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Urban Cultural Amenities and the Migration of the Creative Class

by

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Urban Cultural Amenities and the Migration of the Creative Class

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This paper models the migration of the Creative Class (Florida, 2003) in a New-Economic-Geography framework. Beside wage differentials, urban cultural amenities play an important role on the choice of location. A public cultural good, financed by taxes, is introduced as an agglomeration force. The public-good is purely consumed by skilled workers. Additionally urban cultural diversity across cities is taken into account to model exogenous differences between cities. I analyze the political equilibrium of tax competition. Furthermore the effects of asymmetries of cities and trade liberalization is examined. There is an optimal level of provision of public cultural goods. In the dispersion-scenario the equilibrium tax rate for workers is hump-shaped with respect to trade integration while for skilled workers it is u-shaped. In the core-periphery scenario the equilibrium tax rate for the core decreases with increasing trade freeness.

Keywords: Creative Class, New Economic Geography, Agglomeration, Urban Cultural Amenities, Public Cultural Goods, Tax Competition.

JEL Classification: F12; H87; J24; R1

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1 Introduction

Urban success is partly determined by how attractive cities are for skilled and creative people (Florida, 2003). A significant body of recent evidence points the importance of skills and ideas for economic growth of cities and regions. Following the “new growth theory” (Romer, 1986), urban economists like Glaeser et al. (1992) and Rauch (1993) have focused on several ways in which cities become more productive as centers of idea transmission. Lucas (1988) states that the high costs of cities would be unfeasible if there were no productivity gains provided by the highly skilled human capital. Location-specific knowledge and faster intellectual flows in cities make firms more productive. Cities with higher concentrations of skilled workers pay higher wages (Behrens, Duranton, and Robert-Nicoud, 2014) and have higher growth (Glaeser, Scheinkman, and Shleifer, 1995, Glaeser, Kolko, and Saiz, 2001).

The conventional wisdom in the field of labor migration is that these skilled individuals are mostly driven by income differentials (Sjaastad, 1962; Todaro, 1969, 1976, 1989; Todaro and Maruszko, 1987). But people are not only driven by pure remuneration motives (Facchini, Mayda, and Mendola, 2013).

In the last decade some urbanists have focused on the role of cultural urban amenities as an agglomeration force for skilled and creative people. Cities that have a high ethnic and intellectual diversity (Ottaviano and Peri, 2005, 2006; Suedekum, Wolf, and Blien, 2014) and are abundant on high-quality cultural experience (Boualam, 2014; Florida, 2002b; Florida and Gates, 2001; Florida, Mellander, and Stolarick, 2008; Mellander, Florida, and Rentfrow, 2012). There is evidence that art and culture draw skilled and creative people (Borck, 2006; Clark, 1988; Florida, 2002a; Florida and Gates, 2001; Florida, Mellander, and Stolarick, 2008; Sheppard, 2006). Following this approach this paper analyzes which role public investment in cultural goods plays for the agglomeration of skilled and creative workers. Addressing these questions is important for policy and academic reasons. Cultural policies are increasingly considered as drivers of economic growth and urban recovery. These policies are justified by the effect of culture on city attractiveness.

Moreover, the present paper examines what function urban cultural diversity, e.g. tolerance and anonymity, play for the attractiveness of cites. Swann, Rentfrow, and Guinn (2002) find that individuals search social environments where their personality is accepted by others and their beliefs can easily be expressed. Clark (2004) and Florida and Gates (2001) show that increased social mobility in the US enable people to relocate where their lifestyle is valued by

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1See Storper and Scott (2006) for a detailed and critical discussion on the topic of human capital, creativity and urban growth.
others. For example, have gay people heavily moved to large cities (Moss, 1997) in the last decades. Barrick, Mount, and Gupta (2005) find that intellectual openness is positively related to the presence of skilled professionals. Cultural variety is a good breeding ground for innovation and entrepreneurship and, therefore, for higher growth (Desrochers, 2001; Feldman, 2000; Fritsch and Stuetzer, 2008). Berliant, Peng, and Wang (2002) follow Jacobs’ (1969) view and argue that new ideas are formed by combining old ideas and that urban diversity is the key to innovation. Duranton and Puga (2001) find microfoundations for the role that diversified cities play in fostering innovation.

I develop a New Economic Geography model where the migration of skilled and creative people is not only driven by wage differentials, but also by urban cultural amenities. My point of departure is the Forslid and Ottaviano (2003) model. Two features are added to the model. (A) I introduce a public cultural good to attract skilled workers. To finance the good taxes are levied, first only on the unskilled workers, later on skilled workers as well. (B) I employ an exogenous endowment of urban cultural diversity for every city.

I analyze the political equilibrium of tax competition and the effects of trade liberalisation. The following results arise:

(i) With asymmetric taxation (i.e., taxing only the unskilled factor), there is a positive optimal level of public cultural goods provision for both cities in the dispersion scenario. Public cultural expenditures are hump-shaped in relation to trade integration. In the agglomeration scenario there is a positive optimal level of cultural expenditures that decreases with trade integration. There are no cultural expenditures in the periphery.

(ii) Adding exogenous asymmetries in urban cultural diversity, lowers the cultural expenditures of the high-amenities city, which we call the creative city, in the dispersive scenario. Trade integration increases the expenditures and eventually turns the equilibrium to a core-periphery outcome. In the agglomeration scenario the equilibrium tax decreases with increasing amenities factor.

(iii) With symmetric taxation, the skilled factor pays for the cultural good while the unskilled does not. With increased trade integration, the unskilled increasingly subsidize the skilled. In the core-periphery scenario the unskilled pay low taxes and the skilled pay high taxes. Both tax rates decrease with increasing trade integration.

The paper is structured as follows. In the next section I present the basic assumptions. Section 2.3 introduces a public-cultural good and taxes on unskilled labor. In chapter 2.4 an exogenous urban amenities factor is added and in chapter 2.5 taxes on both factors are levied. Section 2.6 concludes.

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2Candau (2008) surveys the literature on location of entrepreneurs and firms.
2 The Model

The model is based on the Forslid and Ottaviano (2003) version of the Krugman (1991) core-periphery model.

