. One year later, this right was extended to children whose parents are on leave. In January 2002 the maximum fee rule was introduced. Even though the implementation was voluntary, all but two municipalities introduced the maximum fee rule. On January 1<sup>st</sup> 2003, the last package of the reform was implemented. It guarantees a universal preschool free of charge for 15 hours per week for all children age 4–5.

The maximum fee rule is considered as being the most important part of the reform and is the one studied in this paper. Table 1 illustrates the structure of the maximum fee rule. The child care fee schedule consists of two components: First, the fee per child is now determined as a fixed percentage of the household income. Thus, the new child care prices only vary with household income, and the number of children. Second, the prices for child care are capped at a maximum monthly income of 38,000 SEK ( $\approx$  4,100 EUR)<sup>4</sup>. Per household and month, the maximum amount paid for child care was thus set to 2,280 SEK ( $\approx$  240 EUR, for three or more children; see

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<sup>2</sup> For example, children whose parents became unemployed could not keep their child care slots. Also, children of parents on leave experienced great difficulties in keeping their slots. Due to such rule child care was not open to all children which became an acute issue.

<sup>3</sup> The municipalities attitude was to give parents the choice for or against care: they could either choose an alternative care or use it and be prepared to pay high fees.

<sup>4</sup> This is the threshold introduced in 2002. In 2004 this value was increased to 42,000 SEK  $\approx$  4,500 EUR.

Table 1: The fee schedule implemented on 1 January 2002

<b>percent of HH income and maximum fees per child, preschool</b>	
1. child	3 percent of HH income – maximum: 1,140 SEK/month
2. child	2 percent of HH income – maximum: 760 SEK/month
3. child	1 percent of HH income – maximum: 380 SEK/month
> 4 children	no charge
<b>percent of HH income and maximum fees per child, after-day care</b>	
1. child	2 percent of HH income – maximum: 760 SEK/month
2. child	1 percent of HH income – maximum: 380 SEK/month
3. child	1 percent of HH income – maximum: 380 SEK/month
> 4 children	no charge

Sources:Skolverket (2003).

Lundin *et al.* (2008), Mörk *et al.* (2013)). The maximum fee rule not only applies to pre-school child care but also considers after day care.

The reform had far reaching consequences for the child care prices in Sweden: Before the introduction of the maximum fee rule, an average income full-timing working household with two children experienced a price difference across municipalities up to 2,400 SEK/month. After the reform, prices differed only by about 850 SEK/month for the same family type. Moreover, the average child care prices decreased from about 2,800 SEK/month before 2002 to 1,800 SEK/month after the reform, corresponding to a fee reduction of about 12,000 SEK per year for this family type (Skolverket (2003)). The price drop corresponds to a median fee reduction of about 40% for this family type. Even though the price cap was strongest for medium and high income households, the fees were also substantially lower for low income parents.

Figure 1 illustrates the average child care prices across municipalities for the years 1999–2008. Before 2002, child care prices considerably varied across municipalities. This heterogeneity was almost completely eliminated with the introduction of the maximum fee rule reform. Despite this, the maximum fee rule led to a significant reduction in the level of the child care fees.

One general concern with the new price schedule was that quality of care may decline. To prevent this scenario, all municipalities received a granted compensation by the Swedish government to implement the reform and to balance the decreased fees<sup>5</sup>. Table 2 provides the development of few child quality indicators, the municipalities' total preschool expenditures, and the intensive and extensive margin of child care supply. As expected the child care quality was kept on a constant level over time, having an average group size of about 5.4 children per case worker. Moreover, the fraction of child care staff with pedagogical training remained unchanged. Municipality-specific expenditures as well as the number of child care facilities increased over time, but seem not to discontinuously

<sup>5</sup> Note that child care was heavily subsidized already before the reform. User charges counted for about 16% of the municipalities' total costs for child care in 1999 and about 10% in 2003 (Brink *et al.* (2007)).




Figure 1: Development child care fees over time by municipalities, 1999–2008

jump to a higher level in 2002–2003. The only notable increase around the time of the reform can be found for the total number of child care personnel. However, this number keeps increasing in the later years as well. Given the numbers in table 2 we therefore do not expect any negative trends in the quality of public child care due to the maximum fee rule reform. Any increased demand for child care has been remedied by a moderate increase in child care staff, not by impairments in child quality though (see also Mörk *et al.* (2013)).

Table 2: Child quality, municipal expenditures and supply in Skåne, 1999-2008

	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Enrolled children per caseworker	5.3	5.6	5.4	5.4	5.5	5.5	5.4	5.2	5.2	5.3
share of personnel with pedagogical training,%	54	55	55	54	55	54	54	54	54	55
municipal expenditures per child in SEK, 2010 prices	93,695	95,667	97,753	100,777	99,600	99,580	104,199	110,997	113,591	115,351
total number of child care staff	6,537	5,921	6,066	6,474	6,898	7,073	7,677	8,255	8,661	8,901
number of preschool institutions, entire Sweden	.	6,283	6,114	6,371	6,616	6,576	6,769	7,076	7,324	7,447

source: Skolverket, 1999-2008, these numbers refer to public child care facilities

## 2.2 Health care

In Sweden, health care is mostly public and organized at the region level. Within a region, different municipalities have different health care centers that house all outpatient care. The region of Skåne hosts nine hospitals, 150 local health care centers (primary care units), and one University hospital in the city of Lund. Typically, a rural community has only one center, and larger cities have multiple centers. Every individual is assigned to exactly one health care center which usually is the nearest center. Each center has a team of physicians, first-aid workers, and nurses. In case of a need to see a health care worker, including first-aid and emergency aid, an individual goes to the center and is helped by the next available appropriate health care worker. There is no path dependence in the identity of the health care worker across consecutive contacts. For a given contact reason, on a given day, incoming individuals are dealt with sequentially by the first available health care workers. Workers in the health care sector (from nurses to hospital specialists) are county civil servants. The health care system is funded through a proportional county tax on income. Health care usage is free, with the exception of a small deductible which in our observation window is capped at about 80 euro per adult person per year.

## 3 Theoretical considerations & potential channels

According to the unitary household model, we assume that parents maximize the household utility by making choices on own consumption and child quality subject to budget and time constraints. Child quality consists of different input factors and is produced by either monetary investments in formal child care and by purchasing market goods for children, or by time investments. Market goods are for instance books, music lessons, or sports. Child health is one dimension of child quality, and its consumed quantity can be altered by changes in child care prices. Different mechanisms can be at play: the level of child care before the reform, parental preferences for formal care, as well as income and substitution effects on parental consumption and child quality. Thus, the magnitude and the direction of the price effect on child quality and thus on child health is *ex ante* ambiguous (Havnes and Mogstad (2014)).

There might be several mechanisms linking the maximum fee rule and the different dimensions of child health. First, the availability of affordable child care may decrease the time maternal time investments devoted to child care. The additional time may lead to an increase maternal labor supply. This generates additional household income which can be used for the production of child quality (Black *et al.* (2014)).<sup>6</sup> Alternatively, lower maternal time investments in informal child care may increase quality of the remaining time devoted to the child. Moreover, it may be used to produce other household goods that are inputs for child quality. Second, the cap in child care

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<sup>6</sup> For parents that did not buy child care before the reform increased labor supply at the extensive margin represents a reasonable channel for the reform effect. Parents that already had e.g. half-time slots of public child care the positive effects of the price change on child health may work through increased hours of work.

prices might serve as a positive income transfer. The additional disposable income may be used by parents for monetary investments in child quality<sup>7</sup>. In this case, changes in child health are driven by an income effect induced by the cap in child care prices. A third channel may be fertility. If child care fees decrease households could afford more children. Siblings may be an important factor for social development and physical health. The literature has shown that a bigger family size has positive effects on child health, since a greater exposure to infections early in life is beneficial for the immune system (Lundborg *et al.* (2013)). Finally, child health may be influenced by lower child care fees through the direct crowding of informal care arrangements (Havnes and Mogstad (2011)). If quality of formal care is higher than for informal care arrangements, this substitution process may positively influence child development and child health.

Some of these channels have been under investigation. Lundin *et al.* (2008) analyze the impact of the maximum fee rule on mother's labor supply using similar administrative data from Sweden as we are using. They do not find a net increase in female labor supply, neither on the extensive nor on the intensive margin. Havnes and Mogstad (2014) exploit an exogenous increase in child care supply in Norway also finding almost no impact on labor supply of married mothers. Instead this Norwegian child care reform crowds out informal care arrangements (see also Havnes and Mogstad (2011)). In a similar way for Germany, Felfe and Lalive (2014) find a substitution from the time spent with the mother and other informal care provider, to time spent in the child care. Mörk *et al.* (2013) find limited effects of the price changes on the fertility behavior of Swedish families. While they provide evidence for an increase in first birth for formerly childless couples, the authors find only weak effects on timing of higher order births. Finally, Black *et al.* (2014) show that the eligibility for lower child care fees improves children's schooling performance at the junior high school level. Their findings suggest that the predominant mechanism is an income effect generating increased parental investments.

We assume that two dynamic processes are responsible for the long term child health effects of the maximum fee rule. For non-physical health, the child care reform can be viewed as a positive investment at an early period in life, producing a higher stock of health at later stages (Almond and Currie (2011)). Heckman (2006) describes two features of this capacity formation. "Self productivity" implies that the stock of good psychological health at early age translates into good psychological health at later stages. "Dynamic complementarities" defines the process that a high level of non-physical health makes later investments more productive. Together these two features provide the mechanism through which early childhood health begets later childhood or adult health (Cunha and Heckman (2008)).

