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Abstract

In those authoritarian regimes that remained resilient throughout the Arab uprisings, the ruling elites have maintained their power through protest management strategies designed to include or, more frequently, exclude certain societal groups. This paper compares the strategies and their respective target groups in Algeria and Jordan, two cases of limited protests despite which authoritarianism has remained resilient. In both countries, inclusionary strategies towards protesters were pursued only half-heartedly. When they failed, they were subsequently replaced by exclusionary mechanisms. More successful inclusionary strategies were aimed at another target, the regime's support base. The decreasing extent of political protests can thus hardly be attributed to responsive elite behaviour. The limited use but credible threat of repression together with discourses of deterrence prevented greater mobilisation, partly by invoking negative examples of the past or neighbouring countries. However, the massive reliance on exclusionary mechanisms calls the future stability of the Arab world into question.

Keywords: inclusion, exclusion, Arab uprisings, protests, repression, state–society relations

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Article Outline

1 Introduction

During the Arab uprisings, one of the grievances that brought citizens to the streets was the exclusionary politics of their authoritarian regimes. Although scholars studying these events tend to focus on the dramatic and extraordinary phenomena of regime change and violent conflict, important processes below the level of regime change have taken place in many countries, as surviving rulers have tried to recalibrate their societal support base. These rulers

have managed to maintain their power and to subdue the most vocal protests. While the regional diffusion of street protests as a means of contention was hard to prevent, there was no domino effect related to the toppling of leaders. But even the resilient incumbents had to face the crisis that the Arab uprisings posed for authoritarian rule. Popular calls for change presented the chance and the necessity to renew the relationship between the state and society, as the surprising regional wave opened up a short window of opportunity for contentious politics and the potential for changing the rules of the game.

The resilience of authoritarianism in the Arab world before the uprisings has been attributed to low-level changes made through "authoritarian upgrading" (Heydemann 2007). In a recent contribution that revisits this concept in the light of the Arab uprisings, Heydemann (2015) argues that the Arab states in which no shift of power has taken place again resorted to similar strategies, termed "upgrading 2.0." In contrast, he claims, the revolutionary cases of the Arab uprisings are now experiencing a regression into violence as well as "narrowly-nationalist and exclusionary-repressive modes of authoritarian governance" (ibid.: 16). This paper analyses in greater detail whether the non-revolutionary countries have really continued to pursue their default policies since 2011. It is assumed that regardless of the fundamentally different trajectories between the countries mired in (civil) wars and resilient regimes, mechanisms of both exclusion and inclusion have generally been used, targeting different parts of the respective populations with different strategies. This leads to a combined question about strategies, their inclusionary or exclusionary effects, their target groups, and their success or failure, which this paper seeks to answer: Which regime strategies for inclusion and exclusion that were employed towards different target groups during the management of the Arab uprisings in resilient regimes were successful?

The extent and sequence of inclusionary and exclusionary strategies unites the resilient regimes of Algeria and Jordan, which, due to their very different structures, have hardly ever been compared. In order to understand regime dynamics as well as the direction of future state–society interaction, it is necessary to determine exactly what processes were at work. Doing so might tell us whether the "survivors" of the uprisings can maintain regime resilience beyond the short and middle term. As the two case studies selected are quite diverse, the lessons about regime strategies in crisis situations might even be generalisable for further testing beyond the Arab world. While regime resilience is the ultimate result of the strategies, their inclusionary or exclusionary effect is the dependent variable in this study.

To tackle the question of successful inclusion and exclusion, this paper employs a relational approach towards political rule that takes into account the interaction between regime actors and societal actors. It is thus situated between the two extremes of a regime perspective and a purely societal focus, considering both sides and the dynamics between them. The basic premise of this study is that all regime strategies are directed towards *targets*. These targets may be individuals, social groups, or the population as a whole, and their reactions to the regime strategies determine the strategies' success. The strategies are successful when

their effects are realised – that is, inclusion or exclusion are accepted by the direct target groups and not met with rejection or resistance.

The paper first introduces the central concepts and explains the comparative research design. It goes on to outline the basic features of the protests and the challenges posed to the regime by different societal actors in Algeria and Jordan, then identifies the most important strategies of political rule employed by incumbents in both countries. Subsequently, the paper determines the target groups of the various strategies. A discussion of these strategies' success or failure considers the targets and their responses, and the conclusion summarises the theoretical and empirical repercussions of these findings.

2 Conceptual Considerations: A Target-Oriented Approach

As a conceptual basis, this paper maps a broad variety of regime strategies towards different target groups. It is concerned with the inclusionary and exclusionary effects that may result from legitimation and repression, two opposing strategies of political rule that are not solely specific to authoritarian regimes. The effects of these strategies on their direct targets are decisive in evaluating broader patterns of success or failure.[1] Additionally, indirect effects might also play a role. In this sense, single measures intended to include one group may turn out to have an exclusionary effect on opposing groups. The effects of single strategies of political rule can thus be ambiguous when all potential target groups are taken into account, changing their exclusionary effect to an inclusionary one and vice versa. In general, the primary group that should be taken into account and from whose perspective success or failure should be judged is the direct target.

While under autocratic rule decisions are made within small elite circles without consent from the majority of the population, the level of exclusiveness varies substantially between regimes exercising sectarian minority rule or the like and populist regimes. In studies on the Arab world, inclusion most often means formal participation in the political arena, especially in liberalised autocracies (Brumberg 2002). In this sense, political parties, especially Islamist parties, have been a focus of past studies (see for instance Lust-Okar 2005, Schwedler 2007, Wegner 2011). However, as the Arab uprisings were characterised by mass protests outside formal institutions, such a concept doesn't exactly fit the phenomenon under investigation. If we look beyond the formal political sphere, we find that societal inclusion and the question of identity matter. Borman, Vogt, and Cederman (2012) have systematically studied the exclusion of and political discrimination against ethnic groups in Arab countries in relation to other world regions. They find that both are pervasive and that direct "discrimination is actually more prevalent in the Arab region today than it was 65 years ago" (Borman, Vogt, and

1 In the study of regime strategies, a focus on target groups has been highlighted by different authors (for legitimation, cf. Bank 2004; for repression, cf. Moss 2014).

