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Congestion management in power systems: Long-term modeling framework and large-scale application

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Congestion management in power systems - Long-term modeling framework and large-scale application

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Abstract

In liberalized power systems, generation and transmission services are unbundled, but remain tightly interlinked. Congestion management in the transmission network is of crucial importance for the efficiency of these inter-linkages. Different regulatory designs have been suggested, analyzed and followed, such as uniform zonal pricing with redispatch or nodal pricing. However, the literature has either focused on the short-term efficiency of congestion management or specific issues of timing investments. In contrast, this paper presents a generalized and flexible economic modeling framework based on a decomposed inter-temporal equilibrium model including generation, transmission, as well as their inter-linkages. Short and long-term effects of different congestion management designs can hence be analyzed. Specifically, we are able to identify and isolate implicit frictions and sources of inefficiencies in the different regulatory designs, and to provide a comparative analysis including a benchmark against a first-best welfare-optimal result. To demonstrate the applicability of our framework, we calibrate and numerically solve our model for a detailed representation of the Central Western European (CWE) region, consisting of 70 nodes and 174 power lines. Analyzing six different congestion management designs until 2030, we show that compared to the first-best benchmark, i.e., nodal pricing, inefficiencies of up to 4.6% arise. Inefficiencies are mainly driven by the approach of determining cross-border capacities as well as the coordination of transmission system operators’ activities.

JEL classification: C61, C63, D47, E61, L50, Q40

Keywords: Power system economics, unbundling, congestion management, transmission pricing, inter-temporal equilibrium model

1. Introduction

The liberalization of power systems entails an unbundling of generation and grid services to reap efficiency gains stemming from a separate and different organization. While there is competition between generating firms, transmission grids are considered a natural monopoly and are operated by regulated transmission system operators (TSOs). However, strong inter-linkages remain between these two parts of the power system: From a transmission perspective, TSOs are responsible for non-discriminatory access of generating units to transmission services while maintaining a secure grid operation. They are thus strongly influenced by the level and locality of generation and load. Furthermore, due to Kirchhoff’s laws, operation and investment decisions of one TSO may affect electricity flows in the area of another TSO. From a generation firms’
perspective, activities are impacted by restrictions on exchange capacities between markets or operational interventions by the TSOs to sustain a reliable network.

An efficient regulatory design of those inter-linkages between generation and grid will positively affect the overall efficiency of the system, for instance by providing locational signals for efficient investments into new generation or transmission assets. To ensure an efficient coordination of short (i.e., operational) and long-term (i.e., investment) activities in the generation and grid sectors, congestion management has been identified to be of utmost importance (e.g., Chao et al. (2000)). Different regulatory designs and options are available to manage congestion, including the definition of price zones as well as various operational and investment measures. Because it is able to deliver undistorted and hence efficient price signals, nodal pricing is a powerful market design to bring along short-run efficiency. This was shown in the seminal work of Schweppe et al. (1988) and Hogan (1992). Nevertheless, many markets deviate from that short-run efficient congestion management and pursue alternative approaches, e.g. due to historical or political reasons. For instance, most European countries deploy national zonal market areas with uniform electricity prices. Implicitly, several challenges are thus imposed upon the system: First, in zonal markets, intra-zonal network congestion remains unconsidered by dispatch decisions. However, if a dispatch induces intra-zonal congestion (which is typically often the case), it might be necessary to reconfigure the dispatch, known as re-dispatch. Alternatively, a generator-component (g-component) may be implemented as part of the market clearing process. The latter makes generators pay an additional fee according to their impact on the zonal network (and hence, changes the dispatch). Second, cross-border capacity needs to be managed. Whereas historically, cross-border capacities have often been auctioned explicitly, many market areas are now turning to implicit market coupling based on different allocation routines, such as net-transfer capacities (NTC) or flow-based algorithms.\footnote{Cross-border capacities and prices are implicitly taken into account during the joint clearing of coupled markets.}

The literature has investigated various regulatory designs to manage congestion in power systems from different perspectives. Static short term efficiency of nodal pricing – as shown by Schweppe et al. (1988) – was confirmed, e.g., by van der Weijde and Hobbs (2011) who compare nodal pricing and NTC based market coupling in a stylized modeling environment. Furthermore, several papers have quantified the increase in social welfare through a switch from zonal to nodal pricing for static real world case studies (see for example: Green (2007), Leuthold et al. (2008), Burstedde (2012), Neuhoff et al. (2013)). Similarly, Daxhelet and Smeers (2007) show that generator and load components reflecting their respective impact on congestion have a positive effect on static social welfare (as well as its distribution), while Oggioni and Smeers (2012) investigate different congestion management designs in a six node model and find that multilateral arrangements may improve efficiency. Oggioni et al. (2012) and Oggioni and Smeers (2013) show that in a zonal pricing system, the configuration of zones as well as the choice of counter-trading designs have a significant impact on efficiency.

