Between Clumsy Hans and Thumbelina?
Danish Middle East Policy
from WWII to the Arab Uprisings

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# CONTENTS

Introduction 5

The Cold War 1945-1989 6
  Early engagement in the Middle East 6
  Below the radar: the years of Thumbelina 1945-72 6
  A Stronger Nordic internationalism: 1973-1989 8

The 1990s: the end of the Cold War and the gradual emergence of an ‘Activist Internationalism’ and a new focus on the Middle East 9
  Activist internationalism 9
  Denmark gradually enters the Middle East 11

The Years of Clumsy Hans: From 9-11 to the Cartoon Crisis 12
  Promotion of democracy and the Arab Initiative 14

The Cartoon Crisis and the return of Thumbelina’s pragmatism 17

The Arab uprisings: yet another turn 19

Conclusion and perspectives 21

Literature 23
INTRODUCTION

The Danish writer Hans Christian Andersen was not only a famous storyteller, but also an excellent analyst of Danish mentality and identity. The Uckly-Duckling is perhaps his most famous portrayal of the minds of the Danes, but the fairy-tales of Clumsy Hans and Thumbelina can also be interpreted as meta-narratives on Danish self-perception and Denmark’s relations with the outside world.

In Clumsy Hans, the youngest of three brothers (Denmark), rides off on a billy goat to woo the beautiful and witty princess in a faraway kingdom (The Arab World). ‘Hooley-hop Here I come’: Clumsy Hans is, loud, naive, and has no knowledge of the ways and manners of the royal court. Unimpressed by the court, he brings the princess a dead crow, an old shoe and black mud. As readers we feel embarrassed – and a little impressed – by his rudeness and his certainty that he is Mr Right, his self-assuredness and firm conviction that he has something to offer. In the end his straightforward attitude wins the princess over, and Clumsy Hans is given half the kingdom. However, as an analogy of Danes’ interactions with the outside Arab world, Clumsy Hans also points to the embarrassing behaviour of a ‘newcomer’ to the region.

In the case of Tiny Thumbelina, the main protagonist also leaves home to meet the outside world. But in contrast to Clumsy Hans, Thumbelina is tiny, fragile and has little confidence. She cannot shape her life and future the way she likes. Instead she must adapt to the wims and wishes of toads and moles first in a swamp and then in a narrow-minded environment underground. Thumbelina longs for different conditions, but has hardly any tools at her disposal to carry out such a change. In the end it is therefore a giant swallow, ten times bigger than herself, that flies her off to a warm and idyllic country, where she finds a male Thumbelina just like herself. The tale of Thumbelina, like that of Clumsy-Hans, has a happy ending. Yet we are also left with a somewhat ambiguous impression of a tiny creature who is almost too dependent on others, and who seems unable (or unwilling) to take matters into her own hands: Had she not been saved by the swallow, she would probably have agreed to marry the mole underground.

As we will see in this chapter, Denmark’s foreign policy in the Mediterranean and Middle East has some resemblances with the fairy tales of Clumsy Hans, as well as Thumbelina. Self-assured and unimpressed, Denmark became heavily engaged in the region in the aftermath of 9-11, and for the first time launching its own bilateral Reform and Partnership initiative for the Middle East and North Africa; a programme intended to bring political reform, freedom and human rights to the region. From the beginning the Danish government opted for a close alliance with the US in both Afghanistan and later in the war in Iraq, while at the same time apparently devoting little attention to the EU’s Mediterranean framework. It was, however, the Cartoon Crisis in 2005 that brought Denmark to the centre of attention in both the region and the world at large. As Danish embassies were set on fire and Danish products boycotted all over the Muslim world, Denmark learned (once again) that a tiny small-scale power is very exposed, with little influence over events and few allies in times of crisis. Elements of over-confidence, a lack of knowledge (Clum-
Sy. Hans) and excessive timidity (Thumbelina) have thus both been present in Danish foreign policy towards the Arab World over the last decade.

The remainder of this chapter is structured into four large parts: the Cold War (1945-89), the end of the Cold War and the emergence of a more militaristic foreign policy (1989-2001), the years of Clumsy Hans (2001-2006) and the partial return of Thumbelina-like pragmatism (2006-).

**THE COLD WAR 1945-1989**

**Early engagement in the Middle East**

Prior to its defeats and loss of territory in the nineteenth century, Denmark was a so-called ‘middle-power’ in Europe. It was an important trading and seafaring nation with one of the largest fleets in Europe and colonial possessions in the Arctic, on the Gold Coast and in the West Indies, allowing it to monopolize trade with China in particular. Curiously, the very first Danish diplomatic missions abroad (gesandtskaber) were established in North Africa, just as Denmark was involved in two very different ‘missions’ in the Arab world at the time. The first was the so-called ‘Arab Expedition’ of 1761, a scientific expedition commissioned by the Danish King to collect first-hand knowledge about the Arab World. The second was a type of continuous low-intensity warfare with the so-called Barbary States of North Africa, culminating with a declaration of war against Denmark and the subsequent Danish bombardment of Algiers in 1770. While Denmark thus was not entirely cut off from the Middle East in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, it is also clear that, compared to other Mediterranean and/or colonial powers, notably France, England and Spain, Denmark’s involvement and contact with this part of the world was modest indeed. With the sedimentation of Denmark as a small state power in 1864 and its subsequent policy of neutrality and adaptation, Denmark increasingly turned inwards and became preoccupied with domestic reforms and building a welfare state. As a famous post-1864 saying has it, ‘What we lost externally, we have to gain internally’ (Lidegaard 2007).