Physical health is a different concept than non-physical health. Most importantly, physical health can be influenced by infections, a fact that motivates us to consider the so called hygiene hypothesis (Strachan (1989)). Originally, this hypothesis states that a lack of early childhood exposure to infectious agents increases the susceptibility to allergic diseases by suppressing the natural development of the immune system. The immunization process is considered to be more effective the early exposure has set. With respect to the maximum fee rule reform, children should be diagnosed with more diseases in the first years of child care. After the immunization process has been

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<sup>7</sup> For example, the additional income may now be spent on purchasing market goods, such as lessons for playing an instrument or buying more books.

finished, children hold better physical health. The predictions of the hygiene hypothesis are in sharp contrast to the approach of human capital formation applied to physical health. In such a model of health formation, the child care reform might be considered as a negative investment into child health during a sensitive period. If parents cannot sufficiently increase health investments and there is no remediation at later stages, the dynamic process leads to higher health deficits in later childhood.

## 4 Data and Empirical Strategy

### 4.1 Data

The analysis is based on a unique set of merged population register data from the province of Skåne, the southernmost and third most populous region in Sweden. This data follows a large subset of the population of Skåne over the period 1999–2008<sup>8</sup>. It contains merged individual level information from the population register, the income tax register, the medical birth register and the outpatient register.

Child health outcomes are derived from individual health care records in the 1999–2008 “patient administrative register systems” PASiS and PRIVA from the region of Skåne. These two registers are administrated by the Regional Council of Skåne and contain detailed records of all occurrences of inpatient and outpatient care for all inhabitants of the region. Here, “inpatient” refers to visits or spells at medical units that include at least one night’s stay. These are mostly overnight hospital treatments. “Outpatient” refers to all other contacts with care providers, i.e., all ambulatory care, such as day-time visits to physicians, dentists, therapists, emergency care units, specialized nurses, and physiotherapists. In addition, it covers consultations by telephone. Visits are recorded by day, and diagnoses are recorded for each visit. The diagnoses are at the highest level of detail of the ICD-10 classification system. The ICD-10 codes cover a large range of physical and mental health diagnoses, injuries as well as health care utilization information such as (preventive) checkups and vaccinations. For our purpose we collapse most of the detailed 3-digit ICD10 codes into 2-digit main categories and construct binary variables that indicate whether a person was diagnosed with a specific disease.

As noted earlier in the paper, most health care is public. However, some care providers (notably dentists) are private. PASiS contains all publicly provided care, whereas PRIVA contains all privately provided care. The information in PASiS and PRIVA includes dates of admission and discharges, as well as detailed diagnoses and DRG-based costs. These registers have previously been used by Kristensson *et al.* (2007) and Tertilt and Van den Berg (2014). At the county level, the health care registers are collected because they determine the monetary streams from the county to the various health care centers and hospitals. At the same time, at the national level, the register data are collected as part of the so-called “National eHealth” endeavor to improve efficiency in health care. Here, institutional variation in the health care systems across counties is used for “natural experiments” in the analysis of the connection between health care diagnoses and treatments and health outcomes. For this reason,

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<sup>8</sup> Specifically the data set contains all people born between 1940 and 1985 and their family trees.

the national health authorities place great value in the collection of reliable health-care diagnosis records. In Sweden, each individual has a unique identifier which is used to record all contacts with the health care system as well as the general public administration, tax boards, employment offices and so on. We use this to match the above-mentioned health care registers to individual information on socio-economic and demographic conditions. Specifically, we merge these registers to a data set that itself consists of a number of different registers. It includes variables from the annual LISA register on income by type, work absence days, detailed education measures, as well as information on date of birth, marital status, vertical family connections across different individuals, and migration status. This data set is annual, in the sense that each variable is only recorded once a year. This data set has been used before by Meghir and Palme (2005) and covers all persons born in Sweden between 1940 and 1985, their parents, and all their children.

Table 3: Descriptive statistics: health outcomes & health behaviors

	age 1–3		age 4–5		age 6–7	
	N = 69,805		N = 63,538		N = 58,310	
	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd
viral infect	0.09	0.29	0.05	0.22	0.03	0.18
middle ear infect	0.18	0.39	0.15	0.35	0.10	0.30
chicken pox	0.01	0.07	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.04
infections, all	0.15	0.35	0.08	0.28	0.06	0.23
ear diseases	0.19	0.39	0.16	0.37	0.12	0.32
respiratory diseases	0.30	0.46	0.22	0.41	0.17	0.38
skin diseases	0.08	0.27	0.07	0.25	0.06	0.23
other diseases	0.10	0.30	0.08	0.27	0.08	0.27
intoxications & fractions	0.10	0.30	0.09	0.29	0.09	0.28
developmental impairment	0.01	0.12	0.08	0.27	0.04	0.20
psychological, all	0.02	0.14	0.09	0.27	0.06	0.24
preventive visit	1.62	2.26	0.81	0.88	0.30	0.59
diagnoses per year	2.40	4.06	2.30	4.35	1.86	3.58
visits per year	6.46	6.31	4.69	5.37	3.47	4.85

We augment the data with information from Statistics Sweden, namely municipality-specific unemployment rates and population density. This is important information, since they may determine the child care fees before the maximum fee rule was introduced. We construct a panel data set in which we observe each child born between 1993–2004 and living in the region of Skåne between 1999–2008<sup>9</sup>. We restrict our analysis to household with

<sup>9</sup> We are aware that this excludes all children from the sample that did not have any contact to a medical provider.

parents that are married or cohabiting<sup>10</sup>. We set up a sibling sample, containing all remaining households with at least two and a maximum of four children. In order to prevent our estimates from being confounded by the part of the reform addressing children with unemployed parents, we additionally drop households with at least one parent being unemployed just before the reform. The corresponding sibling sample consists of 191,653 observations for 46,453 siblings observed at the same age 1–7, and a maximum of 10 waves.

As outcomes, we select a number of diseases as outcomes children have been diagnosed with and we categorize them along three different groups. The first group one denotes physical health outcomes which can be broadly divided into infections, ear diseases, respiratory diseases, skin diseases, accidents from intoxication or fractions, and other diseases. In addition, we consider few specific subcategories: viral infections, middle ear infections, and chicken pox. We select these health outcomes, since they record typical child diseases that are not innate. The second group are psychological health outcomes. Since the incidence of such diagnoses are rarely made during early childhood, we only take measures of developmental impairments and general psychological health. The latter category comprises diagnoses on ADHD and intellectual problems. Health behaviors define the third category of outcomes. We analyze preventive health behavior as well as the number of medical visits and the number of diagnoses made per year. Table 3 displays the mean incidence of the outcomes by age group.

## 4.2 Empirical Strategy

Our analysis relies on a sibling sample design. To estimate an overall reform effect we compare health outcomes of siblings in households that were fully affected by the reform versus siblings that were only partly or not affected by the reform. Since the reform took effect in January 2002 for all children aged 1–7 years, those born after December 2000 were subject to the reform at each age. Birth cohorts born before January 2001, were partly covered by the reform. We choose three different age groups to measure potential health effects: 1–3, 4–5, and 6–7.

We set up a linear model that links health outcomes of child  $i$  in household  $j$  and municipality  $m$  at year  $t$  to dummy of full reform exposure ( $born\_aft$ ) $_{ijm}$  and covariates.

$$Y_{ijmt,age=a} = \alpha_j + \beta(born\_aft)_{ijm} + X_{ijmt}\delta + \vartheta_t + \varphi_m + \epsilon_{ijmt}. \quad (1)$$

In this specification,  $\alpha_j$  is a household fixed effect,  $\vartheta_t$  is a linear time trend,  $\varphi_m$  is a municipality fixed effect,  $X_{ijmt}$  are covariates and  $\epsilon_{ijmt}$  is an iid error term<sup>11</sup>. Equation (1) is separately estimated for each age group with outcomes  $Y_{ijmt,age=1-3}$ ,  $Y_{ijmt,age=4-5}$ , and  $Y_{ijmt,age=6-7}$ . We estimate a linear probability panel model with sibling fixed effects, obtaining an intention to treat (ITT) effect of full reform exposure on the probability of getting diagnosed with specific diseases at particular ages.

<sup>10</sup> Unfortunately, we do not observe new partners of children’s parents. Moreover, we do not have any information on alimony payments. Thus we cannot calculate the child care fees for families with separated or divorced parents.

<sup>11</sup> Given a linear time trend, we expect differences across children at the same age not to be driven by calendar time. Under this assumption it is sufficient to control for a linear time trend over ages only.

While equation (1) provides us with an estimate for the full reform exposure, we use information on the price schedules to evaluate the relative importance of changes in child care prices and the income effect as a potential mechanism. Municipality-specific price formulas are collected by a survey and allow to calculate the child care fees in the years before and after the introduction of the maximum fee reform on the household level<sup>12</sup>. The household-specific child care fees in each municipality is a function of household income, age and number of children (Lundin *et al.* (2008), Mörk *et al.* (2013)):

$$P_{jmt} = f_m((\text{HH income})_{jt}, (\text{age children})_{jt}, (\text{no children})_{jt}), \quad (2)$$

where  $m$  denotes the municipality,  $j$  refers to a specific household and  $t$  is the calendar time. Prices can be calculated for all households with at least one child aged 1–9 years in the register data<sup>13</sup>. Since we do not observe child care attendance rates on the individual level, we assume that all children of childcare eligible age are enrolled in full-time childcare. Tracing back to the sibling level and taking the logarithm of the calculated child care prices, leads to the following specification linking log child care prices and child health.

$$Y_{ijmt, \text{age}=a} = \alpha_j + \gamma \log(\text{fee})_{ijmt} + X'_{ijmt} \delta + \vartheta_t + \varphi_m + \epsilon_{ijmt}. \quad (3)$$

The coefficient  $\gamma$  provides us with an estimate of the percentage point change in the probability of being diagnosed with any diseases if child care prices across siblings at the same age increase by one percent. Since the maximum fee rule reform imposed a price cap, we expect that higher child care prices go along with higher adverse health risks, and vice versa.

