

Bartling, Björn; Grieder, Manuel; Zehnder, Christian

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## Does Competition Justify Inequality?

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## Does Competition Justify Inequality?

Björn Bartling  
Manuel Grieder  
Christian Zehnder

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# Does Competition Justify Inequality?

## Abstract

Are competitive mechanisms perceived as just sources of economic inequality? Perceptions of fairness violations can have severe economic consequences, as they may cause counterproductive behavior such as rulebook slowdowns or quality shading. To analyze fairness perceptions associated with competitive mechanisms, we run laboratory experiments where a single powerful buyer can trade with one of several sellers- an environment that can lead to pronounced inequality among the interacting parties. Once the terms of trade are determined, sellers can engage in counterproductive behavior. We robustly find that low procurement prices, which allocate most of the surplus from trade to the buyer, trigger significantly less counterproductive behavior if the buyer uses a competitive auction to determine the terms of trade than if he uses his price setting power to dictate the same terms directly. Our data demonstrate that competitive mechanisms, in addition to their capability to produce efficient allocations, can reduce conflict and inefficient reactions by increasing justification for economic inequality.

JEL-codes: C910, D310, D630, P100.

Keywords: fairness, competition, markets, efficiency, inequality.

*Björn Bartling*  
*Department of Economics*  
*University of Zurich*  
*Blümlisalpstrasse 10*  
*Switzerland – 8006 Zurich*  
*bjoern.bartling@econ.uzh.ch*

*Manuel Grieder*  
*Faculty of Business and Economics*  
*(HEC Lausanne), University of Lausanne*  
*Quartier UNIL-Dorigny, Internef*  
*Switzerland – 1015 Lausanne*  
*manuel.grieder@unil.ch*

*Christian Zehnder*  
*Faculty of Business and Economics*  
*(HEC Lausanne), University of Lausanne*  
*Quartier UNIL-Dorigny, Internef*  
*Switzerland – 1015 Lausanne*  
*christian.zehnder@unil.ch*

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# 1 Introduction

Competitive markets are associated with desirable properties such as decision-making autonomy, free entry, and efficient allocation of resources. Notwithstanding, markets are often criticized for reasons beyond allocative efficiency. Some scholars argue, for example, that market exchange leads to a decay of ethical concerns. Recent contributions include Sandel (2012) and Falk & Szech (2013), who conclude from their data that “[m]arket interaction erodes moral values, relative to individually stated preferences” (p. 707). Moreover, the distributive outcomes in many market economies are the subject of heated public controversy—as exemplified by the Occupy Wall Street movement—and prominent academic debate (e.g., Piketty, 2014; Atkinson, 2015). The debate about economic inequality is also a debate about fairness because some inequalities are considered to be fair, while others are not (e.g., Rawls, 1971; Nozick, 1974; Roemer, 1996; Frankfurt, 2015). Our paper contributes to these fundamental debates by studying an additional, potentially desirable, welfare-enhancing property of competitive markets. We provide controlled experimental data showing that a competitive allocation mechanism provides justification for economic inequality, thereby reducing—relative to a non-competitive mechanism and for given distributive outcomes—conflict and wasteful counterproductive behaviors.

Understanding fairness perceptions is interesting in itself, but it is also important for efficiency reasons because many people are willing to retaliate against others whom they blame for economic outcomes that they perceive as unfair. Examples include industrial actions such as strikes, rulebook slowdowns, or acts of outright sabotage in response to low wages,<sup>1</sup> quality shading by suppliers when the terms of trade are unfavorable,<sup>2</sup> or even riots and public disorder triggered by an increase in fuel prices or public transportation fares.<sup>3</sup> In order to judge the overall efficiency of the mechanisms used to coordinate economic activity it is, therefore, important not only to understand their allocative efficiency but also how these mechanisms shape people’s fairness perception of the resulting outcomes. If a given mechanism provides justification for the outcomes it generates, it will then also increase efficiency, *ceteris paribus*, by reducing counterproductive behaviors of less favored actors.

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<sup>1</sup>Krueger & Mas (2004), e.g., report data suggesting a link between management’s attempts to negotiate lower wages (and generally less favorable employment conditions) and faulty tire production at a Bridgestone/Firestone plant. Similarly, illustrating the effects of work-to-rule reactions to perceived unfairness, Mas (2006) shows that arrest rates decline after unfavorable arbitration outcomes for police officers.

<sup>2</sup>Research in the supply chain management and marketing literatures argues that perceived unfairness, created by, e.g., increased pressure on terms of trade, can induce trading partners to lower levels of service or product quality (see, e.g., Carter & Kaufmann, 2007; Samaha et al., 2011).

<sup>3</sup>The public transportation riots in Brazil in 2013 can serve as an example. In an attempt to placate the protestors, Brazil’s President Rousseff pledged 50 billion reals to improve public transportation. The resulting increased budget deficit lead to a currency decline; see <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-06-28/brazil-real-drops-on-concern-rousseff-pledges-will-widen-deficit> (retrieved November 27, 2015).

Given the central role that competition plays in economics, business life, and many realms of society at large, it is of particular interest to better understand the fairness perceptions associated with competitive mechanisms.

Views in economics about the fairness of competitive outcomes diverge. Hart & Moore (2008), for instance, hypothesize that competition “provides a relatively objective measure of what B[uyer] and S[eller] bring to the relationship” (p. 12). Survey evidence reported by Kahneman et al. (1986), on the other hand, documents that many people regard competitive market outcomes as unfair, for example in scenarios where sellers raise prices in response to increased demand. However, the latter study does not consider alternative rationing mechanisms, so that it remains unclear how the competitive market fares relative to other mechanisms, such as the use of power and authority.<sup>4</sup>

Our paper provides the first experimentally controlled, incentive compatible evidence that the use of a competitive mechanism—compared to the use of power or authority—attenuates wasteful reactions to unequal monetary payoffs. Our experimental baseline condition reflects a stylized trading situation where a powerful, monopsonistic buyer can trade with one of two possible sellers. The terms of trade—that is, the markup that the buyer pays on top of the seller’s cost—are reflected in the number of points that the buyer transfers to one of the sellers. The buyer can choose between two different mechanisms. He can either use his price setting power to set the transfer directly, or he can let the transfer be determined in a competitive clock auction. If the buyer uses his price setting power, he approaches one of the two sellers directly, dictates the price, and trades with that seller. The other seller, who is not considered, receives nothing. Under the competitive mechanism, in contrast, the buyer lets the two sellers compete with each other. The transfer in the auction increases automatically every second until one of the sellers accepts. The seller who first accepts receives the transfer; the other seller gets nothing. After the transfer is determined—either by use of the buyer’s price setting power or by competition—the sellers can engage in counterproductive behavior. This is implemented in form of a costly punishment option that allows retaliating against both the buyer and the other sellers.<sup>5</sup> The observed punishment pattern serves as our measure of the perceived fairness of the distributive outcome resulting under the chosen mechanism.

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<sup>4</sup>Results similar to Kahneman et al., who conducted their study in Canada, are found by Shiller et al. (1991) for the US and Russia. Frey & Pommerehne (1993) follow up on Kahneman et al. by including three additional mechanisms—bureaucracy, random allocation, and “first come, first served”—in a survey study in Germany and Switzerland and report that respondents perceive the latter mechanism as the fairest one.

<sup>5</sup>The counterproductive actions in our experiment correspond to what Hart & Moore (2008) call performance shading. In the real world, a seller can, e.g., hurt the buyer by lowering the quality of the product or service delivered to the buyer. Lowering the quality may be costly if there is a risk of detection or if the seller has a preference for delivering a high quality product. Another potentially powerful form of retaliation is malicious gossip to destroy someone’s reputation. This kind of punishment can be used also by the seller who did not win the deal and may be targeted at both trading partners and competitors.

We find that—for given distributive outcomes—the competitive mechanism triggers less punishment for the buyer compared to when he uses his market power to set the price directly. Moreover, we find that the use of the competitive mechanism leads to a partial shift of blame. While the buyer is punished less under competition, the sellers punish each other more. Importantly, the increase in the sellers’ mutual punishment is smaller than the reduction in the punishment of the buyer. The use of competition thus decreases the total amount of counterproductive behavior for given realizations of economic inequality. That is, it decreases the inefficiencies such as acts of sabotage, quality shading, or social unrest that conflicting views about the fairness of the resulting distributive outcome cause.

As one concrete example for the implications of our findings, consider procurement auctions. The existing literature argues that asymmetric information about the sellers’ costs of production is the key reason for the use of procurement auctions (see, e.g., Klemperer, 1999). Our results show that powerful buyers, who intend to buy intermediate products from outside suppliers, may not only want to use a procurement auction because it allows elicitation of sellers’ costs, but also because it attenuates inefficiencies caused by counterproductive behaviors of sellers who feel shortchanged if prices are low.

More generally, our paper adds a new angle to transaction cost economics. When comparing the costs and benefits of the use of markets and hierarchies, the incomplete contracting literature emphasizes the trade-off between inefficiencies caused by opportunism in outsourced producer-supplier relations on the one hand, and bureaucracy costs in authority-based, vertically integrated firms on the other hand (Williamson 1975, 1985). Buyers in our experiment are not confronted with an explicit make-or-buy decision, but the available options—competition and power—can very naturally be interpreted as the choice between markets and hierarchies. Our results thus reveal an additional benefit of using the market that has, to the best of our knowledge, never been considered in the literature before: replacing authority-driven, in-house governance with a competitive market mechanism may avoid retaliatory counterproductive behaviors that would have occurred otherwise.

To check the robustness of our results we implemented a series of control treatments. First, we test whether our results are a consequence of self-selection of different buyer types into different mechanisms. Sellers’ punishment decisions might, for instance, be driven by the belief that “unkind” buyers use their market power, while “kind” buyers use the competitive mechanism. Hence, to isolate the effect of the mechanism itself from the effect of the buyer’s choice, we randomly assign mechanisms to buyers. Second, we study the role of average transfer levels on punishment in the two mechanisms. In our baseline condition, average transfers turned out to be higher under competition than under price setting power. To preclude this from affecting our results, we modified the experimental parameters to reverse

this relation. Third, we add another seller to our game to test whether an increase in the intensity of competition affects our results. We find that all our findings hold in all three control treatments.