A second line of literature deals with the dynamic long term effects of congestion management, i.e., the investment perspective. On the one hand, issues of timing (e.g., due to uncertainty or commitment) in settings consisting of multiple players (such as generation and transmission) have been addressed. Höfler and Wambach (2013) find that long term commitment of a benevolent TSO may lead to inefficient investment decisions due to the locational decisions of investments in generation. In contrast, Sauma and Oren (2006) and Rious et al. (2009) formulate the coordination problem between a generation and a transmission agent
as a decomposed problem, and find that a prospective coordinated planning approach as well as transparent price signals entail efficiency gains. On the other hand, imperfect simultaneous coordination (e.g., due to strategic behavior or hidden information) has been investigated by Huppmann and Egerer (2014) for the case of multiple TSOs being active in an interconnected system. They find that a frictionless coordinated approach outperforms the system outcome with strategic TSOs maximizing social welfare within their own jurisdiction.

With this paper, we contribute to the above literature with a generalized and flexible economic modeling framework for analyzing the short as well as long term effects of different congestion management designs in a decomposed inter-temporal equilibrium model including generation, transmission, as well as their inter-linkages. Specifically, with our framework we are able to represent, analyze and compare different TSO organizations, market areas (i.e., nodal or zonal pricing), grid expansion, redispatch or g-components, as well as calculation methods for cross-border capacity allocation (i.e., NTC and flow-based). A major advantage of our analytical and numerical implementation is its flexibility to represent different congestion management designs in one consistent framework. We are hence able to identify and isolate frictions and sources of inefficiencies by comparing these different regulatory designs. Moreover, we are able to benchmark the different designs against a frictionless welfare-optimal result, i.e., the "first best". In order to exclusively focus on the frictions and inefficiencies induced by the congestion management designs, we do not address issues of timing, such as uncertainty or sequential moving. Instead, we assume perfect competition, perfect information, no transaction costs, utility-maximizing agents, continuous functions, inelastic demand and an environment where generation and grid problems are solved simultaneously. As an additional contribution, we calibrate and numerically solve our model for a large-scale problem. Specifically, we investigate a detailed representation of the Central Western European (CWE) region. Thereby, we offer a sound indication on how different congestion management designs perform in practice, and provide empirical evidence that nodal pricing is the efficient benchmark while alternative designs imply inefficiencies of up to 4.6% until 2030.

The paper proceeds as follows: In Section 2, we analytically develop our modeling framework. In Section 3, a numerical solution method to solve this framework is proposed. In Section 4, we apply the methodology to a detailed representation of the CWE region in scenarios up to the year 2030. Section 5 concludes and provides an outlook on future research.

2. Economic framework

In order to develop a consistent analytical modeling framework for different congestion management designs, we start with the well-known model for an integrated optimization problem for planning and operating a power system. By design, this model does not contain any frictions and inefficiencies. Hence, its result is necessarily first best and may serve as the efficient benchmark for alternative settings. Moreover, it corresponds to the concept of nodal pricing as introduced by Schweppe et al. (1988).

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2 The CWE region is one of seven regional initiatives to bring forward European market integration. The countries within this area are Belgium, France, Germany, Luxemburg and the Netherlands.

3 Such a model is typically applied to represent the optimization problem of a social planner or an integrated firm optimizing the entire electricity system, including generation and transmission.

4 Nodal pricing usually describes prices based on short-term marginal costs. In our case, however, since we consider investments and inelastic demand, the interpretation of the nodal prices differs. We discuss implications in Section 2.1.
Conceptually similar to Sauma and Oren (2006), we then make use of the possibility to separate an integrated optimization problem into multiple levels (or, in other words, subproblems). Even though the model structure is different, it can be shown that both formulations of the problem yield the same results. However, in the economic interpretation we can take advantage of the separated model structure representing unbundled generation and transmission sectors. On the generation stage, competitive firms decide about investments in and dispatch of power plants, whereas the transmission stage consists of one or multiple TSOs that efficiently expand and operate transmission grid capacities. Lastly, with generation and transmission separated, we are able to introduce six practically relevant congestion management designs through the manipulation of the exchange of information between and among the two levels, and show how they deviate from the first best.

