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Worker Mobility in a Search Model with Adverse Selection

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September 2015

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ABSTRACT

Worker Mobility in a Search Model with Adverse Selection*

We analyze the effects of adverse selection on worker turnover and wage dynamics in a frictional labor market. We consider a model of on-the-job search where firms offer promotion wage contracts to workers of different abilities, which is unknown to firms at the hiring stage. With sufficiently strong information frictions, low-wage firms offer separating contracts and hire all types of workers in equilibrium, whereas high-wage firms offer pooling contracts, promoting high-ability workers only. Low-ability workers have higher turnover rates and are more often employed in low-wage firms. The model replicates the negative relationship between job-to-job transitions and wages observed in the U.S. labor market.

JEL Classification: D82, J63, J64

Keywords: adverse selection, on-the-job search, worker mobility, wage dynamics

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1 Introduction

The ability of the labor market to allocate resources hinges upon the type and severity of the frictions that prevent workers and firms in forming the most efficient matches. On the one hand, theories of search frictions emphasize the costs associated with finding the right worker or the right job. Theories of adverse selection, on the other hand, stress the importance of asymmetric information at the hiring stage as an impediment for labor turnover.¹ Taken together these frictions can present formidable barriers for worker turnover and efficient resource allocation. Lockwood (1991), for example, suggests that adverse selection exacerbates the negative effects of search frictions by reducing the re-employment chances of unemployed workers. With almost no exceptions, however, current contributions on labor search with adverse selection abstract from job-to-job flows,² although these transitions account for a sizeable part of worker flows. Furthermore, the rate at which workers change jobs is an important determinant of wage dynamics (see, e.g., Topel and Ward (1992)). Thus one would expect that asymmetric information not only has non-trivial implications for workers' job turnover, but also for how their wages evolve over time.

In this paper we present a theoretical analysis of the interaction between search frictions, on-the-job search and asymmetric information. Our objective is to study how asymmetric information about workers' abilities affects the mobility of workers within and across firms in a frictional labor market. A key implication of our model is that high-wage firms offer more attractive employment conditions to high-ability workers than to low-ability workers. This implies that low-ability workers have higher turnover rates even though all workers face the same degree of search frictions.³ We show that our model is quantitatively consistent with the observed negative relationship between wages and the number of job-to-job transitions we uncover using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). In particular, workers that undertake substantial job changes have on average lower earnings than workers who change relatively fewer times. This is in contrast with standard theories of on-the-job search such as Burdett and Mortensen (1998), which we show predict a positive relationship between wages and the number of job-to-job transitions. We further show that the negative relationship between those variables observed in the data is generated by worker unobserved heterogeneity, as implied by our model.

We consider a frictional labor market similar to Burdett and Mortensen (1998), where workers search randomly for job opportunities and firms commit to long-term wage contracts. In deviation from this benchmark, information is asymmetrically distributed in our model: while workers are perfectly informed about their ability, firms learn workers' ability slowly over time. Further, firms post a menu of promotion contracts, one for each worker type, to which they are committed. Any contract offers a starting wage based on the worker's reported ability.

¹Search models of the labor market are surveyed in Rogerson et al. (2005). For labor market implications of adverse selection, see e.g. Salop and Salop (1976), Greenwald (1986), Gibbons and Katz (1991).

²We review some of this literature in Section 1.2 below.

³The empirical findings of Kahn (2013) indeed suggest that workers with higher job mobility patterns are on average of lower ability than those who move relatively less.

Upon learning the worker's type, the firm promotes the worker if the worker reported his type truthfully; otherwise the worker is demoted.

When a meeting takes place, the worker chooses whether to accept the job and the terms of employment based on the reported ability. By misreporting his type, a low-ability worker earns a higher starting wage but faces the possibility of demotion accompanied by a wage cut. By reporting truthfully, the worker earns a lower starting wage but faces the prospects of a promotion with a wage rise. This trade-off determines the incentive-compatibility constraint that firms must satisfy if they want to separate workers at the hiring stage. A key result is that the firms' willingness to separate their applicants depends on the degree of information frictions relative to search frictions. Indeed, adverse selection adds a novel trade-off in the firm's problem. By offering high starting wages to attract and retain more high-ability workers, it becomes more costly to satisfy incentive compatibility and separate workers. As information frictions increase relative to search frictions, the cost of separating workers becomes larger. Stronger information frictions (or lower search frictions) imply that workers have a higher chance of moving to another job before the firm learns their type, making it even more attractive for workers to misreport and more difficult for firms to separate at the hiring stage.

In equilibrium, firms follow one of two strategies. Either they decide to offer separating contracts or they offer pooling contracts. Firms offering pooling contracts hire all workers at the same starting wage, promoting high-ability workers and demoting low-ability workers after their types are revealed. Firms offering separating contracts hire workers at different starting wages and promote all workers after their types are revealed. The offer distribution of starting wages for each ability type is always dispersed for similar reasons as in Burdett and Mortensen (1998). We find a cutoff value of the firms' learning rate such that when firms learn sufficiently fast, a *separating equilibrium* emerges where all firms offer separating contracts. Otherwise, there exists a *segmented equilibrium* in which low-wage firms offer separating contracts while high-wage firms offer pooling contracts. The segmented equilibrium has particularly interesting qualitative properties: because high-wage firms demote workers of low-ability, these workers have higher turnover rates than high-ability workers. Hence, they are more frequently employed in low-wage firms who then end up with a less productive workforce.⁴ The segmented equilibrium also features rich individual wage dynamics, including wage cuts and wage gains, both within and between firms.

To analyze the quantitative implications of our model, we calibrate it to match the monthly rates and the wage gains/losses associated with job-to-job transitions, job-to-nonemployment transitions and within-firm promotions, as observed in the U.S. for workers with ten years of potential work experience. Our estimate for the firm's learning rate follows Lange (2007). The

⁴Idson and Oi (1999) suggest that smaller firms are less productive because they attract and retain less productive workers than larger firms. They argue that this is due to complementarities between capital and labor, while they are silent on the way recruitment and retention policies firms use to achieve a more productive workforce. Our theory provides a possible explanation. See Lentz (2010) for a model in which high-ability workers search harder and hence have a higher chance of being employed in high-wage firms.

segmented equilibrium that arises in the calibration has novel features relative to standard labor search models without information frictions, such as Burdett and Mortensen (1998). In the calibrated model, for example, larger firms have higher internal mobility, pay higher wages, employ a more productive workforce and exhibit less separations (see Idson (1989) and Papageorgiou (2014), among others). Larger firms also have less dispersed starting wages, a prediction that we confirm using the NLSY.

The main implication of our calibrated model pertains to the relationship between the cumulative count of workers' job-to-job transitions and (log) wages. We show using NSLY data that an OLS regression generates a negative relationship between these two variables, after controlling for a large set of observable characteristics including the cumulative count of non-employment spells.⁵ Our calibrated model generates this negative relationship, while a Burdett and Mortensen (1998) model predicts a positive relationship.

We further analyze whether worker unobserved heterogeneity might be driving the negative relationship between the number of job-to-job transitions and wages observed in the data. This exercise is important as our model predicts that this should be the case. To test this prediction we control for possible correlations between a time-invariant worker effect in the error term and the cumulative count of job-to-job transitions. Once we control for such a correlation, we find a positive relationship between the cumulative count of job-to-job transitions and wages. Hence, standard job ladder models seem to be fully consistent with the data once we account for worker unobserved heterogeneity. However, those models miss the fact that some workers churn a lot in the labor market and yet remain largely unsuccessful.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. After a brief review of the related literature, we set out the basic framework in Section 2. In Section 3 we characterize separating and segmented equilibria. Particularly, we show that all firms separate their applicants when the firms' learning rate is high enough; but when information frictions are sufficiently severe, a fraction of high-wage firms offer pooling contracts and end up retaining more high-ability workers. In Section 4 we calibrate our model and explore its implications for worker turnover and wage dynamics. Section 5 analyzes an extension where firms can condition their contracts on workers' employment status. Here we show that employment status gives firms further monopsony power, which in turn makes it easier to separate workers at the hiring stage. Section 6 concludes. All proofs, tedious derivations and data analysis are relegated to the Appendix.

1.1 Related Literature

In their recent survey paper about hiring and incentives, Oyer and Schaefer (2011) call for further theoretical exploration about the effects of asymmetric information at the hiring stage in a frictional labor market. We contribute to this literature by developing an equilibrium

⁵This is inline with previous empirical studies that find that more job turnover is associated with lower average wages (see, e.g., Mincer and Jovanovic (1981) and Light and McGarry (1998)).

model of random search in which firms commit to self-selecting contracts to study the effects on worker turnover and wage dynamics. We allow firms to face the risk of losing workers to other firms through competition brought about by workers' on-the-job search. In general, firms may also use other screening devices like aptitude tests, but those can be costly to implement or might not reveal the desired information. Salop and Salop (1976), for example, show how firms can use deferred compensation contracts to separate workers with high and low quit rates. Lazear (2000) and Oyer and Schaefer (2005) emphasize the importance of self-selection contracts in explaining the use of performance-based pay in organizations. Here we explore the role of promotion/demotion contracts as a self-selection device that helps firms to separate applicants at the hiring stage.

Besides a few earlier contributions (e.g. Lockwood (1991), Albrecht and Vroman (1992), Montgomery (1999)), a number of more recent papers study the interrelation between search frictions and adverse selection. Guerrieri et al. (2010) analyze existence and efficiency properties of competitive search models with adverse selection, characterizing separating equilibria where different worker types are employed in different contracts. As they consider a static environment, they cannot discuss worker turnover or wage dynamics. Lester et al. (2015) analyze a random search economy with adverse selection, also in a static environment. They show that when the degree of competition in a market is sufficiently low there exists a segmented equilibrium where some buyers use separating contracts and some buyers use pooling contracts.⁶ To the best of our knowledge, there are only two papers with on-the-job search under adverse selection. Kugler and Saint-Paul (2004) analyze the effects of firing cost on different types of workers in a model with on-the-job search, assuming however an ad-hoc wage schedule. This is very different from this paper which is interested in optimal wage policies under adverse selection. Visschers (2007) considers a model with random search based on Stevens (2004) and assumes that both the worker and the employer do not observe the worker's (match-specific) ability at the start of the relation. Although the employer learns faster than the worker, it offers the same wage contract to all its new hires.

This paper also relate to the literature that studies employer learning to analyze worker reallocation. Jovanovic (1979), Moscarini (2005) and Papageorgiou (2014) provide insightful examples. This literature typically focuses on bilateral asymmetric information where the firm and the worker jointly observe signals about the match quality over time. An important empirical literature has developed from such insights, aiming to test the degree of asymmetric information and the speed of employer learning (e.g. Altonji and Pierret (1996), Lange (2007) and Kahn (2013)). These papers imply that low-ability or poorly matched workers are negatively selected, facing a higher turnover rate. Our paper constructs a tractable equilibrium wage-posting model with adverse selection, on-the-job search and firm learning. In this setting we analyze how

⁶Within a static environment Inderst (2005) analyzes existence of separating equilibria in a model of random search with adverse selection in a static environment. Camera and Delacroix (2004) and Michelacci and Suarez (2006), consider the interaction of search frictions and adverse selection to study firms' decisions to offer a take-it-or-leave-it wage offer or to engage in bilateral bargaining with their job applicants.

the degree of frictions in the labor market and firms' speed of learning affect their hiring and retention strategies. We show that the resulting workers' job mobility and wage patterns are quantitatively consistent with evidence for the U.S. labor market.

2 Basic Framework

2.1 Environment

Consider the steady state of a continuous time economy which comprises a continuum of workers and a continuum of firms. There are two types of workers who differ in their innate ability. A mass $\alpha_H = 1$ of workers has high ability p_H and a mass $\alpha_L = \alpha > 0$ has low ability p_L , where $p_H > p_L$. The life of any worker has uncertain duration and follows an exponential distribution with parameter $\phi > 0$. Let ϕ also describe the rate at which new workers enter the labor market, keeping the measures of both worker types constant. Firms are infinitely lived. All firms operate the same constant returns to scale technology, producing flow output p_i with every employed worker of type $i = H, L$. All agents have a zero rate of time preference and are risk neutral. The objective of any worker is to maximize total expected lifetime income, and the objective of any firm is to maximize steady state profits.

While workers are perfectly informed about their type upon entering the labor market, firms do not know a worker's ability at the hiring stage. We assume that firms monitor the output of a particular worker at exogenous rate $\rho > 0$, which describes the firm's learning rate.⁷ Once the firm has learned the worker's ability, the latter can be verified in a court of law. We will refer to the period prior firm learning as the "probation" period.

Unemployed and employed workers meet firms according to a Poisson process with parameter $\lambda > 0$. There are also job destruction shocks in that each employed worker is displaced into unemployment according to a Poisson process with parameter $\delta > 0$. Once unemployed, any worker receives a payoff of $b < p_L$ per unit of time. For simplicity we do not allow that workers of different abilities obtain different payoffs when unemployed. The flow payoff b can be interpreted as flow income from unemployment benefits (imposing equal treatment across workers) or as flow utility from leisure (imposing identical leisure preferences).

2.2 Contracts

We consider wage contracts that allow for promotions or demotions when the firm verifies the worker's type. A contract contains a commitment to three wages: a starting wage, a promotion wage and a demotion wage. All other transfers between workers and firms (at the hiring stage or thereafter) are ruled out.

⁷The implicit assumption here is that the firm observes total output, but since it employs a mass of workers it is too costly to observe the output of each individual worker immediately.

The firms' information structure at the hiring stage mirrors that of the Burdett and Mortensen (1998) model. In particular, firms cannot make wage contracts contingent on the applicants' employment histories. As it will become clear later, this restriction is important since a firm could use information on its applicants' current wages or their wage histories to update its beliefs about the workers' types. However, allowing wage contracts to be contingent on these characteristics also involves dealing with the workers' decisions of whether to reveal this information truthfully to the firm. We do not pursue this possibility here as it would complicate our analysis even further, raising difficult signalling issues at the recruitment stage.⁸ Instead we assume that a firm must offer the same wage contract to all applicants that report a given type. Further, as in Burdett and Mortensen (1998), we assume that wage contracts are not renegotiated when workers receive outside offers.

When a firm meets a worker, the firm offers a menu of two contracts, indexed by the worker's reported ability $i = H, L$. We denote these contracts as $\omega_i = (w_i, w_i^+, w_i^-)$, where w_i denotes the starting wage paid during the probation period. When the firm verifies that worker i reported his ability truthfully, he is promoted and receives the promotion wage w_i^+ for as long as he stays employed in the firm. When the firm verifies that worker $j \neq i$ misreported his type in contract ω_i , he is demoted and paid the demotion wage w_i^- for as long as he stays employed in the firm.⁹ While firms commit to these wage profiles, they cannot commit to retain workers that yield negative expected profit value.¹⁰

Upon meeting the firm, the worker observes the posted contracts and can choose one of them, but nothing restricts the worker from choosing the contract the firm designs for workers of a different ability level. If both contracts are rejected, the worker remains in his current state with no option to recall previously met firms. We make the following tie-breaking assumptions: an unemployed worker accepts a wage contract if indifferent between accepting it or remaining unemployed, while an employed worker quits only if the offered contract delivers a strictly higher expected payoff.

We restrict attention to contracts of the form $\omega_i = (w_i, p_i, b)$. Firms promote truth-telling workers to their marginal product, while they demote misreporting workers by cutting their pay to their reservation wage.¹¹ In these contracts the promotion and demotion wages are

⁸In principle workers would be unwilling to reveal this information since the firm would then be able to condition its contract on workers' current reservation wages, individualizing their wage contracts, and extracting further rents.

⁹In a previous working paper version (Carrillo-Tudela and Kaas (2011)), we consider a contractual environment in which firms are restricted to offer wage contracts without promotions, but can threaten to fire workers who misreport their type upon learning. We also consider contracts allowing wage cuts for misreporting workers.

¹⁰The underlying assumption here is that both the worker and the firm are free to initiate a separation at any time. Firms will initiate a separation when the expected continuation value of employing a worker is negative. Workers will initiate a separation when the expected continuation value of employment is below that of unemployment. Even if firms were able to commit to employ unprofitable workers, our main segmentation results would survive; see also footnote 22 below.

¹¹Since the offer arrival rate is independent of a worker's employment status, b is the common reservation wage after types are revealed.

maximally differentiated so that the incentives for truthful reporting are as large as possible, given that workers and firms may voluntarily quit the employment relationship. This implies that $w_i^+ \leq p_i$ and $w_i^- \geq b$.¹² Further, backloading of wages for truth-telling workers serves the purpose of minimizing turnover while earning positive profits on lower starting wages during the probation period. In Lemma 1 in Section 3.1 below we prove that in equilibrium maximally differentiated contracts are indeed optimal for firms (within the class of contracts of the form (w_i, w_i^+, w_i^-)), provided that the condition stated in the lemma is satisfied.

To summarize, the main restrictions we impose on the contract space are: (i) equal treatment at the hiring stage to all workers that report a given type and no responding to outside offers; (ii) maximally differentiated promotion and demotion wages, where promotions and demotions occur together with learning events; and (iii) no side payments.

In Section 5 we consider a variation of the model in which firms condition their contracts on workers' employment status. We analyze whether this information makes it easier for firms to separate workers. In this context we also analyze the case of "up-or-out" contracts where a firm promotes truth-telling workers to their marginal product, but lays off misreporting workers instead of demoting them to their reservation wage.

2.3 Equilibrium

Let $F(w_H, w_L)$ denote the joint distribution of starting wage offers, and let F_i denote the marginal distribution of starting wages offered to workers of type i . Consider a worker of type $i = H, L$ that encounters a new employer offering promotion/demotion contracts with starting wages w_H and w_L . This worker may report his type truthfully, which leads to an expected value of $V_{ii}(w_i)$, or he may misreport his type and obtain an expected value of $V_{ij}(w_j)$ for $i \neq j$. After the firm learns the worker's type, the worker receives continuation value of $V_i(p_i)$ if he reported his true type. If the worker misreported his type, his continuation value equals the expected value of unemployment, $V_i(b) = U_i$. These expected values are linked through the following Bellman equations:

$$\phi U_i = b + \lambda \int \max[V_{iL}(w'_L) - U_i, V_{iH}(w'_H) - U_i, 0] dF(w'_H, w'_L) , \quad (1)$$

$$\begin{aligned} \phi V_{ii}(w_i) &= w_i + \lambda \int \max[V_{iL}(w'_L) - V_{ii}(w_i), V_{iH}(w'_H) - V_{ii}(w_i), 0] dF(w'_H, w'_L) \\ &\quad + \delta(U_i - V_{ii}(w_i)) + \rho(V_i(p_i) - V_{ii}(w_i)) , \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

$$\begin{aligned} \phi V_{ij}(w_j) &= w_j + \lambda \int \max[V_{iL}(w'_L) - V_{ij}(w_j), V_{iH}(w'_H) - V_{ij}(w_j), 0] dF(w'_H, w'_L) \\ &\quad + \delta(U_i - V_{ij}(w_j)) + \rho(U_i - V_{ij}(w_j)) , \end{aligned} \quad (3)$$

¹²By paying a promotion wage above a worker's productivity, the firm obtains a negative expected continuation profit from employing the promoted worker. By paying a demotion wage below b , a worker obtains an expected continuation payoff of employment that is lower than the expected value of unemployment.

$$\phi V_i(p_i) = p_i + \lambda \int \max[V_{iL}(w'_L) - V_i(p_i), V_{iH}(w'_H) - V_i(p_i), 0] dF(w'_H, w'_L) + \delta(U_i - V_i(p_i)) . \quad (4)$$

Equation (1) shows that the expected value of unemployment for a worker of type i includes unemployment income b plus the option value of searching. The latter entails the possibility of meeting a firm at Poisson rate λ in which case the worker either accepts any of the offered contracts with starting wages w'_H or w'_L , or rejects those offers. The other three Bellman equations include similar option values of search, as well as the expected loss of a separation to unemployment which happens at rate δ . Equation (2) further includes the expected gain for a truth-telling worker who is promoted to p_i at rate ρ . Equation (3) includes the expected loss for a misreporting worker whose continuation value drops to U_i after a demotion.

Let R_i denote the reservation (starting) wage of an unemployed worker of type i who reports truthfully. This reservation wage satisfies $V_{ii}(R_i) = U_i$, and using (1) and (2) we obtain that $b - R_i = \rho[V_i(p_i) - U_i]$. Since $V_i(p_i) > U_i$, we have that $b > R_i$ for $i = H, L$. That is, unemployed workers are willing to accept starting wages below b due to the expected capital gain of a promotion. From (2) and (3), worker i 's incentive constraint $V_{ii}(w_i) \geq V_{ij}(w_j)$ can be equivalently expressed as¹³

$$w_j - w_i \leq \rho[V_i(p_i) - U_i] = b - R_i . \quad (5)$$

This incentive constraint describes the main trade-off faced by a worker when meeting a firm. By misreporting his type, worker i earns potentially the higher starting wage w_j but faces the possibility of demotion with continuation value U_i . By reporting truthfully, the worker possibly earns a lower starting wage but faces the prospects of a promotion, yielding continuation value $V_i(p_i)$. The worker will report his type truthfully and self-select into the right contract when the flow gain from misreporting does not exceed the expected gain from a promotion relative to a demotion.¹⁴

Firms choose starting wages (w_H, w_L) to maximize steady state profits $\Pi_H(w_H) + \Pi_L(w_L)$, where $\Pi_i(\cdot)$ denotes the firm's profit from hires in contract (w_i, p_i, b) . Since the general expressions for $\Pi_i(\cdot)$ are cumbersome because some workers may report truthfully while others may misreport their types, it is notationally convenient to formally derive firms' profits when characterizing equilibria.

¹³To derive the inequality in (5), subtract (3) from (2) to obtain

$$[\phi + \delta + \rho] \cdot [V_{ii}(w_i) - V_{ij}(w_j)] - H(V_{ii}(w_i)) + H(V_{ij}(w_j)) = w_i - w_j + \rho[V_i(p_i) - U_i] , \quad (*)$$

where function H is defined as $H(V) \equiv \int \max[V_{iL}(w'_L) - V, V_{iH}(w'_H) - V, 0] dF(w'_H, w'_L)$, which is weakly decreasing in V . Then $V_{ii}(w_i) \geq V_{ij}(w_j)$ is equivalent to the LHS of (*) being non-negative which in turn is equivalent to the inequality in (5).

¹⁴This trade-off is similar to the one found in efficiency wage models, in which shirking (misreporting) yields a higher utility (starting wage) but implies a higher probability of being caught and fired (demoted).

A *market equilibrium* is then a joint distribution F of starting wages, and value functions $U_i, V_i, V_{ii}, V_{ij}, \Pi_i, i, j = H, L$, for workers and firms such that (i) every (w_H, w_L) in the support of F maximizes firms' steady state profits subject to optimal turnover and truth-telling behavior of workers; and (ii) workers' turnover and reporting strategies are optimal given that starting wages are drawn randomly from the offer distribution F . For future reference and following Burdett and Mortensen (1998), we label (i) the equilibrium constant profit condition.

To simplify the analysis, we focus on the set of *rank-preserving* market equilibria. These are market equilibria in which firms that offer higher starting wages to workers of type H also offer (weakly) higher starting wages to workers of type L . This equilibrium restriction implies that there is a (weakly) increasing function \hat{w} such that $F_L(\hat{w}(w_H)) = F_H(w_H)$ for all wages w_H in the support of the offer distribution F_H . In any market equilibrium rank-preservation automatically holds among all firms for which incentive constraints bind. This is because the incentive constraint (5) entails an increasing (linear) relationship between w_L and w_H . As we show and discuss in Section 3.2, however, when firms face slack incentive constraints, the equilibrium constant profit condition implies that these firms are indifferent between offering alternative orderings of incentive-compatible starting wages. Rank preservation simplifies the characterization of equilibrium as we can use the function \hat{w} throughout our analysis to relate the starting wages a firm offers to high and low-ability workers.¹⁵

3 Equilibrium Analysis

3.1 Preliminary Considerations

An important property of a market equilibrium is that the distribution of starting wage offers is dispersed across firms which gives rise to worker turnover before the promotion/demotion events. That is, the distributions F_i are non-degenerate. This occurs because promotions and demotions are linked one-to-one to employer learning, which is a stochastic event. Since promotion dates are uncertain, workers quit to contracts offering higher starting wages during the probation period. Firms, in turn, respond to these incentives by offering dispersed starting wages, trading off higher flow profits against higher hiring and retention rates, similar to Burdett and Mortensen (1998).¹⁶

Another important property of a market equilibrium is that high-ability workers do not misreport their type. This is not obvious because the starting wage $w_L = \hat{w}(w_H)$ can exceed w_H at the bottom of the wage offer distribution in a rank-preserving equilibrium (as we see below). To show that high-ability workers do not misreport their type note (5) implies that the incentive

¹⁵The restriction to rank-preserving equilibria is not without loss of generality as it has some implications for the relationship between firm size, wages and productivity discussed in Section 4.2. Without this restriction our analysis still goes through, but firms that offer contracts with slack incentive constraints might not exhibit a positive relationship between wages, size and workforce productivity.