Finally, to study possible determinants of the punishment-reducing effect of competition, we implemented three further treatments. First, we explore the extent to which our results are driven by the free entry property of competition. In our baseline condition the buyer's choice of competition grants all sellers an equal chance to obtain the transfer. When the buyer uses his price setting power, in contrast, one seller is predetermined to receive the transfer. To identify the effect of symmetric participation opportunities, we randomize which seller gets the transfer when the buyer uses his price setting power. This ensures that all sellers have the same chances of getting the transfer in both mechanisms. Second, we study the importance of decision-making autonomy on the sellers' inclination to retaliate. In the baseline condition sellers make an active acceptance decision only under competition, but not when the buyer uses his price setting power. We therefore also introduce an active acceptance decision in the latter case. In a final treatment, we directly involve the buyer in the competitive price determination by letting him set the sequence of increasing prices in the auction. We find that our results remain unchanged in all these treatments.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses further related literature. Section 3 describes the design of our baseline condition. Section 4 presents our main results. Sections 5 and 6 document the robustness of our results in six additional treatments. Section 7 discusses individual heterogeneity in sellers' counterproductive behavior. Section 8 analyzes buyers' optimal and actual choices of mechanism. Section 9 concludes.

## 2 Related Literature

The idea that the same outcome is judged differently depending on the procedure that leads to it is deeply entrenched in psychology (e.g., Thibaut & Walker, 1975) and not foreign to economics (e.g., Frey et al., 2004). The existing work on procedural fairness in economics mainly focuses on the role of biased vs. unbiased random procedures to capture the idea of equal opportunity, "level playing field," or ex-ante fairness (e.g., Bolton et al., 2005; Trautmann, 2009; Krawczyk & Le Lec, 2010; Sebald, 2010; Krawczyk, 2011; Brock et al., 2013; Cappelen et al., 2013). Our paper advances this literature by showing that, compared to the use of power or authority, a competitive mechanism is perceived as a fair procedure.

Our paper also contributes to the literature on the diffusion of responsibility. Studies in psychology show that responsibility is diffused in groups (the so called "bystander effect", see Darley & Latane, 1968), and recent studies in economics show that responsibility diffusion

leads to more selfish behavior in economic contexts (e.g., Dana et al., 2007; Hamman et al., 2010). The punishment pattern reported here is consistent with the idea that responsibility diffusion reduces blame. If the buyer uses his price setting power to determine the transfer, he is the only person who makes a decision. Under competition, in contrast, two actors make a decision: the buyer chooses the mechanism and one of the sellers accepts the transfer. Relatedly, Bartling & Fischbacher (2012) show that delegating a potentially unpopular decision to another person or to a random device reduces the own punishment for unfair outcomes (see also Coffman, 2011; Oexl & Grossman, 2013). Our paper shows that it is possible as well to deflect blame by delegating the determination of the terms of trade to a competitive mechanism and “let the market decide.” Importantly, however, the punishment-reducing effect of the competitive mechanism goes beyond the mere blame-shifting effect of delegation and diffusion of responsibility because it reduces overall punishment and it is present also in our control treatment with exogenous assignment of mechanisms.

Moreover, recent experimental papers argue that people make more selfish decisions in market environments than in comparable non-market environments (Falk & Szech, 2013; Bartling et al., 2015). Other papers argue that merely framing an interaction with market terminology or priming individuals to think of money reduces the importance of fairness considerations among interacting individuals (e.g., Hoffman et al., 1994; Ross & Ward, 2003; Vohs et al., 2006; Ellingsen et al., 2012; Cappelen et al., 2013). Our paper makes an important contribution to this literature by showing that competitive procedures provide justification for economic inequality. Hence, competitive mechanisms (which might be primed by money) do not necessarily reduce the importance of fairness considerations (or morals). Rather, people judge inequality as more justified if it is the result of a competitive mechanism.

Furthermore, our paper is related to experimental studies by Fehr et al. (2009, 2011, 2015), who confirm Hart & Moore’s (2008) hypothesis that a competitively negotiated ex-ante contract provides a reference point for ex-post trade (see also Bartling & Schmidt, 2015; Brandts et al., 2015). The papers by Fehr et al. take a competitive environment as given and focus on the impact of the buyer’s choice between a rigid and a flexible contract on sellers’ ex-post counterproductive behavior. In contrast, we do not focus on the choice of a contract type but on the buyer’s choice of mechanism—either the use of price setting power or of competition—on counterproductive behavior by sellers.

Finally, previous work has investigated the effect of competition in ultimatum games (Güth et al., 1998; Marchand, 2001; Grosskopf, 2003; Fischbacher et al., 2009). These studies show that competition among receivers hugely increases their willingness to accept low offers. However, it is important to notice that these findings do not imply that competition alters the receivers’ fairness perceptions. Fehr & Schmidt (1999) show that the same outcome-based

fairness preferences that motivate receivers to reject low offers in the standard ultimatum game can induce them to accept the same low offers under competition. The reason is that the presence of competing receivers implies that a single receiver cannot ensure punishment of the proposer by rejecting a low offer. There is always the possibility that another receiver accepts, in which case the rejecting receiver lowers his expected payoff without affecting the proposer’s payoff.<sup>6</sup> In contrast, outcome-based fairness models such as Fehr & Schmidt cannot explain why sellers in our study punish less when the same unequal payoff distribution was determined by competition rather than by the buyer’s price setting power. The reason is that once the transfer is determined, sellers are in the exact same strategic situation—irrespective of the underlying mechanism.

### 3 Experimental Design

To address our research question, we consider the following trading situation. A single buyer can trade with one of several sellers, either by using his monopsonistic price setting power to directly set the selling price or by entering the sellers into price competition with each other. After the price is determined, sellers who feel shortchanged can engage in costly counterproductive behavior such as sabotage or performance shading. Our experimental strategy is to capture this situation in the simplest possible design.

#### 3.1 Baseline Treatment

We implement a three-player game with one buyer and two sellers. The buyer has an endowment of 90 points and the two sellers have an endowment of 10 points each. The buyer implements a transaction with one of the sellers. The transaction is executed simply by transferring an integer amount  $t \in [0, 40]$  to one of the two sellers. The transfer can be interpreted as the markup that the buyer pays the seller on top of the seller’s cost. The default is that the buyer receives the entire surplus from trade (90 points), represented by his large endowment, but he can set a positive transfer—i.e., a price that strictly exceeds the seller’s costs—to share parts of the surplus with the seller. The buyer decides whether to use his monopsonistic price setting power and set the transfer directly or to let it be determined in a competitive auction. One randomly chosen seller can finally allocate costly punishment points to the buyer and/or the respective other seller.<sup>7</sup> In the following we provide a step-by-step account of the game and describe each player’s decisions in detail.

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<sup>6</sup>A similar argument holds for ultimatum games with proposer competition, as in Roth et al. (1991).

<sup>7</sup>Allowing only one seller to punish prevents potential strategic counter-punishment motives among the sellers, which would confound the interpretation of the punishment decisions. Moreover, our design prevents a public goods problem among the sellers with respect to the punishment of the buyer.

**Step 1:** *The buyer's choice of mechanism*

The buyer (player A) first decides whether to use his price setting power or to employ a competitive mechanism to determine the transfer  $t$  that goes to one of the two sellers (players B and C).

- (i) If A chooses to use his price setting power, he determines directly how many points  $t$  to transfer to the seller. Importantly, the transfer always goes to B in this case, and C receives nothing.
- (ii) If A chooses competition, the transfer is determined by an increasing clock auction. The transfer starts at 0 points and increases automatically by one point each second. The auction stops as soon as one of the two sellers accepts the current transfer. The transfer can thus go to either B or C, depending on who accepts first. Should the clock auction arrive at the maximal transfer of 40 points (after 40 seconds), it does not increase further.<sup>8</sup>

Two important features of our experimental design are worth noting at this point. First, openness is a common feature of competitive mechanisms. Indeed, one defining characteristic of perfect competition is free market entry. We capture this feature in our experimental design by granting both sellers (B and C) equal chances to receive the transfer under the competitive mechanism. We exclude one of the sellers (C) from receiving the transfer if the buyer uses his price setting power in order to clearly differentiate the two mechanisms along the dimension of participation opportunities. This allows us to elicit counterproductive behavior from two different types of sellers, i.e. to study whether B and C react differently to given transfers under the two mechanisms. Moreover, in one of our additional treatments, which we describe below, we implement symmetric participation opportunities for both sellers also when the buyer uses his price setting power. This enables us to isolate the role of equal participation opportunities.

Second, real world buyers are free to decide whether they want to run, for example, a procurement auction or employ other ways to determine the price. Providing the buyer with the *choice* of the price setting mechanism is thus a realistic feature that we want to capture in our design. However, in another additional treatment, described below, we impose the mechanism exogenously. This allows us to separate the effect of the buyer's choice of mechanism and the effect of the mechanism in itself on the sellers' counterproductive behavior.

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<sup>8</sup>In 97.5 percent of cases it took less than 20 seconds until a seller accepted; it never took 40 seconds.

**Step 2: Sellers' acceptance decisions**

If A chooses the increasing clock auction to determine the transfer, B and C must independently decide when to click on an accept button to receive the actual transfer. Accepting early results in receiving a low transfer, but waiting comes with the risk that one receives nothing as the respective other seller accepts first. Once one of the sellers accepts, the auction ends and the respective other seller cannot make a decision any longer. When the buyer uses his price setting power to set the transfer directly, B cannot decide whether to accept or reject the transfer but simply receives the transfer determined by the buyer.

Note that by the very nature of the competitive auction, sellers choose whether or not to accept a given transfer. Indeed, decision making autonomy is an important feature of competitive mechanisms in general. In contrast, the seller does not have a choice if the buyer uses his price setting power to set the transfer. We implemented this feature in our experimental design in order to differentiate the two price setting mechanisms along the dimension of “active acceptance.” In one of our additional treatments, discussed below, we provide B with an explicit acceptance decision also when the buyer uses his price setting power. This allows us to identify the effect of sellers' active acceptance.