One issue with the child care prices is that they may be endogenous. In particular, we have to assume that household income is not exogenously determined. In addition, the family income clearly affects child health at each age. It has been shown that investments in child health depends on disposable family income (see for instance Case *et al.* (2002), Currie and Stabile (2003)). Consequently, any unobserved changes altering household income and child health may also change the child care prices. We reply to this issue by exploiting the exogenous variation in child care prices induced by the maximum fee rule reform. Equation (4) shows the first stage specification.

$$\log(\text{fee})_{ijmt, \text{age}=a} = \alpha_j + \pi(\text{timing\_ref})_{ijmt} + X'_{ijmt} \delta + \vartheta_t + \varphi_m + \zeta_{ijmt}. \quad (4)$$

The variable  $(\text{timing\_ref})_{ijmt}$  is the reform dummy taking the value one in the year 2002, and is zero otherwise. We again account for household fixed effects, municipality fixed effects and a linear time trend. We expect a strong negative shift of the child care prices stemming from the timing of the reform.

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<sup>12</sup> Child care prices were collected by Eva Mörk and colleagues via an email-request sent to all Swedish municipalities asking for the exact price formulas. They received complete information from 220 of Sweden's 290 municipalities. For the region of Skåne 26 of 33 municipalities provided this information. Thus we exclude the municipalities Svalöv, Burlöv, Vellinge, Östra Göinge, Höör, Klippan and Lund from our analysis

<sup>13</sup> Due to our data restrictions we only analyze children's health outcomes below age of 8.

## 5 Results

We estimate equations (1) and (2) for age groups 1–3, 4–5 and 6–7. We account for these age groups for several reasons. First, it has been shown that children at different ages suffer from different diseases, and we would like to take account of this heterogeneity. Second, the effects of the maximum fee rule reform might be dynamic in the sense that we obtain negative effects on physical health at younger ages and positive effects at later ages. Finally, children aged 6–7 are at preschool or elementary schooling age. Positive health effects for these children could be interpreted a medium-run gains from the child care reform<sup>14</sup>.

### 5.1 Main reform effects

Table 4 displays the results obtained from estimating equation (1). For children’s physical health we only find very small or zero effects of being fully exposed to the reform compared to their siblings at ages 1–3. However, the impact of the reform exposure on child health at ages 4–5 is significantly different from zero for a bunch of physical health measures. Being fully exposed to the reform decreases the probability of suffering from viral infections by 1.2 percentage points, from middle ear infections by 2.4 percentage points, and from chicken pox by 0.3 percentage points. In addition, we find significantly lower probabilities of suffering from general infections (1.8 percentage points), ear diseases (3 percentage points), respiratory diseases (2.6 percentage points) skin diseases (1.0 percentage points) as well as from other disease (1.7 percentage points). The effect of being fully exposed to the reform persists into ages 6–7 for almost all physical health diagnoses. Children in this age group have 2.4 percentage points lower risk of being diagnosed with ear diseases, and a 3.2 percentage points lower risk of being diagnosed with respiratory diseases compared to their non-exposed siblings. The findings in table 4 indicate that full exposure to the reform is beneficial for physical child health at older ages. The pattern is broadly consistent with the hygiene hypothesis that an early exposure to germs translates into a stronger immune system and better physical health at later ages.

The results for psychological health effects and health behaviors are presented in table 5. At age 1–3 the probability of being diagnosed with psychological impairments is 0.6 percentage points lower if a child was subject to the reform. Despite this, we do not find any significant effects on the number of diagnoses per year or the number of medical contacts. While no positive psychological health effects of the reform can be found for age 4–5 either, the probability of having psychological impairments significantly decreases by 1.4 percentage points at age 6–7. In addition we find a 0.8 percentage point decrease in the probability of being diagnosed with developmental problems in this age group. Health behaviors at both age groups, 4–5 and 6–7, seems to be significantly influenced by the reform. The probability of having a preventive visits significantly decreases by 2.7 and 6.9 percentage points respectively, and also the number of diagnoses per year and the number of medical visits per year are significantly lower for children fully affected by the reform in these age groups.

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<sup>14</sup> We also estimated all regressions for different ages groups and for single ages. The results are available upon request.

Table 4: Effects of reform exposure on children’s physical health

	viral infect	middle ear infect	chicken pox	infections all	ear diseases	respiratory diseases	skin diseases	intoxications fractions	other diseases
age 1–3									
<i>born_aft</i>	-0.003 (0.005)	-0.013* (0.007)	0.002 (0.001)	0.002 (0.006)	-0.014* (0.007)	0.008 (0.008)	0.010* (0.006)	0.006 (0.006)	0.007 (0.005)
N×T	62,164	62,164	62,164	62,164	62,164	62,164	62,164	62,164	62,164
N	13,380	13,380	13,380	13,380	13,380	13,380	13,380	13,380	13,380
age 4–5									
<i>born_aft</i>	-0.012*** (0.0004)	-0.024*** (0.007)	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.018*** (0.005)	-0.030*** (0.007)	-0.026*** (0.007)	-0.010** (0.005)	-0.006 (0.006)	-0.017*** (0.005)
N×T	58,355	58,355	58,355	58,355	58,355	58,355	58,355	58,355	58,355
N	17,406	17,406	17,406	17,406	17,406	17,406	17,406	17,406	17,406
age 6–7									
<i>born_aft</i>	-0.007* (0.004)	-0.024*** (0.007)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.009* (0.005)	-0.024*** (0.007)	-0.032*** (0.008)	-0.011* (0.006)	-0.015** (0.006)	-0.018*** (0.006)
N×T	54,038	54,038	54,038	54,038	54,038	54,038	54,038	54,038	54,038
N	14,946	14,946	14,946	14,946	14,946	14,946	14,946	14,946	14,946

standard errors are clustered on the household level; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1; sibling fixed effects regression and control for a linear time trend and municipality fixed effects. Controls: gender, annual household income, number of kids in household, unemployed father after reform, number of older siblings, child moved, log birth weight, twins, private doctor visit, acute visit, outpatient visit, unemployment rate and population density in municipality.

The estimates are of considerable size when interpreted along given baseline risks, ranging between 6% to 24%. For example, the probability of infections decreases by about 23%, and the probability of ear diseases by about 19% in relative terms at age 4–5. At age 6–7 psychological impairments show the highest decrease in incidence rates. Given a baseline risk of 6%, the probability of getting diagnosed with such psychological issues is about 23% lower if being fully affected by the reform.

Overall, the results suggest that the maximum fee rule reform has long-term physical and non-physical health benefits. One concern with our estimates is that we do not observe enrollment in child care on the individual level. The ITT might understate the average treatment effect of the introduction of the maximum fee rule reform if enrollment rate are particularly low for specific age groups.

Table 5: Effects of reform exposure on children’s psychological health and health behavior

	developmental impairments	psychological all	preventive visits age 1–3	diagnoses per year	visits per year
<i>born_aft</i>	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.006** (0.002)	-0.044 (0.034)	0.037 (0.051)	-0.045 (0.076)
N×T	62,164	62,164	62,164	62,164	62,164
N	13,380	13,380	13,380	13,380	13,380
age 4–5					
<i>born_aft</i>	0.004 (0.006)	0.002 (0.006)	-0.027* (0.015)	-0.206** (0.081)	-0.155* (0.090)
N×T	58,355	58,355	58,355	58,355	58,355
N	17,406	17,406	17,406	17,406	17,406
age 6–7					
<i>born_aft</i>	-0.008* (0.005)	-0.014** (0.005)	-0.069*** (0.012)	-0.095 (0.065)	-0.187** (0.080)
N×T	54,038	54,038	54,038	54,038	54,038
N	14,946	14,946	14,946	14,946	14,946

standard errors are clustered on the household level; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1; sibling fixed effects regression and control for a linear time trend and municipality fixed effects. Controls: gender, annual household income, number of kids in household, unemployed father after reform, number of older siblings, child moved, log birth weight, twins, private doctor visit, acute visit, outpatient visit, unemployment rate and population density in municipality.

## 5.2 Reform effects by income

The main consequence of the maximum fee rule reform was a significant drop in the child care fees. While the cap in child care prices may have led to additional disposable income for all household, it makes child care more affordable for low income households. If a proportionally larger fraction of children from low income household did not attend child care before the reform, we expect that the positive effects on child health are mainly driven by this group. We define three distinct income groups. Children from households whose household income in 2001 was below the 25<sup>th</sup> percentile of the income distribution belong to a low income household. Families whose household income in 2001 lied above the 75<sup>th</sup> percentile of the income distribution are denoted as high income households. Accordingly, medium income households have a household income in 2001, that is between the 25<sup>th</sup>

and 75<sup>th</sup> percentile of the household income distribution in 2001.