**Below the radar: the years of Thumbelina 1945-72**

Danish engagement in the Middle East has been modest in recent modern history. Indeed, Danish foreign policy from WWII to the end of the Cold War can best be described as cautious, balanced and rather quiet in terms of the big issues that marked the region from the Suez Crisis to the Iran-Iraq War. Three factors can account for this modesty: Denmark’s geostrategic position, the Cold War superpower rivalry, and a foreign policy identity which dictated that, as a small state, Denmark had little influence over world events and was best staying out of contentious issues in order not to be caught up in big power politics. This ‘small-state’ narrative has strong historical roots, going back to Denmark’s unsuccessful wars with Prussia in the 1850s and 1860s and prior to that the Napoleonic wars. With the Second Schleswig War in 1864 Denmark faced a humiliating defeat and lost the territories of Schleswig, Holstein and Saxe-Lauenburg to Prussia. This war in particular became a traumatizing and defining event for Denmark’s foreign policy identity. The new identity, which was borne as a result of the defeats and loss of territory, was centered on the idea that Denmark now had to adapt its foreign policy to the reali-
ties and powers of the day and that it was no longer was able to wage wars outside its own territory. In very concrete terms, this implied that Denmark did not go to war abroad from 1864 to 1999 but pursued a policy of neutrality from 1864 to WWII. With the end of WWII, Denmark broke with its long policy of neutrality and became a founding member of NATO. This also had consequences in terms of Danish involvement in the Middle East, where Denmark to a large extent needed to follow the line of the great powers: first that of France and Great Britain, and later that of the US. On the question of Algerian independence, Denmark seemed from the beginning willing to accommodate France in so far as Algeria was not seen as a matter of vital Danish interest. Throughout the 1950s Denmark chose not to vote on the many UN resolutions on Algeria and in public only spoke in very cautious and vague terms on the Algerian conflict. This stood in sharp contrast to some of the other Nordic countries, which were quite critical of France’s policy on Algeria (Borring Olesen and Villaume, 2005: 347).2

With the Suez Crisis, Denmark initially attempted to adopt a more balanced approach. On the one hand the Danish government was critical of Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal. On the other hand the government strongly encouraged Great Britain and France not to solve the crisis by military means. Behind closed doors Denmark, like other smaller European countries, voiced its concerns over ‘Operation Muskeeteer’. Yet in public the government kept a low profile in order not to go openly against the interests of major NATO partners. The Danish govern-

2 In 1960, however, Denmark voted for Algerian self-determination in the UN General Assembly and again in 1961, despite the fact that France, Great Britain and the US all abstained.
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s Danish governments and Danish society were very sympathetic towards Israel, and Denmark was effectively carrying out a pro-Israeli policy. The Danish Social Democratic Party, which was in government for most of the period, could easily relate to the socialist ideas of the *kibbutz* movement and the Zionist Labour party that dominated Israeli politics at the time (Hansen, 1998). For its part Israel also held favourable views of Denmark, not least because of the way the Danes had helped Jews flee the country during the Nazi occupation. The close relationship between Israel and Denmark was reflected in Danish ‘voting behaviour’ in the UN General Assembly (GA), where Denmark abstained or opposed many GA resolutions that either favoured some form of Palestinian autonomy or were critical of the Israeli occupation (Borring and Villaume, 2005: 675-678). Yet the official Danish position on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict was really one of neutrality. Denmark, like other Nordic countries, thought that, as a small state, it could potentially play a constructive mediating role between the two sides. Since Denmark was not burdened with a colonial past and was not a great power in the region, it was hoped that it could play the part of neutral arbiter or go-between. In the wake of the Six-Day War in 1967, as a Security Council member Denmark was instrumental in formulating the compromise text of the famous UN Resolution 242 (Land for Peace) together with Canada and the US.

**A Stronger Nordic internationalism: 1973-1989**

In the 1970s and 1980s, Denmark’s relationship with the US became increasingly strained, just as Denmark came to have strong reservations with respect to NATO policies. This led among other things to the so-called ‘footnote policy’, where Danish objections and reservations were regularly inserted into all official NATO declarations and Denmark refused to allow nuclear weapons or foreign troops on its territory.

The relationship with the US also changed, as Danish foreign and security policy often collided openly with that of the US, for example, in relation to the Vietnam War, the renewed arms race with the Soviet Union and US interventionist policies in the Third World. ‘Solidarity’ with the Third World became a cornerstone of Danish foreign policy in the 1970s and 1980s. Denmark increasingly saw development aid as the appropriate way of tackling the root causes of poverty and inequality and as a way to create peace and security in the long run. From early on Denmark sought to achieve the UN target of giving 0.07% of GNP to development aid, and by the 1990s Danish aid had reached over 1% of the GNP, this being the highest percentage of any country in the world.

The 1970s and 1980s also saw the peace movement gaining ground and, like the issue of development aid, the peace movement enjoyed relatively broad popular support, adding layers to Denmark’s self-perception as a somewhat exceptional progressive state when it came to issues of peace and development (Lawler, 2007; Petersen, 2004).

This was arguably a shift away from the small-state pragmatism of previous decades and can be seen as the result of a number of developments in the 1970s. In particular the détente of the 1970s created a window of opportunity for Denmark – and other Nordic countries – to pursue a more idealistic foreign policy which could make a real difference in the Third World. With a less intensive superpower rivalry in Africa, development aid constituted a type of foreign policy niche
for Denmark in which the social-democratic welfare model could be promoted and the broader goals of a more peaceful international order pursued.

With Danish accession to the EEC in 1973, Danish policy on Middle Eastern issues and on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict in particular also became slightly more Europeanized (see also Hansen, 1998; Dyvig, 1993; Petersen, 2004). In 1973, following the October war of Yom Kippur, Denmark endorsed a common European declaration which referred to the need to recognize ‘the Palestinians’ legitimate rights’ in order to achieve peace in the region. Although Denmark only supported the declaration half-heartedly, it was a first step in the direction of a more ‘European’ approach to the issue. Yet as Petersen argues, Denmark was still among the most pro-Israeli countries in Europe. In the wake of the October war, Denmark together with Holland was targeted by the OPEC countries for being partisan and too pro-Israeli, and a partial oil embargo was launched against both countries. At the time Denmark was very dependent on imports of oil. The partial embargo therefore hit the Danish economy hard.

In sum, the 1970s slowly gave way to a more idealistic and assertive Danish foreign policy identity. Danish foreign policy became invested with a sense of mission and idealism (e.g. developing the Third World and advocating peaceful conflict resolution and disarmament). As we will see below, this more assertive and idealistic policy can be said to have paved the way for active Danish engagement in eastern Europe and the Balkans in the 1990s and ultimately for the heavy military engagements in the Middle East in the 2000s.