Even though the modeling framework would allow to study an extensive range of congestion management designs, we restrict our attention to four settings (and two additional variations) that are both, relevant in practical applications and sufficiently different from each other. Specifically, our settings vary in the definition of market areas (nodal and zonal pricing), the regulation and organization of TSOs (one or several TSOs), the way of managing congestion besides grid expansion (redispatch and g-component) and different alternatives for cross-border capacity allocation (NTC vs. flow-based market coupling). The analyzed settings are summarized in the following Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Market area and coupling</th>
<th>TSO scope</th>
<th>TSO measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Nodal markets</td>
<td>One TSO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II - NTC</td>
<td>Zonal markets, NTC-based coupling</td>
<td>One TSO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II - FB</td>
<td>Zonal markets, Flow-based coupling</td>
<td>One TSO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III - NTC</td>
<td>Zonal markets, NTC-based coupling</td>
<td>Zonal TSOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III - FB</td>
<td>Zonal markets, Flow-based coupling</td>
<td>Zonal TSOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>Zonal markets</td>
<td>Zonal TSOs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Analyzed congestion management designs

Noticeably, despite the separated generation and transmission levels, in all settings agents are assumed to act rationally and simultaneously while taking into account the activities of the other stage.\(^5\) Furthermore, we assume perfect competition on the generation stage and perfect regulation of the TSOs in the sense that TSO activities are aligned with social objectives. TSOs as well as generators are price taking, with an independent institution (e.g. the power exchange) being responsible for coordinating the activities of the different participating agents and for market clearing.\(^6\) Importantly, while in the first best design all information is available to all agents, alternative congestion management designs may induce an adverse (e.g., aggregated) availability of information. The solution of the problem is an intertemporal equilibrium which is unique under the assumption of convex functions. Hence, a unique ordering of alternative problem settings, i.e., in our case, congestion management designs, can be obtained. Noticeably, with the above assumptions, our general modeling approach can be thought of as a way to compare today’s and future performances of different congestion management designs based on today’s state of the system, today’s

\(^{5}\)I.e., sequential moving and issues of timing are not considered.

\(^{6}\)By assuming perfect competition and an inelastic demand, we are able to treat the general problem as a cost minimization problem. This assumption is commonly applied for formulation of electricity markets in the literature. An alternative formulation with a welfare maximization approach would be possible, but wouldn’t impact the general conclusions.
information horizon, as well as rational expectations about future developments and resulting investment decisions.\(^7\)

For developing the economic modeling framework in the following subsections, we will deploy parameters, variables and sets as depicted in Table 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model sets</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(i \in I, j \in J)</td>
<td>Nodes, (I, J = [1, 2, ...])</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(m, n \in M)</td>
<td>Zonal markets, (M = [1, 2, ...])</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(i \in I_m, j \in J_m)</td>
<td>Nodes that belong to zonal market (m, I_m \subset I, J_m \subset J)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(i \in I_{m,cb}, j \in J_{m,cb})</td>
<td>Nodes that belong to zonal market (m) and are connected to another zone (n) by a cross-border line, (I_{m,cb} \subset I_m, J_{m,cb} \subset J_m)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Model parameters | | |
| \(\delta_i\) | EUR/kW | Investment and FOM costs of generation capacity in node \(i\) |
| \(\gamma_i\) | EUR/kWh | Variable costs of generation capacity in node \(i\) |
| \(\mu_{i,j}\) | EUR/kW | Investment costs of line between node \(i\) and node \(j\) |
| \(d_i\) | kW | Electricity demand in node \(i\) |
| \(PTDF\) | – | Power Transfer Distribution Factor |
| \(\sigma_{i,j}\) | % | Cost share for an interconnector capacity between node \(i\) and node \(j, i \in I_{m,cb}, j \in J_{m,cb}\) |

| Model primal variables | | |
| \(G_i\) | kW | Generation capacity in node \(i\), \(G_i \geq 0\) |
| \(G_i\) | kW | Generation dispatch in node \(i\), \(G_i \geq 0\) |
| \(T_{i,j}, T_{m,n}\) | kW | Electricity trade from node \(i\) to node \(j\), or market \(m\) to market \(n\) |
| \(X\) | EUR | Costs of generation |
| \(Y\) | EUR | Costs of TSO |
| \(P_{i,j}\) | kW | Line capacity between node \(i\) and node \(j\), \(P_{i,j} \geq 0\) |
| \(R_i\) | kW | Electricity flow on line between node \(i\) and node \(j\) |

| Model dual variables | | |
| \(\kappa_{i,j}, \kappa_{m,n}\) | EUR/kW | price for transmission between nodes \((i\) and \(j)\) or zones \((m\) and \(n)\) |
| \(\lambda_i, \lambda_m\) | EUR/kW | nodal or zonal price for electricity |