**Step 3: Sellers' punishment decisions**

Once one of the sellers has received the transfer from A, either B or C is randomly selected with equal probability. The selected seller receives 5 additional points, which he can keep or use in part or all to punish the other players. To destroy one point of another player, the selected seller must give up 0.1 points of his own. He can deduct a maximum of 50 points in total from the other two players. Punishment can reduce a player's profit down to 0, but we do not allow for negative monetary payoffs.<sup>9</sup>

We used the strategy method to elicit punishment decisions from both sellers. First both sellers decided privately how many points, if any, to deduct from the other players. Only thereafter it was randomly determined whether B's or C's decisions were implemented.

In the following we summarize the players' payoffs. Table 1 displays the intermediary payoffs  $\tilde{\pi}$  resulting from the game before punishment. In the table, “Power” refers to the case where the buyer uses his price setting power to determine the transfer; “Competition” refers to the case where the buyer employs the clock auction. Table 2 shows the final payoffs  $\pi$  that result after punishment points  $p$  have been assigned by the randomly determined seller. The game was played repeatedly for 12 periods with fixed roles but random rematching of players. One period was randomly selected for payment at the end of the experiment.

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<sup>9</sup>We provided subjects with “house money” and made punishment inexpensive to ensure that many subjects make use of the punishment option. Note that we are not per se interested in the *level* of punishment but in the *difference* in punishment between the two mechanisms under which the transfer is determined.

Table 1: Intermediate Payoffs before Punishment

	<i>Power</i>	<i>Competition</i>	
		<i>B wins</i>	<i>C wins</i>
$\tilde{\pi}_A$	$90 - t$	$90 - t$	$90 - t$
$\tilde{\pi}_B$	$10 + t$	$10 + t$	10
$\tilde{\pi}_C$	10	10	$10 + t$

*Notes:* “Power” refers to the case where the buyer uses his price setting power to determine the transfer; “Competition” refers to the case where the buyer employs the clock auction. A has an endowment of 90 points and B and C have an endowment of 10 points each. The intermediate payoffs  $\tilde{\pi}$  for A, B, and C are shown as a function of the transfer  $t$  that goes from the buyer (A) to the seller (B or C).

Table 2: Final Payoffs

	<i>B can punish</i>	<i>C can punish</i>
$\pi_A$	$\tilde{\pi}_A - p^A$	$\tilde{\pi}_A - p^A$
$\pi_B$	$\tilde{\pi}_B + 5 - 0.1 \cdot (p^A + p^C)$	$\tilde{\pi}_B - p^B$
$\pi_C$	$\tilde{\pi}_C - p^C$	$\tilde{\pi}_C + 5 - 0.1 \cdot (p^A + p^B)$

*Notes:* The table shows final payoffs  $\pi$  as a function of the intermediate payoff  $\tilde{\pi}$  and payments relating to punishment. The seller who can punish (B or C) receives 5 points extra. Each punishment point  $p$  assigned to another player reduces the punisher’s payoff by 0.1 points. Superscripts denote the target of punishment.

### 3.2 Data Collection and Procedural Details

We conducted the study at the FLEX lab at Goethe-University in Frankfurt, Germany. Participants were recruited from the regular subject pool, covering all fields of study, using ORSEE (Greiner, 2003). The study was computerized using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).

We ran 51 sessions with a total of 1,090 subjects. We ran nine sessions of our baseline treatment and seven sessions for each of our six additional treatments, which we describe in Sections 5 and 6. We conducted two waves of sessions; the first in June, July, and November 2012 and the second in October and November 2014.<sup>10</sup> Within the two waves of sessions, treatments were randomly assigned to sessions and participants were randomly assigned to roles. We aimed at 24 subjects per session but some sessions were smaller due to no-shows. One session had 15 subjects only; all other session had at least 18 subjects.

Subjects received detailed written instructions at the beginning of a session and had to correctly answer several control questions before the experiment was started. While the participants read the instructions, they had the possibility to ask comprehension questions, which were answered in private. A summary of the instructions was finally read aloud.

<sup>10</sup>Seven sessions of the baseline treatment took place in 2012 and two in 2014 to control for unobserved changes in the subject pool that may have occurred after 2012 (we do not find evidence for such changes; see footnote 16). Treatments “symmetric participation,” “intense competition,” and “buyer involvement” were conducted in 2012, treatments “exogenous mechanism,” “seller acceptance,” and “reversed levels” in 2014.

The experiment was framed neutrally. The roles in the experiment were not labeled as “buyers” and “sellers,” instead we simply referred to roles A, B, or C (or D in our “intense competition” treatment). A translation of the original German instructions for the baseline condition is in Appendix B. Subjects finally answered a questionnaire containing demographics and some personality measures (see our discussion in Section 7). Role assignments, choices made, and earnings were anonymous.

Sessions lasted for 75 to 90 minutes including the reading of the instructions and the final cash payments. Subjects received a show-up fee of 10 EUR and experimental points were converted at a rate of five points per Euro. Average total earnings were 16.42 EUR; 24.06 EUR for subjects in the role of A, and 12.78 EUR for subjects in the role of B, C, or D.

## 4 Main Results

In this section we analyze the data of the baseline treatment to study the impact of the mechanism that was employed to set the transfer on the sellers’ counterproductive behavior.

The grey bars in Figure 1 display the relative frequency of the different transfer levels when the buyer uses his price setting power (“Power”) and the black bars show the transfers under the competitive auction (“Competition”). We aggregate transfers in bins of five to smooth random variation. Transfers of zero are displayed separately as they account for a substantial number of observations when the buyer uses his price setting power. Transfers larger than 15 are grouped together as they are infrequent under both mechanisms. The average transfer amounts to 4.32 when the buyer sets it directly and to 9.68 under competition.


Our main interest is the punishment of the buyer for given transfers under the two mechanisms. The grey solid line in Figure 1 displays this information for the use of price setting power and the black solid line for the use of competition.<sup>11</sup> The figure reveals that the punishment of the buyer for given transfers is lower on average under competition than when the buyer uses his price setting power. Averaged over all transfer levels, punishment equals 15.17 points if the buyer sets the transfer directly and 6.55 points if the transfer is determined competitively.

Regression (1) in Table 3 confirms the statistical significance of the difference in counterproductive behavior across the two mechanisms. The dependent variable is the punishment of the buyers. The use of price setting power is the omitted category and “Competition” is a dummy variable that takes on value 1 if an observation comes from the competitive mech-

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<sup>11</sup>Recall that we use the strategy method to elicit punishment. The numbers shown are the averages of all punishment decisions, irrespective of the actual implementation of a particular seller’s punishment decision.

Figure 1: Punishment patterns in the baseline treatment



anism and value 0 otherwise. The regression controls for the size of the transfer and the period of observation. It also includes dummy variables for each of our additional treatments and interactions with the competition dummy, which we will discuss in Sections 5 and 6.

The important observation is that the coefficient of the competition dummy is large in size, negative, and highly significant ( $p < .001$ ).<sup>12</sup> The estimation reveals that, on average over all transfer levels, punishment under competition is about 6.5 points lower under competition. This confirms that the use of a competitive mechanism reduces counterproductive behavior for given transfer levels.<sup>13</sup>

**RESULT 1:** Sellers punish the buyer less for given transfer levels if the transfer is determined competitively rather than by use of the buyer’s price setting power.

<sup>12</sup>Unless otherwise noted, p-values are from OLS regressions based on standard errors clustered at the session level.

<sup>13</sup>The size and significance of the effect is robust to alternative regression models. Table A1 in the Appendix provides a Tobit model and Tables A2 and A3 present a two-part hurdle model. The latter analysis reveals that the competitive mechanism affects both the frequency of punishment and the punishment level conditional on punishing.

Table 3: OLS regression of determinants of punishment

	(1) Punishment for A	(2) Punishment for B/C/(D)	(3) Total Punishment
Competition	-6.503*** (1.359)	1.589*** (0.413)	-4.914*** (1.393)
<i>Exogenous Mechanism</i>	-1.140 (2.185)	-0.236 (0.231)	-1.376 (2.211)
Competition X <i>Exogenous Mechanism</i>	1.328 (2.102)	-0.126 (0.580)	1.202 (2.201)
<i>Reversed Levels</i>	-0.770 (1.949)	0.081 (0.563)	-0.689 (2.077)
Competition X <i>Reversed Levels</i>	1.108 (1.882)	0.341 (0.624)	1.450 (1.951)
<i>Intense Competition</i>	-4.036** (1.960)	0.419 (0.438)	-3.618* (1.993)
Competition X <i>Intense Competition</i>	2.084 (1.694)	0.456 (0.695)	2.539 (1.667)
<i>Symmetric Participation</i>	1.987 (2.573)	0.088 (0.274)	2.076 (2.573)
Competition X <i>Symmetric Participation</i>	0.904 (1.866)	0.596 (0.549)	1.500 (1.920)
<i>Seller Acceptance</i>	0.858 (1.846)	0.518 (0.358)	1.376 (1.908)
Competition X <i>Seller Acceptance</i>	1.317 (1.427)	0.100 (0.571)	1.417 (1.557)
<i>Buyer Involvement</i>	2.644 (2.258)	-0.438* (0.225)	2.206 (2.284)
Competition X <i>Buyer Involvement</i>	0.383 (1.573)	0.786 (0.535)	1.168 (1.546)
Transfer	-0.365*** (0.032)	0.086*** (0.011)	-0.280*** (0.035)
Period	-0.305*** (0.052)	-0.014 (0.017)	-0.318*** (0.057)
Constant	18.651*** (1.649)	0.599** (0.228)	19.250*** (1.630)
$R^2$	0.071	0.059	0.037
Observations	8868	8868	8868

\* $p < .10$ , \*\* $p < .05$ , \*\*\* $p < .01$

*Notes:* Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by 51 sessions. Dependent variables are the number of punishment points for the buyer (1), the respectively other seller(s) (2), or in total (3). For the intense competition treatment, the dependent variable in (2) corresponds to the sum of punishment assigned to the other two sellers. Post-estimation Wald tests show that competition significantly decreases punishment for A in all treatments ( $p < .001$ ; except in exogenous mechanism, where  $p = .002$ ). The decrease in punishment for B/C/(D) is also significant in all treatments ( $p < .001$ ), as is the overall decrease in total punishment (exogenous mechanism:  $p = .030$ , reversed levels:  $p = .016$ , intense competition:  $p = .007$ , symmetric participation:  $p = .013$ , seller acceptance:  $p < .001$ , and buyer involvement:  $p < .001$ ).

