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Rationing and Screening in Crowdinvesting-markets

by

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The allocation of shares on crowd-investing-platforms is best described by the phrase “first come, first served”. An entrepreneur who sells corporate equity to a “crowd” of investors on such a platform chooses a fixed investment target before the investment period begins. Once the aggregate investments equal the investment target the financing period ends immediately. We demonstrate that this preferential treatment of early investors is not optimal because it potentially excludes informational disadvantaged investors and entrepreneurs from the market. We recommend a market design that allows for some excessive demand. Such a design would increase the willingness of informational disadvantaged investors and entrepreneurs to participate in the market. At the same time, it would minimize a platforms screening costs and maximize its profits.

Keywords: Crowd-investing, initial public offering, excessive demand, market microstructure, asymmetric information.

JEL Classification: D40; D45; G21; G32; L10.

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1 Introduction

So-called crowdinvesting-platforms are a recent development in the financial sector. On these platforms, private investors can buy shares of non-publicly traded companies guaranteeing investors claims on upcoming profits and on some platforms even voting-rights. On crowdinvesting-platforms, entrepreneurs describe their business ideas and choose a fixed investment target. If the investment target is completely funded within a fixed period, the raised capital less charges is handed out to the entrepreneur. If the investment target is not reached within this time period, capital that has been already invested is given back to private investors.

This paper focuses on the market microstructure of crowdinvesting-platforms, especially on the way that the supply of shares is allocated among the investors. Our research approach is to apply insights from the academic literature on Initial Public Offerings (IPO) on the market microstructure of these platforms. We justify this approach by the obvious similarities between the issuance of corporate shares on stock exchanges and the issuance of corporate shares on crowdinvesting-platforms.

A well-known phenomena in the literature on IPOs is underpricing, which is the observation that the issue price of shares initially sold to the public is usually lower than the price of these shares at the end of the first day of trading. This underpricing necessarily results in excessive demand for the shares sold in an IPO. Several theories of the IPO-underpricing literature line out that certain benefits arise when there is underpricing of and excessive demand for corporate shares.

In the process of an IPO, excessive demand can easily be observed. This is due to the fact that the date for an IPO is fixed several months before the event takes place. Thus the excessive demand is just the difference between the aggregate demand of all investors and the supply of shares at this point of time. The excessive demand for corporate shares on a crowdinvesting-platform is not that obvious because the end of a financing period is not as predictable. For example, the financing periods of the British platform “Crowdcube.com” or the German platform “Seedmatch.de” end immediately when the fixed investment target is surpassed. All the investors running late will be rationed completely. That is, their excessive demand cannot actually be observed. But this does not mean that there is no excessive demand.

The status quo of the rationing of excessive demand on crowdinvesting-platforms creates at least two problems. First, imagine there are heterogeneous investors in the crowdinvesting-market. Experienced investors with a comparatively fast evaluation process observing underpriced shares could buy the whole supply of shares at a time. As a result, inexperienced investors with
a slower evaluation process would be excluded from the market because the
shares left over by experienced investors will be overpriced. Therefore, inexpe-
rienced investors will abstain from market participation reducing the overall
number of investors in the market.

The second problem of the status quo of rationing procedures is closely re-
lated to the first one. An entrepreneur who sells corporate shares to a crowd
of investors is interested in a huge and diffuse investor base. A large number
of investors will increase the social support of the company, it will make the
upcoming trade of shares more liquid, and it will reduce the monitoring of
the entrepreneur. But the market microstructure of crowdinvesting-platforms
at the moment creates quite concentrated ownership structures and relatively
small investor bases.

We develop a theoretical model that includes the essential participants in
the crowdinvesting market. First, there is one crowdinvesting-platform that
wants to maximize its profits by choosing the optimal amount of screening
of entrepreneurs and the optimal market microstructure. Second, there is a
large number of entrepreneurs who want to sell their corporate shares at the
platform. Third, there are three types of investors. One informed investor
conducts a costly screening process to completely identify an entrepreneur’s
quality before they invest. Uninformed investors cannot perfectly observe an
entrepreneur’s quality and their investment decision exclusively depends on
the signals of preceding investors. Donators invest for non-monetary reasons,
e.g. because they are family members of the entrepreneur. Although, their
market participation is useful for entrepreneurs they dilute the informativeness
of the market.

We demonstrate that informed investors need preferential treatment in the
rationing process because they face costs of information production and send
positive signals to the market. This is done by guaranteeing a specified fraction
of shares, called zero-rationing threshold, to those investors who invest first.
But the remaining supply of shares beyond that threshold is allocated equally
among the remaining investors.

At the moment, European crowdinvesting-platforms use a zero-rationing
threshold of 100 percent, that is, an investor who buys the whole supply of
shares at a time will receive 100 percent of shares and will not be rationed
at all. We demonstrate that an optimal zero-rationing threshold of strictly
less than 100 percent can guarantee uninformed investors’ and entrepreneurs’
market participation and maximize the expected profits of the crowdinvesting-
platform.

Crowdinvesting-platforms have a very young appearance. Consequently,
academic literature related to this topic is very rare or available in the form
of yet unpublished discussion papers. Contributions to the broader topic of
crowdfunding have been made, for example, by Belleflamme, Lambert, and Schwienbacher (2011), Hemer (2011), Rubinton (2011), and Agrawal, Catalini, and Goldfarb (2011).

