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Policies on intergroup relations in the cities of CEE countries

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Policies on intergroup relations in the cities of CEE countries

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Patrycja Matusz Protasiewicz
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Abstract

For many years Western European cities have been influenced by the inflow of immigrants from all over the world, having different cultural, religious and linguistic background. Due to this process especially local authorities have been confronted with the need for managing peaceful and successful relations between different groups within the local urban societies. The policy making of intergroup relations in Western European cities has traditionally involved various actors from both native and immigrant groups, acting on behalf of city representatives, NGOs, political parties, labour organizations, churches etc. In comparison with Western European countries, the development of intergroup relations in the metropolises of CEE countries is still in its initial stage because the numerical presence of ‘new’ immigrant groups is still marginal. In place of immigrants, it is possible to talk about national minorities with differing cultural, religious and linguistic heritage, who settled down in these states as a result of conflict, wars or border changes.

This article explores the differences concerning the understanding of ‘group’ and ‘intergroup relations’ in four cities of CEE region: Tallinn (Estonia), Wrocław (Poland), Prague (Czech Republic), Budapest (Hungary). The current analyses are based on interviews and field research within the Eurofound-financed research project CLIP done in 2008 in those cities in cooperation with local scientific experts, representatives of the ethnic communities and officials of respective Municipalities. It explores which historically and legally established groups are taken in consideration by creating intergroup policy, if the newly arrived immigrants are seen too the target groups for such strategies/policies. And finally, it investigates what types of actors are involved in creating this process and if impulses for actions are coming from a top-down or bottom–up perspective. The main aim of this article is the comparative analysis of 4 cities from CEE countries in order to indicate the similarities and differences in the understanding of intergroup relations in the early stage of development of policy in this field.

Keywords: CEE countries, intergroup policies, local policy-making, migration

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Introduction

In CEE countries the fall of state socialism marked the shift from a state-controlled economy to a market economy, from merely controlling emigration to regulating rising immigration. Importantly, capitalism has been introduced across as the dominant way of organising people's lives. Labour migrants have begun to play a more important role in many sectors of the economies whilst at the same time these countries have started to receive asylum seekers as they entered the international regime of refugee protection (Jazwinska & Okolski 1996; Morawska 2000). The process of political transformation in Central Eastern Europe is on the one side characterized by general patterns, on the other side also nation-state specific developments from former communism to democratic systems can be observed (Kostelecký 2004). The institutional and policy developments in the field of migration and asylum were shaped by the expansion of the European Union towards the East as well as by the dynamics of migration and refugee flows, including their perceptions, in respective nation-states (Lavenex 2001; Szczepaniková 2006). The economic and political transformation is not only a story of success but at the same time brought disappointment caused mainly by high unemployment. Such kind of disappointment is a fertile breeding ground for emigration waves from the region as well as anti-immigration attitudes such as xenophobia (Kornai 2006, Tőkés, 2000). Diverse strategies and practices both on the part of migrants and local populations have emerged in response to the political efforts to control and organise migration in these states.

In this article we will try to analyze the status quo of the development of strategies of intercultural policies and their implementation. Furthermore, we want to illustrate the causal factors of their genesis. Our intention is to answer the following questions: What factors are relevant for patterns of convergence/divergence in local policymaking on intergroup relations and what are the framework conditions of the politicisation in this field? Are there significant differences in municipal policies on intergroup relations between the CEE countries? Or, on the contrary, to what degree can similar political strategies be pointed out? What are the common mechanisms behind local policymaking on intergroup relations? Because of a general lack of reliable data and empirical studies the answers to these questions have some temporary character reflecting the actual state of the art of research and the status quo of political decision-making in this field. This confirms the need for more systematic research on this so far neglected dimension of policymaking in Eastern European cities.

Alexander's (2007: 48-50) classification of ‘policy domains’ and ‘issue areas’ will be of theoretical relevance for our analyses. Policies on cultural relations between different groups are one of the four policy domains of local migration policy, he identified. Alexander’s theoretical tool can help us to identify common patterns of policymaking despite a considerable institutional differentiation in the four CEE countries and their metropolises. We also incorporate the concept of ‘local migration policy arenas’ (Caponio 2010) of which the intergroup policy arena is one. The introduction of the notion of a local migration policy arena as a policymaking field structured around specific issues of migration policy enables us to focus on patterns of similarities and differences in the local-level responses and policymaking processes across the four cities considered. The local migration policy arenas take shape in specific national contexts and systems of state-municipality relations as well as in a specific historical context (Kornai 2006; Kostelecký 2004). The experiences with migration during communism and specific links with some countries have been influential
for the post-transformation inflows to this area. This can be compared with Western European countries which after decolonisation had kept links with former colonies which played the role of sending areas (the Netherlands with Surinam, the UK with India, France with Algeria). Despite differences in the local policymaking structures of Hungary (Hajduk 2008; Hárs 2009), the Czech Republic (Drobohlav 2009; Burdová Hradečná 2009, Tošnerová), Poland (Desponds, A., Lesińska, 2008) and Estonia (Reinvelt, 2000, Tesser, 2005), similarities can be noted in relation to the mechanisms of functioning of the local immigration policy arenas. In all four countries, intergroup relations constitute a recently established policy arena which intersects with more established local policies, in particular labour market policies but also population policies (Drobohlav et al. 2008, 2009; Hajduk 2008, Uherek 2003). The development of intergroup policies/strategies is strongly influenced by the kind of group present in the society (some of them historically settled in those cities in the time of communism) and in other cases by the EU legislation. In case of Estonia, where the situation of Russian speakers was the subject of discussion on EU level and in case of Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland the Roma minority after EU accession has been strongly supported by EU institutions. In general policy-making in the fields of migrant integration in CEE metropolises is still far from being as systematic as it is in most Western European contexts (compare Bruquetas-Callejo et al. 2008, D’Amato 2006, Penninx and Martinello 2004) and this in particular can be said about policies on intergroup relations (Banducci et al. 2004).

As compared to other European regions, CEE countries lag significantly behind in terms of their passage through the migration cycle, which means in a general shift from emigration to immigration country status. Since the early 1990s labour migrants and asylum seekers have used CEE counties, in particular Hungary and the Czech Republic, and in smaller numbers Poland, as their preferred destinations in Eastern Europe (Szczepaniková et al. 2006, Wallace 2001). Immigrants in the CEE countries are very diverse with respect to their nationalities and duration of stay. Despite a different extent of labour demand and migrant labour supply in CEE countries some structures seem to be very similar. The migration and integration policy domain in the CEE countries was characterized by a gradual development in four steps (Drobohlav 2009; Hárs 2009): (1) During the era of the early 1990s large immigration inflows took place. At that time not the migration policy but instead rather the ‘migration non-policies’ dominated, which was typical of very liberal approaches. (2) In the mid-1990s a phase of institutionalization and the creation of a legal framework system for immigration matters occurred. (3) From the late 1990s to 2004 the phase of stabilization and harmonization of CEE national policies to EU standards was established. (4) Since 2004 a process of a general consolidation of the migration regime is observable. Formally there is a significant influence of the EU or, in other words, a ‘Europeanization’ of migration policies. This trend is accompanied by a sometimes marked ignorance of migration and integration policies in the national, regional and local policy arenas which is due to the actual political and socio-economical contexts. In particular, the frequent and radical political changes after elections and the instability concerning the political decision-makers are hampering a consistent immigration policy. While analyzing migration in CEE region after transformation one should stress explicitly that the outflow in this region after transformation and following EU enlargement (as result of opening labour markets) has been much more of importance both to the policy process and public debate than the inflow which is still marginal.
The specific statistical and migration context in CEE countries

While analyzing migration in the CEE countries, transformation seems to be in almost all documents and articles the starting point of inflow of immigrants to this area. From the debate about migration in CEE region after transformation some general conclusions can be drawn:

- CEE remains a region of net emigration
- Immigration is still limited, and rarely subject of public debate
- Structures of immigrants in all CEE countries are very similar (immigrants mainly from former USSR countries)
- Migration policies are at a very initial stage

Knowing the materials from CLIP research in selected CEE cities we consider it interesting to look at the reasons for differences in structure of immigrants in these cities/countries which go back to the communism past. As regards Western European countries, intensive immigration started in early 1950s as an effect of booming development of post-war economy. At the same time in the communist countries migration almost didn’t exist and was fully controlled by the regime. Emigration from the CEE region to the Western countries was strongly politicalized and the opportunity was given only to a very limited and selected group (according to Stola in 1952 only 52 citizens of Poland obtained passports for a private visit in Western countries, Stola 2010: 10), immigration from outside of the communist bloc to this area was almost non-existent, but even the migration between the Eastern Bloc countries was very restricted (ibidem). In all 3 cases (Wrocław, Prague and Budapest) the territorial shift of borders after WWII caused the mass movement of people. Many Germans were expelled to the territory of Germany and Austria from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. In order to depopulate the new border areas mass replacement of Poles, Czechs and Hungarians was initiated. In the former territory of the Austro-Hungarian Empire the displacement of Hungarians, Czechs, Slovaks and Ukrainians took place. Bearing in mind that international migration during the communism was very specific and the Soviet Bloc was isolated from the rest of the world, we decided to demonstrate some differences between our case studies which, as the following analysis shows, have influenced the contemporary migration situation.