Cederman 2012: 5). Eva Bellin elaborates on the relationship between political and economic inclusion, understanding inclusion as "expanding the role of popular voice in the policy-making process" (2013: 137). As many societal and economic questions have political repercussions, it makes sense to employ a holistic view of inclusion.

In the following, inclusion is understood as the effect of a strategy reflecting responsiveness to the target group's previously voiced demands and/or their identity on the public, political and societal spheres, both in the material and the immaterial sense. This is in line with an older definition referring to "a political elite's recognition of the need to respond to previously *ex*cluded, distrusted sectors of the population" (Jowitt 1975: 72, emphasis in original). Exclusion is at the opposite side of the continuum and entails the neglect or rejection of the demands of certain groups and/or disregard for or discrimination against their identity. The two concepts of inclusion and exclusion can be linked to two dominant strategies of political rule: legitimation and repression.

Legitimation is defined as comprising the strategies incumbents use to increase citizens' acceptance of their claim to rule. These strategies are directed towards individuals, groups, or the whole population. Co-optation is a subtype of legitimation that brings additional benefits for the target, such as rents or political offices (Josua 2016). The effect of both kinds of strategies is supposed to be the target group's inclusion. Successful legitimation strategies lead to acceptance or, in the case of co-optation, loyalty. Failed legitimation is the rejection of or opposition to the respective strategies. Repression is a twofold concept.[2] Elites may raise the costs of contention for opposition leaders, rank-and-file activists, or the population in general through the use of so-called constraining repression – that is, intimidation, violence and surveillance (Mason 1989: 478 f.). Or state agents may impede potential challengers from acting altogether through the use of incapacitating repression – that is, detention or killings (Josua and Edel 2015: 292). The effect of repression on the targets is exclusionary. Successful repression is deterrence, whereas failed repression can only be indirectly measured by the continuation of protests. The following analysis focuses on strategies geared towards groups rather than individuals.

In the Arab world, both sets of strategies have been used extensively in the past. Literature on authoritarian resilience has pointed out various factors vital for tackling challenges to incumbent regimes (Bank 2004; Heydemann 2007; Bellin 2012). While other approaches might be useful in those cases where the uprisings led to dramatic game-changing dynamics, for those cases where authoritarianism is alive and kicking the well-established reasons for authoritarian resilience are still valid (Bellin 2012: 143). Most of the recent research has neglected developments in those countries where little change has taken place (Schwedler 2015). Empirical accounts of the events focus on political reforms from above, or on the actual management of protests and socio-economic measures. These domains of the regime strate-

2 On repression in general, cf. Davenport (2007).

gies were of vital importance in containing the uprisings (e.g. Zoubir and Aghrout 2012; Yom 2015a; Heydemann and Leenders 2014: 82–84; Bellin 2012). First, legal regulations pertaining to political rights, civil freedoms, and institutions were changed to channel demands and create an image of reformism in the polity. Second, the protest movements themselves were addressed more directly during their contentious actions, both on the rhetorical level as well as through policing and the repression of protests. Third, material allocation strategies served to alleviate potential dissatisfaction among larger segments of the population and to accommodate the demands of different groups. The empirical analysis is structured according to these three domains and systematically juxtaposes the Jordanian and Algerian cases.

3 Comparative Design and Case Selection

The Arab uprisings have led the scholarly community to review the dominant explanations for the resilience of authoritarian regimes, some of which are useful in the context of this study.[3] Given the fact that it was only in republics that rulers were overthrown, one prominent debate has revolved around monarchical exceptionalism (see Yom and Gause 2012). There is convincing historical and contemporary evidence that monarchies have a better chance of surviving regime crises (Bank et al. 2015). Similarly, Brownlee et al. (2015) point to hereditary succession and add the long-standing argument of oil wealth as contributing to regime resilience in their systematic account. While these structural factors certainly have explanatory merit, they fall short of capturing the dynamics during regime crises. Therefore, this paper looks at what the actors in both monarchies and republics actually did. The advantages of a monarchical system are compared to those of a republic that has substantial income from natural resources at its disposal. The two cases have been selected in accordance with a most-dissimilar-systems design with a similar outcome, though they are not compared in a strict variable-oriented sense (Przeworski and Teune 1970). A research design with contrasting cases is helpful for identifying different paths leading to the same outcome, discerning common patterns, and making generalisations about the management of protests more broadly.[4] The case selection therefore transcends the regime-subtype dichotomy and seeks to maximise the diversity of structural characteristics between the countries under investigation.

Among the Arab countries that experienced protests but did not undergo the overthrow of a ruler or protracted violence, Algeria and Jordan are characterised by very different polit-

3 For a state-of-the-art overview of current explanations, cf. Yom (2015b).

4 Up until now, only one contribution has included Jordan and Algeria as the sole case studies (Cavatorta and Elananza 2008). It shows that civil society organisations in both states could not unite across the religious vs. secular cleavages and fell prey to divide-and-rule strategies.

ical, economic, and historical conditions.[5] Algeria is a republic in North Africa and is ruled by President Bouteflika. Its founding myth is built on the war of independence against French colonisation (Brand 2014). The former single-rule party Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) used the country's large oil reserves to fund Arab socialism in the form of a classical rentier state with a huge public sector. After a phase of austerity and economic and political liberalisation, the 1990 electoral victory of the Islamist party Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) ultimately led to a traumatic civil war, during what was known as the "black decade." Power now lies in the hands of an unknown number of army generals, who often have business and mafia interests. President Bouteflika has particularly catered to the massive security apparatus.

Jordan is a traditional monarchy ruled by King Abdullah II, a member of the Hashemite family, who claims religious legitimacy through descent from the prophet Muhammad. Located in the Levant, the country is resource poor and has always depended on external aid for survival. Despite its economic situation, clientelist structures are pervasive in this semi-rentier state. The regime's support base consists of tribes of Transjordanian origin from provincial cities and rural areas and businessmen of Palestinian origin from the capital Amman. In both Jordan and Algeria, the rulers have been in office since 1999, and the army, the police forces, and the public sector more broadly play an important role in maintaining their image and stability.