However, as described before, the IPO literature was useful in developing the following argumentation because on both, crowdinvesting-platforms and on stock exchanges, firms sell equity to investors. Excellent surveys of the literature of IPO-underpricing are the articles of Ljungqvist (2007) or Ritter and Welch (2002). Theories of this finance discipline describe motives of several parties to create excessive demand as well as benefits arising from excessive demand when corporate shares are initially sold to the public. We will apply these insights on the context of the crowdinvesting market.

Excessive demand for corporate shares creates some desirable scope of action. For example, as Booth and Chua (1996) have demonstrated, entrepreneurs might benefit from excessive demand because it allows to allocate shares in a investor base maximizing way. The increase of the investor base increases a firm’s post-IPO market value because traded assets will be more liquid. Brennan and Franks (1997) arguments that excessive demand allows to create a dispersed ownership structure that protects the benefits of control of the management. According to Rock (1986), excessive demand is necessary to guarantee the market participation of informational disadvantaged investors. We will summarize these arguments in a unified mathematical framework and apply it to the crowdinvesting-market.

This paper is structured as follows. Chapter 2 describes the basics of the optimization problem of a crowdinvesting-platform. The solution of this problem is derived in chapter 3. Chapter 4 concludes.

2 The Model

In the following chapter, we will describe a theoretical model of the crowdinvesting-market. We begin to introduce all involved agents in subchapter 2.1. Subsection 2.2 illustrates the course of action. Subchapter 2.3 includes the derivation of state-dependent allocation probabilities which are essential for the utility functions of market participants. Finally, we will present the objective function of the crowdinvesting-platform in subchapter 2.4 and the participation constraints in subchapter 2.5.

2.1 The agents

Consider a crowdinvesting-market with five types of agents. There are entrepreneurs who apply at a crowdinvesting-platform because they want to re-
alize a project. There is one *crowdinvesting-platform* where entrepreneurs can sell corporate shares to a crowd of investors. There are three types of investors potentially participating in the market. There is one representative *informed investor* who can conduct screening at some cost. The informed investor is able to distinguish good from bad investments. There is a so-called *donator* who buys shares on the crowdinvesting-platform because he/she realizes non-monetary benefits from investment. Finally, there are *uninformed investors* who cannot separate good from bad investments.

**The entrepreneurs**

There is a total population of \( N_t \) entrepreneurs. These entrepreneurs apply at the crowdinvesting-platform. For the sake of simplicity it is assumed here that all entrepreneurs require the same amount of funds to realize their projects. It is further assumed that entrepreneurs sell 100 percent of shares to the crowd. This assumption implies that entrepreneurs will become employees of their companies if they realize a successful funding on the platform. In the moment of their application, entrepreneurs do not know whether their project will create a non-negative return or a negative return. This assumption implies that entrepreneurs do not have any informational advantage compared to investors. In his seminal paper on IPO-underpricing, Rock (ibid.) made the same assumption about entrepreneurs selling shares in an initial public offering. Analogous to Rock (ibid.), this assumption is justified by the fact that entrepreneurs have to reveal so much information on a crowdinvesting-platform that they loose any informational advantage.

**The crowdinvesting-platform**

The crowdinvesting-platform wants to maximize its profits. On the one hand, a platform wants to maximize its revenues. A typical feature of the crowdinvesting market is that platforms only receive money from their customers if a specified investment target is surpassed within a certain period of time. It is assumed here that the platform only receives a fixed fee \( F \) if the investment target is surpassed. Therefore, the platform is interested in maximizing the number of projects that surpass the investment target.

On the other hand, the platform wants to minimize its costs. The platform can conduct costly screening to identify bad projects and sort these projects out. By choosing an amount \( c_p \) used for screening it can sort out bad projects from the set of applicants. Therefore, the fraction of good projects in the population of accepted projects \( N_a(\leq N_t) \) is higher than the fraction of good projects in the set of applicants \( N_t \), that is \( p(c_p) \geq p_c \). As we will show below, this screen-
ing is necessary to guarantee the participation of informed and uninformed investors.

The platform also has to choose the so-called zero-rationing threshold $\bar{\alpha}$, that is, the platform has to choose a certain market microstructure. The zero-rationing threshold $\bar{\alpha}$ determines how much preferential treatment early investors receive in the screening process on the platform. This threshold affects the expected utility of entrepreneurs, informed investors, and uninformed investors. As we will see, the optimal choice of this threshold can minimize the screening costs of the platform and therefore maximize its profits.

**The investors**

Three types of investors participate on the crowdinvesting-market: a representative informed investor, a representative donator and $N_{\text{uninf}}$ uninformed investors.

The informed investor screens every firm that has been accepted on the platform. This process produces costs of $c_{\text{inf}}$ for each of the $N_a$ accepted companies. After this process, the informed investor knows whether a project will generate profits or losses. Once the informed investor knows whether he/she faces a good project, he/she will try to buy as many shares as possible. We assume that the informed investor’s wealth is big enough to buy the majority of shares but not sufficient to absorb the whole supply of shares, that is, $0 < \alpha_{\text{inf}} < 1$.