Let us take a look at different situation in our 4 cities during communism. During the communist regime the former republics of the USSR (after the transformation referred to as “independent states”), as in our case Estonia, were influenced by the process of Russification. Due to the economic growth, but mainly by political decisions many Russians were forced to migrate to Estonia. This involuntary process has changed the population structure of this country and caused a politically sensitive situation after transformation in 1990. Due to this historical change, about 30% of citizens of Estonia are not ethnic Estonians by origin (see table 1). The consequences of this process for the contemporary migration to Estonia will be presented later in this text.

At the same time when Estonia was influenced by forced internal (internal in USRR) migration of Russian speakers, Poland remained a very closed country with limited immigration from outside communist countries. In different periods between 1945 and 1989 due to political decisions, the mass emigration from
Poland occurred (Polish citizens of Jewish origin, Polish citizens). The tradition of emigration was strongly connected with the Polish history and has influenced the migration situation after transformation as well, which is going to be explained later in text.

In all countries of the Soviet Bloc international movement of persons was based on the so-called ‘visa system’, which was very restricted and accessible only to selected citizens. For the majority of citizens of Central Europe even a short travel to Western Europe was not possible. Due to different historical moments a large wave of emigration took place from Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary (Hungarian Revolution 1956, the Prague Spring 1968, Jewish Emigration from Poland after 1968, the rise of Solidarność in 1980). In a small country, this kind of mass outflow accounted for shortages on the labour market. As regards Czechoslovakia, the loss of population during the communist regime was estimated at about 0.5 million of people (Drbohlav et al 2009).

In the period between 1945 and 1989 Czechoslovakia invited workers from diverse countries of the Soviet Bloc. According to Drbohlav, commencing from 1970 the Czechoslovak Parliament started to discuss the issue of shortages of labour force in some sectors of economy. The Czechoslovak authorities decided to launch a temporary worker and trainee program with other communist countries. This so-called ‘international aid cooperation’ invited workers mainly from neighbouring countries such as Poland and Hungary but also from Vietnam, Cuba, North Korea, Angola etc. (ibidem)

As a result of WWII and subsequent border changes, Hungary was transferred from a multiethnic society (a token of Austro Hungarian Empire) to a homogeneous society. However, quite a numerous Hungarian minority stayed abroad in the neighbouring countries. According to Hars, these ethnic links remained an important source of migration inflow to Hungary (Hars et al. 2009). The inflow and outflow from Hungary during the communism was very restricted. The country faced some numerous waves of emigration in the politically sensitive moments comparable with other communist countries. Due to the political decision, Hungary has given asylum to some communists from Greek and Chile.

In order to understand the specific contemporary situation in CEE metropolises deeply, statistical information seems to be necessary, although the lack of reliable statistics makes a satisfactory assessment difficult. The foreign population in Hungary stood 2009 at about 2%, showing no marked change, though the proportion of asylum seekers increased slightly. Two thirds of foreign nationals came from neighbouring countries and most were ethnic Hungarians who were targeted by a national settlement programme. Many applications for residence permits were submitted by the Chinese and Vietnamese. Illegal migration is actually mostly transit migration (Tóth 2009). According to Census 2001 data, Budapest had a total population of 1,777,921. The biggest non-Hungarian ethnic groups were ethnic Roma (12,266) and Germans (7,014). Further communities of a considerable size were the Chinese (1,827), the Greeks (1,522), the Slovaks (1,528) and the Ukrainians (1,425). One must emphasize that these official numbers neither mirror the de facto size of ‘old’ national nor of ‘new’ immigrant minorities. It is also quite revealing in terms of the relevance of official data that in the census 135,924 (!) respondents did not indicate their nationality and 11,151 residents were of ‘unknown’ national affiliation (compare Hungarian Statistical Office 2003).
In addition to approximately 400,000 foreigners legally residing in the Czech Republic, the estimated number of foreigners without officially necessary documents in the country in 2009 ranged between 100,000 and 200,000, of whom an unknown proportion is living in the capital.\(^1\) In 2007 Prague had 1,258,062 inhabitants of whom 10.2\% were foreign nationals (Information System of Registration of Inhabitants, ISEO, 31\(^{\text{st}}\) Dec. 2007). The Population Census 2001 reported that 93.4 \% of the population of Prague claimed Czech ethnic origin. The second important nationality was Slovak (1.6\%). Other national minorities constituted only small percentages (Czech Statistical Office 2009). As there was no obligation to indicate one’s ‘nationality’ in the Census, it is probable that many residents did not declare their ‘minority’ identity. Statistical data can thus be seen as a tool of only minor importance in the national minorities’ political issue. An illustrative example is the case of the Roma. According to Census 2001 only 653 inhabitants of Prague officially stated that they were ethnic Roma. Scientific estimations (Drbohlav 2009; Drbohlav et al. 2008) indicate the numbers of Roma population between 20,000 and 25,000!

Contrary to Czech Republic, numbers of immigrants in Poland still remain very low. As it has already been mentioned, Poland has been a country of emigration for decades. This trend has been strengthened following Poland’s accession into the European Union. The figures from different sources reveal that the overall number of Polish post-accession migrants may reach approximately one million. But according to the Central Statistical Office, the number of Poles living temporarily abroad, as at 1\(^{\text{st}}\) January, 2008 may reach as many as 1,950 thousand persons which accounts for more than 4.8\% of the total population. Poland can be described as a net emigration country where immigration does not appear to be noticeably accelerated. Pursuant to the population register, the number of foreigners who were permanent residents of Poland at the end of 2006 was approximately 54,800. This number constitutes 0.14\% of the total population. The Central Statistical Office collected data about the foreigners who registered their temporary stay exceeding three months. In the period of 2002-2005 the number of temporary immigrants was at 42-45,000. The list of nine top sending countries was as follows: Ukraine, Germany, Belarus, the Russian Federation, Vietnam, Armenia, the United States, France and the United Kingdom (Kępińska 2007, Matusz Protasiewicz 2009)

Estonia is representing a different case due to its historical past. The foreign population – understood as newly arrived immigrants – is very limited, but due to the political change in 1990 the number of Russian speakers reached about 26\%, however in the capital city of Tallinn the percentage of this minority is even higher and accounts for 46\% (Statistical Office of Estonia 2007). In terms of ethnicity, the Russian-speaking minority is very diverse and represents citizens of different former republics of the USSR. Due to their historical links, the citizens of Scandinavian countries, mainly Swedes, have settled in Estonia as well. They are representatives of multinational corporations opened in Estonia as a result of foreign direct investments. This type of highly qualified immigrants, working for international companies, staying temporarily in other countries are present in all CEE countries and are perceived as a positive result of transformation and globalization of economy.

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Table 1. The number of minorities living in Estonia (based on nationality).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>1934</th>
<th>1989</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estonians</td>
<td>993 000 (88%)</td>
<td>963 000 (61%)</td>
<td>930 000 (68%)</td>
<td>921 900 (69%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>93 000 (8%)</td>
<td>475 000 (30%)</td>
<td>351 000 (26%)</td>
<td>345 200 (26%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germans</td>
<td>16 000 (2%)</td>
<td>3 000 (0.2%)</td>
<td>2 000 (0.1%)</td>
<td>1 900 (0.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swedes</td>
<td>8 000 (0.7%)</td>
<td>300 (0.02%)</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>4 000 (0.4%)</td>
<td>500 (0.3%)</td>
<td>2 000 (0.1%)</td>
<td>1 900 (0.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finns</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>17 000 (1%)</td>
<td>12 000 (1%)</td>
<td>11 200 (1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>48 000 (3%)</td>
<td>29 000 (2%)</td>
<td>28 300 (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Byelorussians</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>28 000 (2%)</td>
<td>17 000 (1%)</td>
<td>16 300 (1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>13 000 (1%)</td>
<td>30 000 (2%)</td>
<td>27 000 (2%)</td>
<td>18 000 (1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1 127 000</strong> (100%)</td>
<td><strong>1 564 800</strong> (100%)</td>
<td><strong>1 370 000</strong> (100%)</td>
<td><strong>1 344 700</strong> (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistical Office of Estonia 2007

