

Klingemann, Hans-Dieter

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## Research into right-wing radicalism

Patterns of prejudice: a bi-monthly on international antisemitism, radical right movements and counter-activities

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# Research into right-wing radicalism

by Dr. HANS D. KLINGEMANN

*This article which originally appeared in West Berlin University's Political Science magazine, Der Politologe, No. 24, 1967, reviews the most comprehensive project of research into Right-wing radicalism so far undertaken in Western Germany. The project is being jointly carried out by the Institute for Comparative Social Research (Institut für Vergleichende Sozialforschung) and the Central Office for Empirical Social Research (Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung), Cologne University, to which the author is attached.*

Footnotes are printed at the end of the article.

## I

The NPD successes in the Federal Parliament elections of September 1965 and in the subsequent elections for various Länder parliaments in 1966 and 1967 have once more brought the subject of Right-wing radicalism to the fore. However much the immediate and intense reactions of scholars and journalists are to be welcomed, the all too frequent equation of the NPD and its voters with National Socialism is not conducive to the theoretical understanding of present-day circumstances. In the first place, it is highly unsatisfactory to regard Right-wing radicalism as nothing but a facet of German society; furthermore thorough empirical investigations are often hampered by the assumption that the groups tending towards Right-wing radicalism

and their underlying motives are all too well known from analyses of the Weimar Republic. It was not only that this sort of argumentation seemed to provide ready-made models for the explanation of the new situation: to equate the NPD and those who voted for it with Right-wing radicalism *per se* and its potential in Germany implies the danger—and this is far more disquieting—of an undesirable construction of vision. At the same time, the confrontation of the postulates of democratic principles with the results of broad-based empirical analyses of the politically relevant attitudes of the German electorate might, particularly at this moment, lead to a better understanding of democracy in Germany.<sup>1</sup>

## II

The research into problems of Right-wing radicalism and the reactions of the German electorate, undertaken by the Institute for Comparative Social Research and the Central Archive for Empirical Social Research, was the outcome of a series of discussions relating to the 1965 Federal election results and the then success of the NPD, with interested fellow-scholars from the Political Science Research Institute of Cologne University and the Survey Research Center, Ann Arbor. It was agreed that suitable terms of reference for theoretical assessment could only be arrived at by an unbiased consideration of the new empirical circumstances. A preliminary enquiry by the opinion poll institutes in October 1965 was to provide suitable material for this purpose; it was then assumed that to use a conventional set of questions about voting or about party preferences, would not have

yielded adequate information about voters supporting the radical Right.<sup>2</sup>

At the Cologne meeting, it was finally decided to ask questions some of which were to gauge attitudes towards the future development of the NPD, others the degree of liberal reactions to a variety of political and social statements. Furthermore, spontaneous verbal associations elicited by the stimuli *Democracy*, *National Socialism*, and *Weimar Republic* were to find out how far semantic differentials were capable of contributing to the analysis of Right-wing radicalism. An assessment of the results showed that well wishers of the NPD, were more likely to agree with anti-liberal indicators than those inclined to criticise it. However, the general spread of anti-liberal attitudes was by no means restricted to NPD sympathisers.<sup>3</sup>

Table 1

Attitudes taken by supporters and opponents of a future strengthening of the NPD<sup>1</sup> to various indicators