Table 6: Effects of reform exposure on children's physical health by household income in 2001

	viral infect	middle ear infect	chicken pox	infections all	ear diseases	respiratory diseases	skin diseases	intoxications fractions	other diseases
age 1–3, by log income in 2001									
<i>N</i> = 21,122									
low: <i>born_aft</i>	-0.007 (0.008)	-0.013 (0.012)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.010)	-0.009 (0.012)	-0.005 (0.013)	0.001 (0.009)	-0.006 (0.009)	0.012 (0.009)
<i>N</i> = 19,057									
med: <i>born_aft</i>	0.005 (0.010)	-0.007 (0.013)	0.004* (0.002)	0.013 (0.011)	-0.009 (0.014)	0.010 (0.015)	0.022** (0.010)	-0.003 (0.010)	-0.005 (0.010)
<i>N</i> = 14,078									
high: <i>born_aft</i>	-0.010 (0.011)	-0.018 (0.015)	0.006** (0.003)	0.002 (0.013)	-0.022 (0.015)	0.012 (0.017)	0.009 (0.011)	0.037*** (0.012)	0.002 (0.012)
age 4–5, by log income in 2001									
<i>N</i> = 18,066									
low: <i>born_aft</i>	-0.025*** (0.007)	-0.023* (0.012)	-0.004* (0.002)	-0.030*** (0.009)	-0.026** (0.012)	-0.047*** (0.013)	-0.019** (0.009)	-0.007 (0.009)	-0.019** (0.009)
<i>N</i> = 18,746									
med: <i>born_aft</i>	-0.008 (0.007)	-0.027** (0.012)	-0.003* (0.002)	-0.012 (0.009)	-0.036*** (0.013)	-0.019 (0.013)	-0.020** (0.009)	-0.017* (0.009)	-0.018** (0.009)
<i>N</i> = 16,663									
high: <i>born_aft</i>	-0.005 (0.008)	-0.015 (0.014)	0.000 (0.002)	-0.014 (0.010)	-0.022 (0.014)	-0.016 (0.014)	0.016 (0.010)	-0.010 (0.011)	0.000 (0.010)
age 6–7, by log income in 2001									
<i>N</i> = 15,556									
low: <i>born_aft</i>	-0.010 (0.007)	-0.018 (0.012)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.010 (0.009)	-0.021 (0.013)	-0.036*** (0.014)	-0.014 (0.010)	-0.009 (0.010)	-0.006 (0.011)
<i>N</i> = 18,055									
med: <i>born_aft</i>	-0.007 (0.007)	-0.026** (0.012)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.010 (0.009)	-0.020 (0.013)	-0.018 (0.015)	-0.018* (0.010)	-0.012 (0.011)	-0.024** (0.011)
<i>N</i> = 18,876									
high: <i>born_aft</i>	-0.002 (0.008)	-0.019 (0.013)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.004 (0.011)	-0.025* (0.014)	-0.053*** (0.015)	-0.008 (0.011)	-0.033*** (0.012)	-0.018 (0.011)

standard errors are clustered on the household level; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ ; sibling fixed effects regression and control for a linear time trend and municipality fixed effects. Controls: gender, annual household income, number of kids in household, unemployed father after reform, number of older siblings, child moved, log birth weight, twins, private doctor visit, acute visit, outpatient visit, unemployment rate and population density in municipality. Observations are grouped along tertiles of the log household income in 2001.

Table 6 and table 7 show the results from estimating the reform effects for the three income groups separately. The first panel of table 6 illustrates the effects of the reform exposure for children aged 1–3 years. Children from low income families do not experience any physical health benefits from the reform. In this age group, we find increased incidence for chicken pox for children from medium and high income families. This results provides suggestive evidence of the existence of a negative exposure effect to infectious childhood diseases, as stated by the hygiene hypothesis.

The estimation results for children aged 4–5 are displayed in the second panel of table 6. Children from low income families largely benefit from the maximum fee rule reform along almost of dimensions of physical health. The risk of being diagnosed with viral infections at age 4–5 significantly decrease by 2.5 percentage points, and by 3 percentage points for general infections. Moreover, children from low income families are significantly less likely to be diagnosed with ear diseases (2.6 percentage points), respiratory disease (4.7 percentage points), skin diseases (1.9 percentage points) as well as other disease (1.9 percentage points). We also find positive effects of the child care reform on physical health for children from medium income households. The impact is strongest for ear diseases, middle ear infections, and skin-related diagnoses. In contrast, we do not find any significant health effects from the reform for children from high income families.

At ages 6–7 physical health effects of the reform are distributed across age groups. We find significantly lower probability of suffering from respiratory diseases for children from low income families. For other diseases the sign of the estimates is negative, neither of them is statistically different from zero though. Children from median income households also benefit from the reform in their physical health. They have a significantly lower probability of 2.6 percentage points of being diagnosed with middle ear infections and of 2.4 percentage points of being diagnose with other diseases. Children with high income background are significantly less likely diagnosed with ear diseases, respiratory diseases and intoxication or fractions. If we compare these findings to the results in table 4, it is obvious that health effects of the maximum fee rule reform are mainly driven by children from low to medium income families.

Table 7 provides us the results for psychological and behavioral health measures. Children from median income household benefits most from the reform in terms of developmental and psychological impairments at age 1–3. Compared to their siblings this group of exposed children shows a significantly lower probability of 0.7 percentage points of being diagnosed with developmental problems. Moreover, they have a 1.5 percentage points lower risk for mental health issues. In this age group, children from low income families have less preventive visits, and they see doctor less often. In contrast, children from medium and high income households have more frequent medical contact, in general and for preventive visits. This findings is broadly driven by the physical health results of the maximum fee rule reform, as shown in table 6.

We do not find any significant impact of the maximum fee rule reform on psychological health at age 4–5. However, children from low income households are less likely to be diagnosed with any diseases and the see the doctor less often, which was expected given the results for physical health. Interestingly, and in contrast to the youngest ages group, we find a lower number of preventive visits due to the reform for children from medium and high income families. We assume that the reform led to an age shift in the preventive visits towards younger ages.

Table 7: Effects of reform exposure on children’s psychological health and health behavior by household income in 2001

	developmental impairments	psychological all	preventive visits	diagnoses per year	visits per year
age 1–3, by log income in 2001					
<i>N</i> = 21, 122					
low: <i>born_aft</i>	0.002 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.252*** (0.053)	-0.030 (0.082)	-0.459*** (0.121)
<i>N</i> = 19, 057					
med: <i>born_aft</i>	-0.007** (0.004)	-0.015*** (0.005)	0.165*** (0.062)	0.101 (0.095)	0.118 (0.142)
<i>N</i> = 14, 078					
high: <i>born_aft</i>	-0.006 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.006)	0.209*** (0.075)	-0.008 (0.104)	0.365** (0.149)
age 4–5, by log income in 2001					
<i>N</i> = 18, 066					
low: <i>born_aft</i>	0.005 (0.010)	0.005 (0.010)	0.020 (0.025)	-0.308** (0.139)	-0.287* (0.165)
<i>N</i> = 18, 746					
med: <i>born_aft</i>	0.005 (0.011)	0.002 (0.011)	-0.061** (0.026)	-0.191 (0.139)	-0.094 (0.149)
<i>N</i> = 16, 663					
high: <i>born_aft</i>	-0.005 (0.012)	-0.007 (0.012)	-0.064** (0.029)	-0.104 (0.154)	0.011 (0.159)
age 6–7, by log income in 2001					
<i>N</i> = 15, 556					
low: <i>born_aft</i>	-0.013 (0.008)	-0.023** (0.010)	-0.084*** (0.021)	-0.301*** (0.114)	-0.597*** (0.138)
<i>N</i> = 18, 055					
med: <i>born_aft</i>	0.001 (0.008)	-0.006 (0.009)	-0.041* (0.021)	0.073 (0.103)	0.089 (0.124)
<i>N</i> = 18, 876					
high: <i>born_aft</i>	-0.007 (0.009)	-0.004 (0.010)	-0.066*** (0.024)	-0.031 (0.136)	0.004 (0.148)

standard errors are clustered on the household level; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1; sibling fixed effects regression and control for a linear time trend and municipality fixed effects. Controls: gender, annual household income, number of kids in household, unemployed father after reform, number of older siblings, child moved, log birth weight, twins, private doctor visit, acute visit, outpatient visit, unemployment rate and population density in municipality. Observations are grouped along tertiles of the log household income in 2001.

Finally, children at ages 6–7 with disadvantageous background show a significantly lower risk of 2.3 percentage points for being diagnosed with psychological impairments if they were fully affected by the maximum fee rule reform. Moreover, this group of children has significantly less preventive visits, a lower number of medical visits per year and fewer medical diagnoses per year, indicating that the reform improved their overall health.

Our findings are strongly supported by the literature. As discussed by Currie (2001) children with low socioeconomic background strongly benefit from early interventions, such as Head Start or the Perry Preschool program. The main goal of such programs is to equalize initial endowments between children with different socioeconomic backgrounds. Our findings suggest that also an affordable universal, public child care arrangements improves the physical and non-physical health prospects of disadvantaged children. Our results are moreover in line with the literature on the effects of universal child care programs (Berlinski *et al.* (2009), Felfe and Lalive (2014), Dustman *et al.* (2013)).

### 5.3 Child care fees

The earlier analysis has revealed considerable health effects for children being fully exposed to the reform compared to their non-exposed siblings. We now add an empirical analysis that allows to assess the price effect on child health associated with the maximum fee rule reform<sup>15</sup>.

Table 8: First stage regression of maximum fee rule reform implementation on logarithm of child care fees

	$\log(\text{fee})$		
	age 1–3	age 4–5	age 6–7
<i>timing_ref</i>	-0.415*** (0.004)	-0.478*** (0.005)	-0.492*** (0.004)
N×T	62,050	58,274	53,964
N	13,821	17,397	14,945
R <sup>2</sup>	0.746	0.679	0.710
F statistics	13,026	10,671	13,711
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000

standard errors are clustered on the household level; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1; sibling fixed effects regression and control for a linear time trend and municipality fixed effects. Controls: gender, annual household income, number of kids in household, unemployed father after reform, number of older siblings, child moved, log birth weight, twins, private doctor visit, acute visit, outpatient visit, unemployment rate and population density in municipality.

As outlined in section 4, the child care prices might be endogenous which makes us using the timing of implementation of the maximum fee rule reform as an instrument. Table 8 presents the results from estimating the first stage.

<sup>15</sup> This identification strategy is similar to the one used in Lundin *et al.* (2008) and Mörk *et al.* (2013)).

The relationship between the timing of the maximum fee rule reform and the log child care prices is negative and significantly different from zero for all age groups. The obtained coefficients imply a significant drop in child care prices by approximately 42%–49% due to the implementation of the reform. The  $R^2$  shows that between 68% and 75% of the variation in child care prices can be explained by the reform, and the F-statistics is sufficiently high to assume that the instrument is relevant.