There are two cities called Bohemia (B) and Suburbia (S) with identical consumer preferences, firm technologies, transport costs and initial factor endowments. There are two sectors, the agricultural produces good $A$, and the industrial produces a variety of goods $M$. There are two factors, skilled workers $H$ which is the creative class, and unskilled workers $L$.

The representative consumer has a two-tier utility function with an upper tier Cobb-Douglas “nest” of the agricultural good $A$ and the industrial variety $M$ which consists of a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) sub-utility

$$U = C_M^\mu C_A^{1-\mu}, \quad C_M \equiv \left( \int_{i=0}^{n+n^*} c_i^{1-1/\sigma} \, di \right)^{1/(1-1/\sigma)}; \quad 0 < \mu < 1 < \sigma,$$

where $c_i$ is the amount of an industrial variety $i$ consumed, $n$ and $n^*$ are the numbers of manufacturing goods in B and S, respectively, and $\mu$ is the constant share of income spent on $M$. $\sigma$ is the CES between the industrial goods.

With $Y$ as the consumer expenditures, the demand of a typical variety $j$ yields

$$x_j = \frac{p_j^{-\sigma} \mu Y}{\int_{i=0}^{n+n^*} p_i^{1-\sigma} \, di}, \quad Y = w_L L + w H,$$

where $w_L$ and $w$ is the wage of unskilled and skilled workers, respectively. World expenditures are $Y + Y^*$. The expressions for $S$ are isomorphic and are indicated with asterisks.

The agricultural good $A$ is homogenous and is produced by unskilled workers. There are constant returns of scale and perfect competition. It is assumed that one unit of labor is used to produce one unit of good $A$. Taking this good as the numeraire and assuming that trade is costless, equalizes the price of the homogenous good and the wage of the unskilled workers to unity across cities.

As regards the industrial sector, I follow the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) model of monopolistically competition with increasing returns. $a_M$ units of unskilled workers and the service of one skilled worker is needed for R&D and headquarter services (fixed costs, $F = 1$). The total cost of producing $x_j$ units of manufactured good $j$ is

$$\chi_j = w + a_M x_j.$$
Trade in manufactured goods is subject to iceberg trade costs. A firm that
wants to sell one unit of a variety in the other city has to ship $\tau \geq 1$ units,
since $1 - \tau$ units “melt” on the way. $\phi \equiv \tau^{1-\sigma}$ is the “freeness of trade” and
$0 \leq \phi \leq 1$.

Profit maximization by firms, under the Chamberlinian large group assump-
tion, leads to producer price of each differentiated commodity produced in
Bohemia sold there and in Suburbia, respectively, are

$$
p = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} a_M, \quad p^* = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} \tau a_M.
$$

I assume that $a_M = (\sigma - 1)/\sigma$, then $p = 1$. As there is monopolistically competi-
tion, the fixed cost must be covered by the excess of variable revenue over the
variable cost so that

$$
x_j = \sigma w.
$$  \label{2}

**The short-run equilibrium**

Unskilled workers are immobile and both cities have the same constant en-
dowment $L = L^*$.

In the short run skilled workers do not migrate either and with full em-
ployment the number of firms $n$ is equal to the number of skilled workers
$n = H = n^* = H^*$. If $P$ is the overall price index in equilibrium

$$
P = [\lambda + \phi(1 - \lambda)]^{1/(1-\sigma)}, \quad P^* = [\phi \lambda + (1 - \lambda)]^{1/(1-\sigma)},
$$

and as all varieties have producer price 1, (1) and (2) yield the wage for skilled workers

$$
w = \frac{\mu}{\sigma} \left( \frac{Y}{\lambda + \phi (1 - \lambda)} + \frac{\phi (1 - Y)}{\phi \lambda + (1 - \lambda)} \right),
$$

$$
w^* = \frac{\mu}{\sigma} \left( \frac{\phi Y}{\lambda + \phi (1 - \lambda)} + \frac{\phi (1 - Y)}{\phi \lambda + (1 - \lambda)} \right),
$$

with $\lambda = H$ as the share of the total skilled workers living in Bohemia since the
world endowment of skilled workers is normalized to unity. $1 - \lambda$ is the share
of total skilled workers living in Suburbia.
The long-run equilibrium

In the long run, skilled workers will move to the city where they get a higher indirect utility\(^3\).

\[ V = \mu^\mu (1 - \mu)^{1 - \mu} \frac{w}{P^\mu}, \quad V_L = \mu^\mu (1 - \mu)^{1 - \mu} \frac{w_L}{P^\mu}, \]

are the indirect utility functions of the skilled and unskilled workers in Bohemia and Suburbia, respectively. The “migration equation” is

\[ \dot{\lambda} = (V - V^*) \lambda (1 - \lambda). \]

Migration stops in two cases:

1. Dispersed equilibrium: \( V = V^* \) if \( 0 < \lambda < 1 \).
2. Agglomeration equilibrium: \( \lambda = 1 \) or \( \lambda = 0 \).

The model contains dispersion and agglomeration forces and the equilibria are thus not always stable or unique. The city with the larger number of skilled workers has a supply linkage since the local price index is lower. The larger share of the mobile factor gives a larger market which raises the profitability of firms and attracts even more skilled workers. In addition to that, there is a dispersive force. By having a higher share of mobile workers in a city, competition between firms raises and, therefore, profitability of the domestic firms falls. Trade costs affect the strength of these forces. If they are large enough, the symmetric equilibrium is stable. If trade costs are low, there are stable agglomeration equilibria where all of the mobile factor resides in one city.

3 Introducing taxes and public goods

In this chapter a public cultural good is introduced, financed through a tax on wages. The idea behind it is that a city can raise its attractiveness for skilled workers by financing expenditures in culture (i.e., operas, theaters, art exhibitions, museums, etc).