Another type of investor is the so-called donator. A donator does not buy shares to maximize his/her wealth but for non-monetary benefits of investment. On several crowdfunding-platforms, such as the German platform MySherpas.de, investors support entrepreneurs, like movie-makers or musicians, without receiving any monetary benefits. Thus motives of such investors are purely charitable. On a crowdinvesting-platform, family members or close friends of an entrepreneur could be expected to act as donators by buying corporate shares. It is assumed here that the donator has the same individual demand as the informed investor, that is $\alpha_{\text{don}} = \alpha_{\text{inf}}$ and $0 < \alpha_{\text{don}} < 1$. It is further assumed that the donator supports projects randomly with probability $p_{\text{don}}$. As we will see, the similarity between informed investors and donators creates a negative externality for uninformed investors because it dilutes the informed investor’s signals to the market.

There are $N_{\text{uninf}}$ uninformed investors who buy shares to maximize their wealth. They are assumed to be comparatively poor and that their individual wealth is given by $0 < \alpha_{\text{uninf}} < 0.5$. In contrast to the informed investor, uninformed investors are not able to screen firms and identify attractive projects. Therefore uninformed investors try to use the information implied by preced-
ing investments. If neither the informed investor nor the donator invests in a
certain project they know for sure that this project is bad and they will not in-
vest. If they observe that the informed investor and the donator have invested
in a certain project they know for sure that the project is good and they will
invest. A problem arises when uninformed investors observe that preceding
investors contributed $a_{\text{don}} = a_{\text{inf}}$. Then uninformed investors do not know
whether it was the informed investor who bought shares or the donator.

2.2 The course of action

In the model the following course of action takes place. First, a pre-funding
period involving only the entrepreneurs and the platform takes place. Second,
the funding period involving the investors takes place. Third, in the rationing
period the available supply of shares is allocated to the investors.

The prefunding period is as follows. First, all $N_t$ entrepreneurs apply at the
platform to sell corporate shares. Second, the platform uses financial resources
of $c_p$ to screen the applications and sort out bad projects. After this process
only $N_a(c_p)$ projects will be accepted. At the same time the platform chooses
its market microstructure by choosing a certain zero-rationing threshold $\bar{\alpha}$.

After the prefunding period, the funding period of the crowdinvesting-platform
begins. On the first stage of the funding period, the informed investor pro-
duces information. If the project is good, the informed investor will demand a
fraction $a_{\text{inf}}$ of a company’s shares. If the project is bad, the informed investor
will not demand any shares. On the second stage, the donator will demand a
fraction $a_{\text{don}}$ of shares with probability $p_{\text{don}}$. On the third stage, the uninformed
investors make their investment decision after observing the preceding invest-
ments. If the aggregate preceding investments are $a_{\text{inf}} + a_{\text{don}} = 2a_{\text{inf}} = 2a_{\text{don}}$
all uninformed investors will ask for shares creating an aggregate uninformed
demand of $N_{\text{uninf}} a_{\text{uninf}}$. If the aggregate preceding investments are zero the
uninformed investors will not ask for any shares. The behavior of uninformed
investors after observing preceding investments of $a_{\text{don}} = a_{\text{inf}}$ will be discussed
later.

After the funding period, the rationing period begins. First, the initial in-
vestor - that is, the investor who invested first - receives an allocation of $\bar{\alpha}$
shares. The remaining supply of $1 - \bar{\alpha}$ is allocated equally among the remain-
ing investors.
2.3 The allocation probabilities

The central topic of this paper is how the available corporate shares should be allocated to maximize the profits of the platform while guaranteeing the market participation of the remaining agents. It is assumed here, that the allocation or rationing process in case of excessive demand includes two stages. On the first stage, the initial investor (either the informed investor or the donator) receives the shares guaranteed by the zero-rationing threshold \( \bar{\alpha} \). On the second stage, the remaining supply of shares \( 1 - \bar{\alpha} \) is distributed among all investors in a way that all investors face the same degree of rationing of their (remaining) demand.

Table 1 depicts four possible scenarios of investments on the first and the second stage of the funding period. The project’s quality is good in scenarios I and II while the project’s quality is bad in scenarios III and IV. Scenarios I and IV depict scenarios where uninformed investors on the third stage have full information: In scenario I uninformed investors know that the project is good and they will demand shares while in scenario IV they know that the project is bad and they will not invest.

Uninformed investors could obviously choose the strategy of exclusively investing in scenario I. In that case, the probability of receiving an allocation of underpriced shares on the second stage of the rationing process is given by

\[
\hat{b}^* = \frac{1 - \tilde{\alpha}}{\alpha_{inf} - \tilde{\alpha} + \alpha_{don} + N_{uninf} \alpha_{uninf}}
\]

The enumerator of (1) is the remaining supply of shares \( 1 - \tilde{\alpha} \). The denominator includes the remaining aggregate demand for shares. The remaining individual demand of the informed investor is \( \alpha_{inf} - \tilde{\alpha} \), while the donator demands \( \alpha_{don} \) and the aggregate uninformed demand is \( N_{uninf} \alpha_{uninf} \).