The negative and significant coefficient of “Transfer” shows that punishment tends to be lower for higher transfers on average over all treatments and mechanisms, which can be seen in Figure 1 for the baseline treatment and in Figure 3 for all other treatments. The negative and significant coefficient of “Period” reveals that punishment generally declines over the course of the 12 periods of the experiment. Importantly, however, a separate analysis shows that the difference in punishment across the two price setting mechanisms does not diminish over time.<sup>14</sup>

We next turn to the sellers’ mutual punishment. The grey dashed line in Figure 1 displays the average punishment that the sellers inflict upon each other when the buyer uses his price setting power and the black dashed line displays mutual punishment under competition. The figure reveals that the sellers punish each other more under competition. Averaged over all transfer levels, sellers punish the other seller with 0.88 points when the buyer picks the transfer using his power and with 2.93 points when the transfer is determined under competition. Regression (2) in Table 3 confirms the statistical significance of this effect. The dependent variable is the punishment for the respective other seller; otherwise regressions (1) and (2) are equivalent. The coefficient of the competition dummy in regression (2) is positive and highly significant ( $p < .001$ ). The effect is again large: the mutual punishment increases by more than 1.5 points on average over all transfers levels. Hence, the use of the competitive mechanism leads to a shift of the blame for the implementation of low transfers from the buyer to the respective other seller. We summarize this finding in our second result.

**RESULT 2:** Sellers punish each other more for given transfer levels if the transfer is determined competitively rather than by use of the buyer’s price setting power.

Given the opposite effects of competition on the punishment targeted at the buyer and the respective other seller, the question arises whether total punishment increases or decreases. A comparison of the effect sizes displayed in Figure 1 suggests that competition reduces total punishment for given transfers. This is confirmed by regression (3) in Table 3. The dependent variable is total punishment; otherwise regression (3) is equivalent to regressions (1) and (2). The coefficient of the competition dummy is negative and highly significant ( $p = .001$ ).<sup>15</sup> We summarize this finding in our third result.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>14</sup>Adding the interaction effect “Competition x Period” to the regression models in Table 3 yields non-significant coefficients in all estimations ( $p > .10$  in all three models). See also Figure A1 in the Appendix.

<sup>15</sup>Tables A1 to A3 in the Appendix show that Results 2 and 3 hold in Tobit and two-part hurdle models.

<sup>16</sup>Recall that Figure 1 and Table 3 include the data from all nine sessions of the baseline treatment, seven of which were conducted in 2012, while two were conducted in 2014 during the second wave of treatments (see Section 3.2). Using only the data from these nine sessions, we ran regressions equivalent to regressions (1)-(3)

**RESULT 3:** Overall punishment—the sum of punishment targeted at the buyer and the punishment targeted at the respective other seller—for given transfer levels is lower if the transfer is determined competitively rather than by use of the buyer’s price setting power.

## 4.1 Robustness across Seller Types

Recall that the transfer always goes to seller B but never to seller C when the buyer uses his price setting power. Cs thus have a chance to receive the transfer only when the buyer chooses the competitive mechanism. For Bs, in contrast, competition creates an additional risk. When the buyer uses his price setting power, they receive a transfer with certainty (though it might be zero), but under competition they only receive a transfer if they accept first. This asymmetry between seller types may create different punishment motives. One might, for instance, suspect that the higher punishment for A when he uses his price setting power is predominantly driven by punishment from Cs who punish A for not having chosen competition.


We address this possibility in Figure 2, which displays the buyers’ average punishment under the two price setting mechanisms separately for the two types of sellers. The left panel of Figure 2 reveals that the effect of competition on the punishment for the buyer is not only driven by Cs. Both seller types punish the buyer more harshly on average when he uses his price setting power than when he chooses the competitive mechanism to determine the transfer. Moreover, the right panel reveals that the increase in punishment of the respective other seller also stems from both seller types (though the effect is smaller for Cs).<sup>17</sup> In fact, irrespective of the seller type, the increase in punishment for the respective other seller is mainly driven by the loser under the competitive mechanism. When examining punishment behavior for competition winners and losers separately, we find that the losers punish the winners more than the winners punish the losers ( $p < .001$ ). In contrast, we find no significant difference in the punishment for the buyer between competition winners and losers ( $p > .10$ ; see Table A8 in the Appendix).

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in Table 3 and additionally included a dummy for data from 2014 and its interaction with competition. We find that both the 2014-dummy and the interaction term are insignificant in all three regressions ( $p > .10$ , standard errors clustered by individual, not session, as there are nine baseline sessions only), suggesting that no substantial changes had occurred in the subject pool between 2012 and 2014.

<sup>17</sup>In the Appendix we provide additional regression analyses confirming these findings. Tables A4 to A7 report regressions equivalent to the regressions in Tables 3 (OLS) and A1 (Tobit) for both seller types separately. Results 1-3 hold for both seller types separately, with the only exception that the increase in sellers’ mutual punishment is not significant for Cs.

Figure 2: Punishment by seller type



Notes: Error bars represent plus/minus one standard error of the mean, clustered by individual.

## 5 Robustness

In this section we discuss three additional treatments to study the robustness of our main results. First, we exogenously assign mechanisms to buyers to separate the role of the buyer’s choice of the mechanism from the effect of the mechanism as such. Second, we implement a treatment where we reverse the average levels of the transfer that result under power and competition in the baseline treatment. Finally, we study the robustness of the effect of competition on counterproductive behavior by varying the intensity of competition.

### 5.1 Exogenous Mechanism

The fact that the price setting mechanism is a choice could give rise to selection effects on the buyers’ side. For example, if sellers update their beliefs about a buyer’s “type” by observing the buyer’s choice of mechanism, differences in punishment between the two mechanism could stem from sellers’ reactions to different types of buyers rather than from their reactions to different mechanisms (e.g., Levine, 1998).

The *exogenous mechanism treatment* removes the buyer’s choice of mechanism. Instead, a random device selects for each buyer and in each round with equal probability the mechanism that determines the price, thus either the competitive mechanism or the mechanism under which the buyer uses his price setting power. The baseline and exogenous mechanism treatments are identical in all other respects. The exogenous mechanism treatment thus allows us to separate the effect of (i) the mechanism itself and (ii) the buyer’s choice of the mechanism on counterproductive behavior.

Figure 3 displays transfers and punishment in all our additional treatments. Panel A shows the data for the exogenous mechanism treatment. Looking at transfers first, it is evident that there are only about half as many cases, relative to the baseline condition, in which the buyer directly sets a transfer of zero. The average transfer when the buyer uses his price setting power in the exogenous mechanism treatment amounts to 9.00, while it is 4.32 in the baseline treatment only. This difference is highly significant ( $p < .001$ ) and it suggests that different types of buyers indeed self-select into the different mechanisms in the baseline condition: buyers who want to ensure a small transfer use their price setting power rather than the competitive mechanism.

Importantly, however, Panel A of Figure 3 reveals that the punishment pattern remains qualitatively unchanged.<sup>18</sup> This is confirmed by the regression analyses in Table 3. The regression models include treatment dummies and interactions of the treatment dummies with the “Competition” dummy. The interaction measures whether the impact of the use of the competitive mechanism on the sellers’ counterproductive behavior is different from its impact in the baseline condition. The table shows that the interaction “Competition X *Exogenous Mechanism*” is not significant in either regression model, indicating that punishment behavior does not significantly differ between the baseline and the exogenous mechanism treatment. This finding shows that it is not the choice of the mechanism but the mechanism in itself that is driving our main Results 1 to 3.


## 5.2 Reversed Levels

The transfer levels when the buyer uses his price setting power are determined by the buyers’ generosity and the sellers’ threat of punishment, the ones under competition are determined by the intensity with which sellers compete with each other. Which mechanism generates higher transfers depends on a number of parameters and there is no generic reason why the average level of the transfer should be higher or lower under one or the other mechanism. The transfers are higher on average under competition than under price setting power in our baseline condition (9.68 vs. 4.32). We cannot a priori exclude that this difference in average transfers has partially determined the sellers’ counterproductive behavior under the two mechanisms in the baseline treatment. For example, it is possible that sellers have judged buyers who chose competition as more kind because this choice leads to higher average transfers (e.g., Rabin, 1993; Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger, 2004; Falk & Fischbacher, 2006).

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<sup>18</sup>For transfers exceeding 15 the relation appears to flip, an effect that can also be seen in Panels B and D. Note, however, that this is partly due to the way the data are presented in the figure. The average transfer within the bin of transfers larger 15 is always lower in “Competition” than in “Power” because some buyers select the payoff equalizing transfer of 40, while transfers exceeding 20 are rare under competition.

Figure 3: Transfers and punishment patterns in the treatment conditions



Notes: For the intense competition treatment (panel C) the dashed lines represent the sum of punishment assigned to the respectively two other sellers.

To study whether the sellers’ counterproductive behavior is driven by the relative level of the average transfer in our baseline treatment—rather than by genuine features of the two mechanisms—we conducted the *reversed levels treatment*.<sup>19</sup> To reverse the relative average transfer level in the two mechanisms, we implemented the following two changes. First, the seller who does not receive the transfer obtains five points only under both mechanisms (instead of 10 points as in the baseline). This change increases the pressure to accept low transfers in the auction because already accepting a transfer of zero makes a seller better off (10 points) than not obtaining a transfer at all (5 points). Second, the buyers who use their price setting power in the baseline treatment determined the transfer by way of a scroll bar, where the default was set to zero.<sup>20</sup> In the reversed levels treatment, we replaced the scroll bar with an empty entry field where buyers had to enter the desired transfer, i.e. no default was indicated. The distribution of transfers displayed in Panel B in Figure 3 shows that these changes reduced transfers under competition and increased transfers when buyers used their price setting power. As intended, average transfers in the reversed levels treatment are now lower under competition than under price setting power (6.89 vs. 9.59).

Importantly, the results presented in Table 3 show that the interaction “Competition X *Reversed Levels*” is not significant in any of the three regression models. Punishment behavior does not significantly differ between the baseline and the reversed levels treatment, indicating that Results 1 to 3 also hold if transfers are on average lower under competition.