¹⁶See Stevens (2004) for the case in which firms pre-commit to a promotion date without facing the adverse selection problem we introduce in our paper.

constraint of a high-ability worker is $w_L - w_H \leq b - R_H$, which is slack at firms offering starting wages $(w_H, w_L) = (R_H, R_L)$ since $b > R_L$. This incentive constraint is also fulfilled at all higher wages provided that $w_L - w_H = \hat{w}(w_H) - w_H$ is a non-increasing function of $w_H \geq R_H$. As we show in the proofs of Propositions 1 and 2, the slope of function \hat{w} does not exceed one, hence the incentive constraint for high-ability workers is slack for all wages in the support of the wage offer distribution. In contrast, low-ability workers may want to misreport their type when the starting wage w_H is particularly high.

A third important property of a market equilibrium is that at the pair of starting wages (R_H, R_L) , firms face slack incentive constraints and are able to always separate workers. That incentive constraints for high-ability workers are slack follows from the previous arguments. For low-ability workers, (5) implies their incentive constraint is given by

$$w_H - w_L \leq b - R_L, \quad (6)$$

which is slack at (R_H, R_L) because $b > R_H$. Furthermore, by continuity (6) is also slack in a neighborhood of (R_H, R_L) and hence a market equilibrium implies that firms always separate workers in such a neighborhood. Since incentives constraints do not bind around (R_H, R_L) a similar argument as in Burdett and Mortensen (1998) shows that the reservation wages R_i constitute the lower bounds, \underline{w}_i of the offer distributions F_i for $i = H, L$. Firms offering those wages hire only from unemployment and they lose their workers as soon as they meet another firm offering a higher starting wage.¹⁷

In the next subsections we proceed to fully characterize the rank-preserving equilibria that arise in our model. We start by considering equilibria where the contracts offered by all firms are separating. In those situations, which requires the learning rate ρ to be sufficiently large, all firms promote workers who stay long enough with the firm, and they never exercise a demotion option. We then show that if the learning rate is sufficiently low, the market equilibrium is segmented, featuring some pooling contracts at the top of the wage offer distribution, with promotions of high-ability workers and demotions of low-ability workers.

Before characterizing equilibrium, however, we show that the restriction to maximally differentiated promotion/demotion wages is not binding for firms, provided that the condition stated in Lemma 1 is satisfied. Specifically, given any rank-preserving equilibrium in which firms offer contracts of the form (w_i, p_i, b) , no firm has an incentive to deviate from its contract offer to any alternative contract of the form (w_i, w_i^+, w_i^-) with promotion and demotion wages satisfying $w_i^+, w_i^- \in [b, p_i]$.

Lemma 1: *Consider a rank-preserving market equilibrium in contracts of the form (w_i, p_i, b) . Then no firm has an incentive to deviate to contract offers $(w_i, w_i^+, w_i^-)_{i=H,L}$ if either (i) the*

¹⁷Offering a lower starting wage offer $w_i < R_i$ (for any $i = H, L$) does not attract workers and hence leads to zero profits. Offering \underline{w}_i slightly higher than R_i for $i = H, L$ leads to strictly lower profits without violating the incentive constraint. This occurs since such a starting wage attracts and retains the same number of workers as offering R_i and strictly reduces firms' profit flows; i.e. $p_i - \underline{w}_i < p_i - R_i$.

equilibrium features separation at all firms (that is, (5) holds for all pairs (w_H, w_L) of equilibrium offers), or (ii) the equilibrium features some firms pooling workers of both types in the same contract and the condition $\Gamma(w) \leq \Gamma(R_L)$ holds for all $w \in [R_L, p_L]$, where

$$\Gamma(w) \equiv \frac{p_L - b - \int_{R_L}^w \frac{\phi + \delta + \lambda(1 - F_L(w'))}{\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda(1 - F_L(w'))} dw'}{\phi + \delta + \lambda(1 - F_L(w))} .$$

In the proof of Lemma 1 we show that when incentive constraints are slack for all firms and all workers report truthfully their types, firms prefer to backload wages as an optimal reaction to workers' on-the-job search. By offering p_i after promotion, firms extract as much rents as they can during the starting period and eliminate worker turnover after promotion. The same argument holds when some firms face slack incentive constraints and the rest of firms face binding incentive constraints. In these cases it is optimal to threaten to maximally punish misreporting workers, although demotions are never exercised in equilibrium. In the case in which some firms pool workers, however, demotions are an equilibrium outcome and we need to guarantee that the demotion wage $w_i^- = b$ is optimal. The latter is not obvious as firms may prefer to pay a higher demotion wage $w_H^- > b$ and increase the retention rate of demoted workers. The condition $\Gamma(w) \leq \Gamma(R_L)$ is needed to ensure that offering $w_H^- > b$ is not a profitable deviation.¹⁸ In Section 4 we verify that this condition is satisfied for the plausibly calibrated parameter combinations we consider.

3.2 Separating Equilibrium

Workers

Let \bar{w}_i denote the upper bound of the support of distribution F_i . In a separating equilibrium the value functions of unemployed workers (1) are given by

$$(\phi + \lambda)U_i = b + \lambda \int_{R_i}^{\bar{w}_i} V_{ii}(w) dF_i(w) . \quad (7)$$

For workers $i = L, H$ employed at starting wage w_i , we can rewrite (2) as

$$[\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda(1 - F_i(w_i))]V_{ii}(w_i) = w_i + \delta U_i + \rho V_i(p_i) + \lambda \int_{w_i}^{\bar{w}_i} V_{ii}(w) dF_i(w) . \quad (8)$$

For promoted workers (4) becomes

$$[\phi + \delta]V_i(p_i) = p_i + \delta U_i ,$$

¹⁸If this condition fails, demotion wages would be dispersed across pooling firms. This will considerably complicate the equilibrium analysis without providing additional economic insights. We therefore only consider equilibria where contracts take the form (w_i, p_i, b) which already give rise to rich wage dynamics between and across firms.

since these workers never quit in a separating equilibrium. Note from equation (8) that the reservation wage of an employed worker in the probation period is given by the current wage since all firms offer the same promotion wage (for a given type). The reservation wage of an unemployed worker of type i is given by

$$R_i = b - \rho \frac{p_i - \phi U_i}{\phi + \delta} < b . \quad (9)$$

As discussed before, the incentive constraint of low-ability workers (6) is always slack at the lowest wage of the offer distribution. Possibly, however, the incentive constraint of these workers is binding at higher wages. Let \tilde{w}_i denote the critical threshold wage such that the incentive constraint (6) is binding for $w_i \geq \tilde{w}_i$ and slack otherwise.

Steady State Measures

Given that all wage contract offers are acceptable to the unemployed, steady state turnover implies that the unemployment rate for both types of workers is given by

$$u = \frac{(\phi + \delta)}{\phi + \delta + \lambda}$$

and that the earnings distribution of workers employed at starting wages below or equal to w_i is given by

$$G_i(w_i) = \frac{(\phi + \delta)F_i(w_i)}{\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda(1 - F_i(w_i))} .$$

Profit Maximization

A firm's steady state profit is given by $\Pi_H(w_H) + \Pi_L(w_L)$, where

$$\Pi_L(w_L) = \ell_L(w_L)(p_L - w_L) \quad , \quad \Pi_H(w_H) = \ell_H(w_H)(p_H - w_H) ,$$

and $\ell_i(w_i)$ denotes the steady state workforce of workers of ability i who are employed at starting wage w_i . Steady state and optimal turnover then imply that

$$\ell_i(w_i) = \frac{\lambda \alpha_i [u + G_i(w_i)(1 - u)]}{\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda(1 - F_i(w_i))} .$$

Substituting this expression together with that of u and G_i in the firm's profit gives

$$\Pi_i(w_i) = \frac{A_0 \alpha_i}{[\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda(1 - F_i(w_i))]^2} (p_i - w_i) , \quad \text{where } A_0 \equiv \frac{\lambda(\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda)(\phi + \delta)}{\phi + \delta + \lambda} . \quad (10)$$

The equilibrium constant profit condition implies firms are indifferent between offering all pairs (w_L, w_H) in the support of F . When the incentive constraint (6) does not bind (i.e., $w_i < \tilde{w}_i$), the constant profit condition holds for each ability type independently. Equating $\Pi_i(w_i) = \Pi_i(R_i)$

yields offer distributions with a similar functional form as in Burdett and Mortensen (1998). Namely,

$$F_i(w_i) = \frac{(\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda)}{\lambda} \left[1 - \left(\frac{p_i - w_i}{p_i - R_i} \right)^{1/2} \right], \quad w_i \leq \tilde{w}_i. \quad (11)$$

For wages above \tilde{w}_i , the incentive constraint (6) binds. Substituting this constraint into the firm's profit function gives, for $w_H \geq \tilde{w}_H$,

$$\Pi_H(w_H) + \Pi_L(w_H - b + R_L) = \frac{A_0[p_H - w_H + \alpha(p_L - w_H + b - R_L)]}{[\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda(1 - F_H(w_H))]^2}.$$

Now the constant profit condition $\Pi_H(w_H) + \Pi_L(w_H - b + R_L) = \Pi_H(R_H) + \Pi_L(R_L)$ yields the wage offer distribution

$$F_H(w_H) = \frac{(\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda)}{\lambda} \left[1 - \left(\frac{\bar{p} - w_H(1 + \alpha) + \alpha(b - R_L)}{\bar{p} - \bar{R}} \right)^{1/2} \right], \quad w_H \geq \tilde{w}_H, \quad (12)$$

where we define $\bar{p} \equiv p_H + \alpha p_L$ and $\bar{R} \equiv R_H + \alpha R_L$.

Rank Preservation

Because the constant profit condition holds for each ability type independently when the incentive constraints do not bind, firms are indifferent from offering any pair of wages (w_H, w_L) in the supports of F_i such that $w_i \leq \tilde{w}_i$ for $i = L, H$, as long as incentive constraints continue to be satisfied. For firms offering starting wages above \tilde{w}_i , however, the binding incentive constraint implies that firms offer starting wages to low- and high-ability workers that have the same rank in the corresponding F_i . Imposing rank preservation for starting wages below \tilde{w}_i is useful as we can define a monotonic relation between starting wages to rank firms irrespectively if incentive constraints bind or not. This allows us to analyze in a simpler way the relationship between starting wages and the firms' learning rate ρ .

Using (11) and the rank preservation condition $F_L(\hat{w}(w_H)) = F_H(w_H)$, we obtain the following relation between the starting wages a firm offers to workers:

$$w_L = \hat{w}(w_H) = p_L - \left(\frac{p_L - R_L}{p_H - R_H} \right) [p_H - w_H], \quad w_H \leq \tilde{w}_H. \quad (13)$$

This relation applies to all pairs of starting wages $(w_i)_{i=H,L}$ which are below the cutoff \tilde{w}_i so that incentive constraint (6) is slack. By substitution of (13) into (6), this cutoff can be calculated as a function of workers' reservations wages:

$$\tilde{w}_H \equiv \frac{b(p_H - R_H) - R_H(p_L - R_L)}{p_H - R_H - p_L + R_L}. \quad (14)$$

For wages above \tilde{w}_H , the incentive constraint must be binding which delivers the relation $w_L = \hat{w}(w_H) = w_H - b + R_L$ between pairs of starting wage offers (w_H, w_L) .

Slack Incentive Constraints

If the firms' learning rate is sufficiently large (above threshold level ρ_1 defined below), the incentive constraint (6) is slack for all wages in the wage distribution. Using (11) and $F_i(\bar{w}_i) = 1$, the upper bounds \bar{w}_i are given by

$$\bar{w}_i = p_i - C^2(p_i - R_i), \quad i = L, H, \quad \text{where } C \equiv \frac{\phi + \delta + \rho}{\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda}. \quad (15)$$

To find reservation wages R_i , rewrite equations (7) and (9) to obtain

$$\frac{\phi + \delta}{\rho}(R_i - b) + p_i - b = \lambda \int_{R_i}^{\bar{w}_i} [V_{ii}(w) - V_{ii}(R_i)] dF_i(w) = \int_{R_i}^{\bar{w}_i} \frac{\lambda(1 - F_i(w))}{\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda(1 - F_i(w))} dw, \quad (16)$$

where the last equality uses partial integration and the derivative of (8). Solving the integral using (11) yields the following reservation wages

$$R_i = \frac{(\phi + \delta + \rho)(\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda)^2 b - \rho[(\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda)^2 - \lambda^2] p_i}{(\phi + \delta)(\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda)^2 + \lambda^2 \rho}, \quad (17)$$

for each $i = H, L$. Note that unemployed workers of high-ability are willing to accept a job at a lower starting wage than unemployed low-ability workers, $R_H < R_L$. Therefore the firm at the bottom of the wage offer distribution offers a lower starting wage to high-ability workers. This is because high-ability workers will be promoted to a higher wage, $p_H > p_L$, after the firm learns these workers' type.

From (15) and (17) we obtain the highest starting wages:

$$\bar{w}_i = p_i - \frac{(\phi + \delta + \rho)^3}{(\phi + \delta)(\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda)^2 + \lambda^2 \rho} [p_i - b]. \quad (18)$$

Since $w_H - w_L = w_H - \hat{w}(w_H)$ is increasing in w_H , the incentive constraint (6) is slack at all offered pairs of starting wages (w_L, w_H) if and only if it is slack at \bar{w}_H . Using (6), (17) and (18), this is true if and only if¹⁹

$$\frac{p_L - b}{p_H - p_L} > \frac{\lambda^2 + 2\lambda(\phi + \delta) - \rho(\phi + \delta + \rho)}{\rho(\rho + \phi + \delta + 2\lambda)}. \quad (19)$$

Since the right-hand side of this condition becomes unboundedly large as the learning rate goes to zero, the condition in (19) defines a unique threshold level $\rho_1 > 0$ for the firms' learning rate such that the incentive constraint for low-ability workers is slack for all $\rho > \rho_1$.²⁰ Intuitively, as the firms' learning rate decreases, the incentive constraint of low-ability workers starts to bind because these workers now find that they can quit at a faster rate (relative to the rate at which the firm learns their type), and hence the threat of a demotion becomes weaker.

¹⁹This condition is equivalent to the requirement that the threshold wage \tilde{w}_H defined in (14) exceeds the upper bound \bar{w}_H defined in (15).

²⁰To verify this claim rewrite (19) as $\frac{p_L - b}{p_H - p_L} [\rho(\rho + \phi + \delta + 2\lambda)] = \lambda^2 + 2\lambda(\phi + \delta) - \rho(\phi + \delta + \rho)$. Note that the LHS of this equation equals zero at $\rho = 0$ and is strictly increasing in ρ , while the RHS is positive at $\rho = 0$ and is strictly decreasing in ρ . Continuity implies that there exists a unique $\rho_1 > 0$ that solves this equation, such that the incentive constraint of low-ability workers is slack for all $\rho > \rho_1$.

Binding Incentive Constraints

If $\rho \leq \rho_1$, incentive constraints must be binding for some wages at the top of the wage offer distribution in which case the cutoff value \tilde{w}_H does not exceed the upper bound \bar{w}_H . In this case we can use the wage offer distribution (12) and $F_H(\bar{w}_H) = 1$ to solve for its upper bound:

$$\bar{w}_H = \frac{1}{1+\alpha} \left[\bar{p} + \alpha(b - R_L) - C^2(\bar{p} - \bar{R}) \right]. \quad (20)$$

Reservation wages for the two worker types are again obtained from equations (16). In the appendix (proof of Proposition 1) we show how these equations can be solved for R_L and R_H . Given these solutions, we can determine \tilde{w}_i from (14), \bar{w}_H from (20), $\bar{w}_L = \bar{w}_H - b + R_L$, and the wage offer distributions from (11) and (12). All these equilibrium objects are uniquely defined.

The solution to these equations only constitutes a separating equilibrium if the highest starting wage offered to low-ability workers \bar{w}_L does not exceed their marginal product p_L . If $\bar{w}_L > p_L$, firms offering the pair (\bar{w}_H, \bar{w}_L) would make negative expected profits on low-ability workers ($\Pi_L(\cdot) < 0$) and hence could not commit to offer such contracts. Expected profits $\Pi_L(\cdot)$ would be negative in this case because flow profits, $p_L - \bar{w}_L$, would be negative during the probation period and then zero after promotion.

In fact, if the learning rate is sufficiently low, and given a sufficiently high job arrival rate λ , it is possible that the highest separating and incentive compatible wage offer to low-ability workers exceeds their marginal product. We denote $\rho_2 < \rho_1$ as the threshold value for the learning rate such that $\bar{w}_L \leq p_L$ if $\rho \geq \rho_2$. This threshold value is strictly positive if the parameter condition

$$p_H - p_L > \left(\frac{\phi + \delta}{\lambda + \phi + \delta} \right)^2 [\bar{p} - (1 + \alpha)b] \quad (21)$$

is satisfied, which requires λ to be sufficiently large.²¹ Intuitively, for larger values of λ , firms compete more fiercely for workers which drives up \bar{w}_H . This occurs for the same reasons as in Burdett and Mortensen (1998). At the same time and because the incentive constraint (6) is binding, \bar{w}_L can get pulled up above p_L .

Note again that binding incentive constraints do not distort the incentives for firms to back-load wages for truth-telling workers of both types (cf. Lemma 1). As in the regime with slack incentive constraints, promoting workers to their marginal product eliminates turnover after learning. Moreover, maximal differentiation between promotion and demotion wages provides the largest possible incentives for workers to select the right contract.

To verify that the solution that we describe above is indeed a separating equilibrium, we still need to make sure that firms do not find it profitable to deviate and offer a pooling contract. In Appendix A, we prove that this is true provided that $\rho \geq \rho_2$, and hence $\bar{w}_L \leq p_L$. Proposition 1 summarizes our characterization of rank-preserving equilibria with separating firms.

²¹In the proof of Proposition 1, we establish the existence of the threshold value ρ_2 . While cumbersome analytical expressions complicate a uniqueness proof, all our numerical examples suggest a unique value ρ_2 since the defining equation is monotonic in ρ .

Proposition 1: *There are threshold values $\rho_1 > \rho_2 \geq 0$, such that for any $\rho \geq \rho_2$, there exists a unique rank-preserving market equilibrium with dispersed offers in starting wages w_i drawn from distributions F_i and support $[R_i, \bar{w}_i]$, with $R_i < b$ and $\bar{w}_i \leq p_i$, and separation of workers such that*

- (a) *if $\rho > \rho_1$, incentive constraints are slack for all firms;*
- (b) *if $\rho \leq \rho_1$, incentive constraints are binding for firms offering $w_H \geq \tilde{w}_H$ with $\tilde{w}_H \leq \bar{w}_H$, while they are slack for all other firms.*

Moreover, ρ_2 is strictly positive if condition (21) is satisfied.




Figure 1: Starting wages in a separating equilibrium ($\rho > \rho_2$).

Figure 1 illustrates the relation $w_L = \hat{w}(w_H)$ between starting wages in equilibrium implied by this proposition when $\rho > \rho_2$. When $\rho > \rho_1$, the highest starting wages are $\bar{w}_i < \tilde{w}_i$ and the function \hat{w} implies that an increase in w_H goes hand in hand with a less than proportional increase in w_L . When $\rho \in [\rho_1, \rho_2)$, we have that $\bar{w}_i \in [\tilde{w}_i, p_i)$ (as shown in the figure) and the function \hat{w} now implies, due to binding incentive constraints for low-ability workers, firms' starting wages move one-to-one in the upper section of the offer distribution.

3.3 Segmented Equilibrium with Pooling at Top Wages

When $\rho < \rho_2$, firms must offer a wage $w_L > p_L$ to low-ability workers to satisfy their incentive constraint. Hence in this case there is no equilibrium in which all firms are able to separate

workers by offering an incentive compatible contract menu. Instead, firms at the top of the wage offer distribution post pooling contracts designed to attract and retain high-ability workers. Low-ability workers accept these contracts, anticipating that firms demote them to their reservation wage after learning their type.

Firms at the top of the wage offer distribution pool workers of high and low ability in the same contract at starting wages $w_H > w_H^* \equiv \hat{w}^{-1}(p_L) = p_L + b - R_L$. Such situations occur if the job arrival rate is sufficiently large (inducing firms to compete more fiercely for workers) and the learning rate is sufficiently small (so that separating starting wages are sufficiently close).²²

Whenever firms offer pooling contracts $w_H > w_H^*$, they attract all workers of low ability that have been promoted to p_L at another (lower wage) firm since these workers strictly prefer the job with a higher starting wage even though they expect to be demoted later on.²³ Since there is a positive mass of such workers which yield negative expected profit value when employed in a pooling contract $w_H > w_H^*$, the profit value of firms offering $w_H^* + \varepsilon$ would jump down discontinuously, *unless* the wage offer distribution has a mass point at w_H^* . With a mass point of the wage offer distribution at wage w_H^* , a positive mass of high-ability workers employed at w_H^* quit their job to outside offers $w_H^* + \varepsilon$, such that in equilibrium this profitable inflow of high-ability workers exactly offsets the unprofitable inflow of low-ability workers.²⁴ Furthermore, at the mass of firms offering the separating contract pair (w_H^*, p_L) , equilibrium requires that a positive fraction of low-ability workers do not self-select into contract p_L but instead misreport high ability by choosing w_H^* .²⁵ In fact, we prove the following:

Lemma 2: *If $\rho < \rho_2$, a positive mass of firms offer contract menu (w_H^*, p_L) . Low-ability workers contacted by these firms report high ability with positive probability.*

We now characterize an equilibrium where a positive mass of firms offer contract pair (w_H^*, p_L)

²²It is important to note that pooling at top wages will still occur even if we were to allow firms to offer low-ability workers wages above their marginal product. This arises because firms offering the highest wages to high-ability workers will also need to offer high wages to low-ability workers in order to satisfy their incentive constraint. Given a small enough ρ relative to λ , such a strategy becomes too costly for high-wage firms which then prefer to hire all workers at the same starting wage, promoting high-ability workers and demoting low-ability ones after learning their types. See Carrillo-Tudela and Kaas (2011) for the formal argument using constant wage contracts.

²³This assertion follows since at w_H^* a low-ability worker is indifferent between truth-telling (contract (p_L, p_L, b)) and misreporting (contract (w_H^*, p_H, b)). Both strategies deliver the same expected value to the worker because at w_H^* the incentive constraint is binding. Therefore, low-ability workers *strictly* prefer pooling contracts (w_H, p_H, b) with $w_H > w_H^*$ over employment at flat wage p_L .

²⁴In the Burdett and Mortensen (1998) model, mass points in the offer distribution are ruled out because higher wage offers would lead to a profitable inflow of workers employed at the mass point. Here this inflow is needed precisely to compensate for the losses on low-ability hires.

²⁵Even though the low-wage contract is incentive compatible, low-ability workers are indifferent between the two contracts and they may equally well accept the contract with the higher starting wage. In principle, such deviations could also occur at lower wages with binding incentive constraints, but firms would easily prevent those by paying $\varepsilon > 0$ more to workers of low ability. At the contract pair (w_H^*, p_L) , however, such counter deviations are not possible, since firms cannot credibly offer wages above p_L to workers of low ability.

such that a fraction of low-ability workers misreport their type, so that some pooling occurs at these firms. Possibly there is also a mass of firms offering pooling contracts $w_H > w_H^*$. We can equivalently interpret such a pooling contract as a menu of contract pairs (w_H, p_L) where p_L is so unattractive that low-ability workers do not accept this offer but instead report high ability with starting wage w_H . Without loss of generality and to keep the notation consistent throughout, we specify the analysis in terms of such contract pairs where starting wages are linked according to $w_L = \hat{w}(w_H)$, such that $p_L = \hat{w}(w_H)$ for $w_H > w_H^*$, thus violating incentive compatibility (6).

In a segmented equilibrium, the different types of firms can be ranked according to their wage offers $w_H \in [R_H, \bar{w}_H]$ as follows.

1. For $R_H \leq w_H < \tilde{w}_H$, firms offer separating contracts with slack incentive constraints.
2. For $\tilde{w}_H \leq w_H < w_H^* = p_L + b - R_L$, firms offer separating contracts with binding incentive constraints.
3. Mass $\eta > 0$ of firms offer the contract menu (w_H^*, p_L) . Low-ability workers misreport their type with probability $\xi > 0$.
4. Firms offering $w_H > w_H^*$ pool all workers in the same contract, promoting high-ability workers and demoting low-ability workers.

The last group of firms only exists if the learning rate is sufficiently low. In fact, in our numerical examples, we determine a threshold value of the learning rate, denoted ρ_3 ($< \rho_2$), such that a positive mass offer pooling contracts at $w_H > w_H^*$ if $\rho < \rho_3$. For $\rho \in [\rho_3, \rho_2)$, in contrast, the highest pooling wage is at w_H^* . Although we do not have an existence proof for ρ_3 , in Proposition 2 we prove the existence of a pooling equilibrium for both these cases together.