Attitude to future development of NPD				
Indicator	(in percentages)			n
	NPD should get stronger in the future	NPD should not get stronger in the future	No clear response	
Indicator I				
Democracy or dictatorship doesn't matter all that much. Main thing is that there should be true statesmen at the top ... ..	20	55	25	339
Dictatorship is always a danger. I always prefer democracy ... ..	7	79	14	1542
No clear response ... ..	7	33	60	120
Indicator II				
Today, we are really pursuing the appeasement policy of a vanquished people towards the victors ... ..	17	67	16	509
The policy of alliance with the West is not really an appeasement policy, but one which serves German interests ... ..	8	80	12	1175
No clear response ... ..	3	52	45	317
Indicator III				
It is intolerable that in our country people should hold different opinions on such vital questions as morals, family life and belief in God				
(a) This statement is wholly or partly true	17	68	15	292
(b) This statement is more or less untrue or totally untrue ... ..	8	77	15	1413
(c) No clear response ... ..	7	55	38	296
Indicator IV				
Which form of government is preferable: a government primarily concerned with the welfare and freedom of the individual, or a government which concentrates on the welfare and freedom of the nation as a whole?				
(a) Welfare and freedom of the individual	8	76	16	731
(b) Welfare and freedom of the nation	10	72	18	1142
(c) No clear response ... ..	8	49	43	128
Indicator V				
Should a German buy German products first and foremost, or doesn't it matter where the products come from so long as they are good and inexpensive?				
(a) Buy German products ... ..	11	70	19	590
(b) Doesn't matter where the products come from ... ..	8	74	18	1360
(c) No clear response ... ..	10	45	45	51
TOTAL ... ..	9	72	19	2001
EMNID Institutes Poll, October 1965.				

EMNID Institutes Poll, October 1965.

The question as to the social location of NPD sympathisers could not be unequivocally answered with the material at our disposal.<sup>5</sup> The

most striking peculiarity was the relatively large number of better educated people among NPD sympathisers.

Table 2

Education and attitude towards future development of NPD<sup>a</sup>

Attitude towards future development of NPD	Elementary school	Intermediate education	Matriculation or university
NPD should get stronger in the future ...	8	9	22
NPD should not get stronger in the future ...	72	75	66
No clear response ... ..	20	16	12
n = ... ..	1544	354	103

EMNID Institutes Poll, October 1965

Now this group, being generally better informed about political events may have shown a more immediate and more direct reaction to negative political developments. On the other hand an explanation could also be found in the values and thought processes taught in these particular types of schools.<sup>7</sup> Both these theories could be supported by further arguments. We found, for example, that among people of higher education who agreed with the anti-liberal indi-

cators, the number of those who adopted a positive attitude towards the NPD was always greater than among people with an elementary or intermediate education. They were thus shown to be more consistent and more inclined to give political expression to their attitudes by becoming NPD sympathisers.

These more consistent attitudes among people with higher education have also been reported from the U.S.A.<sup>7a</sup>

Table 3

Acceptance of anti-liberal indicators, and attitude towards future development of NPD<sup>a</sup>

Indicators	Elementary school	Of these, pro-NPD	Intermediate education	Of these, pro-NPD	Matriculation or university	Of these, pro-NPD
<i>Indicator I</i>						
Foreign policy = appeasement policy (n = 509) ... ..	25	16	24	16	31	37
<i>Indicator II</i>						
No matter whether democracy or dictatorship — main thing is that there should be true statesmen at the top (n = 339) ...	17	18	17	24	17	39
<i>Indicator III</i>						
A German should buy German goods (n = 590) ... ..	31	9	87	13	21	45
<i>Indicator IV</i>						
Rejection of pluralism on basic questions of belief, ethics and morals (n = 292) ...	15	16	15	14	10	50
<i>Indicator V<sup>10</sup></i>						
Obedience and subordination as educational values (n = 380) ... ..	20	9	17	5	15	31

The attempt to establish a correlation between status in consistency and a tendency towards Right-wing radicalism produced a number of interesting clues, but failed eventually, because it was based on too few data. The number of cases was too small to allow for significant deductions to be drawn.<sup>11</sup>

## III

As a result of further discussions and study of the relevant literature, a theoretical concept was arrived at which has been described by Erwin K. Scheuch in the *Hamburger Jahrbuch für Wirtschafts- und Gesellschaftspolitik*.<sup>12</sup> It was

an essential part of this concept to consider the theories on Right-wing radicalism, hitherto treated as alternatives, as specialised instances of a much broader theory. In order to facilitate the understanding of the Cologne study projects, the main points may be briefly summarised as follows:

(1) In industrial societies, which are subject to rapid social change, we must expect to find typical tensions. Values from the field of primary relationships and those from secondary institutions arising from the functional requirements of changing industrial societies, tend to contradict each other. Individuals experience this conflict of values as a contradiction in the kind of conduct that is expected or demanded of them.