\(^3\)One contrast between skilled and unskilled workers is that the skilled migrate more than the unskilled (Greenwood, 1997; Molloy, Smith, and Wozniak, 2011). Davis and Dingel (2013) show, that prime-working-age US-born individuals who change residences are nearly 70% more likely to change metropolitan areas if they hold a bachelor’s degree rather than just a high school degree.
I assume that taxes are levied only on unskilled workers. This is done for simplicity and since skilled workers are mobile and can “vote by feet.” Tax revenues are spent on public cultural goods that are enjoyed only by skilled workers. Their utility function is

\[ U = C_M^{\mu} C_A^{1-\mu} G^\gamma \quad ; \quad 0 < \gamma < 1 , \]

where \( G \) is the public cultural good, and \( \gamma \) is the importance of the public good which is a constant.

To avoid intractable interactions, I will follow Andersson and Forslid (2003) and assume that the public good is produced by means of the average consumption basket (i.e., a fraction \( 1 - \mu \) of the tax revenue is spent on agricultural goods, and a fraction \( \mu \) on manufactures). The amount of the public good is equal to the expenditure (in numeraire units)

\[ G = \frac{t_L L}{P^\mu} , \]

with \( t_L \) as the tax rate on unskilled workers. The indirect utilities of the two workers are

\[ V = \mu^\mu (1 - \mu)^{1-\mu} \frac{w}{P^\mu} G^\gamma \quad , \quad V_L = \mu^\mu (1 - \mu)^{1-\mu} \frac{1 - t_L}{P^\mu} (P^\mu + G^\gamma) . \]

Note that there must be at least a rudimentary public sector to have a non-zero utility of the skilled workers. Let \( \rho \) be the ratio between the utilities of mobile workers of the two cities. If \( \rho \) is equal to unity, no individual has an incentive to migrate

\[ \rho = \frac{\frac{w}{P^\mu} G^\gamma}{(P^\mu + G^\gamma)^\gamma} = 1 . \]

Dispersed equilibrium

First the stable symmetric equilibrium scenario is analyzed. I will look at the impact of public goods and taxes on the mobility of the skilled factor.

The breakpoint

The breakpoint is the level of trade freeness where the symmetric equilibrium switches from stable to unstable. It is the point where the agglomeration forces

\[ 4 \text{In chapter 2.5 both factors will be taxed and basic insights turn out not being significantly different.} \]
get stronger than the dispersion force. Or formally the point where the slope of \( \rho \) with respect to \( \lambda \) is equal to zero at \( \lambda = 1/2 \). Let us analyze the breakpoint of the present model, \( \phi^b \), to check whether there is an additional dispersion or agglomeration force compared to the footlose entrepreneur model of Forslid and Ottaviano (2003).

\[
\phi^b = \frac{(\sigma - \mu)(\sigma - 1 - \mu - \mu\gamma)}{(\sigma + \mu)(\sigma + \mu - 1 + \mu\gamma)},
\]

\[
\phi^b_{FE} = \frac{(\sigma - \mu)(\sigma - 1 - \mu)}{(\sigma + \mu)(\sigma + \mu - 1)}.
\]

The symmetric equilibrium is unstable for trade costs lower than \( \phi^b \). The difference to the breakpoint of the footloose entrepreneur model \( \phi^b_{FE} \) is the term \( \mu\gamma \) in both, the numerator and denominator. Since both are positive constants smaller than one, \( \phi^b < \phi^b_{FE} \). This indicates that there is an additional agglomeration force. Note that the breakpoint is decreasing in the preference for public goods. These results are valid since it is assumed that the so-called “no-black-hole” condition holds.\(^5\) The breakpoint cannot be negative since it is assumed that \( \mu < \sigma - 1 \) and \( 0 < \gamma < 1 \).

**The extra agglomeration force**

The additional agglomeration force created through the public good can be illustrated at the symmetric equilibrium. It is useful to split \( \rho \) into two parts:

\[
\rho \equiv \Omega\Gamma, \quad \Omega \equiv \frac{w/P^L}{w^*/(P^*)^\mu}, \quad \Gamma \equiv \left(\frac{tL/P^L}{t^*L/(P^*)^\mu}\right)^\gamma,
\]

where \( \Omega \) is the ratio of real wages and \( \Gamma \) is the ratio of real public goods. To investigate the stability properties of the symmetric equilibrium, one has to differentiate (3) with respect to \( \lambda \) and evaluate it at \( \lambda = 1/2 \) with \( t = t^* \)

\[
\left. \frac{\partial \rho}{\partial \lambda} \right|_{\lambda = \frac{1}{2}} = \Gamma \left. \frac{\partial \Omega}{\partial \lambda} \right|_{\lambda = \frac{1}{2}} + \Omega \left. \frac{\partial \Gamma}{\partial \lambda} \right|_{\lambda = \frac{1}{2}}.
\]

Note that on the right hand side \( \Gamma = \Omega = 1 \) since \( \lambda = \frac{1}{2} \) and \( t = t^* \). Eq. (4) can be rewritten as

\[
\left. \frac{\partial \rho}{\partial \lambda} \right|_{\lambda = \frac{1}{2}} = \left. \frac{\partial \Omega}{\partial \lambda} \right|_{\lambda = \frac{1}{2}} + \left. \frac{\partial \Gamma}{\partial \lambda} \right|_{\lambda = \frac{1}{2}},
\]

where

\[
\frac{\partial \Gamma}{\partial \lambda} \bigg|_{\lambda=\frac{1}{2}} = 4 \gamma \cdot \frac{\mu}{\sigma - 1} \cdot \frac{1 - \phi}{1 + \phi}.
\]  

(6)

The first term of (5) on the right hand side is the same as in the standard footloose entrepreneur model. This partial has the three already known agglomerative and dispersive forces: the stabilizing market-crowding effect and the two destabilizing forces of circular causality called demand and cost linkage.

(6) shows that there is an additional agglomeration force in the present model. The first part $4 \gamma$ is the “amenities linkage” already known from Baldwin et al. (2003, p. 385). Taxes are levied only on skilled workers but the public good is enjoyed by both factors. Since it is positive, it makes the symmetric equilibrium unstable and it is an agglomeration force. Production shifting to Bohemia does not influence the tax base since only the immobile factor pays taxes. The production shifting reduces the overall price index through the cost-of-living effect and, therefore, raises the provision of real public goods.

