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An Economic Theory of Religious Belief


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An Economic Theory of Religious Belief

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Abstract. In this paper I consider how individuals allocate their time between church attendance (and other religious activities) and secular leisure activities. Moreover individuals use a cognitive style, which is either intuitive-believing or reflective-analytical. I assume that the full benefit from religious activities is achieved by intuitive believers. The model predicts that, ceteris paribus, wealthier individuals and individuals with higher cognitive ability are more likely to abandon the intuitive-believing cognitive style. They may continue to attend church but do so less frequently than intuitive believers. In general equilibrium, there exists a locally stable steady state where believing and frequent church attendance is widespread across the social strata. A sufficiently large negative shock (e.g. the Enlightenment, repeal of Sunday shopping laws), however, initiates the gradual secularization of society.

Keywords: religiosity; church attendance; cognitive style; consumerism; fuzzy fidelity.

1. Introduction

A salient socio-cultural phenomenon of the 20th century is the gradual secularization of Europe and other developed countries with Christian traditions. While Europe was deeply religious before industrialization it is now largely secular (Norris and Inglehart, 2004; Bruce, 2011). Long-run data provided by Iannaccone (2003) and Voas (2009) for a panel of countries shows that there is a falling trend of religious activity over the 20th century for every country (see also Herzer and Strulik, 2013). This paper develops a new economic theory of secularization, drawing on recent research in evolutionary psychology. In particular, it proposes an economic mechanism explaining how individuals “optimally” lose their faith.

In a nutshell, the theory works as follows. Individuals experience utility from attending church (or engaging in other religious activities) as well as from secular leisure (e.g. shopping or attending a football game). Their style of cognitive reasoning is characterized as either intuitive-believing or reflective-analytical. As explained in greater detail below, cognitive style, understood as the willingness to engage in analytic reasoning processes, is a choice variable. An intuitive-believing cognitive style allows for maximum utility from church attendance (and other religious activities). A reflective-analytical cognitive style, on the other hand, reduces gains from church attendance, and the loss is increasing in cognitive ability. Assuming that secular leisure complements consumption, we observe two potential long-run outcomes.

When income is low, most individuals prefer an intuitive-believing cognitive style and church attendance is frequent and widespread. However, as income rises, the steady state of high levels of church attendance disappears. Individuals now prefer to spend more income and time on secular leisure activities. In order to reduce the opportunity cost of secular leisure, individuals also increasingly apply a reflective-analytical cognitive style. Critical reflection on core ideas of the (Christian) religious belief-system, such as heaven and hell, the creation of man, a personal god, forgiveness of sins, or salvation and resurrection, raises doubt and reduces utility gains from church attendance. This allows individuals to derive more pleasure from secular consumption. The model predicts that, ceteris paribus, wealthy individuals and individuals with high cognitive ability are the first to lose their faith. They have the most opportunities for secular leisure and the greatest power to reduce the benefit (opportunity costs) from church attendance through cognitive reflection. Holding income constant, secularization could also be set in motion by innovations in secular leisure (e.g. the advent of the department store) as well as a decrease in the general value
of religion (e.g. Enlightenment and the scientific revolution, after which fewer mysteries where left to be explained by supernatural agents and forces).

This paper’s emphasis of cognitive reflection relates it to economic studies on the nexus between education and religiosity. As argued by Hume (1757), it seems intuitively plausible that education reduces the utility experienced from believing in supernatural agents and therefore, well educated individuals, ceteris paribus, are less religious, and attend church less frequently. Consequently this issue is relatively well researched, the results, however, are (yet) inconclusive. For example, Iannaccone (1998), summarizing the earlier literature, concludes a largely positive association of education and religiosity. Likewise, McCleary and Barro (2006) observe a positive association of education with belief in God, an afterlife, heaven and hell, as well as which church attendance. Deaton (2009), in contrast, finds education to be negatively associated with religiosity across the world, and Arias-Vasquez (2012) confirms this conclusion for the U.S. Becker et al. (2014) argue that education drove the secularization movement in historical Prussia. Using compulsory education laws, Hungerman (2013) finds a causal impact of education on identification with religious traditions and church attendance. In contrast, Sander (2002) finds that once education is instrumented by parents’ education the causal effect disappears, and concludes that education and church attendance may be driven by an unobserved third variable.