**Migration strategies/policies in the 4 cities**

Since 2004 the migration situation in Hungary has been shaped by European integration, but there are no strong efforts towards a more pronounced integration policy. Instead, since the last elections in 2010, there are tendencies of the government to force the Parliament to derogate the existing constitutional protection of fundamental rights, including the protection of personal data, in the name of Hungarians’ ‘right of security’ (Tóth 2009). In 2007, two laws concerning immigrants were adopted. These laws were created in compliance with European Union directives rather than in an internal motivated effort to create a systematic immigration policy. An important element that is still missing is a consistent policy for the integration of immigrants (Hajduk et al. 2008). Despite the fact that the numbers of immigrants are still small and even decreasing and that the majority of them are ethnic Hungarians (Kincses 2008), an integration law is still an urgent demand. Hungary ratified the Revised European Social Charter (1996) in 2009. However the country exempted itself from optional articles concerning the protection of migrants. The recent government policy paper regarding Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) remains a gesture, as both the AFSJ elements of the Lisbon Treaty and Stockholm Programme will render it irrelevant. In January 2009, Hungary liberalised the accession to the labour market of EEA nationals, thus ending temporary restrictions and complicated legal provisions. In Hungary strong emphasis is put on labour immigration, whereas the ‘demographic logic’ of immigration is not really welcome. In the context of the recent economic crisis there was a dismissal of
migrants working in heavy industry and manual jobs (particularly Romanians and Slovaks), which was labelled as ‘reasonable protectionism’ (Tóth 2009). A positive aspect is that with the enlargement of the Schengen Area, and expansion of border control, migration data exchange will be stepped up. This will have positive results in managing lawful migration, within the limitations of labour force demands and demographic balance.

In the Czech case, too, the main emphasis of immigration policy is on labour migration while also including immigration as an officially welcomed ‘remedy’ against the low fertility rate of the native population (Worldwide Immigration Consultancy Services Ltd 2008). This and economic reasons were causal factors, that the Czech Republic was the very first former communist country which offered the official possibility to apply for permanent residence already after 5 years of work and stay in the country (IDEA Policy Briefs 2009). The most frequent expression emerging in debates on migration in the Czech Republic is ‘integration’. Integration is understood as integration into the labour market and independence from state aid (knowledge of the language and acceptable accommodation are vital conditions). This narrow understanding of integration leads to a one-sided perception of immigration and its impacts (Drbohlav 2009). Integration policies have been since 2004 largely predefined by EU but also by some national criteria such as the economic policy, labour conditions and a weak position of labour unions in the CR. In this sense of integration, the ‘value’ of migrants and the possibility of their acceptance by Czech society are predefined by their economic utility (Klvačová 2006). This simplified vision of integration is taken out of the context of policies which makes integration difficult in reality. The discussion about how the process of integration is perceived by different stakeholders, especially the migrants themselves is still insufficient (Szczepaniková 2010).

As stated before, Poland is still an emigration country and the mass inflow has occurred after EU accession and opening labour markets. Immigrants in Poland coming from neighbouring countries, mainly from Ukraine, are characterised as circular migrants, living between the country of origin and country of destination. Such migrants use an existing legal and illegal way to enter Poland and work there for a few months. This kind of migration is a response to labour market needs, particularly visible after Poland’s EU accession. The development of migration policy in Poland is still at the early stage and besides some necessary changes in law before EU accession and adaptation of international conventions, still there is no general strategy and clearly formulated migration and integration policy. The complex administrative and extremely time-consuming procedures rather encourage entrepreneurs to employ immigrants. The lack of a clear migration strategy providing the answer to the question: what kind of integration policies should be followed? (Szczepaniková 2010).

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2 The actual fertility rate (2010) is 1.25 according to UN TFR Ranking. Thus, the Czech Republic has now one of the lowest fertility rates all over Europe combined with a rising life expectancy. Demographers have calculated that in the year 2030 there may be a statistical lack of more than 420,000 workers on the Czech labour market.
migrants are necessary and welcome? has promoted all kinds of temporary forms of migration, such as seasonal and short-term. In 2006-2009 some necessary changes in law were implemented, which liberalized the access to the Polish labour market for workers from Eastern neighbouring countries as well as new EU member states. Due to a temporary character of immigrants living in Poland integration policy has not been formulated, yet. Few integration initiatives were taken rather ad hoc and addressed to a small group of refugees. In 2011 an inter-ministerial working group pursuant to the commission of the Polish government presented a draft of a document called ‘Polish Migration Strategy’, which is presently undergoing social consultation and may introduce institutional and system-related changes into the migration policy. To a large extent, it pertained to the issues connected with integration. Immigration has not been perceived by policy makers as an important issue subject, it was discussed by experts, researchers and NGO activists because in Poland (maybe except for Warsaw) the existence of small groups of immigrants mainly from the former USSR countries or highly skilled workers of multinational companies is not perceptible as problematic by the community members. Integration programs are rather ad hoc formulated actions financed by public funds but in many cases organized by NGOs working with emigrants for a long time. The newly arrived migrants are not targeted by integration policy but according to the law, namely Act on National and Ethnic Minorities and Regional Language (Ustawa o Miniejszościach Narodowych i Etnicznych oraz Języku Regionalnym) dated January 6th, 2005 there are 9 national minorities living in Poland: Byelorussians, Czechs, Lithuanians, Germans, Armenians, Russians, Slovaks, Ukrainians, Jews and 4 ethnic minorities: Karaims, Lemks, Romani and Tatars. All the categories included in the act have been living in Poland for decades and constituted parts of the multiethnic population of the country before the WWII. There were no new categories, as for example the Vietnamese community introduced in this act.

The situation in Estonia after transformation was very sensitive. Estonians who gained their independence after the long Soviet occupation, are willing to return to their language and culture, as the symbols of the state and nation. For Russian speakers who had lived there for years or were born there, the Russian language was a part of their identity and with the political change in the country they were confronted with the question of their identity. The debate was focused primarily on issues such as the status of non-Estonians, citizenship policy, integration of minorities and language and cultural policy. All the solutions in this field were obscured by the memory of the Russian occupation, Stalin’s deportations and the process of Russification of Estonia still living in the elderly and middle-aged generation. In addition, the law on which the minority issues are based should be mentioned as well. The definition of a minority group is contained in the Law on the Cultural Autonomy of National Minorities. To be a part of a minority, its members must:

- Be citizens of Estonia;
- Reside in Estonia;
- Have long-term, stable and strong links with Estonia;
• Differ from ethnic Estonians on the basis of their ethnic affiliation, cultural, religious traditions or linguistic characteristics; be guided by the desire to conserve through joint effort their cultural traditions, religion and language, underlying their common identity.

The law allows the minorities to constitute themselves as autonomous communities. It also limits the rights of such groups as Finns or Danes who are living in the territory of Estonia and do not have the Estonian citizenship. It is possible to form cultural or religious communities similarly to Jewish communities from the beginning of the 1990s. In the Development Plan for 2009-2012 the priority was also given to promoting the diversity of Estonian culture. Estonians and other cultural institutions, organizations, NGOs and clubs are financed from the public sources. The main goals for the integration policy in the future were formulated in the State Integration Programme 2008-2013, prepared by the academics and practitioners pursuant to the commission of the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Estonia. (Public Procurement No 034118, State Integration Programme Development, 2008-2013, PRAXIS, University of Tartu, Institute of Baltic States, HILL&KNOWLTON, Geomedia) There were 6 main fields defined for the Integration Program:

• Education (incl. teaching the language to adults and pupils, teaching history and social studies, citizenship education)
• Tolerance and intercultural dialogue, media
• Naturalization, political identity
• Social risk groups
• Labour market
• Study of local governments

The New Integration Program has replaced the previous one from the year 2000-2007. Under many symbolic and practical issues connected with the relations between Estonians and non-Estonians there are two aspects which continue to be debated: the sense of citizenship, education and language. During the last 15 years, the number of naturalized people increased, but the question whether naturalization and the Estonian citizenship automatically translate into complete integration remains open. On the other hand, the knowledge and use of the Estonian language among non-Estonians remains a hot issue. Estonian is the official language of the country, however, the state and local governments provide some information in Russian, in the places where the majority of inhabitants are Russian (eastern part of the country, close to the Russian border but also in the city of Tallinn) the local authority is obliged to offer the services in both languages. The comparison of proportions of the Russian speakers in the population of some cities is shown in the table below.