To describe the equilibrium, suppose that mass $\eta > 0$ of firms offer the contract menu (w_H^*, p_L) , and that fraction ξ of low-ability workers who are offered these contracts opt for w_H^* , thus pooling with high-ability workers. Denote by $\varphi = F_{L-}(p_L) = F_{H-}(w_H^*)$ the fraction of firms offering separating contracts strictly below (w_H^*, p_L) . When the mass point is the highest offered wage ($\rho \geq \rho_3$), we have that $\varphi + \eta = 1$; otherwise $\varphi + \eta < 1$.

In the appendix (proof of Proposition 2) we characterize a rank-preserving equilibrium by a set of equations determining the vector of equilibrium objects $\mathcal{E} \equiv (\varphi, \xi, \eta, R_L, R_H)$ and we also prove that such an equilibrium exists.

Proposition 2: *For any $\rho < \rho_2$, there exists a market equilibrium in contracts (w_i, p_i, b) with dispersed offers in starting wages w_i drawn from distributions F_i and support $[R_i, \bar{w}_i]$, with $R_i < b$. Firms with $w_H < w_H^* = p_L + b - R_L$ offer separating contracts to all workers. There is also a positive mass of firms offering $w_H \geq w_H^*$ who pool low-ability workers in the same contract as high-ability workers.*

Figure 2 illustrates the different *accepted* starting wages (w_H, w_L) at separating and pooling firms in a segmented equilibrium. It is worthwhile to note that the segmented equilibrium

converges to a solution which resembles the Burdett and Mortensen (1998) model in the limit where firms (almost) never learn their workers' types ($\rho \rightarrow 0$). In this limit, workers are (almost) never promoted or demoted, and separating firms offer contracts that are (almost) indistinguishable and hence resemble pooling contracts. Specifically, both reservation wages converge to b , $w_L = \hat{w}(w_H)$ converges to w_H , and the mass of firms offering (w_H^*, p_L) goes to zero.²⁶ The limiting wage offer distribution is identical to the one in a Burdett-Mortensen model in which any worker's marginal product equals the population average $(p_H + \alpha p_L)/(1 + \alpha)$.




Figure 2: Accepted starting wages in a segmented equilibrium ($\rho < \rho_2$).

We briefly discuss some of the implications for labor turnover in a segmented equilibrium. First, low-ability workers have a higher degree of turnover. While high-ability workers are promoted at rate ρ and subsequently leave the job at rate $\phi + \delta$, low-ability workers employed in pooling firms expect a demotion to wage b at flow rate ρ , with subsequent quits at rate λ (in addition to separation and labor market exit risks). Second, the segmented equilibrium features wage gains and wage cuts, both within firms (promotions and demotions) and between firms. Particularly, demoted low-ability workers are willing to quit to new employers offering promotion contracts with starting wages below b . Third, low-ability workers are underrepresented in high-wage (pooling) firms, and therefore high-wage firms are more productive. Conversely, firms offering separating contracts have a higher proportion of low-ability workers in their workforces relative to pooling firms. Furthermore, since quit rates are falling in wages, the proportion of high-ability workers is increasing in $w_H > w_H^*$ among pooling firms. The intuition is that

²⁶We verify those limiting outcomes for the numerical example we consider in the next section.

high-wage firms are able to attract and retain more workers of both types, while they demote misreporting low-ability workers at the same rate ρ (who subsequently quit at rate λ), independent of the offered starting wage.²⁷

All those three features are not present in the separating equilibrium that we characterized in the previous subsection. In particular, in the separating equilibrium with rank preservation, both worker types have the same turnover patterns and they never experience wage cuts without intervening non-employment spells. Because turnover patterns for both worker types are identical, in a separating equilibrium all firms have equally productive workforces. We summarize these observations as follows.

Corollary 1: *If $\rho \geq \rho_2$, both worker types have the same turnover patterns, no worker experiences wage cuts without intervening unemployment spells, and all firms have the same ability composition of the workforce. If $\rho < \rho_2$, low-ability workers have higher turnover rates, and they experience wage cuts within and between firms. Firms offering pooling contracts (high-wage firms) have a more productive workforce than firms offering separating contracts (low-wage firms). Among high-wage firms with $w_H > w_H^*$, the workforce productivity is increasing in w_H .*

4 Quantitative Implications

In this section we show that our model delivers predictions about the relationships between job mobility and wages and between internal mobility and firm size which are in line with empirical evidence. At the same time, we show that those predictions are not easily picked up by standard job-ladder models.

We calibrate our model to match the following statistics for the U.S. labor market. Set the time period to a month and let $\phi = 0.002$ reflect an average working life of 40 years. We set $\rho = 0.027$ to reflect an average learning period of three years, which we take from Lange (2007).²⁸ We set $\delta = 0.02$ to reflect the adjusted layoff rate of Davis et al. (2008) and normalize $b = 1$. We set the remaining four parameters, λ (meeting rate), p_L and p_H (worker productivities), and α (mass of low-ability workers) to match the following four calibration targets: (1) A monthly job-to-job transition rate of 2.8%, which corresponds to the average monthly EE rate reported by Nagypal (2005) based on Current Population Survey data for all workers and which is also close to her estimates for workers aged 25–34. (2) An average promotion gain of 8%, which corresponds to the estimate of Pergamit and Veum (1999) based on workers with approximately

²⁷Due to the mass point at w_H^* , the relationship between firm size and workforce productivity is generally non-monotone.

²⁸Lange (2007) estimates a model in which employers learn gradually the ability of their employees. His estimate implies that employers' initial expectation errors decline by 51% during the first three years of employment and decline to 36% of their initial value after five years. This suggests that a large part of employer learning occurs in the first few years of an employment relationship. Although we consider a different learning process, we take the Lange (2007) estimate as the best available for our purposes and assume an average learning period of three years. Using an average learning period of four or five years does not change our main conclusions.

10 years in the labor market in the NLSY (see Table 5, specification 2 in their paper).²⁹ (3) An average quit gain of 3%. (4) An average layoff loss of 4%. These last two calibration targets correspond to our own estimation results using the NLSY for workers with approximately 10 years in the labor market.³⁰

To calculate the corresponding model statistics, we solve our model for the stationary equilibrium characterized above. We then simulate the labor market transitions of 100,000 workers during the first ten years of their work life. The parameters are estimated by minimizing the sum of squared distances between the simulated moments and the data moments. Table 1 shows the calibrated parameter values and how our model matches the calibration targets stated above.

Table 1: Parameter choices and calibration targets.

Parameter	Value	Model statistics	Value
λ	0.118	Monthly EE flow	2.7%
p_L	1.004	Quit gain	3.0%
p_H	1.131	Promotion gain	8.0%
α	0.324	Layoff loss	4.2%

The calibrated model implies that in equilibrium 29% of firms offer separating contracts, while 71% of firms offer pooling contracts.³¹ The equilibrium unemployment rate is 15.7%, and reservation wages are $R_H = 0.935 < R_L = 0.999$.³² Among employed high-ability workers, 47.7% are in the probation period of a contract, while the rest are promoted to $w = p_H$. Among employed low-ability workers, 83.7% are in probation (where 89.4% of these workers are found in pooling firms), 2.2% are promoted to $w = p_L$, while the remaining 14.1% are demoted to $w = b$.

²⁹Consistent with the interpretation of our model, Pergamit and Veum (1999) find that in the NLSY most worker-reported promotions do not involve a change in job title and nearly all promotions involve a wage increase. In particular, they find that around 56% of those who received a promotion did not change job title and essentially performed the same duties as before. Only 14% were promoted to a higher-level job in a different section, while the rest obtained new jobs because of reorganization, a lateral move or because they took their supervisor's job. Of all promotions, 89% led to a wage increase. The reported promotion gain of 8% is the average wage change for all types of promotions. But even promotions that involved performing the same duties as before raised wages by about 7%.

³⁰These estimates are obtained by using first differences on the regressions used in Section 4.1 and described in Appendix B for the period 1987-1994, which is chosen so that the average potential labor market experience is 10 years. The wage gain estimate after a job-to-job transition is consistent with that of Pergamit and Veum (1999), Table 5, specification 2.

³¹Among the firms offering separating contracts, $\eta = 0.05\%$ are at the mass point (p_L, w_H^*) , where $\xi = 53\%$ of low-ability workers misreport their type. Note that our wage offer distributions has an increasing convex density as in the Burdett and Mortensen (1998) model. The threshold values for ρ described in the previous sections are $\rho_1 = 0.123$, $\rho_2 = 0.119$ and $\rho_3 = 0.116$. Further, the condition in Lemma 1 holds in this calibration.

³²Our main results are kept unchanged if we use values of δ between 0.005 and 0.01, as reported in Nagypal (2005), to obtain lower unemployment rates that range between 5.6% and 9.2%, respectively.

Further, 4.6% of low-ability workers experience wage cuts when making a job-to-job transition.

Our calibrated model also implies that the monthly promotion rate is 1.2%. This statistic is a bit smaller than the average monthly promotion rate of 2% obtained by Pergamit and Veum (1999) for workers with around 10 years in the labor market in the NLSY.³³ We also obtain a monthly demotion rate of 0.5%, which implies a promotion-to-demotion ratio of 2.4. Given that one tends to consider demotions as infrequent events, this number might seem low. However, Belzil and Bognanno (2008), analyzing a survey of executives in U.S. firms, find that within-firm promotions are only slightly more frequent than demotions.³⁴

4.1 Worker Mobility and Wage Dynamics

We now analyze the implications for workers' job mobility and wage dynamics. Is it the case that workers move to better paying jobs over time, as predicted, for example, by the Burdett and Mortensen (1998) model? An important finding of Light and McGarry (1998) is that more separations are negatively related to wages. But as they do not distinguish between separations into non-employment and job-to-job transitions, those results cannot be directly used to evaluate our model predictions against other theories of job mobility.

To take different labor market transitions into account, we use a similar sample of the NLSY as Light and McGarry (1998) and regress the log of real hourly wages on cumulative counts of job-to-job transitions and non-employment spells, together with the same number of further controls that Light and McGarry (1998) used. As Table 2 shows, both coefficients are *negative* in the OLS wage regression.³⁵ In light of the literature on earnings losses after displacements (see Jacobson

³³Note that in the calibration presented above promoted high-ability workers will not experience a second promotion without first losing their jobs. The latter arises because high-ability workers will not quit their jobs once they are promoted. This creates a tension with the data, where many workers have more than one promotion and these are likely workers of "high ability". As an alternative calibration, we use the 2% promotion rate of Pergamit and Veum (1999) as a target. This calibration delivers a $\rho = 0.05$ and produces a segmented equilibria with very similar properties as the ones discussed in Sections 4.1 and 4.2. In this case we find that 61% of all employed high-ability workers are promoted, aggravating the tension with the data. Although not pursued here, one way to address this issue is to introduce a reallocation shock as in Jolivet et al. (2006) or add firm heterogeneity as suggested in Carrillo-Tudela and Kaas (2011).

³⁴When defining a promotion (demotion) as an upward (downward) change in reporting levels, the promotion-to-demotion ratio is 1.08. When considering only level changes that were accompanied by job title changes, the promotion/demotion ratio increases to 1.6. If one only considers job title changes, disregarding changes in reporting level, the promotion/demotion ratio is 5.05. Further, Kramarz et al. (2014), using French administrative data, find that the promotion/demotion ratio within firms is 3.6 based on occupational changes. See also Lazear (1992) and Seltzer and Merrett (2000) for evidence on the extent of demotions based on firm case studies.

³⁵The coefficient estimates shown in Table 2 are obtained using all available years in the NLSY (1979-2010). Light and McGarry (1998) use the first 8 years of workers' labor market history. Using the first 8, 10 or 15 years of workers labor market history does not change our general conclusion. The job-to-job transition coefficients at 8, 10 and 15 years are -0.007, -0.0075 and -0.0081, respectively, all significant at a 1% level. The non-employment spell coefficients at 8, 10 and 15 years are -0.0137, -0.0140 and -0.0159, respectively, again all significant at a 1% level. See Appendix B for the data description and a discussion of the regression specifications used.

et al. (1993) for a seminal study), the negative coefficient on the count of non-employment spells is not surprising. But we also observe a negative correlation between the cumulative count of job-to-job transitions and current earnings. This goes against the intuition from standard theories of on-the-job search where workers generally climb up the wage distribution as they move between employers. Taking intervening non-employment spells into account, as we do in the wage regressions, one should therefore expect a positive relationship between the number of past job-to-job transitions and current wages. Indeed, when we run the same wage regression on simulated data from a Burdett and Mortensen (1998) model, we confirm this insight: more job-to-job transitions correlate positively with wages.³⁶ We further prove in the Appendix (Lemma A.2) that more job-to-job transitions (counted from the last non-employment spell) in the Burdett and Mortensen (1998) model indeed lead to higher expected wages.³⁷

Table 2: Wage regressions

	Data	Models	
		B-M	CT-K
JTJ	-0.0073	0.0009	-0.0051
NESP	-0.0185	-0.0034	-0.0040
EXP	0.0431	0.0021	0.0055
EXP ² /10	-0.0075	-0.0005	-0.0010
R^2	0.331	0.064	0.161

Notes: Data regressions are based on the NLSY, regressions for the Burdett-Mortensen model (B-M) and for our model (CT-K) are based on simulations of 100,000 workers; for further details about the sample, control variables and robustness, see Appendix B. JTJ and NESP stand for the cumulative counts of job-to-job transitions and non-employment spells, EXP is actual labor market experience. All reported coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level.

The last column in Table 2 shows that the same regression applied to our model can account for the empirical observations: more job-to-job transitions are negatively correlated with wages, while again non-employment spells go together with lower earnings.³⁸ Note that this finding does not contradict the average wage gain of 3% of a job-to-job transition in our calibration

³⁶The reported regression results are based on a homogeneous worker version of the model, but it remains true when we use the two-worker version as in our calibration. It is also not sensitive to the parametrization. We use the same calibrated parameters as in our model (with $\alpha = 0$ so that all workers have productivity p_H). In the simulated data both for our model and for the Burdett and Mortensen (1998) model, workers have very similar average experience, job duration, number of job-to-job transitions, number of job-to-nonemployment transitions and non-employment durations; see Appendix B for further details.

³⁷This theoretical finding is not trivial since workers with few job transitions are predominantly workers who initially find a good job and hence have less reasons to quit.

³⁸Table 2 shows that both our and the Burdett and Mortensen (1998) model generate OLS coefficients for the cumulative count of non-employment spells that are one order of magnitude smaller than the one obtained in the data. This difference could arise because in the data some workers who typically earn lower wages might

(Table 1). We argue that the negative link between the *count* of job-to-job transitions and wages is driven by worker (unobserved) heterogeneity, both in our model and in the data. To test this, we follow the procedure described in Light and McGarry (1998) and run IV regressions on our data sample to account for unobserved worker heterogeneity in the error term. We find that in this case the coefficient on job-to-job transitions turns positive, while the coefficient on non-employment spells stays negative (see Appendix B for further details). Hence, standard job ladder models appear to be fully consistent with the data once worker heterogeneity is accounted for. On the other hand, those models miss the fact that some workers churn a lot in the labor market and yet remain largely unsuccessful.³⁹

In our model, workers of high-ability climb up the distribution of starting wages with every quit until they are promoted to their marginal product in which case no further job-to-job transitions occur unless the worker is displaced. In contrast, low-ability workers misreport their ability level sometimes, which can lead to demotions and to further job transitions to low-wage employers.⁴⁰ Hence, low-ability workers undergo much higher job mobility.⁴¹

4.2 Internal Mobility and Firm Size

Another feature present in our model that does not come out of a standard job ladder model like Burdett and Mortensen (1998), is the presence of within firm worker mobility and its relationship with firm size. Our model is able to generate the positive relationship between firm size, internal mobility, wages and job stability observed in the data. In the calibration larger (pooling) firms have a 2% higher internal mobility rate (defined as promotions and demotions relative to employment) than smaller (separating) firms, which is consistent with the evidence obtained by Idson (1989).⁴² Alongside this result, we also find that workers in smaller (separating) firms have 18% lower tenure than workers in larger (pooling) firms, which is consistent with the empirically

also face a higher probability of job destruction, a feature that is not accounted for in our or the Burdett and Mortensen (1998) model. See Pinheiro and Visschers (2015) for a theoretical way of introducing such a feature in the Burdett and Mortensen (1998) framework and Kletzer and Fairlie (2003) for evidence on post-displacement earnings losses using the NLSY.

³⁹Light and McGarry (1998) also find considerable variation in mobility patterns. Particularly, the mobility of some workers does not decline over time, while other workers undergo no or only little job mobility.

⁴⁰Consistent with Gibbs et al. (2002) and Belzil and Bognanno (2008), demotions in our model are accompanied by pay cuts and by subsequent increases in job-transition probabilities.

⁴¹Kahn (2013) also suggests that such composition effects are present in the NLSY data, finding that movers are on average of lower ability than stayers. In particular, she finds that movers have lower AFQT scores, years of school, and tenure in the year before they moved, relative to stayers. See Table 2 of her paper for further details.

⁴²In the calibration the relative difference in internal mobility between larger and smaller firms depends quite heavily on the value of ρ . For example, with $\rho = 0.05$ (as obtained when targeting an average monthly promotion rate of 2%) implies that larger (pooling) firms have around 17% higher internal mobility than smaller (separating firms).

well documented fact that larger employers have lower job separation rates.⁴³

Furthermore, as we establish in Corollary 1, pooling firms have a more productive workforce than separating firms. We confirm this finding in the calibrated example but note that productivity differences are tiny which is explained by the feature that most workers in the calibration have high ability and that productivity differences between workers are also not too large. We do reproduce, however, the usual positive relationships between firm size and wages, consistent with the empirical evidence (e.g. Brown and Medoff (1989), Idson and Oi (1999)). Although firms in our model are ex-ante identical, we expect that a similar conclusion obtains if firms differ in their exogenous productivity level, in which case positive sorting between workers and firms should obtain in equilibrium.⁴⁴

Recently, Papageorgiou (2014) presents a theory that is also able to explain the positive relationship between firm size, internal mobility, wages and job stability. A key difference is that Papageorgiou (2014) uses occupational mobility within the firm to measure and model the internal mobility of workers (see also Kramarz et al. (2014)). Further, his theory is based on workers' learning about their match quality in a given occupation within the firm and hence is closely related to that of Jovanovic (1979) and Moscarini (2005). Instead, here we build on search models in the Burdett and Mortensen (1998) tradition and focus on firms' learning about the productivity of a worker. Also Papageorgiou (2014) does not consider long-term wage contracts, but instead uses spot wages that are determined by Nash bargaining. We see our contributions as complementary. Using different approaches, both our paper and Papageorgiou (2014) relate within and between firm mobility in an equilibrium framework in the context of labor market frictions.

A final prediction that we highlight and that does not arise in the Burdett and Mortensen (1998) model is that smaller (separating) firms have more dispersed starting wages than larger (pooling) firms. While this is certainly true within firms, we verify for our calibrated model that overall dispersion of starting wages is indeed higher across smaller firms. This feature can also be confirmed for the NLSY in which workers are asked about the number of employees at their current place of work (plant size) as well as if their current employer has below or above 1000 workers in other locations (firm size). Comparing standard deviations of log wages for workers who are in their first year of a job, we document in Table 3 that dispersion of starting wages is indeed higher among smaller plants or firms.⁴⁵ This is true unconditionally, but it becomes more pronounced after we condition on the same set of regressors that we use in Table 2.

⁴³Note that in our model the relationship between firm size and job stability is generally ambiguous. This is because high-wage firms have higher quit rates of demoted low-ability workers.

⁴⁴In a previous version of this paper with flat-wage contracts (Carrillo-Tudela and Kaas (2011)), we prove this assertion.

⁴⁵Similar results hold if instead of the standard deviation we use the 90-10 or the 80-20 percentile ratios.

Table 3: Dispersion of starting wages by employer size

	Plant size			Firm size	
	1-49	50-249	250+	1-999	1000+
Unconditional	0.671	0.615	0.626	0.617	0.602
Conditional	0.572	0.501	0.489	0.526	0.505

Notes: Standard deviations of log real hourly wages for workers in the NLSY. Statistics are calculated across all firm-worker years for which the worker was not employed at their current employer in the previous year. Conditional standard deviations are for the residuals after controlling for the regressors that we use in Appendix B except tenure. Information about firm size is only available until the year 2000.

5 Further Discussion

Here we discuss some variations to our assumptions. In particular we consider the case in which firms can observe their applicants' employment status to analyze whether using this information makes it easier to separate workers. In this context we analyze two types of contracts: (i) up-or-out contracts, where workers that reported their type truthfully get promoted and misreporting workers are laid off; and (ii) up-or-down contracts as analyzed in the previous sections.⁴⁶ An important conclusion from these extensions is that information on employment status strengthens firms' monopsony power which makes it easier to separate workers.

Consider the same setup as before, but now firms offer a menu of four contracts $\omega_i^s = (w_i^s, w_i^{+s}, w_i^{-s})$ indexed by the worker's reported ability level $i = L, H$ and employment status $s = u, e$. The first component, w_i^s , denotes the starting wage offered to a worker of employment status s that reports type i . When a firm learns a worker's type, the worker receives $w_i^{+s} = p_i$ if he reported his type truthfully. Otherwise, he receives w_i^{-s} . In the case of up-or-out contracts, it is notationally convenient to assume that firms set w_i^{-s} below the worker's reservation wage, which is equivalent to a layoff. In the case of up-or-down contracts, w_i^{-s} equals the worker's reservation wage as analyzed in previous sections. Let F_i^s denote the corresponding offer distribution of starting wages, where \underline{w}_i^s and \bar{w}_i^s denote the infimum and supremum of its support, for $i = L, H$ and $s = u, e$.

The workers' value functions are similar to the ones described in equations (1)-(4) and are described in Appendix C. The main difference is that the offer distributions and their supports are now indexed by s . The incentive-compatibility constraint is now $w_j^s - w_i^s \leq \rho[V_i(p_i) - U_i]$. The problem of the firm is to maximize $\sum_{s=u,e} \Pi_H^s(w_H^s) + \Pi_L^s(w_L^s)$ by choosing w_H^s, w_L^s for $s = u, e$. Since firms can perfectly differentiate workers by employment status, they choose (w_L^u, w_H^u) and (w_L^e, w_H^e) independently. Hence the problem of hiring workers in the unemployment market can be treated independently from that of hiring workers in the employment market. Equilibrium

⁴⁶Up-or-out contracts are common practice in some labor markets, such as those for academics, consultants and lawyers.

requires that the optimal choices of w_i^s must be consistent with the offer distributions F_i^s and the associated function \hat{w}^s . Once again we analyze a rank preserving equilibrium such that \hat{w}^s is increasing and $F_H^s(w) = F_L^s(\hat{w}^s(w))$ for each $s = u, e$ and for all w in the support of F_H^s .

Despite this change, we show that for a sufficiently low learning rate, a segmented equilibrium emerges with higher turnover of low-ability workers and higher workforce productivity of high-wage firms. The key difference between the up-or-out contracts and the up-or-down contracts is that when a segmented equilibrium arises, up-or-out contracts imply that the unemployment pool is biased towards low-ability workers.

5.1 Up-or-out contracts

Lemma 4: *Consider the model where firms offer up-or-out contracts and condition their offers on employment status. Then, for any starting wages earned by workers of type $i = H, L$ who were hired from employment (w_i^e) or from unemployment (w_i^u) the inequality $w_i^e > w_i^u$ holds.*

The above result shows that the supports of the offer distributions F_H^u and F_H^e do not overlap. Importantly, this result is independent from whether we have a separating or a segmented equilibrium. Non-overlapping supports imply that workers hired from unemployment quit as soon as they get an outside offer during the probation period. Firms then maximize profits by offering unemployed workers their reservation wage. This leads F_i^u to degenerate to a mass point at $w_i^u = R_i$ for $i = L, H$. Further, the incentive-compatibility constraint for low-ability workers hired from unemployment becomes $R_H - R_L \leq \rho[V_L(p_L) - U_L]$, which never binds since $p_H > p_L$ implies that $R_L > R_H$ holds for any ρ . This result shows that information on employment status enables firms to exert their full monopsony power when hiring these workers, leading to an outcome similar to that of Diamond (1971), which in turn makes it easier to separate unemployed workers.