Table 2: Model sets, parameters and variables

2.1. Setting I – First Best: Nodal pricing with one TSO

By design, nodal pricing avoids any inefficiency by covering and exchanging all information present within the problem of optimizing the dispatch. It hence represents the first best setting in our analysis of different congestion management designs. According to Schweppe et al. (1988), a distinct price per grid node results from the optimal dispatch of the entire system. Nodal prices are based on efficient locational short-run marginal costs, obtained from a simultaneous market clearing that implicitly considers the physics

\(^7\)In our numerical application, this approach is supplemented with discounted future cash flows. See Section 4 for further details.
of the electricity network (specifically, loop flows). Introducing a dynamic perspective in this nodal pricing framework, we abstract from economies of scale and lumpiness that would render short-run nodal prices insufficient for long-term investments and jeopardize the existence of an equilibrium as well as its uniqueness (Joskow and Tirole (2005), Rious et al. (2009)). Instead, we assume constant marginal grid costs and continuous generation and transmission expansion. Together with the assumption of inelastic demand, we derive nodal prices which are either based on short-run marginal costs (in off-peak hours) or include marginal capacity costs in peak load hours. Consequently, we derive nodal prices that are both efficient and sufficient.

The following optimization problem \( P1 \) corresponds to the formulation of Schweppe et al. (1988) of an integrated problem for operating generation and transmission, extended to include investment decisions. In this formulation, a social planner or an integrated firm minimize total system costs of the operation and investment of generation and transmission.

\[ \begin{align*}
\min_{G_i, T_{i,j}, P_{i,j}} \quad & X = \sum_i \delta_i G_i + \sum_i \gamma_i G_i + \sum_{i,j} \mu_{i,j} P_{i,j} \\
\text{s.t.} \quad & G_i - \sum_j T_{i,j} = d_i \quad \forall i \quad |\lambda_i| \\
& G_i \leq G_i \quad \forall i \\
& |P_{i,j}| = f(T_{i,j}) \leq P_{i,j} \quad \forall i,j \quad |\kappa_{i,j}|
\end{align*} \]

Indices \( i, j \) represent nodes in the system. Generation \( G_i \), generation capacity \( G_i \) and transmission capacity \( P_{i,j} \) are explicitly optimized, while trade \( T_{i,j} \) is implicitly derived from Equation (1b). Additional capacities can be installed at the costs of \( \delta_i \) for generation and \( \mu_{i,j} \) for transmission. Nodal prices are derived from the dual variables \( \lambda_i \) of the equilibrium constraint which states that the demand level \( d_i \) at node \( i \) can be either satisfied by generation at the same node or trade (Equation (1b)). Equations (1c) and (1d) mirror that generation is restricted by installed generation capacities, and trade by installed transmission capacities. The calculation of flows on transmission lines according to Kirchhoff’s law is represented by function \( f \) in Equation (1d). For instance, function \( f \) could represent a PTDF matrix which determines how flows on each line are impacted by trades.

As has been shown, e.g., by Conejo et al. (2006), an integrated optimization problem can be decomposed into subproblems which are solved simultaneously, while still representing the same overall situation and corresponding optimal solution. In our application, we take advantage of this possibility to represent separated generation and transmission levels in problem \( P1' \). The generation stage \( P1'a \) states the market clearing of supply and demand while respecting generation capacity constraints. As in \( P1 \), the same nodal prices

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8 This assumption is certainly more critical for transmission investments which require a certain magnitude to be realized. Generation investment might also be lumpy, but smaller plant sizes are possible.

9 Note that in the long-term, without additional restrictions, nodal prices would all tend to the costs of the most cost-efficient generation technology. However, in a problem with diversified assets to start with (i.e., an existing generation fleet), and inter-temporal (e.g., ramping) as well as technology-specific (e.g., renewable resource availability) constraints, long-term variations in the nodal prices will persist. These conditions will typically hold true in any applied power system model.

10 For better readability, we dropped the time index \( t \), which is the only reason why \( G_i \) and \( G_i \) may differ.