In summary it can be stated that labour migration of circular and short-term type still represents the dominant form of migration to CEE countries, however, the numbers of immigrants are still low. Due to difficulties with bureaucracy many of short-term migrants have been using the illegal way to work in the countries of CEE. The capital cities in each of those countries attract the majority of immigrants which can be compared with Western cities. The source countries are mostly other CEE countries, former USSR republics, Vietnam, China and Mongolia. In recent years also rising numbers
of asylum seekers came to Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, in lesser numbers to Estonia. The majority of them try to move to Western countries, but are often sent back to the CEE countries because of the ‘country of origin principle’. Many migration impacts have not yet become too visible because of a circular and short-term nature of the labour migration and because only a short time has elapsed since the change of migration patterns. Ethnic migration (ethnic Hungarians from Romania) is a special characteristic of Hungarian immigration patterns. As it was mentioned before, the structure of immigrants in all 4 cases is strongly connected with their history of migration during communism. 

Ethnic minorities, which due to border changes stayed outside the country (Hungary), Russian speakers being linked to Russian minority (Estonia), Vietnamese and Chinese immigrants (Czech Republic) and finally diverse immigrants mainly from former USSR republic (Poland). In CEE countries, in general, not so many immigrants than in most Western EU countries have been naturalised – with the exception of ethnic Hungarians in Hungary. Although all four countries are in early stages of the ‘migration cycle’, they differ significantly in certain aspects. The Czech Republic has probably already entered the so called take-off stage of the migration cycle (Drbohlav 2009) whereas Hungary seems to be in a proper preliminary stage (ibidem). In terms of the length of stay, in the Czech Republic and Hungary there are significant numbers of migrants who stay for a long-time (several months) or permanently, whereas in Poland short-term stays (accompanied by so called petty trade activities) dominate. As a general finding one can say that integration of migrants seems to be still in the infancy stage in all East-Central European urban contexts (Tóth and Gődri 2005). Generally, no major separated or segregated immigrant communities have been established yet, though there are some tendencies of ‘parallel society’ building, for example among the Chinese in Budapest (Müller, Nyíri 2007) and the Vietnamese in Prague (Brouček 2003). In Estonia there is a visible division between Estonians and Russian speakers in all spheres of social life due to a language barrier and the separate educational system being a hangover from the old political system (Matusz Protasiewicz 2009)

**Institutions, responsibilities and legal determinants**

Notwithstanding the scarce literature (Klvačová 2006) and empirical evidence available, we will now try to point out some characterising features of the national and local intergroup policies. Distribution of power is of central relevance in local policymaking on migration since policies on intergroup relations have to be formally decided upon by local representative and executive institutions, such as city councils or municipal governments (Banducci et al. 2004, Caponio 2010). Confrontation between different ideologies and political framing of migration can often be observed. In CEE countries migration was for a long time not present in public debate. Now slowly it becomes an issue. The public discussion is more emotionalized in the Czech Republic with its critical mass media attention and where public opinion was for a long time negatively oriented. In Hungary anti-immigrant sentiments are even rising recently which is also mirrored in mass media. In Poland the debate is more about emigration and its social consequences. And in Estonia the focus of public discussion is still about Estonians-Russians relations and integration. Thus, local migration policymaking is characterised by negotiation and pragmatic orientation and is always chucked into a broader political context.
Hungary’s migration policy is not decided by a special political actor or ministry; it spans the competences of the Justice and Law Enforcement Ministry (and within it the Department of Cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs and Migration, and the Office of Immigration and Nationality, whose interests do not always align), the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour, the Ministry of National Development and Economy, National Development Agency, Ministry of Education and Culture, and the Foreign Ministry. Furthermore, an inter-ministerial Committee on Migration was officially set up in 2004, but so far it has not played a significant role in formulating migration policy measures. Thus, numerous non-governmental organizations (NGOs), community organizations, and associations play an important role in the devising, and especially in the implementation of the policy (Hajduk et al. 2008; Fassmann and Szabo 2008).

On the Hungarian national level, intergroup policies aren’t picked out as a central theme, yet. Thus, these policies are a complex topic which is determined by other priorities which cannot be decided autonomously by the Municipality (Office for National and Ethnic Minorities 2006). Immigration policies in Hungary are additionally complicated by the fact that this field is tangled with the politics which considers ethnic Hungarians who live in neighboring countries, e.g. in Slovakia and Romania and the question of national minorities in general (Tóth and Vékás 2004). There is still some kind of subtle or semi-official perceived aspiration to keep territories which are still populated by ethnic Hungarians. In Hungary, the first milestone was set in 1995 with the introduction of a Parliamentary Commissioner for National and Ethnic Minorities Rights (‘Minorities Ombudsman’). The Ombudsman’s office is an organ of the Parliament and the Ombudsman is accountable exclusively to it. The Ombudsman takes measures solely on the basis of the Constitution and the law and cannot be given instructions concerning the course of his proceedings. The Ombudsman often intervenes in cases of discrimination of migrant children, because there is still considerable exclusion in the decentralised school system (There are even schools which refuse pupils of non-native origin). Since 11 June 2007 Erno Kallai, head of the Institute for Romology at Apor Vilmos Roman Catholic College has been the new Ombudsman. He is very active and in 2009 he proposed 35 pieces of legislation and made 78 recommendations for the government and minority organisations for the benefit of the 13 officially recognised minorities.

In the media and in public discourse integration and intergroup relation policies are treated as political issues of a certain importance and as a kind of ‘implicit consequence’. Neither on the national nor on the municipal level are there any concrete measures or special departments dealing directly with that issue.

Budapest’s political and administrative bodies are still in a very initial stage as regards the development of local intergroup policies or their implementation or even of an increased awareness of the issue per se. In the Budapest case it is important to note that policies on intergroup relations as an elaborated political concept or ‘local intercultural policies’ as a concrete implementation of it do not exist yet. From a mere bureaucratic view it is not the responsibility of the city to deal with migrants’ issues or integration. There is a strategy of cooperation, between the municipality and NGOs oriented towards issues related to the coexistence of different ethno-cultural communities in Budapest in order to create an Integration Plan Concept of the city which the capital does not have yet. At the time of our fieldwork in spring 2008, some city officials said that policies on intergroup relations would really be an important issue.
and as a consequence they started to create a concept (Fassmann and Szabo 2008). The main problem is the limited room for manoeuvre or as a city official expressed it:

“It is difficult to deal with something that is not ours, it is on national level and we don’t have the authority to interfere. What we can do is to cooperate on lower levels, but we don’t have the responsibility, the tools, and the matter of reaction in this field. This is an obstacle which kills also initiatives because if the responsibility is not mine, why to deal with it?”

There is still no municipal department responsible for integration or for policies on intergroup relations. Also implemented measures directly concerning that issue are still absent. According to the Municipality, the official policy of the City is that Budapest is a multicultural and diverse city. This is in fact not expressed by law or visible as a special political or legislative tool but local politicians are merely promoting this as an official image.

In Budapest the organization Menedék (Migránsokat Segítő Egyesület or Hungarian Association for Migrants) is of crucial importance in the context of policies on intergroup relations. Menedék was established in January 1995 as a civil initiative. It operates as a non-profit organisation, independent from governmental institutions. Its main seat is in Budapest, and there are smaller branches in Debrecen and Békéscsaba. This organization represents the interests and rights of migrants towards the political, administrative, governmental and municipal bodies and in the media and takes part in the elaboration of decisions relating to migration policy. Menedék also provides expertise for the elaboration of Hungary's anti-discrimination and migration policy. In 2006 the creation of a national network of organizations (called Hálózat and consisting of 22 members) dealing with migrants was initiated. The initiative was financed by the National Civil Fund and is still continuing. The initial aim was to establish coordinated and enhanced cooperation among the organizations and experts working in the field of migration and also to strengthen the participants’ capacity to represent their interest both on an individual and on a network level. The direct objectives are the organizations and institutes (civil organizations dealing with migrants, civil self-organizations, volunteers) whose members are interacting with migrants on daily basis. The program consists in network building, creating immigration-related databases, and organizing conflict solving trainings for members of organizations.

Within its networking activities Menedék has found 110 official ethnic associations, of which only 78 were de facto existing. A considerable number were only registered and more than a half were ethnic Hungarian organizations. These are very active, incorporated and maintain a lot of links with the municipality and the government, with each other and especially with their sending countries. Actually, many of them don’t even consider themselves as ethnic organizations. Their relation to the majority and their status in intergroup relations is not exactly the same as that of non-Hungarian minority organizations. The Chinese and Vietnamese organizations whose networks are more closed are focused on the cultural, economic and religious matters. They maintain some connections with other organizations of the same ethnic community. The Chinese have had an established foothold (in the socio-economic sense) in Budapest since the 1990s. Actually, the estimated number of Chinese living in Budapest is between 25,000 and 60,000. These uncertain numbers clearly show that census data is not reliable and that a considerable
number of Chinese moved unofficially into the country. The Chinese are not really integrated into the urban society, but have established an all-embracing social and economic network which makes them a relatively successful immigrant group in economic manners as well as in every-day life (Irimiás 2008). Estimated 5,000 Chinese retailers run their sometimes more or less legal businesses. As a consequence a so-called ‘parallel society’ with a good internal infrastructure was developed (Nyíri 1999, 2002). The Chinese community is much more highly estimated than Africans or Roma because natives of lower income groups are thus provided with affordable consumption goods (Nyíri 2003, 2007; Odehnal 2007).