(2) The rapid change of environmental conditions exercises a constant pressure which forces the individual either to re-adapt continuously to his environment, or to participate in actively changing this environment. Rigidity of thought is one way of coping with changing environmental conditions. Such rigidity becomes evident from the inflexibility of value and orientation systems. The more marked the changes in environmental conditions, the less realistic become these value and orientation systems. At the same time, as they fail to fulfill their functions of coping with everyday life, the individual with a rigid value and orientation system reacts to changes of environmental conditions with increasing worry (anxiety, aggressiveness, etc.)

(3) The main causes of social change in industrial societies are a) Scientific institutions associating with rationalised mass production, and b) institutions from the political sphere. This is further accentuated by the fact that more and more people became immediately dependent on these institutions, and that traditional means of individually influencing their actions, are becoming increasingly inadequate. This fact, in turn, contributes to produce feelings of helplessness, particularly in cases where the educational system has failed to provide adequate training in the mechanisms and strategies of adaptation.

(4) Contrary to current belief, we do not hold that rigid thinking (cf. above under 2 and 3) must immediately manifest itself in political activity. Participation in politics always presupposes that the people concerned have clear ideas as to what should determine political action. We shall call these kinds of ideas political sentiments or political philosophies. They range from scarcely systematised, contradictory, unconsidered, and largely inarticulate primitive ideologies to the classical systems of well-reasoned ideologies. As most citizens of Western industrial nations regard politics as an area of society reserved for experts, we are faced with a preponderance of primitive ideologies in the sense of general political sentiments. Only a specialist

can articulate in this field.

(5) Specialists in this sense are the politicians and the political parties as the vehicles of legitimate striving for power. They attempt to articulate political sentiments. Here the hypothesis applies that the extremist parties first attempt to articulate the political sentiments of people with rigid value and orientation systems. We may deduce from (2) and (3) that the special content of extremist philosophies should primarily consist of an opposition to the current form of industrial society and its political institutions. Alternative types of organised society are proffered in the guise (a) of a reaction against the conflict of values between norms in the primary and secondary environmental areas, postulating that a society should be transformed in such a way as to allow for the values of the primary groups to be equally applied to the secondary field. Simultaneously (b) the efficiency of the existing type of society is to be decisively improved by the desired change. This increase in efficiency is pluralism.

(6) The following definitions are submitted for a further differentiation of extremism:

We call an extremist movement Left-wing if it attacks existing society by pointing to future utopias. An extremist movement is called Right-wing if present-day society is attacked by pointing backwards to an idealised past. Basically, utopias of the future tend to be more homogeneous than idealisations of the past. The following hypothesis may be put forward with regard to political movements of the extreme Right: the ideal image set before the people always relates to the past of the existing society. It romanticises the last stable period before the onset of the modern age. The present time in industrial societies is thus confronted with a value system which represents pre-industrial values in a way which is particular to the country concerned. Such analytical insight into the nature of Right-wing radicalism should prove especially helpful for comparative research.

(7) The rise and success of Right-wing extremist political movements is also dependent on the state of the existing political system. As soon as it becomes doubtful whether a political system is capable of taking control in a crisis situation, or as soon as doubts arise as to its efficiency in achieving success in areas of home and foreign politics which are generally considered important, the chances for manifestly extremist political behaviour begin to grow. The definition of "hate-groups" in this context depends on the kind of conflict involved.

(8) Manifestly extremist ways of behaviour can reflect themselves in the formation of organised extremist movements, in the behaviour of existing political movements, and finally in the behaviour of the rest of the population. Attempts by parties

and politicians belonging to the Establishment to hold on to their supporters in competition with extremist parties, can lead to a cumulative effect in the formation and activation of radical sentiments.