Building on Hume’s argument, a natural candidate for this “third variable” seems to be cognitive ability. According to this view, it would not be the act of learning as such (e.g. learning the details of the history of the Catholic church or of astronomy or human evolution) that reduces the utility experienced from church attendance but the active reflection on potentially doubt-raising issues (Dawkins, 2006). Individuals of high cognitive ability seem to have a comparative advantage in analytical reasoning. This positive association between cognitive ability and education is already well known to economists (e.g. Heckman and Vytlacil, 2001) but a recent literature in cognitive psychology also established a strong negative association between cognitive ability and religiosity. For example, Lynn et al. (2009) document a significantly positive correlation between IQ and religious disbelief across 137 countries (correlation coefficient 0.6) and Pesta et al. (2010) document a negative correlation between IQ and religiosity across American states (correlation coefficient -0.55). Zuckerman et al. (2013) provide a meta-analysis of micro studies on this issue. Of the 37 studies showing a significant correlation between IQ and religiosity, 35 were negative. When both education and intelligence enter the regression equation on religiosity, intelligence
has a significantly negative effect while education becomes insignificant. These observations are made by Ganzach et al. (2013) for the U.S. using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth and the General Social Survey. Likewise, using between-siblings estimates, Ganzach and Gotlibovski (2013) show that religiosity is significantly negatively correlated with IQ while education becomes insignificant.

One could argue, however, that while possessing high cognitive ability may be conducive to low utility returns from religiosity, it is not necessarily sufficient. After all, even highly gifted individuals may not fully utilize their intellectual power. This view is supported by a new literature in cognitive psychology that distinguishes between cognitive ability as the capacity to engage analytical reasoning and cognitive style as the willingness or disposition to engage in analytical reasoning (Pacini and Epstein, 1999; Stanovich and West, 1998; Pennycook, 2014). While cognitive ability is largely given for adults, cognitive style is a choice, i.e. a problem could be tackled either in a fast, intuitive-believing style or a slow reflective-analytic style (Sloman, 1996; Kahneman, 2003, 2011; Evans, 2008).

In order to elicit the cognitive style employed by a person, psychologists designed the cognitive reflection test (CRT; Frederick, 2005). A typical question of such a test is the following: “A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost?” The intuitive answer that immediately springs to mind is that the ball costs 10 cents. The correct answer that requires some effort and (basic) analytic thinking is that the ball costs 5 cents. A couple of recent studies have found that performance taking the CRT is a strong predictor of religiosity. For example, persons believing that the ball costs 10 cents are also more likely to believe that God exists and more likely to have increased their belief in God since childhood (Shenhav et al., 2011; Gervais and Norenzayan, 2012). Pennycook et al. (2012) show that performance on CRTs is not only significantly negatively associated with religious beliefs but that it also renders both education and cognitive ability insignificant in multiple regression analysis. One way to explain these results is that human beings are psychologically predisposed to develop religious beliefs (Boyer, 2001; Dennett, 2006), and that reflective-analytical processes are purposefully chosen by religious disbelievers to inhibit and override intuitive religious cognitions (Pennycook, 2014). The incentive to apply the reflective-analytical cognitive style, particularly when reasoning about supernatural agents and forces, is high when income is high and secular leisure opportunities are abundant. By applying reflective-analytical processes, individuals
essentially devalue their experience at church and strategically reduce the opportunity cost of secular leisure (e.g. shopping, attending a football match, or other Sunday activities).

Given these stylized facts, it seems intuitively plausible that individuals for whom a reflective-analytical style is most essential for professional success, are more likely to become less religious. This view is supported by the observation that scientists are much less religious than the public at large and that leading scientists are even less religious than “ordinary” ones. For example, in the U.S., 33% of scientists believe in God vs. 83% of the general public (Pew Research Center, 2009). Among elite American scientists, 7% believe in a personal god (Larson and Witham, 1998) and 19% attend church once week or more vs. 49% of the general public (Ecklund et al., 2008). Interestingly, the low level of belief in God among elite scientists is not a recent phenomenon. Even in 1914, only 28% percent of elite American scientists believed in God (Leuba, 1916) and in 1933, 15% (Leuba (1934). The trade-off between religious belief and scientific attitude is also observed in society at large. Using the World Value Surveys, Benabou et al. (2015) document a strong association between alternative measures of religiosity (e.g. importance of God, church attendance) and negative attitudes toward science (e.g. that there is too much dependence on science versus faith, that science develops too fast, etc.).