Table 9: Effects of log child care prices on children’s physical health

	age 1–3									
	viral infect	middle infect	ear pox	chicken all	infections all	ear diseases	respiratory diseases	skin diseases	intoxications fractions	other diseases
$\log(\text{fee})$	0.018** (0.008)	0.012 (0.010)	0.002 (0.001)	0.020** (0.010)	0.012 (0.010)	0.032*** (0.012)	0.009 (0.007)	0.013* (0.008)	0.016** (0.008)	
<i>K-P statistic</i>	4,932									
<i>F statistic</i>	12,159									
<i>N</i>	61,528									
	age 4–5									
$\log(\text{fee})$	-0.001 (0.006)	-0.011 (0.010)	0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.008)	-0.008 (0.010)	0.006 (0.011)	0.011 (0.007)	0.013 (0.008)	0.006 (0.008)	
<i>K-P statistic</i>	4,103									
<i>F statistic</i>	12,256									
<i>N</i>	57,601									
	age 6–7									
$\log(\text{fee})$	0.002 (0.04)	-0.015* (0.008)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.006)	-0.013 (0.008)	-0.012 (0.010)	0.000 (0.007)	0.017** (0.008)	0.001 (0.007)	
<i>K-P statistic</i>	4,374									
<i>F statistic</i>	14,464									
<i>N</i>	53,576									

standard errors are clustered on the household level; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ ; IV sibling fixed effects regression and control for a linear time trend and municipality fixed effects. log fees are instrumented by reform exposure dummy. Controls: gender, annual household income, number of kids in household, unemployed father after reform, number of older siblings, child moved, log birth weight, twins, private doctor visit, acute visit, outpatient visit, unemployment rate and population density in municipality.

The estimation results from the second stage with family fixed effects are presented in table 9 and table 10. In contrast to the findings in table 4, the impact of the child care fees on physical health outcomes is more pronounced for young ages. A 1% increase in the average monthly child care fees increases the probability of viral infections by 1.8 percentage points.

Table 10: Effects of log child care prices on children’s psychological health and health behavior

	age 1–3				
	developmental impairments	psychological all	preventive visits	diagnoses per year	visits per year
$\log(\text{fee})$	0.001 (0.002)	0.005 (0.004)	0.027 (0.055)	0.369*** (0.063)	0.348*** (0.112)
<i>K-P statistic</i>			4,932		
<i>F statistic</i>			13,159		
<i>N</i>			61,528		
	age 4–5				
$\log(\text{fee})$	0.006 (0.007)	0.008 (0.007)	-0.071*** (0.024)	0.126 (0.088)	-0.116 (0.097)
<i>K-P statistic</i>			4,103		
<i>F statistic</i>			12,256		
<i>N</i>			57,601		
	age 6–7				
$\log(\text{fee})$	0.016*** (0.005)	0.018*** (0.007)	-0.038** (0.018)	0.185*** (0.069)	0.062 (0.085)
<i>K-P statistic</i>			4,374		
<i>F statistic</i>			14,464		
<i>N</i>			54,576		

standard errors are clustered on the household level; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1; IV sibling fixed effects regression and control for a linear time trend and municipality fixed effects. log fees are instrumented by reform exposure dummy. Controls: gender, annual household income, number of kids in household, unemployed father after reform, number of older siblings, child moved, log birth weight, twins, private doctor visit, acute visit, outpatient visit, unemployment rate and population density in municipality.

The risk for being diagnosed with any infections significantly increases by 2 percentage points, and by 3.2 percentage points for respiratory diseases if the child care fees increase by 1%. We also find a higher incidence for

accidents from intoxication or fractures as well as for other disease for increasing child care fees. In contrast, the physical health effects of an increase in the child care fees is almost never statistically different from zero for older age groups. For children aged 6–7 the probability of being diagnosed with an intoxication or fracture increases by 1.7 percentage points if the child care fees increase by 1%.

Results for non-physical health and health behavior are presented in table 10. Across all ages, we find evidence of an increased number of medical diagnoses if the child care prices increase by 1%. In addition, children aged 1–3 year see the doctor significantly more often. While the number of preventive visits does not change for this age group, older children have less preventive visits when child care fees increase. An increase in the child care prices by 1% leads to a significant increase in the probability of developmental diseases by 1.6 percentage points, and of psychological problems by 1.8 percentage points.

We interpret the findings for child health as follows: any positive health effects from a decrease in child care prices are rather short run and fade out as children get older. In contrast, lower child care fees improve children’s psychological health in the long run, a finding which is consistent with the literature (Black *et al.* (2014)). A decrease in child care prices also seems to have positive long lasting consequences for preventive health behavior. If the maximum fee rule reform serves as a real income transfer to households, then they might use this additional disposable income to buy additional health checks and preventive methods, they would not have done otherwise.

#### 5.4 Potential mechanisms

Given the observed effects of the maximum fee rule reform on different dimensions of child health, the next question is how the results for different reform measures fit together, and what factors are driving these results.

We first explore whether child care attendance rates have risen around the implementation of the reform. An increased attendance rate paves the way for a number of mechanisms linking the the maximum fee rule reform and the observed patterns in physical and non-physical child health. Figure 3 illustrates the development of the child care attendance rates for children aged 1–5 years in the region of Skåne. The light background curves denote the attendance rates for single municipalities; the black curve is municipality average of the child care enrollment rates. While there seems to be a general upward trend in the percentage of children attending public child care, the slope is considerably steeper in the years 2001–2003. This time window corresponds to the period in which the maximum fee rule reform was implemented. During this period enrollment rates increased by about 9%, from 73% to almost more 82%. Child care attendance rates continue to increase in later periods, and are around 85% for children aged 1–5 years in 2008.

We assume that the sharp increase in the child care attendance rates around the time the reform took effect reflects an increase in child care demand, rather than a pure supply side effect. Supply constraints exist if parents are willing to pay market prices for child care but cannot find such an arrangement (Blau and Hagy (1998)). In Sweden, however, every household could get a slot in a public child care facility before the reform as long as they have been willing to pay the price set by municipalities. Thus increases in child care demand are driven by the introduction of the maximum fee rule, that is, by a lower child care price.

With respect to the sharp increase in the child care attendance rates around the implementation of the maximum




Figure 2: Development child care attendance rate by municipalities, 1999–2008

fee rule reform, a number of pathways may come into play channeling the reform effect on child health. First, the maximum fee rule reform guarantees broader access to public child care, leading to a crowding out effect of informal care arrangement. Havnes and Mogstad (2011) provide evidence for Norway that newly subsidized child care crowds out most of the informal care arrangements. In our setting, the lower child care prices imposed by the reform make public child care affordable to households at the lower end of the income distribution. For children affected by the reform, these households substitute public child care for private or informal care arrangements. As public child care arrangements in Sweden are of very high quality, the crowding out towards public care has positive effects on children’s physical and psychological health. Moreover, quality of care at home might have improved. If child care is more affordable, mothers might invest less but higher quality time into their children<sup>16</sup>. A second mechanism may be female labor supply. One goal of the maximum fee rule reform was to improve the families’ financial situation by facilitating labor force participation. A reduction in child care fees may have effects on the intensive and the extensive margin of labor supply. First, the supplied hours of work may increase if the children can spend more hours in public care. Second, labor force participation may increase if the reduced prices makes child care available. Both might have an income effect on the household. The additional income might be invested in child quality. Lundin *et al.* (2008) analyzed the effects of the maximum fee rule on maternal labor supply on along the intensive and the extensive margin, finding no statistically significant effects. We repeat

<sup>16</sup> It has been shown in the medical literature, that day care services help to reduce the risks for internalizing problems for children of mothers with elevated depression symptoms (Herba *et al.* (2013)).

this exercise by estimating the effect of reform exposure on labor force participation and female earnings. In line with Lundin *et al.* (2008), we do not find significant effects labor supply neither on the intensive nor the extensive margin<sup>17</sup>.

A further pathway for the child care reform effect on child health is fertility. Typically, child care fees denote a significant item in the household's budget and are likely to enter the decision on whether to have an additional child or not. A reduction in child care fees may push parents decision towards having an additional child. The literature detects a strong correlation between family size and child quality (Becker and Tomes (1976), Lundborg *et al.* (2013)). More siblings suggest that investments per child may be lower negatively influencing child health (see for instance Becker and Tomes (1976)). On the other hand, siblings may have a positive child health effect, since children are exposed to their siblings. We investigate the robustness of our main findings along this hypothesis by re-estimating equation (1) for families with two children only. Compared to the results in table 4, the found effects seem to be marginally stronger but are qualitatively very similar (see Appendix table A.1 and A.2). The reform effect seems not to depend on the number of siblings in the household, and is robust to changes in the sample composition.

Finally, the impact of the maximum fee rule reform might on child health might be driven by the income effect induced by the reduction in child care prices. For families with children in public child care before the reform, any reduction in the child care prices serves as a positive income transfer. Black *et al.* (2014) have shown that lower child care prices act as a positive income shock to disposable income and improve child outcomes through this mechanism. Therefore, the maximum fee rule may directly lead to additional disposable income which parents can invest to buy more child quality.

Despite discussing the mechanisms, it is also of great importance to understand the dynamics behind them. Since physical and psychological health are different dimensions of health, we assume that also the underlying theoretical models are different. One potential rationale for our results of physical health is the hygiene hypothesis. It states that children that are affected by germs and bacteria early in life develop a stronger immune system, making them more resistant against future diseases. This immunization process typically is initiated by utilizing early life child care services. Our findings by and large coincide with this hypothesis.

A process underlying the patterns in non-physical health provides Heckman's approach on the formation of human capital (Heckman (2006), Cunha and Heckman (2008)). He formulates a dynamic model of human skill formation in which early life investments initiate self-productivity and dynamic complementarities, so that the early acquisition of skills begets skill formation at later stages in life. The maximum fee rule reform can be viewed as a positive child investments that generates long term positive psychological health gains.