When uninformed investors choose the strategy to invest in scenario I, II and III different allocation probabilities arise. As you can see, the probability of receiving an allocation of underpriced shares is different whether the donator participates in the market or not.
\[ b = \begin{cases} 
\frac{1 - \tilde{\alpha}}{\alpha_{\text{inf}} - \tilde{\alpha} + \alpha_{\text{don}} + N_{\text{uninf}} \alpha_{\text{uninf}}} & \text{if the donator invests,} \\
\frac{1 - \tilde{\alpha}}{\alpha_{\text{inf}} - \tilde{\alpha} + N_{\text{uninf}} \alpha_{\text{uninf}}} & \text{if the donator does not invest.}
\end{cases} \quad (2) \]

If the donator buys underpriced shares (scenario I) the remaining demand on the second stage of the rationing process is \( \alpha_{\text{inf}} - \tilde{\alpha} + \alpha_{\text{don}} + N_{\text{uninf}} \alpha_{\text{uninf}} \). If the donator does not buy underpriced shares (scenario II) the remaining aggregate demand on the second stage of the rationing process is \( \alpha_{\text{inf}} - \tilde{\alpha} + N_{\text{uninf}} \alpha_{\text{uninf}} \). The resulting expected probability of receiving underpriced shares when uninformed investors participate in scenarios I, II and III is given by \( \hat{b} \)

\[ \hat{b} = p_{\text{don}} \frac{1 - \tilde{\alpha}}{\alpha_{\text{inf}} - \tilde{\alpha} + \alpha_{\text{don}} + N_{\text{uninf}} \alpha_{\text{uninf}}} + (1 - p_{\text{don}}) \frac{1 - \tilde{\alpha}}{\alpha_{\text{inf}} - \tilde{\alpha} + N_{\text{uninf}} \alpha_{\text{uninf}}} \quad (3) \]

which is weighted by the probability of the donator’s participation \( p_{\text{don}} \). When uninformed investors choose the strategy of investing in scenarios I, II and III they face the problem of potentially buying overpriced shares. The resulting probability of receiving overpriced shares \( b' \) is derived by the following case-by-case analysis:

\[ b' = \begin{cases} 
\frac{1 - \tilde{\alpha}}{\alpha_{\text{inf}} - \tilde{\alpha} + \alpha_{\text{don}} + N_{\text{uninf}} \alpha_{\text{uninf}}} & \text{if the donator invests,} \\
0 & \text{if the donator does not invest.}
\end{cases} \quad (4) \]

When the donator invests (scenario III) the uninformed investors demand overpriced shares. In this case, the remaining supply of overpriced shares \( 1 - \tilde{\alpha} \) is used to satisfy the remaining aggregate demand \( \alpha_{\text{don}} - \tilde{\alpha} + N_{\text{uninf}} \alpha_{\text{uninf}} \). If the donator does not invest, uninformed investors definitely know, that shares are overpriced resulting in an allocation probability of zero. Accounting for the probability of a donation \( p_{\text{don}} \) delivers the expected probability of receiving overpriced shares \( \hat{b}' \):

\[ \hat{b}' = p_{\text{don}} \frac{1 - \tilde{\alpha}}{\alpha_{\text{inf}} - \tilde{\alpha} + N_{\text{uninf}} \alpha_{\text{uninf}}} \quad (5) \]

These allocation probabilities will be used in the following chapters to calculate the expected utility of the involved agents.

2.4 The objective function of the crowdinvesting-platform

One typical feature of crowdinvesting-platforms is the fact that entrepreneurs only have to pay a fee determined as a fraction of their investment target if the
The investment target is surpassed. Since we have assumed that all entrepreneurial projects have the same size every entrepreneur will have to pay the same fee $F$. This fact makes the participation of uninformed investors particularly important to platforms. As we have seen before, the uninformed investors can choose two strategies of market participation. The first strategy is to exclusively participate when the informed investor and the donator have invested before (scenario I). The second strategy for the uninformed investors is to participate whenever at least one agent has invested before (scenarios I, II and III). Obviously, the crowdinvesting-platform wants the uninformed investors to choose the second strategy because this will guarantee higher revenues for the platform and maximize its gross income. If the participation of uninformed investors is guaranteed in scenarios I, II and III from Table 1 the platform’s expected profit is:

$$\pi = (p(c_p) + (1 - p(c_p))p_{don})N_a(c_p)F - c_p$$  \hspace{1cm} (6)$$

The expected gross income of the platform is determined by $[p(c_p) + (1 - p(c_p))p_{don}]N_a(c_p)F$ while the overall costs are determined by the screening costs $c_p$. That is, the platform will receive fees of $F$ whenever the aggregate demand exceeds the investment target. The number of projects that successfully surpass the investment target depends on the number of accepted projects $N_a(c_p)$. If the uninformed investors’ participation can be guaranteed in scenarios I, II and III the investment target $F$ will be surpassed with probability $p(c_p) + (1 - p(c_p))p_{don}$. That is, the investment target will either be surpassed when the project is good, which is the case with probability $p(c_p)$, or it will be surpassed when the project is bad but the donator invests, which is the case with probability $(1 - p(c_p))p_{don}$.