11 We will use the PTDF approach in the numerical implementation, as it enables a linearization of the non-linear grid problem (cf. Hagelsie et al. (2014)).
are obtained by the dual variable $\lambda_i$ of the equilibrium constraint (2b). Instead of including the explicit grid expansion costs in the cost minimization, the objective function of the generation stage now contains transmission costs which assign transmission prices $\kappa_{i,j}$ to trade flows between two nodes $i$ and $j$. These prices are derived from the dual variable of the equilibrium constraint on the transmission stage (Equation (2e)). We assume that the TSO is perfectly regulated to minimize costs of grid extensions accounting for the physical feasibility of the market clearing as determined on the generation stage while considering all grid flows and related costs (problem $P1'\beta$).

$$\begin{align*}
P1'a \quad \text{Generation} \\
\min_{\overline{G}_i, G_i, T_{i,j}} X = \sum_i \delta_i \overline{G}_i + \sum_i \gamma_i G_i + \sum_{i,j} \kappa_{i,j} f(T_{i,j}) \\
\text{s.t.} \quad G_i - \sum_j T_{i,j} = d_i \quad \forall i \quad | \lambda_i \\
G_i \leq \overline{G}_i \quad \forall i
\end{align*}$$

$$\begin{align*}
P1'b \quad \text{Transmission} \\
\min_{\overline{P}_{i,j}} Y = \sum_{i,j} \mu_{i,j} \overline{P}_{i,j} \\
\text{s.t.} \quad |P_{i,j}| = f(T_{i,j}) \leq \overline{P}_{i,j} \quad \forall i, j \quad | \kappa_{i,j}
\end{align*}$$

As can be seen, all terms of $P1$ reappear in $P1'$, however, allocated to two separated levels. Both formulations describe the same problem and hence, have the same outcome, namely the first best. In fact, in the optimum of Problem $P1'$, it must hold that the costs of transmission expansion are equal to the marginal of the transmission constraint, i.e. $\mu_{i,j} = \kappa_{i,j}$. Furthermore, the duality property of the problem ensures that in the optimum, $\sum_{i,j} \mu_{i,j} \overline{P}_{i,j} = \sum_{i,j} \kappa_{i,j} f(T_{i,j})$, such that the objectives of $P1$ and $P1'$ coincide.

2.2. Setting II: coupled zonal markets with one TSO and zonal redispatch

In zonal markets, a number of nodes are aggregated to a market with a uniform price. In contrast to nodal pricing, coupled zonal markets only consider aggregated cross-border capacities between market zones during market clearing (instead of all individual grid elements). Thus, the obtained prices for generation do not reflect the true total costs of the entire grid infrastructure. This is due to the fact that zonal prices only reflect those cross-border capacities that limit activities between zonal markets. Cross-border capacities can be allocated in different ways. We consider Net Transfer Capacity (NTC) and flow-based market coupling as cross-border capacity allocation algorithms because they have been used extensively in the European context (see, e.g., Glachant (2010), Commission de Régulation de l’Énergie (2009)). NTCs are a rather simplified version of cross-border trade restrictions, widely neglecting the physical properties of the grid as well as its time-varying characteristics. Flow-based (FB) market coupling shows a much better consideration of the physical grid properties which is crucially important in case of meshed networks. Under flow-based market coupling, cross-border transmission capacities are calculated taking into account the impact of (cross-border) line flows on every line in the system (e.g., Oggioni and Smeers (2013)). As a consequence, more capacity can generally be offered for trading between markets, and a better usage of existing infrastructures is achieved.
Because intra-zonal congestion is neglected in the zonal market-clearing, it needs to be resolved in a subsequent step by the TSO. Besides the expansion of grid capacities, in Setting II we provide the TSO with the opportunity of zonal redispatch. The TSO may instruct generators located behind the bottleneck to increase production (positive redispatch), and another generator before the bottleneck to reduce production (negative redispatch). We assume here a cost-based, revenue-neutral redispatch: the TSO pays generators that have to increase their production their variable costs, and in turn receives the avoided variable costs of generators that reduce their supply. As the generator with positive redispatch was not part of the original dispatch, it necessarily has higher variable costs than the generator that reduces supply. Thus, the TSO has to bear additional costs that are caused by the redispatch which amount to the difference between the variable costs of the redispatched entities. Assuming further that the TSO has perfect information about the variable costs of the generating firms, redispatch measures of the TSO have no impact on investment decisions of generating firms as they are revenue-neutral. Hence, additional costs for the economy are induced by inefficient investment decisions of those generators that are not aligned with the overall system optimum due to missing locational price signals.