In light of the two states' different structures, particularly in terms of the form of rule and other sources of legitimacy (resource-rich republic versus resource-poor monarchy), it could be assumed that their crises and crisis management would have diverged to some extent. Both countries were counted as "liberalized autocracies" (Brumberg 2002) among Arab states before the uprisings, as were Egypt and others. In early 2011, public protests occurred in both countries, developing similar trajectories and eliciting similar regime responses. In both cases, the protest movements emerged partially from socio-economically motivated groups and spread to include political actors, resulting in the formation of promising alliances that cut through both ideological and to some extent even social cleavages. However, the political protests remained limited in terms of mobilisation, in stark contrast to the socio-economic protests, including strikes. Both the Jordanian and Algerian ruling elites adopted a similar mixture of legitimation and repression strategies with the aim of including and excluding certain actors. By early 2016, the overall situation in both states was somewhat shaky, but the main challenges the incumbent elites faced were not directly related to their domestic protest movements. Isabelle Werenfels (2009) has called the Algerian political landscape an "equilibrium of instability" due to its opaque and changing elite alliances, while Jordan is the Middle

5 Morocco, a resource-poor monarchy with moderate protests and regime survival, falls into the same category as Jordan. However, choosing Jordan maximises geographical diversity within the Arab world through the study of both subregions: North Africa and the Middle East.

Eastern country which is "forever on the brink" (Lynch 2012a), mostly because of multiple flows of refugees and its geographical position in the midst of conflict-prone states.

This contribution emphasises the similarity of the measures employed in both countries in order to discern generalisable patterns in the possible success or failure of strategies of political rule. Beyond the ex post analysis, a closer look at the targets of these strategies also provides some clues about the potential for future dissatisfaction. The sources considered include news reports and scholarly articles as well as qualitative semi-structured interviews conducted with diverse actors, mainly activists and academics, during field-research stays in Jordan in spring 2011 and in Algeria in fall 2013.

4 The Protests in Algeria and Jordan

The core drivers of the uprisings that hit Algeria and Jordan consisted of a combination of political and socio-economic factors. In both countries, as in the entire Arab world, economic grievances were the spark for the unrest, which subsequently spread to the political sphere. The number of sit-ins in both countries had already jumped in 2010 (cf. Bennadji 2011 for Algeria), but these incidents remained largely disconnected. Then, in January 2011, the day-labourer movement started the first demonstrations in Jordan (Adely 2012), while so-called "sugar and oil riots" erupted in Algeria. Later that month, both states witnessed a politicisation of demands, which by mid-February culminated in the most significant demonstration in Algiers and the largest protest so far in Amman.

In Algeria, an opposition alliance called the Coordination Nationale pour le Changement et la Démocratie (CNCD), consisting of human rights organisations, independent unions, students and Berber political parties, staged demonstrations all over the country. Their most anticipated protest on 12 February 2011 was thwarted by some 30,000 police, who were deployed in the capital. Afterwards, the decidedly political demonstrations lost steam, and the CNCD split into two rival currents. In Jordan, various loose movements formed to call for reforms, with the Islamic Action Front (IAF), the local political branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, which had boycotted the 2010 parliamentary elections, as one of the driving forces. The so-called March 24 Youth Movement brought together activists from various groups and staged an open-ended sit-in in front of the Ministry of Interior, but the protest was attacked and dispersed by self-proclaimed nationalist thugs and riot police.

Notably, the regional momentum had already been lost when the protest movement became serious in Jordan at the end of March.[6] Only in summer 2011 did the protest movements form the overarching National Front for Reform under the lead of former prime minister

6 The so-called reverse regional "tidal wave" (Lynch 2012b) had begun one week before with the Gulf Cooperation Council's intervention in Bahrain, the first status-quo-preserving constitutional referendum in Egypt, and the beginning of the crackdown in Syria.

and intelligence director Ahmad Obeidat. This was a potentially influential cross-cutting opposition alliance. Decentralised popular movements from the provincial cities, the so-called Hirak, also joined the Front (Yom 2014). However, uneasiness regarding the aims of other groups within the movement, especially between the Islamists and the tribal Hirak, was visible and was exploited by regime elites. In the end, the Front failed to present an alternative to the status quo that was attractive to a majority of Jordanians. The dynamics within the oppositional movement were slower to develop in Jordan than in Algeria, probably also because protesters in the monarchy uniformly restricted their demands to political reform rather than attacking the king or the monarchy.

Depending on the nature of their country's form of rule, protesters in the Arab world demanded either a complete regime change or at least significant change within the regime. The scope of the challenge was similar in both Algeria and Jordan. Because Algeria's power structures are fuzzier than those in other Arab states, people there inherently resented the anonymous circle of decision makers known as *le pouvoir*. The protests were only partly directed against the elderly president Bouteflika, as he was only the visible face of an unknown number of powerful army generals. In Jordan, the calls for a constitutional monarchy did not touch upon King Abdullah II's function as head of state, but were almost in line with the official discourse on reform under his leadership. Only very marginally did protesters call for changing the king or even for a republic; instead, the common denominator for the opposition was meaningful reform under the current king. While the demands made in both countries were not as radical as in other Arab countries, one of the remarkable characteristics of both protest movements was that only a part of them sought inclusion within existing structures. The bulk of the politically relevant opposition alliance in each country opted to protest against the status quo of decision-making structures and called for fundamental changes in the distribution of political power. The following sections describe the regime strategies and the target groups' responses.