The largest ethnic minority group in Budapest is also traditionally most discriminated: Estimated 20,000 Roma live in Budapest, a great number is concentrated in the 8th and 9th district as a consequence of forced labour and housing market integration during the socialist era. In contrast to the situation of the Roma in other parts of Hungary, their living conditions in the capital are better. The employment-based income of this minority is about six times higher there than in the countryside (TÁRKI 2004). The Roma topic is a very complex and sensitive issue in Hungary (on 03-08-2009 in the village of Kisléta the 8 person was murdered by right wing radical groups and the offenders are still unknown), therefore it was intentionally excluded from this paper.

Sub-Saharan Africans are also a very discriminated, however a better organized community. Although their number is modest, they have a lot of connections with other organizations and charity associations. Many of them are refugee-oriented and are standing in a very good relation with Menedék.

The level of integration differs considerably between the migrant communities. While ethnic Hungarian immigrants or the German minority are well integrated in the city’s civil-society, Africans and Roma are ‘at the bottom’ of it. In case of the Africans there are even neither official programs nor established ethnic networks that would promote intergroup relations with them. With the exception of the ethnic Hungarian organizations mainly from Transylvania, most of ethnic associations are not very active and have only a few members with just some people organizing maybe only one cultural event per year.

“Actually many communities are unfortunately completely ignorant and don’t have really an emblematical representative who is a strong enough to make their voices being heard” said a representative of Menedék.

It is a matter of fact, that most migrant associations in CEE capitals are still mostly active in organizing cultural events, in education, teaching and information diffusion and are no strong partners in the laborious process of developing policies on intergroup relations.

In the Czech Republic the coordinative political institutions for integration policies and policies on intergroup relations are the Ministry of Work and Social Affairs in close cooperation with the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Culture and the Ministry of Health. The main target group is that of the legal immigrants with long-term status. In Prague the relevant bodies for setting the principles and strategies of communication with national minorities and migrants’ integration are the City
Council of Prague and the Municipal Assembly of the City of Prague. Both institutions form an integral part of the whole communication and cooperation strategy with national minorities and immigrants. ³

Obviously, Prague is more advanced than Budapest on its way to EU adequate policies on intergroup relations. This means that the existing legal and organizational framework is already much more complex. The City considers the communication with national minorities explicitly as very important, but the Municipality has not much room for manoeuvre as it acts within the framework of national regulations. It is worth mentioning that official policies always consider both groups, national minorities and immigrants, but in reality immigrant communities are not represented as good as ‘traditional’ national minorities. So far, so good but it must also not be forgotten that the policy of the City of Prague in relation to national minorities is also burdened with some “historical incriminations”, which should be subject to some reconsiderations. As part of the Prague Resolution No. 47/11 (17th October 2002) the city approved its ‘Concept of Policy of the City of Prague in Relation to National Minorities’ (Magistrát Hlavního Města Prahy 2006). This concept is a guarantee for continuity in communication with national minorities (Balvin 2003). Aspects of cooperation with ethnic groups and their organizations are guaranteed by the ‘Act on the Capital City of Prague’, the ‘Policy Statement of the Council of the Municipal Assembly of the City of Prague for the term 1998-2002’, the ‘Strategic Plan of the City of Prague’, and the ‘Act on the Rights of Members of National Minorities’. The policy statement (1999) of the Council of the Municipal Assembly of the City of Prague focused on city programs of support for activities of national minorities. The Act of 13th April 2000 on the Capital City of Prague refers to the establishment of a Committee for National Minorities within the City Council of Prague. The Advisory Board for National Minorities created in 1997 was later transformed into the Commission of the Council of the City Council of Prague (Prague City Hall 2006). The Strategic Plan of the City of Prague (2000) comprises two education programs focusing on cooperation with national minorities. Cooperation with the city districts as well as with the municipal departments of social care, housing, education, culture etc. forms an integral part of the cooperation strategy with national minorities and migrants. The Act on the Rights of Members of National Minorities anticipates amendments to other laws requiring direct communication of organizations of national minorities with the City Council and the Municipal Assembly of Prague (Magistrát Hlavního Města Prahy 2006).

One of the first visible manifestations of the formation of a policy on intergroup relations in Prague was the foundation of the Multicultural Center Prague (Multikurní Centrum Praha). This is a non-profit organization oriented towards issues related to the mutual enrichment of the coexistence of different ethno-national communities in the Czech Republic. Since its foundation (1999), the Center has organized a lot of

³ “A national minority is a community of citizens of the Czech Republic living in the territory what is now the Czech Republic, generally differing from other citizens by their common ethnic origin, language, culture and traditions, forming a minority in order to make a concerted effort to preserve and develop their common characteristics, language and culture as well as to express and protect the interest of their historically formed community” (see Act of 10th July 2001 on the Rights of Members of National Minorities and amendments to Act No. 273/2001, Collection of Laws, chapter 104 distributed on 2nd August 2001, p. 1; Office of the Government of the Czech Republic Secretariat of the Government Council for National Minorities (2008).
public debates, educational, cultural and public informational activities, has supported research and publications and established links between migrant and ethnic minority organizations in the Czech Republic and abroad.

A second important milestone was set in 2007, when the City opened the House of National Minorities where the 11 officially approved national minorities (Polish, Bulgarian, Slovak, Roma, Hungarian, German, Ruthenian, Greek, Russian, Croatian and Ukrainian) have office space for their associations. Although no concrete diversity concept forms the background, this House can be seen as an important step towards the formation of an urban society being more sensitized to intergroup relations and diversity issues. Administratively this institution is subordinated to the Center of Social Services which is a municipal department. It is co-financed by the national minorities, the Advisory Board on National Minorities and the Czech Government. It is a place of cooperation, social and educational events, art activities, exhibitions and folklore. Up to now the city does not maintain formal or informal regular and institutionalized contacts with all ethnic and religious organizations but through the House of National Minorities a platform and institutionalized structure is provided. Both the Multicultural Center and the House of National Minorities owe their formation to official municipal policies and co-operations with migrant associations.

Obviously, Prague’s initiatives were taken as role models. In February 2010 Hungary’s Minority Ombudsman proposed establishing a House of Minorities in Budapest too, to halt the assimilation of national and ethnic minorities and protect their cultural assets. This common cultural centre, should keep the public collections of the 12 national minorities and the Roma ethnic minority. The facility would also operate as a research centre, library and centre of the arts. In addition to developing the existing cultural network, there is a need, Erno Kallai (MTI 02-02-2010) said:

‘If we want to keep Hungary as a multicultural state as specified in the Constitution, we need concrete steps, institutions and funds rather than mere declarations. Otherwise, our minorities, mainly the smaller ones with no institutions, could end up fully disappearing from Hungary’s ethnic map within a few decades’.

In many western EU cities Muslim communities are high on the agenda of local intergroup policy-makers. In Prague and Budapest the situation is quite different. Neither among the official approved national minorities nor among the immigrant communities Muslims are playing an influential role. The numbers of Muslims are small (estimated 10,000 in the Czech Republic) and Islam is not relevant from the perspective of local policy-makers in Prague. In 1999 a mosque was opened by the Islamic Foundation in Prague (Islámská nadace v Praze). Regarding the size of the Muslim population in Budapest it is very difficult to get precise official data. It is not compulsory to provide information about religious affiliation in the Census! There are considerably diverging numerical estimations. The Municipality supposes that there live about 1,000 Muslim

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residents in Budapest. Following Menedék, the number of Muslims in Budapest is about 5,000 persons of whom a considerable proportion moved illegally to Hungary. According to the ‘Organisation of Muslims in Hungary’ approximately 30,000 Muslims live in the country of whom the majority have been settled in Budapest.

According to our research neither in Budapest nor in Prague special political measures or strategies with a focus on Muslim immigrants are in force. Up to now neither in Prague nor in Budapest systematic empirical research on this topic was done (Klvačová 2006). Also scientific research about the mutual relations between immigrant associations and the major society is absent (Klvačová 2006, Uherek 2003). The available sources are mostly statistical.

In all four cities NGOs are a relatively new phenomenon and play a crucial role in the local intergroup policy arena. NGOs work in partnership with public authorities, community and immigrant associations, etc. Most NGOs were founded for the first time during the 1990s or even later and declare themselves through the main mission to fight for the rights of immigrants and their acceptance in the society. The general position of the NGOs is to provide social and legal assistance to migrants and make them more trusted towards the different ethnic groups.

