Sudan: Big tasks ahead

Intereconomics


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of the "Andine" Customs Union depends on whether the individual countries concerned are willing to subordinate their national interests to the interests of the Community. Adherence by Venezuela would therefore be desirable, for its rich oil resources could solve the energy problem of the partner-countries. Colombia and Chile will at first have to make concessions to the three less developed countries, Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia in order to make it easier for them to adjust themselves to the new conditions. But equally important for the success of the Customs Union is whether the industrial countries have confidence in the political stability and economic progress of these countries and contribute much more than they have done hitherto towards their much too narrow capital base. Efforts by the "Andine" countries alone are not enough. The industrial countries must at long last comprehend that the mentality of the developing countries differs completely from their own. They must learn to adjust themselves to entirely new conditions. The present conflict between the USA and Peru is an example of what one finds all too frequently—clumsiness on the part of the industrial country and sensitiveness on the part of the developing country.

Sudan

Big Tasks Ahead

The civil government was overthrown in Khartoum on May 25. The inner-political reason for the forcible change of government was dissatisfaction with the constantly rising number of unsolved internal problems. According to UN-statistics, the number of South Sudanese alone killed so far by government troops in the civil war is said to be 600,000, and still the war is going on. In the economic field, the consequences of neglect of the past years are becoming ever more apparent. The ten-year plan which was worked out in 1961/62 envisaged a 63 p.c. increase in the GNP and a 23 p.c. increase in the income per head of population. What utopian figures, how infinitely far removed from reality!

The problems of the Sudan arise as in many other developing countries from its one-sided economic structure. The Sudan is today still an agricultural country. Its main product is cotton of which 95 p.c. must be sold abroad, representing as it does roughly 50 p.c. of the country's volume of exports. The Sudanese therefore depend to a large extent for the state of their export trade and their incomes on the annually fluctuating yields of the cotton crop. What is needed is the creation of industries which are geared to the resources of the country. What hinders the economic development of the Sudan is its inadequate communications system. Its only harbour, Port Sudan, is constantly over-loaded, jeopardising the supply of the hinterland with vital consumption goods and raw materials. The financial and balance-of-payments situation is extremely critical. What the Sudan therefore stands in need of is a realistic economic policy, supported by generous development aid from the industrial countries. Politically, the new ruling group, led by Djaafar Mohammed el Niman is clearly leftist, that is to say pro-socialist and anti-Israeli. The first actions of the new regime in the field of foreign policy—surely overestimated—are hardly of a nature to encourage Western donor-countries to adhere to their present commitments or to increase them even further. But it is doubtful in how far the Sudan will be able to do without this aid or replace it by deliveries from the East.

Malaysia

Talking of the Devil

For twelve years Malaya and subsequently the Federation of Malaysia enlarged by the incorporation of North Borneo enjoyed the reputation of being a model of orderly development while its leader, Prince Tunku Abdul Rahman, was regarded as a far-seeing statesman. Malays and Chinese appeared to have agreed to live in peace. The ruling "establishment" consisted of Malays, Chinese and upper-class Indians who had studied in Cambridge and Oxford and understood each other—in English—perfectly, until a new generation had grown up.

Led by the pan-Malayan Islamic party, the Malay villagers constantly threatened as they are by unemployment, rose against their local Sultans and Chinese capitalists. The young Chinese, too, had in the meantime developed an entirely new patriotic consciousness of their independent state. They are now clamouring for political responsibility.

Purely numerically, these Chinese also play a big role. Together with the 10 p.c. Indian minority, their 38 p.c. share in the total population nearly equals the 52 p.c. made up by Malays. If a feeling of violent animosity should develop against them, if persecution should uproot them from the Malaysian soil and make them again homeless, the damage to the state could be incalculable because in Asiatic communism ideology plays a lesser role than social alienation. Here Peking would stand a much better chance—than it did in Indonesia with its weak Chinese minority—to gain a strong foothold. True, the Chinese opposition parties are as yet progressively but by no means communistically inclined. The government, before putting the blame for the unfortunate disorders in the well-tried manner on "communist saboteurs" should bear one thing in mind: Talk of the devil and you may soon make that gentleman's unwelcome acquaintance.