5 Similar Strategies in Algeria and Jordan

5.1 Reform Packages

In both cases under investigation, the elites' reaction to the protests was "a combination of appeasement and force," as Zoubir and Aghrout note for Algeria (2012: 70). In both states, reforms to the legislation on **public gatherings** were undertaken shortly after the demonstrations had started. Nevertheless, the legal changes in both cases served as window dressing and failed to include protesters, even falling short of legitimising their presence on the streets. In Algeria, the state of emergency was formally abandoned in February 2011, but demonstrations in the capital Algiers remained outlawed, and the anti-terror law treated public gatherings as "unarmed mobs." In Jordan, the modified public gatherings law, effec-

tive from March 2011, introduced the obligation to notify the authorities of a demonstration instead of requiring their approval. Yet the definition of gathering was stretched to private events that "discuss any topic related to public policy" (Jordan Times, 27 April 2011), ultimately prohibiting any discussion of politics about which the Ministry of Interior was not informed. In both cases, media commentaries swiftly unveiled the shallowness of the reforms. Also, these changes did not have any influence on activists' behaviour, as the new legal regulations did not stop protesters from crossing red lines and discussing sensitive topics.

Among the constructive strategies that heralded the elites' will to enact changes was the establishment of **reform commissions** in both countries. In Jordan, the National Dialogue Committee, established in March 2011, brought together some 50 personalities, the bulk of them well-known regime elites, as well as some more reform-minded journalists, academics and members of civil society. The appointed representatives of the Islamist opposition boycotted the committee and thus rejected the top-down approach. It soon became clear that the commission was nothing more than a paper tiger, as its recommendations for modifying the electoral and political parties laws were subsequently watered down. This occurred first in another royally established committee that was created to propose constitutional changes[7] and later in both houses of parliament. Ultimately, the National Dialogue Committee served merely as a fig leaf that enabled the incumbents to buy time and co-opt some new elites. In Algeria, the Bensalah Commission, created in May 2011, tried to consult with a wider variety of groups but was even less successful. Activists claimed the commission was not pursuing a national dialogue but rather holding a self-referential "monologue against change."[8] Consequently, the commission was boycotted not only by the opposition parties and civil society but also by former high-ranking politicians (Jeune Afrique, 23 June 2011). The inclusion of some new elites via commissions succeeded in both cases, while the inclusion of more serious challengers failed.

The legal changes pertaining to political participation were designed to uphold the façade of liberalising autocracy, although the contents of the modified legislation contradicted the proclaimed aims. The new laws governing political parties only marginally lowered the thresholds for engaging in politics; regime elites were the ones who profited most from the new opportunities. In the wake of the regional uprisings, the Algerian Islamists saw their chance to distance themselves from the government. The Mouvement pour la Société et la Paix (MSP) party left the presidential alliance in the hope of gaining more votes in the legislative elections. The remainder of the coalition was not amused, as important MSP cadres used their mandates to found new parties of their own (Dris 2013). Tiny splinter parties

7 The constitutional amendments that were later enacted did not bring about any substantial changes.

8 Such were the statements by the opposition party Rassemblement pour la Culture et la Démocratie and by one of the CNCD leaders, cf. Le Quotidien d'Oran, 16 June 2011, and online: <www.algerie360.com/algerie/le-cirque-de-la-commission-bensalah-s%E2%80%99acheve-dans-lindifference-le-grand-flop-de-bouteflika/rev.> (22 May 2014).

flourished and politicians used the opportunity of co-optation to increase their spoils. Some 20 new parties registered ahead of the parliamentary elections in May 2012. They were largely made up of recycled personnel from the parties of the presidential alliance: Front de Libération Nationale (FLN), Rassemblement National Démocratique (RND) and the Islamist MSP. The splintering of the political landscape enabled the FLN to gain the majority of seats in parliament with a mere 17 per cent of the national vote, in a masterpiece of electoral engineering (see Dris 2013). In Jordan, the decisive change was supposed to be the renunciation of the one-person-one-vote system that had given tribal areas a disproportional advantage (cf. Lust and Hourani 2011). What remained from the process that had started with the National Dialogue Committee's recommendations and ended with the electoral law's enactment was the allocation of merely 27 out of 150 seats through a nation-wide party list in a second vote. After playing the role of the loyal opposition for years, the IAF had established itself as the main challenger during the uprisings and did not want to give up its new credibility by accepting reforms which it regarded as insufficient. With the IAF's boycott of the parliamentary elections in January 2013, the resulting composition of the lower house looked a lot like that of former parliaments.

In both countries, the women's quota was raised, thus allowing for approximately 30 per cent female members of parliament (MPs) in Algeria and 10 per cent in Jordan. Both parliaments were enlarged, and the higher number of seats made it possible to co-opt more individuals and to maintain or even expand the existing rewards. This basically served to rejuvenate the entrenched elites. The age of eligibility in Algeria was lowered to 23, but youth activists complained that it was still mainly "old faces" that were present on the party lists (NDI 2012: 44). Both parliaments included factions of regime-friendly elitist Islamist parties. In Jordan, the Wasat party gained a surprisingly high number of seats, probably benefiting from the IAF's boycott. In Algeria, the previously disproportionally represented MSP was punished for having withdrawn from the presidential alliance and was cut back to its actual size. In both cases, however, the overwhelming majority of MPs came from regime strongholds. Thus, after a couple of legal twists, the pre-uprising political elites were rearranged and bolstered in asserting their institutional claim to rule.

In both countries, efforts to monitor elections were stepped up in order to enhance their credibility. Jordan's electoral commission had more competencies than Algeria's, and the coverage of the two countries by external observers varied. However, irregularities could not be prevented in either case. In Jordan, candidates who had been accused of buying votes were elected while under arrest, without losing their mandates or facing any other consequence (Jordan Times, 25 January 2013).

The dissatisfaction of significant parts of the population and the legal opposition in both cases manifested itself in high rates of abstention and boycotts. In Jordan, official turnout was 56.5 per cent of registered voters, which was equivalent to between 35 and 39 per cent of the population entitled to vote. In Algeria, turnout was reported to be as high as 42 per cent,

though this number contrasted with the reality that voters and observers witnessed in polling stations. It was suspected that army members were registered as voters both in their hometowns and "in multiple deployment sites," leading to an inexplicable increase in voters by four million over 2009 (NDI 2012: 18). Non-voters and protest votes (18 per cent blank or invalid ballots) accounted for two-thirds of the electorate, indicating that citizens saw through the empty façade.[9] This shows that the reforms met neither the reform activists' demands nor those of the citizens, and that the attempt to include the broader population thus failed. However, some younger political elites were successfully included.