Inspired by the insights from cognitive psychology, we integrate cognitive style into economic modeling as a decision variable. It is, however, important to note that – similar to Akerlof and Kranton’s (2000) theory of identity choice – individuals are not necessarily aware of their active choice in utility-maximizing cognitive style (or identity). Instead, following, Friedman’s (1953) general methodology of positive economics, it is important that people behave as if they maximize their utility regardless of whether they are aware of their maximizing behavior. Moreover, it should be acknowledged that the strict separation of society into intuitive believers and reflective analytical thinkers is an assumption made for simplicity. It approximates a reality, in which some individuals apply the intuitive believing style more frequently than others.

Although there exists a relatively large economics literature on religion, the phenomenon of religious belief, as such, has not received much attention. Hardin (1997) offers an interesting non-formal discussion of various aspects of religious beliefs and identifies the sincerity of beliefs, according to which “doubt itself is a sin or a wrong” as an essential difference between religious and other pragmatic knowledge. Relatedly, Caplan (2001) proposes a (non-formal) theory of rational

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1At the macro-level, the nexus between religiosity and cognitive style is reflected by a negative association between religiosity and innovation (Benabou et al. 2015b).
irrationality, according to which people optimally choose a degree of “self-delusion” because the “private costs of the belief are less than the private costs”. Benabou and Tirole (2011) propose an elaborated theory of identity and moral behavior where one application is related to taboos and investments in a moral identity that avoids rational reflection of certain questions. None of these studies, however, have combined the analysis of religious beliefs with individual leisure choice in order to explain the gradual secularization of society.

The proposed channel of leisure choice and opportunities in this paper has been inspired by recent empirical findings on the association between consumerism and religiosity. Hirschle (2011) computes an index of “consumption-related cultural activities” (number of visits to cinemas, concerts, sports events, etc.) and finds a negative association with church attendance across 82 European regions. More importantly, when income and secular leisure activities are represented in the regression, income becomes insignificant. Additionally, Hirschle shows that at the micro level, individual income is an insignificant explanation of church attendance in regressions in which secular leisure activities are represented (with a significantly negative sign). Hirschle (2010) presents corroborating evidence from Ireland’s recent growth and secularization history. Gruber and Hungerman (2008) show that religious participation across American states declined when laws prohibiting retail activity on Sunday were repealed. Through experiments, Stillman et al. (2012) find that a lower level of spirituality corresponds with a higher desire to consume material goods. Strulik (2015) proposed a theory of identity choice, consumerism, and religiosity, that captured some aspects of these empirical findings. The theory, however, was rather “reduced-form” since it addressed neither the problem of leisure time allocation nor the change of cognitive style from believing to rational reflection, i.e. the process of losing one’s religion, which is the focus of the present paper.

2. The Model

2.1. Setup of Society. Consider a society of non-overlapping generations of adults, each alive for one period (generation). Individuals are heterogenous with respect to three exogenous attributes, cognitive ability $a$, propensity to religiosity $r$, and income $y$. For simplicity, ability and religiosity are uniformly distributed in the unit interval, $r \in (0, 1), a \in (0, 1)$, and income has a potentially moving upper boundary $\bar{y}_t$, $y_t \in (0, \bar{y}_t)$. The parameter $r$ captures religious preferences, i.e. the propensity to experience utility from spending time attending church or other
religious activities. This preference is taken as exogenous, as in standard economics (e.g. the propensity to like ice-cream). We include religious propensity in order to account for the fact that there are some wealthy individuals or individuals with high cognitive ability who frequently attend church. Individuals are endowed with two units of time. One unit is inelastically supplied on the labor market to earn income. One unit is spent on religious and/or secular leisure activities. For simplicity, we call the time-consuming religious activities church attendance.