The second part $\mu/(\sigma - 1)$ is always positive since $\sigma > 1$. But since $\mu < 1$, the overall effect of this agglomeration force is lowered for realistic values of $\sigma$ and $\mu$. The third part of (6) is the closedness of trade. Since $\frac{1-\phi}{1+\phi} \leq 1$ it reduces the overall extra agglomeration effect compared to Baldwin and Krugman (2004). In their model the tax base gets higher than in the present model since skilled workers pay taxes too and, therefore, there is an increased agglomeration force.

The public good is provided to skilled workers and creates an additional agglomeration force. This force is smaller than in the case where all workers are taxed and all workers enjoy the public good (Andersson and Forslid, 2003). Migration leads to a lower overall price index and, therefore, to a higher level of real consumption. This force induces further migration. The stronger are the preferences for the public good and the manufacturing good, the stronger is this agglomeration force in the present model. Notice that in contrast to Andersson and Forslid (ibid.) and Baldwin and Krugman (2004) trade costs reduce the overall effect if trade gets freer.

**The tax gap**

To analyze how migration responds to marginal changes in the tax rate, it is useful to transform the equilibrium condition $\rho = 1$ such that

\[
\Psi = t_L^* / t_L, \quad \Psi \equiv \left( \frac{w_P - \mu (1+\gamma)}{w^* P^* - \mu (1+\gamma)} \right)^{1/\gamma}.
\]

(7)

Since $\Psi$ does not depend on taxes the equilibria can be studied graphically by superimposing $\Psi$ with the tax ratio $t_L^*/t_L$, which shall be called the tax gap.
The starting point is a perfectly symmetric situation where half of the world’s skilled people is in each city and tax rates are equal, $\rho = 1 = t^*_L/t_L$. This case shall be disturbed by an exogenous increase in the tax gap, e.g. assume that Bohemia increases its tax rate to $t_L + \epsilon > t_L$, while Suburbia does not. This will induce some skilled workers to move to Bohemia since it provides a higher amount of the public cultural good. In Fig. 1 the initial tax gap is $t^*_L/t_L = 1$. The marginal tax change gives a marginal relocation of the skilled workers at $\Psi = t^*_L/(t_L + \epsilon)$.

![Figure 1: Tax gap with different levels of trade freeness](image.png)

However, as can be seen in Fig. 1 the degree of relocation depends largely upon the level of trade freeness. When trade is freer ($\phi_1 < \phi_2$) the $\Psi$-curve is flatter and the same tax gap yields a higher amount of skilled workers in Bohemia. Furthermore a tax change may have dramatic effects if $\phi$ is large enough. This happens since the $\Psi$-curve is hump shaped to the left of the symmetric point. If $\phi$ would be large enough, a change to $t_L'$ will end with a catastrophic relocation of the mobile factor to Bohemia.

**Agglomeration Equilibrium**

As a next step I will analyze the scenario, where all mobile workers are in one city, the so-called core-periphery outcome. If trade freeness is sufficiently small there is a stable equilibrium, even if the tax rates of the two cities are different.
However, when trade freeness is larger than the sustain point, the impact of asymmetric taxes is quite different. Fig. 2 shows, that the relationship between $\Psi$ and the dispersion of capital is reversed and the slope of the $\Psi$-curve is positive in $\lambda = 1/2$. This indicates that at this level of trade freeness agglomeration forces are stronger as dispersion forces.

Let us assume the core is in Bohemia. In this case asymmetric taxation may not change anything. Even if Suburbia raises its tax rate to $t^*_L + \epsilon > t^*_L$, it maybe still not be large enough to relocate the skilled workers. Graphically this is shown in Fig. 2.

In the standard New Economic Geography literature the agglomeration rent is defined as the difference between the indirect utility a mobile worker gets in the core-city and the indirect utility the worker is indifferent to stay in the city or move to the other city. As Fig. 3 shows, the agglomeration rents are hump-shaped with respect to trade freeness. At very high trade costs, agglomeration is not really possible since shipping goods to distant markets is expensive. At very low trade costs, agglomeration is not really needed since trade is so cheap.

Fig. 3 shows that the agglomeration rent is larger in the present model as for the standard footloose entrepreneur model. When trade is sufficiently free, $\phi > \phi^s$, the agglomeration rent is positive. The sustain point $\phi^s$ is lower that the one in the standard footloose entrepreneur model $\phi^s_{FE}$. This can be explained by the additional agglomeration force found in the analysis above. Since there

\[
\frac{t^*_L}{t^*_L, \Psi} = \frac{(t^*_L + \epsilon)}{t^*_L}
\]

\[
\frac{t^*_L}{t^*_L} \leq 1
\]

\[
\Psi \leq 1
\]

\[
\lambda = 1/2
\]

Figure 2: Tax gap and core-periphery outcome

Figure 3: Agglomeration rent with respect to trade freeness
are no taxes on mobile factor the government cannot tax this agglomeration rent.

\[ \mu=0.4; \sigma=4; \gamma=0.4; t_L^* = 0.1; \lambda=1; \]

![Figure 3: Agglomeration rents](image)

Given Bohemia’s tax rate, Suburbia can raise its tax rate at a certain level so that all mobile workers relocate to Suburbia. The utility surplus mobile workers have in Bohemia must be offset by the provision of public goods by Suburbia. The formal condition will be

\[ \Psi_{CB} t_L^* < 1 , \]

where \( \Psi_{CB} \) is the real reward ratio without the nominal ratio of public goods if the core is in Bohemia (\( \lambda = 1 \)). Solving for \( t_L^* \) gives the tax rate at which Suburbia can “steal” the core

\[ t_L^{SC*} > \Psi_{CB} t . \]

If Suburbia taxes its unskilled workers at \( t_L^{SC*} \), the first skilled worker will move to Suburbia creating a catastrophic migration so that at the end the whole mobile factor will be in Suburbia. Fig. 4 shows the tax rate Suburbia must set to attract the mobile factor that is agglomerated in Bohemia with \( t_L \) constant at 0.1.
Political Equilibrium

The previous section provided a series of insights on stability and comparative statics. However the tax rates were fixed and not the complete set of interactions between the cities were modelled.