Since workers earning their reservation wage face offer distributions F_i^e , the infimum of the support is $\underline{w}_i^e = R_i$ which is not offered in equilibrium, so that all firms recruit workers hired from unemployment upon contact. In Appendix C we fully characterize the equilibrium where firms observe workers' employment status and use up-or-out contracts. There we show that the problem faced by firms hiring employed workers turns out to be isomorphic to the one faced by firms offering promotion/demotion contracts without conditioning on employment status considered in the previous sections. In particular, the incentive-compatibility constraint for low-ability workers hired from employment is now given by $w_H^e - w_L^e \leq \rho[p_L - b]/(\phi + \delta)$. As we decrease ρ , this constraint starts to bind at high wages. Decreasing ρ further then implies that firms start offering pooling contracts when the incentive compatible w_L^e exceeds p_L . Therefore F_H^e and F_L^e can be derived in the same way as before and the main insights still apply here. The difference, however, is that with up-or-out contracts firms do not extract rents from workers caught misreporting their type, whereas conditioning contracts on employment status allows firms to strictly increase profits by segmenting its hiring markets.

To illustrate the properties of this version, we provide a quantitative example using the same calibration targets as in Section 4. When firms can condition their offers on employment status, reservation wages are lower. This reduces all starting wages in the offer distributions which makes it easier for firms to separate workers. As a result, the threshold values for parameter ρ where incentive constraints start and where pooling is the preferred choice for some firms are lower than in the benchmark model. Indeed, we have that $\rho_1 = 0.0404 > \rho_2 = 0.0395 > \rho_3 = 0.0393$. Given a value of $\rho = 0.027$, a segmented equilibrium with pooling at top wages is the outcome. In this equilibrium low-ability workers have an unemployment rate of $u_L = 32.8\%$, while high-ability workers have an unemployment rate of $u_H = 28.7\%$. Reservation wages are $R_H = 0.911$, $R_L = 0.993$. Different from the benchmark model, however, this model predicts a positive effect of the count of job-to-job transitions on wages.

In the environment analyzed in this paper, up-or-out contracts could arise, for example, because firms face downward wage rigidities that do not allow them to cut wages. However, without such imposed constraints, firms will always prefer to use up-or-down contracts. To understand this, first note that both contracts offer worker the same incentives to report truthfully their type. Since with up-or-out contracts misreporting workers are laid off, firms make strictly less profits ex-post relative to up-or-down contracts where firms continue to make profits on demoted workers. From an ex-ante perspective, firms will also prefer to use up-or-down contracts as they provide workers with the same incentives as up-or-out contracts.⁴⁷ Given these arguments, we now turn to the case in which firms observe their applicants' employment status and use up-or-down contracts.

5.2 Up-or-down contracts

The analysis of the case of up-or-down contracts is very similar to the one of up-or-out contracts described in Appendix C.⁴⁸ With non-overlapping supports of the offer distributions F_H^u and F_H^e , we have that information on employment status once again enables firms to exert their full monopsony power when hiring unemployed workers, which in turn makes it easier to separate these workers. Further, the threshold values ρ_1 and ρ_2 as well as all separating equilibria are the same as in the previous subsection. The difference arises in the case of segmented equilibria where demotions (instead of layoffs) occur in equilibrium. A segmented equilibrium with up-or-down contracts therefore has very similar properties to those of the benchmark model considered in the previous sections.

⁴⁷Kahn and Huberman (1988) show that up-or-out contracts can be preferred to up-or-down when workers have private information about their firm-specific investments and their employers have private information about the resulting productivity of these investments. As argued by these authors their results rely on two-sided asymmetric information. When there is only one party with private information, the resulting contract is a full-employment contract. Our model pertains to the latter class.

⁴⁸Given the similarity between the two analyzes, we do not present the case of up-or-down contracts. The only substantial difference is that the profits of pooling firms include an additional term which reflects the profits earned on demoted workers, which is similar to the one used in the proof of Proposition 2.

To illustrate these properties, we calibrate this version of the model using the same targets as we used for our benchmark model. The model matches the targets reasonably well, exhibiting a job-to-job transition rate of 2.5%, a quit gain, a layoff loss and a promotion gain of 3.0%, 4.5% and 6.7%, respectively. The cutoff values for the learning rate are $\rho_1 = 0.0394 > \rho_2 = 0.0383 > \rho_3 = 0.0380$, which implies the calibrated model is characterized by a segmented equilibrium. In this equilibrium 80.2% of firms offer separating contracts, while 19.8% of firms offer pooling contracts, reflecting that firms find it easier to separate when they can exert a higher degree of monopsony power at the hiring stage. The latter is illustrated in the lower values of unemployed workers' reservations wages relative to the benchmark model, where R_L and R_H are now 0.994 and 0.916, respectively. Further, this calibration exhibits a promotion rate of 1.4% and a demotion rate of 0.2%, yielding a higher promotion-to-demotion ratio relative to the benchmark model.

Using this calibration we revisit the implications for wage dynamics and job mobility and the relationship between firm size and internal mobility. In both cases we find that the predictions of the benchmark model survive when firms condition their contracts on workers' employment status. In particular, we perform the same exercise as described in Table 2 and obtain that the coefficient for the cumulative count of job-to-job transitions remains negative, although it is now one order of magnitude lower relative to the benchmark case (-0.0002 vs -0.005). The coefficient for the cumulative count of non-employment spells also remains negative and of similar magnitude as before (-0.007 vs -0.004). Regarding internal mobility and firm size, we find that the internal mobility rate is 14% higher in larger (pooling) firms relative to smaller (separating) firms. We also find that jobs in smaller (separating) firms have 2.6% lower tenure than those in larger (pooling) firms, as well as a positive relationship between wages and firm size. Further, we find that starting wages are more dispersed in smaller firms.

6 Conclusions

In this paper we consider a model of the labor market in which search frictions coexist with information frictions. The latter arise as firms do not observe worker ability upon hiring but gradually learn it over time. Given this adverse selection problem, we show that when the learning rate is sufficiently low, an equilibrium emerges in which low-wage firms attempt to hire both low- and high-ability workers by offering incentive compatible separating contracts. These contracts offer initially a low wage and then promote the worker by increasing his wage to marginal productivity. High-wage firms, however, offer contracts that pay the same starting wage to all workers, but after learning their employees' types they promote high-ability workers and demote low-ability workers. This implies that low-ability workers can experience a wage cut or a wage rise when undertaking a job-to-job transition, while high-ability workers can only experience wage rises when changing jobs without an intervening spell of unemployment.

In such a segmented equilibrium, low-ability workers have a higher degree of job turnover and

lower average earnings than high-ability workers. To gain further insights on this relationship, we calibrate our model and show that it generates indeed a negative overall relationship between the number of job-to-job transitions and wages, which is consistent with the evidence that we obtain in NLSY data, extending the empirical findings of Light and McGarry (1998). Such a negative relationship is not easily picked up by standard models of job-to-job mobility, such as Burdett and Mortensen (1998), where workers generally climb up the wage ladder as they move between employers.

It should be an interesting extension to include different occupations and assignment problems within the firm. For example, suppose that firms aim to assign workers into one of two different occupations, such that only high-ability workers can efficiently perform the “high occupation”, yielding output p_H , whereas low-ability workers should be assigned to the “low occupation”, producing output $p_L < p_H$. Any mismatch between workers’ abilities and occupations yields (weakly) lower output levels. If a worker self-selects to the right occupation/contract, the firm promotes the worker after learning his type, but if he is caught misreporting, the firm re-assigns the worker to the correct occupation and pays the demotion wage. In such a setting, this model could speak to occupational mobility within and across firms.

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Appendix A: Proofs

Proof of Lemma 1

Consider a rank-preserving market equilibrium in contracts of the form $\omega_i = (w_i, p_i, b)$. In such an equilibrium any pair of starting wages (w_H, w_L) in the support of the offer distribution F implies that $\Pi^* \equiv \sum_{i=H,L} \Pi_i(w_i) \geq \sum_{i=H,L} \Pi_i(w'_i)$ for all alternative pairs of offers $(w'_i)_{i=H,L}$. Further, profit values in starting contracts $\Pi_i(w_i)$ must be non-negative. To prove the lemma, we need to show that no other contract pair of the form $(\hat{\omega}_i)_{i=H,L} = (\hat{w}_i, \hat{w}_i^+, \hat{w}_i^-)_{i=H,L}$ can lead to profit values higher than Π^* . To show that this is the case, assume that one firm offers a deviating contract $\hat{\omega}_i = (\hat{w}_i, \hat{w}_i^+, \hat{w}_i^-)$, $i = H, L$; while all other firms offer contracts of the form (w'_i, p_i, b) with (w'_H, w'_L) drawn from distribution F . Note that the deviating contract must satisfy $\hat{w}_i^+ \leq p_i$, $\hat{w}_i^- \leq p_j$ for $j \neq i$ (else the firm obtains a negative continuation value from employing the worker), $w_i^+, w_i^- \geq b$ (else the worker obtains continuation value from employment lower than that of unemployment), and profit values in starting contracts $\Pi_i(\hat{\omega}_i)$ must be non-negative.

To adapt notation to the more general contract, we write $\Pi_i(\omega_i)$ for the firm's profit value and $V_{ii}(\omega_i)$, $V_{ij}(\omega_j)$ for the worker values, interchangeable with the notation $\Pi_i(w_i)$, $V_{ii}(w_i)$, $V_{ij}(w_j)$ that we use for contracts of the form (w_i, p_i, b) .

We divide the proof into three parts. The first part derives the value functions associated with the deviating contract. They are needed to derive workers' incentive constraint associated with the deviating contract. The second part considers the case in which the deviating contract satisfies the incentive constraint. The third part considers the case in which the deviating contract does not satisfy the incentive constraint.

Part 1: The Bellman equations describing the expected values of workers employed in the deviating contract are given by

$$\begin{aligned} \phi V_{ii}(\hat{\omega}_i) &= \hat{w}_i + \lambda \int \max[V_{iL}(w'_L) - V_{ii}(\hat{\omega}_i), V_{iH}(w'_H) - V_{ii}(\hat{\omega}_i), 0] dF(w'_H, w'_L) \\ &\quad + \delta(U_i - V_{ii}(\hat{\omega}_i)) + \rho(V_i(\hat{w}_i^+) - V_{ii}(\hat{\omega}_i)) , \end{aligned} \quad (22)$$

$$\begin{aligned} \phi V_{ij}(\hat{\omega}_j) &= \hat{w}_j + \lambda \int \max[V_{iL}(w'_L) - V_{ij}(\hat{\omega}_j), V_{iH}(w'_H) - V_{ij}(\hat{\omega}_j), 0] dF(w'_H, w'_L) \\ &\quad + \delta(U_i - V_{ij}(\hat{\omega}_j)) + \rho(V_i(\hat{w}_j^-) - V_{ij}(\hat{\omega}_j)) , \end{aligned} \quad (23)$$

$$\begin{aligned} \phi V_i(\hat{w}_i^+) &= \hat{w}_i^+ + \lambda \int \max[V_{iL}(w'_L) - V_i(\hat{w}_i^+), V_{iH}(w'_H) - V_i(\hat{w}_i^+), 0] dF(w'_H, w'_L) + \delta(U_i - V_i(\hat{w}_i^+)) , \end{aligned} \quad (24)$$

$$\begin{aligned} \phi V_i(\hat{w}_j^-) &= \hat{w}_j^- + \lambda \int \max[V_{iL}(w'_L) - V_i(\hat{w}_j^-), V_{iH}(w'_H) - V_i(\hat{w}_j^-), 0] dF(w'_H, w'_L) + \delta(U_i - V_i(\hat{w}_j^-)) . \end{aligned} \quad (25)$$

From (22) and (23), we can express worker i 's incentive constraint $V_{ii}(\hat{\omega}_i) \geq V_{ij}(\hat{\omega}_j)$ for $i \neq j$ equivalently as⁴⁹

$$\hat{w}_j - \hat{w}_i \leq \rho[V_i(\hat{w}_i^+) - V_i(\hat{w}_j^-)] . \quad (26)$$

This condition has the same interpretation as (5) in the main text.

Part 2: Consider the case in which the deviating contract pair $(\hat{\omega}_i)_{i=H,L}$ is incentive compatible, i.e. conditions (26) hold for $i \neq j$.

⁴⁹The proof of that assertion is identical to the derivation of the incentive constraint (5) in the main text.

Note that $V_{ii}(\hat{\omega}_i) \in [U_i, V_i(p_i)]$: $V_{ii}(\hat{\omega}_i)$ cannot be smaller than U_i (otherwise the contract would not attract any workers), and it cannot exceed $V_i(p_i)$ because otherwise the present value of earnings would exceed flat-income stream p_i and hence give rise to negative expected continuation profits. Hence, for both $i = H, L$, there exist contracts $\omega'_i = (w'_i, p_i, b)$ such that $V_{ii}(\omega'_i) = V_{ii}(\hat{\omega}_i)$. Using the latter equality and (22) (for both contracts $\hat{\omega}_i$ and ω'_i) we obtain that the starting wage w'_i for $i = H, L$ satisfies the equation

$$w'_i + \rho V_i(p_i) = \hat{w}_i + \rho V_i(\hat{w}_i^+) . \quad (27)$$

This equation is useful as we can now use it to show that the pair of contracts $(\omega'_i)_{i=H,L}$ is also incentive compatible: for any $j \neq i$

$$\begin{aligned} w'_j &= \hat{w}_j + \rho[V_j(\hat{w}_j^+) - V_j(p_j)] \\ &\leq \hat{w}_i + \rho[V_i(\hat{w}_i^+) - V_i(\hat{w}_j^-)] \\ &= w'_i + \rho[V_i(p_i) - V_i(\hat{w}_j^-)] \\ &\leq w'_i + \rho[V_i(p_i) - V_i(b)] , \end{aligned}$$

where the two equalities make use of (27), the first inequality makes use of (26) and $\hat{w}_j^+ \leq p_j$ (which implies $V_j(\hat{w}_j^+) \leq V_j(p_j)$), and the second inequality makes use of $\hat{w}_j^- \geq b$ (which implies $V_i(\hat{w}_j^-) \geq V_i(b)$). Because of $\sum_{i=H,L} \Pi_i(\omega'_i) \leq \Pi^*$, contract pair $(\hat{\omega}_i)_{i=H,L}$ does not lead to higher profit than Π^* if we can prove that $\Pi_i(\hat{\omega}_i) \leq \Pi_i(\omega'_i)$ for $i = H, L$. To show this assertion, note that because $\hat{\omega}_i$ and ω'_i satisfy incentive compatibility, the respective profit values are given by

$$\Pi_i(\omega'_i) = \ell'_i[p_i - w'_i] \quad \text{and} \quad \Pi_i(\hat{\omega}_i) = \hat{\ell}_i \left[p_i - \hat{w}_i + \rho \frac{p_i - \hat{w}_i^+}{\phi + \delta + \lambda \hat{q}_i} \right] ,$$

where ℓ'_i and $\hat{\ell}_i$ are the masses of workers of type i who are employed in the probationary periods of the two contracts. Further, $\ell'_i = \hat{\ell}_i$ since $V_{ii}(\omega'_i) = V_{ii}(\hat{\omega}_i)$ and hence both contracts attract and retain the same number of type i workers during the probationary period of the contracts. In the case of $\Pi_i(\omega'_i)$, the term in the square brackets, $[\cdot]$, contain the flow profit $p_i - w'_i$. In the case of $\Pi_i(\hat{\omega}_i)$, the term in the square brackets contains the flow profit $p_i - \hat{w}_i$ and a continuation profit value which is realized at flow rate ρ when the worker is promoted (which is zero for the contract ω'_i). Here we use \hat{q}_i to denote the probability that worker i who is promoted to wage \hat{w}_i^+ quits when meeting another firm. Substituting the corresponding expressions for Π_i and using (27), the requirement $\Pi_i(\hat{\omega}_i) \leq \Pi_i(\omega'_i)$ is equivalent to showing that

$$V_i(p_i) - V_i(\hat{w}_i^+) \geq \frac{p_i - \hat{w}_i^+}{\phi + \delta + \lambda \hat{q}_i} . \quad (28)$$

To do so, use equation (24) to express $V_i(p_i)$ and $V_i(\hat{w}_i^+)$ as

$$V_i(p_i) = \frac{p_i + \delta U_i + \lambda \mathbb{E}\{\max[V_i(p_i), \tilde{V}_i]\}}{\phi + \delta + \lambda} \quad \text{and} \quad V_i(\hat{w}_i^+) = \frac{\hat{w}_i^+ + \delta U_i + \lambda \mathbb{E}\{\max[V_i(\hat{w}_i^+), \tilde{V}_i]\}}{\phi + \delta + \lambda} ,$$

where \tilde{V}_i denotes the expected value for a worker of type i of an outside offer which is itself the maximum between the two reporting strategies, truth-telling or misreporting. Subtracting these value functions, their difference can be expressed as

$$\begin{aligned} V_i(p_i) - V_i(\hat{w}_i^+) &= \frac{p_i - \hat{w}_i^+ + \lambda \mathbb{E}\{\max[V_i(p_i), \tilde{V}_i] - \max[V_i(\hat{w}_i^+), \tilde{V}_i]\}}{\phi + \delta + \lambda} \\ &\geq \frac{p_i - \hat{w}_i^+ + \lambda[V_i(p_i) - V_i(\hat{w}_i^+)](1 - \hat{q}_i)}{\phi + \delta + \lambda} . \end{aligned}$$

Rearranging proves (28).

Part 3: Now suppose that the deviating contract pair $(\hat{\omega}_i)_{i=H,L}$ is not incentive compatible and that both types of workers are pooled in contract $\hat{\omega}_H$. The alternative scenario where both types of workers are pooled in contract $\hat{\omega}_L$ is captured as well: if both workers would pool in contract $\hat{\omega}_L = (\hat{w}_L, \hat{w}_L^+, \hat{w}_L^-)$, we can define contract $\tilde{\omega}_H = (\tilde{w}_H, \tilde{w}_H^+, \tilde{w}_H^-)$ by $\tilde{w}_H = \hat{w}_L$, $\tilde{w}_H^+ = \hat{w}_L^-$, $\tilde{w}_H^- = \hat{w}_L^+$, and pick an arbitrary unattractive contract $\tilde{\omega}_L$, so that both worker types are pooled in some contract $\tilde{\omega}_H$. We can therefore consider the case where both types of workers pool in contract $\hat{\omega}_H$.

In this setting we need to prove that $\Pi_H(\hat{\omega}_H) \leq \Pi^*$, where

$$\Pi_H(\hat{\omega}_H) = \hat{\ell}_H \underbrace{\left[p_H - \hat{w}_H + \rho \frac{p_H - \hat{w}_H^+}{\phi + \delta + \lambda \hat{q}_H} \right]}_{\equiv \hat{\pi}_H} + \hat{\ell}_L \underbrace{\left[p_L - \hat{w}_H + \rho \frac{p_L - \hat{w}_H^-}{\phi + \delta + \lambda \hat{q}_L} \right]}_{\equiv \hat{\pi}_L}, \quad (29)$$

and $\hat{\ell}_i$ denotes the steady state employment of type i workers in the probationary period of this contract and \hat{q}_i , $i = H, L$, are the probabilities that promoted/demoted workers of type i quit contract $\hat{\omega}_H$ when outside offers arrive. To show that $\Pi_H(\hat{\omega}_H) \leq \Pi^*$ we now proceed in three steps. Step 1 deals with the first term of (29), while steps 2 and 3 deal with the second term of (29).

Step 1: Since $V_{HH}(\hat{\omega}_H) \in [U_H, V_H(p_H)]$, there exists a contract $\omega'_H = (w'_H, p_H, b)$ such that $V_{HH}(\omega'_H) = V_{HH}(\hat{\omega}_H)$. Using the latter equality and (22) (for both contracts $\hat{\omega}_H$ and ω'_H) we obtain the following relationship between w'_H and \hat{w}_H :

$$w'_H + \rho V_H(p_H) = \hat{w}_H + \rho V_H(\hat{w}_H^+). \quad (30)$$

Because contract ω'_H attracts and retains the same mass of high-ability workers as $\hat{\omega}_H$, we have that the number of workers in the probationary period under both contracts are the same; i.e. $\ell'_H = \hat{\ell}_H$. Hence, the contract $\hat{\omega}_H$ yields lower profits on high-ability workers relative to contract ω'_H if $\pi'_H \equiv p_H - w'_H \geq \hat{\pi}_H$.

To show that indeed $\pi'_H \geq \hat{\pi}_H$ is true, substitute the expression for $\hat{\pi}_H$ to obtain the equivalent inequality $\hat{w}_H - w'_H \geq \rho \frac{p_H - \hat{w}_H^+}{\phi + \delta + \lambda \hat{q}_H}$, which by virtue of (30) can be expressed as

$$V_H(p_H) - V_H(\hat{w}_H^+) \geq \frac{p_H - \hat{w}_H^+}{\phi + \delta + \lambda \hat{q}_H}. \quad (31)$$

Note that $V_H(p_H) = \frac{p_H + \delta U_H}{\phi + \delta}$ and $V_H(\hat{w}_H^+) = \frac{\hat{w}_H^+ + \delta U_H + \lambda \hat{q}_H \hat{V}_H}{\phi + \delta + \lambda \hat{q}_H}$, where \hat{V}_H denotes the expected value a high-ability worker obtains from quitting w'_H . Substituting the expressions for $V_H(p_H)$ and $V_H(\hat{w}_H^+)$ into (31) and rearranging yields the equivalent inequality

$$\hat{V}_H \leq \frac{p_H + \delta U_H}{\phi + \delta} = V_H(p_H),$$

which is fulfilled since no firm can offer a greater continuation utility than $V_H(p_H)$. Therefore the contract $\hat{\omega}_H$ yields (weakly) lower profit on high-ability workers:

$$\ell'_H \pi'_H \geq \hat{\ell}_H \hat{\pi}_H. \quad (32)$$

To prove that $\Pi_H(\hat{\omega}_H) \leq \Pi^*$, however, we still need to show that contract $\hat{\omega}_H$ also yields (weakly) smaller profit on low-ability workers. To show the latter we distinguish between two cases: $\hat{\pi}_L \geq 0$ and $\hat{\pi}_L < 0$.

Step 2: Suppose that $\hat{\pi}_L \geq 0$. In addition to $\omega'_H = (w'_H, p_H, b)$ as defined in Step 1, now consider a contract $\omega'_L = (w'_L, p_L, b)$ such that $V_{LL}(\omega'_L) = V_{LH}(\hat{\omega}_H)$ and hence $w'_L = \hat{w}_H - \rho[V_L(p_L) - V_L(\hat{w}_H^-)]$. Moreover, the contract ω'_L satisfies $w'_L \leq p_L$ and hence yields non-negative profits. To verify the latter claim note that

$$V_L(p_L) - V_L(\hat{w}_H^-) \geq \frac{p_L - \hat{w}_H^-}{\phi + \delta + \lambda \hat{q}_L},$$

which follows from a similar argument as (28), and together with $\hat{\pi}_L \geq 0$ yields

$$w'_L = \hat{w}_H - \rho[V_L(p_L) - V_L(\hat{w}_H^-)] \leq p_L - \hat{\pi}_L + \rho \frac{p_L - \hat{w}_H^-}{\phi + \delta + \lambda \hat{q}_L} - \rho \frac{p_L - \hat{w}_H^-}{\phi + \delta + \lambda \hat{q}_L} \leq p_L, \quad (33)$$

where we have also substitute out \hat{w}_H using the expression for $\hat{\pi}_L$ in (29). In turn, (33) also implies that $\pi'_L \equiv p_L - w'_L \geq \hat{\pi}_L$.

Finally, note that the pair of contracts (ω'_H, ω'_L) are incentive compatible since $V_{LL}(\omega'_L) = V_{LH}(\hat{\omega}_H) \geq V_{LH}(\omega'_H)$. The inequality follows because contract ω'_H promises a lower starting wage and a lower continuation wage to low-ability workers than contract $\hat{\omega}_H$ (i.e. $\hat{w}_H \geq w'_H$ and $\hat{w}_H^- \geq b$). Therefore, and because of $V_{LL}(\omega'_L) = V_{LH}(\hat{\omega}_H)$, contract ω'_L when offered jointly with ω'_H attracts and retains the same number of low-ability workers during the probationary period as pooling contract $\hat{\omega}_H$. Hence $\ell'_L = \hat{\ell}_L$ together with $\pi'_L \geq \hat{\pi}_L$ implies

$$\ell'_L \pi'_L \geq \hat{\ell}_L \hat{\pi}_L. \quad (34)$$

Since the pair of contracts (ω'_H, ω'_L) yields profit not greater than the equilibrium profit Π^* , it follows from (32) and (34) that $\Pi_H(\hat{\omega}_H) \leq \Pi^*$. Hence offering the pooling contract $\hat{\omega}_H$ is not a profitable deviation for a firm.

Step 3: Now suppose that $\hat{\pi}_L < 0$. Here we again need to distinguish between two cases. The first is the case where only separating contracts are offered in the market equilibrium. In this situation, $\ell'_H \pi'_H$ is smaller than Π^* and it provides an upper bound for the deviating pooling contract $\hat{\omega}_H$, as we show in the next paragraph. In the other situation where some pooling occurs in equilibrium, further arguments are required.