To sum up, our findings draw the following picture linking the maximum fee rule reform and child health: For physical child health, the introduction of the maximum fee rule leads to a crowding out of informal care and to a sudden increase in disposable income. While the former mechanism leads to potential negative physical health at younger ages (as predicted by the hygiene hypothesis), additional parental health investments induce health gains, explaining the zero effects at ages 1–3. While the positive price effect generated through the maximum fee rule

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<sup>17</sup> Results are available upon request.

is rather short-term and translates into better health immediately, the immunization process begin to take effect, improving physical health at later ages. For psychological health, a combination of crowding out and income effect seems to be most likely to drive the findings. As shown in the literature, universal care has beneficial effects on child development in the short term as well as in the long term (see for instance Drange *et al.* (2012), Havnes and Mogstad (2014)). The driving factor for these findings is that children are exposed to a stimulating and suitable environment that supports cognitive and noncognitive development. The additional disposable income for families whose children have been in care before the reform, may increase parental investments into child quality. Crowding out of informal care seems to be the main mechanism that is responsible for the health gains of the maximum fee rule reform among low and low-medium income households. Children from medium and high income households benefit from the reform in terms of psychological health through decreased child care fees and increased disposable household income.

### 5.5 Municipality-specific heterogeneities

As indicated by figure 1 there is a large variation in child care prices before the introduction of the maximum fee rule reform across municipalities. We assume that these different price levels generate a considerable heterogeneity in physical and non-physical health effects of the reform. To explore this, we categorize municipalities into low, medium and large changes in child care prices, and interact the resulting three categories with the reform exposure dummy<sup>18</sup>. The reference group denotes children from municipalities with relatively high changes in child care prices. This analysis allows us to assess if children from municipalities with high prices before the reform benefit relatively more from the maximum fee rule compared to their siblings.

Table 11 displays heterogeneous effects of a reform exposure on physical child health. For ages 1–3, the main reform effect is negative and significantly different from zero for viral infections, middle ear and general ear diseases as well as for respiratory diseases. This suggests that exposed children from municipalities with relatively high changes in child care prices experience significantly lower probabilities of being diagnosed with such diseases. The pattern of heterogeneity is similar for other age groups, and the effects of reform exposure do not disappear.

Table 12 provides the results for psychological health outcomes and health behavior. Similar to physical health outcomes, we find heterogeneities in the reform exposure effect with respect to the municipality group. Children from municipalities with high price changes are significantly better off in terms of non-physical health, they have more medical check ups, and they less often see a doctor at age 6–7 if they have been fully exposed to the reform. Moreover, being exposed to the reform significantly reduces the number of medical diagnoses among these children, irrespective of the age of diagnosis.

The results show that there are considerable heterogeneities in the reform exposure effect displayed in table 4. Children from municipalities with high fees before the reform benefit most from the introduction of the maximum fee rule, while health gains are comparably lower for children from municipalities that experienced medium and

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<sup>18</sup> We define municipalities with low fee changes to lie below the 25th percentile, with medium change between 25th and 75th percentile, and with high changes above 75th percentile of the distribution of price changes.

Table 11: Heterogeneous effects of reform exposure on children's physical health

	viral infect	middle infect	earchicken pox	infections all	ear diseases	respiratory diseases	skin diseases	intoxications fractions	other diseases
age 1–3									
<i>(born_aft)</i>	-0.22*** (0.007)	-0.029*** (0.010)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.015* (0.009)	-0.032*** (0.010)	-0.024** (0.011)	-0.007 (0.007)	-0.004 (0.008)	-0.012 (0.008)
<i>muni : low × (born_aft)</i>	0.031*** (0.008)	0.033*** (0.011)	0.002 (0.002)	0.030*** (0.011)	0.036*** (0.011)	0.061*** (0.012)	0.032*** (0.008)	0.023*** (0.008)	0.024*** (0.008)
<i>muni : med × (born_aft)</i>	0.028*** (0.009)	0.013 (0.012)	0.000 (0.001)	0.016 (0.012)	0.016 (0.012)	0.032** (0.013)	0.021** (0.009)	0.005 (0.009)	0.032*** (0.009)
age 4–5									
<i>(born_aft)</i>	-0.025*** (0.006)	-0.033*** (0.010)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.034*** (0.008)	-0.040*** (0.010)	-0.063*** (0.011)	-0.018** (0.007)	-0.017* (0.008)	-0.028*** (0.008)
<i>muni : low × (born_aft)</i>	0.025*** (0.007)	0.029** (0.012)	-0.000 (0.002)	0.036*** (0.009)	0.029** (0.013)	0.081*** (0.013)	0.019** (0.009)	0.025** (0.010)	0.020** (0.009)
<i>muni : med × (born_aft)</i>	0.012 (0.008)	-0.003 (0.013)	-0.002 (0.002)	0.008 (0.010)	-0.001 (0.013)	0.025* (0.014)	0.001 (0.009)	0.003 (0.010)	0.011 (0.010)
age 6–7									
<i>(born_aft)</i>	-0.008 (0.007)	-0.028** (0.011)	-0.002* (0.001)	-0.014 (0.009)	-0.032*** (0.012)	-0.034*** (0.012)	-0.018** (0.009)	-0.019* (0.010)	-0.033*** (0.010)
<i>muni : low × (born_aft)</i>	0.002 (0.009)	0.011 (0.014)	0.000 (0.001)	0.010 (0.011)	0.017 (0.015)	0.021 (0.016)	0.017 (0.011)	0.001 (0.012)	0.032** (0.013)
<i>muni : med × (born_aft)</i>	0.001 (0.009)	-0.000 (0.015)	0.001 (0.002)	0.004 (0.012)	0.002 (0.015)	-0.021 (0.017)	-0.002 (0.012)	0.011 (0.013)	0.007 (0.013)

standard errors are clustered on the household level; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1; sibling fixed effects regression and control for a linear time trend and municipality fixed effects. Controls: gender, annual household income, number of kids in household, unemployed father after reform, number of older siblings, child moved, log birth weight, twins, private doctor visit, acute visit, outpatient visit, unemployment rate and population density in municipality.  $N_{age\ 1-3} : N(N \times T) = 24, 204(91, 514)$ ;  $N_{age\ 4-5} : N(N \times T) = 24, 557(75, 160)$ ;  $N_{age\ 6-7} : N(N \times T) = 22, 061(68, 296)$ .

low change in prices. The finding is also in line the presumed mechanisms discussed in section 5.4: Public child care least affordable in municipalities with high price changes. Thus the maximum fee rule reform may have led

Table 12: Heterogeneous effects of reform exposure on children’s psychological health and health behavior

	developmental impairments	psychological all	preventive visits	diagnoses per year	visits per year
age 1–3					
<i>(born_aft)</i>	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.006* (0.003)	-0.072* (0.042)	-0.254*** (0.064)	0.015 (0.095)
<i>muni : low × (born_aft)</i>	0.000 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.004)	0.346*** (0.048)	0.462*** (0.076)	0.285*** (0.108)
<i>muni : med × (born_aft)</i>	0.000 (0.003)	0.000 (0.004)	-0.316*** (0.052)	0.404*** (0.082)	-0.544*** (0.114)
age 4–5					
<i>(born_aft)</i>	0.004 (0.009)	0.006 (0.010)	0.036 (0.022)	-0.317*** (0.103)	0.057 (0.115)
<i>muni : low × (born_aft)</i>	-0.000 (0.011)	-0.004 (0.011)	-0.033 (0.026)	0.269* (0.141)	-0.175 (0.142)
<i>muni : med × (born_aft)</i>	-0.002 (0.010)	-0.007 (0.011)	-0.150*** (0.027)	0.040 (0.119)	-0.435*** (0.127)
age 6–7					
<i>(born_aft)</i>	-0.007 (0.008)	-0.018** (0.009)	-0.112*** (0.017)	-0.144 (0.095)	-0.104 (0.101)
<i>muni : low × (born_aft)</i>	0.002 (0.009)	0.013 (0.011)	0.111*** (0.023)	0.137 (0.130)	-0.034 (0.134)
<i>muni : med × (born_aft)</i>	-0.006 (0.009)	-0.002 (0.011)	-0.001 (0.023)	-0.015 (0.121)	-0.223 (0.142)

standard errors are clustered on the household level; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1; sibling fixed effects regression and control for a linear time trend and municipality fixed effects. Controls: gender, annual household income, number of kids in household, unemployed father after reform, number of older siblings, child moved, log birth weight, twins, private doctor visit, acute visit, outpatient visit, unemployment rate and population density in municipality.  $N_{\text{age } 1-3} : N(N \times T) = 24, 204(91, 514)$ ;  $N_{\text{age } 4-5} : N(N \times T) = 24, 557(75, 160)$ ;  $N_{\text{age } 6-7} : N(N \times T) = 22, 061(68, 296)$ .

to a relatively strong crowding out of informal child care and to a relatively high increase in disposable income. As discussed in the previous section this generates large health gains for children from these regions<sup>19</sup>.

<sup>19</sup> We also explored heterogeneous effects across geographical areas. By splitting up the region of Skåne into an urban area (south-west) and a rural area (north-east), we find that children living in rural areas have better physical health if they have been fully exposed to the reform.