Activist internationalism

With the end of the Cold War in 1989, Danish foreign policy shifted towards a more pro-American and more mainstream NATO approach, just as its more pacifist side was put under pressure by Denmark’s support of the Iraq war in 1991 and above all by Danish participation in the NATO-led operations in the Balkans throughout the 1990s. The new foreign policy, dubbed ‘activist internationalism’, should primarily be seen against the backdrop of the end of the Cold War. This enabled Denmark to play a new role in terms of broader security-related issues such as the eastern enlargement of the EU and NATO and peace-building in the Balkans, while keeping in line with the previous period’s humanitarian ideas and emphasis on international institutions as ways to mitigate great power politics in international anarchy.

One indication of the winds of change were the many reciprocal visits between the American President Bill Clinton and the Danish Social Democrat Prime Minister Poul Nyrup, while another is that Denmark took part in the NATO-led missions in Bosnia (1995) and Kosovo (1999). This new kind of military involvement constituted a crucial turning point in Danish foreign and security

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3 Denmark therefore abstained over the many resolutions seeking to grant the Palestinians some kind of permanent representation in the UN, a tradition which Denmark maintained until 2012. Opinion polls from the time also show overwhelming sympathy for the Israeli side among the Danish public until 1982 (Hansen, 1998: 144).

4 Today Denmark is self-sufficient in energy, in part a result of a major change in energy policy following the two ‘oil crises’ in the 1970s.
policy. Denmark had, as we saw above, been a rather reluctant partner in NATO through the 1970s and 1980s, a sceptic of the use of military means to solve international conflicts. The official position was that, if force was to be used at all, it should be clearly mandated by the UN. By 1999, however, Danish soldiers were not only fighting wars ‘out of area’, but in the case of Kosovo they were also doing so without a UNSC mandate.

The first step in the direction of greater military involvement was made in the immediate aftermath of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 3, 1990. In response to Saddam Hussein’s invasion, the Bush administration adopted a so-called ‘interdiction policy’ stopping all ships and vessels that were trying to circumvent the UN embargo against Iraq, and several European countries such as Britain, France and the Netherlands were sending ships to the Gulf. The Danish Foreign Minister of the ruling right-wing Liberal party, Uffe Elleman Jensen, was also keen to lend Danish military support to the naval blockade in the Gulf, and not least to shift Denmark’s overall security policy in a more US-friendly direction. Elleman Jensen had been foreign minister during the NATO footnote policy era and subjected to the demands of the alternative majority on the left in Parliament on issues of NATO and the US (Petersen, 2004: 452), the right wing Liberal and Conservative Parties in Denmark being generally more pro-American.

However, Uffe Elleman Jensen encountered much opposition in Parliament from both the parties in his own government (the Social-Liberal party) and leading parties in Parliament (the Social Democrats and the Socialist Party). They were critical of Danish military involvement, especially if Danish engagement were to be carried out under NATO military command out of area or without a clear UN mandate. The Social Democrats and the Liberal-Social Party – the latter having historically held strong pacifist views – thus much preferred to send a hospital ship than a warship to the Gulf, in line with their previous security policy positions throughout the 1980s. However, on 25 August 1990 UN Resolution 665 indirectly giving a green light to the US-led naval embargo, thus paving the way for Danish participation in the blockade.

The Kosovo intervention in 1999 broke once and for all with the strong Danish tradition of operating within the framework of UN-mandated resolutions. Foreign Minister Niels Helveg Petersen from the Social-Liberal party – a traditional strong supporter of peaceful conflict resolution and the UN – argued that the magnitude of the humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo and the looming ethnic cleansing against the Kosovars justified the use of military means even in the absence of a UNSC mandate. Although the Kosovo intervention might not be legal to the letter, it was legitimate from a moral and political point of view, so the argument went (see also Malmvig, 2006). In fact both the Social-Liberal party and the Social Democrats – just like their counterparts in, for instance, Britain – argued for a dynamic interpretation of international law and for the evolving right to humanitarian intervention, the forerunner of the responsibility to protect (R2P). In the event the Kosovo intervention did enjoy broad support, not only amongst all the major political parties, but also among the Danish public, with thirds of the population supporting the intervention (Petersen, 2004: 465). Humanitarian justifications struck a deep chord with the existing Danish foreign policy identity as one that gave particular expression to humanitarian principles of solidarity, internationalism and the protection of
human rights, as we saw above. Indeed, as we shall see below, the liberal humanitarian form of legitimation for war was also employed in Iraq in 2003 and the Libya intervention in 2011.

**Denmark gradually enters the Middle East**
The Middle East also came slowly on to the Danish foreign policy agenda in the 1990s. The Iraq War in 1991, the Oslo Peace Process and the rise of political Islam in North Africa all played a role in this. In 1997, for instance, Denmark sent an observatory mission (TIPH) to Hebron, and for the first time the Danish Defence Academy taught two classes of cadets in Arabic (traditionally language classes had been taught in Russian) in order to be able to send trained peacekeeping forces to the region. The Danish government also opened a Cultural Institute in the heart of old Damascus with the aim of enhancing cultural bonds and understandings between Denmark and the Arab World, just as several international conferences were held on the rise of political Islam and relations with the West (Hansen 1998: 145ff). There was, in other words, an emerging new orientation towards the Middle East, which signalled a new threat perception from the East towards the South, as well as a growing sense of Denmark’s ability to play a role in the region by using some of its traditional soft-power instruments, such as peace-keeping, cultural dialogue and a focus on human rights (see e.g. Helveg Petersen in *Politiken*, 19.01.1996).