The focus will be on the competition of the two cities for skilled workers. The object of choice is the tax rate $t_{L}$, which determines $G$ enjoyed only by mobile workers. Choosing taxes to be the strategic variables, Nash equilibria of the game will be analyzed. The goal of the government is to maximize the utility of the immobile factor, so its objective function is $W = U_{L}$. I follow the median-voter model, which means the majoritarian group uses electoral competition to force the government to adopt its preferences. The unskilled workers do have majorities in the two cities if the proportion of mobile workers is less than one third globally. This fits the findings of Florida and Gates (2001), who estimate that the skilled workers represent around 30% of the workforce in the US.

The second assumption will be that skilled workers do not get taxed since they are mobile and can “vote by feet”.

The starting point is the symmetric equilibrium with freeness of trade lower than the breakpoint. This means that there is some room for raising taxes without creating a catastrophic migration. Competition for mobile workers works through raising taxes and providing more of the public cultural good. The competition for skilled workers stops for sure at the point where immobile workers can do better “on their own”
\[ V_L(\tilde{t}_L, \lambda = 1/2) \geq V_L(t_L = 0, \lambda = 0) . \]

Solving the inequality for \( \tilde{t}_L \) gives the upper-bound for the tax rate

\[ \tilde{t}_L \leq 1 - \frac{P_S^\mu}{P_P^\mu} , \]

where \( P_S \) and \( P_P \) are the price levels in the symmetric equilibrium and periphery, respectively. Algebraically the optimum is determined by solving

\[ \max_{t_L} V_L . \]

This gives

\[ \frac{\partial V_L}{\partial t_L} = 0 \Rightarrow (1 - t_L) + \frac{P}{\mu \frac{\partial P}{\partial \lambda} \frac{\partial \lambda}{\partial t_L}} = 0 , \quad (8) \]

where

\[ \frac{\partial P}{\partial \lambda} = \frac{(-1 + \phi)(\lambda + \phi - \lambda \phi)^{\gamma/\sigma}}{-1 + \sigma} , \]

and

\[ \frac{\partial \lambda}{\partial t_L} = -\frac{\partial P}{\partial t_L} , \]

if the implicit-function theorem is applied.

As long as the additional utility is not negative, it makes sense paying more taxes to attract skilled workers. Solving Eq. (8) for \( t_L \) gives the optimal tax rate \( \hat{t}_L \) that maximizes \( V_L \).

The first-best tax rate would be at the lowest possible level for both cities providing maximum disposable income to immobile workers. But one city could deviate from that tax rate and attract skilled workers and raise the indirect utility of unskilled workers through a lower price level. Both cities will, therefore, offer the mobile workers \( \hat{G} = \frac{\hat{t}_L L}{P} \) as long \( \hat{t}_L \leq \tilde{t}_L \). Once \( \hat{t}_L > \tilde{t}_L \), both cities will set their tax rate at \( \tilde{t}_L \) and offer \( \tilde{G} = \frac{\tilde{t}_L L}{P} \) of the public cultural good.

Recall that \( \tilde{t}_L \) is the tax rate at which the utility of the unskilled is equal to the level of utility if no skilled workers would be in a city. If the two cities would cooperate, they could set \( t_L = t_L^* = 0 \) once \( \hat{t}_L > \tilde{t}_L \) and \( \hat{t}_L > \tilde{t}_L \) since the level of utility of the unskilled workers would be the same. We rule out this scenario.

To establish that the solution is a Nash equilibrium of the tax game, one should ask whether Bohemia could improve its payoff by varying its tax rate
slightly. Starting off at \( t_L = t^*_L = \hat{t}_L \), any deviation will result in a lower utility for the unskilled workers. Lowering the tax rate would induce the mobile factor to migrate to Suburbia resulting in a higher overall price index in Bohemia. Raising the tax rate would make immobile workers worse off since the costs to attract \( H \) would be higher than the benefits. Consequently Bohemia would not deviate from \( \hat{t}_L \) and Suburbia would come to the same conclusion. This is also valid for levels of trade freeness where cities charge \( \tilde{t}_L^S \).

\[ \lambda=0.5;\mu=0.4;\sigma=4;\gamma=0.4 \]

![Figure 5: Nash equilibrium tax rate for \( \phi < \phi^B \)](image)

Fig. 5 provides a numerical example for the Nash equilibrium tax rate at values of freeness of trade lower than the breakpoint. Both cities will always set the lower tax rate of the two depicted, which means the equilibrium tax rate is hump-shaped. At low levels of trade freeness, cities will set the tax rate that maximizes the utility of the unskilled (\( \hat{t}_L \), continuous line) since otherwise the benefit of taxes, the lower price index, is lower than the costs, a marginal increase in the tax rate. The equilibrium tax rate increases with respect to trade freeness until it crosses the upper-bound tax rate (\( \tilde{t}_L \), dashed line). Once \( \hat{t}_L > \tilde{t}_L \), cities will set \( \tilde{t}_L \), the upper-bound tax rate. The equilibrium tax rate then decreases with respect to trade freeness.

\[
\frac{\partial \hat{t}_L}{\partial \phi} = -\frac{2^{\mu/(\sigma-1)} \mu \phi^{[\mu/(\sigma-1)]} (1 + \phi)^{[\mu/(1-\sigma)]} (1 + \phi)^{-1}}{\sigma - 1}.
\] (9)
As Eq. (9) shows, the slope of the upper-bound tax rate is negative since \( \mu > 0, \phi > 0, \) and \( \sigma > 1. \) If trade freeness raises, the increase in welfare of workers in the periphery is proportionally higher than the one in the symmetric scenario. The reason is that in the periphery all varieties have to be imported since there is no industrial firm that produces locally.