2.2. Leisure Activities. Any generation \( t \) of individuals decides how to spend their leisure time and whether to apply a reflective-analytical or intuitive-believing thinking style (i.e. whether to be a “true” believer). Reflective-analytical thinking reduces the value of religious activities. Only intuitive-believing individuals experience the full potential value of church attendance. For them the experienced value of religion is the product of the time \( \tau_t \) spent at church times the idiosyncratic weight to like these kind of activities \( r \) times the general value of religion \( R_t \), \( \tau_t r R_t \).

While the distribution of individual religious propensities \( r \) is constant, the general value of religion \( R_t \in (0,1) \) is potentially time varying. It is exogenous to the individual and culturally and socially determined by its past value and by average church attendance in society. It will be introduced in detail later on. Reflective-analytical thinking individuals experience less utility from attending church. Specifically, the utility for attending church is declining in cognitive ability \( a \) such that experienced utility is \((1-a)\tau_t r R_t \).

The preferences for consumption and secular leisure activities are not type-dependent and are assumed to be complements (e.g. playing golf and the golf equipment). While this assumption is not necessary in order to explain secularization of society, it allows us to capture the association between secularization and consumerist leisure activities documented in the Introduction (Hirschle, 2011; Gruber and Hungerman, 2008). In order to obtain analytical results, we assume that the sub-utility function of secular activities is Cobb-Douglas, such that type-dependent utility is given by

\[
U(\sigma) = \lambda c_1^\sigma (1 - \tau_t)^{1-\sigma} + \tau_t (1 - a \sigma) r R_t,
\]

in which \( \sigma \in \{0,1\} \) denotes the cognitive style, with \( \sigma = 0 \) for intuitive-believing. The shifter \( \lambda \) measures the general importance of secular leisure activities. It is taken as given by individuals but may change occasionally. For example, if the leisure activity is shopping, \( \lambda \) may increase through the invention of the department store.
Solving the first order condition with respect to church attendance and supposing that individuals consume all of their income \((c_t = y_t)\), we obtain:

\[
\tau_t = \max \left\{ 0, \ 1 - y_t \left( \frac{\lambda(1 - \alpha)}{(1 - a\sigma)r R_t} \right)^{\frac{1}{\alpha}} \right\}.
\] (2)

Church attendance is type-specific but neither high cognitive ability nor a reflective-analytical thinking style necessarily precludes church attendance. Specifically, we observe:

**Proposition 1 (Church Attendance).** *Ceteris paribus, church attendance is low if the general value of religion \(R_t\) is low or if the weight of secular leisure activities \(\lambda\) is high. It is low when income is high and individuals spend much on (secular leisure-dependent) consumption and it is low for individuals of high cognitive ability \(a\), for individuals with low religious propensity \(r\), and for individuals applying an analytical cognitive style (for \(\sigma = 1\)).

The proof follows from inspection of (2). Ceteris paribus, individuals with high cognitive ability and reflective-analytical thinking style are first to stop attending church altogether. However, church attendance also largely depends on the general value of religion. This is shown by the example in Figure 1, which depicts church attendance according to (2) in the “cognitive-ability”–“religiosity-propensity” space for \(y = 1\), \(\alpha = 0.5\), and \(\lambda = 0.05\). If the general value of religion \(R\) is relatively high, as shown in the diagram on the left-hand side, only a few individuals of high ability and low religious propensity avoid church altogether. When the value of religion is relatively low, as shown on the right hand side, non-attendance is wide-spread and only individuals of relatively low cognitive ability and high religious propensity spend much time on religious activities.

**Proposition 2 (Fuzzy Fidelity).** *Individuals who apply the reflective-analytical style (\(\sigma = 1\)) may continue to attend church, but less frequently than otherwise similar individuals applying the intuitive-believing style (\(\sigma = 0\)).