(9) Traditional political affiliations of individuals are to a large extent maintained through mediating sectors of society. Radical parties will be initially unsuccessful if strong sanctions against manifestly extremist political behaviour are applied. If, however, the mediating sectors fail to impose taboos on extremist behaviour, or do so only timidly, land-slides in favour of radical political movements may ensue.

#### IV

The 1966 and 1967 election for the Länder parliaments supplied further material. The elections in Schleswig-Holstein and in Lower Saxony in particular suggested the usefulness of a repetition of previous studies.<sup>13</sup> In the case of Schleswig-Holstein, Bavaria (Central Franconia), and Rhineland-Palatinate, the data provided by population and occupational censuses, the election results as well as specific surveys are available for secondary analysis. In studying the elections for the Länder parliaments the main emphasis is, however, on a study of electoral development in regions with social or political tensions. Furthermore areas with different political and administrative traditions will have to be investigated in order to account for regional deviations.<sup>14</sup>

In this connection, interest attaches particularly to a comparison between NPD and Hitler's Party. In those areas where the NSDAP once was strong, now the NPD is strong too. The comparison must be drawn however not with the elections of 1928 and 1930 but with that of July 1932. Leaving aside Schleswig-Holstein where considerable social changes were wrought by the post-war refugees and expellees, it is probably true that the NPD stands today where the Nazi Party stood in 1932 after it had attracted most of the Protestant bourgeoisie.

#### V

On the basis of the theoretical premises outlined above, further primary investigations and secondary analyses have been prepared or carried out. A study of Cologne schoolchildren attempts to trace the influence of family and school on the political attitudes of children.<sup>15</sup> It starts from the assumption that family and school are socialising factors, widely responsible for forming the thought structure of children, and that the mode of thinking in turn contributes

to determining the child's attitude towards politics. To measure the thought structure, Roghmann's dogmatism scale (15-items version) was used.<sup>16</sup> The initial evaluation produced a marked interrelation between family structure and children's dogmatism, i.e., the weaker the child's influence within the family, the stronger becomes his dogmatism.

The interrelation between dogmatism and school is less unequivocal. It may even be said that the less influence a child has in class, the lower the degree of dogmatism. On the other hand, dogmatism in its turn has a strong effect on the political responsibility and the lack of political interest in children.

Table 4

Dogmatism in correlation with children's political responsibility<sup>17</sup>

Child's political responsibility	Child's dogmatism				Total
	High	Medium	Low		
Low	35	32	21		20
Medium	50	49	54		51
High	13	19	25		28
Not scaled	2	0	0		1
n =	221	683	628		1534 <sup>18</sup>

Table 5

Dogmatism in correlation with political indifference<sup>19</sup> in children

Child's political responsibility	Child's dogmatism				Total
	High	Medium	Low		
High	26	14	8		14
Medium	44	43	33		39
Low	29	43	59		47
Not scaled	1	—	0		0
n =	221	683	628		1534 <sup>18</sup>

Survey of Cologne school children, April/May 1967

The analysis included further characteristics of family and school as intervening variables. The father's political interest proved to be of particular importance.

#### VI

Inspired by American experiments with techniques of secondary analysis,<sup>20</sup> a further source of data was tapped. With reference to the crisis period of the Erhard Government, seven questions which applied to the whole of the Federal Republic, were combined in an analytical sample. The cumulation of interviews added up

to a total sampling of 11,942 persons. 47 comparable variables could be extracted from these seven questions, such as party preferences, nearness to particular parties (scalometer), mode of party support, and subjective assessment of degree of political information. The particular moment of the individual interview was in itself treated as a variable. This procedure made the analysis of trends possible. The large number of interviewees in this "test-tube poll" was to allow for the analysis of status inconsistencies, and more generally for a multidimensional combination of social categories in order to find the exact structural location of NPD voters and sympathisers.