Fig. 5 shows a numerical example of the tax rate that maximizes the indirect utility of unskilled workers. For various values of the variables, which have frequently used in the literature, the slope of \( \hat{t}_L \) with respect to the trade freeness is positive. There are three main effects. First, unskilled workers benefit if trade freeness increases since the costs of imported goods are lower and this reduces the price level. If trade freeness increases, unskilled workers benefit less from the cheaper import of industrial goods. Second, a higher share of skilled workers in Bohemia increases the indirect utility of unskilled workers since less varieties have to be imported. As trade freeness increases, this effect decreases since the cost of importing goods decreases. Third, the higher the tax rate of Bohemia the more skilled workers will move to Bohemia since their indirect utility will be higher. But since \( \frac{\partial^2 \lambda_{t}}{\partial t \partial \phi} > 0, \) this effect increases with increasing trade freeness. As depicted in Fig. 6, everything else being equal, a marginal increase in the tax rate attracts more high skilled workers at a higher level of trade freeness. Higher trade freeness reduces the direct advantage unskilled workers have through the price index, but increases disproportionally stronger the effect taxes have on attracting skilled workers.

Two results can be derived from this section. First, there is an equilibrium tax rate and, therefore, an optimal quantity of public cultural goods provided to keep the mobile workers in the city. And second, increased integration first raises public cultural expenditures and then decreases it.

The next step is to look at the agglomeration scenario, where all skilled workers are in one city. This is the case if trade freeness is larger than the sustainpoint \( \phi^s. \) It is assumed that all skilled workers reside in Bohemia. In this case a simultaneous-move Nash tax game as above cannot be applied. All skilled workers move to Suburbia, if it increases its tax rate to a level at which skilled workers get a higher utility than in Bohemia. This means that the government reaction functions are discontinuous and the Nash tax game has no pure-strategy equilibrium Baldwin et al., 2003, p. 412.

Baldwin and Krugman (2004) offer a solution with a “limit taxing” game. In the first stage, Bohemia (the core) sets its tax rate. In the second stage, Suburbia (the periphery) sets its tax rate. In the third stage, migration and production occur.
The tax game is solved in reverse order (i.e., with Suburbia’s choice of the tax rate first). If Suburbia chooses a sufficiently low tax rate, no skilled worker will migrate since the real reward is still higher in Bohemia. But if Suburbia raises its tax rate sufficiently, all skilled workers will migrate. The objective function is discontinuous.

If the core stays in Bohemia, Suburbia’s government will choose $t^*_L = 0$. Its alternative would be to set $t^*_L$ high enough to “steal” the core. There is an upper-bound $\bar{t}^*_C$ for Suburbia’s tax rate to steal the core. Fig. 7 shows the relationship between the welfare in a city and its tax rate. The upper right panel reproduces the second-stage game for Suburbia and the bottom panel on the right shows the Bohemia’s first-stage problem. If $t^*_L > \bar{t}^*_C$, the utility for the unskilled workers in Suburbia as the core, $W^*_C$, would be lower than in the periphery scenario, $W^*_P$, with $t^*_L = 0$. The formal condition for the upper-bound is

$$V^*_L (\bar{t}^*_L, \lambda = 0) \geq V^*_L (t^*_L = 0, \lambda = 1).$$

Solving for $\bar{t}^*_C$ gives

$$\bar{t}^*_C = 1 - \frac{P^*_P}{P^*_C}.$$
where \( P_C^* \) and \( P_P^* \) are the price levels in Suburbia as the core and as the periphery, respectively. Bohemia knows about its influence on Suburbia’s decision.

So in the first stage Bohemia will set \( t_L \) at a level such that Suburbia will not be able to steal the core. From Eq. (3) Bohemia knows the level of the tax rate Suburbia has to chose to steal the core. Bohemia knows also that Suburbia will not go beyond \( \tilde{t}_C^* \). The equilibrium tax rate for Bohemia therefore is

\[
t_L^{eq} = \frac{\tilde{t}_C^*}{\Psi^{CB}}.
\]

The upper quadrants of Fig. 7 show that in equilibrium the indirect utility of unskilled workers in Bohemia (point A) is higher than in Suburbia (point B). Bohemia is the core and sets its tax at \( t_L^{eq} \). Suburbia is the periphery and sets its tax at \( t_P^* = 0 \).

Fig. 8 represents \( t_L^{eq} \) for the level of trade freeness above the sustain point. The equilibrium tax rate and, therefore, the quantity of the public good provided, decreases with lower trade costs. In the core-periphery scenario higher
integration leads to lower public expenditures in culture in the core. The periphery has no expenditures on culture.

\[
\begin{align*}
\lambda &= 0.5; \mu = 0.4; \sigma = 4; \gamma = 0.4
\end{align*}
\]

Figure 8: Equilibrium “keep-the-core” tax rate

4 The Creative City – introducing urban cultural diversity as an exogenous difference

Skilled and creative workers move to cities that are abundant in certain amenities, e.g. bars, restaurants, clubs, museums, theaters, and art galleries. Moreover, they prefer places that are rich on immaterial amenities like ethnic and intellectual diversity, tolerance\(^6\) and anonymity. Despite lower wages or less jobs offered, skilled workers sometimes locate in places where they can enjoy their lifestyle. These immaterial amenities and urban cultural diversity can be seen as exogenous asymmetries that make certain cities more attractive for skilled workers compared to other cities\(^7\). We shall call these places Creative Cities. As Krugman (1991) states, initial conditions or historical accidents decide which city may be the core and the periphery. This principle can be

\(^6\)\(\omega\) can be interpreted as what Florida (2002b) calls “Tolerance”. It may be an important factor of attraction of cities for skilled and “creative” people.

\(^7\)As Florida (2008) states: “Why do so many people want to locate to New York City, NY, but not to Cleveland, OH.”
applied also for the endowment of a cities urban cultural diversity. For vari-
uous economic and sociological reasons, certain cities have developed a higher
stock of immaterial amenities and cultural diversity over time and are more
attractive to skilled people than other cities.