The robustness of our results with regard to average transfer levels in the two price setting mechanisms can also be read from Panel B of Figure 3. For small transfers (up to 10 points), the punishment targeted at the buyer is clearly lower under competition than under price setting power in the reversed levels treatment as well. Note that this part of the transfer distribution contains the large majority of observations (72.4 percent). Since higher transfers decrease punishment much more strongly when the buyer sets the transfer directly than when it is set under competition, the solid lines cross for transfers greater than 10 points. This interaction effect between transfer size and mechanism is also present in the other treatments.<sup>21</sup> The reason for this observation can be understood when considering that the buyer fully determines the transfer when he uses his price setting power. Consequently,

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<sup>19</sup>We devised this treatment ex-post, after observing the results of the baseline condition.

<sup>20</sup>We implemented the choice of the transfer by way of moving a scroll bar with a zero transfer default position in order to closely mimic the fact that the transfer starts at zero in the clock auction as well. The decision screens can be seen in the instructions that are provided in Appendix B.

<sup>21</sup>An additional interaction term “Competition X Transfer” entered in regression (1) of Table 3 is positive and highly significant ( $p < .001$ ) indicating that the interaction is present when pooling all treatments together. On the treatment-level we find a significant “Competition X Transfer” interaction in the baseline ( $p = .004$ ), symmetric participation ( $p = .018$ ), seller acceptance ( $p < .001$ ), intense competition ( $p = .022$ ), and reversed levels ( $p < .001$ ) treatments, but not in the buyer involvement treatment ( $p = .119$ ). See also footnote 18.

the buyer is punished less if he shows himself to be more generous. Under competition, in contrast, the buyer has no control over the resulting transfer any longer, hence punishment does not decrease as much when a competitive transfer turns out to be relatively large.

### 5.3 Intense Competition

A decisive characteristic of any competitive mechanism is its intensity. The more intense the competition between sellers, the lower is the expected transfer. The intensity of competition might thus be an important determinant of the perceived fairness of a competitive mechanism. To study the influence of this factor on counterproductive behavior, we increase the number of sellers in the *intense competition treatment* by adding a player D, who is a “clone” of C in every respect. Thus, if A chooses competition, there are now three sellers (B, C, and D) who compete for receiving the transfer. If A chooses to use his price setting power, the rules are as in the baseline treatment in that the transfer always goes to B.<sup>22</sup>

Comparing the distribution of the transfers under competition in the intense competition treatment as shown in Panel C in Figure 3 with the distribution in the baseline condition reveals that the increased competition in the intense competition treatment leads to lower transfers under competition than in the baseline. The average competitive transfer amounts to 5.88 in the intense competition treatment, which is significantly lower than the average competitive transfer of 9.46 in the baseline ( $p = .001$ ). This indicates that competition for transfers is indeed harsher when a third seller is present.

Importantly, however, the punishment pattern shown in Panel C in Figure 3 is again qualitatively identical to the baseline condition, which is confirmed by the insignificance of the interaction term “Competition X *Intense Competition*” in all three models in Table 3. This shows that Results 1 to 3 hold under intensified competition.

## 6 Potential Determinants

In this section we discuss three additional treatments to analyze potential determinants of our results, such as the sellers’ participation opportunities, active acceptance decisions, and the buyer’s involvement in the competitive mechanism.

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<sup>22</sup>Recall that we use the strategy method to elicit punishment decisions. The presence of player D means that the probability that a given seller’s punishment decision is implemented is reduced from 1/2 to 1/3.

## 6.1 Symmetric Participation

To identify the impact on counterproductive behavior of the participation asymmetry between Bs and Cs when the buyer uses his price setting power in the baseline condition, we provide symmetric participation opportunities under both mechanisms in the *symmetric participation treatment*. Specifically, if the buyer uses his price setting power in the symmetric participation treatment, he first sets the transfer and it is then randomly determined, with equal probability, whether B or C receives the transfer. If the buyer chooses competition, the rules are exactly as in the baseline condition.

Our analysis in Section 4.1 revealed that the punishment pattern observed in the baseline condition is not driven by one particular seller type. This does, however, not necessarily exclude that the asymmetry between Bs and Cs is an important driver of our results. It is possible, for example, that the buyer’s use of his price setting power is perceived as relatively unfair by both B and C, because it favors player B and prohibits player C from getting a transfer. The symmetric participation treatment allows us to identify the importance of the participation asymmetry between Bs and Cs.

Panel D of Figure 3 shows that the punishment pattern in the symmetric participation treatment is very similar to the baseline. The regression results in Table 3 confirm that punishment in the symmetric participation treatment does not significantly differ from the baseline. The interaction of the treatment variable “*Symmetric Participation*” with “Competition” is not significant in any of the regression models. This shows that the asymmetric participation opportunities when the buyer uses his market power do not drive our main Results 1 to 3.

## 6.2 Seller Acceptance

Decision making autonomy is an integral feature of any competitive mechanism. On the one hand, it means that everybody is free to reject given terms of trade—even if this implies not trading at all. On the other hand, it means that a transaction always involves an active decision to accept the terms of trade—even if these terms are unattractive. The feature of “freedom of choice” is mirrored in our experimental design as it is the sellers’ choice whether or not to click on an accept-button to receive the actual transfer under the competitive mechanism. In contrast, B does not have a choice when the buyer uses his price setting power in our baseline treatment because the transfer is simply dictated by the buyer.

The *seller acceptance treatment* introduces an acceptance decision also when the buyer uses his price setting power. If A uses his price setting power in the seller acceptance treatment, B receives the transfer only if he accepts it by clicking on an “accept” button—exactly

as under competition. If B does not accept, the transfer goes to C, who then automatically has to accept.<sup>23</sup> The competitive mechanism is identical to the baseline treatment.

Panel E in Figure 3 and the regression results in Table 3 show that sellers’ punishment behavior in the seller acceptance treatment does not differ significantly from the baseline condition. However, since the acceptance decision is held constant between the two mechanisms only for Bs, we also run regressions with the data from the Bs only (recall that Figure 3 and Table 3 consider data from Bs and Cs jointly). These estimations do not reveal any significant differences between the two treatments either. The coefficient for the “Competition X *Seller Acceptance*” interaction term is not significant in either model, i.e. the effect of competition is the same as in the baseline when it comes to the punishment for the buyer ( $p = .289$ ), for the respective other seller ( $p = .650$ ), or in total ( $p = .257$ ).<sup>24</sup> Based on these results, we conclude that the active acceptance decision present in the competitive mechanism is not a key driver of Results 1 to 3 that we identify in the baseline condition.

### 6.3 Buyer Involvement

The clock auction that is used to determine the transfer under the competitive mechanism is completely detached from the buyer. In particular, once A has chosen the competitive mechanism, the transfer is determined entirely by the acceptance decisions of B and C—without any further involvement of A. This might allow the buyer to hide behind the forces of competition and to avoid possible blame for low transfers. In the real world, however, buyers often remain involved in the determination of the terms of trade even under competitive mechanisms. Consider, for example, a situation where a buyer simultaneously engages in multiple bilateral negotiations with potential sellers.

We give A an active part in the auction in the *buyer involvement treatment* in order to study whether an involvement of the buyer in the competitive mechanism affects the sellers’ counterproductive behavior. In particular, if A chooses competition, he first has to set a sequence of ten strictly increasing transfer offers (the sequence cannot increase further if it reaches the maximum transfer of 40 before the tenth offer). In the actual auction, A’s transfer offers are then shown to B and C in increasing order.<sup>25</sup> As in the baseline treatment,

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<sup>23</sup>We did not give C the option to reject the transfer in order not to affect A’s incentives. Since C cannot reject, A knows that the transfer will be implemented for sure—exactly as in the baseline treatment. Bs accepted transfers of 1-5, 6-10, 11-15, and >15 in 82.3, 95.7, 89.7, and 100 percent of the cases, respectively. They accepted transfers of zero in 37.9 percent of the cases, but this is an inconsequential choice.

<sup>24</sup>The p-values stem from OLS regressions reported in full in Table A4 in the Appendix. Table A5 reports Tobit regressions.

<sup>25</sup>The buyer’s sequence of transfer offers was displayed on the sellers’ screens before the start of the auction. Moreover, we slowed down the clock auction from 1 second to 1.5 seconds because it is cognitively more demanding for the sellers to process the buyer’s sequence of increasing offers than to follow the standard clock auction with constant increments of 1 point.

the seller (B or C) who first accepts an offer receives the transfer. If none of A’s ten offers is accepted, the highest transfer offer is automatically increased by one point each second (up to the maximum transfer of 40) until one of the sellers accepts. The rules are exactly as in the baseline condition if A chooses to use his price setting power.

Panel F of Figure 3 reveals a very similar punishment pattern in the buyer involvement treatment compared to the baseline condition. The regression analysis in Table 3 confirms this result. The interaction of the treatment variable “*Buyer Involvement*” with “*Competition*” is not significant in any of the regression models.<sup>26</sup> These results show that involving the buyer in the competitive mechanism does not affect our main Results 1 to 3.

## 7 Individual Heterogeneity

In this section, we analyze individual heterogeneity in punishment decisions. For example, across all treatments 24.6 percent of the sellers (B, C, or D) never deduct any points from any other player during the 12 periods of the experiment.

The regressions reported in Table 4 show the extent to which unobserved individual differences explain the variation in punishment decisions. The dependent variable in all regressions is the punishment for the buyer. Model (1) considers “*Competition*,” “*Transfer*,” and “*Period*” as explanatory variables and uses the data from all our treatments. This regression confirms our main finding that the use of a competitive mechanism reduces the punishment for the buyer. A comparison of column (1) with column (2) illustrates that including individual fixed effects does not alter the coefficients much, but simply increases the  $R^2$  from about 6 percent to 56 percent. Unobserved individual differences thus explain the largest part of the variance in punishment decisions. However, since the assignment of subjects to roles and treatments is random and interactions were anonymous and one-shot, our experimental design allows for a clean identification of the effect of the mechanism on punishment, despite the presence of large individual heterogeneity.

