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Crisis of Unification: How Germany Changes

GERMANY HAS CHANGED MORE IN THE LAST four years than it has in the last four decades. How are Germans coping with the opportunities and challenges created by the breakdown of communism and national unification? Will the new Germany be mainly a continuation of the old Federal Republic? Or will it be a different country? In which respects? How does the German case compare with other experiences in the postcommunist world? How should it be evaluated in the light of historical experience?

THE EXIT FROM COMMUNISM: THE GERMAN PATTERN

The East German revolution has been part of a cycle of interrelated revolutions which dramatically changed Eastern and Central Europe in 1989 and 1990. In basic respects, it resembled the revolutions in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania. Like the German Democratic Republic (GDR), these countries had been the objects of Soviet domination since the end of World War II, and liberation from Soviet rule was a central element of all the revolutions in 1989–1990. There were many underlying, contributing, and facilitating factors, but none was as important as the sudden weakening of Soviet control and the unwillingness of the Soviet government to send troops in support of befriended governments which were challenged by their subjects. With the exception of Romania, the revolutions were nonviolent. They were not prepared in advance. They were not led by clearly defined elite groups.
striving for power. They were not guided by nor did they bring about new sets of ideas. Rather they were inspired by democratic, liberal, and social-democratic ideas which have become central in Western political thought since the eighteenth century: the norms and ideals of modern civil society. Given the nonviolent, "reformist" character of those revolutions, their immediate structural impact was limited. The change in the political system was significant; but social structures, economic relations, culture, and collective mentalities have only begun to change.¹

The postcommunist situation is characterized by elements of breakdown, destruction, and vacuum, in which older traditions regain some weight and new structures emerge rather slowly. Three tasks everywhere seem to be on the agenda: the transition to democracy, the building of an open society, and the introduction of a market economy. As the German sociologist Claus Offe has pointed out, an overlapping of these three major initiatives has been rare in history. It explains why "the exit from communism" has been so difficult. Postcommunist societies are heavily dependent on what Western countries offer or deny them. In every case, transition has been slower than expected and only partly successful. The optimism of 1989 is gone. One is increasingly made to realize how difficult it is to transfer the Western model to a part of the world without the economic, social, and cultural conditions which that model seems to presuppose. Doubts about the universal applicability of the Western model grow, both in the East and the West.²

In these respects, the East German gains and challenges—which have become the gains and challenges of unified Germany—are of a more general nature: part of the fate of "the East."³ Germany is not only a well integrated part of the West; she has also absorbed part of the East and has to deal with some of its problems.

East Germany’s geopolitical situation and advanced industrialization helped the ruling Communist Party elite to integrate large parts of the population and to avoid reforms. Compared with Poland and Hungary, change came late in East Germany; when it came, it came fast, like an implosion. It was heavily based on mass-mobilization. The (Protestant) Church played a larger role in changing East Germany than it did in changing other countries. But what made the experience of the GDR really unique was the national situation. The GDR was one of two German states: there was no
congruity between state and nation. The GDR had to cope with the existence of a strong noncommunist state of the same nationality, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), which never fully accepted the nation’s division. It is this particular national situation which distinguished the transition in East Germany from similar transitions in other countries in 1989-1990.4

Since 1953, the internal opposition against the regime in East Germany had been remarkably weak. The Polish Solidarnosz, Hungarian reform communism, and the Czech Charta 77 had no equivalent in East Germany. Intellectual dissidents were rare. Part of the explanation is to be found in the fact that there was another German state which always accepted actual and potential dissidents from East Germany, thereby weakening the GDR’s internal opposition. While in other communist countries dissidents could use national arguments and refer to national traditions when they wanted to criticize dictatorial rule and Soviet domination, arguments of this kind were taboo for East German intellectuals as long as they did not want or dare to question the existence of an independent GDR altogether (which was virtually impossible inside the country). In 1989-1990, the dissident elite turned out to be small in number and of little weight; they could not act as a counterelite, and they disappeared quickly from positions of power.