Separating Eq. Consider first the case in which all firms offer separating contracts in the market equilibrium (cf. Proposition 1). Because of (32) and $\hat{\pi}_L < 0$, $\ell'_H \pi'_H$ provides an upper bound for $\Pi_H(\hat{\omega}_H)$. Hence, the deviating contract $(\hat{\omega}_H, \hat{\omega}_L)$ does not yield higher profits than Π^* if we can show that $\ell'_H \pi'_H \leq \Pi^*$. Write \bar{w}_H for the highest equilibrium starting wage offered to high-ability workers, and let $\bar{\ell}_H$ denote the number of high-ability workers employed during the probationary period of this contract. Let $\bar{\pi}_H = p_H - \bar{w}_H$ denote the profit flow for each of these workers. (i) If $w'_H \geq \bar{w}_H$, it follows that $\pi'_H \leq \bar{\pi}_H$. Moreover, since contract (w'_H, p_H, b) does not attract or retain any more high-ability workers than contract (\bar{w}_H, p_H, b) (because the equilibrium distribution F_H has no mass point at \bar{w}_H as shown in Proposition 1), it follows that $\ell'_H = \bar{\ell}_H$. Hence,

$$\ell'_H \pi'_H \leq \bar{\ell}_H \bar{\pi}_H < \bar{\ell}_H \bar{\pi}_H + \bar{\ell}_L \bar{\pi}_L = \Pi^*.$$

(ii) If $w'_H < \bar{w}_H$, then w'_H is in the support of the equilibrium wage offer distribution and an incentive compatible contract (w'_L, p_L, b) exists such that $\ell'_H \pi'_H < \ell'_H \pi'_H + \ell'_L \pi'_L = \Pi^*$.

Segmented Eq. Consider now the case in which some firm offer separating contracts and some firms offer pooling contracts in the market equilibrium. In this case the arguments of the previous paragraphs do not apply as now there may not exist a contract of the form $\omega'_L = (w'_L, p_L, b)$ which is incentive compatible to contract ω'_H and yields the same expected value to low-ability workers as pooling contract

$\hat{\omega}_H$. Because of $w'_H \leq \hat{w}_H$ and $b \leq \hat{w}_H^-$, the contract $\omega'_H = (w'_H, p_H, b)$, when offered as a pooling contract, is less attractive to low-ability workers than pooling contract $\hat{\omega}_H$ and it also retains fewer of these workers; hence $\ell'_L \leq \hat{\ell}_L$.

We now show that the profit from any low-ability worker in the pooling contract ω'_H is no smaller than the one with contract $\hat{\omega}_H$, i.e.

$$\pi'_L = p_L - w'_H + \frac{p_L - b}{\phi + \delta + \lambda} \geq \hat{\pi}_L = p_L - \hat{w}_H + \rho \frac{p_L - \hat{w}_H^-}{\phi + \delta + \lambda \hat{q}_L}.$$

Because of $w'_H \leq \hat{w}_H$, the above inequality holds if

$$\frac{p_L - b}{\phi + \delta + \lambda} \geq \frac{p_L - \hat{w}_H^-}{\phi + \delta + \lambda \hat{q}_L}. \quad (35)$$

Note that the right-hand side of (35) shows that by increasing the demotion wage above b , the firm gains from reducing the quit rate of demoted workers. Hence, firms will prefer to offer a demotion wage of b when these gains are not big enough. We now show that the latter occurs when the condition stated in the lemma is satisfied.

Consider any arbitrary demotion wage w^- and define function

$$H(w^-) \equiv \frac{p_L - w^-}{\phi + \delta + \lambda[1 - F_L(\check{w}(w^-))]}, \quad (36)$$

where $\check{w}(w^-)$ is the starting wage of a contract $(\check{w}(w^-), p_L, b)$ that yields the same continuation payoff to a low-ability worker as the flat demotion wage w^- , so that $[1 - F_L(\check{w}(w^-))]$ is the probability that low-ability workers quit the demotion wage w^- . That is, $H(\hat{w}_H^-)$ equals the right-hand side of condition (35). The wage $\check{w}(w^-)$ satisfies $V_{LL}(\check{w}(w^-), p_L, b) = V_L(w^-)$ (and hence $\check{w}(b) = R_L$). With this notation, we can also define $\Gamma(w) \equiv H(\check{w}^{-1}(w))$ for starting wages $w \geq R_L$. Condition (35) applied to all values $\hat{w}_H^- \in [b, p_L]$ is then equivalent to $\Gamma(w) \leq \Gamma(R_L)$ for all $w \in [R_L, p_L]$.

Now we derive $\Gamma(w)$. Since $V_{LL}(w, p_L, b) = V_L(\check{w}^{-1}(w))$ can be expressed as

$$\check{w}^{-1}(w) = w + \rho[V_L(p_L) - V_{LL}(w, p_L, b)],$$

we have that

$$\check{w}^{-1'}(w) = 1 - \rho \frac{d}{dw} V_{LL}(w, p_L, b) = \frac{\phi + \delta + \lambda(1 - F_L(w))}{\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda(1 - F_L(w))},$$

where we have made use of the derivative of (8), which applies to all wages $w \leq p_L$. Direct integration further implies that

$$\check{w}^{-1}(w) = b + \int_{R_L}^w \frac{\phi + \delta + \lambda(1 - F_L(w'))}{\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda(1 - F_L(w'))} dw',$$

and substituting this expression in (36) we obtain

$$\Gamma(w) = \frac{p_L - b - \int_{R_L}^w \frac{\phi + \delta + \lambda(1 - F_L(w'))}{\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda(1 - F_L(w'))} dw'}{\phi + \delta + \lambda(1 - F_L(w))}.$$

With the condition of Lemma 1, the requirement $\Gamma(w) \leq \Gamma(R_L)$ is fulfilled so that $\hat{\pi}_L \leq \pi'_L$. This, together with $\ell'_L \leq \hat{\ell}_L$ and $\hat{\pi}_L < 0$ proves that $\ell'_L \pi'_L \geq \hat{\ell}_L \hat{\pi}_L$. Therefore, the pooling contract ω'_H yields total profit $\Pi_H(\omega'_H) = \ell'_H \pi'_H + \ell'_L \pi'_L$ which is at least as large as $\Pi_H(\hat{\omega}_H) = \hat{\ell}_H \hat{\pi}_H + \hat{\ell}_L \hat{\pi}_L$. Because market equilibrium requires $\Pi_H(\omega'_H) \leq \Pi^*$, this proves that $\Pi_H(\hat{\omega}_H) \leq \Pi_H(\omega'_H) \leq \Pi^*$. Hence, the deviation to $\hat{\omega}_H$ is not profitable. This completes the proof of Lemma 1. \square

Proof of Proposition 1

To express the dependance on ρ , we write $R_i(\rho)$, $i = H, L$, for the reservation wages, and $\bar{w}_i(\rho)$ for the highest wages in the support of the offer distributions. The separating equilibrium characterized in Section 3.2 requires $\bar{w}_L(\rho) \leq p_L$ which is equivalent to

$$\bar{w}_H(\rho) \leq p_L + b - R_L(\rho) . \quad (37)$$

This inequality is strictly fulfilled as long as incentive constraints do not bind (that is, if $\rho \geq \rho_1$), because of $\bar{w}_L < p_L$. On the other hand, when ρ tends to zero, $R_L(\rho) \rightarrow b$, while

$$\bar{w}_H(\rho) \rightarrow \bar{w}_H(0) = \frac{1}{1+\alpha} \left[\bar{p} - \frac{(\phi + \delta)^2 (\bar{p} - (1+\alpha)b)}{(\lambda + \phi + \delta)^2} \right] .$$

Because (21) is equivalent to $\bar{w}_H(0) > p_L$, inequality (37) fails if $\rho < \rho_1$ is sufficiently small. Hence, under condition (21), there exists $\rho_2 \in (0, \rho_1)$ such that the separating equilibrium satisfies $\bar{w}_L(\rho) \leq p_L$ for any $\rho \geq \rho_2$. On the other hand, if (21) fails, either (37) holds for all $\rho \in [0, \rho_1]$, in which case $\bar{w}_L(\rho) \leq p_L$ holds for all $\rho \geq \rho_2 = 0$, or condition (37) fails for some values $\rho \in [0, \rho_1]$ in which case $\rho_2 > 0$ is defined as the supremum of those values of ρ where (37) holds with equality.

Conditional on $\rho \geq \rho_2$, we first solve for equilibrium reservation wages when incentive constraints bind. Define

$$h_i(w) \equiv \frac{\lambda(1 - F_i(w))}{\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda(1 - F_i(w))} , \quad i = L, H ,$$

and split the integral expressions in the reservation wage equations (16) as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \int_{R_H}^{\bar{w}_H} h_H(w) dw &= \tilde{w}_H - R_H + 2C(Y^{1/2} - 1)(p_H - R_H) , \\ \int_{\bar{w}_H}^{\bar{w}_H} h_H(w) dw &= \bar{w}_H - \tilde{w}_H + \frac{2C}{1+\alpha} \left[C(\bar{p} - \bar{R}) - (\bar{p} - \bar{R})^{1/2} (\bar{p} + \alpha(b - R_L) - (1+\alpha)\tilde{w}_H)^{1/2} \right] , \\ \int_{R_L}^{\bar{w}_L} h_L(w) dw &= \tilde{w}_L - R_L + 2C(Y^{1/2} - 1)(p_L - R_L) , \\ \int_{\bar{w}_L}^{\bar{w}_L} h_L(w) dw &= \bar{w}_L - \tilde{w}_L + \frac{2C}{1+\alpha} \left[C(\bar{p} - \bar{R}) - (\bar{p} - \bar{R})^{1/2} (\bar{p} + \alpha(b - R_L) - (1+\alpha)\tilde{w}_H)^{1/2} \right] , \end{aligned}$$

where we define $Y \equiv \frac{p_H - b - p_L + R_L}{p_H - R_H - p_L + R_L}$. Adding up the integral expressions gives

$$\begin{aligned} \int_{R_H}^{\bar{w}_H} h_H(w) dw &= \frac{1}{1+\alpha} \left[(\bar{p} - \bar{R})(1 + C^2) + \alpha(b - R_H) \right] \\ &+ 2C \frac{\alpha}{1+\alpha} [p_H - b - p_L + R_L]^{1/2} [p_H - R_H - p_L + R_L]^{1/2} - 2C(p_H - R_H) \end{aligned}$$

and

$$\begin{aligned} \int_{R_L}^{\bar{w}_L} h_L(w) dw &= \frac{1}{1+\alpha} \left[(\bar{p} - \bar{R})(1 + C^2) + R_H - b \right] \\ &- 2C \frac{1}{1+\alpha} [p_H - b - p_L + R_L]^{1/2} [p_H - R_H - p_L + R_L]^{1/2} - 2C(p_L - R_L) . \end{aligned}$$

Substitution of these terms into the reservation wage equations (16) yields two nonlinear equations that determine R_L and R_H simultaneously. Adding the equation for R_H to the one for R_L multiplied by α , we see that the nonlinear term disappears so that we can solve for $\bar{R} = R_H + \alpha R_L$:

$$\bar{R} = \frac{\bar{p}\rho C(C - 2) + b(1 + \alpha)(\rho + \phi + \delta)}{\phi + \delta + \rho(1 - C)^2} .$$

We can now substitute $R_H = \bar{R} - \alpha R_L$ into the reservation wage equation for R_L , which is quadratic in R_L . The relevant root is obtained as follows:

$$R_L = \frac{4C^2(F(1+\alpha) + G) - 2DE + \sqrt{[4C^2(F(1+\alpha) + G) - 2DE]^2 - 4(4C^2(1+\alpha) - E^2)(4C^2FG - D^2)}}{2E^2 - 8C^2(1+\alpha)},$$

with

$$D \equiv b[(1+\alpha)\frac{\phi+\delta}{\rho} + \alpha] + \bar{p}(1+C^2) - p_L(1+\alpha)(1+2C) - \bar{R}C^2,$$

$$E \equiv (1+\alpha)[2C - \frac{\phi+\delta}{\rho}] - \alpha, \quad F \equiv p_H - b - p_L, \quad G \equiv p_H - \bar{R} - p_L.$$

These reservation wages, together with \tilde{w}_i from (14), \bar{w}_H from (20), $\bar{w}_L = \bar{w}_H - b + R_L$, and the wage offer distributions from (11) and (12), characterizes the equilibrium with binding incentive constraints. To prove that worker separation is indeed optimal for firms, we still need to show that no firm finds it optimal to deviate to a pooling contract. We formulate this assertion as Lemma A.1 below. This completes the proof of Proposition 1. \square

Lemma A.1: *For any $\rho \geq \rho_2$, firms do not find profitable deviations to a pooling contract.*

Proof: Consider a firm offering a pooling contract $\tilde{\omega} = (w_H, p_H, b)$ such that $w_H \leq \bar{w}_H$, to retain high-ability workers. Note that offering a pooling contract (w_H, p_H, b) in which $w_H > \bar{w}_H$ is not profitable since this contract has the same hiring and retention rate of workers as the pooling contract (\bar{w}_H, p_H, b) , but leads to lower profit per worker.

Instead of offering the pooling contract $\tilde{\omega} = (w_H, p_H, b)$, the firm can also offer a menu of separating contracts (ω_H, ω_L) with $\omega_H = \tilde{\omega}$ and $\omega_L = (\hat{w}(w_H), p_L, b)$, $\hat{w}(w_H) = w_H - b + R_L \leq p_L$. The pooling (separating) contracts, conditional on hiring a worker, yield expected profit values $\tilde{\Pi}$ (Π) satisfying

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{\Pi} &= \tilde{\ell}_H[p_H - w_H] + \tilde{\ell}_L\left[p_L - w_H + \rho\frac{p_L - b}{\phi + \delta + \lambda}\right], \\ \Pi &= \ell_H[p_H - w_H] + \ell_L[p_L - \hat{w}(w_H)], \end{aligned}$$

where $\tilde{\ell}_i$ and ℓ_i are the numbers of workers of ability i in the starting phase of the two contracts. Note that both contracts have the same hiring and quit rates for both worker types in the pre-promotion stage since $F_L(\hat{w}(w_H)) = F_H(w_H)$ and low-ability workers are indifferent between reporting type L or type H at the offered contract wages. Therefore, $\ell_i = \tilde{\ell}_i$ for $i = H, L$, and the pooling contract strictly dominates the separating contract if and only if

$$p_L - \hat{w}(w_H) < p_L - w_H + \rho\frac{p_L - b}{\phi + \delta + \lambda},$$

which is equivalent to (see (9) and (6))

$$w_H - \hat{w}(w_H) = \rho\frac{p_L - \phi U_L}{\phi + \delta} < \rho\frac{p_L - b}{\phi + \delta + \lambda}.$$

This in turn is the same as

$$\phi U_L > \frac{\lambda p_L + (\phi + \delta)b}{\phi + \delta + \lambda}. \quad (38)$$

On the other hand, we have that

$$(\phi + \lambda)U_L = b + \lambda \int_{R_L}^{\bar{w}_L} V_{LL}(w) dF_L(w) < b + \lambda\frac{p_L + \delta U_L}{\phi + \delta},$$

since no contract offered to low-ability workers yields utility value greater than $(p_L + \delta U_L)/(\phi + \delta)$. But this inequality is equivalent to

$$\phi U_L < \frac{\lambda p_L + (\phi + \delta)b}{\phi + \delta + \lambda}, \quad (39)$$

which contradicts (38) and thus proves that the separating contract dominates the pooling contract when $\rho \geq \rho_2$. This completes the proof of Lemma A.1. \square

Proof of Lemma 2

We first show that firms make negative expected profit on any low-ability worker hired in a pooling contract with starting wage $w_H \geq w_H^* = \hat{w}^{-1}(p_L)$, i.e.

$$p_L - w_H + \rho \frac{p_L - b}{\phi + \delta + \lambda} < 0,$$

for all $w_H \geq p_L + b - R_L$. This is true if and only if

$$\rho \frac{p_L - \phi U_L}{\phi + \delta} = b - R_L > \rho \frac{p_L - b}{\phi + \delta + \lambda}.$$

In the proof of Proposition 1 we show that this inequality is fulfilled (see equation (39)).

To prove the first claim, suppose there is no mass point. Then $\rho < \rho_2$ implies that $\bar{w}_H > w_H^* = \hat{w}^{-1}(p_L)$ so that some firms offer pooling contracts at $w_H^* + \varepsilon$. In the limit $\varepsilon \rightarrow 0$, the inflow (quit) rates of high-ability workers at these firms are identical to the inflow (quit) rates of high-ability workers at firms with the highest separating contract at w_H^* . However, for $\varepsilon \rightarrow 0$, the inflow rate of low-ability workers is strictly larger at $w_H^* + \varepsilon$ than at w_H^* since the former contract attracts the mass of promoted low-ability workers (earning p_L) whereas the latter contract does not. Hence, profit would jump down discontinuously since firms make negative profits on low-ability workers in a pooling contract $w_H \geq w_H^*$. This contradicts profit maximization.

To prove the second claim, suppose that all low-ability workers who are offered separating contracts (w_H^*, p_L) report truthfully. Then firms offering this contract earn zero profits on low-ability workers and positive profits on high-ability workers. A firm offering a separating contract at $w_H^* - \varepsilon$ and $w_L = \hat{w}(w_H^* - \varepsilon)$, however, also earns (nearly) zero profit on low-ability workers and it has the same inflow rate of high-ability workers in the limit $\varepsilon \rightarrow 0$; however, the quit rate of high-ability workers jumps down discontinuously from $w_H^* - \varepsilon$ to w_H^* because workers earning $w_H^* - \varepsilon$ (w_H^*) quit (do not quit) to another firm offering w_H^* . Since there is a mass of firms offering w_H^* , profits jump up discontinuously from $w_H^* - \varepsilon$ to w_H^* , which again contradicts profit maximization.

This completes the proof of Lemma 2. \square

Proof of Proposition 2

The proof proceeds in two steps. We first characterize the vector of endogenous variables $\mathcal{E} \equiv (\varphi, \xi, \eta, R_L, R_H)$ by a set of equilibrium conditions. Second, we prove that the equilibrium exists using Brouwer's fixed-point theorem.

Steady State Measures

We write $G_i(w)$ for the earnings distribution of *starting* wages and $G_i^*(w)$ for the earnings distribution of wages *after promotions/demotions*. Since the latter has mass points at p_i and at b and zero density elsewhere, we write $g_i^*(p_i)$, $i = H, L$, and $g_L^*(b)$ for the measures of employed workers after promotion/demotion. Since the distribution of starting wages has a mass point at (w_H^*, p_L) , we write $g_L(p_L)$, $g_L(w_H^*)$ and $g_H(w_H^*)$ for the measures of workers earning p_L (low ability) or w_H^* (high and low ability) before promotion/demotion decisions. We calculate these earnings distribution measures as functions of equilibrium variables \mathcal{E} as follows.

1. Low-ability workers

Write $g_1 = G_{L-}(p_L)$, $g_2 = G_L(p_L) - G_{L-}(p_L) = g_L(p_L)$, $g_3 = G_L(w_H^*) - G_{L-}(w_H^*) = g_L(w_H^*)$, $g_4 = G_L(\bar{w}_H) - G_L(w_H^*)$, $g_5 = g^*(b)$, $g_6 = g^*(p_L)$. Thus, fraction $G_0 \equiv g_1 + g_2 + g_3 + g_4$ of employed low-ability workers receive starting wages and fractions g_5 (g_6) have been demoted (promoted). Hence, $G_0 + g_5 + g_6 = 1$. Note that no low-ability worker earns a wage in the interval (p_L, w_H^*) , so that $G_{L-}(w_H^*) = G_L(p_L)$. Remember that fraction $\varphi > 0$ of firms offer wages strictly below p_L and fraction $1 - \eta - \varphi \geq 0$ offer wages strictly above w_H^* . Also remember that fraction ξ of low-ability workers accept w_H^* when offered (w_H^*, p_L) .

G_0, g_1, g_2, g_3, g_5 and g_6 satisfy the set of linear steady-state equations

$$g_1[\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda(1 - \varphi)] = [\phi + \delta + \lambda g_5]\varphi, \quad (40)$$

$$g_2[\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda(1 - \varphi - \eta)] = [\phi + \delta + \lambda(g_1 + g_5)]\eta(1 - \xi), \quad (41)$$

$$g_3[\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda(1 - \varphi - \eta)] = [\phi + \delta + \lambda(g_1 + g_5)]\eta\xi, \quad (42)$$

$$G_0[\phi + \delta + \rho] = [\phi + \delta + \lambda g_5] + \lambda g_6(1 - \varphi - \eta), \quad (43)$$

$$g_5[\phi + \delta + \lambda] = \rho(G_0 - g_1 - g_2), \quad (44)$$

$$g_6[\phi + \delta + \lambda(1 - \varphi - \eta)] = \rho(g_1 + g_2). \quad (45)$$

These can be solved for

$$g_1 + g_2 = \frac{C(E + \rho) + DE}{B(E + \rho) + DF}, \quad G_0 = \frac{E - F(g_1 + g_2)}{E + \rho},$$

with

$$\begin{aligned} B &= (\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda(1 - \varphi - \eta))(\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda(1 - \varphi))(\phi + \delta + \lambda) \\ &\quad + \lambda\varphi\rho(\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda(1 - \varphi - \eta\xi)) + \lambda\rho\eta(1 - \xi)(\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda(1 - \varphi)), \\ C &= (\phi + \delta)(\phi + \delta + \lambda)[(\varphi + \eta(1 - \xi))(\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda(1 - \varphi)) - \lambda\varphi\eta\xi], \\ D &= \lambda\rho[(\varphi + \eta(1 - \xi))(\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda(1 - \varphi)) - \lambda\varphi\eta\xi], \\ E &= \phi + \delta + \lambda, \\ F &= \frac{\rho\lambda(\varphi + \eta)}{\phi + \delta + \lambda(1 - \varphi - \eta)}. \end{aligned}$$

The other variables g_n , $n = 1, \dots, 6$ follow immediately from (40)–(45). The unemployment rate is $u = (\phi + \delta)/(\phi + \delta + \lambda)$. For the earnings distributions of starting wages, the steady state relations are

$$G_L(w) = \frac{(\phi + \delta + \lambda g_5)F_L(w)}{\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda(1 - F_L(w))} \quad \text{if } w < p_L, \quad (46)$$

$$G_L(w) = \frac{(\phi + \delta + \lambda g_5)F_H(w) + \lambda g_6(F_H(w) - \varphi - \eta)}{\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda(1 - F_H(w))} \quad \text{if } w > w_H^*. \quad (47)$$

2. High-ability workers

For the distribution of starting wages, steady state relations yield

$$G_H(w) = \frac{(\phi + \delta)F_H(w)}{\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda(1 - F_H(w))}, \quad w \neq w_H^*,$$

and

$$g_H(w_H^*) = G_H(w_H^*) - G_{H-}(w_H^*) = \frac{(\phi + \delta + \lambda G_{H-}(w_H^*))\eta}{\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda(1 - \varphi - \eta)}.$$

Profit Maximization

Firms are indifferent between all contracts in the offer distribution. In the following, we derive this indifference relation for different wage offers to high-ability workers.

For convenience, we define $\hat{\alpha} \equiv \alpha \frac{\phi + \delta + \lambda g_L^*(b)}{\phi + \delta}$, which is the ratio of low-ability worker who are either unemployed or demoted at wage b , relative to the mass of unemployed high-ability workers.⁵⁰ We also define parameter A_0 as in Section 3, equation (10).

1. $w_H \in [R_H, \tilde{w}_H)$: Firms offer separating contracts with slack incentive constraints.

When the firm offers w_i to workers of ability $i = H, L$, profit is

$$\Pi(w_H, w_L) = \frac{A_0[p_H - w_H]}{[\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda(1 - F_H(w_H))]^2} + \hat{\alpha} \frac{A_0[p_L - w_L]}{[\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda(1 - F_L(w_L))]^2} .$$

With slack incentive constraints, profit is constant for both worker types independently. This gives rise to the same wage offer distributions (11) as in the previous section. Rank preservation implies that the two starting wages are linked according to (13), and the incentive constraint (6) implies that the threshold wage \tilde{w}_H satisfies (14).

2. $w_H \in [\tilde{w}_H, w_H^*)$: Firms offer separating contracts with binding incentive constraints.