## 5.6 Robustness checks

One potential issue with the identification is that the reform does not only directly impact the exposed sibling's health, but also indirectly the other sibling's health. The direction of such an indirect effect however is ambiguous. On the one hand, the reduction in child care prices may lead to a reallocation of financial resources and to an increase in (health) investment for the non-affected sibling. In this case the estimated health effects of the reform may provide a lower bound estimate. On the other hand, there may be a spillover effect from the younger sibling's health to the older sibling's health. For instance, the presence of a younger sibling at age two being affected by the reform may negatively influence the health of the older sibling at age five, possibly changing the subsequent health path. Then, by comparing both siblings' health at age five and later, the positive health effect of the reform might also be driven by an unobserved, negative spillover effect on the older sibling's health. The positive and direct impact of the maximum fee rule reform on child health might be overestimated. To show that the estimated effects of reform exposure are not likely driven by spillovers or redistribution within households, we estimate the reform exposure effects with single children. Tables A.3 and A.4 provide us with the corresponding results. Even though some of the physical health effects are not significantly different from zero, they still have a negative sign. In addition, psychological health effects remain strongly negative, indicating that single children strongly benefit from the maximum fee rule reform.

Despite any spillover effects, birth order might play a role for our findings. A number of studies has investigated the effect of birth order on children's development and education. While Garces *et al.* (2002) do not find any differences between the oldest and younger siblings in the effect of Head Start, Black *et al.* (2005) show that birth order rather than family size reveals causes high differences in later educational outcomes. In an analysis of infant health effects on child health, Oreopoulos *et al.* (2008) do not find significant differences in their results when controlling for sibling's birth order. To investigate the robustness of our results, we run a specification in which birth order fixed effects are included. As indicated by tables A.5 and A.6, accounting for birth order does not change our baseline findings in significant ways. Thus, the birth order of the sibling does not confound the overall exposure effect of the maximum fee rule reform.<sup>20</sup>

We finally change the level of clustering the standard errors from the household level to the municipality×year level to address potential issues with grouped error terms. As Bertrand *et al.* (2004) state such a specification yields valid standard errors if health development between exposed and non-exposed siblings is the same in the absence of the maximum fee rule reform. Based on this assumption, tables A.7 and A.8 illustrate the findings. It is obvious that changing the level of clustering only marginally changes the baseline results.

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Effects on psychological health and health behavior however seem not to follow a geographical pattern. The corresponding results are available upon request.

<sup>20</sup> We also estimated the effect of being the younger child on child health in a sample of siblings that were all not affected by the maximum fee rule reform. Birth order mostly has a negative effect on children's health or is neutral for all age groups. This indicates that birth order does not play a major role in our setting.

## 5.7 Public child care expenditures and health costs

We finally would like to investigate the effectiveness of the maximum fee rule reform for child health costs. The results of our main analysis strongly support the assumption that children that have been fully affected by the reform are physically and non-physically healthier at the same age. In addition, these children have a lower total number of annual doctor visits than their counterparts. This suggests that the average health costs per child should be lower after the reform has taken place than in the years before. At the same year, however, the implementation of the maximum fee rule reform may have increased the municipalities' expenditures. We investigate the potential health cost-effectiveness of the maximum fee rule reform comparing the changes in health costs and child care expenditures per child on the municipality level. Information on health costs per child and municipality are derived from the administrative outpatient and inpatient data for the region of Skaåne. They contain all costs being generated by medical contact. The child care expenditures are defined as the sum of all costs per child in a municipality including costs for facilities and staff.




Figure 3: Development health costs and child care costs, per child

The left figure of figure 3 shows the evolution of overall costs for child health and child care<sup>21</sup>. There is a large differences in the predicted cost levels of the quantities: Municipality expenditures for child care are very high, ranging between 90.0000 and 112.000 SEK/a. Health costs are on a much lower level. They are between 5.000 and 8.000 SEK/a. While health costs seem to be on a constant level, child expenditure increase over time. The right figure of figure 3 plots annual percent changes of both costs, shedding more light on their development. Child expenditures annually increase by about 3% in the years before the reform, but remain almost unchanged in the

<sup>21</sup> figure 3 shows predicted values from a regression of health costs and child care expenditures, respectively, on the reform dummy, fractions of population for ages 1-3,4-5,6-15,16-19,65+, a measure of population density, the fraction of low educated, poor children, foreigners, the local income tax base, the total municipalities expenditures, child care staff, municipality fixed effects, and a linear time trend. All costs are deflated to the 2010 level. We also checked the development of local tax rates, finding no changes over time and due to the reform.

immediate years after the reform. From 2005, costs seem to increase again by up to 7%. This can be explained by the fact, that each municipality received a grant from the state government to keep the level of child care quality and to implement the maximum fee rule reform. It has been shown by Hanes *et al.* (2009) that the grant significantly improves the situation for the municipality. Child health costs are strongly increasing by up to 20% in the years before the maximum fee rule reform was implemented. However, immediately after the reform health costs accumulations start to decrease and turn to be negative from 2005. In 2006 health costs are almost 20% lower than the pre-annual level. Local health costs per child decrease over time which supports the findings on lower rates of annual medical visits and fewer medical diagnosis per year. We expect that the long-term savings in health costs per child as adult may even be higher.

## 6 Conclusion

One major goal of universal preschool reforms throughout the world is to positively impact children's physical, cognitive and noncognitive development. This paper presents evidence on how a major universal reform of the Swedish child care system has influenced the physical and the psychological dimension of child health, and health behavior. We have shown that particularly children from low income families are better off in terms of physical and mental health after the reform has been implemented, presumably being driven by a crowding out of informal care arrangements towards public child care. Moreover, we show that the changes in child care prices which represents the major mechanism of the maximum fee rule reform exhibit positive short term effects on physical health, but are beneficial for non-physical child development at later ages.

Our paper adds to the literature of child health development. According to the theory of health production, such positive health returns may persist into adolescence and adulthood and yield as cross fertilizer for cognitive and noncognitive child development (see Case *et al.* (2005), Currie *et al.* (2010), Almond and Currie (2011), Bartling *et al.* (2012)). Our study thus may be a first step towards understanding how health develops throughout childhood and how universal high-quality, highly subsidized preschool influences the path of health production.

From a policy point of view our findings suggest that changing child care fees is an effective tool to influence child health. Reducing child care fee is not only beneficial for children from medium or high income families due to increased disposable household income which possibly is invested into child health by parents. Such a policy also makes child care more accessible to those who could not afford child care before. Thus, a policy of low priced universal child care indirectly targets children from disadvantaged background, having a very positive influence on their physical and psychological health.

Finally, the results have shown that the reduction in child care fees leads to a decreasing path of health costs. This raises expectations about the long-term decrease in health from in adulthood. Unfortunately, our data do not allow us to track children into adult age in order to analyze long-term health and effects on other economic outcomes. However, if child health is indeed a strong predictor of adult health we expect them to perform better economically,

suggesting financial benefits for the Swedish social system. Analyzing these long term effects leaves much scope for future research.

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## 7 Appendix

Table A.1: Effects of reform exposure on children's physical health, two sibling household

	viral infect	middle ear infect	chicken pox	infections all	ear diseases	respiratory diseases	skin diseases	intoxications fractions	other diseases
age 1–3									
<i>born_aft</i>	-0.003 (0.005)	-0.015* (0.008)	0.003* (0.002)	0.000 (0.007)	-0.016* (0.009)	0.005 (0.00)	0.011* (0.006)	0.004 (0.006)	0.007 (0.007)
N×T	45,792	45,792	45,792	45,792	45,792	45,792	45,792	45,792	45,792
N	10,612	10,612	10,612	10,612	10,612	10,612	10,612	10,612	10,612
age 4–5									
<i>born_aft</i>	-0.011*** (0.005)	-0.025*** (0.008)	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.017*** (0.006)	-0.031*** (0.009)	-0.029*** (0.009)	-0.009 (0.006)	-0.006 (0.006)	-0.017*** (0.006)
N×T	42,793	42,793	42,793	42,793	42,793	42,793	42,793	42,793	42,793
N	13,804	13,804	13,804	13,804	13,804	13,804	13,804	13,804	13,804
age 6–7									
<i>born_aft</i>	-0.0011** (0.005)	-0.025*** (0.009)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.017** (0.007)	-0.028*** (0.009)	-0.029*** (0.010)	-0.009 (0.007)	-0.015** (0.007)	-0.028*** (0.008)
N×T	39,949	39,949	39,949	39,949	39,949	39,949	39,949	39,949	39,949
N	11,756	11,756	11,756	11,756	11,756	11,756	11,756	11,756	11,756

standard errors are clustered on the household level; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1; sibling fixed effects regression and control for a linear time trend and municipality fixed effects. Controls: gender, annual household income, number of kids in household, unemployed father after reform, number of older siblings, child moved, log birth weight, twins, private doctor visit, acute visit, outpatient visit, unemployment rate and population density in municipality.

Table A.2: Effects of reform exposure on children’s psychological health and health behavior, two sibling household

	developmental impairments	psychological all	preventive visits	diagnoses per year	visits per year
age 1–3					
<i>born_aft</i>	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.007** (0.003)	-0.078** (0.039)	0.044 (0.060)	-0.050 (0.089)
N×T	45,792	45,792	45,792	45,792	45,792
N	10,612	10,612	10,612	10,612	10,612
age 4–5					
<i>born_aft</i>	-0.002 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.007)	-0.021 (0.018)	-0.229** (0.091)	-0.091 (0.094)
N×T	42,793	42,793	42,793	42,793	42,793
N	13,804	13,804	13,804	13,804	13,804
age 6–7					
<i>born_aft</i>	-0.012** (0.005)	-0.015** (0.006)	-0.076*** (0.014)	-0.088 (0.074)	-0.155* (0.084)
N×T	39,949	39,949	39,949	39,949	39,949
N	11,756	11,756	11,756	11,756	11,756

standard errors are clustered on the household level; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1; sibling fixed effects regression and control for a linear time trend and municipality fixed effects. Controls: gender, annual household income, number of kids in household, unemployed father after reform, number of older siblings, child moved, log birth weight, twins, private doctor visit, acute visit, outpatient visit, unemployment rate and population density in municipality.

