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Conditioning on what? Heterogeneous contributions and conditional cooperation

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Heterogeneous
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Conditioning on What?

Heterogeneous Contributions and Conditional Cooperation

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November 2014

Abstract

We experimentally investigate how different information about others' individual contributions affects conditional cooperators' willingness to cooperate in a one-shot linear public goods game. We find that when information about individual contributions is provided, contributions are generally higher than when only average information is available. This effect is particularly strong when others' individual contributions are relatively homogeneous. When both types of information are provided, this effect is moderated. In the case of individual feedback we find the willingness to contribute to be higher the lower the variation in others' contributions, but with pronounced heterogeneity in individuals' reactions. While the majority of conditional cooperators' are mainly guided by others' average contributions, more people follow the bad example of a low contributor than the good example of a high contributor. Overall, we provide evidence that information (and lack thereof) about others' individual contributions affects conditional cooperators' willingness to cooperate in systematic ways.

Keywords: Conditional cooperation; Information; Heterogeneity; Public goods; Experiments

JEL-Classification: H41; C91; C72

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1. Introduction

What makes people cooperate? Understanding the determinants of behavior in social dilemmas is important for numerous economic interactions, ranging from team work in organizations to multilateral treaties among nations. In this type of situation, contributions to public goods (or consumption of common pool resources) typically differ across individuals. Yet, there is surprisingly little conclusive evidence on how information (and lack thereof) about heterogeneity in others' individual contributions affects people's *willingness to cooperate* within groups. Most previous empirical studies either exclusively studied reactions to average behavior, or looked at repeated interactions which are likely to be biased by strategic considerations. In addition, from a theoretical perspective there seems to be no unanimous guidance as models of other-regarding preferences make different behavioral predictions about how people react to heterogeneity in others' individual contributions.

In this study, we provide clean experimental evidence on how different information – *aggregated, disaggregated, or both* – about others' heterogeneous contributions affects conditional cooperators' willingness to cooperate in a linear public goods game. We contribute to the previous literature in two respects: First, to rule out potential confounds due to strategic concerns from repeated interaction, we conduct a *one-shot experiment*. To control for different beliefs about others' behavior, following Fischbacher et al. (2001, henceforth FGF), we apply a variant of the *strategy method* (Selten, 1967) which allows us to elicit people's general attitude toward cooperation and classify them into different cooperation 'types' (see also Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010, for more recent evidence). Second, in contrast to FGF and replications of their experiment (see Chaudhuri, 2011, for a review), we not only study reactions towards average behavior but also examine how

people react when confronted with heterogeneity in others' individual contribution behavior. In particular, we ask which, if any, contribution of the other group members is most influential in determining own willingness to cooperate? We classify subjects into three different contribution types: 'conditional cooperators', 'free riders', and 'others'. We then focus on the largest fraction of subjects, i.e., 'conditional cooperators', and ask whether they are more inclined to follow a bad example of an uncooperative group member, whether they match a good example of a high contributor, or whether they just go along with the average?

These are important questions as examples of heterogeneous contributions to a common good are ubiquitous in social and economic life. Think of the Kyoto Protocol designed to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases. While most industrialized countries have signed the protocol, other countries continue to abstain from signing the treaty, thus free riding on the efforts of others. Likewise, think of municipalities publicizing households' heterogeneous electricity consumption and recycling rates. Or, imagine a team context in which, for example, an academic working on a joint paper faces one free riding and another highly dedicated co-author.

Insight from these questions suggests what kind of information can facilitate cooperation when institutions have some discretion about information policy, for example in the case of fund-raising or charitable giving. It may also give guidance about which contribution a policy maker should try to increase in order to best enhance further cooperation. This might be relevant in the case of teamwork or international treaties where a leader can try to motivate single group members to increase their contribution.

Our experimental design comprises three between-subjects treatments in which we systematically vary others' individual contributions and the information subjects receive. In our baseline treatment (*AVG*), we replicate FGF and provide subjects only with information about others' average contribution behavior. In this treatment, if subjects wanted to match a certain contribution or were concerned about the composition of the average, they would have to form beliefs about the distribution of individual contributions. In our second treatment (*IND-AVG*), we remove this lack of knowledge by additionally providing information about others' individual contributions. In this case, subjects can condition their behavior on both individual and average others' contributions. Finally, in our third treatment (*IND*) we remove the aggregated feedback and only provide information about others' individual contributions.

Although information about average behavior is still available implicitly in *IND*, this treatment allows us to explore whether explicitly providing average information on top of individual information has a focal effect moderating reactions to variation in others' individual contributions.

To investigate the effects of variation in others' individual contributions on willingness to cooperate, in *IND* and *IND-AVG*, we systematically vary the composition of a given average contribution. For example, in one case an average of 5 is given by individual contributions of 5/5/5, while in another case individual contributions are 0/5/10. By comparing two such cases, we can examine whether people react to variation or whether they are mainly concerned about average behavior only.

Our main finding shows that compared to the *AVG* treatment, conditional cooperators exhibit a significantly higher willingness to cooperate when only information

about others' individual contributions is provided (*IND*). This effect is particularly strong when others' individual contributions are relatively homogeneous, and less pronounced when they differ a lot. Explicitly announcing the average on top of others' individual contributions (*IND-AVG*) has a moderating effect leading to lower contributions than in *IND* but still higher contributions than in *AVG*.

When information about individual contributions is provided (*IND* and *IND-AVG*), we find, *ceteris paribus*, that the willingness to contribute is on average the lower the higher the variation in the other group members' contributions. This suggests that subjects do in fact care about the composition of the average contribution, an observation that could not be captured by the original design of FGF. At the individual level, however, we find pronounced heterogeneity in how 'conditional cooperators' react to variation in others' contributions. While the majority of 'conditional cooperators' are mainly guided by others' average contribution, we also find a considerable fraction of 'conditional cooperators' who react strongly to the minimum and maximum contribution of others. In line with the results from the aggregate analysis, we find the distribution of types to be skewed towards those who focus on the minimum.

When comparing the *IND* and *IND-AVG* treatment we find evidence that explicitly announcing the average contribution in addition to individual contributions induces subjects to condition their contributions more strongly on the average or median contribution and less strongly on the maximum. The reaction towards the minimum, in contrast, stays similar. This indicates that providing average information on top of individual information induces a self-serving bias, i.e., the moderating effect only operates downwards but not upwards.

Related to our study, some previous papers have analyzed the effects of different information regimes on cooperation in public goods games. In contrast to us, all of these studies focus on the dynamic effects of information in repeated interactions and, overall, report rather mixed results. While Sell and Wilson (1991) find higher cooperation rates under individual compared to aggregate contribution feedback, Carpenter (2004) reports an effect in the opposite direction. Croson (2001) and Bigoni and Suetens (2012) find no significant differences across these two feedback conditions.¹ We differ from these studies by applying a one-shot game which rules out possible confounds due to strategic considerations. Because we use the strategy method rather than a direct-response experiment, we can further draw inference about people's general willingness to cooperate without any distortion due to beliefs. In addition, this allows us to observe responses in nodes of the game that are rarely reached by actual play.

There are two further related studies looking at the effect of heterogeneity in others' individual contributions on cooperation. Using data from a repeated public goods game, Croson (2007) finds that the median contribution of others in the previous period is a better predictor of subjects' contributions in the next round than either the minimum or the maximum of others. However, because in her game subjects interact repeatedly - again - her results might partially be driven by strategic considerations. Cheung (2013), who developed his design independently of ours, also employs the strategy method to study how individuals' willingness to contribute responds to variation in others'

¹ The way information is presented is long known to influence people's behavior. For example, the likelihood that subjects in oligopolistic market games play competitive strategies depends on the type of information that is provided to them (e.g. Huck et al. 1999, 2000; Offerman et al. 2002). Other examples are Vesterlund (2003) and Irlenbusch and Rilke (2012), who look at the effects of information on public goods provision.

contributions. Unlike us, he concentrates on a situation in which information about individual contributions is provided (our *IND* treatment), and applies a reduced public goods game with only three players and four possible contribution levels. Because we apply an often employed parameterization of the public goods game (groups of four, $MPCR=0.4$, contribution levels between 0 and 20), our results are more likely to be comparable to the results from previous public goods experiments. Furthermore, because compared to Cheung we also have a richer dataset (more observations per individual), we can extend his findings by looking more closely at individual heterogeneity in reactions towards variation in others' contributions.

Our paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes the experimental design and procedures. In section 3, we discuss behavioral predictions based on different models of other-regarding preferences. The experimental results are presented and discussed in section 4. Section 5 concludes.

2. Experimental Design and Procedures

2.1 The Basic Setup

In our experiment we apply a standard one-shot linear public goods game. Subjects are randomly matched into groups of four and each subject is endowed with 20 tokens which she can either (partly or fully) keep or contribute to a joint project. The payoff function for each individual i is given by:

$$\pi_i = 20 - c_i + 0.4 \sum_{j=1}^4 c_j,$$

where the amount of public good provision is equal to the sum of contributions of all group members. If subjects are only interested in maximizing their own monetary payoff, the dominant strategy for each subject i is to free-ride completely, i.e., $c_i = 0$ for all i . However, as marginal social benefits exceed marginal private costs, social welfare is maximized when all group members contribute their whole endowment. Hence, we have a typical social dilemma situation in which individual and group interests are at odds.

Within this basic setting, we elicit people's general attitude towards cooperation by allowing subjects to state their contributions conditional on the contribution decisions of others. Following the design of FGF, each subject is asked to make two types of decisions: an *unconditional contribution* and a *conditional contribution*. The unconditional contribution is a single decision in which subjects choose how many of their 20 tokens they want to contribute to the public good. For the conditional contribution, we apply a variant of the "strategy method" (Selten, 1967). In a series of decisions, subjects have to indicate how much they want to contribute given specific public goods contributions by the other group members. Like in FGF, to ensure incentive compatibility at the end of the experiment a random mechanism determines which of the two decisions – the *conditional* or the *unconditional contribution* – becomes payoff-relevant, i.e., in each group, for three randomly selected subjects the *unconditional contribution* is used. For the fourth subject, the *conditional contribution* corresponding to the other three group members' unconditional contributions applies.

2.2 Treatments

Our experimental design comprises three between-subjects treatments in which we systematically vary others' individual contributions and the information subjects receive about it (see Table 1 for an overview).

< Insert Table 1 around here >

In the first treatment (*AVG*), only information about others' average behavior is provided, i.e., participants are shown a table in which they are asked to state their conditional contributions for each of the 21 possible values of (rounded) average contributions by the other three group members (compare the original paper by FGF). Hence, in this treatment, if subjects want to match a certain contribution of any of the other group members or are concerned about the composition of the average, they have to form beliefs about the distribution of individual contributions.

In our second treatment (*IND-AVG*), we remove this lack of knowledge by additionally providing information about others' individual contributions. This means that in this treatment, when stating their conditional contributions subjects are shown the complete vector of others' individual contributions as well as the corresponding average contribution. This allows us to investigate how subjects condition their contributions depending on the specific composition of individual contributions in the group. To operationalize this, we apply the so-called *Conditional Information Lottery* design that has been previously used and validated by Bardsley (2000) and Bardsley and Sausgruber (2005). In total, subjects are confronted with 36 tasks displayed in a contribution table. There are 35 fictitious tasks chosen by the experimenters and 1 real task determined by

the actual unconditional contributions of the subject's group members.² Subjects are told that all but one task are fictitious and that only the real task will affect earnings. Importantly, participants do not know ex-ante which task is the real one and thus have an incentive to treat each task as being payoff relevant.