The proof follows from inspection of (2) and noting that \(\tau_t\) is positive for \(\sigma = 1\) if \(R_t\) is sufficiently high (or \(\lambda\) or \(y_t\) are sufficiently low). The term “fuzzy fidelity” was coined by Voas (2009) to describe the phenomenon that, in Europe, an increasing share of individuals lose their traditional Christian belief but without becoming outright atheists. Instead, many people display a casual loyalty to religious tradition (like attending church on special occasions).
2.3. **Cognitive Style.** By inserting the interior solution from (2) into (1) we obtain the indirect utility function:

\[
U(\sigma) = \lambda y_t \left[ \frac{(1-\alpha)\lambda}{(1-\sigma\alpha)\sigma R_t} \right]^{\frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}} + R_t (1-\sigma a) r \left[ 1 - y_t \left( \frac{(1-\alpha)\lambda}{(1-\sigma\alpha)\sigma R_t} \right)^{\frac{1}{\alpha}} \right].
\]

(3)

Individuals compare utility for \( \sigma = 0 \) and \( \sigma = 1 \) and adopt a reflective-analytical thinking style if \( U(1) > U(0) \), that is if

\[
f(a, y, R_t) := \frac{\lambda a^\alpha (1-\alpha)^{1-\alpha} y_t^\alpha}{R_t} \left[ (1-a) \frac{(1-\alpha)}{\alpha} - 1 \right]^{\alpha} > r.
\]

(4)

In the \( a-r \)-space, \( f(a, y, R_t) \) is the threshold separating believers and non-believers for given income. It is monotonously increasing.

**Lemma 1.** The religiosity threshold is increasing in cognitive ability, \( \partial f / \partial a > 0 \).

The proof is in the Appendix. It follows from Lemma 1 that, on average, individuals of high cognitive ability are less likely to be intuitive believers. But we may also observe individuals of high cognitive ability (and high religious propensity) who avoid the reflective-analytical thinking style. This is particularly the case when the general value of religion \( R \) is high. Holding income constant, Figure 2 shows three realizations of the threshold in the \( r-a \)-space for alternative values of \( R \). Individuals, characterized by an \( (a, r) \)-tuple above the threshold apply an intuitive-believing cognitive style. The area above the threshold provides the population share of believers (for any
given income group). The area below the threshold measures the population share of individuals applying the reflective-analytical thinking style, denoted by \( s_t \). More generally, we observe:

**Proposition 3 (Losing Religion).** *Individuals with low religious propensity, high cognitive ability, and high income are more likely to abandon the intuitive-believing cognitive style. If the general value of religion \( R_t \) declines, or the value of secular leisure \( \lambda \) increases, more individuals abandon the intuitive-believing cognitive style.*

The proof follows from inspection of (3) and Lemma 1 in conjunction with Figure 2. The question is then: why do individuals stop believing? It appears that becoming less religious merely reduces the utility from religious activities and nothing is gained from it. Upon closer inspection, however, the benefit from becoming less religious appears through the back-door, through the “worldly temptations” of secular leisure and consumption. To see this, inspect the first element of indirect utility in (3). It comprises utility from secular activities and is increasing in \( \sigma \). Moving away from the intuitive-believing style allows individuals to experience more utility from secular leisure and -- due to the complimentary -- from consumption. Also, note that utility from secular activities is pre-multiplied by the weight of leisure \( \lambda \) while indirect utility from religious activities, the second term in (3), is pre-multiplied by \( R_t \), the value of religion. In short, once the value of religion is low enough (instigated e.g. by the Enlightenment), or the value of secular leisure is high enough (e.g. the formation of sports clubs with Sunday matches), or income and thus the pleasure from leisurely consumption is high enough, some individuals activate reflective-analytical processes in order to stop believing, which enables them to fully enjoy the pleasure derived from secular activities.

**Figure 2: Faith Threshold in Ability–Religious Propensity Space**

The panels show a cross-section of society for given income levels. Individuals above the threshold apply the intuitive-believing cognitive style (white area), while individuals below the threshold apply the reflective-analytical style (grey area). Parameters: \( \alpha = 0.5, \lambda = 0.15 \); income held constant at unity.
In other words, through rational reflection, individuals can actively reduce the opportunity cost of secular activities. Rational reflection raises doubt about the existence of salvation, forgiveness of sins, hell, purgatory, and other elements of Christian dogma and devalues the religious experience of church attendance and other time consuming religious activities. It allows individuals to experience the maximum pleasure from secular leisure and consumption. When income is close to subsistence and few devices for secular leisure have been invented, the temptation to stop intuitive-believing is relatively low and this cognitive style is widespread in society. Church attendance is frequent among all social strata. On the other hand, when income is high and the possibilities to enjoy secular leisure are abundant, many individuals apply the reflective-analytical style (in particular, when reasoning about supernatural forces), church attendance is less frequent, and some individuals stop attending church altogether. Ceteris paribus, these are individuals with high cognitive ability and high income levels.