It should be stressed that the breakthrough phase of the East German revolution—from late September to November 1989—was an endogenous development, neither engineered nor triggered by the West Germans. But in an indirect way, the Federal Republic played an important role in the East German revolution: the mass exodus of East Germans to the West decisively fueled the internal demands for change, the mass demonstrations, and their powerful challenge to the communist establishment. “Exit” produced “voice” in this case, to use the well-known terms of the political economist Albert Hirschman. This mass exodus would not have been possible without the influence of the West German media in the GDR and the citizenship law of the Federal Republic which served as a standing invitation to all ethnic Germans, including those in the GDR. The East German revolution in its second phase—between the opening of the Wall in November 1989 and the first free elections to the East German Volkskammer in March 1990—took a national turn. The demand for reform of the GDR, which would
become democratic but stay independent, was gradually eclipsed by the quest for national unity. Large majorities of the population supported this national turn which articulated East German dissatisfaction, their distrust in the changeability of the GDR, and, above all, their hope of quickly improving their lot by joining the more wealthy, more liberal, more attractive FRG. This national turn would not have been possible without the existence of another German state, its principal support for unification, and the promises of its governing elite (which later on were not kept). From December 1989 onwards, the influence of the West German government quickly increased, became direct and open. The East German revolution became a movement for national unification that had no parallel in any other country. The East German exit from communism led into a process of self-dissolution; the East German state finally acceded to the Federal Republic and ceased to exist.\textsuperscript{5}

The decisive changes related to unification have been generated within the GDR. This holds with respect to the revolutionary mass movements in the autumn and winter, which brought down the Socialist Unity Party (SED) government, forced the opening of the Berlin Wall, and initiated basic reforms; the ensuing drive towards unification; and the self-dissolution of the GDR.\textsuperscript{6} But in this process of unification, within the emerging national framework, the tremendous inequality of the two German societies quickly made itself felt. Already in the winter of 1989–1990 the center of gravity started to move from the East to the West, from Leipzig, Berlin, and other East German cities to Bonn, from the grass roots to the centers of government, from a spontaneously organized movement to the established parties and administrations. Certainly, initiatives from below have continued, albeit in different, less spectacular forms. They have found new bases in the communities, regions, and \textit{Länder} of the East in recent years. But those who had improvised mass actions, had founded groups and parties, and had raised from anonymity to unstable leadership positions in the first phase of the revolution, quickly lost out.

In the following months and years, the revolution became something like an orderly “revolution from outside and above,” increasingly controlled by the dominant West and engineered by professional politicians and administrators.\textsuperscript{7} Basic constitutional change continued throughout 1990. The process of restructuring the econ-
omy, social relations, cultural institutions, the educational system, and other spheres of life speeded up and deepened in 1990 and has continued in the following years. The transition from communism became part of a process of incorporating the East into the West by transferring institutions, resources, elites, and ideas from the West to the East.

No other postcommunist countries have had this experience. Change and recovery in East Germany are based on resources that her Eastern neighbors can only dream of. In East Germany, the transition is faster and more thorough than anywhere else. At the same time, it is less autonomous, less self-controlled, and leads to new contradictions.

INCORPORATING THE EAST INTO THE WEST: ACHIEVEMENTS, LIMITS, AND PROBLÉMATIQUES

The Basic Decision

In 1990, an extended debate took place about which constitutional form unification should take. Should it be enacted according to Article 146 of the West German Basic Law which provided that in case of unification a new constitution should be framed and voted upon by the people? Or should unification be brought about along the lines offered by Article 23 which made possible the accession of the GDR to the Federal Republic, whose constitution would remain unchanged and apply to Germany as a whole?

Article 146 would have made necessary an extended process of consulting and bargaining which would have offered the opportunity to bring elements from both the West and the East together into a new and better solution. It would not only liberate the Easterners from their socialist constitution, but also, hopefully, overcome some of the weaknesses of the West German political order. This is how advocates of Article 146—mostly on the Left or left of the center—justified their demand. They also thought that such an extended public debate on the constitutional core of unification would present the necessary platform on which the Germans could find out why and how they wanted to get together. It would help the new Germany and its emerging constitutional order to get popular support and legitimation, for the sake of democratic stability.
This strategy would have taken much time which, as those favoring Article 23 felt, was not available given the unstable international situation. A basic change inside the Soviet Union, which was not altogether unlikely, could easily close the "window of opportunity" for German unification. The very unstable situation within the GDR also seemed to require a quick decision. The Basic Law had proven its strength; it enjoyed broad acceptance among West and East Germans. Why dispose of it and increase the uncertainties of an already risky unification? Advocates of Article 23 doubted that much improvement of the Basic Law could be found in the East German constitution. To find international acceptance for German unification was a difficult task that would only become more difficult if the actors on the international scene had to deal with a new Germany whose constitutional order and basic profile would only slowly emerge in a long and painful debate. The international obligations of the Federal Republic were not to be questioned. Advocates of Article 23 thought that it offered a simple and appropriate way to bring about unification without jeopardizing the basic continuity between the old Federal Republic and the newly emerging Germany.