The fictitious tasks are chosen such that (i) they reflect realistic contribution patterns so that subjects cannot easily figure out which task contains the real unconditional contributions of their group members, and (ii) they exhibit sufficient variation to investigate the effects of heterogeneous contribution behavior on the willingness to cooperate. To ensure (i) we fit the distribution of contributions used in these tasks to a typical one-shot public good experiment with the same parameters that was run as a pilot.³ To achieve (ii) we selected cases with a great range of variation in others' contributions from very equal to very unequal (the standard deviation ranges from 0 to 11.5). Furthermore, we implement several cases which have the same average but differ in the composition of individual contributions. For example, while in one case an average of 5 is given by individual contributions of 5/5/5, in another case the same average results from individual contributions of 0/5/10. For an overview of all 35 fictitious tasks and a brief discussion of our selection process, see Table A1 and section A1 in the Appendix.

² When the real task is identical to one of the 35 fictitious tasks, we add another fictitious task so that no task shows up twice. The restriction to a manageable set of selected cases is necessary as the number of all possible combinations of other players' contributions amounts to 1771, which makes it hardly feasible to let subjects decide for each possible contribution level. Note that this approach is different to the one of Cheung (2013) who instead restricts the number of players to three and the possible contribution levels to 0, 2, 4, and 6 which, in turn, allows him to include all possible combinations of others' contributions.

³ After the experiment we asked subjects for their incentivized beliefs about which case is the actual combination of contributions. Our results reveal that each case was selected at least once and only 9 out of 256 (3.5%) participants guessed the actual combination correctly, which is not significantly different from random luck ($1/36 = 2.78\%$; binominal test: $p = 0.443$).

Finally, our third treatment (*IND*) is identical to *IND-AVG* treatment except for the fact that we remove the aggregated feedback and only provide information about others' individual contributions. The comparison between the two treatments allows us to examine whether providing average information on top of individual information moderates the effect of variation in others' individual contributions. Although subjects in *IND* could, in principle, easily calculate the average contribution of others as well, it is not clear whether they indeed do engage in such reasoning. Social psychologists, for example, have argued that people sometimes act as *cognitive misers* who rely on cognitive shortcuts and who do not use all information available (Fiske and Taylor, 1991). Furthermore, from a methodological point of view this treatment allows us to vary only one dimension at a time going from *AVG* to *IND-AVG* to *IND*.

2.3 Procedures

The experiment was conducted at the Cologne Laboratory for Economic Research (CLER). We used the experimental software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and recruited student participants from the University of Cologne with the online recruiting software ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). In total, we ran twelve experimental sessions with 32 participants each. Thus, we had 384 subjects, 128 per treatment. At the beginning of each session, participants were randomly assigned to cubicles in the lab. After taking seats, subjects had to read the instructions explaining the public goods problem, the incentives, and the rules of the game. After that, participants had to answer several control questions to make sure that they understood the game. Only after all participants had answered all questions correctly, the experiment started. At the end of each session, subjects were asked to fill in a short questionnaire on their motivation and demographic data.

Afterwards, they were informed about the decisions of their group members and about their payoffs. Finally, participants were privately paid their individual earnings in cash. On average, participants earned €14.50 and all sessions lasted for approximately one hour.

3. Behavioral Predictions

In the following, we discuss the predictions of different theories of other-regarding preferences on how heterogeneous contribution behavior of others could influence people's willingness to cooperate. All three models we discuss are consistent with free riding, but make different predictions for 'conditional cooperators'. For more formal considerations supporting our lines of reasoning we refer the reader to the Appendix.⁴

According to the model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999; henceforth FS-model), individuals suffer both from advantageous and disadvantageous inequality, with the latter looming at least as large as the former. Individuals with such preferences are willing to contribute to the public good if others do so as well provided that the benefit of reducing the costs of (advantageous) inequity outweighs the monetary costs of contributing. Given the payoff structure of our experiment and the assumptions of the FS-model, this condition can only be fulfilled if the own contribution is equal or lower than the lowest contributions of others, i.e., no player wants to be worse off than the richest of the other group members.⁵

⁴ The intention of our experiment is to analyze reactions to the composition of others' contributions. We do not aim at contesting the different models (see e.g., Engelmann and Strobel, 2004).

⁵ See also Sugden's principle of reciprocity (1984) which is related.

In contrast, the model of Bolton and Ockenfels (2000; henceforth BO-model) assumes that individuals suffer from inequity when their own payoff differs from the *average* payoff. Because the average does not vary with the specific composition of others' contributions, in our context the BO-model predicts no effect of disclosing heterogeneous individual contribution behavior of others.

Finally, the model by Charness and Rabin (2002; henceforth CR-model) assumes that people are concerned about efficiency and that they care about the group member with the lowest payoff (maximin). Because in the public goods game, the lowest payoff belongs to the group member contributing the most, this model can explain why individuals might be willing to contribute up to the maximum contribution of others when being provided with this information.⁶

Taken together, when holding constant the average contribution of others, an increased spread of others' individual contributions may have a negative (FS-model), a positive (CR-model), or no effect (BO-model) on people's willingness to contribute.

4. Results

We divide our analysis in two parts. First, we compare contribution behavior across the three treatments to analyze how different information about others' contributions influences people's willingness to cooperate. Second, we investigate behavior in the *IND*

⁶ If the concerns for efficiency are sufficiently strong, the CR-model can even explain full contributions to the public good irrespective of others' behavior. However, previous evidence suggests that there are only very few people who contribute unconditionally to increase overall welfare.

and *IND-AVG* treatment more closely to identify behavioral patterns depending on the composition of others' individual contributions.⁷

As a first step, we follow a similar approach as FGF and group subjects depending on their conditional contributions into three different contribution types: 'conditional cooperators' who contribute more to the public good the more others contribute, 'free riders' who never contribute a positive amount irrespective of what others do, and 'others' who display more complicated patterns.⁸

The results from this categorization, summarized in Table 2, reveal no significant differences in the distribution of types across treatments ($\chi^2(4) = 5.89$, $p = 0.208$). In particular, we find a similar fraction of 'conditional cooperators' ($\chi^2(2) = 1.64$, $p = 0.439$)⁹, a similar fraction of 'free riders' ($\chi^2(2) = 1.79$, $p = 0.555$), and a weakly significantly different fraction of 'others' ($\chi^2(2) = 9.05$, $p = 0.069$). Since we are interested in systematic reactions to variation in others' individual contributions, in the main part of our analysis, we concentrate on the behavior of 'conditional cooperators' only ($n = 229$). Also note that 'conditional cooperators' constitute the largest fraction in each of the three treatments (compare Table 2). In Section 4.3, we briefly discuss the behavior of subjects not classified as a 'conditional cooperator' ($n = 155$).

< Insert Table 2 around here >

⁷ In the following it is important to keep in mind that the presented results are based on our selection of the 35 cases. While we have no indications that this selection affects our findings in any systematic way, it should be mentioned that it might not be immediately clear whether our results generalize to the complete set of possible cases.

⁸ See the Appendix for an exact description of our classification strategy.

⁹ All reported statistical tests in this paper are two-sided if not stated otherwise.

4.1 Effects of Individual vs. Average Information on Conditional Cooperators

We start our analysis by pair-wise comparing contribution behavior of ‘conditional cooperators’ in *IND-AVG* and *IND* with the corresponding cases in *AVG* that have the same (rounded) average of the other group members’ contributions. Among all 35 comparisons, 18 reach statistical significance using a non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis-test ($p < 0.1$). When having a closer look at these cases, it turns out that treatment differences are particularly strong when others’ individual contributions are relatively uniform and less pronounced when they differ a lot. This can be illustrated by comparing the standard deviation of others’ individual contributions¹⁰ between the cases yielding significant and insignificant treatment comparisons, respectively. While the former have an average standard deviation of 3.5, for the latter it is 5.4.

When looking at the pairwise treatment comparisons (compare Table A1 in the Appendix), it becomes clear that these results are mainly driven by differences between *IND* and *AVG*, i.e., when either only individual or only average information is provided. Strikingly, in all 35 cases contributions in *IND* are higher than in *AVG*, with 22 of them reaching statistical significance using a Mann-Whitney U-test ($p < 0.1$).¹¹ In contrast, when both types of information are given, this effect of variance is moderated, leading to intermediate contributions. While contributions in *IND-AVG* are still higher than in *AVG* in 28 out of 35 cases, these differences are only significant in 2 cases. We summarize these findings in our first observation:

¹⁰ Throughout the paper we will use the standard deviation in others’ individual contributions as a simple measure for contribution heterogeneity. Very similar results are obtained, however, using alternative measures such as the range or the variance.

¹¹ In the conclusion, we discuss potential explanations for why contributions of conditional cooperators in *IND* are always higher than in *AVG*.

Observation 1: *If others' individual contributions are relatively uniform, this has a positive effect on cooperation on 'conditional cooperators' compared to presenting only the average contribution. If individual contributions vary a lot, contributions are similar under both information regimes. When both types of information are provided, this effect is moderated.*

This result is further supported by a regression analysis. Table 3 shows results from a random effects regression with own conditional contributions as the dependent variable and average contribution of the other group members as the independent variable. To isolate the effects of the three information regimes, we use the *IND-AVG* treatment as the reference group and include dummy variables for *IND* (removing average information) and *AVG* (removing individual information), respectively, and interact them with the average others' contributions.

< Insert Table 3 around here >

The results reveal that 'conditional cooperators' contribute on average 0.86 tokens for each token of the others' average contribution when both types of information are available. If only average information is available, this decreases to 0.78 tokens (-10%), which is significantly less ($p < 0.001$). In contrast, if only individual information is available, contributions per-token of others' average contribution amount to 0.84 tokens which is not significantly different from *IND-AVG* ($p = 0.175$), but significantly higher than in *AVG* (Wald-test, $p = 0.011$). Furthermore, we also observe a weakly significant

level effect between *IND* and *IND-AVG* ($p = 0.054$), but not between *IND* and *AVG* (Wald-test, $p = 0.154$) or *IND-AVG* and *AVG* ($p = 0.620$).¹²

Taken together, these results indicate that compared to the situation in which both types of information are given, removing average information leads to generally (weakly) higher contributions, whereas removing individual information has a negative effect on conditional contributions. To further investigate what drives these results, in the following we study in more detail to what extent individual information about others' individual contributions affects subjects' willingness to cooperate.