The legislative reform in the domains of **media and associations** loosened some restrictions on the one hand, but opened the door for future bans on inconvenient activities on the other. The new texts include vaguely formulated clauses on the protection of national interest, unity and other similarly fuzzy values. The print media was allowed limited freedom in the wake of increasingly critical reporting, based on the idea that barking dogs never bite, as written criticism offered a safety valve for discontent. At the same time, more effective forms of activism, especially online journalism and blogging, were increasingly discouraged, not least through the use of force. In Jordan, Internet freedom was drastically curbed: 200 to 300 news websites that did not comply with new regulations stipulating unrealistic requirements were blocked in summer 2013 (7iber 2013). In Algeria, the entire civil society became illegal in January 2014, when the deadline for adapting to the new associations law expired and virtually no civil society organisation had managed to renew its registration with the Ministry of Interior. Likewise, a change in media law paved the way for arbitrary censorship (Dris 2012). The effect of these laws was exclusionary, reversing the temporary opening up of the public space in the heyday of the uprisings.

5.2 Derogatory Rhetorics and Repression

On the rhetorical level, both President Bouteflika and King Abdullah II warned against an escalation of protests that would lead to *fitna*, thus evoking a strong deterrent with religious connotations. They focused on the stability achieved before the uprisings, which they tried to promote as positive and not to be taken for granted. Tobin notes for the case of Jordan that "the regime […] also encouraged comparisons to neighbouring countries" (2012: 105). This became even more relevant as the Syrian war escalated and refugees began to flow into Jordan. In Algeria, the equivalent was the traumatic past, as the 1988–1989 liberalisation process which official discourse referred to as "Algeria's own Arab spring" had ultimately resulted in a civil war. Moreover, the escalation of violence in Libya was a concern given the porous desert border between the two countries. The historical and regional experiences credibly supported the stability frame in both cases, though through different mechanisms. As a conse-

9 For the detailed results see the NDI report (2012).

quence, even protesters employed some self-restraint and did not become too extreme in their demands. Thus, this deterrent rhetoric succeeded.

In both countries, however, protests were attacked by thugs and, in part, by police forces. To counter the regional contagion of the protests, both governments raised the question of national **loyalty**. Protesting was devalued as unpatriotic behaviour and surrendering the nation to "foreign influences." Rhetorically, politicians denounced the protest movements as being orchestrated by troublemaking minorities and thus not representing the majority of the population. In Jordan, the allegations were that only "Islamists," "jihadists," and "Palestinians" were taking to the streets, while the Algerian narrative referred to "Kabylians" and "Christians." The terms Palestinian and Kabylian, which have ethnic connotations, were suddenly used as an insult, worsening existing resentments against the respective groups. Given these allegations, citizens who identified with the majority affiliations didn't want to be accused of acting against the "mainstream," while the minority groups, as the direct targets of exclusion, were successfully dissuaded from taking to the streets.

In addition to the negative rhetoric, the discourse used by the rulers in their official speeches also stressed what a good citizen's behaviour looked like. Bouteflika tried to mobilise citizens to vote in his 2012 speech on the anniversary of one of the decisive starting points in Algeria's liberation war by framing the vote as a struggle for stability. He likened voter mobilisation to the mobilisation against the French colonisers and indirectly accused boycotters of the elections of attacking the national cause (Dris 2013). In King Abdullah II's eagerly anticipated speech in June 2011 for the combined celebration of the Arab Revolt, Army Day and Coronation Day, he stressed the difference between a desirable process of reform, which would be led by him as always, and "chaos," which would be inevitable if particular groups came to dominate the democratic transformation process (Abdullah II, 12 June 2011). One strategy used to underline this threat was the decision to let the Salafi jihadi movement appear in the public sphere. After clashes with riot police in a demonstration in northern Jordan in April 2011, images of brutal and dangerous Salafis were spread to terrify the population. This served as the perfect pretext for renewing the repression and incarcerating approximately one-tenth of the movement's total members. Similarly, though on a smaller scale, the Algerian authorities allowed former FIS leader Ali Belhadj to appear at the central CNCD protest to discredit the protest movement. The motive behind this move was clear, as hundreds of young activists had been monitored and arrested on the morning before the demonstration started. This kind of deterrence again served to delegitimise the oppositional alliance by reminding Algerian citizens of the violent experience of the civil war that had stemmed from the regime's confrontation with FIS during the 1990s.

In both countries, **constraining repression** was employed broadly. The groups targeted went well beyond street protesters, including all sorts of citizens who did not accept an apolitical way of life, and sometimes even those who simply happened to belong to a particular minority or adhered to a non-mainstream belief. In terms of **incapacitating repression**, the

lethality of the protests in both countries was at the lower end of the scale compared to the rest of the Arab world. If the numbers are correct, fewer than 10 citizens altogether lost their lives in direct relation to political demonstrations in the two countries. The form of incapacitating repression that prevailed in both Jordan and Algeria, and which was effective, was arrest. Opposition leaders were only temporarily targeted by these measures. Instead, it was mainly young rank-and-file activists who ended up in jail or at police stations. The number of activists arrested was in the hundreds on various occasions in both countries, amounting to a considerable share of protesters. The main difference between Jordan's and Algeria's approaches was that the latter's security forces used more pre-emptive strategies, often arresting activists before scheduled protests. They also physically prevented mobilised protesters from uniting in the streets. In Jordan, this would also have been possible, but the harassment and beating of protesters was outsourced to thugs. It is difficult to establish whether this strategy of exclusion was generally successful, as there were other factors that also determined whether the protests continued or stopped.