German unification was enacted on the basis of Article 23. Apart from some minor exceptions, temporary arrangements, and limited amendments to be negotiated later, the constitutional order of West Germany was extended to the East. This debate and its outcome had paradigmatic character. Not only with respect to constitutional law, but in nearly all other respects as well, unification was drafted as a process of transferring the internal order of West Germany to East Germany, with only minimal changes. Unified Germany was not meant to be something new. It was meant to be an enlarged Federal Republic of Germany. Has the strategy worked, so far?

Political System

The official name—the Federal Republic of Germany—has not been changed nor has the national hymn, although alternatives were proposed and discussed in 1990. The West German flag became the flag of united Germany. In general, the constitutional and legal system proved to be flexible enough to be extended to the new Länder. The reconstruction of the administrative and judicial
system according to the West German model is under way. But there are exceptions and countertendencies.

In the constitutional debates, East German participants—frequently supported by West German speakers representing parties from the Left—tend to emphasize the need for more plebiscitary elements (i.e., referendum) and for a broader formulation of some basic rights especially with respect to social conditions (i.e., the right to work), ecological protection, and gender equality. These preferences may result in part from the East German lack of experience with a representative multiparty system, from memory of the successful mass movements during the autumn and winter of 1989-1990, and from the widespread tendency in the East to expect much from “the state” and less from the market. Such preferences have not had much impact on the national level. Although a Constitutional Committee, consisting of members of the Bundestag and representatives of the Länder, has been set up as recommended by the Treaty of Unification, its conclusions as to amending the Basic Law have remained extremely cautious. But those preferences have influenced the framing of the new constitutions of the East German Länder. They increasingly influence the general debate.

Political Parties

The West German parties have quickly spread to the East by absorbing some of the SED-dependent parties existing throughout the years in the GDR (in the case of the Christian Democratic Union [CDU] and the Free Democratic Party [FDP]), by fusing with parties newly created in the GDR during the revolution (the Social Democratic Party [SPD] and the Greens), and by trying to establish a new local and regional base. Apart from the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), the successor party of the SED (11 percent of the vote in the East and 2 percent in the West in the Bundestag elections of December 1990), there has been no significant change in the West German party system as it extended to the East. Roughly the same can be said with respect to the unions and other large associations. This bird’s eye view does not, however, allow one to discover the limits of the transfer of such institutions. Party membership is desperately low in the new Länder. It is difficult to find enough activists (candidates) for local elections. The decades of dictatorship and the abrupt changes of 1989-1990 seem to have produced a
vacuum. East German church membership lags far behind West German. People are reluctant to enter new stable commitments beyond the private sphere.

West German institutions have spread to the East but they have barely taken root in the population. Traditional loyalties have broken down, new ones are not yet established. The social composition and the priorities of the East and West branches of one party frequently differ. Parties, unions, and associations are internally torn by the task of bridging differences and contradictions between their Eastern and Western members. Still, thus far they have managed to avoid being split along regional lines. As of yet, regional parties and movements have not emerged, at least not successfully (apart from the PDS). The system is creaking but not breaking.¹³

**Economic Change**

In July of 1990, the economic order of the West was abruptly introduced to the East. Custom borders and mobility barriers were removed, and, before it existed as one state, Germany was a single market with a common legal framework and a common currency. This was a political decision against which some economists cautioned. But in the last years, the economic structure of the GDR has been quickly molded according to the West German model.

Privatization has proceeded faster there than anywhere else in the postcommunist countries. The Treuhand-Anstalt, a public, government-controlled, but highly autonomous and controversial corporation, founded in 1990, was charged with taking over and privatizing the state-owned and collectivized enterprises of the GDR. Of a total of roughly sixteen thousand units, the Treuhand, by July 1993, had sold about 78 percent and liquidated 17 percent. Seven hundred and forty units remain under Treuhand control to be sold as soon as possible. When transferred to private investors, entrepreneurs, and managers, most of whom come from West Germany and abroad, the units were usually restructured, rationalized, and reduced, frequently with the help of public money.¹⁴