Incentive constraints are binding so that $w_L = \hat{w}(w_H) = w_H - b + R_L$. The firm's profit is

$$\Pi(w_H, \hat{w}(w_H)) = \frac{A_0}{(\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda(1 - F_H(w_H)))^2} [p_H - w_H + \hat{\alpha}(p_L - w_H + b - R_L)] .$$

The constant profit condition $\Pi(w_H, \hat{w}(w_H)) = \Pi(R_H, R_L)$ yields the wage offer distribution

$$F_H(w_H) = \frac{\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda}{\lambda} \left[1 - \left(\frac{\hat{p} - w_H(1 + \hat{\alpha}) + \hat{\alpha}(b - R_L)}{\hat{p} - \hat{R}} \right)^{1/2} \right], \quad w_H \in [\tilde{w}_H, w_H^*) , \quad (48)$$

where we define $\hat{p} \equiv p_H + \hat{\alpha}p_L$ and $\hat{R} \equiv R_H + \hat{\alpha}R_L$. We define

$$C(x) \equiv \frac{\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda(1 - x)}{\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda} ,$$

and obtain, because of $F_H(w_H^*) = F_L(p_L) = \varphi$, an equilibrium condition for φ

$$C(\varphi)^2 = \frac{p_H - p_L - b + R_L}{\hat{p} - \hat{R}} . \quad (49)$$

3. $w_H = w_H^*$: Mass $\eta > 0$ of firms offer the contract menu (w_H^*, p_L) . Fraction $\xi > 0$ of low-ability workers misreport their type.

These firm offer p_L to low-ability workers of whom fraction $1 - \xi$ accept this contract so that firms make zero profits on these workers. Fraction ξ of low-ability workers, being indifferent between the two contracts, report the wrong type, earn starting wage $w_H^* = p_L + b - R_L$ and are demoted to wage b at the firm's learning rate ρ . On each worker of low ability hired into such a contract, the firm makes expected profit

$$J_L(w_H^*) = \frac{(\phi + \delta + \lambda)(R_L - b) + \rho(p_L - b)}{(\phi + \delta + \lambda)(\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda(1 - \varphi - \eta))} .$$

⁵⁰The mass $\alpha \frac{\phi + \delta + \lambda g_L^*(b)}{\phi + \delta + \lambda}$ of low-ability workers are unemployed or employed at demotion wage b , whereas there are $\frac{\phi + \delta}{\phi + \delta + \lambda}$ unemployed high-ability workers.

Note that low-ability workers before demotion quit at rate $\lambda(1 - \varphi - \eta)$ since fraction $1 - \varphi - \eta$ of firms offer starting wages above w_H^* . After demotion, these workers quit at rate λ . Note also that $J_L(w_H^*)$ is negative (see the proof of Lemma 2).

The rate at which low-ability workers are hired into this contract is

$$h_L(w_H^*) = \frac{\alpha\lambda\xi}{\phi + \delta + \lambda} \left[\phi + \delta + \lambda(g_L^*(b) + G_{L-}(p_L)) \right] = \frac{\lambda\hat{\alpha}\xi(\phi + \delta)(\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda)}{(\phi + \delta + \lambda)[\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda(1 - \varphi)]}.$$

The first expression is the flow of low-ability workers who are either unemployed or who are employed at wages below p_L who report the wrong type when meeting this firm (flow rate $\lambda\xi$). The second expression makes use of the steady-state earnings distribution of low-ability workers (46). Therefore the firm's profit on low-ability workers at wage w_H^* is

$$\Pi_L(w_H^*) = h_L(w_H^*)J_L(w_H^*) = \frac{A_0\hat{\alpha}\xi[(\phi + \delta + \lambda)(R_L - b) + \rho(p_L - b)]}{[\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda(1 - \varphi)][\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda(1 - \varphi - \eta)](\phi + \delta + \lambda)}.$$

Workers of high ability yield a profit flow before promotion $p_H - w_H^*$, quit at rate $\lambda(1 - \varphi - \eta)$, and they are hired at rate $\frac{\lambda(\phi + \delta)(\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda)}{(\phi + \delta + \lambda)(\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda(1 - \varphi))}$. Thus, for the firm's profit, we have a similar expression:

$$\Pi_H(w_H^*) = \frac{A_0[p_H - w_H^*]}{[\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda(1 - \varphi)][\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda(1 - \varphi - \eta)]}.$$

The constant-profit condition $\Pi_L(w_H^*) + \Pi_H(w_H^*) = \Pi(R_H, R_L)$ then implies

$$C(\varphi)C(\varphi + \eta) = \frac{p_H - p_L - b + R_L + \xi\hat{\alpha}[R_L - b + \frac{\rho}{\phi + \delta + \lambda}(p_L - b)]}{\hat{p} - \hat{R}}, \quad (50)$$

which is an equilibrium condition for the endogenous variable ξ .

4. $w_H > w_H^*$: Firms pool all workers in the same contract, promoting high-ability workers and demoting low-ability workers.

If the equality

$$1 - \varphi - \eta = 0 \quad (51)$$

holds, there are no firms offering wages above w_H^* . Otherwise, positive mass $1 - \varphi - \eta$ of firms offer wages $w_H > w_H^*$. These firms hire all low-ability workers who currently earn w_H^* or less, including those low-ability workers who have been promoted to wage p_L . Similar to the previous case, each worker of low ability hired at w_H yields negative profit

$$J_L(w_H) = \frac{(\phi + \delta + \lambda)(p_L - w_H) + \rho(p_L - b)}{(\phi + \delta + \lambda)(\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda(1 - F_H(w_H)))},$$

since these workers quit at rate $\lambda(1 - F_H(w_H))$ (rate λ) before (after) demotion.

The rate at which low-ability workers are hired into this contract is

$$\begin{aligned} h_L(w_H) &= \frac{\lambda\alpha}{\phi + \delta + \lambda} \left[\phi + \delta + \lambda(g_L^*(b) + g_L^*(p_L) + G_L(w_H)) \right] \\ &= \frac{\lambda\alpha \left[(\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda)(\phi + \delta + \lambda(g_L^*(b) + g_L^*(p_L))) - \lambda^2 g_L^*(p_L)(\varphi + \eta) \right]}{(\phi + \delta + \lambda)[\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda(1 - F_H(w_H))]} . \end{aligned}$$

The first expression is the flow of low-ability workers who are either unemployed or who are employed at wages below w_H meeting this firm. The second expression makes use of the steady-state earnings distribution of low-ability workers (47). We define

$$\hat{\alpha} \equiv \alpha \frac{\phi + \delta + \lambda(g_L^*(b) + g_L^*(p_L)) - \frac{\lambda^2 g_L^*(p_L)(\varphi + \eta)}{\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda}}{\phi + \delta},$$

and find that the firm's expected (negative) profit on low-ability workers at wages $w_H > w_H^*$ is

$$\Pi_L(w_H) = h_L(w_H)J_L(w_H) = \frac{A_0 \hat{\alpha} [(\phi + \delta + \lambda)(p_L - w_H) + \rho(p_L - b)]}{[\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda(1 - F_H(w_H))]^2 (\phi + \delta)}.$$

For workers of high ability, the firm's profit is

$$\Pi_H(w_H) = \frac{A_0 [p_H - w_H]}{[\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda(1 - F_H(w_H))]^2}.$$

Now the constant-profit condition $\Pi_L(w_H) + \Pi_H(w_H) = \Pi(R_H, R_L)$ yields the wage offer distribution

$$F_H(w_H) = \frac{\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda}{\lambda} \left[1 - \left(\frac{\hat{p} - w_H(1 + \hat{\alpha}) + \hat{\alpha} \frac{\rho}{\phi + \delta + \lambda} (p_L - b)}{\hat{p} - \hat{R}} \right)^{1/2} \right], \quad w_H \in (w_H^*, \bar{w}_H], \quad (52)$$

where we define $\hat{p} \equiv p_H + \hat{\alpha} p_L$. The top wage follows from $F_H(\bar{w}_H) = 1$:

$$\bar{w}_H = \frac{1}{1 + \hat{\alpha}} \left[\hat{p} + \frac{\hat{\alpha} \rho}{\phi + \delta + \lambda} (p_L - b) - \left(\frac{\phi + \delta + \rho}{\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda} \right)^2 (\hat{p} - \hat{R}) \right].$$

Since the distribution of wage offers must have connected support, $F_{H+}(w_H^*) = \lim_{w_H \searrow w_H^*} F_H(w_H) = \varphi + \eta$, we obtain an implicit condition for variable η :

$$C(\varphi + \eta)^2 = \frac{p_H - p_L - b + R_L + \hat{\alpha} [R_L - b + \frac{\rho}{\phi + \delta + \lambda} (p_L - b)]}{\hat{p} - \hat{R}}. \quad (53)$$

Reservation Wages

It remains to derive reservation wages for the two workers types. For both types, we make use of $R_i = b - \rho[V_i(p_i) - U_i]$ and calculate the difference $V_i(p_i) - U_i$.

For workers of low ability we have from (1) and (4)

$$(\phi + \delta)V_L(p_L) = p_L + \delta U_L + \lambda \int_{w_H^*}^{\bar{w}_H} [V_{LH}(w) - V_L(p_L)] dF_H(w), \quad (54)$$

$$\begin{aligned} \phi U_L &= b + \lambda \int_{R_H}^{\bar{w}_H} [\max[V_{LL}(\hat{w}(w)), V_{LH}(w)] - U_L] dF_H(w) \\ &= b + \lambda \int_{R_H}^{\rightarrow w_H^*} [V_{LL}(\hat{w}(w)) - U_L] dF_H(w) \\ &\quad + \lambda \int_{w_H^*}^{\bar{w}_H} [V_{LH}(w) - V_L(p_L) + V_L(p_L) - U_L] dF_H(w) \\ &= b + \lambda \int_{R_H}^{\rightarrow w_H^*} [V_{LL}(\hat{w}(w)) - U_L] dF_H(w) \\ &\quad + \lambda \int_{w_H^*}^{\bar{w}_H} [V_{LH}(w) - V_L(p_L)] dF_H(w) + \lambda(1 - \varphi)[V_L(p_L) - U_L]. \end{aligned} \quad (55)$$

Subtracting (55) from (54) and substitution into $R_L = b - \rho[V_L(p_L) - U_L]$ gives

$$\frac{\phi + \delta + \lambda(1 - \varphi)}{\rho}(b - R_L) = p_L - b - \lambda \int_{R_H}^{\rightarrow w_H^*} [V_{LL}(\hat{w}(w)) - U_L] dF_H(w) . \quad (56)$$

The integral expression in this equation can be calculated as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \lambda \int_{R_H}^{\rightarrow w_H^*} V_{LL}(\hat{w}(w)) - U_L dF_H(w) &= \lambda \int_{R_L}^{\rightarrow p_L} [V_{LL}(w) - V_{LL}(R_L)] dF_L(w) \\ &= \int_{R_L}^{p_L} \frac{\lambda[\varphi - F_L(w)]}{\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda(1 - F_L(w))} dw \\ &= (p_L - R_L)(1 - 2C(\varphi)) + \frac{2C(\varphi)^2}{1 + \hat{\alpha}}(\hat{p} - \hat{R}) - \frac{2C(\varphi)}{1 + \hat{\alpha}}[p_H - R_H - p_L + R_L]^{1/2}[p_H - p_L - b + R_L]^{1/2} . \end{aligned}$$

The last equation makes use of (11), (48), and $F_L(w) = F_H(w + b - R_L)$ for $w_L \geq \tilde{w}_L = \tilde{w}_H - b + R_L$, similar to the calculations in the proof of Proposition 1. Substitution back into (56) yields an equation which defines R_L implicitly.

For workers of high ability, we obtain a similar reservation wage equation:

$$\frac{\phi + \delta}{\rho}(b - R_H) = p_H - b - \lambda \int_{R_H}^{\bar{w}_H} [V_{HH}(w) - U_H] dF_H(w) . \quad (57)$$

For the integral expression, we obtain

$$\begin{aligned} \int_{R_H}^{\bar{w}_H} [V_{HH}(w) - V_{HH}(R_H)] dF_H(w) &= \int_{R_H}^{\rightarrow w_H^*} [V_{HH}(w) - V_{HH}(R_H)] dF_H(w) + \eta[V_{HH}(w_H^*) - V_{HH}(R_H)] \\ &+ \int_{\rightarrow w_H^*}^{\bar{w}_H} [V_{HH}(w) - V_{HH}(w_H^*)] dF_H(w) + (1 - \varphi - \eta)[V_{HH}(w_H^*) - V_{HH}(R_H)] \\ &= \int_{R_H}^{w_H^*} \frac{\varphi - F_H(w)}{\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda(1 - F_H(w))} dw + \int_{w_H^*}^{\bar{w}_H} \frac{1 - F_H(w)}{\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda(1 - F_H(w))} dw \\ &\quad + \int_{R_H}^{w_H^*} \frac{1 - \varphi}{\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda(1 - F_H(w))} dw \\ &= \int_{R_H}^{w_H^*} \frac{1 - F_H(w)}{\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda(1 - F_H(w))} dw + \int_{w_H^*}^{\bar{w}_H} \frac{1 - F_H(w)}{\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda(1 - F_H(w))} dw . \end{aligned}$$

Using (11), (48) and (52), the sum of the last two integrals can be further calculated to obtain

$$\begin{aligned} \lambda \int_{R_H}^{\bar{w}_H} [V_{HH}(w) - V_{HH}(R_H)] dF_H(w) &= \bar{w}_H - R_H - 2C(1)(p_H - R_H) + \frac{2C(1)C(\varphi)}{1 + \hat{\alpha}}(\hat{p} - \hat{R}) \\ &+ \frac{2C(1)\hat{\alpha}}{1 + \hat{\alpha}}[p_H - p_L - R_H + R_L]^{1/2}[p_H - b - p_L + R_L]^{1/2} + \frac{2C(1)(C(1) - C(\varphi + \eta))}{1 + \hat{\alpha}}(\hat{p} - \hat{R}) . \end{aligned}$$

Substitution back into (57) yields the implicit equation for R_H .

This completes the first part of the proof, namely the derivation of all equilibrium conditions.

Equilibrium Existence

There are two types of equilibria. The first case is that the mass point at $w_H^* = \bar{w}_H$ is the highest offered starting wage. In this case the equilibrium variables $(\varphi, \xi, \eta, R_L, R_H)$ satisfy equations (49), (50),

(51), (56) and (57). Second, some firms offer starting wages above w_H^* in which case $(\varphi, \xi, \eta, R_L, R_H)$ satisfies (49), (50), (53), (56) and (57) (so that $\eta < 1 - \varphi$). Typically the second case describes an equilibrium if the learning rate falls below some threshold ρ_3 . If this threshold value exists, both (51) and (53) are jointly satisfied at $\rho = \rho_3$.

To prove equilibrium existence, we apply Brouwer's fixed-point theorem by defining a suitable continuous map $H : X \rightarrow X$ on a compact, convex subset $X \subset \mathbb{R}^5$, such that every fixed point of H satisfies the equilibrium conditions. First, we define upper and lower bounds on reservation wages. For workers of high ability, note that the integral on the right-hand side of (57) is bounded below by zero and it is bounded above by

$$\int_{R_H} [V_{HH}(w) - U_H] dF_H(w) < \frac{p_H - \phi U_H}{\phi + \delta} = \frac{p_H - b - \lambda \int_{R_H} [V_{HH}(w) - U_H] dF_H(w)}{\phi + \delta},$$

which implies

$$\int_{R_H} [V_{HH}(w) - U_H] dF_H(w) < \frac{p_H - b}{\phi + \delta + \lambda}.$$

Therefore, (57) defines upper and lower bounds on R_H :

$$\underline{R}_H \equiv b - \frac{\rho}{\phi + \delta} (p_H - b) < R_H < \bar{R}_H \equiv b - \frac{\rho}{\phi + \delta + \lambda} (p_H - b).$$

For workers of low ability, the integral on the right-hand side of (56) is bounded below by zero which defines the lower bound

$$R_L > b - \frac{\rho}{\phi + \delta + \lambda(1 - \varphi)} (p_L - b) \geq \underline{R}_L \equiv b - \frac{\rho}{\phi + \delta} (p_L - b).$$

The integral in (56) is bounded above by

$$\int_{R_L}^{\rightarrow w_H^*} [V_{LL}(\hat{w}(w)) - U_L] dF_H(w) < \varphi [V_L(p_L) - U_L] = \frac{\varphi(b - R_L)}{\rho},$$

which defines the upper bound

$$R_L < \bar{R}_L \equiv b - \frac{\rho}{\phi + \delta + \lambda} (p_L - b).$$

We can now define

$$X \equiv \left\{ (\varphi, \xi, \eta, R_L, R_H) \in [0, 1]^3 \times [\underline{R}_L, \bar{R}_L] \times [\underline{R}_H, \bar{R}_H], \eta + \varphi \leq 1 \right\},$$

which is a compact, convex subset of \mathbb{R}^5 .

Define $\text{RHS}(N)$ ($\text{LHS}(N)$) for the right-hand side (left-hand side) of generic equation (N), and define functions $G_i : X \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ by

$$\begin{aligned} G_1(\varphi, \xi, \eta, R_L, R_H) &= \text{LHS}(49) - \text{RHS}(49), \\ G_2(\varphi, \xi, \eta, R_L, R_H) &= \text{LHS}(50) - \text{RHS}(50), \\ G_3(\varphi, \xi, \eta, R_L, R_H) &= \text{LHS}(53) - \text{RHS}(53), \\ G_4(\varphi, \xi, \eta, R_L, R_H) &= \text{LHS}(56) - \text{RHS}(56), \\ G_5(\varphi, \xi, \eta, R_L, R_H) &= \text{LHS}(57) - \text{RHS}(57). \end{aligned}$$

Since all steady-state measures and the other expressions defined above depend continuously on $(\varphi, \xi, \eta, R_L, R_H)$, functions G_i are continuous. Then define the map $H : X \rightarrow X$ by

$$\begin{aligned} H_1(x) &= \max\{0, \min\{1, \varphi + G_1(x)\}\}, \\ H_2(x) &= \max\{0, \min\{1, \xi - G_2(x)\}\}, \\ H_3(x) &= \max\{0, \min\{1 - \varphi, \eta + G_3(x)\}\}, \\ H_4(x) &= \max\{\underline{R}_L, \min\{\bar{R}_L, R_L + G_4(x)\}\}, \\ H_5(x) &= \max\{\underline{R}_H, \min\{\bar{R}_H, R_H + G_5(x)\}\}, \end{aligned}$$

for any $x = (\varphi, \xi, \eta, R_L, R_H) \in X$. It clear from the definition that H maps X into itself and that it is continuous. Hence it has a fixed-point, denoted $x^* = (\varphi^*, \xi^*, \eta^*, R_L^*, R_H^*) \in X$. It still needs to be shown that this fixed-point is an equilibrium. For this we need to prove that $G_i(x^*) = 0$ for $i = 1, 2, 4, 5$, and that $G_3(x^*) \geq 0$ if $\eta^* + \varphi^* = 1$.

To show $G_1(x^*) = 0$, we have to prove that $\varphi^* \in (0, 1)$. Observe that, due to Proposition 1, $\rho < \rho_2$ is equivalent to $\bar{w}_H > p_L + b - R_L$, with \bar{w}_H defined in (20). This is equivalent to

$$C(1)^2 < \frac{p_H - p_L + R_L - b}{\bar{p} - \bar{R}}. \quad (58)$$

Hence, at $\varphi = 1$, we have that $g_L^*(b) = 0$, $\hat{\alpha} = \alpha$, so that $\hat{p} = \bar{p}$, $\hat{R} = \bar{R}$. Then (58) implies that LHS(49) < RHS(49) at $\varphi = 1$ provided that $\rho < \rho_2$. Now suppose that $\varphi^* = 1$, so that $G_1(x^*) < 0$. But this contradicts $H_1(x^*) = \varphi^* = 1$. Second, suppose that $\varphi^* = 0$, so that LHS(49) = 1 while RHS(49) < 1, and hence $G_1(x^*) > 0$, which contradicts $H_1(x^*) = \varphi^* = 0$.

Next we show that $\eta^* > 0$ and that $G_3(x^*) \geq 0$, $\varphi^* + \eta^* \leq 1$ hold with complementary slackness. Suppose first that $\eta^* = 0$. Then, since $G_1(x^*) = 0$ and because of $[R_L - b + \frac{\rho}{\phi + \delta + \lambda}(p_L - b)] < 0$ (proof of Lemma 2),

$$C(\varphi^*)^2 = \frac{p_H - p_L - b + R_L}{\hat{p} - \hat{R}} > \text{RHS}(53).$$

This implies $G_3(x^*) > 0$, which contradicts $H_3(x^*) = \eta^* = 0$. From $H_3(x^*) = \eta^*$ it also follows that $G_3(x^*) \geq 0$ and that $\eta^* + \varphi^* \leq 1$. Moreover, one of these inequalities must bind if $H_3(x^*) = \eta^*$.

To prove $G_2(x^*) = 0$, we have to show that $\xi^* \in (0, 1)$. Suppose first that $\xi^* = 0$; then, because of $G_1(x^*) = 0$ and $\eta^* > 0$,

$$C(\varphi^*)C(\varphi^* + \eta^*) < C(\varphi^*)^2 = \frac{p_H - p_L - b + R_L}{\hat{p} - \hat{R}} = \text{RHS}(50),$$

so that $G_2(x^*) < 0$. This contradicts $H_2(x^*) = \xi^* = 0$. Now suppose $\xi^* = 1$, which implies $g_L^*(p_L) = 0$ and therefore $\hat{\alpha} = \hat{\alpha}$. This implies that

$$\text{RHS}(50) = \text{RHS}(53) \leq C(\varphi^* + \eta^*)^2 < C(\varphi^*)C(\varphi^* + \eta^*),$$

because of $\eta^* > 0$ and $G_3(x^*) \geq 0$. Hence $G_2(x^*) > 0$, which contradicts $H_2(x^*) = \xi^* = 1$.

Finally, it is straightforward to show that $G_4(x) < 0$ ($G_5(x) < 0$) if $R_L = \bar{R}_L$ ($R_H = \bar{R}_H$) and that $G_4(x) > 0$ ($G_5(x) > 0$) if $R_L = \underline{R}_L$ ($R_H = \underline{R}_H$). This proves that $G_i(x^*) = 0$ for $i = 4, 5$.

This completes the proof of Proposition 2. \square

Lemma A.2: *In a Burdett-Mortensen (1998) model with matching rates λ_0 and λ_1 for unemployed and employed workers, separation rate δ , birth/death rate ϕ , let G_i denote the earnings distribution of*

workers who had $i \geq 0$ job-to-job transitions since the last unemployment spell. Then G_i first-order stochastically dominates G_j for any $i > j$. Hence a worker's expected wage is increasing in the number of job-to-job transitions since the last unemployment spell.

Proof: Write F for the wage offer distribution with support $[R, \bar{w}]$ where R is the reservation wage. Let e_i be the mass of employed workers with exactly i job-to-job transitions since the last unemployment spell, and let u be the mass of unemployed workers. Let $G_i(w)$ be the earnings distribution of workers in group e_i , and write g_i for the density.

For group $e_i G_i(w)$, $i \geq 1$, the outflow=inflow condition is

$$e_i \left[(\Phi + \delta) G_i(w) + \lambda_1 \int_R^w g_i(w') [1 - F(w')] dw' \right] = e_{i-1} \lambda_1 \int_R^w g_{i-1}(w') [F(w) - F(w')] dw' .$$

For group $e_0 G_0(w)$, the corresponding condition is

$$e_0 \left[(\Phi + \delta) G_0(w) + \lambda_i \int_R^w g_0(w') [1 - F(w')] dw' \right] = u \lambda_0 F(w) .$$

Partial integration and differentiation yields the following formulas for the densities:

$$\begin{aligned} g_i(w) &= \frac{\lambda_1 e_{i-1} G_{i-1}(w)}{e_i} f(w) \psi(w) , \quad i \geq 1 , \\ g_0(w) &= \frac{\lambda_0 u}{e_0} f(w) \psi(w) , \end{aligned}$$

with $\psi(w) \equiv [\Phi + \delta + \lambda(1 - F(w))]^{-1}$. Because $\psi(w)$ is strictly increasing, it first follows that $g_0(w)/f(w) \approx \psi(w)$ is strictly increasing. Hence G_0 likelihood-ratio dominates F . Second, since $g_0(w)$ is proportional to $f(w)\psi(w)$, it follows that $g_1(w)/g_0(w) \approx G_0(w)$ is strictly increasing. Hence, G_1 likelihood-ratio dominates G_0 , which in turn implies reverse-hazard-rate dominance: $g_1(w)/G_1(w) \geq g_0(w)/G_0(w)$ (see Krishna (2009)). Third, it follows recursively that any G_i likelihood-ratio dominates G_{i-1} for $i \geq 2$. To see this, consider

$$\frac{g_i(w)}{g_{i-1}(w)} = \frac{e_{i-1}^2 G_{i-1}(w)}{e_i e_{i-2} G_{i-2}(w)} .$$

Here the right-hand side is increasing iff $g_{i-1}(w)G_{i-2}(w) \geq g_{i-2}(w)G_{i-1}(w)$ for all w which is true iff G_{i-1} reverse-hazard-rate dominates G_{i-2} which is true if G_{i-1} likelihood-ratio dominates G_{i-2} . As this is true for $i = 2$, it holds for all $i > 2$ by induction. It follows that any G_i first-order stochastically dominates G_j for $i > j$ (Krishna (2009)). \square

Appendix B: Data and Simulations

Our discussion in Section 4.1 extends the work of Light and McGarry (1998) by considering a worker’s cumulative count of the number of job-to-job transitions and cumulative count of the number of non-employment spells. To do so, we use the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY), focusing on white male and female workers. Following Light and McGarry (1998), we drop from this group those workers with indeterminate entry dates, those with entry dates that preceded their 16th birthday or 01/01/78 (the earliest date included in our regressions timeframe), those who stayed in school throughout 1979-1993, those who were observed for less than 8 years after their entry date and those without employment data during the 1979-1993 period. Also following Light and McGarry (1998), to determine the entry date we use as a guide the start of the first non-enrolment (in education) spell lasting more than 12 months. Because of the lack of detailed enrolment information for the survey years 1979-1980, we use a different method in those years relative to the 1981-2010 survey years. In the 1979-1980 survey years, the NLSY only provides information on the date last enrolled. For these two years, we use the number of months between the date last enrolled and the interview date, and identify the entry date for those who had 12 months in between. From 1981 onwards, the NLSY provides a dummy variable for each month since the last interview which is equal to 1 if the respondent was enrolled in that month and zero otherwise. In this case we use the first 12-months non-enrolled streak and took the first month of that streak as the entry month.