5.3 Socio-Economic Demands and Material Strategies

While political protests were mostly suppressed, strikes and sit-ins by professional associations and other groups were often tolerated. The incumbents' basic approach to dealing with socio-economic challenges was through divide-and-rule strategies that encouraged and subsequently satisfied **particular demands**. Professional groups on strike were handled one by one, and the various parts of their demands were satisfied in a piecemeal manner. This compartmentalising approach precluded the emergence of a larger, unified labour protest. Professional associations held frequent work stoppages and sit-ins to attain further concessions. After the state authorities' initial showing of courtesy and its recognition of some demands, these groups' unwillingness to accept low-level accommodation often led to more repressive and exclusionary state behaviour, which negatively affected the strikers' freedoms, job security, and reputation.

In both Jordan and Algeria, material legitimation strategies in the years leading up to the uprisings had benefited a growing business elite, which had profited from the privatisation accompanying selective structural reforms. In the wake of the uprisings, only the most corrupt among the nouveau riche were excluded from the elite, if this was deemed necessary, while the structures and possibilities for enrichment were left untouched. The protesters' socio-economic grievances were regarded as legitimate, so that the leadership in both countries initiated a wave of mass allocation to make up for the lost "social contract" – a difficult endeavour given the growing populations and diminishing resources. As Eva Bellin writes, "[t]he low-hanging fruit of economic inclusion have already been picked (and to some degree over-picked)" (2013: 143). When the uprisings began, socio-economic demands preceded political demands; therefore, the elites' rationale was to appease the most urgent needs and thus remove the most pertinent reasons for discontent from the accumulated grievances.

Both Jordan and Algeria resorted to emergency populist measures that failed to address the underlying economic challenges which had led to the misery in the first place. At least for a while, the previously dominant neoliberal policies were superseded.

The most important measure in both countries was the reintroduction or maintenance of **subsidies** on basic foodstuffs, fuel, and cooking gas. This turned out to be so costly that in Jordan the desperate economic situation necessitated an IMF loan in the summer of 2012. This led the government to overturn the fuel and cooking gas subsidies, thus indicating the measure's failure. An attempt to replace direct subsidies with a cash transfer system as a potentially sustainable economic policy change was answered with the most violent riots since the beginning of the Arab uprisings. The subsequent management strategy of returning to a committee that set fixed prices for the current month squarely contradicted the logic of reducing state intervention and left responsibility with the government, maintaining the potential for future outbursts of popular anger. Part of the problem was that the citizens had profited from the previous rentierist, inclusionary allocation and neither side was willing or able to negotiate the conditions for achieving a transformation towards a more sustainable system. Due to its high rent income, Algeria was able to maintain its redistribution strategy, but its future maintenance is also doubtful.

The groups that benefited the most from more narrowly targeted material allocation were public sector employees, and not truly disadvantaged groups. In Jordan, military veterans' pensions were raised, partly as a reaction to their vocal criticism of the Palestinian business elite, including the queen. **Salary increases** for security forces in Algeria, which had already been enacted in winter 2010, included a three-year payback deal and triggered the envy of other state employees. In a different vein, a credit scheme for young, unemployed Algerians was boosted. However, this programme did not work to integrate youths into the regular job market but instead offered loans to fund microenterprises. While this might sound like a good way to stimulate entrepreneurship, most of the new businesses faced bankruptcy after operating only briefly.[10] The programme led to resentment among those youth working two jobs who had less money at their disposal than the idle beneficiaries.[11] Effectively, this measure was a means to distribute money without expecting it to be paid back, and it primarily served to buy off the youth through informal and irregular structures.[12] The volume of Algeria's allocative measures naturally surpassed those of Jordan by far due to the former's oil wealth. However, neither country successfully tackled the demographic challenges and youth unemployment, as the elites prioritised the appeasement and inclusion of their support base over the introduction of a new social contract that could have served as a viable long-term solution.

10 It is estimated that 90 per cent of the loans will not be paid back. Personal interview with anti-corruption activist, November 2013, Algiers.

11 Personal interview with young journalist, October 2013, Algiers.

12 On details of this scheme, cf. El Watan, 10 June 2011.

6 Patterns of Success or Failure Related to the Targets

As this paper seeks to highlight the different target groups, this section outlines the patterns of regime strategies adopted vis-à-vis relevant target groups as well as these targets' responses following the uprisings.

Journalists were deliberately targeted, especially via constraining repression, in both cases. Online bloggers suffered increasingly intensely, such that some of them exercised self-censorship to a greater extent than they had done at the height of the uprisings. Co-optation attempts were directed towards more elite journalists and opinion leaders, with mixed results. Some joined the reform commission and even became cabinet members; others left their posts because of the sluggish implementation of reforms.

The **youth**, the most active group in initiating the protests in early 2011, were largely neglected and excluded. In Algeria, they were included to a somewhat greater degree than in Jordan, as they were massively subsidised through the credit scheme programme and at least on paper attained the right to run for parliament, while this threshold remained at 30 years of age in Jordan. Neither Algeria nor Jordan implemented measures to improve the youths' prospects for the future.

The **protest movements** in general experienced more repression than legitimation. Regime elites in both countries did not intend to open up genuine space for the protest movements, instead attempting to channel them into existing formal structures. Every activity that went beyond the arena of formal politics was subject to delegitimation, despite the fact that street protests had become a regular mode of contention. One reason for the elites' reluctance to tolerate political street protests is that they undermined the discourse about their leading role in pursuing reform. The concessions that would have satisfied the protesters were too far-reaching for regime elites, so only superficial tactical concessions were promised. These basically served to take the mobilising dynamic out of the protest movements, by introducing deliberalisation instead of ceding power. The potentially challenging cross-cutting oppositional alliances couldn't gather momentum, and the protests that have continued have almost become institutionalised, though they have failed to trigger profound changes.