However, it was also clear that the Middle East and the Mediterranean region did not constitute a main priority in Danish foreign policy. It remained above all eastern Europe and the Balkans that dominated the Danish foreign policy agenda in the 1990s, where Denmark perceived it could make an independent foreign policy contribution (see Agenda for Europe, MFA 1996). Denmark very actively promoted eastern enlargement in both the EU and NATO and lobbied very early on for recognition of the independence of the three Baltic States. Like other northern European states, Denmark gave a priority to the east while the southern European countries were more focused on the south. This may in part also explain why Denmark did not divert much attention to the Barcelona Process throughout the 1990s. According to a leading diplomat in the Prime Minister’s office, the Barcelona Process was part of a deal struck between the north and the south aimed to cancel out an excessively strong (northern) European focus on eastern Europe (background interview with PM’s office, 2012). Thus, although the Barcelona Process in many ways resembled the CSCE framework and the ‘Nordic way’ of doing peace and soft security, Denmark was from the beginning a rather passive onlooker (see Schumacher). At the inauguration ceremony in Barcelona in 1995 Denmark was not represented at ministerial level, and this continued to be the case for a majority of EMP ministerial meetings. Similarly, the Barcelona Process would hardly ever be mentioned in the Danish press. In the years from 1995 to 1998, there are thus fewer than ten press clippings referring to the Barcelona Process in the Danish media, as also reflected in the resources devoted to EMP affairs in the Ministry. In the MFA it would often be a very junior civil servant just graduated from university who would attend to EMP affairs.

At the level of civil society, however, Denmark did engage in one important initiative within the EMP framework. In 1996 the Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network (EMHRN) was established in Copenhagen as a result of a successful conference on po-
Political Islam held earlier that year. The conference had brought together leading human rights institutions and networks in Europe and the southern Mediterranean, and the energetic Director and founder of the Danish Human Rights Center, Morten Kjærum – today Director of the European Union Agency for fundamental rights – took the initiative to form a Euro-Mediterranean Network. The Network is one of the oldest civil-society networks within the framework of the EMP and is supported by the Commission and by a smaller grant from the Danish government. Thus while the government did not prioritize the southern Mediterranean or the EMP, it can be argued that Denmark’s traditional strong prioritization of human rights issues paved the way for the establishment of EMHRN in Copenhagen.

THE YEARS OF CLUMSY HANS: FROM 9-11 TO THE CARTOON CRISIS

The 9-11 terror attacks against the World Trade Centre – and not least the way the terror attacks were interpreted and given meaning by the new right-wing government – changed Danish involvement in the Middle East almost overnight. The Middle East now entered the heart of Danish foreign policy. Denmark participated from early on with military forces and equipment in the US-led war against al-Qaida in Afghanistan from 2001 and in Iraq from 2003. In addition it launched its own bilateral initiative for political reform and partnership with the Arab World, as well as a multilateral initiative for peace and regional security.

The new Danish involvement in the region was above all legitimized with reference to 9-11 and a radically changed security environment (see e.g. En Verden til forskel, 2003; Arabiske Initiativ, 2003). Yet Denmark’s participation in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan was also a result of a deliberate change in foreign-policy orientation adopted by the new right-wing government coalition composed of the Conservative and Right-wing Liberal party Venstre, but with the crucial parliamentary support of the very right-wing Danish People’s Party. The new Prime Minister, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, very vocally advocated ending a Danish foreign-policy tradition which he saw as being complacent and appeasing, where Denmark too often had sacrificed its values on the altar of narrow security interests. It was particularly Denmark’s (passive) role during WWII that the Prime Minister opposed, but also the so-called footnote policy in NATO and the ‘anti-Americanism’ of the 1970s and 1980s. ‘In the 30s, during the occupation and the Cold War to a large extent, the basic attitude was that we could enjoy freedom and peace, while leaving it to others to fight for it. But that is not acceptable…we must also contribute, even though we are a small country,’ the Prime Minister argued (see e.g. Mandag Morgen, 11.09. 2006: 30).

According to Fogh Rasmussen, Denmark – and the West at large – was now involved in a global struggle over values, between democrats on one side and totalitarian dictators on the other, between the dark medieval values of terrorists and the values of a free and democratic society (ibid.). This battle over values was originally introduced by the government in the national context. Here the liberal-conservative government had from the beginning been eager to break with what it saw as a form of cultural dominance by a small elite of liberal and leftist experts and opinion-makers in Danish society. This cultural
elite, according to the new government, was too politically correct and out of touch with popular sentiments on a range of important topics, especially on immigration, integration and the importance of national social cohesion. The role and status of experts – especially within the fields of human rights and peace and conflict studies – were generally questioned, and experts were often derogatorily referred to as ‘taste judges’ (*smagstommere*). This was also the backdrop against which the government sought to close down the Danish Human Rights Centre and the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies (COPRI), the former having been particularly critical of the government’s continuous tightening of Danish immigration policy. This also had repercussions at an international level, where a number of reports from the UN and the European Council criticized Denmark for violating international conventions. Indeed, the government’s immigration policies and harsh tone on Muslim immigrants polarized the political debate in Denmark in a way unseen since the Cold War and tainted its image abroad, Denmark now being associated with Islamophobia and strict immigration laws (see also Erslev Andersen, 2008: 15).

The battle over values in the foreign-policy arena resulted in a highly idealistic and militaristic policy, which the Fogh Rasmussen government deliberately called an ‘activist policy’. Activism was rhetorically a clever phrasing of the new policy, in so far as it worked to make militarism and activism synonymous while at the same time categorizing alternative foreign-policy positions as somehow passive. In effect the idealistic and militaristic elements of the new activist foreign policy in many ways resembled the neo-conservative approach of the Bush Administration in the United States, and Anders Fogh Rasmussen and George W. Bush cooperated very closely on international affairs and became personal friends.

The close cooperation between Denmark and the US was to some extent facilitated by the two leaders’ shared idealistic-militaristic foreign policy, and a certain eagerness on part of the liberal-conservative right-wing government coalition to show ‘transatlantic solidarity’ and therefore proving that Denmark was an ally to be trusted and counted on. But this was arguably also a result of a more realist type of strategic power analysis. The US was simply deemed to be the most influential and effective power globally, as well as in the Middle East. Thus if Denmark were to influence developments in the region, it would have a much better chance of doing so in close cooperation with the US than with the EU, so the argument went (Petersen, 2004: 582 and interview with Prime Minister’s office). In an interview with the monthly *Mandag Morgen*, the Prime Minister even argued that Denmark was in a ‘unique position…’ because it had a ‘special access to the US,…the world’s only super-power and only nation with a global reach’ (*Mandag Morgen*, 11.09. 2006: 30).