The officials of the Municipality of Prague verbally expressed their high estimation for the cooperation with NGOs in integration and intergroup matters. One of the most important results of such a cooperation (with governmental authorities, too) was a special website for foreigners (www.cizinci.cz; ‘Cizinci’ means ‘foreigners’ in Czech). An important NGO in the Czech capital is ‘SLOVO 21’ which was founded by migrants to help immigrants who came later in the process of integration. Educational, cultural, media, public awareness projects, also focused on Roma and on integration matters are organized. The goals are to combat racism and xenophobia, to help to protect human rights, to teach tolerance towards ethnic minorities, to support integration of foreign nationals living in the Czech Republic and to provide media support. SLOVO 21 maintains a lot of cooperative connections with other NGOs and governmental organizations in the Czech Republic. Further organizations of immigrant communities, the Ukrainians and Vietnamese as the most active, are ‘Klub Hanoi’, a NGO founded by Czech students with the aim to spread the Vietnamese culture, and the ‘Forum of Ukrainians of the Czech Republic and Ukrainian Initiative in the Czech Republic’.6

To some extent it appears that national authorities and municipalities on the one side, and NGOs on the other side are in opposition to each other, and some municipal representatives and political decision-makers may still have (but usually not officially!) a negative perception of the NGOs (Szczepaniková 2010). In fact they are linked by mutual dependence. In the new democratic societies of CEE countries, the state seeks to legitimize its power through a certain degree of cooperation with civil society, such as working with


NGOs. On the other hand, NGOs depend not only on state funding but also on the general support and legal environment for the development of associative activities of citizens.

We have already mentioned the predominant negative attitudes towards immigration in Hungary and the Czech Republic. Radical statements by government representatives, including even the Minister of the Interior and the president of the Czech police force, have sometimes stirred the situation in the country, and raised concerns within some communities of foreigners and the majority society (e.g. its fear of growing criminality). These statements have resulted in debates on state power and could support the criminalisation of migration in the eyes of majority society. As far as mass media are concerned, their way of communicating about immigration and migrants’ integration into the city influences the establishment of the public discourse and public opinion climate. Thus, the role of local media in the intergroup policy area can be considered as becoming stronger and stronger, for in CEE countries, too, since the 1990s public discourse gained a more and more crucial relevance in the framing of the migration topic.

As it was mentioned above, the migration situation in Poland is rather simple and can be described as a low number of immigrants, with the majority of temporary labour migrants. This kind of temporary migrants depend on economic and political situation of their sending countries, in this case mainly Ukraine and Belarus. Because so far Poland has not been confronted with bigger waves of culturally and ethnically diverse migrants, the development of political and institutional instruments and a clearly formulated strategy remained a declaration repeated by consecutive governments. There was no formulation of national interest in the field of migration and also no institutions responsible for coordination of this area. The responsibility was divided between different ministries and departments. Intergroup policy understood as a part of migration/integration policy was even not a subject of any debate in Poland neither on national nor local level. Wroclaw seems to be an interesting example in Poland of an attempt to promote national minority in order to create a more multicultural atmosphere in the city.

While talking about intergroup relations in Wroclaw, we should distinguish between two groups: national minorities and newly arrived migrants. National minorities are closely connected with the post war history of the city. Due to the historical border change after WWII, the German city of Breslau was transformed into the Polish city of Wroclaw. It is probably the only example of a city in Europe where 100% of inhabitants were exchanged. The most intense process of displacement of Germans took place between 1945 and 1949, after 1950 the continuation of this process was called a family reunion. During the “Operation Swallow”, 1 million 298 thousand of Germans were displaced from the entire territory of Lower Silesia. (Encyklopedia Wroclawia 2002) By the end of 1945, the number of inhabitants living in Wroclaw amounted to 43 thousand, by the end of 1946 - 185 thousand and in 1947 the number of inhabitants increased to 224 thousand. Between 1954 and 1950, the structure of the population of Wroclaw was built in the process of migration, namely inflows of people from other parts of the country. Only in 1981, the number of inhabitants increased to 621 thousand which corresponded to the number of inhabitants of the prewar Wroclaw. (Davies, Moorhouse 2002, Thum 2006) The new inhabitants of Wroclaw, who migrated to the city, demonstrated different cultures and traditions, strongly represented by the culture of former Polish provinces in the East – with the predominance of Lvov tradition. It is important to add that the Polish state
was very multicultural before WWII particularly in the Eastern part. To those people, Wrocław was a new, unfamiliar place where they were expected to build a new existence. The newly settled inhabitants put down roots in Wrocław but it was a long term process. It is also worth mentioning that during communism there was no space for cultural differences. The regime made an attempt to create a homogeneous society of equal citizens and one common Polish culture. Thus there was no room for multiethnic tradition of Poland from the prewar time. The situation has been changing after transformation and the EU accession has influenced the activity of national minorities in Wrocław. The Law on National Minorities and the access to different European grants has activated minority organizations to present their culture and tradition to other members of community. All the members of national minorities are well integrated with the Polish society. The second group mentioned above are the newly arrived migrants. By the end of 2008, according to the official statistics available in Lower Silesian Governor’s Office based on residence permits of various types issued so far there were 3980 foreigners living in the agglomeration of Wrocław (less than 1%). The structure of this group is diverse and may be divided into several major sections, such as:

- Students from Eastern countries (mainly Ukraine, Belarus, Russia, Kazakhstan)
- Students from Western countries coming to Wrocław for 6-12 months as part of European Exchange Projects or for the full time BA or MA studies
- Workers of the multinational corporations based in agglomeration (the biggest group – South Koreans, but also Germans, Swedes, French)
- Muslims from different countries living in Wrocław and active in the Muslim Center (Matusz Protasiewicz 2009)

Due to the high diversity of this rather small group there are no organizations representing it except for International Friends of Wrocław Club – the club of expatriate families. As in other Western European countries highly qualified migrants are accepted by the society and are seen as temporary guests in the city. The policy towards different minority groups in Wrocław is not explicitly formulated but it can be seen as part of the development policy of the city. From early 1990s the city of Wrocław has built up its strategy based on two messages: investor-friendly place and building the multicultural image of the city. In 2008, within the administration of the City of Wrocław, a Group for National and Ethnic Minorities and International Cooperation was established. The main goal of this group consisting of the representatives of the city authorities and minority organizations was to support the activities based on promotion of the cultural tradition of minorities living in the city. The composition of the group was expanded by the member of the Governor’s Office in 2009. The cooperation with the representatives of local, regional, governmental structures might be useful for the organization in order to acquire information concerning different financial sources available for their activities. In Wrocław we can name two groups of organizations: cultural and religious. The Ukrainian minority organization having a long tradition in the cultural activities promoting the culture, language and tradition of the community to the inhabitants of Wrocław may be included in the former group. The Ukrainian Organization in Wrocław is well known to all institutions in the city, representing not only the city authorities but also the governmental and regional authorities. As for the main cultural organizations in the city of Wrocław, the German Social and Cultural Society (Deutsche Sozial- und
Kulturelle Gesellschaft in Breslau) ought to be mentioned. The organization has a long tradition (50 years) in the activities in the field of culture and education and is currently involved in many projects promoting the German language and culture as well as the multiethnic history and tradition of Lower Silesia region. The German Minority organization is financed from both German and Polish resources. Among the minority organizations actively represented in the city life, two others have to be mentioned, both of religious nature. The Jewish community and the Muslim Cultural and Educational Centre which is representing the newly arrived migrants. The Muslim community in Wrocław is organized around the Muslim Cultural Centre – the only Muslim organization in the city. There is no official data available pertaining to the structure of the community but the interviews have provided some characteristics of this group. The Muslims living in Wrocław are mostly educated and young (20-40 years). They came to Wrocław to study mainly from Algeria, Syria, Turkey, Palestine, some of them are Muslims from Western European countries who came to Wrocław because of lower costs of study and living. According to the data provided by the Centre there are about 800-1,000 Muslims living in the Lower Silesia region, in this group about 600-800 live in the city itself. The majority of Muslims living in Wrocław are Sunnis. Due to the geographic location, close distance to Berlin, after Poland's EU accession there is a visible increase of foreign entrepreneurs with Turkish origin, coming to the city from Germany. Summing up, due to small numbers of immigrants in the city the development of intergroup policy is in a very early stage of development. All the ad hoc promoted actions towards immigrants and national minorities are taken as part of the multicultural image of the city. Wrocław won a nomination for the Capital of Culture 2016.