As you can see in formula (6) the probability of a good project $p(c_p)$ depends on the amount of screening costs $c_p$. We assume, that the total population of $N_t$ entrepreneurs has a fixed and known fraction of good projects $p_e$. By conducting screening activities the platform can sort out bad projects. Therefore, the number of accepted projects $N_a$ cannot exceed the total number of projects $N_t$ and the probability of a good project in the set of accepted projects must at least equal the probability of a good project in the total population of projects, that is, $p(c_p) \geq p_e$. Thus, the number of accepted projects is given by

$$N_a(c_p) = N_t - \left(\frac{c_p}{e}\right)^{1/\gamma}, \ \gamma > 1$$ \hspace{1cm} (7)$$

Notice, that this specification implies that $dN_a(c_p)/dc_p < 0$ and $d^2N_a(c_p)/d^2c_p < 0$. Thus the number of accepted projects falls when screening costs rise, but it involves rising costs to sort out an increasing number of bad projects. There-
Therefore, the endogenous probability of good projects on a crowdinvesting-platform is

\[ p(c_p) = p_e N_t / N_a(c_p) \]  \hspace{1cm} (8)

Notice, that there is a negative relationship between the amount of screening by the platform \( c_p \) and the platform’s profits. This relationship is depicted in figure 1 which includes a plausible calibration of values. Nonetheless, the platform will usually not choose \( c_p = 0 \), due the effect of \( c_p \) on the participation constraint of the remaining agents.

\[
\alpha_{inf}=0.9, \alpha_{don}=0.9, \alpha_{uninf}=0.01, p_{don}=0.25, N_{uninf}=200 \\
\Delta=3000, p_e=0.07, \gamma=1.2, N_t=100
\]

Figure 1: The profit of the platform and the screening costs of the platform

2.5 The participation constraints

The following chapter includes the participation constraints of the entrepreneur, the informed investor and the uninformed investors. The participation constraint of the donator does not need to be considered because the donator participates anyway.
2.5.1 Participation constraint of the entrepreneur

It was assumed that entrepreneurs applying at the platform sell 100% of their companies shares. Consequentially, it is assumed that entrepreneurs become employed managers of their companies after a successful funding. Nonetheless, entrepreneurs are still interested in keeping their role as the CEO. According to Shleifer and Vishny (1986) the probability of the initial entrepreneur loosing control of his/her (former) company is an increasing function of the stake size of the largest external shareholder. That is, if the largest external investor holds a comparatively small stake in the company this will result in comparatively low overall monitoring of the CEO. This argument was also used by Brennan and Franks (1997) to explain IPO-underpricing as a tool to avoid large external investors in the post IPO ownership structure of a company.

It is assumed here that an entrepreneur will only participate in the crowdinvesting-market if he expects to remain the CEO. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) used the simplifying assumption that the current management can only be replaced when the biggest external investor owns at least 50 percent of a company’s shares. Therefore, in our model an entrepreneur will only participate in the crowdinvesting-market if he/she expects that the informed investor will own no more than 50 percent of the company’s shares after a successful funding. This will result in the following participation constraint of the entrepreneur:

\[ E[U_{ent}] = 0.5 - \bar{\alpha} - E[\hat{b}(\bar{\alpha})(\alpha_{inf} - \bar{\alpha})] \geq 0 \]  \hspace{1cm} (9)

\[ E[U_{ent}] = 0.5 - \bar{\alpha} - \left( p_{don} \frac{1 - \bar{\alpha}}{\alpha_{inf} - \bar{\alpha} + \alpha_{don} + N_{uninf}\alpha_{uninf}} + (1 - p_{don}) \frac{1 - \bar{\alpha}}{\alpha_{inf} - \bar{\alpha} + N_{uninf}\alpha_{uninf}} \right) (\alpha_{inf} - \bar{\alpha}) \geq 0 \]  \hspace{1cm} (10)

Formula (9) says that the expected stake of the informed investor after the funding \( \bar{\alpha} + (\alpha_{inf} - \bar{\alpha})E[\hat{b}] \) must be no more than 50 percent. This formula is a very good description of the functions of the zero-rationing threshold \( \bar{\alpha} \). This threshold can be used to reduce the probability that the informed investor will hold a majority stake in the company after a successful funding. The relationship between the expected utility of the entrepreneur \( E(U_{ent}) \) and the zero-rationing threshold is illustrated in Figure 2.

Figure 2 illustrates three different utility functions of the entrepreneur. Obviously, the expected utility of the entrepreneur \( E(U_{ent}) \) decreases with an increasing zero-rationing threshold \( \bar{\alpha} \). Remember the assumed structure of the
rationing process: On the first stage, the informed investor receives a guaranteed fraction of $\bar{\alpha}$ of the available shares. On the second stage, the remaining individual demand of the informed investor $\alpha_{inf} - \bar{\alpha}$ is rationed in the same way as the individual demand of the succeeding investors. Thus, the expected stake of the informed investor is increasing in $\bar{\alpha}$ and decreasing in the number of (uninformed) investors $N_{uninf}$. If the market is big (e.g. $N_{uninf}=1000$), the informed investor will receive a comparatively small allocation of shares on the second stage of the rationing procedure. In this case, $\bar{\alpha}$ can be quite close to 0.5 and the entrepreneur will still participate in the market. But when the market is small (e.g. $N_{uninf}=100$), the informed investor expects a comparatively big allocation of shares on the second stage of the rationing procedure. Therefore, the maximal zero-rationing threshold that still guarantees the market participation of the entrepreneur must be quite small.