Denmark’s unequivocal support for the Iraq war divided the country, just as it had divided Europe and the transatlantic relationship in the months prior to the war. Over the summer of 2002, it became increasingly clear that the Bush administration was set on a so-called pre-emptive war with Iraq, while European countries such as Germany and France were adamantly against it.

While the Danish government’s readiness to support the US was unambiguous, from the very beginning the Danish Parliament was strongly divided on the issue of going to war without UN approval. The opposition argued that the UN weapon inspectors had not been allowed sufficient time to do their work and that the government had effectively
abandoned the UN track. Moreover, waging a war without a comfortable majority in Parliament was dangerous and without historical precedent, the opposition argued (Petersen, 2004: 590). The Social Liberal Party similarly emphasized how Danish foreign policy had now taken a dangerous new turn. Denmark would now become a virtual occupying power in Iraq, going to war without the UN and embracing the pre-emptive logic of the Bush administration. This was out of line with Denmark’s traditional role as a peacekeeping nation, it was argued (ibid.: 594).

As in other European countries, the debate on Iraq thus divided the country and resulted in hearings and commissions debating Denmark’s new activist foreign policy, the justifications for the intervention and the soundness of the intelligence used to support the claim that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction. In 2004 the first so-called whistle-blower in Denmark, a former employee of the Danish Defence Intelligence unit (FE), revealed that the FE had been much more cautious in their reports on Iraq’s potential weapons of mass destruction than the Danish government had led the public to believe (see e.g. Ågaard, 2005).

Promotion of democracy and the Arab Initiative

Denmark’s participation in the Iraq war was primarily justified with reference to the UN and Iraq’s alleged weapons of mass destruction. Yet similarly to the Bush Administration, the Fogh Rasmussen government also portrayed the war efforts as part of an overall attempt to bring democracy to Iraq and ultimately to the Arab world as a whole. In the long run, it was assumed, this would contribute to fighting the root causes of terrorism (Fogh Rasmussen, 21 March 2003).

The Danish government also launched its own bilateral initiative for ‘Progress and Reform in the Middle East’, called the ‘Arab Initiative’ in Danish. According to a high-ranking diplomat in the Prime Minister’s office, this new initiative was intended to ensure that the Danish engagement in the region had two legs, one military (in Iraq) and one civilian (the Arab Initiative) (anonymous background interview with the author, October, 2012). The stated goals of the new initiative were ‘to establish a wider dialogue with countries in the region...[and] support local forces working for reforms that make societies more free and democratic’ (Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005: 4). The initiative formally included all countries in the region from Morocco in the west to Iran in the east. But in the first phase the Foreign Ministry focused on three countries in particular, namely Yemen, Jordan and Morocco, and was divided into three thematic sections on media, human rights and youth, a figure of €13.4 million in total being allocated. This was obviously a rather small amount compared, for instance, to the budget lines allocated to good governance programmes in Africa, and of course a very small sum compared to the amount spent by the Danish government on the Iraq war. Indeed, as one of the senior advisors in the Middle East office later revealed in an interview with the author, it was striking how much political attention and media spin the initiative received in Denmark, given the small amount of resources that were devoted to the programme.

Nonetheless the Arab Initiative enjoyed broad support in Parliament across the political spectrum and soon mobilized a range of

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5 Except from the very right-wing People’s Party, which argued that Israel also should be included in the Initiative and was generally skeptical about Danish involvement in the region.
Danish NGOs that had not previously been active in the region, from youth movements to women’s rights groups and journalists working for media freedom. In fact, in a later international review of the Arab Initiative commissioned by the Ministry, it was argued that one of the main contributions of the Initiative was its effect on Danish society, in so far as it had broadened Danish knowledge of the Arab world and established valuable ties and dialogue between civil-society groups (Review 2006, 2009). However, the Arab Initiative was also criticized by important stakeholders on two accounts especially. First it was pointed out that the Initiative was driven by an unfortunate security logic (see also FRIDE). The initiative had been launched against the backdrop of 9-11, and the Foreign Minister made no secret of his intention to use it to ‘combat extremism and terrorism’ and to avoid a ‘clash of civilizations. In fact, presenting the Initiative to potential partners, the Foreign Minister opens the very first page of the MFA’s glossy leaflet in English and Arabic with a sentence on 9-11: ‘We all remember where we were on September 11’. For potential Arab partners this might not have felt to be so obvious and hardly laid the ground for equal partnership and dialogue.

A related type of criticism was raised by the Danish aid and development sector. The €13.4 million devoted to the Initiative had been taken from a budget line on development assistance, but since the Arab World is not part of the developing world, the traditional development goal of poverty reduction did not apply. In practice, it was argued, the Ministry had moved resources from development to security. Moreover, the development sector also saw this as one more unfortunate turn in the new government’s strategy on development issues. The new centre-right wing government had already made substantial cutbacks in Danish development assistance, and in its new development strategy paper from 2003, A World of Difference, it significantly linked development and security, the former being posed as a means to enhance the latter. Critics argued that this constituted an unfortunate shift in emphasis from poverty reduction to value promotion and security.

A second type of criticism related to the bilateral character of the initiative. In the MFAs formal description of the Arab Initiative, the EU’s Mediterranean Partnership and NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue were included as parts of Denmark’s overall efforts to enhance reform and dialogue in the region (Partnership for Progress and Reform, 2004). In principle the bilateral and multilateral tracks were thus intended to complement one and other and create ‘mutual synergy effects’ (Review of the Arab Initiative, 2006: 16). In practice, however, the two tracks were not ‘sufficiently coordinated’ (ibid.). Critics also argued that an isolated Danish effort of minor scale to promote reform in the region would inevitably have a very limited impact, if any, and that it would ideally be much more effective to work through the EU’s Mediterranean initiatives. The EU would obviously speak with a stronger voice and have greater muscle and credibility in the region (see e.g. Malmvig, 2006b; Review, 2006). In response to this critique, however, the MFA contended that as a newcomer to the region Denmark needed to build its own knowledge base and networks before it could influence the EU’s Mediterranean agenda. Against Mediterranean heavyweights such as Spain or France, Denmark would need to build up its own relations and expertise before being able to claim a say in EMP affairs (see review).