To understand the local policy making process in the field of intergroup relations in Tallinn one should stress once again that the population of Estonia due to political and historical changes, is very diverse in terms of ethnicity. The figures show that 54.9% of Tallinn's population are Estonians, followed by Russians with 36.5% and other Russian speakers coming from other former republics of the Soviet Union. The majority of Russian speakers was born in Estonia and feel a strong connection to this place but not necessarily to the independent state of Estonia. The independence of Estonia changed the status of Russian speakers and opened a discussion about citizenship and identity. The question of citizenship was broadly discussed during the 90s' and the pre-accession time. Estonia was obliged by the EU to regulate the rights of the Russian speakers. The persons without the Estonian citizenship can live in Estonia pursuant to the European Union Council Directive 2003/109/EC principle of a “long -term resident”; such status gives these persons the right to live and work in the EU countries. While analyzing the situation of the minorities in Tallinn, it ought to be clarified that the pictures of minorities are rather simple in terms of policy and a dialogue. The biggest group is formed by Russian speakers, however the structure of this group is very diverse in terms of its members’ status (Russian speaking citizens of Estonia, citizens of other countries, such as Russia, Byelorussia, Ukraine, stateless persons) and socio-economic position. The Russian speakers are organized in the city in different organizations based on the common interest. It is important to add that at present, there are over 200 registered societies and unions of minorities in Estonia. The majority of creative groups belong to 17 umbrella organisations. One of those is: The International Association of National and Cultural Societies Lüüra (this is the umbrella organization for many smaller associations). Russkij Dom is another example of such structure/group as a place of different cultural activities of Russian speakers community. The main directions in the activities of ethnic minorities’
cultural societies involve choral and vocal singing, choreography, amateur theatre, visual and media arts, literature and publishing, educational activities, decorative and applied art as well as work in clubs and hobby groups. They are both national and local funds available for the activities. The ethnic organizations are expected to apply for grants for their project. The city of Tallinn has supported the activities taken by the minority organizations thus contributing to the development of Estonian culture or the cooperation between different groups living in the city. An outstanding example of the financial support obtained by the Russian speaker community is renovation of the Russian House and sponsorship of its activities. This prestigious building is located in the centre of the city and after its restoration it appears to be the most renowned concert hall. According to the city authorities, this is the only Russian culture centre outside Russia entirely sponsored by local authorities. The centre hosts concerts, theatrical performances, workshops for children, etc. Integration policy in Estonia, initiated in the late 90s, was addressed mainly to the non-Estonian Russian-speaking population defined as a target group in the process of integration. In some programs, Russian speakers were divided into such target groups as e.g. in the educational program- or labour market-oriented activities, but in general, the non–Estonian community has been perceived as a homogeneous body. According to the Estonian Open Society Institute research of 2007, ¾ of the residents of Tallinn considered the integration process unsuccessful. These results were a stimulus for the city of Tallinn to develop its own integration activities. The local policy is based on the state integration program and is addressed to all minorities living in Tallinn. On the basis of the data obtained from the City of Tallinn, it appears that the activities should ensure the minorities equal opportunities.

The program *Kodurahu – Peace in the Community* has been currently developed with the aim of improving the relations between Estonians and non-Estonians living in Tallinn. The objective of the program, according to its leaders, “is the peaceful co-existence in the community”. But having analyzed the structure of the program it seems to be focused on the development of inter-group relations and interactions between both communities. In all the activities the authorities strive for the common interest of the groups in order to bring them closer and to reduce the division between two communities in one society. The program covers the following activities:

- Working group of 15 leaders of minority organizations (5 groups: media, education, culture, politics, economics)
- The Home Peace Forums
- The training trips for the NGO leaders
- Media scholarships for the journalist writing about integration process
- Information Centre for Minorities
- Mentor Program
- Unemployment Club
- Funds for entrepreneurs
- Training program for non-Estonians
All the activities taken up by the Tallinn’s authorities are focused on building up the dialogue platform through different forms of communication in the local community. The city authority strongly supports all the actions taken by NGOs of Estonians as well as non-Estonians in various spheres of the social life. According to the representatives of NGOs there is no cooperation between the organizations of both communities. The Russian organizations are more distrustful of contacts with the officials; they seem to be less prone to participate in programs and activities of the local community and more closed in their own interest group. So is the case with Estonian organizations which do not seek contacts with „Russian“ organizations. The situation of NGOs and other Estonian organizations appears to be more favorable though, due to the obvious knowledge of the language or e.g. regulations on fund raising for its activities.

Looking at the institutional frame in the field of integration of ethnic minorities, the Department of Cultural Affairs and Department of Development are in charge of intergroup relations and intercultural relations, however, all other units are interconnected over different issues of the city population. The City Mayor of Tallinn is the leader of the Council of Minorities, the platform for discussions and the consultative body for the decisions on minority issues. The City Office of Tallinn is responsible for the diversity policy. The main person responsible in this field is the City Secretary who is appointed by the City Mayor of Tallinn. In the City Council 20 seats, out of 61, belong to the representatives coming from national minorities.

All statements concerning the cooperation between Estonians and non-Estonians, as well as the research referred to the above about the little effectiveness of the national integration program indicate that in the local programs the emphasis should be placed on cooperation and getting to know each other, which could prevent tensions and a lack of understanding and promote one Estonian society instead of two parallel societies. The elements hindering this process are not only cultural differences, but above all the language.

The reality of policies on intergroup relations – exclusion from policy-making process and lack of formal cooperation

The representatives of some NGOs in Prague affirmed that there actually exists considerable exclusion of ethnic groups from the official policy-making process. This stands in sharp contrast to the opinion of the local authorities (see above) and their formal estimation of each kind of cooperation with NGOs. In Prague as well as in Budapest there is no systematic cooperation between immigrant organizations and associations of long-established ethnic minorities. As for Prague, most cooperation takes place in the House of National Minorities and there still is no regular institutionalized dialogue between the different associations. In the immediate past there were some activities of the Vietnamese NGOs which tried to organize some cooperation on certain issues, but these efforts didn’t bring considerable results. Even so, ‘Klub Hanoi’ could be a good model of orientation for other ethnic groups and formation of new associations in the future (Brouček 2003; Cameron 2004; Čermáková 2007) but smaller Asian immigrant groups, such as the North Koreans and Mongolians are still by far not so well organized as the Vietnamese community (Jelinková 2009). Even within the Vietnamese community there are internal conflict lines and among the Ukrainians tensions between long-established immigrants and newcomers who are mostly interested in finding temporary work are observable.
But why is cooperation between the city administrations and immigrant associations in intergroup policies in CEE metropolises so difficult? One of the main reasons can be found in the fact that the municipalities actually are lacking in instruments for solving the real issues of policies on intergroup relations. The House of National Minorities in Prague is focused on national minorities, but unfortunately in reality that doesn’t bring as much as had been expected before for the ‘new’ immigrant groups. As a matter of fact the problem constellations of national minorities and immigrants are completely different. In Prague as well as in Budapest this fundamental contrast is still mostly neglected by the actual policies on intergroup relations.

Exclusion is also a multi-faceted phenomenon. In Prague the low participation of migrants in NGO work is evident. Despite twenty years of migrants’ presence, there are only a few persons with migration background working in Czech NGOs. Exactly the same can be said about Budapest. The staff of Menedék, for example, consists almost entirely of ethnic Hungarians. Paradoxically, though NGOs could play an important part in the professionalization of migrants and help them to participate in the public migration discourse more actively, this potential remains largely unused and there are still no political measures - neither from the municipality nor on the national level - to intervene there. In the CEE countries it seems that rising professionalization in the assistance for migrants created a more complicated and bureaucratized system which is less accessible for individuals with a migration background who are interested to participate in it not as clients alone. Thus, bureaucratization and professionalization stand in the way of a more active participation of migrants in defining their needs and the means of fulfilling them.

Also financial aspects are playing an important role. The work of NGOs aimed at migrants in the CEE countries has been undermined for many years by unstable and insecure funding leading to an uncertain future for the organisations. Often, frustration was expressed by NGO representatives about the constant struggle with state authorities against the increasing restrictions towards migrants and the feeling that the work done – often volunteer or remunerated poorly – passes unappreciated by state and local authorities. Comparing the budgets which are spent for national minorities and immigrant organizations it is obvious that in Prague about 70% or even more is spent on national minorities and there is only modest funding for the immigrant NGOs. At the time of our research the Municipal Grant Budget of Prague for such purpose was only about 6 Mio CZK per year, which was really humble.

In this context, it will be an interesting aspect to follow the development of the so-called Regional Integration Support Centres for Foreigners operated by the Refugee Facilities Administration, administration of the South Moravian Region and the Counseling Centre for Integration. This initiative launched and controlled by the Ministry of the Interior can be interpreted as the state’s effort to compete with or even replace some of the services previously supplied by NGOs (see Tošnerová 2010).