In this context it is interesting to observe that all major religions and, in particular, Christianity, criticize excessive consumption for being inconsistent with religious fulfillment (Belk, 1983, Abela, 2007). According to the proposed model, the church “knows” that secular leisurely consumption is in direct competition with the goods that the church offers (salvation from sin, redemption from the dire situation on earth). The church also “knows” that the temptation of consumer leisure also threatens individual faith as such. Since the temptation is, ceteris paribus, higher at large incomes, the Bible predicts “It is easier for a camel to go through a needle’s eye than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of God.” (Luke 18:25).

2.4. The Value of Religion. The model suggests two distinct drivers of secularization (which may, in practice, operate simultaneously and amplify each other). The first driver is economic growth. As can be seen from (4), rising income increases the slope of the faith threshold, which becomes infinite for $y \to \infty$. Rising income thus gradually increases the population share applying the reflective-analytical cognitive style. Similarly, rising income gradually reduces church attendance, and increases the share of individuals who stop attending church, cf. (2).

The second driver is the value of religion $R$, which may itself be subject to change. Specifically the value of religion may have stayed constant for several centuries (during medieval times) and then gradually shrank (since Enlightenment). We capture this idea formally by conceptualizing the value of religion as a slow moving state variable, for which its current value depends on its last period’s value. This could be thought of as a reduced form representation of vertical
transmission of religious values. Moreover, the value of religion is assumed to depend positively on aggregate religious activity in society, i.e. the strength of the social norm to attend church (and to participate in other religious activities).

We capture the strength of the social norm by the frequency of church attendance of the median believing citizen, denoted by \( \tau^m_t \). Specifically, we assume that the next period’s value of religion is given by \( R_{t+1} = (\rho + \tau^m_t)^\omega R_t^{1-\omega} \). Here, \( \omega \) measures the relative contribution of history and social norms to the value of religion, \( 0 < \omega < 1 \). By \( \rho \geq 0 \) we acknowledge that religion may attain a positive value although the median believing citizen stopped attending church completely.

From the fact that \( r = 1/2 \) and \( y_t = y_t/2 \) for the median believing citizen, and inserting church attendance from (2) we obtain the law of motion for the value of religion:

\[
R_{t+1} = \begin{cases} 
\left( \rho + 1 - \frac{2\lambda(1-\alpha)}{R_t} \right)^\omega \frac{y_t}{2} \cdot R_t^{1-\omega} & \text{for } R_t > 2\lambda(1-\alpha)(\frac{y_t}{2})^\alpha \\
\rho^\omega R_t^{1-\omega} & \text{otherwise.}
\end{cases}
\]  

(5)

Inspection of (6) shows that if the initial value of religion is sufficiently low or if initial income or the value of secular leisure activities are sufficiently large, then the value of religion declines gradually to a low value of \( \rho \), at a speed that depends positively on \( \rho \).

In order to establish the value of religion as a stand-alone driver or secularization, consider the case where income stays constant and normalize all incomes at \( y_t = 1 \). This case could capture the absent growth of average income during the Middle Ages. Setting \( R_{t+1} = R_t \) in (5) we see that, if the median voter attends church, a steady state for the value of religion exists where

\[
R = F(R) := 1 + \rho - \frac{2\lambda(1-\alpha)}{R}^{\frac{\omega}{2}} R^{-\frac{\omega}{2}}.
\]  

(6)

The curve \( F(R) \) originates from \( R = \frac{2\lambda(1-\alpha)}{1+\rho} \), and \( F' > 0 \) and \( F'' < 0 \). Thus, the positive and strictly concave curve intersects the identity line either twice or never. If it intersects twice, we identify the intersection at the higher \( R \) as locally stable while the intersection at the lower \( R \) is unstable. An increase of \( \lambda \) or a decline of \( \rho \) moves the curve to the right, which leads to the following conclusion.