Yet unofficially, there were also important strategic and political reasons for Denmark’s
lack of prioritization of the Barcelona Process. According to diplomats in the MFA and the PMO, the Barcelona Process had reached a dead end as a result of the collapse of the Israeli–Palestinian peace process. According to one Danish diplomat, the senior officials’ meetings had effectively become ‘political dialogue meetings’ without substance. Each meeting would open with long speeches by the Arab representatives on the plight of the Palestinians and demands that needed to be met before cooperation could begin, followed by the Israeli representative’s ritual counter-demands. In this way these meetings had ceased to be effective fora for Euro-Mediterranean cooperation, which over time would also be reflected in the lack of high-level representation at both senior official meetings and ministerial meetings.

Off the record, Denmark was also less than satisfied with the EMP’s lack of focus on Arab political reform and the kind of silent obstructionism that some southern European countries exercised. In general many of the southern European member states were not very enthusiastic about the political reform agenda, and they seemed more concerned with upholding economic ties and security cooperation with the incumbent Arab regimes than with pushing for political change. Southern European states would often stress the need for an incremental EU approach, conducted in partnership with Arab governments and carried out without the use of conditionality measures. ‘We do not use the term “conditionality” in the Euro-Mediterranean family’, a senior representative from a southern European country once told the author (2004). Another Danish diplomat involved in EMP affairs similarly revealed that, ‘There seemed to exist a kind of special bond between some southern European member states and their Arab counterparts, meaning that issues of political reform or human rights simply were not on the agenda at senior officials’ meetings. There was a kind of silent consensus that these issues were not raised’ (anonymous interview, January, 2012).

Denmark was, however, eager to push the agenda of democracy more forcefully and was willing to use sticks and carrots towards that end. Denmark and Great Britain thus worked closely together on the so-called Strategic Partnership Initiative for the Mediterranean and the Middle East, lobbying to persuade the other member-states, especially Spain and France, to support the idea. According to a key Danish diplomat involved, these two states in particular were most opposed to launching any new initiative that might compete with the Barcelona Process, and they were critical of the strong emphasis on democracy (interview with Danish Diplomat Skott, 15.05.2013). The Initiative aimed to put political and economic reforms at the centre of the EU’s strategy in the region, as well as to include the Gulf States within an overall EU framework, thereby broadening the EU’s focus somewhat from the Mediterranean to the Gulf. Indeed, according to the Danish diplomat, part of the deal with the southern Mediterranean countries was that the Initiative was to commence in the Gulf. However, only a few years after the Strategic Partnership was adopted, it seemed slowly to fade out. Skott indicates several reasons for this, among others the difficulty of commencing in the Gulf, the lack of support from key Mediterranean states, what Skott calls the somewhat ‘naïve attitude’ of Denmark to what could actually be accomplished in the region, and the degree to which key persons in the Council and in COREPER were able to obstruct the initiative (ibid.). Indeed, the Strategic Partnership was soon overrun by other major initiatives appearing shortly af-
terwards, such as the New Neighbourhood Policy, the Anna Lindh Foundation and the Broader Middle East Initiative, which were all launched in 2004. Moreover, Denmark and Great Britain were clearly seen as too close to the Bush administration and too involved in the war in Iraq for other key European states to wholly embrace the initiative.

To sum up: Denmark entered the Middle East with a very ambitious agenda. The Danish government set out to promote democracy, create peace and regional security, as well as to enhance dialogue and ties between Denmark and the Arab World. As a small state with little prior experience and few existing ties to the region, Denmark thus displayed some resemblances with the fairy tale of Clumsy Hans: unimpressed and self-assured, Denmark seemed perhaps a little too certain that it had something to offer the region (democracy, peace, security) and that it was offering these ‘gifts’ in the right way.

THE CARTOON CRISIS AND THE RETURN OF THUMBELINA’S PRAGMATISM

On 30 September 2005, the daily right-wing-conservative newspaper *Jyllandsposten* printed twelve caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad. In the accompanying article, the cultural editor, Flemming Rose, explained why the newspaper had commissioned the twelve drawings. In Denmark as in other Western countries, Rose argued, an atmosphere of self-censorship was slowly gaining ground. Artists, comedians and writers were hesitant or even afraid of making satire and caricature of Muslims and Islam because of the expected angry reactions and retaliation by Muslims. In a secular democracy such as the Danish one, religious feelings should not preclude freedom of speech. In a democratic society everybody had to be prepared for public insult, mockery and ridicule (*Jyllandsposten*, 30.09.2005).

The Islamic Society in Denmark quickly responded to *Jyllandsposten’s* cartoons, first through a letter to the Ambassador of Saudi Arabia in Denmark to be distributed among Muslim ambassadors in Denmark (05.10.2005 in Jerichow & Rode, eds, 2006) and later the Islamic Society condemned the provocation by *Jyllandsposten*. Publicly the Islamic Society also argued that the role of the Danish media should not be to marginalize minority groups, who already felt that they had been objects of smear campaigns for too long (11.10.2005 in Jerichow & Rode, 2006). This latter argument concerning the growing Islamophobia in Denmark was also taken up by competing newspapers on the centre left such as *Politiken* and *Kristelig Dagblad*, as well as by more liberal-minded politicians such as the former Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann Jensen.

The government kept relatively quiet on the issue in the first few months after the publication of the cartoons, and in the Middle East itself the cartoons only spurred a few scattered demonstrations and official comments. Yet by the end of January the cartoon crisis had escalated into what the Prime Minister described as Denmark’s worst foreign-policy crisis since the end of WWII. Mass demonstrations raged in the Middle East, Danish flags were burned and Danish products boycotted, Danish embassies and companies in Damascus, Beirut, Jakarta and Tehran were attacked, and some were set on fire. Diplomats were withdrawn from all over the region. The violent reactions and demonstrations against Denmark shook Danish society at large, as well as the self-image of Denmark and Denmark’s role in the international arena.
(see also Holm, 2006) as a country that had traditionally framed its foreign-policy role as one of actively promoting human rights, dialogue and development in the world and of being particular suited to doing so because of Denmark’s longstanding democratic tradition and its lack of a colonial history. Indeed this was often the way that the Danish Partnership for Progress and Reform was presented to potential partners in the Arab World. But now Denmark was being portrayed as the prime representative of an increasing Islamophobic Europe, placed on a par with the US and Israel in the region.