In the formulation of problem P2a zonal pricing is represented by the zonal market indices $n,m$, each containing one or several nodes $i$. Market clearing, depicted by the equilibrium Equation (3b), now takes place on zonal instead of nodal markets. The corresponding dual variable $\lambda_m$ represents zonal prices, which do not include any grid costs except for cross-border capacities. This is indicated by the term $\sum_{m,n} \kappa_{m,n} T_{m,n}$ instead of the nodal formulation (with $\kappa_{i,j}$) above. Transmission prices are determined on the transmission stage (Equation (3h)). However, contrary to nodal pricing, these prices are determined based on some regulatory rule (e.g., NTC or FB) and are thus inherently incomplete since they do not represent real grid scarcities. It is noteworthy that nodal trades cannot be used by the TSO anymore to calculate line flows via $f(T_{i,j})$. However, the information on generation ($G_i$) and demand ($d_i$), i.e., nodal power balances, is equally sufficient to determine power flows on all lines via function $f(G_i,d_i)$.\(^{12}\) In addition to grid expansion, the TSO may relieve intra-zonal congestion and optimize the situation by means of redispatch measures $R_i$ at costs of $\gamma_i R_i$.

\begin{align}
\text{P2a Generation} \\
\min_{\!G_i, G_i, T_{m,n}} \quad X &= \sum_i \delta_i \!G_i + \sum_i \!\gamma_i G_i + \sum_{m,n} \kappa_{m,n} T_{m,n} \\
\text{s.t.} \\
\sum_{i \in I_m} G_i - \sum_{n} T_{m,n} &= \sum_{i \in I_m} d_i \quad \forall m \quad |\lambda_m| \\
G_i &\leq \! \mathcal{G}_i \quad \forall i
\end{align}

\(^{12}\)Note that the duality of the problem would also allow for an alternative formulation of the cross-border transmission constraint by means of quantity constraints instead of prices. Hence, the cost of transmission in the objective function of the generation stage ($\sum_{m,n} \kappa_{m,n} T_{m,n}$) would disappear and an additional constraint for trading would be implemented ($|T_{m,n}| \leq C_{m,n}, \forall m,n$). The restriction of trading volumes $C_{m,n}$ would be calculated on the transmission stage P2b via a constraint $C_{m,n} = h(P_{i,j})$ instead of the prices $\kappa_{m,n}$. These prices would then be the dual variable of the volume constraint on the generation stage, and necessarily coincide with $\kappa_{m,n}$.
The following two examples illustrate the fundamental differences between Setting I and II.

Example for 2 nodes and 2 markets: If the electricity system consists of 2 nodes and 2 markets (Figure 1, left hand side), Setting I and II should be identical. Due to the market regions only consisting of one node, the redispatch Equations (3f), (3g) as well as the cost term of redispatch in the objective function ($\sum_i \gamma_i R_i$) vanish. In a welfare optimized system, it holds that $\kappa_{m,n} = \kappa_{i,j}$, leading to equivalence of problem $P2$ and problem $P1'$.  

Example for 3 nodes and 2 markets: Figure 1, right hand side, shows an electricity system consisting of two markets $m$ and $n$, where $m$ includes one node (1) and $n$ two nodes (2, 3). Function $g$ for calculating the transmission price $\kappa_{m,n}$ (Equation (3h)) between the markets has to be defined, e.g. by averaging the single line prices $\kappa_{m,n} = (\kappa_{1,2} + \kappa_{1,3})/2$. Still, the TSO cannot supply the locational fully differentiated prices $\kappa_{1,2}, \kappa_{1,3}$ and $\kappa_{2,3}$ to the market, and hence, efficient allocation of investments is (partly) achieved between the markets, but not within the markets. Redispatch does not fully solve this problem, because it is revenue-neutral and does not affect the investment decision.

Overall, Settings I and II differ in the way grid costs are reflected on the generation stage. Specifically, Setting II lacks locational differentiated prices, thus impeding efficient price signals $\kappa_{i,j}$ for the generation stage. Of course, the level of inefficiency depends substantially on the regulatory rule determining the calculation of prices based on a specification of function $g(\kappa_{i,j})$. In general, it is clear that the closer the specification of $g$ reflects real-time conditions and the more it enables the full usage of existing grid infrastructures, the more efficiently the general problem will be solved. While we limit our analysis in this section to this general finding, we will discuss two possible specifications often implemented in practice (NTC
and flow-based market coupling) in the empirical example in Section 4. Given the inefficiency induced by the specification of function \( g \), the question remains whether and how redispatch measures may help to relieve the problem. We find that the resulting inefficiency cannot be fully resolved by redispatch because the latter remains a zonal measure (Equation (3f)). Hence, the TSO cannot induce an efficient usage of generation and transmission across zonal borders. Furthermore, investments into generation capacities are not influenced by redispatch and only zonal prices as well as their costs are considered.\(^\text{13}\) Hence, the setting lacks locational signals for efficient generation investments within zonal markets.