Regression (3) extends regression (1) by adding a “*Female*” dummy and its interaction with “*Competition*” to the explanatory variables. Our sample is relatively balanced, with 52.3 percent of subjects (570 of 1090) being female. We find that our main result—the reduction of the punishment when the buyer uses a competitive mechanism to set the

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<sup>26</sup>Involving the buyer in the determination of the transfer slightly increases the transfer level under competition (12.02) relative to the baseline condition (9.46). This difference is marginally significant ( $p = .054$ ). We do not detect systematic effects of buyers’ transfer sequences on punishment. Buyers’ sequences can be characterized by the first transfer (starting point), the last transfer (end point), and the mean transfer. When regressing punishment for the buyer on these independent variables and controlling for transfer size and period, the results are as follows: first transfer = .076 ( $p = .692$ ), mean transfer =  $-.193$  ( $p = .559$ ), last transfer = .062 ( $p = .707$ ; OLS regression clustered by individual).

Table 4: Individual heterogeneity in sellers' punishment of the buyer

	Punishment for A			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Competition	-5.470*** (0.476)	-5.043*** (0.376)	-7.525*** (0.728)	-7.595*** (0.722)
Transfer	-0.341*** (0.033)	-0.477*** (0.032)	-0.344*** (0.033)	-0.339*** (0.031)
Period	-0.303*** (0.052)	-0.316*** (0.056)	-0.301*** (0.052)	-0.301*** (0.052)
Female			-4.015*** (1.014)	-3.920*** (1.081)
Female X Competition			3.982*** (0.978)	4.135*** (0.972)
Agreeableness				-0.951 (0.758)
Extraversion				-0.401 (0.532)
Openness				-1.514** (0.679)
Neuroticism				0.056 (0.613)
Conscientiousness				0.082 (0.606)
Constant	18.359*** (0.847)	19.260*** (0.449)	20.447*** (0.950)	30.927*** (5.146)
Individual fixed effects	No	Yes	No	No
$R^2$	0.059	0.561	0.066	0.072
Observations	8868	8868	8868	8868


\* $p < .10$ , \*\* $p < .05$ , \*\*\* $p < .01$

*Notes:* OLS; robust standard errors, clustered by 51 sessions, are in parentheses. The dependent variable is the number of punishment points assigned to the buyer. Big Five traits included in model 4 were measured in the post-experimental questionnaire using a German translation (Streib & Wiedmaier, 2001) of the mini-IPIP scale (Donnellan et al., 2006). Each trait was measured by four items on five-point Likert scales. Cronbach's  $\alpha$  indicate the following measurement reliabilities: Agreeableness  $\alpha = .660$ , Extraversion  $\alpha = .750$ , Openness  $\alpha = .603$ , Conscientiousness  $\alpha = .740$ , and Neuroticism  $\alpha = .701$ .

transfer—is significantly less pronounced for women than for men. This can be seen by the positive sign of the coefficient for the interaction of “Female” and “Competition.” Moreover, the negative sign of the “Female” dummy reveals that women punish less than men in general. Regression (4) shows that these results also hold when we control for a number of personality dimensions that are potentially correlated with gender.<sup>27</sup>

<sup>27</sup>None of the personality measures included in Model 4 in Table 4 show a significant interaction with the

Figure 4: Buyers' profits and mechanism choices over time



*Notes:* The figure presents pooled data from all treatments. Error bars in panel A represent plus/minus one standard error of the mean, clustered by session. In panel B, data from the exogenous mechanism treatment has been excluded.

We want to stress that we did not have an ex-ante hypothesis regarding a gender effect, hence it should be interpreted cautiously. However, the observation that the punishment reducing effect of competition in our data is less pronounced for women than for men resonates with the existing literature showing that women have a less pronounced preference for competition compared to men (e.g., Gneezy et al., 2003; Gneezy & Rustichini, 2004; Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007; Croson & Gneezy, 2009). Our data suggest that this gender difference in preferences for competition extends to fairness judgments of outcomes created by competitive mechanisms. In comparison to women, men seem to view competition as a relatively more acceptable source of inequality and therefore reduce their punishment behavior more strongly when an outcome has been determined competitively.

## 8 Buyers' Profits and Choice of Mechanism

The fact that the choice of competition reduces the punishment that sellers inflict on the buyer (for given transfer levels) renders competition potentially attractive for buyers. However, giving up power and delegating the transfer determination to a competitive auction also means that the buyer loses control over the resulting transfer. In this section we examine the impact of the buyers' choices of mechanism on their profits in our experiment.

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competition dummy. Moreover, the interaction between competition and gender remains significant when we include these additional interaction terms in the regression.

The left panel of Figure 4 allows identifying the optimal strategy for a money-maximizing buyer. The grey line shows the average profit of the buyer as a function of the transfer that buyers choose when they make use of their price setting power.<sup>28</sup> The black line illustrates the expected profit when the buyer chooses competition; it is horizontal because the buyer cannot control the transfer level but instead simply faces the expected competitive outcome. The figure reveals that buyers cannot realize higher (expected) profits when they use their price setting power instead of competition. Buyers can maximize their expected profit either by making use of the competitive mechanism or by directly setting a small transfer, slightly greater than zero.

Consistent with these observations, panel B of Figure 4 shows that buyers make use of the competitive mechanism with increasing frequency over the course of the 12 periods of the experiment.<sup>29</sup> While buyers choose competition in less than 40 percent of the cases in the first two periods, the share increases to levels close to 50 percent in the last two periods of the experiment. On average over all treatments (except exogenous mechanism) and periods, buyers choose competition in 46.9 percent of all cases.<sup>30</sup>

## 9 Conclusions

Competitive markets are associated with desirable properties such as decision-making autonomy and free entry. This paper asked whether competitive mechanisms are also perceived as just sources of economic inequality. To address this question, we conducted a series of laboratory experiments where a single powerful buyer could trade with one of several sellers, and where sellers could engage in inefficient counterproductive behavior. We found that low procurement prices, which allocate most of the surplus from trade to the buyer, trigger significantly less counterproductive behavior if the buyer uses a competitive auction to determine the terms of trade than if he uses his price setting power to dictate the same terms directly.

These insights not only contribute to a long-standing debate in political philosophy about just sources of economic inequality, but are of importance for efficiency reasons as well. Perceived fairness violations can have severe economic consequences in the real world because

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<sup>28</sup>Figure 4 shows the pooled data from all treatments. Figure A2 in the Appendix provides the same information for each treatment separately. It shows that the patterns are similar in all treatments, except for the reversed levels treatment, where profits are higher under competition for all possible transfers.

<sup>29</sup>Figure A3 in the Appendix provides the same information for each treatment individually.

<sup>30</sup>This percentage does not differ much across treatments: 49.4 (baseline), 58.0 (reversed levels), 39.2 (intense competition), 43.1 (symmetric participation), 46.1 (seller acceptance), and 46.4 (buyer involvement). The positive time trend is highly significant when pooling the treatments together ( $p < .001$ ). Looking at treatments separately it is at least marginally significant in all but the seller acceptance treatment.

they may lead to retaliatory actions, such as quality shading or sabotage, and our work shows that the use of competitive mechanisms makes such inefficient reactions less likely.

While our results were robustly obtained in seven independent treatment conditions, it will be interesting to consider further extensions in future research. First, we implemented an arguably fair manifestation of a competitive procedure, where all sellers have the same chance of winning the deal. It will be insightful to also study competitive mechanisms that provide some advantage to some sellers, i.e., that do not perfectly “level the playing field” (for instance because of an incumbent advantage). Second, we focused exclusively on counterproductive behavior. In some situations, however, efficient trade not only necessitates limiting harmful behavior, but also requires inducing proactive behavior, initiative, or voluntary cooperation (for instance effort beyond the letter of the contract in complex R&D projects). It will be important to examine whether the use of competition also allows motivating trading partners to engage in such productive behaviors. Finally, previous papers argue that differing beliefs about the fairness of income inequality lead to differences in redistributive policies across countries (e.g., Alesina & Angeletos, 2005; Alesina & Giuliano, 2011; see also Bénabou & Tirole, 2006). It will be of interest to use our experimental design to study cross-country differences in the extent to which competitive mechanisms provide justification and thus shape beliefs about the fairness of income inequality.

Considering our findings in a broader context, we note that by providing justification for economic inequality and potentially reducing political pressure for redistribution, competitive mechanisms might perpetuate or even foster inequality in society. While a certain level of merit-based inequality is needed to sustain proper incentives for investment and innovation (e.g., Mirrlees, 1971), excessive inequality can result in misallocation of resources and harm economic growth (see, e.g., Aghion et al., 1999; Barro, 2000). The positive interpretation of our results that we provide in this paper might therefore be warranted as long as overall inequality remains within reasonable boundaries.

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# Appendix

## A Additional Figures and Regression Analyses

Figure A1: Effect of mechanism on punishment over time





Figure A2: Buyers' profits by choice of mechanism for all treatments individually



Notes: Error bars represent plus/minus one standard error of the mean, clustered by individual.

Figure A3: Buyers' choice of competition over time for all treatments individually




Table A1: Tobit regression results for effects on punishment

	(1) Punishment for A	(2) Punishment for B/C/(D)	(3) Total Punishment
Competition	-7.668*** (1.576)	1.589*** (0.412)	-6.112*** (1.637)
<i>Exogenous Mechanism</i>	-1.630 (2.499)	-0.235 (0.231)	-2.164 (2.640)
Competition X <i>Exogenous Mechanism</i>	1.818 (2.363)	-0.127 (0.580)	1.823 (2.536)
<i>Reversed Levels</i>	-1.306 (2.253)	0.081 (0.562)	-1.387 (2.482)
Competition X <i>Reversed Levels</i>	1.563 (2.171)	0.342 (0.624)	2.006 (2.260)
<i>Intense Competition</i>	-4.808** (2.266)	0.419 (0.437)	-4.512* (2.398)
Competition X <i>Intense Competition</i>	2.690 (1.955)	0.456 (0.694)	3.068 (1.913)
<i>Symmetric Participation</i>	2.116 (2.980)	0.088 (0.274)	2.384 (3.145)
Competition X <i>Symmetric Participation</i>	0.971 (2.192)	0.596 (0.549)	1.733 (2.352)
<i>Seller Acceptance</i>	0.574 (2.131)	0.518 (0.358)	1.148 (2.275)
Competition X <i>Seller Acceptance</i>	1.695 (1.625)	0.100 (0.570)	1.861 (1.800)
<i>Buyer Involvement</i>	2.918 (2.597)	-0.438* (0.225)	2.496 (2.786)
Competition X <i>Buyer Involvement</i>	0.461 (1.828)	0.786 (0.534)	1.441 (1.827)
Transfer	-0.417*** (0.037)	0.086*** (0.011)	-0.337*** (0.042)
Period	-0.309*** (0.058)	-0.014 (0.017)	-0.338*** (0.067)
Constant	20.500*** (1.956)	0.599*** (0.228)	21.897*** (2.058)
Pseudo $R^2$	0.010	0.010	0.005
Observations	8868	8868	8868
Censored observations	930	1	1353

\* $p < .10$ , \*\* $p < .05$ , \*\*\* $p < .01$

*Notes:* Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by 51 sessions. Dependent variables are the number of punishment points for the buyer (1), the respectively other seller(s) (2), or in total (3). For the intense competition treatment, the dependent variable in (2) corresponds to the sum of punishment assigned to the other two sellers. The table reports Tobit regressions right-censored at 50 (maximum punishment). The models correspond to those estimated by OLS in Table 3.