Moreover, the EU and in particular the US did not seem to provide Denmark with the kind of unequivocal support that the Danish government had hoped for and expected (see also Cain, 2008). There were no official comments from President Bush or Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. On the contrary, a White House spokesperson called the cartoons unacceptable, and former President Bill Clinton described them as shameful (Cain, 2008: 44). The front pages in leading Danish newspapers ran such headlines as ‘America takes the side of Muslims’ (Berlingske Tidende, 06.02.2006) and ‘they [the US] have deserted us’ (BT, 06.02.2006). The right-wing Danish People’s Party even argued that Denmark should withdraw its troops from Iraq because of the US’s lack of support to Denmark (Cain, 2008: 46). Only when embassies were set on fire and protests against Denmark turned violent did the much awaited official expressions of solidarity with Denmark start pouring in from the EU and US. According to anonymous interviews made by the author with leading diplomats in Denmark, the Danish government had expected very different reactions from the Bush administration. In the end it turned out to be the EU which was most supportive in its declarations of support, with especially the German government and Angela Merkel helping the Danish government, while countries such as Sweden, Finland, Spain and Great Britain were allegedly more critical of the Danish position (see Petersen, 2006: 638). During these months of crisis the Danish government realized – according to interviews with leading diplomats – that it was closer to the more secular-democratic tradition of continental Europe than to the more religious-grounded politics in the US.

The cartoon crisis also caused a major re-direction of the Partnership for Progress and Reform (the Arab Initiative). As the crisis evolved in 2005-2006, the Initiative inevitably came under heavy pressure both from sectors inside Denmark (notably from the Danish People’s Party) and from within the region itself. Danish NGOs working in the Arab World often had to keep their identities concealed, while some programmes were shut down and others put on hold. With Denmark’s image being severely tainted, it was increasingly difficult to see how it could contribute to positive reform processes in the region, and the Danish government and diplomats in the MFA focused more on dialogue projects and public diplomacy than democracy-promotion and regional security (see also FRIDE: 46).

However, the downplaying of the reform and democracy-promotion element was not solely a result of the cartoon crisis. In most western capitals there seemed to be increasing disillusionment with the prospects of furthering democracy and reform in the region, just as the ‘experiments’ with democratic elections in Iraq and Gaza were watched with concern. In Denmark the Fogh Rasmussen government decided to withdraw Danish troops from Iraq, and when Hamas won the parliamentary elections in 2006, both Wash-
ington and Brussels were in agreement in imposing a harsh economic boycott against Hamas in the Gaza strip and the listing of Hamas as a terrorist organization. Inside the EU, the disillusionment with the Barcelona Process was also visible. It was now official wisdom that the Barcelona Process had far from achieved its ambitious goals and that the deadlock in the peace process and the multilateral tracks effectively hindered the Barcelona Process in moving forward. This was also part of the background to Sarkozy’s controversial initiative, the Mediterranean Union, which was eventually launched in 2008. Denmark was from the beginning not opposed to the French, but neither did this reflect any kind of enthusiasm for the UfM on the part of Danish government. Rather, a kind of defeatism reigned according to a senior diplomatic official: ‘Why not, everything else has not worked’. This defeatism was also reflected in Denmark’s overall strategic foreign-policy priorities with regard to the Middle East, where the region dropped from being one of its first priorities to being number eight or nine.

THE ARAB UPRISINGS: YET ANOTHER TURN

When the Arab uprisings swept North Africa in early 2011, Denmark once again redirected its focus to the region both militarily and diplomatically. Denmark was in the front line in Libya in enforcing the no-fly zone, just as the Danish government was swift to double the funding for the Arab Initiative. The Arab uprisings also brough renewed attention to the EU’s policies and initiatives in the region and a new willingness to engage with Islamist actors and parties. But above all, as we shall see in this last section, the Arab Spring cemented the importance of the Middle East in Danish foreign policy, as well as Denmark’s readiness to use force when it deemed necessary.

The Danish government responded rather quickly to the Arab uprisings by giving support to the demonstrators in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya and earmarking new funds for transition processes in all three countries. The Prime Minister, Lokke Rasmussen, (taking over from Fogh Rasmussen, but in the same governing coalition) argued only four days into the protest in Egypt that ‘the Arab people wish to see political, social and economic reform. That’s what needs to be delivered’ (quoted from Boserup, 2012: 95). Most political parties saw the protests in the Arab World as a kind of vindication of Denmark’s efforts to promote reform in the region, and the foresightedness of the Danish Partnership for Progress and Reform was celebrated across the political spectrum. In Parliament all parties except the Danish People’s Party were in favour of expanding the Partnership both in terms of funding and partner countries, and in December 2011 the new centre-left coalition government nearly doubled the funding for the Initiative. Funds were also taken from the so-called Freedom Fund to Egypt and Tunisia, while €13.5 million was directed to support transition and democratic consolidation in Libya.

Overall the substance and basic premises of the Partnership Initiative did not change, but two novelties were introduced. Prior to the uprisings, like most European governments the Danish government had refrained from engaging and incorporating Islamist parties in partnership projects due to resistance and red lines from incumbent secular regimes fearing Islamist opposition parties. With the fall of Ben Ali, Mubarak and Gadaffi, the Danish government was now ready to coop-
erate with, and even provide funding for, Islamic actors such as the Muslim Brotherhood and even the Salafi parties in Egypt, as long as these movements acted democratically. A second novelty concerned the EU. In the new goals and guidelines for the Partnership for Progress and Reform adopted in December 2011, one of three main aims identified was ‘a strengthening of Danish efforts in multilateral fora, in particular the EU, and an enhancement of coordination among the Nordic states’ (Goals and Guidelines, MFA, December, 2011: 6). The new Partnership, in other words, sought to take previous criticism and reviews into account by acknowledging the need to go through the EU in order to support major political and economic reforms most effectively. As a first step in this direction, the MFA has seconded three Danish diplomats to three separate EU representations in the region. Moreover, it can also be argued that the EU’s common response to the Arab uprisings – in particular the revised neighbourhood policy and the stronger emphasis on positive conditionality in form of the ‘more for more’ approach – have brought the EU’s and the Danish democracy promotion strategies closer to one another, just as the Arab uprisings as such have made it easier for Denmark to play a role. Thus, according to one of the leading diplomats in the Danish Middle East office, the uprisings created a window of opportunity for smaller non-Mediterranean countries to challenge the traditional pro-regime/stability line of the southern EU members.