4.2 Effects of Heterogeneous Individual Contributions on Conditional Cooperators

As a first piece of evidence of how conditional cooperators in *IND* and *IND-AVG* react to information about heterogeneity in others' contributions, Figure 1 depicts variation in conditional contribution responses across subjects as a function of variation in others' contributions according to the contribution vectors (both measured in units of standard deviation). Each dot represents one of the 35 fictitious cases and the solid line is a fitted line from a linear regression. As can be seen, in both *IND* and *IND-AVG* there is a strong and significant positive relationship between contribution heterogeneity and variation in contribution responses. This suggests two important findings. First, not only others'

¹² As pointed out rightly by one referee, subjects in *AVG* faced more "extreme" cases than subjects in *IND* and *IND-AVG* with regard to others' averages contributions. In particular, averages of 1, 2, 3, 14, 16, 18, and 19 appear in *AVG* but not in *IND* and *IND-AVG*. To check whether this could have biased our treatment comparison, we re-run the regression presented in Table 3 excluding those "extreme" cases in *AVG*. The results from this regression show the same significances and coefficients change only very marginally. One could still argue, however, that because in *IND* and *IND-AVG* subjects faced several cases with the same average (ranging from 5 to 15), this potentially could have suggested that contributions in this range are more likely and, hence, more socially appropriate. While we cannot rule out this possibility for certain, we believe that this did not systematically affect our results. First, in *IND* and *IND-AVG* we also observe beliefs for cases outside that range such as 10/20/20, or 0/5/7. Second, also as indicated by the distribution of beliefs in *AVG*, intermediate contributions are perceived to be more likely and, hence, probably as more socially appropriate. In particular, 72% (44%) of the beliefs in *AVG* fall in the range of 5-15 (7-10).

average contribution but also the distribution of individual contribution is important for conditional contributions. Second, the more spread out others' contribution behavior, the higher the variation in contribution responses, i.e., heterogeneity breeds heterogeneity. We summarize these findings in our second result:

Observation 2: *The composition of individual contributions significantly affects contribution responses of 'conditional cooperators'. In particular, the higher the heterogeneity in others' contributions the larger the variation in conditional contribution responses.*

< Insert Figure 1 around here >

To test whether the composition of the average contribution not only matters for the variation but also for the absolute level of conditional cooperators' contribution responses, in Table 4 we apply random effects regressions with individual contributions as the dependent variable. As a benchmark, in model (1) we use the average contribution of others, a dummy for *IND-AVG*, and their interaction as independent variables. To verify the importance of variance in the other group members' contributions, in model (2) we include the standard deviation of the individual contributions as a measure of heterogeneity. The results underline that 'conditional cooperators' do not only care about the average of others' contributions, but also about its composition. Ceteris paribus, we find that the more spread out others' individual contributions, the lower, on average, the willingness to contribute.¹³ This constitutes our third observation:

¹³ This effect is robust even if we exclude the cases where the standard deviation of others' contributions is zero (i.e. where all three contributions are equal). The coefficient of STD. DEV. becomes -0.048 with a *p*-value of 0.028.

Observation 3: *In addition to the expected strong and positive effect of the average contributions of others, we find that the higher the variation in others' individual contributions, the lower, on average, the willingness of 'conditional cooperators' to contribute.*

Model (2) in Table 4 further shows that the standard deviation of others' contributions affects 'conditional cooperators' similarly in the two treatments *IND-AVG* and *IND*, but overall they contribute approximately one token less in *IND-AVG* compared to *IND*. To gain a better understanding of why this is the case, in model (3) in Table 4 we decompose the effect of the average into its three components *minimum*, *median*, and *maximum* and assess the relative importance of each of these factors. If all three components were equally important for contribution behavior and the composition of individual contributions was irrelevant, each coefficient would have equal size.

< **Insert Table 4 around here** >

For the *IND* treatment our estimation results reveal that the minimum is significantly more important than the median (Wald-test, $p < 0.001$) and the maximum ($p = 0.005$), and that the maximum is slightly more important than the median ($p = 0.065$). In the *IND-AVG* treatment, the weight of the minimum remains similar relative to *IND*, but the weight of the median and maximum significantly increases and decreases, respectively. As a result, the minimum and median are relatively more important than the maximum (Wald-test, $p < 0.001$ and $p = 0.020$, respectively), but the difference between minimum and median is now insignificant ($p = 0.293$). Thus, increasing the minimum, median, and maximum by one token explains 39%, 28%, and 33%, respectively, of the total effect in *IND*, and 37%, 34%, and 28%, respectively, of the total effect in *IND-AVG*. Also note

that the treatment dummy for *IND-AVG* is now insignificant which indicates that apart from the different influences of the median and the maximum, contribution behavior is similar in *IND* and *IND-AVG*.

These results are interesting as they suggest a form of self-serving bias when average information is provided on top of individual information. While it does not mitigate the effect of the minimum, it does effectively weaken the effect of the maximum on the willingness to contribute. Put differently, providing average information indeed seems to have a moderating effect, but only into the direction of self-interest.

Overall, the results from both treatments suggest that ‘conditional cooperators’ are more inclined to follow the bad example of a low contributor rather than the good example of a high contributor, i.e., increasing the minimum contribution has a stronger effect on enhancing cooperation than increasing the maximum. While so far we have only looked at aggregate effects, heterogeneous contribution behavior may provoke heterogeneous response behavior as suggested by Figure 1. In the following we therefore investigate to what extent ‘conditional cooperators’ differ with respect to how they react to heterogeneity in others’ individual contributions by estimating the following model

$$contribution_i = \beta_{0i} + \beta_{1i} \cdot average + \beta_{2i} \cdot std.deviation + \epsilon_i$$

separately for each individual i (compare model (2) in Table 4). This allows us to sub-classify ‘conditional cooperators’ depending on whether they react positively, negatively, or neutrally to variations in others’ contributions as indicated by a significantly positive, significantly negative, or insignificant β_{2i} coefficient (at the 5% level). We refer to these three types as *high*, *low*, and *average* types, indicating that they tend to align their

contributions primarily with the highest, the lowest, or the average contribution of the other group members, respectively.¹⁴

According to this criterion, we find 25% *low* types, 61% *average* types, and 14% *high* types in *IND*, and 27% *low* types, 66% *average* types, and 7% *high* types in *IND-AVG* (see also Table 5). Hence, while the majority of ‘conditional cooperators’ does not significantly adjust their contributions to the composition of others’ individual contributions, more than one third of the subjects do indeed systematically react to heterogeneity in others’ individual contributions. In line with the overall negative effect at the aggregate level, at the individual level we find that more subjects react negatively rather than positively to the variance in others’ contributions.

< Insert Figure 2 around here >

This imbalance is illustrated in Figure 2 showing the distribution of individual reactions towards the variance in others’ contributions (as measured by β_{2i}). While in both treatments the majority of observations is around zero, both distributions are clearly left-skewed indicating that more ‘conditional cooperators’ react negatively rather than positively to variation. We summarize our findings in our fourth observation:

Observation 4: *There is pronounced heterogeneity in how ‘conditional cooperators’ react to the variation in others’ contributions. While the majority is mainly guided by others’ average contribution, a considerable fraction also takes into account the composition of others’ individual contributions. Within the latter group, we find that*

¹⁴ Note that the three types loosely correspond to the three other-regarding preference models discussed in section 3, i.e., a high type tends to be more in line with CR-model, the low type tends to be more in line with the FS-model, and the average type tends to be more in line with the BO-model.

more people follow the bad example of low contributors rather than the good example of high contributors.

While observation 4 is true in *IND* and *IND-AVG*, there are also some differences between both treatments. In particular, in Figure 2 in *IND-AVG* we observe a much flatter right-tail and a higher spike at zero compared to the *IND* treatment. In line with the previous results from our aggregate analysis, this suggests that providing additional average information moderates the effect of variation in others' individual contributions into the direction of self-interest.

In the following, we investigate to what extent the general willingness to cooperate and reactions towards variation in others' individual contributions correspond with each other. Table 5 shows the average type-specific reactions towards the average and standard deviation of others' contributions as estimated by the model. Two interesting observations can be made from that. First, Columns 2 and 5 reveal that on average all types react very similarly to the average contribution of others. In fact, a non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test cannot reject the null hypothesis that coefficients come from the same distribution (*IND* $p = 0.402$; *IND-AVG* $p = 0.575$). Further evidence in this direction comes from Spearman-rank correlations showing no significant correlations between β_{1i} and β_{2i} for both treatments *IND* and *IND-AVG* (Spearman-rank correlation; *IND*, $\rho = 0.174$, $p = 0.147$; *IND-AVG*, $\rho = 0.053$, $p = 0.650$). We summarize these findings in our fifth result:

Observation 5: *The general willingness of 'conditional cooperators' to contribute, and the way how they react towards heterogeneity in others' individual contributions appear to be independent factors that both affect contribution behavior.*

Second, while the magnitude of reactions towards the variance appears on average to be relatively low, conditional on being a *low* or *high* type, these reactions can be quite substantial (compare Columns 3 and 6). Holding others' average contribution constant, increasing the standard deviation of others' contributions by one unit changes contributions in *IND* and *IND-AVG* on average by 0.44 and 0.36 tokens, respectively, which is roughly half of the effect of increasing the average by one unit. For average types, this effect has a mean of zero.¹⁵

< Insert Table 5 around here >

Taken together, while the majority of 'conditional cooperators' are mainly guided by the average contribution, others react strongly to variation in individual contributions, especially with a propensity towards self-interest. It therefore appears that the observed behavior cannot be explained solely by one of the three models discussed in section 3. While *average types* are consistent with the ERC-model of Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), *low* and *high* types are apparently motivated by preferences that combine elements of the ERC-model with Fehr-Schmidt (1999) inequality aversion and Charness and Rabin (2002) welfare concerns, respectively, to varying degrees.

¹⁵ As a robustness check for our classification into *low*, *average*, and *high* types, for each conditional cooperator *i* we also estimate a model explaining own contribution by the minimum, median, and maximum contributions of others. As expected, *low types* react most to the minimum contribution, *high types* react most to the maximum contribution, and *average types* react fairly equally to all three contributions.

4.3 Behavior of Non-Conditional Cooperators

In this section we briefly discuss the behavior of subjects not being classified as ‘conditional cooperators’ to check how our treatment manipulation and how information about heterogeneity in others’ individual contributions affect their behavior.

As mentioned at the beginning of Section 4, we find no significant difference in the fraction of ‘free riders’ (*IND*: 20%; *IND-AVG*: 18%; *AVG*: 23%, $\chi^2(2) = 1.79$, $p = 0.555$). Naturally, their behavior does not depend on the composition of others’ contributions and also does not differ across treatments.

For subjects classified as ‘others’ we find a somewhat higher fraction in *IND* and *IND-AVG* compared to *AVG* (23%, 24%, and 11%, respectively, $\chi^2(2) = 9.05$, $p = 0.069$). It is naturally difficult to say whether these subjects are confused, disinterested, or motivated by uncommon preferences (or some combination thereof). In general, compared to ‘conditional cooperators’ ‘others’ condition their behavior much less on other people’s behavior but rather contribute unconditionally. When comparing contribution behavior of ‘others’ across treatments we find that there are no significant differences between *IND* and *IND-AVG*, but there appear to be differences compared to *AVG*. Relative to the former two treatments, in the latter ‘others’ condition their behavior significantly less on others’ average behavior but contribute significantly more unconditionally (see Table A2, model 1). In the treatments where information about individual contributions is available (*IND* and *IND-AVG*), regression results reveal that ‘others’ hardly react at all to variance in others’ contributions (see Table A3, model 2). Similarly, compared to ‘conditional cooperators’ their reactions to changes in individual

contributions are much more subdued and to a similar extent driven by reactions towards the minimum and the maximum (see Table A3, model 3).

When comparing treatments using the whole sample, we find a handful of weakly significant treatment differences in pairwise comparisons (Table A5). This suggests that the treatment differences found earlier are in fact primarily caused by ‘conditional cooperators’. As expected, whole sample regression analyses (Table A2, model 2; Table A3, models 4-6) show similar significances as for conditional cooperators, but with lower coefficients and higher p -values.