Table A2: Two-part models for effects on punishment for A and B/C/(D)

	DV: Punishment for A		DV: Punishment for B/C/(D)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	1st part (OLS)	2nd part (Tobit)	1st part (OLS)	2nd part (Tobit)
Competition	-0.120*** (0.033)	-13.473*** (2.039)	0.110*** (0.025)	3.935*** (1.229)
<i>Exogenous Mechanism</i>	0.036 (0.045)	-7.983** (3.860)	0.021 (0.031)	-2.374** (1.040)
Competition X <i>Exogenous Mechanism</i>	-0.018 (0.055)	7.234** (2.868)	-0.005 (0.046)	-0.011 (1.257)
<i>Reversed Levels</i>	0.035 (0.045)	-7.805* (4.150)	0.039 (0.046)	-0.690 (1.626)
Competition X <i>Reversed Levels</i>	0.012 (0.045)	6.375 (3.975)	0.007 (0.036)	0.233 (2.063)
<i>Intense Competition</i>	-0.041 (0.044)	-9.854** (4.296)	0.005 (0.041)	2.748* (1.441)
Competition X <i>Intense Competition</i>	0.019 (0.057)	5.708 (4.629)	0.103 (0.070)	-3.766** (1.556)
<i>Symmetric Participation</i>	0.045 (0.057)	0.642 (4.063)	-0.003 (0.034)	0.517 (1.076)
Competition X <i>Symmetric Participation</i>	0.037 (0.041)	2.894 (3.711)	0.067** (0.031)	-1.233 (1.643)
<i>Seller Acceptance</i>	0.078* (0.043)	-5.703 (3.746)	0.064** (0.030)	0.552 (1.373)
Competition X <i>Seller Acceptance</i>	0.034 (0.043)	4.794 (3.033)	0.023 (0.036)	-1.873 (1.646)
<i>Buyer Involvement</i>	0.047 (0.054)	2.368 (4.337)	-0.037 (0.029)	-1.549 (1.719)
Competition X <i>Buyer Involvement</i>	0.015 (0.039)	3.748 (3.842)	0.077** (0.029)	0.427 (1.756)
Transfer	-0.007*** (0.001)	-0.586*** (0.063)	0.002*** (0.001)	0.363*** (0.041)
Period	-0.014*** (0.001)	0.354*** (0.109)	-0.006*** (0.001)	0.225*** (0.043)
Constant	0.550*** (0.032)	41.795*** (3.108)	0.148*** (0.027)	3.857*** (0.974)
$R^2$ / Pseudo $R^2$	0.044	0.020	0.045	0.035
Observations	8868	3386	8868	1798
Censored observations	n/a	930	n/a	1

\* $p < .10$ , \*\* $p < .05$ , \*\*\* $p < .01$

*Notes:* Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by 51 sessions. The dependent variable (DV) in the 1st part regressions is a dummy taking on value 1 if there is positive punishment. The DV in the 2nd part is the number of punishment points, given positive punishment; cases with zero punishment are excluded. For the intense competition treatment, the dependent variable in (4) corresponds to the sum of punishment assigned to the other two sellers. The 2nd part Tobit regressions are right-censored at 50 (maximum punishment). The two-part models fit the data better than the Tobit models in Table A1: For the punishment for A, the combined log-likelihood of the two-part model is  $-17,747.9$  compared to  $-35,802.9$  in the Tobit model. For the punishment for the other seller it is  $-10,111.6$  compared to  $-26,904.2$ .

Table A3: Two-part models for effects on total punishment

	DV: Total punishment	
	(1) 1st part (OLS)	(2) 2nd part (Tobit)
Competition	-0.070* (0.037)	-11.808*** (1.789)
<i>Exogenous Mechanism</i>	0.032 (0.047)	-9.857** (4.421)
Competition X <i>Exogenous Mechanism</i>	-0.005 (0.059)	6.117 (3.931)
<i>Reversed Levels</i>	0.041 (0.046)	-8.997** (4.482)
Competition X <i>Reversed Levels</i>	0.035 (0.046)	4.681 (3.075)
<i>Intense Competition</i>	-0.031 (0.043)	-9.809** (4.277)
Competition X <i>Intense Competition</i>	0.092 (0.066)	1.156 (3.378)
<i>Symmetric Participation</i>	0.042 (0.058)	1.392 (4.737)
Competition X <i>Symmetric Participation</i>	0.058 (0.046)	1.528 (3.261)
<i>Seller Acceptance</i>	0.080* (0.044)	-5.746 (4.264)
Competition X <i>Seller Acceptance</i>	0.047 (0.044)	3.566 (2.451)
<i>Buyer Involvement</i>	0.053 (0.055)	0.321 (5.202)
Competition X <i>Buyer Involvement</i>	0.040 (0.042)	2.652 (3.805)
Transfer	-0.007*** (0.001)	-0.257*** (0.083)
Period	-0.011*** (0.001)	0.199 (0.130)
Constant	0.544*** (0.033)	45.334*** (3.628)
$R^2$ / Pseudo $R^2$	0.025	0.011
Observations	8868	3807
Censored observations	n/a	1353

\* $p < .10$ , \*\* $p < .05$ , \*\*\* $p < .01$

*Notes:* Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by 51 sessions. The dependent variable (DV) in the 1st part regressions is a dummy taking on value 1 if there is positive punishment. The DV in the 2nd part is the number of punishment points, given positive punishment; zero punishment cases are excluded. The 2nd part Tobit regressions are right-censored at 50 (maximum punishment). The two-part model fits the data better than the Tobit model in Table A1: the combined log-likelihood of the two-part model is  $-18,659.9$  compared to  $-35,641.0$  in the Tobit model.

Table A4: OLS regression results when considering only decisions from B type sellers

	(1) Punishment for A	(2) Punishment for C/(D)	(3) Total Punishment
Competition	-5.755*** (1.981)	2.448*** (0.569)	-3.307 (1.988)
<i>Exogenous Mechanism</i>	-2.261 (2.910)	-0.139 (0.227)	-2.401 (2.950)
Competition X <i>Exogenous Mechanism</i>	-1.446 (2.907)	-0.590 (0.717)	-2.036 (2.901)
<i>Reversed Levels</i>	-2.406 (2.878)	-0.497** (0.190)	-2.904 (2.887)
Competition X <i>Reversed Levels</i>	-0.346 (2.519)	0.426 (0.714)	0.080 (2.470)
<i>Intense Competition</i>	-7.593** (2.956)	0.277 (0.336)	-7.316** (3.016)
Competition X <i>Intense Competition</i>	3.751 (2.536)	0.514 (0.742)	4.265 (2.567)
<i>Symmetric Participation</i>	-0.760 (3.101)	0.476* (0.254)	-0.284 (3.122)
Competition X <i>Symmetric Participation</i>	0.749 (2.359)	-0.133 (0.670)	0.615 (2.382)
<i>Seller Acceptance</i>	-1.651 (3.083)	0.147 (0.248)	-1.504 (3.042)
Competition X <i>Seller Acceptance</i>	2.604 (2.427)	0.314 (0.687)	2.918 (2.544)
<i>Buyer Involvement</i>	2.805 (3.087)	-0.153 (0.179)	2.652 (3.109)
Competition X <i>Buyer Involvement</i>	-0.847 (2.274)	0.476 (0.945)	-0.372 (2.227)
Transfer	-0.479*** (0.044)	0.060*** (0.011)	-0.418*** (0.046)
Period	-0.328*** (0.083)	-0.012 (0.018)	-0.340*** (0.092)
Constant	22.083*** (2.363)	0.324* (0.178)	22.407*** (2.389)
$R^2$	0.086	0.085	0.052
Observations	4860	4860	4860

\* $p < .10$ , \*\* $p < .05$ , \*\*\* $p < .01$

*Notes:* Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by 51 sessions. Only decisions from Bs are considered, except for the symmetric participation treatment, where both seller types are included, as both types can then receive the transfer under price setting power. Post-estimation Wald tests show that the effect of competition on punishment for A when considering only decisions from B types is significant in the exogenous mechanism, buyer involvement, and reversed levels treatment ( $p \leq .001$ ), as well as in the seller acceptance treatment ( $p = .022$ ), but not in the intense competition treatment ( $p = .205$ ). The increase in punishment for the other seller(s) is significant in all treatments ( $p < .001$ ). For total punishment, it is significant in the exogenous mechanism ( $p = .012$ ), symmetric participation ( $p = .047$ ), buyer involvement ( $p < .001$ ), and reversed levels ( $p = .031$ ) treatments, but not in the seller acceptance ( $p = .800$ ) and the intense competition treatment ( $p = .551$ ).