But the first thing was that the date pool permitted us to make a more differentiated examination of the link between school education and preference for the NPD. We started from the premise that people of higher school education represent more distinctly the values of political progress prevalent at the time of their education. This assumption is borne out by the empirical evidence. Those who had a higher education during the Nazi era showed invariably the closest relationship between school education and preference for the NPD.

In our opinion a further study of analytical

## VII

The empirical differentiation between structure and content of political ideologies seems to be at the heart of research into Right-wing radicalism, which in turn is closely related to the political and social history of societies. If, as we have claimed for Right-wing radicalism, a "normal pathology" can be traced back to identical structural causes, the cultural definition of everything connected with politics seems largely determined by contemporary political and social development. For this reason, NPD supporters, conscious at present of belonging to a political minority, obviously feel impelled to lay greater emphasis on such basic political rights as the right to take part in politics and the right to criticise the ruling party than do the rest of the population. On the other hand, leisure is considered an area which is open to further restrictions.

To analyse the various action-relevant dimensions of political ideologies is a field of research which in Germany is crying out for thorough investigation. Analyses of the contents of Right-wing radical papers—valuable though they may be in themselves—cannot entirely replace

Table 6

It is often said that our government should take a stronger line against the Communist danger. In exchange for this, the citizen should put up with some restriction of his rights. Here is a list. In your opinion, which rights should never be curtailed, which rights could be curtailed to some extent, and which could be greatly curtailed?

<i>Rights of citizens :</i>			". . . that the opposition can criticise the government in the Federal Parliament"			". . . that I can do as I please in my spare time"				
". . . that I can take part in politics"										
NPD rating on scalometer										
+5 to +1	Never curtail	Curtail to some extent	Greatly curtail	Never curtail	Curtail to some extent	Greatly curtail	Never curtail	Curtail to some extent	Greatly curtail	Total
0	12.1	5.5	0.0	12.1	5.5	3.3	10.8	10.8	15.4	10.8
-1 to -5	14.8	1.45	30.0	14.5	20.9	6.7	15.7	12.7	7.7	15.1
No statement	62.4	64.5	50.0	61.4	64.8	80.0	60.8	71.6	69.2	62.5
n =	10.7	15.5	20.0	12.0	8.8	10.0	12.8	4.9	7.7	11.5
	587	110	10	586	91	30	594	102	13	710

DIVO Institute poll in Central Franconia (Sample scaled for potential FDP voters) May 1966

DIVO Institute poll in Central Franconia (Sample scaled for potential FDP voters) May 1966

samples, making use of functionally equivalent indicators, would be a decisive step in the direction of integrating secondary analysis as an independent method within the toolkit of empirical social research.<sup>21</sup>

enquiries which are directly related to the voters' orientation systems. Work on this subject is in progress in two different directions. In accordance with the research initiated by Robert Lane<sup>22</sup>, a number of unstructured interviews with



NPD supporters have been planned. We are also attempting, with the results of the Michigan group as a starting point,<sup>23</sup> to develop concepts of political ideology which will enable us to evaluate existing opinion polls on the political attitudes of the West German electorate by means of a secondary analysis.

The available material has yielded pointers to the fruitfulness of a hypothesis put forward by Campbell and others. The Michigan group found that among people who change their voting intentions—and a great many of current NPD supporters belong to this category—there is one group which does not think in the dimensions of Right-wing or Left-wing ideologies but rather proceeds by simple reaction to a general assessment of the political or economic situation acting on some such slogan as "Throw the rascals out."<sup>24</sup>

Table 7

If, during the forthcoming elections for the Bavarian Parliament, the CSU once again obtains an absolute majority of votes, i.e. more than all other parties put together, it will be able to govern alone without any other party having a say. What do you think; is it a good thing for Bavaria if the CSU governs alone, or are there any disadvantages? 7.5 per cent of all interviewees answered. "The CSU should not govern at all." A subsidiary question was framed: "Why do you hold this opinion?"