5. Discussion and Concluding Remarks

We experimentally investigate how different information about others’ individual contributions affects conditional cooperators’ willingness to cooperate in a one-shot linear public goods game. We find that compared to when only average information is available, providing information about others’ individual contributions has a positive effect on subjects’ willingness to cooperate. This effect is particularly strong when others’ individual contributions are relatively homogeneous and less pronounced when they differ a lot. Explicitly announcing the average on top of individual contributions has a moderating effect leading to intermediate contributions.

When information about individual contributions is provided we find that the more spread out others’ contributions (i) the higher the variance in contribution responses, and (ii) the lower, on average, the willingness to contribute. At the individual level we find pronounced heterogeneity in how ‘conditional cooperators’ react towards variation in others’ contribution. While the majority is mainly guided by the average contribution, a

significant fraction of ‘conditional cooperators’ systematically adjusts their own contribution to the composition of others’ individual contributions. In line with the results from the aggregate analysis, we find more subjects who adjust their contributions downwards rather than upwards when others’ contributions differ a lot.

With respect to existing literature, we confirm Cheung’s (2013) finding that own contributions are highest when others contribute equally. Our results are also consistent with experiments on group composition by Gächter and Thöni (2005) or de Oliveira et al. (2014) showing that homogeneous groups of non-selfish players have higher initial and overall contributions in repeated public good games. However, our results that subjects are primarily influenced by the minimum differs from findings by Croson (2007) which might be due to the fact that we consider one-shot games and not repeated interactions as she does. In repeated interactions strategic considerations for gains from future cooperation might play a larger role.

Our result provides a potential explanation for why many ‘conditional contributors’ fall short of matching others’ average contributions perfectly when only aggregate information is available. Although we cannot directly test this hypothesis with our data, the behavior we observe in our experiment is at least consistent with the assumption that the lack of information about individual contributions provides subjects with moral “wiggle room” to self-servingly form pessimistic beliefs about others’ minimum contribution which they then try to match. This suggest that even in groups consisting only of ‘conditional cooperators’ it may be difficult to keep contributions on a high level as the presence (in case individual information is available) or the belief (when only average information is available) of a “rotten apple” could give ‘conditional cooperators’

a sufficient reason to justify low own contributions (see Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010, for a similar argument).

Our results might also add to the understanding of previous findings showing that peer-punishment typically stabilizes or even increases contributions. While in public goods games without punishment subjects typically only receive information about average contributions, introducing peer-punishment requires revealing individual contributions (see e.g. Fehr and Gächter, 2000). In the light of our results, this difference in information itself could add to the stabilization of contributions in public goods games with punishment. Additionally, when punishment leads to more equal contribution behavior in subsequent rounds, our results suggest that subjects become inherently more willing to contribute at that level, so that the stabilizing effect is not exclusively due to the threat of punishment.

Finally, our results that ‘conditional cooperators’ are more likely to follow the bad example of an uncooperative group member rather than the good example of a high contributor may provide useful insights into management practices within firms. When constructing teams, for example, forming groups of equal performers is generally preferable because in diversely performing teams, it is more likely that the negative effect of low performers outweighs positive effects of the high performers. A similar logic might also apply to multilateral treatise among nations.

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Tables

Table 1: Overview of our experimental treatments

Treatment	Information about individual contributions	Information about average contributions	# Obs.
<i>IND</i>	Yes	No	128
<i>AVG</i>	No	Yes	128
<i>IND-AVG</i>	Yes	Yes	128

Table 2: Distribution of types by treatments

	<i>AVG</i>	<i>IND-AVG</i>	<i>IND</i>
<i>Conditional cooperators</i>	81 [63%]	77 [60%]	71 [56%]
<i>Free riders</i>	30 [24%]	23 [18%]	26 [20%]
<i>Others</i>	17 [13%]	28 [22%]	31 [24%]

Note: Numbers in brackets display relative frequencies.

Table 3: Treatment differences in contribution behavior of conditional cooperators

Dependent variable: Own contributions	(1)
avg. others' contribution	0.864 ^{***} (0.013)
AVG * avg. others' contrib.	-0.082 ^{***} (0.017)
IND * avg. others' contrib.	-0.025 (0.019)
IND <i>1 if treatment = IND and 0 otherwise</i>	1.011 [*] (0.523)
AVG <i>1 if treatment = AVG and 0 otherwise</i>	0.331 (0.504)
Constant	-0.687 [*] (0.362)
<i>N</i>	6881

Notes: The table reports results from random effects regressions. We use data from all 35 cases of conditional cooperators in *IND*, *IND-AVG*, and all 21 cases of conditional cooperators in *AVG*. Standard errors are in parentheses; ^{*} $p < 0.1$, ^{**} $p < 0.05$, ^{***} $p < 0.01$

Table 4: Determinants of contribution behavior of conditional cooperators

Dependent variable:			
Own contributions	(1)	(2)	(3)
avg. others' contribution	0.838*** (0.013)	0.840*** (0.013)	
<i>IND-AVG</i> * avg. others' contrib.	0.025 (0.019)	0.026 (0.019)	
STD. DEV.		-0.054*** (0.017)	
<i>IND-AVG</i> * STD. DEV.		-0.021 (0.023)	
MIN			0.333*** (0.014)
MED			0.239*** (0.014)
MAX			0.281*** (0.013)
<i>IND-AVG</i> * MIN			-0.012 (0.019)
<i>IND-AVG</i> * MED			0.058*** (0.019)
<i>IND-AVG</i> * MAX			-0.036** (0.018)
<i>IND-AVG</i> dummy 1 if treatment = <i>IND-AVG</i>	-1.011** (0.498)	-0.922* (0.507)	-0.762 (0.510)
Constant	0.324 (0.359)	0.549 (0.365)	0.397 (0.368)
<i>N</i>	5180	5180	5180

Note: The table reports results from random effects regressions. In all specifications we use data from all 35 fictitious cases of conditional cooperators in *IND* and in *IND-AVG*. Standard errors are in parentheses; * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 5: Distribution of types of conditional cooperators and their average reactions to the average and standard deviation of others' contributions

Type	<i>IND</i> treatment			<i>IND-AVG</i> treatment		
	$\bar{\beta}_{1i}$	$\bar{\beta}_{2i}$	# Obs.	$\bar{\beta}_{1i}$	$\bar{\beta}_{2i}$	# Obs.
<i>low</i>	0.81	-0.43	18 [25%]	0.88	-0.36	21 [27%]
	0.84	-0.01	43 [61%]	0.85	-0.00	51 [66%]
<i>high</i>	0.88	0.44	10 [14%]	0.94	0.36	5 [7%]
<i>All</i>	0.84	-0.05	71	0.86	-0.08	77

Figures

Figure 1: Variation in conditional cooperators' conditional contribution responses across subjects on variation in others' contributions according the contribution vectors





Figure 2: Distribution of individual reactions of conditional cooperators on the variance in others' contributions



Appendix

Table A1: Average contributions of ‘conditional cooperators’ by treatment and case

Case	Contribution Vector	Mean (rounded)	IND (N=71)	IND-AVG (N=77)	AVG (N=81)	Belief	IND vs. AVG vs. IND-AVG	IND vs. AVG	IND-AVG vs. AVG	IND vs. IND-AVG
1	0/0/0	0	0.20 (0.95)	0.13 (0.80)	0.11 (0.59)	3/4/4				
2	0/5/7	4	3.86 (2.94)	2.92 (3.42)	2.65 (2.25)	6/9/7	**	***		**
3	5/5/5	5	4.25 (2.10)	4.01 (2.87)	3.46 (2.72)	6/2/7	*	**		
4	0/5/10	5	5.01 (3.39)	3.97 (3.26)	3.46 (2.72)	0/3/7	***	***		**
5	0/5/13	6	5.70 (3.42)	4.45 (3.59)	4.17 (2.97)	1/0/4	**	***		***
6	0/0/20	7	5.24 (5.06)	4.43 (4.35)	5.10 (3.35)	1/1/10			*	
7	5/5/10	7	6.56 (2.98)	5.17 (3.17)	5.10 (3.35)	3/5/10	***	**		***
8	4/4/12	7	5.79 (3.09)	5.09 (3.61)	5.10 (3.35)	0/0/10				
9	6/6/10	7	6.52 (2.87)	5.55 (3.14)	5.10 (3.35)	3/0/10	***	***		***
10	4/8/8	7	5.72 (3.18)	5.06 (3.34)	5.10 (3.35)	2/3/10	*	*		**
11	0/8/13	7	6.15 (4.05)	5.03 (3.80)	5.10 (3.35)	1/0/10	***	***		***
12	2/4/15	7	6.66 (3.03)	5.05 (3.34)	5.10 (3.35)	0/4/10				
13	8/8/8	8	6.93 (2.79)	6.38 (3.27)	5.84 (3.76)	3/0/3	*	*		
14	5/5/15	8	7.54 (3.46)	6.08 (3.68)	5.84 (3.76)	0/1/3	**	**		**
15	4/8/12	8	6.96 (3.04)	5.95 (3.43)	5.84 (3.76)	2/1/3				**
16	0/11/13	8	6.58 (4.24)	5.82 (3.87)	5.84 (3.76)	0/0/3				
17	2/7/15	8	6.48 (3.41)	6.00 (3.44)	5.84 (3.76)	2/2/3				
18	3/8/13	8	7.08 (3.11)	5.79 (3.60)	5.84 (3.76)	1/2/3	**	**		***
19	8/8/12	9	8.21 (3.14)	6.97 (3.87)	6.41 (3.87)	2/1/6	**	***		**
20	4/12/12	9	7.86 (3.48)	7.05 (3.58)	6.41 (3.87)	0/1/6	*	**		
21	8/10/10	9	7.99 (2.79)	7.14 (3.37)	6.41 (3.87)	2/4/6	**	**		**
22	6/8/13	9	7.75 (3.15)	6.97 (3.41)	6.41 (3.87)	3/0/6		*		
23	2/10/15	9	8.11 (4.01)	7.19 (3.98)	6.41 (3.87)	0/1/6	*	**		
24	5/10/12	9	7.94 (3.27)	6.87 (3.55)	6.41 (3.87)	3/2/6	**	**		**
25	10/10/10	10	9.18 (2.71)	8.83 (3.66)	7.62 (4.24)	6/8/17	**	***	**	
26	5/5/20	10	8.87 (4.22)	7.95 (4.14)	7.62 (4.24)	0/0/17				
27	5/10/15	10	8.89 (4.24)	8.52 (3.76)	7.62 (4.24)	2/4/17		*		
28	8/10/15	11	9.65 (3.30)	8.84 (3.62)	8.07 (4.46)	3/2/1				
29	5/10/18	11	9.97 (4.48)	8.79 (3.75)	8.07 (4.46)	1/3/1		*		
30	5/15/15	12	9.32 (3.89)	9.60 (4.21)	8.78 (4.60)	2/0/4				
31	0/20/20	13	10.86 (6.44)	10.58 (5.79)	9.26 (4.88)	1/2/0				
32	15/15/15	15	13.30 (3.76)	13.12 (4.33)	11.63 (5.25)	3/1/4		*		
33	10/15/20	15	12.93 (4.46)	12.39 (5.11)	11.63 (5.25)	1/2/4				
34	10/20/20	17	13.39 (4.96)	13.56 (5.04)	13.30 (5.62)	2/0/0				
35	20/20/20	20	17.94 (4.26)	16.73 (5.01)	15.63 (5.78)	5/5/4	**	**		
Ø	4.97/8.86/13.17	9	7.87 (4.78)	7.09 (4.95)	6.64 (4.88)					

Note: Stars indicate significant effects on a * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ level using a Kruskal-Wallis (three-way comparisons) or a Mann-Whitney-U test (pairwise comparisons). Standard deviations are shown in parentheses. The column ‘Belief’ shows how often each case was believed to be the “real” one of the other group members’ unconditional contributions in IND/IND-AVG/AVG.