An important difference with Light and McGarry (1998) is that we create a “main job” dummy variable for a particular month to compute transitions, instead of using all of the overlapping jobs the worker could have held in the same month. In particular, for months where more than one job was held, we follow these tie-breaking rules: (i) The job that had the most hours worked per week is taken to be the main job. (ii) If there were two or more jobs that month with the same maximum hours, the job that began earlier (earlier “jobstart”) is chosen as the main job. (iii) If two or more jobs that month had the same maximum hours and “jobstart”, then the one with higher wages is chosen as the main job. (iv) If two or more jobs had the same hours, start and wages, then the one which lasted longer (later “jobstop”) is considered the main job. (v) If there were still two jobs that had the same hours, start, stop and wages, we assume these to be exactly the same jobs, in which case we choose arbitrarily the one with a smaller job id. Job-to-job transitions are then computed by identifying the months for which the main job changed such that the time gap between these jobs is less than a month. The non-employment spell variable is created when the main job variable is either missing or zero.

Using this data set, we take the same econometric specification proposed by Light and McGarry (1998), except that instead of including the total number of job separations at 2 years and 8 years as regressors, we replace them by the cumulative counts of the numbers of job-to-job transitions and non-employment spells. The equation specification we use is

$$\log w_{ijt} = \zeta + \beta_1 \Gamma_{ijt} + \beta_2 Z_{ijt} + \eta_i + \varepsilon_{ij} + v_{ijt},$$

where the dependent variable is the real log hourly wage of individual i in firm j at time t , the regression constant is given by ζ and the vector Γ_{ijt} contains the cumulative counts of the numbers of job-to-job transitions and non-employment spells. The vector Z_{ijt} contains a quadratic on actual experience and a quadratic on tenure, years of schooling, marital status dummy, health status dummy, a part-time/full-time employment dummy, a government sector dummy, a union job dummy, one-digit industry dummies, unemployment rate and wage index as measures of aggregate conditions, a dummy if the individual lived in a city, a dummy if the individual lived in the South and a gender dummy. All these variables are computed following Light and McGarry (1998). The error structure is given by $\eta_i + \varepsilon_{ij} + v_{ijt}$, where η_i captures the effects of unobserved time-invariant individual characteristics,

ε_{ij} captures the effects of unobserved time-invariant match-specific characteristics, and v_{ijt} includes all other unobservables and it is assumed to be white noise.

We estimate the above equation using OLS and the IV procedure considered by Light and McGarry (1998). We perform these regressions using all available years (1979-2010), all years up to 1994 and all years up to 1989 in the NLSY. We also perform these regressions considering the first 15 years of workers' labor market histories, the first 10 years of workers' labor market histories and the first 8 years of workers' labor market histories. Further, following Light and McGarry (1998) we estimate two versions of the IV regressions. The first one considers the error structure $\eta_i + v_{ijt}$, and hence only captures the effects of time-invariant individual characteristics. The second one considers the full error structure $\eta_i + \varepsilon_{ij} + v_{ijt}$, capturing both the individual and match-specific effects. Table 4 presents the results for the OLS and IV regressions, where column *WE* refers to the error structure $\eta_i + v_{ijt}$ and column *WME* refers to the error structure $\eta_i + \varepsilon_{ij} + v_{ijt}$. As shown in this table, we obtain a positive coefficient on the cumulative number of job-to-job transitions when considering only individual characteristics and when considering individual characteristics in conjunction with match-specific characteristics. Finally, to make sure we indeed follow the same procedure as Light and McGarry (1998), we replicate their original exercise, using separately all jobs and the main jobs, and obtain very similar results.

In the main text, Table 2 reports the estimates using the OLS regressions without the tenure variable. See Table 5 for the full regression result under this specification. The reason we present the regressions results without tenure in Table 2 is because in all our simulations we find that the Burdett and Mortensen (1998) model has a very strong positive relationship between wages and labor market experience, but not necessarily between wages and tenure. In particular, returns to tenure turn negative when the displacement shock, δ , becomes sufficiently high. With small enough δ and ϕ shocks, the Burdett and Mortensen (1998) model generates an aggregate positive relationship between wages and tenure because workers in high-paying jobs stay in those jobs for a long time. However, when δ shocks become more frequent, including our benchmark value of $\delta = 0.02$, workers that climb the wage ladder and end up in high-paying jobs are not able to stay in those jobs for a long time. In these cases we observe a negative relationship between tenure and wages (see Manning (2003) -Appendix 6A- for a formalization of this argument using a partial equilibrium set up). Nevertheless, even if we include a quadratic on tenure in the Burdett and Mortensen (1998) simulated regressions, the same general conclusion drawn from Table 2 holds.

Finally the regressions for the Burdett-Mortensen (B-M) model and for our (CT-K) model reported in Table 2 are based on simulations of 100,000 workers who we follow for up to 30 years, where all Poisson shocks (matching, separation, learning, exit) arrive at monthly frequency. We also run the same regressions following workers for the first 15, 10 and 8 years of workers' labor market histories (as also done in the data) and find that our results do not qualitatively change. Note that for these simulations we make sure that we generate the same data format as in the NLSY. Further, Table 6 reports the average cumulative counts of job-to-job transitions (JTJ) and non-employment spells (NESP) as well as workers' actual experience (EXP), job duration (J-DUR) and non-employment duration (NE-DUR) implied by the NLSY data and the (B-M) and (CT-K) simulated data sets we use for Table 2. Both our model and the calibrated B-M model fit these data averages rather well.

Table 4: OLS and IV regressions with cumulative job-to-job transitions and non-employment spells

VARIABLES	All years		First 15 years		First 10 years		First 8 years	
	OLS	IV/GLS WE WME	OLS	IV/GLS WE WME	OLS	IV/GLS WE WME	OLS	IV/GLS WE WME
Job-to-job transitions	-0.0040***	0.0258***	-0.0036***	0.0183***	-0.0029**	0.0261***	-0.0022*	0.0168
Non-employment spells	-0.0154***	-0.0578***	-0.0114***	-0.0514***	-0.010***	-0.0484***	-0.0098***	-0.0461***
Years of work experience X	0.0338***	0.0300***	0.0471***	0.0370***	0.0566***	0.0284**	0.0581***	0.0263**
X ² /10	-0.0057***	-0.0043***	-0.0119***	-0.0056***	-0.0193***	0.0029	-0.0224***	0.0130
Years of job tenure T	0.0211***	0.0169***	0.0390***	0.0318***	0.0454***	0.0599***	0.0490***	0.0672***
T ² /10	-0.0058***	-0.0050***	-0.0203***	-0.0236***	-0.0296***	-0.0523***	-0.041***	-0.0757***
Transitions * T	0.0005	-0.0020***	0.0002	-0.0043***	-0.0001	-0.0092***	0.001	-0.0085
Transitions * T ²	-2.23E-05	0.0009***	0.0002	0.0030***	0.001	0.0097***	-0.0019	0.0100
1 if <12 years of schooling	-0.2942***	-0.2380***	-0.2663***	-0.1935***	-0.2667***	-0.1711***	-0.2596***	-0.1726***
1 if 12 years of schooling	-0.1951***	-0.1774***	-0.1769***	-0.1163***	-0.1722***	-0.1081***	-0.1655***	-0.1159***
1 if 16 years of schooling	0.2528***	0.2311***	0.2410***	0.2460***	0.2298***	0.2303***	0.2248***	0.2329***
1 if ≥ 17 years of schooling	0.3516***	0.2326***	0.3700***	0.3268***	0.3467***	0.3082***	0.3450***	0.3309***
1 if in school	-0.1181***	-0.1181***	-0.0593***	-0.1033***	-0.0431***	-0.0885***	-0.0371***	-0.0842***
1 if married	0.0625***	0.0548***	0.0310***	0.0326***	0.0218***	0.0309***	0.0178***	0.0223***
1 if divorced	0.0236**	0.0192**	0.0192**	0.0152	0.0271**	-0.0165	0.0187	-0.0018
1 if has health limitations	-0.1204***	-0.0687***	-0.0967***	-0.0300**	-0.1071***	-0.0279*	-0.1130***	-0.0411***
1 if works < 35 hrs/wk	-0.1019***	-0.081***	0.0023	0.0386***	-0.0111	0.0262***	-0.0170**	0.0206**
1 if government job	-0.2821**	-0.1650***	-0.1458***	-0.0566**	-0.1227***	-0.0339*	-0.1257***	-0.0430
1 if union job	0.1194***	0.1344***	0.1557***	0.1642***	0.1590***	0.1695***	0.1616***	0.1643***
1 if lives in city	0.0518**	0.0092	0.0818***	0.0214***	0.0745***	0.0230***	0.0672***	0.0251***
1 if lives in the south	-0.0372**	-0.0297***	-0.0268***	-0.0246**	-0.0254***	-0.0232***	-0.0181***	-0.0145
Unemp rate	-0.0009	-0.0032***	-0.0085**	-0.0130***	-0.0057***	-0.0105***	-0.0056**	-0.0100***
Log wage index	0.0319***	0.0439***	0.0017	0.0221***	0.0068	0.0233***	0.0200**	0.0369***
1 if agriculture	-0.6141***	-0.3367***	-0.4483***	-0.2169**	-0.4327**	-0.2145**	-0.4383**	-0.2514**
1 if mining	-0.1782***	-0.0186	0.0175	0.0850**	-0.0732**	0.1140***	0.1065***	0.1504***
1 if construction	-0.1449***	-0.0232	0.0089	0.0670***	0.0563***	0.0941***	0.0585***	0.0899***
1 if manufacturing	-0.2269***	-0.0751***	-0.0853***	-0.0354	-0.0580***	0.0213	-0.0481**	0.0217
1 if transportation	-0.1372***	-0.0671***	-0.0063	0.0058	0.0347	0.0336	0.0375	0.0397
1 if wholesale & retail	-0.3961***	-0.2368***	-0.2536***	-0.1519***	-0.2210***	-0.1286**	-0.2136***	-0.1290**
1 if info, finance & insurance	0.1325***	-0.0439**	-0.0251	0.0210	-0.0127	0.0340	-0.0351	0.0082
1 if services	-0.3257***	-0.2085***	-0.1847***	-0.1247***	-0.1733***	-0.1229***	-0.1769***	-0.1328***
1 if male	0.1704***	0.1694***	0.1456***	0.1601***	0.1366***	0.1521***	0.1263***	0.1410***
Constant	1.6531***	1.5094***	1.6905***	1.5935***	1.5773***	1.5034***	1.4833***	1.4265***
Obs	57,047	57,047	42,604	42,604	33,833	33,833	28,212	28,212
R ²	0.3071	0.2687	0.3445	0.3093	0.3320	0.2929	0.3447	0.3287
Adj R ²	0.3067	4,538	0.3440	4,519	0.3314	4,498	0.3439	4,473
Num of caseid								
Num of indivjob		20,325		16,744		14,629		13,198

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sample: Male and female white individuals. Dependent variable: log real hourly wage. WE: Error term including only time-invariant worker heterogeneity. WME: Error term including time-invariant worker and match-specific heterogeneity.

Table 5: OLS regressions without tenure

VARIABLES	All years	First 15 years	First 10 years	First 8 years
Job-to-job transitions	-0.0073***	-0.0081***	-0.0075***	-0.0070***
Non-employment spells	-0.0185***	-0.0159***	-0.0140***	-0.0137***
Years of work experience X	0.0431***	0.0657***	0.0792***	0.0835***
$X^2/10$	-0.0075***	-0.0190***	-0.0300***	-0.0360***
1 if <12 years of schooling	-0.3036***	-0.2721***	-0.2726***	-0.2658***
1 if 12 years of schooling	-0.1931***	-0.1807***	-0.1748***	-0.1683***
1 if 16 years of schooling	0.2653***	0.2520***	0.2422***	0.2372***
1 if ≥ 17 years of schooling	0.3688***	0.3868***	0.3659***	0.3646***
1 if in school	-0.0872***	-0.0596***	-0.0426***	-0.0359***
1 if married	0.0698***	0.0349***	0.0242***	0.0197***
1 if divorced	0.0184*	0.0146	0.0210	0.0113
1 if has health limitations	-0.1166***	-0.0949***	-0.1040***	-0.1096***
1 if works < 35 hrs/wk	-0.0396***	-0.0162***	-0.0281***	-0.0336***
1 if government job	-0.2487***	-0.1433***	-0.1183***	-0.1208***
1 if union job	0.1341***	0.1641***	0.1636***	0.1656***
1 if lives in city	0.0500***	0.0820***	0.0751***	0.0674***
1 if lives in the south	-0.0362***	-0.0310***	-0.0299***	-0.0224***
Unemp rate	-0.001	-0.0089***	-0.0055***	-0.0051***
Log wage index	0.0331***	0.0057	0.0087	0.0230***
1 if agriculture	-0.5755***	-0.4434***	-0.4283***	-0.4301***
1 if mining	-0.1473***	0.009	0.0620*	0.0980***
1 if construction	-0.1228***	0.0011	0.0509**	0.0558**
1 if manufacturing	-0.2008***	-0.0855***	-0.0570***	-0.0452**
1 if transportation	-0.1151***	-0.0102	0.0327	0.0376*
1 if wholesale & retail	-0.3607***	-0.2573***	-0.2234***	-0.2123***
1 if inf, finance & insurance	-0.1164***	-0.0299*	-0.0166	-0.0370*
1 if services	-0.3198***	-0.1902***	-0.1767***	-0.1777***
1 if male	0.1707***	0.1516***	0.1423***	0.1311***
Constant	1.6476***	1.7072***	1.5934***	1.4874***
Obs	62,269	42,604	33,833	28,212
R^2	0.3309	0.339	0.3275	0.3415

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sample: Male and female white individuals. Dependent variable: log real hourly wage.

Table 6: Data and model averages

Means	Data	Models	
		B-M	CT-K
JTJ	4.2	3.7	3.3
NESP	3.9	3.6	3.6
EXP	11.6	10.8	10.9
J-DUR	2.3	3.4	2.5
NE-DUR	0.87	0.69	0.68

Appendix C: Offers Contingent on Employment Status

In this Appendix we fully characterize the equilibrium when firms condition their up-or-out contracts on employment status. We first present workers' value functions. Then we prove that the offer distributions faced by unemployed and employed workers do not have overlapping supports. Finally, we characterize the equilibrium. The arguments used here can then be used to analyze the equilibrium when firms condition their up-or-down contracts on employment status.

Workers' Value Functions: It is convenient to think of workers randomly meeting firms who draw the high-ability wage offer w_H^s from distribution F_H^s and who offer $w_L^s = \hat{w}^s(w_H^s)$ to low-ability workers. This implies that the value of unemployment is given by

$$\phi U_i = b + \lambda \int_{\underline{w}_H^u}^{\bar{w}_H^u} \max[V_{iL}(\hat{w}^u(x)) - U_i, V_{iH}(x) - U_i, 0] dF_H^u(x). \quad (59)$$

The value of employment at starting wage w for a worker of ability i that reported truthfully his type is given by

$$\begin{aligned} \phi V_{ii}(w_i) = w_i + \lambda \int_{\underline{w}_H^e}^{\bar{w}_H^e} \max[V_{iL}(\hat{w}^e(x)) - V_{ii}(w_i), V_{iH}(x) - V_{ii}(w_i), 0] dF_H^e(x) \\ + \delta(U_i - V_{ii}(w_i)) + \rho(V_i(p_i) - V_{ii}(w_i)), \end{aligned} \quad (60)$$

where the continuation value after promotion is given by (24) with F_H^e . The value of employment of a worker of type i that misreported his type and is currently earning the starting wage w_j is given by

$$\begin{aligned} \phi V_{ij}(w_j) = w_j + \lambda \int_{\underline{w}_H^e}^{\bar{w}_H^e} \max[V_{iL}(\hat{w}^e(x)) - V_{ij}(w_j), V_{iH}(x) - V_{ij}(w_j), 0] dF_H^e(x) \\ + (\delta + \rho)(U_i - V_{ij}(w_j)). \end{aligned}$$

The incentive-compatibility constraint is given by $w_j^s - w_i^s \leq \rho[V_i(p_i) - U_i]$.

Proof of Lemma 4: To show this, it is useful to note that in any equilibrium $\underline{w}_i^e > \underline{w}_i^u \geq R_i$. This follows since, for example, $\underline{w}_i^e < \underline{w}_i^u$ implies firms offering \underline{w}_i^e will not hire any worker and will make positive profits by offering a wage slightly above \underline{w}_i^u . We divide the proof in two steps. The first step constructs the profits of firms when hiring unemployed workers and derives some preliminary results. The second step compares the firms' profits when hiring employed workers under the assumption of overlapping supports.

Step 1:

Consider a firm offering w_H^u and $w_L^u = \hat{w}^u(w_H^u)$ to unemployed workers. Note that this firm could be separating or pooling workers. When this firm pools we have that $w_H^u = w_L^u$, while when it separates workers $w_H^u \neq w_L^u$. In either case its steady-state profit is $\Pi^u(w_H^u, w_L^u) = \Pi_H^u(w_H^u) + \Pi_L^u(w_L^u)$, where

$$\Pi_i^u(w_i^u) = \frac{\lambda u_i \alpha_i (p_i - w_i^u)}{\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda(1 - F_H^e(w_H^u))}, \quad (61)$$

for $i = L, H$. Let $N_i^u(w_i^u)$ denote the mass of workers hired from unemployment of ability $i = L, H$ earning an starting wage no greater than w_i^u . Steady state turnover implies that

$$N_i^u(w_i^u) = \frac{\lambda u_i \alpha_i F_i^u(w_i^u)}{\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda(1 - F_H^e(w_H^u))}.$$

Now we show under what conditions firms would prefer to offer separating contracts when hiring unemployed workers. First, if satisfying the incentive-compatibility constraint of low-ability workers implies $w_H^u > w_L^u$ and $w_i^u \leq p_i$ for $i = L, H$, this firm will strictly prefer to separate workers. To verify this claim, suppose this firm offered a wage w_L^u to low-ability workers that did not satisfy their incentive constraint, while keeping w_H^u constant. (61) then implies this firm will strictly reduce its profits by doing so, as it will hire low-ability workers at a higher wage while keeping the hiring and retention rates constant. Second, if satisfying incentive compatibility implies $w_H^u \leq w_L^u$, but $w_H^u < R_L$, this firm will also prefer to separate workers, as offering w_H^u to all unemployed workers will only hire high-ability workers. However, if satisfying incentive compatibility implies $w_H^u \leq w_L^u$, but $w_H^u \geq R_L$, then this firm prefers to pool workers and offer both types w_H^u .

Also note that $\underline{w}_i^e > \underline{w}_i^u \geq R_i$ and (61) implies that in equilibrium $\underline{w}_i^u = R_i$ and firms separate workers at low wages. Further, (61) also implies that any firm offering wages $w_i^u \in [\underline{w}_i^u, \underline{w}_i^e)$ for each $i = L, H$, must offer $w_i^u = R_i$, as this firm faces a constant hiring rate and all workers employed in this firm quit as soon as they get an outside offer.

Finally note that in equilibrium $\bar{w}_i^e \geq \bar{w}_i^u$ for $i = L, H$. To verify this argument fix \bar{w}_i^e for $i = L, H$ and suppose $\bar{w}_i^e < \bar{w}_i^u$ for $i = L, H$. Note that (61) then implies that the firm offering $(\bar{w}_L^u, \bar{w}_H^u)$ will optimally set $\bar{w}_i^u = \bar{w}_i^e$ for $i = L, H$, since by doing so it increases flow profits while keeping constant its hiring and retention rates. Reducing the \bar{w}_i^u below \bar{w}_i^e will be optimal, for example, when in equilibrium $\underline{w}_i^e > \bar{w}_i^u$ for $i = L, H$.

Step 2:

In this step we prove the non-overlapping support result by contradiction. Suppose there exists an equilibrium in which $\bar{w}_i^u \in (\underline{w}_i^e, \bar{w}_i^e]$ for $i = L, H$. We want to show that $\bar{w}_i^u > \underline{w}_i^e$ violates the constant-profit condition in the employed workers' market and hence cannot occur in any equilibrium. To do so consider a firm offering wages $w_i^e = \underline{w}_i^e$ for $i = L, H$. This firm's steady-state profit is then given by $\Pi^e(\underline{w}_H^e, \underline{w}_L^e) = \sum_{i=L,H} \Pi_i^e(\underline{w}_i^e)$, where

$$\Pi_i^e(\underline{w}_i^e) = \frac{\lambda N_i^u(\underline{w}_i^e)[p_i - \underline{w}_i^e]}{\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda} = \frac{\lambda F_i^u(R_i)}{\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda} \Pi_i^u(R_i). \quad (62)$$

The second equality follows from noting that this firm only hires workers that are currently earning R_i , and it maximises profits by setting $\underline{w}_i^e = R_i + \varepsilon$, where $\varepsilon > 0$ is sufficiently small, for $i = L, H$. Continuity of (61) then implies $\Pi_i^u(R_i) = \Pi_i^u(\underline{w}_i^e)$. These results also imply that a firm offering \underline{w}_i^e for $i = L, H$ will separate workers in equilibrium.

Now consider a firm offering a wage $w_H^e = \bar{w}_H^u + \varepsilon \leq p_H$ to employed workers. Here we have several possible cases depending on whether the firms decide to pool or separate when hiring unemployed and employed workers. Note that firms could follow different strategies when hiring workers of different employment status.

First assume that the incentive constraint of low-ability workers is binding at \bar{w}_H^u , such that $\bar{w}_L^u = \bar{w}_H^u - \rho(p_L - \phi U_L)/(\phi + \delta)$, and suppose that $\bar{w}_L^u < p_L$. The firm offering $w_H^e = \bar{w}_H^u + \varepsilon \leq p_H$ to employed workers will then offer $w_L^e = \hat{w}^e(w_H^e) = \bar{w}_L^u + \varepsilon$ to low-ability workers. Since $\bar{w}_H^u > \bar{w}_L^u$, firms offering these wages separate workers hired from unemployment and employment. Let $N_i^e(w)$ denote the mass of workers hired from employment with ability i earning a wage no greater than w . The steady-state profit from hiring employed workers at these wages is given by $\Pi^e(\bar{w}_H^u, \bar{w}_L^u) = \sum_{i=L,H} \Pi_i^e(\bar{w}_i^u)$, where

$$\begin{aligned} \Pi_i^e(\bar{w}_i^u) &= \frac{\lambda [N_i^u(\bar{w}_i^u) + N_i^e(\bar{w}_i^u)](p_i - \bar{w}_i^u)}{\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda(1 - F_i^e(\bar{w}_i^u))} \\ &= \frac{\lambda F_i^u(\bar{w}_i^u) \Pi_i^u(\bar{w}_i^u)}{\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda(1 - F_i^e(\bar{w}_i^u))} + \frac{\lambda N_i^e(\bar{w}_i^u)(p_i - \bar{w}_i^u)}{\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda(1 - F_i^e(\bar{w}_i^u))}. \end{aligned} \quad (63)$$

Since in equilibrium $\sum_{i=L,H} \Pi_i^u(R_i) = \sum_{i=L,H} \Pi_i^u(\bar{w}_i^u)$, comparing the profits from offering $(\underline{w}_H^e, \underline{w}_L^e)$ and $(\bar{w}_H^u, \bar{w}_L^u)$ to employed workers implies $\Pi^e(\bar{w}_H^u, \bar{w}_L^u) > \Pi^e(\underline{w}_H^e, \underline{w}_L^e)$, contradicting the constant profit condition on the employed workers' market.