The participation constraint includes two critical implied assumptions. First, it is assumed that the entrepreneur can only be replaced as a CEO if the informed investor owns at least 50 percent of the shares. This assumption is obviously simplifying because several investors could decide collectively to replace the management as long as their common shares exceed 50 percent. Nonetheless, this simplifying assumption is used here just as it was used by Shleifer and Vishny (ibid.).
The second critical implied assumption is that investors on crowdinvesting-platforms would need voting rights to replace the management. But many crowdinvesting-platforms, such as the German platform Seedmatch.de, only sell non-voting shares. Therefore, one might argue that the value of 0.5 in formula (9) is not plausible. Our justification for formula (9) is that entrepreneurs are interested in reduced monitoring incentives even if the sold shares do not include any voting rights. As described by Drake and Vetsuypens (1993) and Lowry and Shu (2002), the issuance of equity - with or without voting rights - always implies the risk that the entrepreneur faces legal costs if investors are disappointed about a company’s post-issue evolution. This means that even if a platform only allows for the issuance of non-voting shares the entrepreneur will be interested in a minimization of monitoring incentives to avoid legal costs. This might justify another value than 0.5 in formula (9), but the central argument that the stake of the informed investor should not exceed a certain threshold to reduce monitoring still holds.

2.5.2 Participation constraint of the informed investor

Although, the informed investor has got the ability to observe a company’s true value, this ability does not come for free. The informed investor has to conduct a costly monitoring process to identify a firm’s true value \( v \), implying costs of \( c_{inf} \). Obviously, an informed investor will only participate in the market if the expected allocation of shares is an adequate compensation for these costs. But if there is a huge excessive demand for those shares the resulting probability of receiving underpriced corporate shares will be low. This could discourage producing information at all. At the same time, a low fraction of good investments in the market \( p(c_p) \) could also be a problem reducing the expected utility from market participation. This can be seen in the participation constraint of the informed investor:

\[
E[U_{inf}] = p(c_p)(v_H - P_0)[\bar{\alpha} + \hat{b}(\bar{\alpha})(\alpha_{inf} - \bar{\alpha})] - c_{inf} \geq 0 \quad (11)
\]

\[
E[U_{inf}] = p(c_p)(v_H - P_0)[\bar{\alpha} + (p_{don} \frac{1 - \bar{\alpha}}{\alpha_{inf} - \bar{\alpha} + \alpha_{don} + N_{uninf}\alpha_{uninf}} + (1 - p_{don}) \frac{1 - \bar{\alpha}}{\alpha_{inf} - \bar{\alpha} + N_{uninf}\alpha_{uninf}})(\alpha_{inf} - \bar{\alpha})] - c_{inf} = 0. \quad (12)
\]

Formula (12) illustrates the average profit of the risk neutral informed investor from participating in the crowdinvesting-market. The informed investor only buys corporate shares, when observing \( v \) being bigger than \( P_0 \). That is,
whenever there are underpriced shares, $v_H - P_0$ is positive. The probability of corporate shares being underpriced is $p(c_p)$. When the informed investor observes underpriced shares he/she will demand a stake of $\alpha_{inf}$ of the available shares. At the moment the informed investor states his demand shares, he/she does not know the allocation he/she will finally receive but he can form expectations. The zero-rationing-threshold $\tilde{\alpha}$ is the minimal allocation he/she will receive. The remaining individual demand $\alpha_{inf} - \tilde{\alpha}$ will be rationed in the same way as the individual demand of the succeeding investors. Unfortunately, the screening costs $c_{inf}$ do occur for every available investment, while the net-profits of buying underpriced shares $(v_H - P_0)E[\tilde{\alpha} + \hat{b}(\tilde{\alpha})(\alpha_{I} - \tilde{\alpha})]$ only occur with probability $p_{c_p}$.

\[
\alpha_{inf} = 0.9, \quad \alpha_{don} = 0.9, \quad \alpha_{uninf} = 0.01, \quad p_{don} = 0.25, \quad N_{uninf} = 200
\]
\[
\Delta = 3000, \quad p_e = 0.07, \quad \gamma = 1.2, \quad N_I = 100
\]

Figure 3: The expected utility of the informed investor and zero-rationing threshold

Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the relationship between the expected utility of the informed investor, on the one hand, and the zero-rationing threshold $\tilde{\alpha}$ or the screening costs of the platform $c_p$, on the other hand. Figure 3 illustrates that an increasing $\tilde{\alpha}$ also increases the expected utility of the informed investor. Notice, that for the informed investor $\tilde{\alpha}$ and $c_p$ are substitutes: Either the platform conducts much screening (e.g. $c_p = 2500$) and chooses a low zero-zero rationing
\( \alpha_{\text{inf}} = 0.9, \alpha_{\text{don}} = 0.9, \alpha_{\text{uninf}} = 0.01, \rho_{\text{don}} = 0.25, N_{\text{uninf}} = 200 \)
\( \Delta = 3000, p_e = 0.07, \gamma = 1.2, N_t = 100, c_p = 1000 \)

**Figure 4:** The expected utility of the informed investor and screening costs of the platform
threshold (e.g. $\bar{\alpha} \approx 0.22$), or the platform conducts little screening (e.g. $c_p = 100$) and chooses a high zero-rationing threshold (e.g. $\bar{\alpha} \approx 0.34$).