Table A2: Treatment differences in contribution behavior of subjects classified as “others” (model 1) and whole sample (model 2)

Dependent variable: Own contributions	(1)	(2)
avg. others' contribution	0.180*** (0.030)	0.558*** (0.011)
AVG * avg. others' contrib.	-0.112*** (0.042)	-0.048*** (0.015)
IND * avg. others' contrib.	0.004 (0.041)	-0.051*** (0.015)
IND <i>1 if treatment = IND and 0 otherwise</i>	0.718 (1.077)	0.820 (0.528)
AVG <i>1 if treatment = AVG and 0 otherwise</i>	2.659** (1.264)	0.268 (0.528)
Constant	3.258*** (0.781)	0.322 (0.373)
<i>N</i>	2422	13440

Notes: The table reports results from random effects regressions. We use data from all 35 cases of conditional cooperators in *IND*, *IND-AVG*, and all 21 cases of conditional cooperators in *AVG*. Standard errors are in parentheses; * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A3: Determinants of contribution behavior of subjects classified as “others” (models 1-3) and of the whole sample (models 4-6)

Dependent variable:						
Own contributions	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
avg. others' contribution	0.183*** (0.028)	0.184*** (0.028)		0.509*** (0.012)	0.510*** (0.012)	
<i>IND-AVG</i> * avg. others' contrib.	0.004 (0.040)	0.005 (0.040)		0.048*** (0.016)	0.048*** (0.016)	
STD. DEV.		-0.005 (0.034)			-0.031** (0.014)	
<i>IND-AVG</i> * STD. DEV.		0.048 (0.050)			0.000 (0.020)	
MIN			0.087*** (0.028)			0.206*** (0.012)
MED			0.024 (0.029)			0.138*** (0.012)
MAX			0.083*** (0.026)			0.176*** (0.011)
<i>IND-AVG</i> * MIN			-0.050 (0.041)			-0.009 (0.017)
<i>IND-AVG</i> * MED			0.035 (0.042)			0.054*** (0.017)
<i>IND-AVG</i> * MAX			0.003 (0.038)			-0.009 (0.016)
<i>IND-AVG</i> dummy 1 if treatment = <i>IND-AVG</i>	-0.718 (1.040)	-0.918 (1.060)	-0.852 (1.067)	-0.820 (0.520)	-0.820 (0.527)	-0.710 (0.529)
Constant	3.975*** (0.716)	3.996*** (0.731)	3.895*** (0.735)	1.142*** (0.368)	1.272*** (0.372)	1.164*** (0.374)
<i>N</i>	2065	2065	2065	8960	8960	8960

Note: The table reports results from random effects regressions. In all specifications we use data from all 35 fictitious cases of conditional cooperators in *IND* and in *IND-AVG*. Standard errors are in parentheses; * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

**Table A4: Average contributions of subjects classified as ‘others’
by treatment and case**

Case	Contribution Vector	Mean (rounded)	IND (N=31)	IND-AVG (N=28)	AVG (N=17)	Belief	IND vs. AVG vs. IND-AVG	IND vs. AVG	IND vs. IND- AVG	IND- AVG vs. AVG
1	0/0/0	0	2.42 (6.17)	1.5 (4.48)	4.29 (6.90)	1/4/0	*	*		*
2	0/5/7	4	4.29 (5.24)	3.75 (4.45)	5.94 (5.37)	3/3/0				*
3	5/5/5	5	4.87 (4.36)	3.68 (4.17)	6.18 (5.21)	2/1/6				*
4	0/5/10	5	4.58 (4.80)	3.68 (4.30)	6.18 (5.21)	0/2/6		*		**
5	0/5/13	6	4.39 (4.26)	4.18 (4.84)	6.76 (4.84)	0/0/1	**	*		**
6	0/0/20	7	4.65 (5.58)	3.86 (5.37)	7.12 (4.47)	0/1/1	**	*		***
7	5/5/10	7	5.39 (4.14)	4.25 (4.31)	7.12 (4.47)	0/1/1	**			**
8	4/4/12	7	5.35 (4.94)	4.57 (4.32)	7.12 (4.47)	0/0/1	*	*		**
9	6/6/10	7	5.84 (4.62)	5.04 (5.29)	7.12 (4.47)	3/0/1		*		*
10	4/8/8	7	5.23 (4.49)	4.50 (4.38)	7.12 (4.47)	2/3/1	**			**
11	0/8/13	7	5.29 (5.28)	4.46 (4.61)	7.12 (4.47)	1/0/1	*	*		**
12	2/4/15	7	4.84 (4.05)	4.36 (4.40)	7.12 (4.47)	0/2/1	**	**		**
13	8/8/8	8	5.77 (4.59)	5.79 (4.98)	7.41 (4.53)	1/0/2				
14	5/5/15	8	5.39 (4.21)	4.89 (4.28)	7.41 (4.53)	3/0/2	*	*		**
15	4/8/12	8	5.52 (4.50)	4.71 (4.22)	7.41 (4.53)	0/1/2	*	*		**
16	0/11/13	8	5.81 (5.36)	4.61 (4.57)	7.41 (4.53)	1/0/2	*			**
17	2/7/15	8	5.81 (4.83)	4.86 (4.18)	7.41 (4.53)	1/0/2	*			***
18	3/8/13	8	5.61 (5.00)	4.21 (4.31)	7.41 (4.53)	0/0/2	**	*		***
19	8/8/12	9	5.48 (4.18)	4.68 (4.58)	7.76 (4.72)	0/0/0	**	*		***
20	4/12/12	9	5.32 (4.53)	4.71 (4.43)	7.76 (4.72)	1/0/0	**	**		**
21	8/10/10	9	5.81 (4.76)	4.75 (4.44)	7.76 (4.72)	0/1/0	*			**
22	6/8/13	9	5.68 (3.95)	5.04 (4.49)	7.76 (4.72)	0/0/0	*	*		**
23	2/10/15	9	4.97 (4.91)	4.32 (4.10)	7.76 (4.72)	1/0/0	**	**		***
24	5/10/12	9	5.97 (4.51)	4.50 (4.45)	7.76 (4.72)	2/0/0	**			***
25	10/10/10	10	6.68 (5.90)	6.50 (4.87)	7.12 (5.05)	2/2/5				
26	5/5/20	10	7.16 (5.96)	6.04 (5.04)	7.12 (5.05)	1/0/5				
27	5/10/15	10	7.19 (5.65)	6.25 (4.25)	7.12 (5.05)	1/2/5				
28	8/10/15	11	6.29 (4.68)	6.57 (5.00)	7.76 (5.01)	0/0/0				
29	5/10/18	11	6.77 (4.81)	5.96 (4.86)	7.76 (5.01)	1/0/0				
30	5/15/15	12	6.58 (5.00)	5.25 (4.55)	8.47 (4.77)	0/0/0	**	*		**
31	0/20/20	13	5.13 (5.95)	6.58 (5.65)	8.24 (5.09)	0/1/0	*	**		
32	15/15/15	15	7.97 (5.74)	7.21 (6.08)	7.88 (5.86)	0/0/1				
33	10/15/20	15	6.81 (5.44)	6.14 (6.01)	7.88 (5.86)	0/3/1				
34	10/20/20	17	6.97 (6.69)	5.86 (6.68)	7.71 (6.23)	1/0/0				
35	20/20/20	20	5.13 (6.84)	3.43 (6.33)	3.06 (4.99)	1/0/0				
Ø	4.97/8.86/13.17	9	5.63 (5.10)	4.88 (4.87)	7.15 (4.92)					

Note: Stars indicate significant effects on a * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ level using a Kruskal-Wallis (three-way comparisons) or a Mann-Whitney-U test (pairwise comparisons). Standard deviations are shown in parentheses. The column ‘Belief’ shows how often each case was believed to be the “real” one of the other group members’ unconditional contributions in IND/IND-AVG/AVG.

Table A5: Average contributions of whole sample by treatment and case

Case	Contribution Vector	Mean (rounded)	IND (N=128)	IND-AVG (N=128)	AVG (N=128)	Belief	IND vs. AVG vs. IND-AVG	IND vs. AVG	IND vs. IND-AVG	IND-AVG vs. AVG
1	0/0/0	0	0.70 (3.24)	0.41 (2.23)	1.08 (2.80)	11/11/7				
2	0/5/7	4	3.18 (3.72)	2.60 (3.57)	2.47 (3.14)	14/14/9				
3	5/5/5	5	3.54 (3.19)	3.22 (3.31)	3.01 (3.42)	9/3/21		*		
4	0/5/10	5	3.89 (3.96)	3.23 (3.54)	3.01 (3.42)	5/7/21		*		
5	0/5/13	6	4.23 (3.95)	3.63 (3.93)	3.54 (3.62)	3/1/8				
6	0/0/20	7	4.03 (5.07)	3.59 (4.52)	4.17 (3.92)	1/4/14	*		**	*
7	5/5/10	7	4.95 (3.93)	4.04 (3.70)	4.17 (3.92)	4/7/14				
8	4/4/12	7	4.51 (4.03)	4.09 (3.92)	4.17 (3.92)	1/0/14				
9	6/6/10	7	5.03 (4.02)	4.44 (4.03)	4.17 (3.92)	7/1/14		*	*	
10	4/8/8	7	4.44 (3.93)	4.09 (3.79)	4.17 (3.92)	5/5/14				
11	0/8/13	7	4.70 (4.63)	4.05 (4.08)	4.17 (3.92)	2/0/14			**	
12	2/4/15	7	4.87 (3.95)	3.99 (3.79)	4.17 (3.92)	1/6/14				
13	8/8/8	8	5.24 (4.07)	5.10 (4.18)	4.68 (4.31)	4/1/7				
14	5/5/15	8	5.48 (4.39)	4.73 (4.14)	4.68 (4.31)	3/1/7				
15	4/8/12	8	5.20 (4.15)	4.61 (3.97)	4.68 (4.31)	2/2/7				
16	0/11/13	8	5.05 (4.83)	4.56 (4.24)	4.68 (4.31)	1/0/7				
17	2/7/15	8	5.00 (4.29)	4.67 (3.98)	4.68 (4.31)	4/2/7				
18	3/8/13	8	5.29 (4.34)	4.41 (4.05)	4.68 (4.31)	1/2/7			*	
19	8/8/12	9	5.88 (4.44)	5.22 (4.50)	5.09 (4.52)	2/1/6				
20	4/12/12	9	5.65 (4.56)	5.27 (4.34)	5.09 (4.52)	1/2/6				
21	8/10/10	9	5.84 (4.38)	5.34 (4.26)	5.09 (4.52)	2/6/6				
22	6/8/13	9	5.67 (4.26)	5.30 (4.25)	5.09 (4.52)	3/1/6				
23	2/10/15	9	5.70 (4.96)	5.29 (4.52)	5.09 (4.52)	1/1/6				
24	5/10/12	9	5.85 (4.49)	5.12 (4.30)	5.09 (4.52)	5/4/6				
25	10/10/10	10	6.71 (4.99)	6.73 (4.89)	5.77 (4.98)	8/11/27				*
26	5/5/20	10	6.66 (5.48)	6.10 (4.95)	5.77 (4.98)	1/0/27				
27	5/10/15	10	6.67 (5.42)	6.49 (4.74)	5.77 (4.98)	3/6/27				
28	8/10/15	11	6.88 (5.03)	6.76 (4.91)	6.14 (5.23)	3/2/1		*		
29	5/10/18	11	7.17 (5.61)	6.59 (4.93)	6.14 (5.23)	2/4/1		*		
30	5/15/15	12	6.77 (5.22)	6.92 (5.35)	6.68 (5.48)	1/1/4				
31	0/20/20	13	7.27 (7.10)	7.90 (6.52)	6.95 (5.77)	1/4/1				
32	15/15/15	15	9.30 (6.53)	9.47 (6.67)	8.41 (6.71)	3/2/5				
33	10/15/20	15	8.82 (6.66)	8.80 (6.84)	8.41 (6.71)	1/5/5				
34	10/20/20	17	9.12 (7.24)	9.44 (7.34)	9.44 (7.47)	3/0/0				
35	20/20/20	20	11.20 (9.01)	10.81 (8.83)	10.30 (8.63)	6/5/4				
Ø	4.97/8.86/13.17	9	5.73 (5.31)	5.34 (5.19)	5.15 (5.14)					