2.3. Setting III: coupled zonal markets with zonal TSOs and zonal redispatch

In this setting, we consider zonal markets with zonal TSOs being responsible for grid expansion as well as a zonal redispatch. Thus, the problem on the generation stage remains exactly the same as in the previous setting (i.e., \( P_{3a} = P_{2a} \)). However, the transmission problem changes, such that now multiple zonal TSOs are considered. Each TSO solves its own optimization problem according to the national regulatory regime (in our case corresponding to a cost-minimization within the zones). However, cross-border line capacities are also taken into account. Hence, grid capacities, especially cross-border capacities, are extended inefficiently as they do not result from an optimization of the entire grid infrastructure. In addition – just as in the previous setting – inefficient investment incentives for generation and grid capacities are caused by the lack of locational differentiated prices. Hence, overall, system outcomes in Setting III must be inferior to those of Setting II.

**P\(3\)a Generation**

\[
\begin{align*}
\min_{G_i, G_i, T_{m,n}} & \quad X = \sum_i \delta_i G_i + \sum_i \gamma_i G_i + \sum_{m,n} \kappa_{m,n} T_{m,n} \\
\text{s.t.} & \quad \sum_{i \in I_m} G_i - \sum_{n} T_{m,n} = \sum_{i \in I_m} d_i \quad \forall m \mid \lambda_m \\
& \quad G_i \leq \bar{G}_i \quad \forall i
\end{align*}
\]  

**P\(3\)b Transmission**

\[
\begin{align*}
\min_{\tilde{P}_{i,j}} & \quad Y_m = \sum_{i,j \in I_m} \mu_{i,j} \tilde{P}_{i,j} + \sum_{i,j \in I_m, cb} \sigma_{i,j} \mu_{i,j} \tilde{P}_{i,j} + \sum_i \gamma_i R_i \quad \forall m \\
\text{s.t.} & \quad |\tilde{P}_{i,j}| = \hat{f}(G_i, d_i) \leq \tilde{P}_{i,j} \quad \forall i,j \in I_m \mid \kappa_{i,j} \in I_m \\
& \quad \sum_{i \in I_m} R_i = 0 \\
& \quad 0 \leq G_i + R_i \leq \bar{G}_i \quad \forall i \in I_m \\
& \quad \kappa_{m,n} = g(\kappa_{i,j})
\end{align*}
\]

In problem \( P_3 \), there are now separate optimization problems for each zonal TSO (indicated by \( Y_m \)), with the objective to minimize costs from zonal grid and cross-border capacity extensions as well as from zonal redapatch measures (Equation (4d)). For the redispatch, TSOs have to consider the same restrictions.

\(^{13}\) For obtaining a unique equilibrium we assume that costs differ over all nodes, such that decisions for generation and investments are unambiguously ordered.
as in the previous setting (Equations (4f) and (4g)). As cross-border capacities are by definition located within the jurisdiction of two adjacent market areas, the two corresponding TSOs have to negotiate about the extension of these cross-border capacities. In fact, cross-border capacities built by two different TSOs may be seen as a Leontief production function, due to the fact that the line capacities built on each side are perfect complements. Corresponding costs from inter-zonal grid extensions are assumed to be shared among the TSOs according to the cost allocation key $\sigma_{i,j}$. According to Equation (4h), prices for transmission between zones that are provided to the generation stage ($\kappa_{m,n}$) are determined just as in the previous Setting II with only one TSO, depending on the type of market coupling, i.e., the specification of function $g$. The only difference is that line-specific prices $\kappa_{i,j}$ may now deviate from Setting II as they result from the separated activities of each zonal TSO (specifically, from Equation (4e), i.e., the restriction of flows on intra-zonal and cross-border lines). Due to the fact that situations may arise where an agreement on specific cross-border lines between neighboring TSOs cannot be reached (which would imply that an equilibrium solution cannot be found), we assume the implementation of a regulatory rule that ensures the acceptance of a unique price for each cross-border line by both of the neighboring TSOs. For instance, the regulatory rule may be specified such that both TSOs are obliged to accept the higher price offer, or, equivalently, the lower of the two capacities offered for the specific cross-border line.