Measured by the distribution of the economically active population among industrial sectors, the economy of the GDR in 1989 was far behind Western countries. By 1992, the West-East difference had nearly disappeared.
Before celebrating this dramatic change as a clear indicator of economic modernization, one has to take into account that it was accompanied by an equally dramatic decrease in overall employment. In 1989, 920,000 were employed in East German agriculture; by 1992 this figure had gone down to 280,000 (a 70 percent reduction). Manufacturing industries employed 3.17 million persons in 1989, but only 1.29 million in 1992 (roughly a 60 percent reduction). Employment in mining and energy production decreased by 39 percent from 1989 to 1992. By contrast, the reduction in the services (including state) amounted to only 22 percent (from 4.35 million to 3.41 million), and employment in the construction trades even grew by 10 percent (from 563,000 to 620,000).

In short, the number of jobs available in East Germany decreased by 34 percent between 1989 and 1992, from 9.3 to 6.2 million. Had it not been for the public works programs (now scheduled for elimination), the reduction would have amounted to 38 percent. Three million jobs were lost within the first three years following unification. And the process of erosion seems to be continuing in 1993. The official unemployment figures—in July 1993, 1.67 million or 15.3 percent in the East, 2.33 million or 7.5 percent in the West—do not fully show the dramatic nature of the breakdown. It is not at all clear when the trend will be reversed, and part of the erosion will probably be permanent.\(^{15}\)

East German industries were overstaffed, with a relatively low degree of productivity, and, thus, were not able to compete with the West. Because Western firms frequently disposed of nonutilized capacities, they could quickly increase their production. Despite vigorous attempts at rationalization and effective improvement of the traffic, transport, and communication system with the help of public investment, the competitiveness of many East German firms was countered by rising labor costs—due to an upsurge in costs of living and the dynamic wage policy of the unions. Other factors, including the breakdown of markets in the East, legal obstacles in the period of transition, inefficiencies of the administration, and the worldwide recession, played a role as well.\(^{16}\)

**Research and Universities**

In nonmarket sectors, policy decisions had similar, though less brutal effects. Take research and higher learning as an example. The
GDR had adopted the Soviet system which provided for a clear institutional separation between universities oriented towards the training of students (although not exclusively) and the institutes of the Academy of Sciences exclusively responsible for research. In West Germany, research and teaching are integrated under the roof of the universities whenever possible, particularly in the social sciences and the humanities. After unification, the huge research institutes of the East German Academy of Sciences, which employed more than twice as many people as the universities, were evaluated by expert commissions in which Western scholars and officials played the major role. The criteria of evaluation were academic quality and efficiency, measured by international standards as well as compatibility with the basic principles of the West German system of research and higher learning. Among those principles, the autonomy, unity, and decentralized structure of research and teaching ranked high. More often than not, the “international standard” was defined by the situation in the old Federal Republic and in other Western countries.

Evaluation was a complicated process which, in the end, was regarded as relatively fair on both sides. It resulted in the dissolution of most academy institutes, in the founding of many new extrauniversity research institutions, and in a vigorous but difficult attempt to reintegrate some members of the academic staff of the dissolved institutes into the university system. Less than 50 percent—some estimate only 30 percent—of the former personnel of the academy institutes are now employed in newly founded institutes and in the universities.17

The GDR universities were tremendously “overstaffed” as compared to West German universities (which is a particularly problematic yardstick since the West German system of higher education is in bad shape and suffers, among other things, from a disadvantageous staff-student ratio). The departments of the GDR universities had been structured to meet the needs of the old regime—particularly in the humanities and the social sciences—and the imperatives of the Comecon, particularly in the economic and technical disciplines. In the humanities and social sciences, the degree of specialization was very high, the system of rewards little developed, mobility and communication restricted, and access to international literature frequently difficult to obtain. There had been scholars and
achievements of high quality, but far fewer than in the West. Political instrumentalization had played a detrimental role, particularly in the humanities and social sciences.

The East German university system has been deeply restructured in the last three years under the control of the Länder governments and with effective participation of Western scholars and administrators according to the West German model. Three processes should be distinguished: 1) The system was reduced in size. 2) University law and organization, the structure of the departments, and the patterns of specialization were deeply altered, and positions and tasks were redefined. As a consequence, existing qualifications were depreciated and new ones were demanded. On the professorial level, the old personnel had to apply and compete with other applicants, in many cases from the West. 3) Screening processes took place (in “commissions of honor” inside the universities) which led to the exclusion of persons found guilty of having discredited themselves by moral and political standards.