In this chapter a preference for cultural diversity is introduced in the utility
function of the skilled workers

$$U = C_M^{\mu} C_A^{1-\mu} G^\gamma \omega, \quad \omega \geq 1,$$

where $\omega$ is the exogenous endowment of a city of immaterial urban amenities
and cultural diversity. The scope is to analyze spatial and political equilib-
rium of asymmetric endowed cities. Therefore, one city, in this case Bohemia
is a Creative City and has a higher initial endowment than the other city. This
means the value of Suburbia can be normalized to unity. If $\omega^* = 1$ and $\omega > 1$
the real reward ratio is

$$\rho_\omega = \frac{w/P^\mu}{w^*/P^{*\mu}} \left( \frac{t_L/P^\mu}{t^*_L/P^{*\mu}} \right)^\gamma \omega.$$

The breakpoint $\phi^b_\omega$ can be analyzed only by numerical simulation with $t_L =
t^*_L$ and $\omega = \omega^*$. $\phi^b_\omega$ is smaller as the breakpoint $\phi^b$ in the previous chapter.
The amenities factor attracts skilled people and is an additional agglomeration
force. Since $\omega > 1$, there exists a symmetric equilibrium at $\lambda = 1/2$ with
different tax rates in the two cities. This is only possible if Suburbia provides
more public goods than Bohemia, or in formal terms

$$\frac{t^*_L}{t_L} = \Psi^{1/\gamma}. \quad (10)$$

Since in the symmetric equilibrium $t^*_L < t_L$, the unskilled workers have higher
utility in Bohemia, the high-amenity city. In the core-periphery scenario the
agglomeration rent is positive in the case of absolute free trade since the addi-
tional agglomeration force does not depend on trade cost. For skilled workers
the high-amenity city offers still a surplus.

Suburbia can steal the core from Bohemia providing a certain amount of
public goods that attracts the skilled workers. How much Suburbia has to
charge depends on $\omega$

$$t^S_{L*} > \Psi^{CB} \omega^{1/\gamma} t_L. \quad (11)$$

More generally, $\omega$ can be explained as any resource that attracts skilled and creative workers,
and, therefore, acts as an agglomeration force.
Political Equilibrium

In the dispersed equilibrium scenario the upper-bound for the tax rate a city will set is defined by the “better-on-their-own” utility level of unskilled workers and the appropriate tax rate

\[ \tilde{t}_L^A \leq 1 - \frac{P^u}{PP^u}. \]

The optimization problem is

\[ \max_{t_L} V_L. \]

The tax rate that maximizes \( V_L \) is called \( \hat{t}_L^A \). For low levels of trade freeness, where \( \hat{t}_L^A \leq \tilde{t}_L^A \) and \( \hat{t}_L^{A^*} \leq \tilde{t}_L^{A^*} \), there is a stable dispersed equilibrium that satisfies

\[ \frac{\hat{t}_L^{A^*}}{\hat{t}_L^A} = \Psi^{1/\gamma}, \]

with \( \hat{t}_L^{A^*} > \hat{t}_L^A \), \( V_L^* < V_L \) and \( \lambda > 1/2 \). Fig. 9 shows a numerical simulation of an asymmetric dispersed stable equilibrium (\( \phi < \phi_{\text{bo}}^b \)). The bold lines and increasing curves are the tax rates that maximize the utility of unskilled workers. The thin lines and decreasing curves depict the upper-bound tax rates. The dashed lines are the tax rates of Suburbia and the continuous lines are the tax rates of Bohemia. At low levels of trade, the cities set \( \hat{t}_L^A \) and \( \hat{t}_L^{A^*} \), respectively, since they are below the upper-bound tax rate. Suburbia’s tax rate (dashed thick line) is larger than Bohemia’s tax rate (continuous thick line) since Bohemia is more attractive to skilled workers (\( \omega > \omega^* \)) and Suburbia has to provide more of the public cultural good to provide the same utility to skilled workers as in Bohemia.

What happens when trade integration increases? Once the two tax rates of suburbia (dashed lines in Fig. 9) intersect (point A), \( \tilde{t}_L^A < \hat{t}_L^A \) and Suburbia will set the “better-on-their-own” tax rate \( \tilde{t}_L^{A^*} \). At that point the model turns to the agglomeration state as a stable equilibrium with the core in the high-endowment city.

In the case of asymmetric endowed cities, higher levels of trade integration have a destabilizing effect on the dispersed stable equilibrium. Once the low-endowment city sets the upper-bound tax rate, all skilled workers will settle in the high-endowment city.
In the core-periphery scenario the “limit taxing” game is again applied. The equilibrium tax rate that Bohemia must set to keep the core is

\[ t^*_L = \frac{\tilde{t}_C^*}{\Psi \omega^{1/\gamma}} \]  

where \( \tilde{t}_C^* \) is the upper-bound tax rate of Suburbia. Eq. (12) shows that \( t^*_L \) depends on the level of exogenous endowment of cultural diversity \( \omega \) in Bohemia. Fig. 10 shows that a larger endowment of cultural diversity \( \omega_2 > \omega \) results in a lower equilibrium tax rate \( t^*_L < t^*_L \), which yields a larger utility for unskilled workers in Bohemia, \( B > A \). Bohemia has to provide less public good to keep the core in the city. Fig. 11 shows the negative relation between equilibrium tax rate in Bohemia and its endowment of cultural diversity.

As in the previous chapter, trade integration reduces Bohemia’s equilibrium tax rate (Fig. 12).

### 5 Taxing both factors

In this section the assumption of cultural diversity is dropped, but the two cities impose taxes on the incomes of both the unskilled and skilled workers. Let \( t_L \) and \( t_H \) denote the corresponding tax rates and the provision of the public
Figure 10: “Limit taxing” game with asymmetric endowed cities
Figure 11: Equilibrium tax rate $t_L^{ea}$ for the high-amenities city (core) with exogenous asymmetry ($\omega > 1$).

$\mu=0.4; \sigma=4; \gamma=0.4; \lambda=1$;

Figure 12: Equilibrium “keep-the-core” tax rate and trade freeness
good then is

$$G = \frac{t_L L + wt_H H}{P^\mu}.$$  

The new indirect utility ratio for skilled workers is

$$\rho_{LH} = \frac{w(1 - t_H)G^\gamma/P^\mu}{w^*(1 - t_H^*)G^*(P^*)^\gamma/(P^*)^\mu}.$$  

A stability analysis of the breakpoint, agglomeration forces and tax gap can be found in Andersson and Forslid 2003 and Baldwin et al. 2003.