The strategies targeting **Islamist and Salafi movements** included a mixture of instrumental inclusion – which largely failed – and repression. In both Jordan and Algeria, the inclusion of the organised Islamic opposition failed because the influential parties decided to remain outside of formal politics. Much to the rulers' chagrin, the Islamist movements refused to be (Jordan) or to remain (Algeria) co-opted. In Jordan, the IAF was offered the chance to participate in the government, the National Dialogue Committee, and the parliamentary elections, but it refused to participate in any formal institution. The Algerian Islamists in the MSP party were crushed in the parliamentary elections. Some of the more radical and usually repressed groups in both countries willingly took the rare chance to appear in the public sphere. However, this short period of revealing the existing spectrum of radical societal forces deterred the "silent majority" by showing what would happen if freedom was

actually unlimited. This was probably one crucial prerequisite for citizens to accept the subsequent deliberalisation.

The groups that profited most from inclusionary strategies in the wake of the uprisings in Jordan and Algeria were the regimes' **backbones**, most notably public sector employees – particularly security personnel – and veterans, and in Jordan the tribes as well. This option was preferred over the low probability of including challengers who in some cases had basically waited for the right moment to voice their long-standing dissatisfaction. Instead, classical co-optation measures towards current and former supporters were intensified and internal power relations clarified. A general argument based on this finding would be that in times of crisis, rulers deem it crucial to solidify their (previous) supporters' loyalty.

Some temporarily successful legitimation strategies were employed towards the **population** as a whole. Of the various rhetorical arguments brought forward, the strongest was probably the stability frame relative to historical or regional experiences. The Algerian framing of the insecure situation in neighbouring Libya and the population's weariness and trauma as a result of the 1990s civil war was empirically credible and resonated with the general sentiment in society.[13] In a similar vein, to Jordanians, neighbouring Syria presented a vivid example of how political protests could trigger escalating dynamics and ultimately lead to civil war. The rhetorical arguments in both countries were backed up by massive material allocations, which overburdened state budgets, even in oil-rich Algeria. However, the high abstention rates in elections are indicative of a lack of support for existing institutions and suggest that scepticism about the future is widespread. Moreover, the growing perception of and discontent with large-scale corruption has become an important societal feature which is likely to remain one of the main triggers for protests.

7 Summarising the Results in Comparative Perspective

This paper's uneasy general finding is that exclusionary strategies, and most notably repression, were temporarily more successful than genuinely inclusionary strategies. This is because they worked as a deterrent for activists, as a result of either reputational or physical factors. The only inclusive strategies that were successful were those directed towards elites and the respective regime's existing support base.

Table 1 summarises the results of the empirical analysis. It clearly shows that it was not inclusion or exclusion per se that succeeded or failed. Rather, it was the question of who the respective targets were and their subsequent reactions that were decisive for the outcomes in Algeria and Jordan.

13 Numerous interviews and conversations in Algiers, October and November 2013.

Table 1. Similar Strategies of Political Rule in Algeria and Jordan

Strategy	*Target group*	*Inclusion/exclusion?*	*Success/failure?*
Reform packages			
Laws on political parties, enlarging parliaments	Elites	Inclusion	Success
Electoral laws, parliamentary elections, reform commissions	Islamists, protesters, broad population	Inclusion	Failure
Laws on media and associations	Activists, journalists	Exclusion	Success
Laws on public gatherings	Protesters	Exclusion	Failure
Derogatory rhetorics and repression			
Defamation of protesters	Protesters Indirect target: broader population	Exclusion	Success
Instrumentalisation of Islamists/jihadists	Protesters Indirect target: broader population	Exclusion	Success
Non-lethal repression of protests	Protesters, journalists Indirect target: broader population	Exclusion	?
Nationalist deterrent & stability discourse	Broader population	Exclusion	Success
Material allocation			
Salary increases	State employees, military [veterans]	Inclusion	Success
Subsidies	Broader population	Inclusion	Failure? (not sustainable)

The detailed strategies implemented by incumbent elites in Algeria and Jordan show that despite the extraordinary challenge of the region-wide uprisings, the regime responses didn't include a substantial share of each country's citizens. The superficial changes to the regulations concerning parties, elections, and parliaments couldn't enhance the elites' credibility among most protesters. Instead, the formal institutions were again used for co-optation and to strengthen support among regime-friendly segments of the population. As the opposition forces correctly diagnosed these strategies as classical co-optation attempts, the majority of them resisted.[14] The incumbents were nevertheless able to regain or maintain the regime's support base while defying the protesters' demands. As incumbent elites are aware of their challengers' position, it can be assumed that they even calculated this outcome and devised their strategies accordingly. The appeasement of tried and true supporters reversed a previous

14 This is mirrored in the formulation of two Algerian human rights activists who characterised their roles as "resistance, not opposition," personal interviews, Algiers, October and November 2013.

phase of neglect in Jordan. Falling back on the regime's support base appears to have been a viable crisis management tactic in both countries, and one that is also indicative of path dependency.

With respect to the protesters' demands, material grievances could be temporarily satisfied. Because mobilisation can take place very quickly, these measures were probably the most urgent and necessary for securing the short-term appeasement of demonstrators. While the number of socio-economically motivated sit-ins, strikes, and other forms of contentious politics in general increased enormously, these "micro-riots" paradoxically served to secure the incumbents' rule, not least by demonstrating the possible repercussions of political unrest. In general, though, trade unions and organisations representing the unemployed are groups that will likely continue to protest for some time. Collaborations between such groups and the political movements were already established during the first rounds of protest in 2011. Even later, in the run-up to the Algerian presidential elections in April 2014 as well as during the Jordanian fuel riots in November 2012, professional associations displayed their solidarity with other protesters.

A striking resemblance across different areas of political life in two rather dissimilar countries has become clear from the elaborations above. This hints at the possibility that the actual policies in structurally different authoritarian regimes converge more than might be expected. One reason for the strategies' similarity might lie in the learning processes of political elites, either through historical experience or through the example of neighbouring countries (Heydemann and Leenders 2014, Bank and Edel 2015). Learning helped them pursue a middle way to avoid the alternatives of either immobility or substantial reform, which might have run the risk of enraging and/or further mobilising protesters. The Egyptian example, which was very important, showed that significant moves towards the protesters' demands might trigger incalculable dynamics, which was a strong disincentive to give up even small amounts of power. However, while the external events in other Arab states demonstrated the urgent need to firmly counter the protests in Algeria and Jordan, the measures themselves were arguably not taken from a blueprint for learning or diffusion. Rather, the strategies can be attributed to path dependency, as many resembled previous strategies. When some of the inclusionary strategies failed to succeed with the temporarily emboldened opposition, a shift towards further exclusion took place.