The necessary shrinking due to financial limits and pressures as well as the widespread redefinition of qualifications due to the change of system have accounted for many more layoffs and personnel exchanges than did political screening. In Saxony, the universities employed thirty-nine thousand persons (among them fifteen thousand scientists) in 1989. In the future, they will employ only 11,200 persons, among them 7,800 scientists. One can estimate that only a small minority—perhaps 10 percent—of those employed in 1989 were dismissed on political and moral grounds.

The influx of Westerners has remained limited, considering the whole system of research and higher learning. About 10 percent of all positions in the universities and research institutions—mostly the leading positions—have been filled by West Germans and, in a small number of cases, by persons from abroad. In fields like history and sociology, the percentage of Westerners is much higher. Of the twenty-nine professors of sociology in East German universities today, only four come from the East. A similar ratio can probably be found among history professors. But there is less change on the level of the nontenured personnel and in such disciplines as mathematics, the natural sciences, medicine, and the technical fields.18
Social Inequalities and Mental Distances

Once the basic political decision had been made to execute unification by transferring the West German order to the East as quickly and completely as possible, the rest followed with a certain necessity: market forces on the one hand, and policy decisions on the other restructured the East German system according to the West German model. A tremendous destruction took place. The present situation is difficult, but it can be hoped and expected that the reduced and deeply restructured system of work in the East will eventually be able to compete and grow again.\(^\text{19}\)

It is quite evident that the restructuring and incorporation of East Germany is heavily dependent upon West Germany. Without the know-how and personnel from the West, this process of revolutionary change could not have been undertaken. Without money from the West, it would not have been socially bearable.\(^\text{20}\)

Because of the massive financial transfer from West to East, the crisis of restructuring has not led to mass poverty in the East. In fact, a majority of the East Germans seem to be and to feel better off today than before the revolution. The unions negotiated huge pay hikes, applying the bargaining rules and tactics of the West. Those who have work can afford more than they used to, and they have access to a whole variety of goods which most of them only dreamed of under the old regime, including the opportunity to travel. Those who lived on pensions were particularly poor and underprivileged in the GDR; most of them now enjoy improved living conditions. Academics who have managed to stay employed have to work more, but do so under better conditions. Life has become freer, the scope of choices has broadened, and new opportunities continue to arise. There also has begun to emerge a new layer of self-employed persons, both in the trades and in the professions.

Not everyone, however, is enjoying an improved standard of living. Many who held power and privilege because of their proximity to the party apparatus and the state have been déclassé, although some have apparently managed to be well placed again, particularly in the world of commerce and services. Women, the large majority of whom had been part of the labor force in the GDR, combining family and job, are now clearly overrepresented among the unemployed. Those who raise children and work outside
the home deplore the breakdown of day-nurseries and the disappearance of other public facilities. Careers for women have become less accessible. In addition, new groups have appeared: the homeless, drug addicts, and the long-term unemployed.21

Inequality is growing, between income groups, between men and women, between those who have work and those who do not, between nouveaux riches and déclassés, between those who manage to hold on to their property and those who must move out. The reinstating of a system of private property after so many years leads to new inequalities and injustices. More than half of the population has experienced some change of vocation, and a change in mobility—upward, downward, or laterally.

Does all this mean that life in the East has become more similar to life in the West? Yes and no. The East German situation remains clearly distinguished, in at least three respects.

First, this is a period of revolutionary change in the East, requiring rapid adjustment. Routines have broken down, trust has been shattered, new orientations are needed, anxiety is widespread, and self-assuredness is scarce. Crisis and rapid transition define the lives of many in the East, but not so in the West. Though collective protests have so far remained weak and scattered, the East German crisis is deep. The East German birthrate has fallen by 60 percent, the marriage rate by 65 percent, and the divorce rate by 81 percent between 1989 and 1992. Declines of this quantity are extremely rare in history. Only the Great Wars offer similar examples. Nothing comparable is happening in West Germany. It is not unreasonable to attribute this demographic breakdown to the crisis caused by transition in East Germany. Early in 1990, the fast pace of unification was justified by the Bonn government by pointing to the East-West mass migration which would not be halted except by economic and monetary unity. Yet, even with such unity, East-West migration continues. Between 1973 and 1989 the East German population hovered around 16.5 and 17 million. By 1992, it had fallen below 16 million, and the loss of population continues.22