Table A5: Tobit regression results when considering only decisions from B type sellers

	(1) Punishment for A	(2) Punishment for C/(D)	(3) Total Punishment
Competition	-7.461*** (2.422)	2.448*** (0.568)	-4.779** (2.417)
<i>Exogenous Mechanism</i>	-3.181 (3.475)	-0.139 (0.226)	-3.693 (3.609)
Competition X <i>Exogenous Mechanism</i>	-0.693 (3.401)	-0.590 (0.716)	-1.370 (3.480)
<i>Reversed Levels</i>	-3.336 (3.446)	-0.497*** (0.190)	-4.331 (3.544)
Competition X <i>Reversed Levels</i>	0.335 (3.035)	0.426 (0.712)	0.921 (2.966)
<i>Intense Competition</i>	-9.133** (3.555)	0.277 (0.335)	-9.182** (3.747)
Competition X <i>Intense Competition</i>	4.979 (3.054)	0.514 (0.740)	5.369* (3.056)
<i>Symmetric Participation</i>	-1.234 (3.711)	0.476* (0.254)	-0.670 (3.874)
Competition X <i>Symmetric Participation</i>	1.334 (2.874)	-0.133 (0.669)	1.199 (2.960)
<i>Seller Acceptance</i>	-2.397 (3.701)	0.147 (0.247)	-2.543 (3.811)
Competition X <i>Seller Acceptance</i>	3.502 (2.874)	0.314 (0.686)	4.214 (3.049)
<i>Buyer Involvement</i>	3.066 (3.811)	-0.153 (0.179)	3.045 (4.002)
Competition X <i>Buyer Involvement</i>	-0.586 (2.890)	0.476 (0.943)	-0.062 (2.767)
Transfer	-0.554*** (0.053)	0.060*** (0.011)	-0.512*** (0.058)
Period	-0.331*** (0.095)	-0.012 (0.018)	-0.368*** (0.110)
Constant	24.820*** (2.941)	0.324* (0.177)	26.205*** (3.063)
$R^2$ / Pseudo $R^2$	0.012	0.015	0.007
Observations	4860	4860	4860
Censored observations	605	0	852

\* $p < .10$ , \*\* $p < .05$ , \*\*\* $p < .01$

*Notes:* Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by 51 sessions. Only decisions from B type sellers are considered, except for the symmetric participation treatment, for which both seller types are included, as both types can receive the transfer under price setting power in this treatment. The table reports Tobit regressions right-censored at 50 (maximum punishment). The models correspond to those estimated by OLS in Table A4.

Table A6: OLS regression results when considering only decisions from C/(D) type sellers

	(1) Punishment for A	(2) Punishment for B/(C)	(3) Total Punishment
Competition	-7.364*** (1.371)	0.683 (0.567)	-6.682*** (1.314)
<i>Exogenous Mechanism</i>	-0.119 (2.076)	-0.375 (0.456)	-0.493 (2.150)
Competition X <i>Exogenous Mechanism</i>	4.183** (1.868)	0.372 (0.815)	4.554** (2.085)
<i>Reversed Levels</i>	0.751 (2.179)	0.611 (1.060)	1.361 (2.526)
Competition X <i>Reversed Levels</i>	2.738 (2.698)	0.332 (0.940)	3.070 (2.502)
<i>Intense Competition</i>	1.183 (3.509)	0.594 (0.904)	1.777 (3.640)
Competition X <i>Intense Competition</i>	-0.604 (3.105)	0.325 (1.008)	-0.280 (3.083)
<i>Seller Acceptance</i>	3.321 (2.360)	0.870 (0.744)	4.190 (2.540)
Competition X <i>Seller Acceptance</i>	0.101 (1.858)	-0.086 (0.748)	0.015 (1.650)
<i>Buyer Involvement</i>	2.436 (2.517)	-0.745* (0.430)	1.691 (2.542)
Competition X <i>Buyer Involvement</i>	1.611 (1.649)	1.094 (1.062)	2.705 (1.900)
Transfer	-0.230*** (0.046)	0.121*** (0.025)	-0.110* (0.058)
Period	-0.286*** (0.065)	-0.020 (0.032)	-0.306*** (0.078)
Constant	15.153*** (1.763)	0.863* (0.459)	16.016*** (1.791)
$R^2$	0.064	0.047	0.037
Observations	3564	3564	3564

\* $p < .10$ , \*\* $p < .05$ , \*\*\* $p < .01$

*Notes:* Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by 51 sessions. Only decisions from C and D type sellers are considered. The symmetric participation treatment is excluded because all seller are identical in this treatment. Post-estimation Wald tests show that the effect of competition on punishment for the other seller(s) when considering only decisions from C and D types is significant in the buyer involvement, seller acceptance, and intense competition treatments ( $p < .001$ ), as well as in the exogenous mechanism ( $p = .016$ ) and the reversed levels treatments ( $p = .049$ ). The increase in punishment for the other seller(s) is marginally significant in the exogenous mechanism ( $p = .082$ ) and the buyer involvement treatments ( $p = .047$ ). It is not significant in the other treatments. For total punishment, it is significant in the seller acceptance ( $p < .001$ ), intense competition ( $p = .015$ ), buyer involvement ( $p = .003$ ), and reversed levels ( $p = .096$ ) treatments, but not in the exogenous mechanism treatment ( $p = .203$ ).

Table A7: Tobit regression results when considering only decisions from C/(D) type sellers

	(1) Punishment for A	(2) Punishment for B/(C)	(3) Total Punishment
Competition	-8.098*** (1.573)	0.682 (0.566)	-7.663*** (1.526)
<i>Exogenous Mechanism</i>	-0.300 (2.296)	-0.373 (0.456)	-0.909 (2.487)
Competition X <i>Exogenous Mechanism</i>	4.490** (2.065)	0.370 (0.814)	5.154** (2.335)
<i>Reversed Levels</i>	0.492 (2.449)	0.610 (1.058)	1.202 (2.932)
Competition X <i>Reversed Levels</i>	3.052 (3.011)	0.333 (0.938)	3.440 (2.859)
<i>Intense Competition</i>	1.137 (3.941)	0.594 (0.903)	1.739 (4.220)
Competition X <i>Intense Competition</i>	-0.656 (3.528)	0.325 (1.006)	-0.364 (3.568)
<i>Seller Acceptance</i>	3.354 (2.631)	0.869 (0.743)	4.566 (2.926)
Competition X <i>Seller Acceptance</i>	0.111 (2.127)	-0.085 (0.747)	-0.188 (1.911)
<i>Buyer Involvement</i>	2.695 (2.781)	-0.745* (0.430)	1.877 (2.931)
Competition X <i>Buyer Involvement</i>	1.547 (1.787)	1.094 (1.060)	2.927 (2.063)
Transfer	-0.258*** (0.051)	0.121*** (0.025)	-0.129* (0.067)
Period	-0.290*** (0.070)	-0.020 (0.032)	-0.314*** (0.088)
Constant	16.235*** (1.984)	0.863* (0.458)	17.624*** (2.106)
$R^2$ / Pseudo $R^2$	0.008	0.008	0.005
Observations	3564	3564	3564
Censored observations	289	1	444

\* $p < .10$ , \*\* $p < .05$ , \*\*\* $p < .01$

*Notes:* Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by 51 sessions. Only decisions from C and D type sellers are considered. The symmetric participation treatment is excluded, because it did not have any C types without access to the transfer under price setting power. The table reports Tobit regressions right-censored at 50 (maximum punishment). The models correspond to those estimated by OLS in Table A6.

Table A8: OLS and Tobit regression results for punishment under competition

	Punishment for A		Punishment for B/C/(D)	
	(1) OLS	(2) Tobit	(3) OLS	(4) Tobit
Winner	-0.819 (1.108)	-0.747 (1.123)	-4.739*** (0.848)	-4.739*** (0.846)
<i>Exogenous Mechanism</i>	0.515 (1.842)	0.555 (1.873)	-0.852 (1.064)	-0.852 (1.063)
Winner X <i>Exogenous Mechanism</i>	-1.150 (1.985)	-1.282 (2.039)	0.936 (1.052)	0.936 (1.050)
<i>Reversed Levels</i>	1.439 (1.673)	1.515 (1.710)	0.772 (1.111)	0.772 (1.109)
Winner X <i>Reversed Levels</i>	-0.530 (1.688)	-0.582 (1.742)	-0.517 (1.179)	-0.517 (1.177)
<i>Intense Competition</i>	-1.554 (1.304)	-1.514 (1.334)	-0.493 (1.017)	-0.493 (1.015)
Winner X <i>Intense Competition</i>	1.810 (2.210)	1.811 (2.285)	2.093** (0.891)	2.093** (0.889)
<i>Symmetric Participation</i>	2.387 (1.920)	2.465 (1.982)	0.805 (0.984)	0.805 (0.982)
Winner X <i>Symmetric Participation</i>	0.880 (1.729)	0.965 (1.777)	-0.257 (1.070)	-0.257 (1.068)
<i>Seller Acceptance</i>	3.110*** (1.123)	3.253*** (1.163)	0.665 (0.991)	0.665 (0.989)
Winner X <i>Seller Acceptance</i>	-1.193 (1.854)	-1.270 (1.887)	-0.014 (0.978)	-0.014 (0.976)
<i>Buyer Involvement</i>	2.228 (1.644)	2.306 (1.685)	0.496 (1.036)	0.496 (1.034)
Winner X <i>Buyer Involvement</i>	0.203 (1.723)	0.332 (1.757)	-0.447 (1.122)	-0.447 (1.120)
Transfer	-0.066 (0.056)	-0.064 (0.057)	0.118*** (0.028)	0.118*** (0.028)
Period	-0.307*** (0.066)	-0.306*** (0.068)	0.000 (0.025)	0.000 (0.025)
Constant	9.678*** (1.272)	9.716*** (1.304)	4.152*** (0.842)	4.152*** (0.840)
$R^2$ / Pseudo $R^2$	0.016	0.002	0.145	0.024
Observations	4176	4176	4176	4176
Censored observations	n/a	149	n/a	0

\* $p < .10$ , \*\* $p < .05$ , \*\*\* $p < .01$

*Notes:* Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by 51 sessions. “Winner” is a dummy variable taking on value 1 for auction winners. For the intense competition treatment, the dependent variable in (3) and (4) is the sum of punishment assigned to the other two sellers. Only observations from the competitive mechanism are considered. Tobit regressions are right-censored at 50 (maximum punishment). Coefficients in (3) and (4) are identical as there was no right-censoring for the punishment for the other seller(s). Post-estimation Wald tests after OLS regressions show that the punishment for A is the same for winners and losers in all treatments ( $p > .10$  for all treatments). However, losers punish the other seller(s) significantly more than winners do ( $p < .001$  for all treatments).