Figure 4 illustrates the same argument. When $\bar{\alpha}$ is low (e.g. $\bar{\alpha} \approx 0.1$), the platform needs to conduct intensive screening (e.g. $c_p = 5500$) to guarantee the informed investor’s participation. When $\bar{\alpha}$ is high (e.g. $\bar{\alpha} \approx 0.3$), the platform needs conduct less screening (e.g. $c_p = 700$) to guarantee the informed investor’s participation. This is one of the main insights of this paper: Choosing the optimal design of $\bar{\alpha}$ can minimize the screening costs of the platform and therefore maximize its profits.

2.5.3 Participation constraint of the uninformed investors

In contrast to the informed investor, the uninformed investors do not face any costs of information production. The main fear of uninformed investors is that the losses of buying overpriced shares exceed the profits of buying underpriced shares. As we have mentioned before, uninformed investors could avoid buying any overpriced shares when they choose the strategy of exclusively investing when the informed investor and the donator invested before. But this would not maximize the platforms profits. Therefore, the platform has to guarantee that uninformed investors demand shares whenever at least one of the preceding investors demanded shares on stage one or two. This leads to the following participation constraint of uninformed investors:

$$E[U_{uninf,I,II,III}] - E[U_{uninf,I}] \geq 0 \quad (13)$$

$$p(c_p)(v_H - P_0)\alpha_{uninf}E[\hat{b}(\bar{\alpha})] - (1 - p(c_p))p_{don}(P_0 - v_L)\alpha_{uninf}$$

$$E[\hat{b}'(\bar{\alpha})] - p(c_p)p_{don}(v_H - P_0)\alpha_{uninf}E[\hat{b}^*(\bar{\alpha})] \geq 0 \quad (14)$$

$$p(c_p)(v_H - P_0)\alpha_{uninf}\left[p_{don} \frac{1 - \bar{\alpha}}{\alpha_{inf} - \bar{\alpha} + \alpha_{don} + N_{uninf}\alpha_{uninf}} + (1 - p_{don})\right]$$

$$\left[1 - \frac{1 - \bar{\alpha}}{\alpha_{inf} - \bar{\alpha} + N_{uninf}\alpha_{uninf}}\right] - (1 - p(c_p))p_{don}(P_0 - v_L)\alpha_{uninf}$$

$$\frac{1 - \bar{\alpha}}{\alpha_{inf} - \bar{\alpha} + N_{uninf}\alpha_{uninf}}] - p(c_p)p_{don}(v_H - P_0)$$

$$\alpha_{uninf}\left[1 - \frac{1 - \bar{\alpha}}{\alpha_{inf} - \bar{\alpha} + \alpha_{don} + N_{uninf}\alpha_{uninf}}\right] \geq 0 \quad (15)$$
Figure 5 helps with the interpretation of Formulas (13) to (15). Uninformed investors will only choose to participate in scenarios I, II and III - instead of just participating in scenario I - if the probability of underpriced shares $p(c_p)$ exceeds a certain threshold. This will only be guaranteed if the platform conducts a sufficient amount of screening. Otherwise, uninformed investors would face a so-called “winner’s curse”: Uninformed investors who receive an allocation of shares (the “winners” in the rationing process) would realize a negative return on average. The dashed line in Figure 5 depicts the winner’s curse: The assumed screening costs $c_p = 1000$ are too low to guarantee the uninformed investors’ participation. Therefore, the platform has to increase its screening costs. For $c_p = 2000$ the expected utility of uninformed investors is positive for any $\bar{\alpha} < 1$.

$$\alpha_{inf}=0.9, \alpha_{don}=0.9, \alpha_{uninf}=0.01, p_{don}=0.25, N_{uninf}=200$$
$$\Delta=3000, p_c=0.07, \gamma=1.2, N_i=100$$

![Figure 5: The expected utility of the uninformed investor and the zero-rationing threshold](image)

$E[U_{uninf}]$
3 The solution of the optimization problem of the crowdinvesting-platform

A solution to the described optimization problem of the entrepreneur can be derived in three steps. First, we have to find the maximal zero-rationing threshold that will still guarantee the entrepreneur’s participation. Second, holding this threshold constant, we can calculate the minimal amount of screening by the platform that will guarantee the informed investor’s and the uninformed investors’ participation. Third, we have to check whether the platform realizes bigger profits when choosing this amount of screening instead of not conducting any screening at all.