Second, a mixture of repression and paternalism, specific to politics and life in the GDR, left East Germans little accustomed to quick change, uncertainty, competition, and the risky utilization of new opportunities.
Third, the difference between East and West continues to be pronounced and visible with respect to income, life-style, status, power, and quality of life. In contrast to popular expectations and convincing promises in the first years, it is increasingly clear that equalization of living conditions in East and West will take decades. The resulting feelings of inequality, frustration, and inferiority on the part of the East Germans maintain a psychological distance. Tension and mutual reservation, resentment, and outright rejection play an increasing role. There is, of course, some mixing. A thin layer of West Germans live and work in the East, usually in leading positions. East Germans move to the West to work and be trained. Still, different newspapers are read in the East than in the West, and the best-seller lists differ. West German and East German historians tend to publish in different journals. Even in united Berlin, the circles of intensive communication and collegiality, friendship, and marriage continue to be divided between East and West.

On the level of social and personal relations, of customs and everyday life, integration and incorporation of the East are clearly limited. In these respects, one can still speak of two different societies, and awareness of this split seems to grow. Some East German intellectuals have begun to consider whether the separate development of an East German society—different and relatively independent from the West—could become a desirable possibility in the long run: two societies within one state.

This may sound unrealistic, but it is not coincidental that such ideas are voiced as it becomes increasingly clear that the Westernization of the East will take much longer and require more effort than originally expected. Perhaps the aims should be redefined.

Political Culture

Public opinion surveys have discovered typical differences between East German and West German attitudes. Easterners seem to expect more from “the state,” in terms of securing economic growth, stabilizing prices, and guaranteeing employment. They hold old-fashioned virtues such as obedience, orderliness, modesty, cleanliness, and duty in higher esteem. Work represents a more central value to Germans in the East than in the West. East Germans tend less to hedonistic, postmaterialistic, and individualistic values than do West Germans—although the difference is less significant among
the younger respondents. East Germans are less likely to identify with political parties and party democracy, and are more sympathetic towards plebiscitary or grass-root democracy. To some observers, Easterners appear more “German” than Westerners, in that they are more deeply rooted in older German traditions.26

Until 1990, East Germans and West Germans were exposed to different interpretations of recent German history. They also differ in formative experiences. Survey-based research has discovered that the national-socialist period, World War II, the German persecution of the Jews, and the immediate postwar developments largely contributed to the historical self-understanding of a multigenerational majority of West Germans. A highly critical view of the Nazi period serves as a negative foil and reference point in contrast to which the political culture of the Federal Republic has frequently been defined. East Germans also lean away from a positive view of the Nazi dictatorship, but the period is less central to their historical self-understanding. The type of “antifascism” which was taught and propagated in the GDR has helped to remove the Nazi experience from the historical self-definition of many East Germans. They seem to have a less abashed view of German national history and are more intent on reconciling their own GDR past.27

Such data does not indicate a widening gap between East and West, but the existence of deep cultural and political differences. They can be viewed either as consequences of different patterns of socialization throughout the last decades or as reactions to present problems posing themselves differently in the two parts of Germany. Under the institutional roof of a common constitution and a largely unified party system, there still seem to exist the elements of two different political cultures.

THE PARTS AND THE WHOLE: CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK

In Germany, prior to unification, nation and state were not congruent. The East German exit from communism took the form of self-dissolution and unification with the West German state. In these most fundamental ways, East Germany differed from all the other countries of East and East Central Europe which were moving away from communism in 1989–1990. Transition proceeds faster and reaches deeper in East Germany than anywhere else, and the long-
term prospects seem brighter. At the same time, the East Germans have to bear more destruction and uprooting than do their Eastern and Southeastern neighbors. Transition has taken the form of a “revolution from outside and above,” again making the East Germans objects of change.

Underlying the transition is the decision to accomplish unification by incorporating the East into the West and by extending the basic order of the Federal Republic to the Eastern part of the country. According to this master plan of 1990, unification meant changing the East but not the West. Unified Germany was not intended to be a new invention nor a compromise between West and East, but an enlarged version of the old Federal Republic.

The transfer of the West German order to the Eastern Länder has worked relatively well on the constitutional, legal, and institutional level. However, it has met stiff resistance and has not progressed far on the level of social relations, political culture, and everyday life. On other levels (i.e., the economy), the transfer of the West German order has led to destruction and crisis, as the demographic breakdown shows. Despite efforts to incorporate and integrate the East, a separate GDR identity seems to have been revived, defensively and obstinately documenting the present limits of Westernization.