NPD rating on scalometer	General criticism of CSU	The SPD should govern	The others should be given a chance	Other remarks, no reasons given	Total
+5 to +1	17.6	12.5	30.8	28.6	20.8
0	11.8	31.3	30.8	28.6	24.5
-1 to -5	52.9	50.0	38.5	28.6	45.3
No reasons given	17.6	6.3	0.0	14.3	9.4
n =	17	16	13	7	53

(= 7.5%)

DIVO Institute poll in Central Franconia (Sample scaled for potential FDP voters) May 1966

### VIII

The interrelation between NPD sympathy and nationalism seems quite clear. The more positive value a person ascribes to the NPD, the more he is convinced that the ideal party should be a nationalist one.

Other indicators for nationalism, such as the conviction that to be nationalist is a good rather than a bad quality, do not yield such clear inter-

Table 8

#### NPD scalometer and nationalism

Should the ideal  
party be  
nationalist?

	+5 to +1	0	-1 to -4	no reasons —5 given	Total
Yes	43	21	16	14	18
No	57	73	84	86	89
n =	77	107	152	292	710

DIVO Institute poll in Central Franconia (Sample scaled for potential FDP voters) May 1966

relations with party sympathy. Part of the middle-class electorate in particular, in spite of its strong opposition to the NPD, is markedly nationalistic in outlook and therefore constantly refuses to acknowledge the NPD as a nationalist party. The various dimensions of nationalist attitudes and the translation of these attitudes into party sympathies form the subject of a further, secondary analysis.<sup>25</sup>

### IX

So far it has only been possible to carry out a limited number of methodical experiments. An attempt to classify each interviewee by means of the semantic differential within a multidimensional area of characteristics, in order subsequently to range the interviewees into groups relating to their position and to describe these groups, has not yet been completed.<sup>26</sup>

A further research project will be devoted to a prognosis model for measuring the NPD potential.<sup>27</sup> In this context, a number of demographic and attitude variables are to be combined, taking into account the interaction between these variables.

### X

All hitherto existing investigations and secondary analyses are being used to prepare for another project: the investigation of the modes of expression available to the radical Right in the Federal Republic of Germany and in the United States. In both countries there are similar conditional constellations which normally enhance basic leanings towards the radical Right. The forms of expression, and the successes of radical Right behaviour, however, have differed considerably. These very differences should make a comparison between the two countries extremely fruitful. It might decisively add to our knowledge of the conditions for radical Right agitation, and its translation into certain political phenomena under varying institutional regulations.<sup>28</sup>