While this paper has focused on the similarities in the Algerian and Jordanian approaches, numerous more regime-specific strategies were enacted in both cases. One fundamental difference between Algeria and Jordan is worth noting: the traditional legitimation strategies that the Jordanian monarchy has at its disposal should not be underestimated. Although the protesters in Jordan did not attack monarchical rule as such, former allies had become disappointed with the king's priorities over the preceding years. In the wake of the uprisings, the king tried to reach out to his neglected tribal support base to restore support, especially as the Hirak movement became active. He also used elements of traditional rule such as the re-

newal of the oath of allegiance and the provision of funding through so-called "royal gifts"; tribally dominated areas especially profited from this allocation of funds. The regime's traditional legitimacy was also strengthened through constitutional regulations limiting the freedom of expression when it came to criticisms of the institution of the monarchy and/or the king himself. As protesters became accustomed to more drastic forms and means of contestation in attacking the king and the monarchy, they were swiftly repressed.[15] Some were subsequently pardoned by the king, who through the royal pardons had the chance to use another form of traditional legitimation.

8 Conclusion

Although the Arab uprisings appeared to be extraordinary phenomena, the elites in Algeria and Jordan countered them through tried and tested strategies of authoritarian upgrading. While this suggests a limited repertoire and a lack of innovative responses to the unprecedented regional protest wave, one can assume that in the short term the limited nature of the challenge didn't necessitate further concessions. The more important result is that over time the strategies gained a strong thrust towards more exclusionary and repressive politics. The sequencing of these strategies was important, with the announcement of concessions taking the steam out of the protest movements and justifying the later repression of those who did not accept these changes as sufficient. The historical and recent regional experiences provided fertile ground for these strategies of deterrence to succeed. This is even more so for the most recent developments towards violent conflict and terrorism. However, regime resilience is an overdetermined result of multiple factors, and this is not to say that the Algerian and Jordanian governments adopted the "right" strategies, which all other Arab states facing protests could have used. Given the nature of the challenge and the reservoir of domestic experiences and regional developments, enough strategies succeeded in these two countries for the political rulers to persevere.

Regarding the broader patterns of political developments in the Arab world, the evidence presented in this paper partly contradicts conventional assumptions about the separate trajectories that distinguish Arab countries ruled by benign autocrats from those countries drowning in violent conflict and repression. The benign, formerly liberalising autocrats have also resorted to deliberalisation, for which the Arab uprisings provided an ironically convenient opportunity. Regarding the case selection, it would be interesting to turn this paper's findings around and look at whether the states with more violent conflicts have also used strategies of inclusion and towards whom.

15 The "discourse of abdication" that Yom (2015a: 285) invokes was a marginal phenomenon and was not endorsed by institutionalised protesters.

The political "reforms" formed the legal basis for introducing more restrictions on civil liberties and implementing the constraining repression of protesters. Instead of including challengers, reform "activism" bought the time needed to paralyse them, to make the population tired of futile political discussions, and to accommodate the direst needs deemed legitimate – primarily economic ones. As substantial parts of the "reform packages" turned out to have exclusionary effects, future research should therefore move away from focusing primarily on allegedly "positive" developments, such as steps towards liberalisation, which can easily be measured via a formal institutionalist approach. More attention should be given to actual practices, which might hint at regression rather than superficial progress. Beyond the Arab world, the aftermath of the Hong Kong protests of 2014 is indicative of the risk that contention will lead in divergent directions, sometimes broadening the scope of liberties but often resulting in a rollback and massive deliberalisation. In the latter case, the crackdown even extended to mainland China. Comparative research examining different world regions is desirable in order to trace whether the increase in exclusion following the Arab uprisings reflects more general current developments at the global level.

The sequencing of Algeria's and Jordan's strategies intertwined with the unfolding events in other Arab states, swinging the two countries towards counter-revolution. To put it more generally, exclusion seems to be a fallback option of authoritarian politics to which elites resort. In addition to including (former) supporters, the Algerian and Jordanian incumbents countered the protests by using exclusionary strategies of repression and divide and rule as well as the rhetoric of deterrence with reference to chaos and instability. The derogatory rhetoric used to appease some target groups excluded other parts of the population, especially minorities and protest movements. Negative examples of the past and/or neighbouring countries also played a role in the successful exclusion of those actors advocating political alternatives. The renewed importance of repression and the framing of marginalised groups during protest waves deserves more scholarly study. The cognitive and psychological bases for understanding framing processes necessitate better knowledge of political culture, propaganda, and socialisation.

In both countries, the incumbents exploited the self-restraint that challengers imposed upon themselves in demanding reforms rather than revolutions. This was taken into account by defenders of the system in their choice of constraining, non-lethal repression, with the threat of lethal repression looming in the background. In the end, both sides seemed to be unwillingly united in their preference for some degree of stability over an uncertain, but certainly more violent outcome. The incumbents' exploitation of this astonishing common ground between them and the challengers deserves more scholarly attention than has been granted to date.

The finding that authoritarian rulers can maintain regime resilience without including most challengers is not surprising. It is rational for oppositional forces to refuse inclusion into authoritarian structures. Nonetheless, the extent to which protesters are excluded and

criminalised even in formerly liberalised autocracies is disheartening. In the long run, a lack of inclusionary mechanisms calls into question the sustainability of state–society relations in these regimes. The strong focus on material allocation is vital but also risky, as citizens will take higher spending for granted and inflation rates will increase, which will cause recurring problems on an even larger scale. Therefore, the medium-term outlook already suggests the increased likelihood of discontent and unrest, possibly leading to more violent conflicts in the Arab world.

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