How will all this affect the system at large? As the role of government in social and economic processes becomes strengthened, the relationship between Bund and Länder will be readjusted.

Recovering from unification cannot be solely the responsibility of those in the East. Rather, it demands extraordinary efforts on the part of the whole population. The burden is already beginning to be felt: taxes and fees are raised and the public debt is growing. Unification will put to the test parliamentary institutions and political parties. Will it be possible to reach a consensus on the necessary redistribution? Will it be possible to convince West German voters that it is in their interest to share with the citizens in the East? While unification remains a positive experience for a clear majority of East Germans, in West Germany the skeptics have started to outnumber the supporters.28

The crisis in the East brings the weaknesses of the whole to the surface. Take, for example, the right-wing extremist attacks in Hoyerswerda and Rostock. They started in places characterized by high unemployment, disintegration, and dissatisfaction as well as
by a weak police force and an evident lack of public authority. But they have triggered waves of extremist attacks on a nationwide scale.

With respect to their basic profiles, the GDR and the old Federal Republic were mutually dependent on each other. For the GDR, the Federal Republic was a permanent challenge and a source of indirect destabilization. For the Federal Republic, the GDR served as a negative foil for comparison and as a source of collective stabilization. Both German states were creations of the Cold War. Their internal structures and external affiliations were deeply influenced by the system of international relations. Now Germany is compelled to find a new place in a changing international environment. This will deeply affect the mood of the country, its self-understanding, and its political substance. Unified Germany will not and cannot be merely an enlarged version of the old Federal Republic. Change, it seems, will extend much farther than the architects of unification intended.

ENDNOTES


3The patterns of change within the Soviet Union and its successor countries were and are different. Because of other differences, Yugoslavia is excluded from the present considerations as well.

4A good account is Konrad Jarausch, The Rush to German Unity (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).

5Pending the consent of the international powers, this direction was clear after 18 March 1990, when a large majority of the East Germans voted for parties supporting such a course. Formally, the GDR ceased to exist on 3 October 1990. Albert O. Hirschman, “Abwanderung, Widerspruch und das Schicksal der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik,” Leviathan 20 (1993): 330–58.

I take the term “revolution from outside and above” ("Revolution von außen und oben") from the East German economic historian Jürgen Kuczynski who used it to characterize the basic reforms in Prussia from 1807–1813 which had been triggered by the Napoleonic challenge and which were largely executed by the civil service.


The local self-administration, for example, has been restructured. Qualified personnel is scarce. The problems tend to surmount the capabilities of the agencies. Cf. Martin Osterland and Roderich Wehser, “Kommunale Demokratie als Herausforderung. Verwaltungsreorganisation in der Ex-DDR aus der Innenperspektive,” *Kritische Justiz* 24 (1991): 318–32.


Articles on the major parties after unification are in Ibid., B 5, 24 January 1992. A good case study is Stephen Silvia, “Left Behind: The Social Democratic Party in Eastern Germany,” *West European Politics* 16 (2) (April 1993): 24–48. Heinrich Tiemann et al., “Gewerkschaften und Sozialdemokratie in den neuen Bundesländern,” *Deutschland-Archiv* 26 (1993): 40–51. Of the East German population in 1991, 6 percent belong to the Roman Catholic Church, 27 percent to the Protestant Church. The West German figures are 42 percent and 45 percent respectively. “Committees for justice” were launched in the summer of 1992, trying to work on a multipartisan basis and serve as a platform for formulating East German interests. It did not amount to much.


The figures are taken and tabulated from an unpublished paper by Jürgen Müller, “Strukturelle Auswirkungen der Privatisierung,” Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, preliminary version June 1993, tables II.1 and III.1; and from Rainer Geißler, *Die Sozialstruktur Deutschlands. Ein Studienbuch zur gesellschaftlichen Entwicklung im geteilten und vereinten Deutschland* (Opladen: 1992), 118.
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20 About DM 150 billion are annually transferred from the West to the East.


25 Cf. the interview with two important East German intellectuals and political speakers: Jens Reich (Neues Forum) and Friedrich Schorlemmer (SPD), “Wer ist das Volk. Die deutschen Integrationsformeln greifen zu kurz,” Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, February 1993, 158–70.