Now suppose that offering a wage $w_H^e = \bar{w}_H^u + \varepsilon \leq p_H$ to unemployed workers of high ability implies that satisfying the incentive-compatibility constraint of low-ability workers yields a wage $w_L^u > p_L$. In this case the firms will offer pooling contracts with starting wage \bar{w}_H^u to both unemployed and employed workers. Noting that we can still use (63), with $\bar{w}_i^u = \bar{w}_H^u$ for $i = L, H$ and that in equilibrium $\sum_{i=L,H} \Pi_i^u(R_i) = \sum_{i=L,H} \Pi_i^u(\bar{w}_H^u)$, one can verify that $\Pi^e(\bar{w}_H^u, \bar{w}_L^u) > \Pi^e(\underline{w}_H^e, \underline{w}_L^e)$, once again contradicting the constant-profit condition on the employed workers' market.

Finally, assume that the incentive constraint of low-ability workers is slack at wages \bar{w}_i^u for $i = L, H$. In this case, we could have that incentive compatibility implies $\bar{w}_H^u < \bar{w}_L^u$ and firms offering \bar{w}_H^u to unemployed workers of high ability can decide to pool workers, while the firm offering \bar{w}_H^u to employed workers of high ability decides to separate. Note, however, that when the incentive constraint is slack, the constant-profit condition can be applied to high-ability workers independently in both the employed and unemployed workers' market. Hence using $\Pi_H^u(R_H) = \Pi_H^u(\bar{w}_H^u)$ and (62) and (63), we obtain that $\Pi_H^e(R_H) < \Pi_H^e(\bar{w}_H^u)$, which contradicts the constant-profit condition on the market for employed high-ability workers.

Taking the above arguments together, they show that in any equilibrium $\underline{w}_i^e > \bar{w}_i^u$ for all $i = L, H$.

□

An implication of Lemma 4 is that all firms offer unemployed workers the separating pair of reservation starting wages (R_H, R_L) , while employed workers are offered starting wages $w_i > R_i$, drawn from cdf F_i , such that the infimum of the support of F_i is equal to R_i . We now proceed to characterize separating and pooling equilibria for this economy.

General considerations

Since firms offer unemployed workers their reservation wage, unemployment utility for both types is identical, satisfying $U_L = U_H = U = b/\phi$. Bellman equations for (truthful and misreporting) low-ability workers and for (truth-telling) high-ability workers are

$$\begin{aligned} [\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda]V_{LL}(w) &= w + \delta U + \rho V_L(p_L) + \lambda \int \max[V_{LL}(\hat{w}(w')), V_{LH}(w'), V_{LL}(w)] dF_H(w') , \\ [\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda]V_{LH}(w) &= w + [\delta + \rho]U + \lambda \int \max[V_{LL}(\hat{w}(w')), V_{LH}(w'), V_{LH}(w)] dF_H(w') , \\ [\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda]V_{HH}(w) &= w + \delta U + \rho V_H(p_H) + \lambda \int \max[V_{HL}(\hat{w}(w')), V_{HH}(w'), V_{HH}(w)] dF_H(w') . \end{aligned}$$

From $V_{ii}(R_i) = U$ follow the reservation wage equations

$$R_i = b - \rho[V_i(p_i) - U] - \lambda \int \max[V_{iL}(\hat{w}(w)), V_{iH}(w)] - U dF_H(w) . \quad (64)$$

Since promoted high-ability workers do not quit, it follows that $\rho[V_H(p_H) - U] = \frac{\rho(p_H - b)}{\phi + \delta}$. Further define $x \equiv \rho[V_L(p_L) - U]$. Then the incentive constraint for low-ability workers is

$$w_H - w_L \leq x . \quad (65)$$

Separating equilibrium

Since all firms offer separating contracts with starting wages $w_L \leq p_L$, promoted low-ability workers do not quit. Therefore,

$$x = \frac{\rho(p_L - b)}{\phi + \delta} . \quad (66)$$

Since no low-ability worker misreports the type, unemployment rates for both types are identical,

$$u_L = u_H = u = \frac{(\phi + \delta)}{\phi + \delta + \lambda} .$$

Let h_i denote the fraction of employed workers of type i hired from unemployment and earning starting reservation wage R_i . Further, let $G_i(w)$ denote the cumulative distribution of starting wages for workers hired from another employer. In steady state this distribution satisfies

$$G_i(w) = \frac{\lambda h_i F_i(w)}{\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda(1 - F_i(w))} .$$

The steady-state workforce of workers of ability i employed at starting wage w_i is

$$\ell_i(w_i) = \frac{\lambda \alpha_i (1 - u) (h_i + G_i(w_i))}{\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda(1 - F_i(w_i))} .$$

It follows that firms' profits are again given by (10), with a redefinition of parameter $A_0 \equiv \lambda^2(\phi + \delta)/(\phi + \delta + \lambda)$. It follows that the wage offer distribution for $w_i \leq \tilde{w}_i$ is again given by (11). For wages above \tilde{w}_i , the binding incentive constraint (65) and $\Pi_H(w_H) + \Pi_L(w_H - x) = \Pi_H(R_H) + \Pi_L(R_L)$ yield the wage offer distribution

$$F_H(w_H) = \frac{(\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda)}{\lambda} \left[1 - \left(\frac{\bar{p} - w_H(1 + \alpha) + \alpha x}{\bar{p} - \bar{R}} \right)^{1/2} \right], \quad w_H \geq \tilde{w}_H ,$$

where \bar{p} and \bar{R} are defined as in the main text.

We again consider a rank-preserving equilibrium. From (13) follows that the incentive constraint (65) is slack for wages

$$w_H \leq \tilde{w}_H \equiv \frac{(p_H - R_H)x + p_H R_L - p_L R_H}{p_H - R_H - p_L + R_L} , \quad (67)$$

while for wages above \tilde{w}_H , $w_L = \hat{w}(w_H) = w_H - x$.

To characterize an equilibrium with slack incentive constraints and to derive threshold parameter ρ_1 , note that

$$\lambda \int_{R_i}^{\bar{w}_i} [V_{ii}(w) - V_{ii}(R_i)] dF_i(w) = \int_{R_i}^{\bar{w}_i} \frac{\lambda(1 - F_i(w))}{\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda(1 - F_i(w))} dw = (p_i - R_i)(1 + C^2 - 2C) ,$$

with parameter C defined as in (15). Reservation wages can then be obtained from (64) and (66):

$$R_i = p_i - (p_i - b) \frac{\phi + \delta + \rho}{(\phi + \delta)C(2 - C)} . \quad (68)$$

Since promotion wages for high-ability workers are higher, we have $R_H < R_L$. Incentive constraints are slack if $\bar{w}_H - \bar{w}_L \leq x$, where top starting wages \bar{w}_i are related to reservation wages via (15). Hence, threshold parameter ρ_1 is the implicit solution of

$$p_H - p_L - C^2(p_H - p_L - R_H + R_L) = x ,$$

with reservation wages (68).

If $\rho \leq \rho_1$, incentive constraints bind at the top of the wage offer distribution. A separating equilibrium with this feature is similarly characterized as in the main text. Instead of (20) we have

$$\bar{w}_H = \frac{1}{1+\alpha} \left[\bar{p} + \alpha x - C^2(\bar{p} - \bar{R}) \right], \quad \bar{w}_L = \bar{w}_H - x.$$

This outcome only describes a separating equilibrium if \bar{w}_L does not exceed marginal productivity of low-ability workers. Hence, the threshold value ρ_2 is defined as the highest value for which $\bar{w}_H - x = p_L$ and hence ensures that a separating equilibrium exists for all $\rho \geq \rho_2$.

In a separating equilibrium with binding incentive constraints, reservation wages for the two worker types can be similarly calculated as in the proof of Proposition 1. Define again $h_i(w) \equiv \frac{\lambda(1-F_i(w))}{\phi+\delta+\rho+\lambda(1-F_i(w))}$, and write (64) as

$$R_i - b + \frac{\rho}{\phi+\delta}(p_i - b) = \int_{R_i}^{\bar{w}_i} h_i(w) dw.$$

As in the proof of Proposition 1, these integrals can be calculated as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \int_{R_H}^{\bar{w}_H} h_H(w) dw &= \frac{1}{1+\alpha} \left[(\bar{p} - \bar{R})(1 + C^2) + \alpha(x + R_L - R_H) \right] \\ + 2C \frac{1}{1+\alpha} [p_H - p_L - x]^{1/2} [p_H - R_H - p_L + R_L]^{1/2} - 2C(p_H - R_H), \\ \int_{R_L}^{\bar{w}_L} h_L(w) dw &= \frac{1}{1+\alpha} \left[(\bar{p} - \bar{R})(1 + C^2) + R_H - R_L - x \right] \\ - 2C \frac{1}{1+\alpha} [p_H - p_L - x]^{1/2} [p_H - R_H - p_L + R_L]^{1/2} - 2C(p_L - R_L). \end{aligned}$$

Adding the equation for R_H to the one for R_L multiplied by α , the resulting equation can be solved for $\bar{R} = R_H + \alpha R_L$:

$$\bar{R} = \bar{p} - [\bar{p} - (1 + \alpha)b] \frac{\phi + \delta + \rho}{(\phi + \delta)C(2 - C)}.$$

Substitution of $R_H = \bar{R} - \alpha R_L$ into the reservation wage equation for R_L yields a quadratic equation in R_L whose relevant root is

$$R_L = \frac{-D + \sqrt{D^2 - 4E}}{2}$$

with

$$N \equiv x - b - 2Cp_L + \frac{1}{1+\alpha} \left[(\bar{p} - \bar{R})(1 + C^2) + \bar{R} - x \right],$$

$$D \equiv \frac{N}{C} - \frac{1}{1+\alpha} (p_H - p_L - x),$$

$$E \equiv \frac{N^2}{4C^2} - \frac{1}{(1+\alpha)^2} (p_H - p_L - \bar{R})(p_H - p_L - x).$$

These reservation wages together with the previous equations for \tilde{w}_i , \bar{w}_H , $\bar{w}_L = \bar{w}_H - x$, and the wage offer distributions characterize the separating equilibrium with binding incentive constraints.

Segmented equilibrium with pooling at top wages

As in the main text, a pooling equilibrium is characterized by the variables $(\varphi, \xi, \eta, R_L, R_H)$. All firms offer separating starting wages (R_H, R_L) to unemployed workers and dispersed starting wages to employed workers. Fraction $\varphi > 0$ of firms offer separating contracts (w_H, w_L) with $w_L < p_L$, fraction $\eta > 0$ offer the same separating contract $(p_L + x, p_L)$, and fraction $1 - \varphi - \eta \geq 0$ offer dispersed pooling

contracts (w_H) with $w_H > p_L + x$. Low-ability workers who are employed at starting wage $w_L < p_L$ and quit to a firm offering $(p_L + x, p_L)$ misreport their type with probability $\xi > 0$. One possibility is that the mass point at $w_H = p_L + x$ is the highest offered contract; this happens when the learning rate is sufficiently large (greater than some threshold $\rho_3 < \rho_2$). The other possibility, when $\rho < \rho_3$, is that positive mass of firms offer pooling contracts with $w_H > p_L + x$.

To obtain steady-state measures, write $G_i(w)$ for the earnings distribution of starting wages for those workers who were hired from another employer. Write h_i for the measure of workers who were hired from unemployment and currently earn starting wage R_i , and write $g_i^*(p_i)$, $i = H, L$, for the measures of employed workers after promotion. Since the distribution of starting wages has a mass point at (w_H^*, p_L) , we write $g_L(p_L)$, $g_L(w_H^*)$ and $g_H(w_H^*)$ for the measures of workers earning p_L (low ability) or w_H^* (high and low ability) before promotion/layoff. These earnings distribution depend on equilibrium variables $(\varphi, \xi, \eta, R_L, R_H)$ as follows.

Low-ability workers: Write $g_1 = G_{L-}(p_L)$, $g_2 = G_L(p_L) - G_{L-}(p_L) = g_L(p_L)$, $g_3 = G_L(w_H^*) - G_{L-}(w_H^*) = g_L(w_H^*)$, $g_4 = G_L(\bar{w}_H) - G_L(w_H^*)$, $g_6 = g^*(p_L)$. Thus, fraction $G_0 \equiv g_1 + g_2 + g_3 + g_4$ of employed low-ability workers receive starting wages and were hired from another employer. Fraction g_6 have been promoted, and h_L were hired from unemployment. Hence, $G_0 + g_6 + h_L = 1$. Mass $\alpha_L u_L$ of workers is unemployed and mass $\alpha_L(1 - u_L)$ is employed. As in the benchmark model, $G_{L-}(w_H^*) = G_L(p_L)$ because no low-ability worker earns a wage in the interval (p_L, w_H^*) . $G_0, g_1, g_2, g_3, g_6, h_L$ and u_L satisfy the following steady-state equations

$$\begin{aligned}
g_1[\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda(1 - \varphi)] &= h_L \lambda \varphi , \\
g_2[\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda(1 - \varphi - \eta)] &= (h_L + g_1)\lambda(1 - \xi)\eta , \\
g_3[\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda(1 - \varphi - \eta)] &= (h_L + g_1)\lambda\xi\eta , \\
G_0[\phi + \delta + \rho] &= h_L \lambda + \lambda g_6(1 - \eta - \varphi) , \\
g_6[\phi + \delta + \lambda(1 - \varphi - \eta)] &= \rho(h_L + g_1 + g_2) , \\
(1 - u_L)h_L[\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda] &= u_L \lambda , \\
u_L[\phi + \lambda] &= \phi + (1 - u_L)\delta + (1 - u_L)(g_3 + g_4)\rho .
\end{aligned}$$

We can solve these as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
g_1 &= \frac{\lambda\varphi}{\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda(1 - \varphi)} h_L \equiv Ah_L , \\
g_2 &= \frac{(1 + A)\lambda(1 - \xi)\eta}{\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda(1 - \varphi - \eta)} h_L \equiv Bh_L , \\
g_3 &= \frac{(1 + A)\lambda\xi\eta}{\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda(1 - \varphi - \eta)} h_L , \\
g_6 &= \frac{(1 + A + B)\rho}{\phi + \delta + \lambda(1 - \varphi - \eta)} h_L \equiv Dh_L , \\
h_L &= \frac{\phi + \delta + \rho}{\lambda + \phi + \delta + \rho + D(\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda(1 - \eta - \varphi))} , \\
u_L &= \frac{(\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda)h_L}{\lambda + h_L(\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda)} .
\end{aligned}$$

The stationary earnings distribution of starting wages is

$$\begin{aligned}
G_L(w) &= \frac{\lambda h_L F_L(w)}{\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda(1 - F_L(w))} \quad \text{if } w < p_L , \\
G_L(w) &= \frac{\lambda h_L F_H(w) + \lambda g_6(F_H(w) - \varphi - \eta)}{\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda(1 - F_H(w))} \quad \text{if } w > w_H^* .
\end{aligned}$$

High-ability workers: Here the same equations for G_H as in the proof of Proposition 2 apply. The unemployment rate is $u_H = (\phi + \delta)/(\phi + \delta + \lambda)$, and mass $h_H = u_H \lambda / (1 - u_H) / (\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda)$ of employed workers were hired from unemployment and earn starting wage R_H .

Profit Maximization: To find wage offer distributions from the firms' profit-maximization conditions, define $\hat{\alpha} \equiv \alpha u_L / u_H$ as the measure of low-ability unemployed workers per unemployed high-ability worker. Hence, a random worker hired from unemployment has high ability with probability $1/(1 + \hat{\alpha})$ and low ability otherwise. Further define parameter A_0 as above.

wage offer distributions in the four possible cases are similar to those in the proof of Proposition 2 with the following differences:

$w_H \in [R_H, \tilde{w}_H]$: **Separating contracts with slack incentive constraints.** Here the wage offer distributions are again given by (11), and the threshold wage \tilde{w}_H is given by (67).

$w_H \in [\tilde{w}_H, w_H^*]$: **Separating contracts with binding incentive constraints.** With binding incentive constraints $w_L = w_H - x$, the firms' profit is

$$\Pi(w_H, w_H - x) = \frac{A_0}{(\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda(1 - F_H(w_H)))^2} [p_H - w_H + \hat{\alpha}(p_L - w_H + x)].$$

The constant profit condition $\Pi(w_H, w_H - x) = \Pi(R_H, R_L)$ yields the same wage offer distribution as in (48), where the term $(b - R_L)$ is replaced by x , and $\hat{p} \equiv p_H + \hat{\alpha}p_L$ and $\hat{R} \equiv R_H + \hat{\alpha}R_L$ are similarly defined. With the same definition of $C(x)$ as in the proof of Proposition 2, the restriction $F_{H-}(w_H^*) = F_{L-}(p_L) = \varphi$ implies the equilibrium condition for φ :

$$C(\varphi)^2 = \frac{p_H - p_L - x}{\hat{p} - \hat{R}}. \quad (69)$$

Mass point at $w_H = w_H^*$ with some pooling and layoffs of low-ability workers. Fraction ξ of low-ability workers misreport their type while the rest accept p_L . On each misreporting worker of low ability hired at w_H^* the firm makes expected (negative) profit

$$J_L(w_H^*) = -\frac{x}{\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda(1 - \varphi - \eta)}.$$

The rate at which low-ability workers are hired into this contract is

$$h_L(w_H^*) = \alpha \lambda \xi (1 - u_L) [h_L + G_{L-}(p_L)] = \frac{\lambda^2 \hat{\alpha} \xi (\phi + \delta)}{(\phi + \delta + \lambda)[\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda(1 - \varphi)]}.$$

Therefore the firm's profit on low-ability workers at wage w_H^* is

$$\Pi_L(w_H^*) = h_L(w_H^*) J_L(w_H^*) = -\frac{A_0 \hat{\alpha} \xi x}{[\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda(1 - \varphi)][\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda(1 - \varphi - \eta)]}.$$

Firms' profits on high-ability workers $\Pi_H(w_H^*)$ is the same as in the proof of Proposition 2. The constant-profit condition $\Pi_L(w_H^*) + \Pi_H(w_H^*) = \Pi(R_H, R_L)$ then implies the equilibrium condition for variable ξ :

$$C(\varphi)C(\varphi + \eta) = \frac{p_H - p_L - x - \xi \hat{\alpha} x}{\hat{p} - \hat{R}}. \quad (70)$$

$w_H > w_H^*$: **Pooling contracts with layoffs of low-ability workers.**

This is only an equilibrium strategy if $1 - \varphi - \eta > 0$. Otherwise (i.e. $1 - \varphi - \eta = 0$), the highest starting wage is at w_H^* . Each worker of low ability hired at $w_H > w_H^*$ yields (negative) profit

$$J_L(w_H) = \frac{p_L - w_H}{\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda(1 - F_H(w_H))}.$$

The rate at which low-ability workers are hired into this contract is

$$h_L(w_H) = \lambda\alpha(1 - u_L) \left[h_L + G_L(w_H) + g_6 \right] = \lambda\alpha(1 - u_L) \frac{(\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda)(h_L + g_6) - \lambda g_6(\varphi + \eta)}{\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda(1 - F_H(w))} .$$

With the redefinition

$$\hat{\alpha} \equiv \alpha(1 - u_L) \frac{[(\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda)(h_L + g_6) - \lambda g_6(\varphi + \eta)](\phi + \delta + \lambda)}{\lambda(\phi + \delta)} ,$$

the firm's expected (negative) profit on low-ability workers at wages $w_H > w_H^*$ is

$$\Pi_L(w_H) = h_L(w_H)J_L(w_H) = \frac{A_0\hat{\alpha}(p_L - w_H)}{[\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda(1 - F_H(w_H))]^2} .$$

Profit on high-ability workers $\Pi_H(w_H)$ is the same as in the proof of Proposition 2. Then the constant-profit condition $\Pi_L(w_H) + \Pi_H(w_H) = \Pi(R_H, R_L)$ yields the wage offer distribution

$$F_H(w_H) = \frac{\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda}{\lambda} \left[1 - \left(\frac{\hat{p} - w_H(1 + \hat{\alpha})}{\hat{p} - \hat{R}} \right)^{1/2} \right] , \quad w_H \in (w_H^*, \bar{w}_H] ,$$

where $\hat{p} \equiv p_H + \hat{\alpha}p_L$. The top wage follows from $F_H(\bar{w}_H) = 1$:

$$\bar{w}_H = \frac{1}{1 + \hat{\alpha}} \left[\hat{p} - \left(\frac{\phi + \delta + \rho}{\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda} \right)^2 (\hat{p} - \hat{R}) \right] .$$

From the limiting condition $F_{H+}(w_H^*) = \lim_{w_H \searrow w_H^*} F_H(w_H) = \varphi + \eta$ follows the condition for variable η (provided that $\eta < 1 - \varphi$):

$$C(\varphi + \eta)^2 = \frac{p_H - p_L - x - \hat{\alpha}x}{\hat{p} - \hat{R}} . \quad (71)$$

Reservation Wages

We first calculate the value $V_L(p_L)$:

$$\begin{aligned} (\phi + \delta)V_L(p_L) &= p_L + \delta U + \lambda \int_{w_H^*}^{\bar{w}_H} [V_{LH}(w) - V_L(p_L)] dF_H(w) , \\ &= p_L + \delta U + \int_{w_H^*}^{\bar{w}_H} \frac{\lambda(1 - F_H(w))}{\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda(1 - F_H(w))} dw . \end{aligned} \quad (72)$$

The last integral is

$$\begin{aligned} \int_{w_H^*}^{\bar{w}_H} \frac{\lambda(1 - F_H(w))}{\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda(1 - F_H(w))} dw &= \bar{w}_H - w_H^* - \frac{\phi + \delta + \rho}{\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda} \int_{w_H^*}^{\bar{w}_H} \left(\frac{\hat{p} - \hat{R}}{\hat{p} - (1 + \hat{\alpha})w} \right)^{1/2} dw \\ &= \bar{w}_H - w_H^* - 2 \frac{C(1)[C(\varphi + \eta) - C(1)]}{1 + \hat{\alpha}} (\hat{p} - \hat{R}) . \end{aligned}$$

This equation together with (72), $x = \rho[V_L(p) - U]$ and $w_H^* = p_L + x$ can be used to obtain x :

$$x = \frac{\rho}{\phi + \delta + \rho} \left\{ \bar{w}_H - b - 2 \frac{C(1)[C(\varphi + \eta) - C(1)]}{1 + \hat{\alpha}} (\hat{p} - \hat{R}) \right\} . \quad (73)$$

The reservation wage for low-ability workers satisfies

$$R_L = b - x - \lambda \int_{R_H}^{\bar{w}_H} \max[V_{LL}(\hat{w}(w)), V_{LH}(w)] - U dF_H(w) . \quad (74)$$

The integral is

$$\begin{aligned} & \lambda \left[\int_{R_L}^{p_L} V_{LL}(w) - U dF_L(w) + \eta[V_L(p_L) - U] + \int_{w_H^*}^{\bar{w}_H} V_{LH}(w) - V_{LH}(w_H^*) dF_H(w) + (1 - \varphi - \eta)[V_L(p_L) - U] \right] \\ &= \int_{R_L}^{p_L} \frac{\lambda(1 - F_L(w))}{\phi + \delta + \rho + \lambda(1 - F_L(w))} dw + \frac{\lambda(1 - \varphi)x}{\rho} + \frac{(\phi + \delta)x}{\rho} + b - p_L \\ &= (p_L - R_L)(1 - 2C(\varphi)) + \frac{2C(\varphi)^2}{1 + \hat{\alpha}}(\hat{p} - \hat{R}) - \frac{2C(\varphi)}{1 + \hat{\alpha}}(p_H - R_H - p_L + R_L)^{1/2}(p_H - p_L - x)^{1/2} \\ & \quad + \frac{(\lambda(1 - \varphi) + \phi + \delta)x}{\rho} + b - p_L . \end{aligned}$$

Here the last equation makes use of the same integral formula as in the proof of Proposition 2. Substitution of this expression and (73) into (74) gives the reservation-wage equation for R_L .

Regarding the reservation-wage equation for R_H , we can also make use of the integral formula in the proof of Proposition 2, which gives

$$\begin{aligned} b - R_H - \frac{\rho}{\phi + \delta}(p_H - b) &= \lambda \int_{R_H}^{\bar{w}_H} V_{HH}(w) - V_{HH}(R_H) dF_H(w) = \quad (75) \\ & \bar{w}_H - R_H - 2C(1)(p_H - R_H) + \frac{2C(1)C(\varphi)}{1 + \hat{\alpha}}(\hat{p} - \hat{R}) \\ & + \frac{2C(1)\hat{\alpha}}{1 + \hat{\alpha}}(p_H - p_L - R_H + R_L)^{1/2}(p_H - p_L - x)^{1/2} + \frac{2C(1)[C(1) - C(\varphi + \eta)]}{1 + \hat{\alpha}}(\hat{p} - \hat{R}) . \end{aligned}$$

The equilibrium variables $(\varphi, \xi, \eta, R_L, R_H)$ are determined by the five equations (69), (70), (71), (74) and (75), when $\eta + \varphi < 1$. Otherwise, equation $\eta + \varphi = 1$ replaces (71).