**Proposition 4 (Stable Religiosity).** If the shifter of secular leisure \( \lambda \) is sufficiently low or the shifter of religious value \( \rho \) is sufficiently high, there exist two steady states with positive church attendance of the median person. The larger steady state is locally stable, while the smaller one
is unstable. There exists always a locally stable steady state with no church attendance of the median person at $R = \rho$.

For the proof, consider Figure 3 showing the two possible cases. The $R_{t+1}$-curve is represented by the strictly concave blue line with a kink where the median citizen stops attending church, at $R_t = 2\lambda(1 - \alpha)$. The identity-line is shown in black. Intersections of the two curves identify steady states. For a sufficiently low value of $\lambda$ (here $\lambda = 0.3$) there exist two intersections, as shown in the panel on the left-hand side of Figure 3. Let the intersection at the larger $R$ be denoted by $R^*_1$ (and $R^*_2$ is the other steady state). Observe that $R_{t+1}$ is strictly concave for large $R_t$. This means that the $R_{t+1}$-curve lies above the identity line for large values $R > R^*_1$, implying convergence towards $R^*_1$ from the initial value above and (mildly) below $R^*$. The upper steady state is locally stable. At the lower intersection, the $R_{t+1}$-curve lies above the identity line for values $R > R^*_2$, implying movement away from the steady state. The lower steady state is unstable. For sufficiently high values of $\lambda$ (here $\lambda = 0.5$) there exists no intersection of the law of motion with the identity line when the median attends church. The only remaining steady state is at $R = \rho$, when society is largely secularized.

**Figure 3: Law of Motion for Value of Religion**

![Figure 3: Law of Motion for Value of Religion](image)

Blue curve: law of motion (6) for $\rho = 0.02$, $\alpha = \omega = 1/2$. Left panel: 3 intersections (steady states). Right panel: 1 intersection (steady state) at low value of religion.

Finally, we investigate the persistence of religiosity with a numerical example. For this purpose, we assume that parameters are such that society rests initially at the high-$R^*$ steady state (cf. the panel on the left hand side of Figure 3). Generations are converted into years by assuming
that a generation covers 25 years. At year 1775, society experiences a shock that drives down \( \rho \) such that the steady state of high religiosity vanishes (cf. the panel on the left-hand side of Figure 3). Secularization dynamics are shown in Figure 4 (parameter values are given below the figure). The first panel shows the value of religion, the second panel shows the share of non-believers in society, and the third panel shows church attendance for different social strata.

**Figure 4: Secularization over Time and across Social Strata**

The figure shows that, although the shock happened in the late 18th century, it takes until the mid to late 20th century until it gains momentum. The main reason is the concavity of (the median’s) church attendance in \( R \), cf. (2), implying that a loss of \( R \) at a high level elicits only minor
response of church attendance. This allows for a very gradual decline of church attendance and religious value for centuries. Eventually, however, the process speeds up and gains considerable momentum after 1950 when church attendance of the median person drops drastically to zero within 2 generations. Similarly, the share of individuals applying the reflective-analytical style rises only gradually for most of the time and gains momentum in the year 2000, after which the median person stopped attending church. Then, society secularizes very rapidly and the value of religion drops to its minimum.

The third panel of Figure 4 shows that other strata of society, with higher propensity to religiosity or lower cognitive ability than the median person, attend church much more frequently during the 20th century. The (perhaps unrealistic) prediction of complete secularization of society could be avoided by assuming a different distribution of \( r \). Alternatively we could have assumed that the distribution of religious propensity is unbounded from above. This would capture the notion that some individuals never abandon religion, regardless of the behavior of society at large (and regardless of their income level). Secularization would then be completed only asymptotically and church attendance would phase out more gradually during the 21st century. The main result of increasing momentum, however, is driven by the median’s behavior, and is robust to this extension.