Note: Stars indicate significant effects on a * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ level using a Kruskal-Wallis (three-way comparisons) or a Mann-Whitney-U test (pairwise comparisons). Standard deviations are shown in parentheses. The column ‘Belief’ shows how often each case was believed to be the “real” one of the other group members’ unconditional contributions in IND/IND-AVG/AVG.

A1 Selection of Fictitious Cases

To establish our 35 fictitious cases, as mentioned, we first used the distribution of contributions derived from a pilot one-shot public good experiment. When creating compositions of individual contributions, we specifically tried to create similar variations in all directions in order to minimize confounding effects that could potentially bias subjects' decisions compared to the AVG treatment. For example, there are 6 cases each with two identical contributions below and above the average, respectively (e.g. 6/6/10 and 10/10/20). Likewise, there are at least 11 cases each where the median lies below, at, or above the average contribution (e.g. 2/4/15, 5/10/15, and 0/11/13, respectively).

Our sample of cases exhibits a higher concentration of average contributions at values from 7 and 10. However, average contributions are inevitably concentrated away from extreme values because there are limited combinations for extreme values.¹⁶ Given that we needed variation in individual contributions for fixed average contributions and that we intended to make combinations appear plausible, our selection emerged naturally from the distribution of contributions obtained from the pilot. Considering that we find cases with significant differences between IND and AVG both above and below the range of 7-10 just like we find cases without significant differences inside the range, there seems to be no evidence that contribution behavior is different inside and outside the range of 7-10 (see also footnote 12).

A2 Classification of Types

To classify subjects into types, we follow a very similar approach as FGF. In IND and IND-AVG we categorize subjects as 'conditional cooperators' if their conditional contributions are weakly monotonically increasing in the average contribution of the other group members, or exhibit a positive and significant (at the 5% level) Spearman's rank-order correlation coefficient between own and others' contributions. To avoid biasing the results of how 'conditional cooperators' react to heterogeneity in others'

¹⁶ For example, there are only two possible combinations for averages of 0 and 20, but several dozen for an average of 10.

contributions, for the purpose of classification we only use the six “no variance” cases (0/0/0; 5/5/5; 8/8/8; 10/10/10; 15/15/15; 20/20/20) so that the lowest, median, average, and highest contribution all coincide. For comparability reasons, in AVG we use exactly the same criterion based on the six cases exhibiting the same average (0; 5; 8; 10; 15; 20). In all treatments, subjects are classified as a ‘free rider’ if in the respective six cases they never contribute anything irrespective of how much others contribute.¹⁷ If none of the previous criteria applies, we classify a subject as ‘other’.

¹⁷ Using a more rigorous criterion for ‘free rider’ by using all 35 (21) cases in IND and IND-AVG (AVG) leads to almost exactly the same results.

A3 Type-specific reactions towards the minimum, median, and maximum contribution of others

Table A8: Average coefficients by types from individual regressions

Type	<i>IND</i> treatment				<i>IND-AVG</i> treatment			
	$\bar{\beta}_1$ min	$\bar{\beta}_2$ med	$\bar{\beta}_3$ max	# Obs.	$\bar{\beta}_1$ min	$\bar{\beta}_2$ med	$\bar{\beta}_3$ max	# Obs.
<i>low</i>	0.593	0.129	0.124	18	0.514	0.254	0.124	21
<i>average</i>	0.278	0.287	0.279	43	0.287	0.303	0.274	51
<i>high</i>	0.103	0.229	0.575	10	0.054	0.408	0.460	5
<i>Total</i>	0.333	0.239	0.281	71	0.321	0.296	0.245	77

A4 Theoretical Predictions

A4.1 Predictions by the Fehr and Schmidt model

In the FS-model, besides getting utility from their own monetary payoff π_i , individuals are assumed to endure envy costs α_i when their own payoff is lower than the payoff of others, and endure compassion costs β_i if it exceeds the payoff of others. In other words, individuals maximize the following utility function:

$$U_i(\pi_i, \pi_{-i}) = \pi_i - \alpha_i \frac{1}{n-1} \sum_{j \neq i} \max[\pi_j - \pi_i, 0] - \beta_i \frac{1}{n-1} \sum_{j \neq i} \max[\pi_i - \pi_j, 0]$$

with $\alpha_i \geq \beta_i$ and $0 \leq \beta_i < 1$, assuring that envy looms at least as large than compassion and individuals never destroy their own payoff to decrease their costs of compassion.

Proposition:

According to the FS-model, in our public goods game a player never contributes more than the minimum of the other group members' contributions.

Proof:

Without loss of generality, assume that player 4 observes contributions $c_1 \leq c_2 \leq c_3$ from her group members 1, 2, and 3, respectively. She then chooses her contribution c_4 to

maximize the utility function mentioned above. With $\pi_i = 20 - c_i + 0.4(c_1 + c_2 + c_3 + c_4)$ for $i \in \{1, 2, 3, 4\}$, player 4's utility is given by:

$$\begin{aligned} U_4(\pi_1, \pi_2, \pi_3, \pi_4) &= 20 - c_4 + 0.4(c_1 + c_2 + c_3 + c_4) \\ &\quad - \frac{\alpha_4}{3}(\max[c_1 - c_4, 0] + \max[c_2 - c_4, 0] + \max[c_3 - c_4, 0]) \\ &\quad - \frac{\beta_4}{3}(\max[c_4 - c_1, 0] + \max[c_4 - c_2, 0] + \max[c_4 - c_3, 0]) \end{aligned}$$

Note that because of the linearity of the public good game and the symmetry of the group members' payoff function, differences in contributions translate one-to-one into differences in payoffs. Therefore, depending on where c_4 ranks among all contributions, increasing the contribution of player 4 by one unit changes her utility by the following amounts:

$$\frac{\partial U_4}{\partial c_4} = \begin{cases} -0.6 + \beta_4 & \text{if } c_4 < c_1 \leq c_2 \leq c_3 \\ -0.6 + \frac{2}{3}\beta_4 - \frac{1}{3}\alpha_4 & \text{if } c_1 \leq c_4 < c_2 \leq c_3 \\ -0.6 + \frac{1}{3}\beta_4 - \frac{2}{3}\alpha_4 & \text{if } c_1 \leq c_2 \leq c_4 < c_3 \\ -0.6 - \alpha_4 & \text{if } c_1 \leq c_2 \leq c_3 \leq c_4 \end{cases}$$

Given the model's assumptions of $\alpha_i \geq \beta_i$ and $0 \leq \beta_i < 1$, only the first expression can be positive, hence the utility maximizing contribution for player 4 is:

$$c_4 = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } \beta_4 < 0.6 \\ c_1 & \text{if } \beta_4 \geq 0.6 \end{cases}$$

i.e. player 4 free-rides if her strength of compassion is lower than a threshold value $\tilde{\beta} = 0.6$, and matches the lowest contribution of the other group members c_1 exactly if β_4 exceeds that threshold. Although further increasing her contributions would decrease advantageous inequity with regard to the two highest contributors in the group, this would also decrease her own material payoff and increase disadvantageous inequity with regard to the lowest contributor. However, this can never increase her utility because $-0.6 + \frac{2}{3}\beta_4 - \frac{1}{3}\alpha_4 < 0$ for all $\alpha_4 \geq \beta_4$, $0 \leq \beta_4 < 1$. Hence, players with FS-preferences will never contribute more than the lowest contribution of the other three group members. ■

A4.2 Predictions by the Bolton and Ockenfels model

The BO-model postulates that individuals maximize their motivation function given by $v_i(y_i, \sigma_i)$ with y_i being the individual's payoff and σ_i the individual's share of the total payoff. By assumption, $v_{i1}(y_i, \sigma_i) \geq 0$, $v_{i11}(y_i, \sigma_i) \leq 0$, $v_{i2}(y_i, \sigma_i) = 0$ if $\sigma_i = 1/n$ (where n is the number of players) and $v_{i22}(y_i, \sigma_i) < 0$. In other words, ceteris paribus, individuals prefer more money over less and prefer to receive the equal split.

Proposition:

Individuals with ERC-preferences never contribute more than the average contribution of the other group members. Furthermore, the composition of individual contributions that make up that average does not matter for contribution behavior.

Proof:

Without loss of generality, assume that player 4 observes contributions c_1, c_2 , and c_3 from her group members 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Let $C := c_1 + c_2 + c_3$. It follows that

$$y_4 = 20 - c_4 + 0.4(C + c_4)$$

and

$$\sigma_4 = (20 - c_4 + 0.4(C + c_4)) / (80 + 0.6(C + c_4)),$$

so both the player's material payoff y and the share σ strictly decreases in c_4 , i.e. $\frac{\partial y}{\partial c_4} < 0$

and $\frac{\partial \sigma_4}{\partial c_4} < 0$. For any given C , c_4 determines both y_4 and σ_4 , we can write

$v_4(y_4(c_4), \sigma_4(c_4))$ or $v_4(c_4)$. The first derivative of v_4 with respect to c_4 has two components: The payoff effect $\underbrace{v_1(y_4(c_4), \sigma_4(c_4))}_{\geq 0} \cdot \underbrace{y_4'(c_4)}_{=-0.6} \leq 0$

and the relative share effect

$$\underbrace{v_2(y_4(c_4), \sigma_4(c_4))}_{\substack{<0 \text{ if } c_4 < C/3 \\ =0 \text{ if } c_4 = C/3 \\ >0 \text{ if } c_4 > C/3}} \cdot \underbrace{\sigma_4'(c_4)}_{<0}$$

which is positive if $c_4 < C/3$, zero if $c_4 = C/3$ and negative if $c_4 > C/3$. When $v_4(y_4(c_4), \sigma_4(c_4))$ is maximized, it follows that $v_4'(y(c_4), \sigma(c_4)) = 0$, hence

$$v_4'_{1}(y_4(c_4), \sigma_4(c_4)) \cdot y_4'(c_4) + v_4'_{2}(y_4(c_4), \sigma_4(c_4)) \cdot \sigma_4'(c_4) = 0,$$

which requires $c_4 \leq C/3$. Therefore, the player never contributes more than the average contribution of the other three group members. Furthermore, since all expressions only depend on the sum C and not on the individual contributions c_1, c_2, c_3 , changing the composition of C does not influence own contributions in the BO-model. ■

A4.3 Predictions by the Charness and Rabin model¹⁸

The CR-model assumes that individuals maximize the following utility function:

$$U_i(\pi_1, \pi_2, \dots, \pi_N) = (1 - \lambda)(\pi_i) + \lambda[\delta \cdot \min[\pi_1, \pi_2, \dots, \pi_N] + (1 - \delta)(\pi_1 + \pi_2 + \dots + \pi_N)]$$

with π_i being individual i 's payoff, $\lambda \in [0,1]$ the strength of social concern compared to material self-interest and $\delta \in [0,1]$ the strength of Rawlsian concern for the individual with the lowest payoff compared to concerns for efficiency.