3.1 Choosing the maximal zero-rationing threshold that guarantees the entrepreneur’s participation

The platform has to choose two parameters to maximize its expected utility: the zero-rationing threshold $\bar{\alpha}$ and $c_p$. The entrepreneur’s utility function is an optimal starting point for the solution of this problem, because it exclusively depends on $\bar{\alpha}$ and is independent of $c_p$. By equalizing equation (9) with zero and solving for $\bar{\alpha}$ we can derive the maximal zero-rationing threshold that will guarantee the entrepreneur’s participation:

$$\bar{\alpha}_{ent,part} = \frac{1}{-1 + 2\alpha_{uninf}N_{uninf} + 2\alpha_{inf}p_{don}}(2\alpha_{inf}\alpha_{uninf}N_{uninf} + \alpha_{uninf}^2 N_{uninf}^2 + \alpha_{inf}$$

$$(-1.5 + (1 + \alpha_{inf})p_{don}) - 0.5(-2\alpha_{uninf}^2 N_{uninf}^2 + \alpha_{inf}(3 - 4\alpha_{uninf} N_{uninf} - 2p_{don} - 2p_{don})$$

$$- 2\alpha_{inf}^2 p_{don})^2 - 4(-1 + 2\alpha_{uninf} N_{uninf} + 2\alpha_{inf} p_{don})(\alpha_{inf}\alpha_{uninf} N_{uninf} + \alpha_{uninf}^2 N_{uninf}^2 N_{uninf}(-2 + 2p_{don})))^{0.5} \quad (16)$$

Obviously, this term is hard to interpret. If we use the standard-parameters that have we used throughout the paper $\bar{\alpha}_{ent,part} = 0.380772$. This means that the entrepreneur will participate in the market as long as the zero-rationing threshold does not exceed for about 0.38. As we have seen in Figures 2 and 3, the zero-rationing threshold and screening costs by the platform are perfect substitutes from the point of view of the informed investor. Therefore, the platform will choose the maximal amount of $\bar{\alpha}$ to minimize the required screening $c_p$.

\[^4\alpha_{inf} = 0.9, \alpha_{uninf} = 0.01, N_{uninf} = 200, p_{don} = 0.25\]
3.2 Choosing the minimal screening costs that guarantee the participation of the informed investor and the uninformed investors

The minimal screening costs of the platform that guarantee the informed investor’s participation is derived by solving equation (12) for \( c_p \), when \( \bar{\alpha} = \bar{\alpha}_{ent, part} \):

\[
c_{p, inf, part} = 0.5\gamma c\left(\frac{N_t(2c_{inf} - p_e \Delta)}{c_{inf}}\right)\gamma
\]  \( (17) \)

Again, using standard-parameters\(^2\), the minimal screening costs by the platform that will guarantee the informed investor’s participation is \( c_{p, inf, part} = 5923.05 \). But at this point it is unclear whether this is the optimal amount of screening. We have to take a look at the uninformed investors too. The minimal screening costs of the platform that guarantee the uninformed investors participation is derived by equalizing equation (15) with 0 and solving for \( c_p \):

\[
c_{p, uninf, part} = c\left(-\frac{p_d^2 N_t + p_e N_t - p_d p_e N_t + p_d^2 p_e N_t}{p_d^2}\right)\gamma
\]  \( (18) \)

Using standard-parameters\(^3\), the result is \( c_{p, uninf, part} = 1369.66 \). To guarantee the participation of both, the informed investor and the uninformed investors, the optimal amount of screening by the platform is given by \( c^*_p = \max\{c_{p, inf, part}, c_{p, uninf, part}\} \). In our example the platform will choose \( \bar{\alpha}^* = 0.38 \) and \( c^*_p = 5923.05 \). Finally, the platform will realize a profit of \( \pi = 16826.90 \) which is bigger than the platform’s profits if it does not conduct any screening.

4 Conclusion

This paper was meant to demonstrate that the market microstructure of international crowdinvesting-platforms is not optimal at the moment. The reason for this is the suboptimal design and use of rationing procedures. It was shown that screening costs by a platform and the choice of the so-called zero-rationing threshold are perfect substitutes for some of the investors participating in the

\(^2\alpha_{inf} = 0.9, \alpha_{uninf} = 0.01, N_{uninf} = 200, p_{don} = 0.25, c_{inf} = 150, \Delta = 3000, p_e = 0.07, c = 100, F = 1000, \gamma = 1.2, N_t = 100 \)

\(^3\alpha_{inf} = 0.9, \alpha_{uninf} = 0.01, N_{uninf} = 200, p_{don} = 0.25, \Delta = 3000, p_e = 0.07, c = 100, F = 1000, \gamma = 1.2, N_t = 100 \)
market. This relationship gives crowdfunding-platforms the opportunity to minimize costs by choosing the optimal rationing procedure.

The focus of this paper was mainly on the rationing of excessive demand on crowdfunding-platforms, while other aspects of the market microstructure of these platforms were ignored. Throughout the paper, we assumed that the platform can increase the probability of good projects by conducting costly screening. Of course, there are different measures that can improve the quality of firms which are accepted on such platforms, for example, increasing disclosure requirements.

Another restriction of this paper was the assumption that the informed investor’s and the uninformed investors’ demand was constant for every (good) project. This assumption made the participation of both types of investors desirable. If we would allow for a varying individual demand of informed and uninformed investors different results could arise. For example, lowering the zero-rationing threshold might push informed investors out of the market, while increasing the individual demand of uninformed investors, instead of remaining constant. This might justify a different market microstructure.

Crowdfunding-platforms are a major achievement for small and medium-sized companies, because it allows small firms access to equity markets which they have been excluded from before. For this reason, the establishment of crowdfunding-markets is socially desirable and Economists should help to improve these markets in the future.
References