Lastly, we consider fuzzy fidelity, depicted in the bottom panel of Figure 4. For that purpose, we use (2), recall that we had meanwhile set \( y = 1 \), and notice that reflective-analytical individuals do not attend church if

\[
h(a, R_t) := \frac{1 - \alpha \lambda}{(1 - \alpha)R_t} > r. \tag{7}
\]

Similar to the case of the faith threshold, the area above the \( h(1, R) \)-curve and below the unity-line provides the population share of individuals attending church, \( g_t \), conditional using the reflective-analytical style. The share of reflective-analytical individuals who attend church is then given by \( z_t = s_t g_t \). As shown in the bottom panel of Figure 4, about 30 percent of the population belong to the fuzzy fidelity group. These individuals can be conceptualized as having lost their faith but still attending church, though less than intuitive believers. The population share of fuzzy fidelity is slightly rising over time until the median believing citizen stops going to church. At this time, when the social norm of religiosity breaks down, the value of religion diminishes drastically, and non-believers stop attending church. As in Voas (2009) we observe the rise and
fall of fuzzy fidelity. Here, however, the timing of vanishing church attendance and the loss of faith is endogenously explained by individual choices of leisure time allocation.

3. Final Remarks

This paper proposes an economic theory of religious belief based on leisure time allocation and choice of cognitive style. The study proposes one potential channel of secularization, which has a micro-foundation in evolutionary psychology, and which leads to predictions on the nexus between income, cognitive ability, and religious beliefs, which are supported by recent empirical research on intelligence, consumer behavior, and religiosity. Of course, the theory highlights only one of many potential channels of secularization and acknowledges that secularization is a complex, multi-dimensional phenomenon, driven by other forces as well, e.g. increasing individualism, rationalism, religious pluralism, liberalism, scientific developments, and structural change ( Warner, 2010; Bruce, 2011).

Several future extensions are conceivable. The theory could be embedded in the context of long-run economic development and economic growth with a causal impact of secularization and cognitive style on economic aggregates. It could also be desirable to endogenize the onset of secularization and the scientific revolution. A feedback effect of the demand for secular leisure on the supply and innovation of leisure consumption goods is also conceivable. Finally, the theory could be used to address the gender gap in religiosity (see e.g. Voas et al. 2013). Such an approach would draw on the observation that women perform worse than men on cognitive reflection tests (Frederick, 2005) in order to explain why they appear to be more religious than men.
Appendix: Proof of Lemma 1

Recall that \( a \in (0, 1) \) and \( \alpha \in (0, 1) \). In order to show that \( f \) is increasing in \( a \), it is sufficient to show that

\[
g(a) = \frac{(1-a)^{1-\frac{1}{\alpha}} - 1}{a}
\]

is positively sloped. This is the case for

\[
g'(a) = \frac{1}{a^2} \left\{ (-1) \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\alpha} \right) (1-a)^{-\frac{1}{\alpha}}a - \left[ (1-a)^{1-\frac{1}{\alpha}} - 1 \right] \right\} > 0,
\]

i.e. for

\[
(1-a)^{-\frac{1}{\alpha}} \left[ a \left( \frac{1}{\alpha} - 1 \right) + a - 1 \right] + 1 > 0 \iff (1-a)^{-\frac{1}{\alpha}}a \left( \frac{1}{\alpha} - \frac{1}{a} \right) + 1 > 0. \quad (8)
\]

**Case (i):** \( a \geq \alpha \). \( g' \) is since \( 1/\alpha > 1/a \).

**Case (ii):** \( a < \alpha \). Rewriting (8) we have

\[
(1-a)^{-\frac{1}{\alpha}} \left[ a \left( \frac{1}{\alpha} - 1 \right) + (1-a)^{\frac{1}{\alpha}} \right] > 0.
\]

Since the first term is positive, the expression is positive for

\[
\frac{a}{\alpha} - 1 + (1-a)^{\frac{1}{\alpha}} > 0 \iff (1-a)^{\frac{1}{\alpha}} > 1 - \frac{a}{\alpha} \iff 1 - a > \left( 1 - \frac{a}{\alpha} \right)^\alpha. \quad (9)
\]

According to Bernoulli’s inequality, we have \((1+x)^r \leq 1 + rx\) for \( x > -1, \ r \in [0, 1], \ r \in R \). Application to the case at hand implies \((1-a/\alpha)^\alpha \leq 1 - \alpha a/\alpha = 1 - a\), confirming (9). Thus \( g(a) \) is increasing in \( a \) for \( a \in (0, 1) \).
References