**Political Equilibrium**

The optimization problem in the dispersed equilibrium scenario is

$$\max_{t_L, t_H} V_L,$$  

$$\frac{\partial V_L}{\partial t_H} = 0 \Rightarrow \mu^\mu(1 - \mu)^{1-\mu} (-\mu) P^{-\mu - 1} \frac{\partial P}{\partial \lambda} \frac{\partial \lambda}{\partial t_H} = 0.$$  

The upper-bound tax rate for the unskilled workers is $\tilde{t}_L = 1 - \frac{P^\mu S}{P^\mu}$. Solving Eq. (13) and (14) gives the tax rates $\hat{t}_H^B$ and $\hat{t}_L^B$ that maximize the utility of unskilled workers. In contrast to Andersson and Forslid 2003, the present model allows for negative tax rates. Fig. 13 shows a numerical example of the tax rates and the upper-bound for different levels of trade freeness. The skilled factor is always taxed at $\hat{t}_H^B$ (thin and continuous line). The unskilled factor is taxed at the lower value of $\hat{t}_L^B$ and $\tilde{t}_L$. At low levels of trade freeness the tax on unskilled workers is lower than the tax on skilled workers. With increased integration $\hat{t}_H^B$ decreases until it turns negative implying that unskilled workers subsidize skilled workers. The tax on unskilled workers increases until $\hat{t}_L^B > \tilde{t}_L$. From that level of trade freeness onwards, both cities will tax the unskilled workers at the upper-bound tax rate $\tilde{t}_L$.

As in Chapter 2.3 and 2.4, the “limit taxing” game of Baldwin and Krugman 2004 is applied for the agglomeration scenario. If all skilled workers are in Bohemia, Suburbia is willing to tax its unskilled workers at a maximum tax rate of $\bar{t}_L^C$ to steal the core. Since there is no skilled worker to be taxed, Suburbia will set $t_H = 0$. Knowing that Suburbia will set $\bar{t}_L^C$ and $t_H^* = 0$, Bohemia will chose a combination of its tax rates that satisfies

$$V(t_L^*, t_H^*) \geq V(t_L^C, t_H^* = 0).$$  

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Solving \( \rho_{LH}(t^c_L, t^c_H) = 1 \) for \( t^c_L \) and \( t^c_H \) at a certain level of trade freeness, gives the equilibrium tax combinations for Bohemia (Fig. 14). For every pair of tax rates above the depicted curve, the utility of Bohemia’s skilled workers is strictly higher than the maximum utility Suburbia would offer. The curve is u-shaped since \( t_H \) is negative and \( t_L \) must be positive. The higher \( t_H \), the higher even \( t_L \) must be to compensate the skilled workers for their utility loss.

The minimum of the curves (point A, B, C, and D in Fig. 14) give the tax combinations that maximize the utility of unskilled workers. Even if the tax on the immobile factor is zero, the tax on the mobile factor can be positive (point C). This can be explained by the agglomeration rent\(^9\) that the skilled workers enjoy in the core-city.

The political equilibrium in the agglomeration scenario is at \( t^c_L, t^c_H, t^*_L = 0, t^*_H = 0 \). As Fig. 14 shows, \( t^c_L \) decreases and \( t^c_H \) increases with higher trade integration.

\(^9\)See chapter 2.2 for a discussion on the agglomeration rent.
6 Conclusion

In this chapter I analyzed the effects of taxes, public cultural goods and urban cultural diversity on the location of skilled workers using a New Economic Geography model. The main results are the following ones:

First, with a public cultural good consumed only by skilled workers and taxes on unskilled workers, there is a Nash equilibrium tax rate for both cities that keeps the symmetric equilibrium in the dispersed scenario. This tax rate is positive and hump-shaped in regard to trade freeness. Both cities provide optimal levels of public cultural goods. In the agglomeration scenario the core has an optimal tax rate and provides public cultural goods. The periphery will set its tax rate at zero since no skilled workers are living in the city.

Second, if an exogenous difference in cultural diversity of cities is introduced, the dispersed equilibrium is still stable. The equilibrium is not symmetric: more skilled workers live in the high-endowment city even though the tax rate is lower than in the low-endowment city. Once trade freeness passes a certain level, the model switches to the core-periphery outcome even before the breakpoint. In the agglomeration scenario the core (high-endowment city) has an optimal tax rate that is lower than without cultural diversity. The larger is the exogenous advantage of the high-endowment city, the lower is the tax rate to keep the core. The periphery does not levy any taxes.
Third, by taxing both factors, but without urban amenities asymmetry, there are optimal tax rates for both cities in the dispersed and symmetric equilibrium. At low levels of trade freeness the tax rate on unskilled labor is smaller than the tax on skilled workers. At increased levels of trade freeness unskilled labor pays higher taxes and subsidizes skilled workers. In the agglomeration scenario the periphery will set both tax rates to zero. The core will set the combination of keep-the-core tax rates that has the lowest tax rate on unskilled workers. The core city taxes the so-called agglomeration rent of skilled workers. Trade integration reduces the optimal tax rate on unskilled and increases the tax on skilled workers.

The model has some weaknesses that could be point of debating in future research. The fact that only skilled workers consume the public cultural good may be considered a questionable feature of the model. But here lies also one of the contributions to the literature of the present model. I am the first to analyze political equilibrium of a good purely consumed by skilled workers in the footlose entrepreneur model.

Another issue is the zero moving cost of skilled workers. But as Andersson and Forslid (2003) observe, it is this assumption is innocent in the sense that relaxing it affects the results only moderately. It turns out that a tractable way of introducing costs of migration is by assuming that mobile workers are attached to their home countries in the sense that each worker intrinsically prefers one country over the other. The exogenous asymmetry in chapter 2.4 can be partly interpreted as such a preference.

At last, New Economic Geography models could be extended in future research. Real world cities do have more states than symmetric dispersed and “all-or-nothing” agglomeration scenarios, although the results should not be interpreted to strictly. A dispersed equilibrium might be construed as a system of cities which are populated more equally while an agglomeration scenario might be cities that differ strongly in population distribution. Anyway, it might be reasonable to model public cultural goods in newer models of urban economics.
References