Table A.3: Effects of reform exposure on children's physical health, single children household

	viral infect	middle infect	earchicken pox	infections all	ear diseases	respiratory diseases	skin diseases	intoxications fractions	other diseases
age 1–3									
<i>born_aft</i>	0.006 (0.008)	0.008 (0.010)	0.003* (0.002)	0.021** (0.009)	0.011 (0.010)	0.007 (0.011)	0.004 (0.008)	0.017** (0.007)	0.020** (0.008)
N	31,373	31,373	31,373	31,373	31,373	31,373	31,373	31,373	31,373
R <sup>2</sup>	0.111	0.200	0.007	0.142	0.204	0.262	0.048	0.057	0.085
age 4–5									
<i>born_aft</i>	-0.002 (0.007)	0.001 (0.011)	-0.000 (0.002)	-0.011 (0.009)	0.004 (0.012)	-0.030** (0.013)	-0.028*** (0.009)	-0.016* (0.009)	-0.020** (0.009)
N	26,927	26,927	26,927	26,927	26,927	26,927	26,927	26,927	26,927
R <sup>2</sup>	0.082	0.145	0.008	0.118	0.153	0.214	0.057	0.070	0.079
age 6–7									
<i>born_aft</i>	-0.000 (0.006)	0.006 (0.009)	-0.000 (0.002)	-0.004 (0.007)	0.002 (0.010)	-0.027** (0.011)	-0.017** (0.007)	-0.001 (0.008)	-0.005 (0.008)
N	26,614	26,614	26,614	26,614	26,614	26,614	26,614	26,614	26,614
R <sup>2</sup>	0.058	0.108	0.005	0.084	0.119	0.180	0.050	0.079	0.067

standard errors are clustered on the individual level; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1; OLS regression controlling for a linear time trend and municipality fixed effects. Controls: gender, annual household income, number of kids in household, unemployed father after reform, number of older siblings, child moved, log birth weight, twins, private doctor visit, acute visit, outpatient visit, unemployment rate and population density in municipality.

Table A.4: Effects of reform exposure on children’s psychological health and health behavior, single children household

	developmental impairments	psychological all	preventive visits	diagnoses per year	visits per year
age 1–3					
<i>born_aft</i>	0.001 (0.002)	0.002 (0.003)	0.174*** (0.057)	0.189** (0.082)	0.206 (0.129)
N	31,373	31,373	31,373	31,373	31,373
R <sup>2</sup>	0.022	0.023	0.497	0.378	0.554
age 4–5					
<i>born_aft</i>	-0.008 (0.009)	-0.009 (0.009)	-0.025 (0.024)	-0.108 (0.102)	-0.023 (0.108)
N	26,927	26,927	26,927	26,927	26,927
R <sup>2</sup>	0.071	0.075	0.308	0.280	0.462
age 6–7					
<i>born_aft</i>	-0.015*** (0.006)	-0.012* (0.007)	-0.033** (0.016)	-0.083 (0.088)	-0.118 (0.104)
N	26,614	26,614	26,614	26,614	26,614
R <sup>2</sup>	0.060	0.068	0.218	0.275	0.448

standard errors are clustered on the household level; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1; OLS regression controlling for a linear time trend and municipality fixed effects. Controls: gender, annual household income, number of kids in household, unemployed father after reform, number of older siblings, child moved, log birth weight, twins, private doctor visit, acute visit, outpatient visit, unemployment rate and population density in municipality.

Table A.5: Effects of reform exposure on children’s physical health, with birth order FE

	viral infect	middle ear infect	chicken pox	infections all	ear diseases	respiratory diseases	skin diseases	intoxications fractions	other diseases
age 1–3									
<i>born_aft</i>	-0.003 (0.005)	-0.013* (0.007)	0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.006)	-0.014* (0.007)	0.008 (0.008)	0.011* (0.006)	0.006 (0.006)	0.006 (0.005)
N×T	62,164	62,164	62,164	62,164	62,164	62,164	62,164	62,164	62,164
N	13,830	13,830	13,830	13,830	13,830	13,830	13,830	13,830	13,830
age 4–5									
<i>born_aft</i>	-0.012*** (0.004)	-0.024*** (0.007)	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.018*** (0.005)	-0.030*** (0.007)	-0.026*** (0.008)	-0.010** (0.005)	-0.006 (0.006)	-0.017*** (0.005)
N×T	58,355	58,355	58,355	58,355	58,355	58,355	58,355	58,355	58,355
N	17,406	17,406	17,406	17,406	17,406	17,406	17,406	17,406	17,406
age 6–7									
<i>born_aft</i>	-0.007* (0.004)	-0.024*** (0.007)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.010* (0.005)	-0.024*** (0.008)	-0.032*** (0.008)	-0.010* (0.006)	-0.015** (0.006)	-0.017*** (0.006)
N×T	54,038	54,038	54,038	54,038	54,038	54,038	54,038	54,038	54,038
N	14,946	14,946	14,946	14,946	14,946	14,946	14,946	14,946	14,946

standard errors are clustered on the household level; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1; sibling fixed effects regression and control for birth order fixed effects, a linear time trend and municipality fixed effects. Controls: gender, annual household income, number of kids in household, unemployed father after reform, number of older siblings, child moved, log birth weight, twins, private doctor visit, acute visit, outpatient visit, unemployment rate and population density in municipality.

Table A.6: Effects of reform exposure on children's psychological health and health behavior, birth order FE

	developmental impairments	psychological all	preventive visits	diagnoses per year	visits per year
age 1–3					
<i>born_aft</i>	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.006** (0.003)	-0.041 (0.051)	0.039 (0.051)	-0.036 (0.076)
N×T	62,164	62,164	62,164	62,164	62,164
N	13,830	13,830	13,830	13,830	13,830
age 4–5					
<i>born_aft</i>	0.004 (0.006)	0.002 (0.006)	-0.027* (0.015)	-0.206** (0.081)	-0.155* (0.094)
N×T	58,355	58,355	58,355	58,355	58,355
N	17,406	17,406	17,406	17,406	17,406
age 6–7					
<i>born_aft</i>	0.008* (0.005)	-0.014** (0.005)	-0.069*** (0.012)	-0.091 (0.066)	-0.188** (0.060)
N×T	54,038	54,038	54,038	54,038	54,038
N	14,946	14,946	14,946	14,946	14,946

standard errors are clustered on the household level; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1; sibling fixed effects regression and control birth order fixed effects, a linear time trend and municipality fixed effects. Controls: gender, annual household income, number of kids in household, unemployed father after reform, number of older siblings, child moved, log birth weight, twins, private doctor visit, acute visit, outpatient visit, unemployment rate and population density in municipality.

Table A.7: Effects of reform exposure on children's physical health, s.e. clustered on municipality×year level

	viral infect	middle ear infect	chicken pox	infections all	ear diseases	respiratory diseases	skin diseases	intoxications fractions	other diseases
age 1–3									
<i>born_aft</i>	-0.003 (0.006)	-0.013 (0.008)	0.002* (0.001)	0.002 (0.008)	-0.014 (0.011)	0.008 (0.014)	0.010* (0.005)	0.006 (0.007)	0.007 (0.006)
N×T	62,164	62,164	62,164	62,164	62,164	62,164	62,164	62,164	62,164
N	13,830	13,830	13,830	13,830	13,830	13,830	13,830	13,830	13,830
age 4–5									
<i>born_aft</i>	-0.012** (0.005)	-0.024** (0.010)	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.018*** (0.007)	-0.030*** (0.010)	-0.026** (0.011)	-0.010** (0.005)	-0.006 (0.006)	-0.017*** (0.005)
N×T	58,355	58,355	58,355	58,355	58,355	58,355	58,355	58,355	58,355
N	17,406	17,406	17,406	17,406	17,406	17,406	17,406	17,406	17,406
age 6–7									
<i>born_aft</i>	-0.007* (0.004)	-0.024*** (0.006)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.009* (0.005)	-0.024*** (0.007)	-0.032** (0.009)	-0.011** (0.005)	-0.015** (0.006)	-0.018*** (0.006)
N×T	54,038	54,038	54,038	54,038	54,038	54,038	54,038	54,038	54,038
N	14,946	14,946	14,946	14,946	14,946	14,946	14,946	14,946	14,946

standard errors are clustered on the municipality×year level; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1; sibling fixed effects regression and control for a linear time trend and municipality fixed effects. Controls: gender, annual household income, number of kids in household, unemployed father after reform, number of older siblings, child moved, log birth weight, twins, private doctor visit, acute visit, outpatient visit, unemployment rate and population density in municipality.

Table A.8: Effects of reform exposure on children’s psychological health and health behavior, s.e. clustered on municipality×year level

	developmental impairments	psychological all	preventive visits	diagnoses per year	visits per year
age 1–3					
<i>born_aft</i>	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.006** (0.003)	-0.044 (0.189)	0.037 (0.090)	-0.045 (0.249)
N×T	62,164	62,164	62,164	62,164	62,164
N	13,380	13,380	13,380	13,380	13,380
age 4–5					
<i>born_aft</i>	0.004 (0.005)	0.002 (0.005)	-0.027 (0.053)	-0.206*** (0.098)	-0.155** (0.075)
N×T	58,355	58,355	58,355	58,355	58,355
N	17,406	17,406	17,406	17,406	17,406
age 6–7					
<i>born_aft</i>	-0.008* (0.004)	-0.014*** (0.004)	-0.069** (0.030)	-0.095* (0.054)	-0.187*** (0.065)
N×T	54,038	54,038	54,038	54,038	54,038
N	14,946	14,946	14,946	14,946	14,946

standard errors are clustered on the municipality×year level; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1; sibling fixed effects regression and control for a linear time trend and municipality fixed effects. Controls: gender, annual household income, number of kids in household, unemployed father after reform, number of older siblings, child moved, log birth weight, twins, private doctor visit, acute visit, outpatient visit, unemployment rate and population density in municipality.