It appears to be extremely difficult to provide a profound analysis of the logic of action performed by local officials in the intergroup policymaking arena on the basis of the scarce empirical evidence available. Nevertheless it seems to be important to note that in all four CEE countries local attitudes towards (some) immigrants and (some) ethnic minorities are predominantly negative in the broader public, which makes any measures in the field of intergroup relation policy difficult for local policy-makers. There are no mentionable differences between the local discourses about intergroup relations in the cities and the discourses on the national level and local policy-makers are not interested to activate unpopular initiatives. Since the cities
cannot or are in some cases not really willing to take effective influence, urban policies which are relevant for intergroup relations and migrant integration are focusing on rather ‘soft’ measures like promoting cultural diversity (e.g. the Roma theatre festival in Budapest or the International Ethnic Festival ‘Prague – Heart of the Nations’, which is now the most important cultural event of national minorities and immigrant groups in Prague). Drawing on existing research on the practices carried out by local-level bureaucrats in the intergroup relations issue area (see Jordan et al. 2003), the need to investigate local administrative cultures becomes obvious.

We must not forget that there are four main actors in the arena of local intergroup policymaking – elected political actors, public officials and civil society organisations we have already mentioned. Scientific experts must be considered the fourth actor. Policymaking processes in Western European municipalities often refer to scientific reports and boards of consultants. These external actors play a relatively important role in influencing local policy and giving a certain direction to it. Obviously, experts do not play such an influential role in the CEE metropolises which we are comparing. Only in Prague some initial steps were taken to involve external experts in migration-related political decisions.

In case of Estonia there is a visible division between Estonian and non-Estonian organizations. There is no evidence in favour of close cooperation of different ethnic groups co-existing in Tallinn but at the same time there are neither conflicts nor competition in fund raising. As mentioned previously, both communities, namely Estonians and Russian speakers, are living in two separate worlds, using different educational systems, media and obviously different languages. Not much attention was paid to cooperation between both communities and the process of creation of an interethnic dialogue. The city of Tallinn, where the minorities constitute almost half of the population, has initiated its own activities in the field of diversity and intergroup relations. Since the program is quite new, it is difficult to present any concrete evaluation. In the program called Kodurahu - Peace in the Community, the city authorities have been striving for the activities which based on the common interest and values could bring both communities together. It seems to be very complicated due to the mistrust and difficulties in communication but the young generation focused mostly on their future and living their life here and now may hopefully make it feasible. The activation of both groups for their mutual cooperation is the most challenging task for the local integration policy. The dialogue of both groups in the case of Tallinn is crucial for avoidance of potential tensions or conflicts in the future and for building the one, diverse and multiethnic Estonian society. While talking about different actors involved in the policy making process on the local level in Estonia, except for the divided cultural organizations and NGOs there are media available in two languages. The city administration of Tallinn has been trying to involve the Russian speaker community in the city life by publishing local newspaper ‘Capital’ in both languages, namely Estonian and Russian. As it was mentioned earlier, there has been a system of different funds available for minority organizations, however the dialogue and cooperation between Estonians and Russian speakers sadly remains far from being achieved. The role of experts is more visible and understandable on the national level than on local level, however it is sometimes difficult in case of such a small country to distinguish between different levels. Almost all influential organizations and both public and private institutions have their headquarters in Tallinn.
Wrocław is far behind all presented cities in terms of local migration policy. The limited number of migrants, consisting mainly of international students and highly qualified members of multinational companies have not forced the local authorities to develop any policy in this field. Intergroup relations are reduced only to a national minority and Muslim Cultural Centre and from the city administration’s point of view small and ad hoc given grants should be perceived as positive cooperation. As it was already pointed out, national minority organizations together with the Muslim Centre have been trying to establish cooperation to promote their culture and identity to the local society. City authorities have expressed their interest in cultural organization as an example of multicultural image of the city which, after transformation, was one of the main goals of city policies. EU accession and Wrocław’s participation in different competitions, such as EXPO, Euro 2012 or the Capital of Culture has strengthened this strategy, however there was no clearly formulated plan to include the national minorities or newly arrived migrants into the regular policy of the city. Similarly to the other three cases, local experts on migration have not been invited to present or take part in any proposal. For local authorities, having some foreigners or national minorities seems to be another example of being a European city. All the programs and initiatives connected with national, ethnic or religious minorities in Wrocław might be seen as a part of cultural or development policy of the city because the local migration/integration policy has not been discussed and formulated yet.

Conclusion

The introduction of the notion of a local migration policy arena has enabled us to focus on patterns of similarities and differences in the local-level responses and policymaking processes across the four cities considered. Our material shows that in CEE metropolises policy-making in the field of intergroup relations is actually far from being as systematic as it is in many Western European urban contexts. Internal structures of CEE states and systems of centre/periphery relations set the general framework of opportunities and constraints for municipalities’ actions in relation to immigration. But local policies cannot be identified just with the actions of local governmental actors, though they are still the most influential actors in the local context of the four cities investigated. NGOs, immigrant associations, experts and media usually play also an important role in local policymaking in Western European metropolises. In case of CEE countries neither NGOs (with the exception of the Czech Republic) nor immigrant associations appear to be crucially involved in the intergroup policy arenas, and scientific experts and media seem to be even of minor importance. This does not mean that NGOs and immigrant organizations are completely irrelevant. As a common trend a slowly increasing incorporation of NGOs in local policymaking can be identified across the four cities considered. In the case of NGOs this does not necessarily imply a greater inclusion of immigrants, who may well be at the margins of NGOs as mere clients and not as actors.

On the national as well as municipal levels in CEE countries there is still a low level of ‘politization’ of the migration topic with prevailing ‘bureaucratic’ attitudes. With growing numbers of immigrants, intergroup policymaking gained a non-negligible relevance in all four countries considered, despite significant differences in the state structures and different models of centre-periphery relations. The institutional structures in the four states are highly centralized with the key role of the Ministry of the Interior with some attempts to share responsibilities via establishing inter-ministerial bodies, but regional and community levels of administration are still playing a more or less marginal role.
The status quo of existing strategies of intercultural policies and their implementation in Budapest may be classified as ‘embryonic’. It may even be said that immigration policy in Hungary was largely developed as a mere response to external pressures of EU accession. The ideological position of the ruling national-conservative party ‘Fidesz’ let us entertain grave doubts that policies on intergroup relations may gain rising attention in the near future. The last national elections in April 2010 produced even a more pronounced swing to the right as the right-wing Jobbik Party gained 16.7% of the votes.

Contrary to Budapest, the Czech capital is somehow more advanced in the field of intergroup policies, although the environment in which such policies are implemented in the Czech Republic has been historically determined by the combination of an ethnically and culturally very homogeneous society with xenophobic tendencies on the one hand and a low level of citizens’ involvement in public affairs on the other hand. The City of Prague has already invested more and more money in projects in the context of intergroup affairs, though the major amount is still granted to the National Minorities. Even in the Czech case policies on intergroup relations are not systematically interlinked with other policy arenas. The political measures often lack a reflection on the methodological approach. In the municipal context the basic institutions for successful policies on intergroup relations have recently been created, but more time will be necessary to establish sustainable communication structures with the immigrant associations. The responsible players have not yet realized the fact that intergroup policies are of economic value, too, in more mature urban immigration societies. Given the rather small numbers of immigrant communities and the dominant economic view on immigration it may be said that the development of adequate institutionalized policies on intergroup relations will take some more time.

As for Estonia, intergroup relations and a dialogue with national minority have undergone different phases after transformation, where the initial stage focused mainly on citizenship, legal regulations in this field as well as identity and loyalty towards Estonia. The status and relations with the Russian speaker community were strongly criticized by EU institutions at the time preceding Estonia’s EU accession. All measures undertaken so far have led to activation of both Estonian and Russian speaker organizations, yet they have not smoothed out the boundary between the two communities. In Estonia the parallel society may still be observable. Therefore it seems to be so crucial to pursue the policy of intergroup relations involving all the above mentioned actors.

CEE countries are still lacking in a clear immigration and integration doctrine which is a precondition for a consistent policy on intergroup relations. For this purpose it would be necessary to stimulate a mutual co-operation process between all relevant stakeholders of which governmental bodies and municipalities are of particular importance. In fact, the migration policy is not interlinked enough with other relevant policy fields such as the integration policy, social policy and economic policy. This means that there is a strong need for a more complex and long-term migration policy as well as a multidimensional integration policy as both policies constitute conditions essential for a successful policy on intergroup relations. In the final analysis, it appears that there is still much to do in the study of the local dimension of intergroup policymaking and thus more attention should be devoted to the analysis of intergroup policies in migration studies.
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