Proposition:

According to the CR-model, individuals are either willing to contribute irrespective of other group members' contributions to increase overall efficiency, or are willing to contribute up to the maximum contribution (including zero) of the other group members to increase the lowest overall payoff.

Proof:

Without loss of generality, assume that player 4 observes contributions $c_1 \leq c_2 \leq c_3$ from her group members 1, 2, and 3, respectively. She then chooses her contribution c_4 to maximize her utility function given by:

$$U_4 = (1 - \lambda)(20 - c_4 + 0.4(c_1 + c_2 + c_3 + c_4)) + \lambda[\delta \cdot \min[20 - c_3 + 0.4(c_1 + c_2 + c_3 + c_4), 20 - c_4 + 0.4(c_1 + c_2 + c_3 + c_4)] + (1 - \delta)(80 + 0.6(c_1 + c_2 + c_3 + c_4))]$$

¹⁸ For comparability with the other two models, we apply the outcome-based version of the CR-model without reciprocity.

We have to distinguish between two cases depending on whether player 4 is the highest contributor or not, i.e. depending on where c_4 ranks compared to the highest contribution of the other group members c_3 increasing the contribution of player 4 by one unit changes his utility by the following amounts:

$$\frac{\partial U_4}{\partial c_4} = \begin{cases} -0.6(1 - \lambda) + 0.4\lambda\delta + 0.6\lambda(1 - \delta) = 1.2\lambda - 0.2\lambda\delta - 0.6 & \text{if } c_4 < c_3 \\ -0.6(1 - \lambda) - 0.6\lambda\delta + 0.6\lambda(1 - \delta) = 1.2\lambda - 1.2\lambda\delta - 0.6 & \text{if } c_4 \geq c_3 \end{cases}$$

From this it follows that

$$c_4 = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } \lambda < \frac{1}{2(1 - \frac{1}{6}\delta)} \\ c_3 & \text{if } \frac{1}{2(1 - \frac{1}{6}\delta)} \leq \lambda < \frac{1}{2(1 - \delta)} \\ 20 & \text{if } \lambda \geq \frac{1}{2(1 - \delta)} \end{cases}$$

i.e. player 4 free-rides if her overall social concern λ is lower than a lower threshold $\underline{\lambda} = \frac{1}{2(1 - \frac{1}{6}\delta)}$. Depending on the player's concern for helping the worst-off player versus maximizing total social surplus δ , this threshold can take values between 0.5 (for $\delta = 0$) and 0.6 (for $\delta = 1$), i.e. the threshold for contributing a positive amount is monotonically increasing in δ . Given λ exceeds this threshold, player 4 exactly matches the highest contribution of the other group members c_3 if λ is smaller than an upper threshold $\bar{\lambda} = \frac{1}{2(1 - \delta)}$, and contributes fully if λ also exceeds $\bar{\lambda}$. Note that $\underline{\lambda} \leq \bar{\lambda}$ for all $\delta \in [0,1]$. Furthermore, note that $\bar{\lambda}$ can, in principle, take values between 0.5 (for $\delta = 0$) and infinity (for $\delta = 1$). However, as $\lambda \in [0,1]$, $\lambda \geq \bar{\lambda}$ can only be fulfilled as long as $\delta \leq \frac{1}{2}$. Taken together, player 4 free-rides if her overall social concern is low. If she does not free-ride, she contributes her full endowment if her efficiency concern is sufficiently strong compared to her Rawlsian concerns, and matches the highest contribution of her group members otherwise. ■

Appendix: Experimental Instructions (translated from German¹⁹)

Differences between treatments are indicated by square brackets

Hello and welcome to today's experiment!

You are now taking part in an economics experiment. If you read the following instructions carefully, you can – depending on your decisions – earn some more money in addition to the 2.50 Euro which you receive in any case for participating in the experiment. The entire amount of money which you earned with your decisions will be added up and paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment.

These instructions are solely for your private information. **You are not allowed to communicate during the experiment.** If you have any questions, please ask us. Violation of this rule will lead to the exclusion from the experiment and all payments. If you have questions, please raise your hand. A member of the study team will come to you and answer them in private. We will not speak of Euros during the experiment, but of points. Your whole income will first be calculated in points. At the end of the experiment, the total amount of points you earned will be converted to Euros at the following rate:

1 point = 50 Cents

Please also note the following:

- All participants will be randomly divided in **groups of four members. Except for us - the experimenters - no one knows who is in which group.**
- All **decisions are made anonymously**, i.e. none of the other participants finds out the identity of someone who has made a decision.
- The payment at the end of the experiment is also made anonymously, i.e., **no participant finds out what another participant's payment is.**

The decision situation

You will learn how the experiment will be conducted later. We first introduce you to the basic decision situation.

You will be a member of a group consisting of **4 people**. Each group member has to decide on the allocation of 20 points. You can put these 20 points into your **private account** or you can invest them **fully or partially** into a project. Each point you do not invest into the project

¹⁹ The original instructions in German are available upon request from the authors.

will automatically remain in your private account. Thus, you and the members of your group have to decide how many points you want to invest **in your project** and how many points you want to **keep for yourself**. The decisions made by all group members are made simultaneously. This means that nobody is informed about the other group members' decisions as long as she hasn't made her own decision.

Your income from the private account

You will earn one point for each point you put into your private account. For example, if you put 20 points into your private account (and therefore do not invest into the project), your income will amount to exactly 20 points out of your private account. If you put 6 points into your private account, your income from this account will be 6 points. **No one except you earns something from your private account.**

Your income from the project

Each group member will profit equally from the amount you invest into the project. At the same time, you will also benefit from the other group members' contributions. The income from the project for each group member will be determined as follows:

$$\text{Income from the project} = \text{Sum of all contributions} \times 0.4$$

If, for example, the sum of all contributions to the project is 60 points, then you and the other members of your group each earn $60 \times 0.4 = 24$ points from the project. If the four members of the group contribute a total of 10 points to the project, you and the other members of your group each earn $10 \times 0.4 = 4$ points.

Total income

Your total income is calculated as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} &\text{Income from your private account (= 20 – contribution to the project)} \\ &+ \text{income from the project (= 0.4 x sum of all contributions to the project)} \\ &= \text{Total income} \end{aligned}$$

Example 1:

Every group member has 20 points at her disposal. Assuming you contribute 4 points to the project and all your group members each contribute 8 points to the project. In this case, your income from your private account amounts to $20 - 4 = 16$ points. Your income from

the common project amounts to $0.4 \times (4 + 8 + 8 + 8) = 0.4 \times 28 = 11.2$ points. Altogether, your total income amounts to $16 + 11.2 = 27.2$ points.

Your group members receive $20 - 8 = 12$ points from their private account and $0.4 \times (4 + 8 + 8 + 8) = 0.4 \times 28 = 11.2$ points from the common project, respectively. Altogether, your group members receive a total income of $12 + 11.2 = 23.2$ points each.

Example 2:

Every group member has 20 points at her disposal. Assuming you contribute 16 points to the project and all your group members each contribute 12 points to the project. In this case, your income from your private account amounts to $20 - 16 = 4$ points. Your income from the common project amounts to $0.4 \times (16 + 12 + 12 + 12) = 0.4 \times 52 = 20.8$ points. Altogether, your total income amounts to $4 + 20.8 = 24.8$ points.

Your group members each receive $20 - 12 = 8$ points from their private account and $0.4 \times (16 + 12 + 12 + 12) = 0.4 \times 52 = 20.8$ points from the common project. Altogether, your group members receive a total income of $8 + 20.8 = 28.8$ points each.

Before explaining the exact sequence of the experiment, we ask you to answer some practice questions regarding the explained decision situation. They are meant to increase your familiarity with the decision situation and make sure that each participant has fully understood the instructions.

Please answer the following questions

Every group member has 20 points at her disposal. Assume that all four group members (including you) contribute 0 points each to the project.

Question 1: What is *your* total income in this case (in points)?

Question 2: What is the total income of each of *the other* group members in this case (in points)?

Every group member has 20 points at her disposal. You contribute 20 points to the project. Each of the three other group members also contributes 20 points to the project.

Question 3: What is *your* total income in this case (in points)?

Question 4: What is the total income of each of *the other* group members in this case (in points)?

Every group member has 20 points at her disposal. The three other group members together contribute a sum of 30 points to the project.

Question 5: What is *your* total income in this case (in points) if you contribute - in addition to the 30 points of the other three group members – 0 points to the project?

Question 6: What is *your* total income in this case (in points) if you contribute - in addition to the 30 points of the other three group members – 10 points to the project?

Question 7: What is *your* total income in this case (in points) if you contribute - in addition to the 30 points of the other three group members – 20 points to the project?

The Experiment

The experiment includes the decision situation just described to you. The decisions you make in this experiment will be paid in cash after the experiment.

As you know, you will have 20 points at your disposal which you can either place in your private account or contribute to the project. In this experiment, each subject has to make **two types** of contribution decisions, which we will refer to below as “**Contribution of Type I**” and “**Contribution of Type II**”. On the next pages it will be explained to you in detail how to make these two contribution decisions.

Contribution of Type I

In the Contribution of Type I you decide how many of your 20 points you want to contribute to the project. You have to enter this amount into the input box.

Contribution of Type II

Your second task will be to make a decision on your Contribution of Type II. This decision will be made by completing a **contribution table**.

[IND, IND-AVG: In the contribution table you have to decide for **different possible combinations of contributions of the other group members**, how much **you want to contribute given these circumstances**.]

[AVG: In the contribution table you have to decide for **different possible (rounded) average contributions of the other group members**, how much **you want to contribute given these circumstances**.]

That is, you can make your contribution decision conditional on the other group members' contributions. This will be immediately clear to you if you take a look at the following table.

The contribution table will appear immediately after you have determined your Contribution of Type I.