The closer alignment with EU Mideast policies is also visible in terms of the government’s positions on Israel-Palestine. Denmark had previously voted no or abstained on UN resolutions that were believed to have a pro-Palestinian bias. But in 2012 the new Danish centre-left government voted in favour of Palestinian non-member observer status at the UN, as did the majority of European states. In fact the Danish government had worked hard to gather support for a common EU position, which obviously would benefit the EU as a whole, but perhaps in particular a small country such as Denmark, making its policy change on the Israeli-Palestinian issue less exposed. First and foremost Denmark’s shift on the Israeli-Palestinian issue should be seen as a reflection of party politics. The new Foreign Minister, Villy Soeëndal, is a leading member of the Socialist People’s Party, a party which has traditionally been very pro-Palestinian, especially at the grassroots level. Indeed part of Soeëndal’s election campaign was to change the Danish position on Palestinian membership at the UN. In 2012 the new centre-left government also proposed a new labelling law on imported products from settlements in the Israeli-occupied territories, similar to that passed in Great Britain. And in 2013, the Danish government, alongside Sweden, Finland and Cyprus, became first movers within the EU by upgrading their Palestinian diplomatic missions to embassy status. The liberal-conservative party, the conservatives and the Danish People’s Party have been adamantly against these changes in Danish policy on Israel and Palestine, and it therefore seems likely that, if they were to gain power at the next elections, they would return to the more pro-Israeli policy of the previous decade.

While the EU’s and the Danish policies on some Middle East issues have moved closer to one another (on democracy promotion, Islamist actors and the Israel–Palestine conflict), it is also clear that Denmark’s Middle East policy (and foreign policy in general) remain more militaristic and perhaps more idealistic than those of most other European states. This was no more evident than in
the case of Libya, where Denmark participated from early on in the enforcement of the no-fly zone, a decision which significantly was backed by all parties in Parliament. When the then Danish Foreign Minister Lene Espersen from the Liberal-Conservative party announced the decision to send F-16 fighter jets to Libya, she rather tellingly opened her speech by saying, ‘I have good news’:

‘No one battered an eyelid. The notion that it was good news that Denmark was going to war was almost universally shared. All parties in parliament, all major news outlets and 78% of the population applauded the decision. This level of public support was the highest polled among the nations participating in the initial phase of the air campaign (Møller and Jacobsen, 2012:106).

As Jacobsen and Møller explain, paraphrasing Robert Kagan, Denmark has in many ways taken a journey from ‘Venus to Mars’, meaning that the majority of political parties today view the use of force as a legitimate and useful foreign-policy tool, and even at times celebrate Denmark’s status as a warrior nation. This is also true of the case of Libya, where Denmark’s ability to be in the lead in joining the great-power coalition of France, the UK and the US in the early bombing missions was commended by most political parties (Møller and Jacobsen, 2012:112). Arguably idealism and humanitarian reasoning play strong roles in the justifications for going to war, drawing on Denmark’s early experience with humanitarian interventions in the Balkans in the 1990s. This was the case in Libya too, where the intervention was above all justified on humanitarian grounds with reference to the UN’s Responsibility to Protect (R2P), designed to prevent genocide and to protect the civilian population against Qadaffi. The fact that the intervention was backed by the UN Security Council was clearly one of the main reasons for the broad support from all parties in parliament, including the Red-Green Party on the far left of the political spectrum. (ibid.).

The willingness to use force and the emphasis on democratic values are also prominent with respect to the Syrian conflict and the recent military take-over in Egypt. While the Danish centre-left government and especially Foreign Minister Søvndal were for a long time very hesitant to deploy military assets to Syria or to support the rebel groups with arms, this changed following the chemical weapons attack against civilians and the Obama administration’s threat to use force in August 2013. The Danish government was once again ready to use force alongside the US and to do so without a UNSC mandate. With respect to Egypt, Denmark was also one of the first states to put its bilateral program with the Egyptian government on hold in response to the Egyptian military’s brutal crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood.

CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVES

Traditionally Denmark has not been very involved in the Middle East. In the 1950s and 1960s, Denmark, much like tiny Thumbelie, adapted to the great-power realities of the day. During the Cold War Denmark was caught in the European Cold War rivalry, and the emphasis was on Denmark’s near abroad and its role in multilateral mechanisms and cooperation frameworks such as the UN, NATO and from 1973 the EU.

The 1970s and 1980s, however, saw a growing idealism and assertiveness in Danish foreign policy, as well as a new emphasis on areas where Denmark can make a real foreign-policy difference, as evidenced in the
large-development programmes and the increasing emphasis on human rights and good governance in the 1980s.

The 1990s gradually breaks with the ideals of peaceful conflict resolution and the necessity of a UN anchoring. The Danish involvement in, and humanitarian justification for, the missions in the Balkans thus partially paved the way for Denmark’s heavy military involvement in the Middle East in the aftermath of the 9-11 terror attacks. Iraq and Libya are thus both legitimized with reference to ideals of democracy and freedom.

Over the last decade, Denmark has mainly cooperated with the US and Britain in hotspots such as Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya, and will potentially do so in Syria as well. However, Denmark also appears to be a better position to influence the EU’s Mediterranean and Middle East policy than ten years ago, due to the knowledge base and ties that have been created throughout the region. It still remains to be seen if the government’s intentions to bring the Danish and EU tracks closer together will bear fruit. But Denmark’s engagement in the region seems to provide a certain guarantee.
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