## FOOTNOTES

1. For general questions of research into democracy by means of a voting analysis, cf. Nils Diederich, *Empirische Wahlforschung*, Westdeutscher Verlag, Cologne and Opladen, 1965, pp. 11-15.
2. For the problem of questionnaires, cf. Klaus Liepen, *Anhänger der neuen Rechtspartei. Ein Beitrag zur Diskussion über das Wählerreservoir der NPD*, in *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, No. 2, June 1967, pp. 237-240.
3. The first interpretation of the poll results was given by Erwin K. Scheuch in an article *Rechtsradikalismus in Deutschland?*, in *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 11 May, 1966.
4. The question read: "More than half a million people voted for the NPD in the Federal elections. Would you wish such a party to get stronger in future, or are you against it?"
5. Further results of polls were quoted by Elisabeth Noeche-Neumann: *Wer wählt die NPD?*, in *Die Politische Meinung*, No. 1, 1967 pp. 22-27, and Klaus Liepeit, op.cit., pp. 23/-271.
6. For the questions asked cf. Table I.
7. This was suggested inter alia, in a study by Helge Lenné: *Jugend Zwischen Tradition und Demokratie*. Duncker und Humblot, Berlin 1967.
- 7a. See S. M. Lipset, "Three Decades of the Radical Right" (1962), in D. Bell (Editor), *The Radical Right*. New York. Anchor Books, Doubleday & Co., Inc. 1964, p. 414.
8. For questions, cf. Table I.
9. For indicator subjects I-IV, cf. Table I.
10. For this indicator the question reads: "Which qualities should be the main object of children's education: obedience and subordination, tidiness and industry, or independence and self-determination?"
11. Results of the evaluation of the EMNID poll of October 1965 and further numerical data are given by Erwin K. Scheuch and Hans D. Klingemann (editor) in *Materialien zum Phänomen des Rechtsradikalismus in der Bundesrepublik*, Cologne 1967 (circulated in MS).
12. Erwin K. Scheuch with the collaboration of Hans D. Klingemann *Theorie des Rechtsradikalismus in westlichen Industriegesellschaften in Hamburger Jahrbuch für Wirtschafts- und Gesellschaftspolitik*, J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Tübingen 1967, pp. 11-29.
13. In special studies an attempt is made to replicate the studies of Heberle and Franz. Cf. Rudolf Heberle, *Landbevölkerung und Nationalsozialismus*, Ferdinand Enke Verlag, Stuttgart, 1963; Günther Franz, *Die politischen Wahlen in Niedersachsen 1867 bis 1949*, Bremen-Horn 1957.
14. The study of Länder parliament elections was carried out for the following Länder of the Federal Republic: Schleswig-Holstein, Rhineland-Palatinate, Lower Saxony, Hesse, Bavaria, Hamburg, Bremen and Baden-Württemberg.
15. The study project was devised by Kendall L. Baker, University of Wyoming, and carried out in collaboration with the Cologne study group led by Professor Scheuch. 1534 pupils of [the equivalent school-types of] grammar schools, secondary modern and technical schools between 14 and 16 years of age were interviewed (April-May 1967).
16. Klaus Roghmann, *Beiträge zur Erforschung von Dogmatismus und Autoritarismus*, Meisenheim/Glan, 1965.
17. Political responsibility was measured by a combination of the following questions: "(1) I believe I could have great influence on the administration of my local borough. (2) Government and politics are such involved subjects that I cannot understand what is going on. (3) So many people take part in Federal elections nowadays that I do not think that my vote would make a difference. (4) I do not think that I might greatly influence decisions of the Federal Government".
18. Two cases not included in the dogmatism scale.
19. Political indifference was measured by a combination of the following questions: "(1) What happens in Bonn does not concern me. (2) It is essential that politics and politicians should have my attention. (3). I do not care what the government is doing."
20. Cf. Ithiel de Sola Pool, Robert P. Abelson, Samuel L. Popkin, *Candidates, Issues and Strategies. A Computer Simulation of the 1960 Presidential Election*. The MIT Press, Cambridge/Mass., 1964.
21. This project of secondary analysis is being carried out by the author of this article, Dr. Hans D. Klingemann, who is particularly indebted to the DIVO institute, Frankfurt, for the valuable support given to this project.
22. Cf. Robert E. Lane, *Political Ideology. Why the American Common Man Believes What He Does*. The Free Press of Glencoe, New York, 1962.
23. Philip E. Converse: "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics", in David E. Apter: *Ideology and Discontent*, The Free Press of Glencoe, New York, 1964, pp. 206-261; Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, Donald E. Stokes: *The American Voter*, John Wiley & Sons, Inc. New York, London, Sydney, 1965, (3rd edition).
24. See Campbell, op. cit., p. 259.  
This project is being carried out by Thomas A. Herz, Central office for Empirical Social Research, Cologne University.
25. This project is being carried out by Franz Urban Pappi, Central Office for Empirical Social Research, Cologne University.
26. In this project the techniques of factor analysis are being applied. Subsequently each interviewee is classified in a category which relates to the qualitative area to which he belongs. This technique would enable us to correlate the results of factor analysis on an individual basis with other variables.  
[The project is being carried out by Dr. Theodor Harder, Institute for comparative Social Research, Dr. Hans D. Klingemann and Thomas A. Herz.]
27. This project is being carried out by Dr. Theodor Harder and Thomas A. Herz.