IND:

Contribution I	Contribution II	Contribution III	Your Contribution
0	5	10	

IND-AVG:

Contribution I	Contribution II	Contribution III	Average	Your Contribution
0	5	10	5	

AVG:

Average	Your Contribution
10	

[*IND, IND-AVG:* The numbers in the first three columns are possible Type I contributions to the project by the **other group members** [*IND-AVG:* and the number in the fourth column is the average rounded contribution of the other group members]. For the Contribution of Type II you simply have to enter the amount of points **you** want to contribute if the other group members decided in their Contribution of Type I decision to contribute the given amounts. For example, you have to enter how many points you contribute to the project if one group member contributed 0 points, another group member 5 points, and the last group member 10 points to the project.]

[*AVG:* The numbers in the first column are possible (rounded) average Type-I contributions to the project by the **other group members**. For the Contribution of Type II you simply have to enter the amount of points **you** want to contribute if the other group members decided in their Contribution of Type I decision to contribute on average the given amount. For example, you have to enter how many points you contribute if the other group members contributed on average 5 points to the project.]

In total, you will be shown 36 [*AVG:* 21] of such contribution situations. **Please note, that for each contribution situation you have to enter a number in the corresponding input box.**

[IND, IND-AVG: Also, please note that the Contributions of Type I for the other group members are given in ascending order and therefore do not allow any inference on the identity of the group members.]

Experimental Payoff

After each participant in every group has made their contribution decisions of Type I and Type II, **in each group three members are chosen randomly**. For these **randomly chosen members**, only their Contribution of Type I is payoff relevant, i.e., the three randomly selected group members contribute their Type-I-Contribution to the project.

For the **fourth group member**, who was not randomly chosen, only the **contribution table** (Contribution of Type II) is payoff relevant. The relevant contribution situation from the contribution table is determined by the [AVG: average] Type-I contributions of the three randomly chosen group members, i.e., the fourth group member contributes the amount of points to the project which she chose for the corresponding contribution situation. **Two Examples on the next page will clarify this.**

Important:

- The experiment will only be conducted **once**, meaning that every decision is only made once.
- When you decide on your Contribution of Type I and II, you do not know whether you will be chosen by the random mechanism. **Therefore, you have to think carefully about both of your contribution decisions, as both of them can become payoff relevant.**
- [IND, IND-AVG: For each group member, it is ensured that one of the contribution situations in the table corresponds to the Type-I contributions of the other group members.]

Example 1

Assume that **the random mechanism did not choose you, meaning that your contribution table is relevant for your payoff**. For the other three members of the group, the Contribution of Type I is payoff relevant. Assume the other three group members decided to contribute 0 points, 2 points and 4 points to the project in their Type-I contributions. [AVG: The average Type-I contribution of these three group members therefore amounts to 2 points.] If you have entered in your contribution table for the entry [IND: 0,2,4, IND-AVG:

0,2,4, (2), AVG: 2] that you will contribute 1 point, then the total contributions of the group to the project is given by $0 + 2 + 4 + 1 = 7$. Each group member therefore earns $0.4 \times 7 = 2.8$ points from the project plus their respective income from their private account.

If you instead have entered in your contribution table that you contribute 19 points when the other three members contribute [IND, IND-AVG: 0, 2 and 4 points, AVG: on average 2 points], the total contribution of the group to the project is given by $0 + 2 + 4 + 19 = 25$ points. Each group member therefore earns $0.4 \times 25 = 10$ points from the project plus their respective income from their private account.

Example 2

Assume that **you have been chosen by the random mechanism, meaning that for you and two other group members your Contribution of Type I is payoff relevant**. Assume your Type-I contribution is 16 points and the Type-I contribution of the other two group members are 18 and 20 points. [AVG: The average Type-I contribution from you and the other two group members therefore amounts to 18 points.] If the non-selected group member decided for the entry [IND: 16,18,20, IND-AVG: 16,18,20 (18), AVG: 18] in her contribution table to contribute 1 point, then the total contributions of the group to the project is given by $16 + 18 + 20 + 1 = 55$ points. Each group member therefore earns $0.4 \times 55 = 22$ points from the project plus their respective income from their private account.

If the group member that was not randomly chosen instead entered in her contribution table that she contributes 19 points when the other three members contribute [IND, IND-AVG: 16, 18 and 20 points, AVG: on average 18 points], the total contribution of the group to the project is given by $16 + 18 + 20 + 19 = 73$ points. Each group member therefore earns $0.4 \times 73 = 29.2$ points from the project plus the respective income from their private accounts.

Please answer the following questions

Each group member has 20 points at her disposal. Assume that the Type-I contributions are given by: You: 10 points, group member 1: 5 points, group member 2: 10 points, group member 3: 15 points.

Assume that **you are not randomly chosen, meaning that your contribution table (Contribution of Type II) is relevant for your payoff**. Therefore, for the other three members of the group the Contribution of Type I is payoff relevant.

Question 8: What is *your* total income (in points), if you entered in your contribution table for the entry [*IND*: 5,10,15, *IND-AVG*: 5,10,15 (15), *AVG*: 10] that you contribute 20 points to the project?

Now assume that **you, group member 1 and group member 3 are randomly chosen, meaning that for you, group member 1 and group member 3 the Contribution of Type I is payoff relevant.** For group member 2, which was not randomly chosen, the contribution table is payoff relevant.

Question 9: What is *your* total income (in points), if group member 2 entered in her contribution table for the entry [*IND*: 5,10,15, *IND-AVG*: 5,10,15 (15), *AVG*: 10] that she contributes 0 points to the project?

Screenshots for the decision screen subjects faced for their Type-II contributions

IND:

Ihr Beitrag vom Typ II zum Projekt (Beitragstabelle)

Beitrag I	Beitrag II	Beitrag III	Ihr Beitrag
5	10	18	<input type="text"/>
3	8	13	<input type="text"/>
0	3	7	<input type="text"/>
5	5	5	<input type="text"/>
10	10	10	<input type="text"/>
6	6	10	<input type="text"/>
8	10	10	<input type="text"/>
0	0	0	<input type="text"/>
0	0	20	<input type="text"/>
4	12	12	<input type="text"/>
15	15	15	<input type="text"/>
0	5	7	<input type="text"/>

Beitrag I	Beitrag II	Beitrag III	Ihr Beitrag
0	20	20	<input type="text"/>
0	5	13	<input type="text"/>
6	8	13	<input type="text"/>
0	11	13	<input type="text"/>
5	5	20	<input type="text"/>
2	10	16	<input type="text"/>
5	10	15	<input type="text"/>
5	5	10	<input type="text"/>
2	4	15	<input type="text"/>
10	20	20	<input type="text"/>
8	10	15	<input type="text"/>
2	7	15	<input type="text"/>

Beitrag I	Beitrag II	Beitrag III	Ihr Beitrag
5	10	12	<input type="text"/>
4	4	12	<input type="text"/>
8	8	12	<input type="text"/>
5	5	15	<input type="text"/>
4	8	12	<input type="text"/>
0	5	10	<input type="text"/>
20	20	20	<input type="text"/>
5	15	15	<input type="text"/>
8	8	8	<input type="text"/>
0	8	13	<input type="text"/>
10	15	20	<input type="text"/>
4	8	8	<input type="text"/>

Hilfe
 Gehen Sie in den Eingabefeldern ein, wie viele Punkte Sie zum Projekt beizutragen wollen, wenn die anderen Gruppenmitglieder die angegebenen Beiträge zum Projekt beigetragen haben, die links vom Eingabefeld stehen. Wenn Sie alle Felder ausgefüllt haben, drücken Sie bitte auf "OK".
 Zur Erinnerung: Gesamteinkommen = Einkommen aus dem Privatkonto (= 20 - Beitrag zum Projekt) + Einkommen aus dem Projekt (= 0.4 x Summe aller Beiträge zum Projekt)

IND-AVG:

Ihr Beitrag vom Typ II zum Projekt (Beitragstabelle)

Beitrag I	Beitrag II	Beitrag III	Durchschnitt	Ihr Beitrag
0	5	7	4	<input type="text"/>
0	3	7	3	<input type="text"/>
0	0	20	7	<input type="text"/>
15	15	15	15	<input type="text"/>
6	6	10	7	<input type="text"/>
5	5	10	7	<input type="text"/>
4	4	12	7	<input type="text"/>
8	8	12	9	<input type="text"/>
4	8	8	7	<input type="text"/>
8	10	10	9	<input type="text"/>
4	12	12	9	<input type="text"/>
0	20	20	13	<input type="text"/>

Beitrag I	Beitrag II	Beitrag III	Durchschnitt	Ihr Beitrag
10	20	20	17	<input type="text"/>
4	8	12	8	<input type="text"/>
5	5	5	5	<input type="text"/>
0	5	10	5	<input type="text"/>
6	8	13	9	<input type="text"/>
8	8	8	8	<input type="text"/>
0	11	13	8	<input type="text"/>
10	10	10	10	<input type="text"/>
5	10	15	10	<input type="text"/>
2	10	15	9	<input type="text"/>
8	10	15	11	<input type="text"/>
10	15	20	15	<input type="text"/>

Beitrag I	Beitrag II	Beitrag III	Durchschnitt	Ihr Beitrag
5	15	15	12	<input type="text"/>
5	5	20	10	<input type="text"/>
2	4	15	7	<input type="text"/>
0	5	13	6	<input type="text"/>
2	7	15	8	<input type="text"/>
5	10	12	9	<input type="text"/>
5	10	18	11	<input type="text"/>
0	0	0	0	<input type="text"/>
0	8	13	7	<input type="text"/>
3	8	13	8	<input type="text"/>
20	20	20	20	<input type="text"/>
5	5	15	8	<input type="text"/>

Hilfe
 Gehen Sie in den Eingabefeldern ein, wie viele Punkte Sie zum Projekt beizutragen wollen, wenn die anderen Gruppenmitglieder die angegebenen Beiträge zum Projekt beigetragen haben, die links vom Eingabefeld stehen. Wenn Sie alle Felder ausgefüllt haben, drücken Sie bitte auf "OK".
 Zur Erinnerung: Gesamteinkommen = Einkommen aus dem Privatkonto (= 20 - Beitrag zum Projekt) + Einkommen aus dem Projekt (= 0.4 x Summe aller Beiträge zum Projekt)

AVG

Ihr Beitrag vom Typ II zum Projekt (Beitragstabelle)

Durchschnitt	Ihr Beitrag
0	<input type="text"/>
1	<input type="text"/>
2	<input type="text"/>
3	<input type="text"/>
4	<input type="text"/>
5	<input type="text"/>
6	<input type="text"/>

Durchschnitt	Ihr Beitrag
7	<input type="text"/>
8	<input type="text"/>
9	<input type="text"/>
10	<input type="text"/>
11	<input type="text"/>
12	<input type="text"/>
13	<input type="text"/>

Durchschnitt	Ihr Beitrag
14	<input type="text"/>
15	<input type="text"/>
16	<input type="text"/>
17	<input type="text"/>
18	<input type="text"/>
19	<input type="text"/>
20	<input type="text"/>

Hilfe
 Geben Sie in den Eingabefeldern ein, wie viele Punkte Sie zum Projekt beizutragen wollen, wenn die anderen Gruppenmitglieder im Durchschnitt den angegebenen Betrag zum Projekt beigetragen haben, der links vom Eingabefeld steht. Wenn Sie alle Felder ausgefüllt haben, drücken Sie bitte auf "OK".
 Zur Erinnerung: Gesamteinkommen = Einkommen aus dem Privatkonto (= 20 - Beitrag zum Projekt) + Einkommen aus dem Projekt (= 0,4 x Summe aller Beiträge zum Projekt)