2.4. Setting IV: coupled zonal markets with zonal TSOs and g-component

In this last setting, we again consider coupled zonal markets with zonal TSOs. However, instead of having the possibility to perform a zonal redispatch (as in Setting III), zonal TSOs may now determine local, time-varying prices for generators, i.e., a g-component, at each node belonging to its zone to cope with intra-zonal congestion. As the g-component reflects the impact of generators on the grid at each node and each instant of time, grid costs are being transferred to the generating firms which consider them in their investment and dispatch decision. In other words, TSOs are able to provide locationally differentiated prices (and hence, generation and investment incentives) for generators within their zone. Noticeably, we do not consider an international g-component here as this would yield the same results as a nodal pricing regime due to generators considering the full set of information concerning grid costs. However, two frictions that may cause an inefficient outcome of this setting remain. When determining nodal g-components, zonal TSOs only consider grid infrastructures within their zone, and not within the entire system. Furthermore, as in Setting III, the desired expansion of cross-border lines, which is here assumed to be solved by some regulatory rule ensuring successful negotiation, may deviate between/across neighboring TSOs. However, the negotiation outcome can only be at least as good as an integrated optimization.

$$\begin{align*}
P4a \quad \text{Generation} \\
\min_{G_i, \Gamma_i, T_{m,n}} \quad X &= \sum_i \delta_i \Gamma_i + \sum_i \gamma_i G_i + \sum_{i,j} \kappa_{i,j} \tilde{f}(G_i, d_i) \\
\text{s.t.} \quad &\sum_{i \in I_m} G_i - \sum_{n} T_{m,n} = \sum_{i \in I_m} d_i \quad \forall m \quad |\lambda_m \\
&G_i \leq \Gamma_i \quad \forall i
\end{align*}$$
\[ P_{4b} \quad \text{Transmission} \]

\[
\min_{\mathbf{P}_{i,j} \in \mathbf{I}_{m_{m,cb}}} Y_m = \sum_{i,j \in \mathbf{I}_{m}} \mu_{i,j} \mathbf{P}_{i,j} + \sum_{i,j \in \mathbf{I}_{m_{m,cb}}} \sigma_{i,j} \mu_{i,j} \mathbf{P}_{i,j} \quad \forall m \quad (5d)
\]

\[
s.t. \quad |\mathbf{P}_{i,j}| = \tilde{f}(G_i, d_i) \leq \mathbf{P}_{i,j} \quad \forall i, j \in \mathbf{I}_{m_{m,cb}} \quad |\kappa_{i,j} \in \mathbf{I}_{m_{m,cb}} \quad (5e)
\]

Problem \(P_{4a}\) is almost identical to \(P_{2a}\) (and \(P_{3a}\)), with the exception of one term in the objective function (5a). With a g-component, generators pay nodal instead of zonal prices for transmission (\(\kappa_{i,j}\) instead of \(\kappa_{m,n}\)), depending on the impact of their nodal generation level on the grid infrastructure (\(\tilde{f}(G_i, d_i)\)). These prices are determined by the zonal TSOs via their flow-restriction (5e).

3. Numerical solution approach

Our approach to numerically solve the problem depicted in the previous section builds on the concept of decomposition. In fact, it follows the approach already depicted in the context of Setting I (Section 2.1), where we decomposed the integrated problem into two separate levels that are solved simultaneously and showed that they can – in economic terms – be interpreted as generation and transmission levels. According to Conejo et al. (2006), decomposition techniques can be applied to optimization problems with a decomposable structure that can be advantageously exploited. The idea of decomposition generally consists of splitting the optimization problem into a master and one or several subproblems that are solved iteratively. For the problem we are dealing with, namely the simultaneous optimization of generation and grid infrastructures under different congestion management designs and a varying number of TSOs, decomposing the overall problem entails two major advantages: First, the decomposition allows to easily implement variations of the generation and transmission levels including the underlying congestion management design. Hence, the model can be flexibly adjusted to represent the various settings described in the previous section. Second, the iterative nature of the solution process resulting from the decomposition allows to readily update PTDF matrices every time changes have been made in the grid infrastructure. This iterative update of the PTDF matrix, as suggested by Hagspiel et al. (2014), successively linearizes the non-linear optimization problem to ensure a consistent representation of generally non-linear grid properties, and allows for solving a corresponding linear problem. Linear problems can be solved effectively for global optima using standard techniques, such as the Simplex algorithm (e.g., Murty (1983)). Furthermore, the decomposition of linear problems preserves convexity and hence, also guarantees convergence towards the global optimum (e.g., Conejo et al. (2006)).

The obtained global optimum corresponds to an intertemporal equilibrium without uncertainty that is – due to the linear (and hence, convex) nature of our problem – unique. Moreover, in economic terms, the iterative algorithm to solve the decomposed problem can be readily interpreted as a price adjustment by a Walrasian auctioneer, also know as tatonnement procedure (e.g., Boyd et al. (2008)).

With some minor modifications, we can directly follow the (economically intuitive) formalization developed in the previous section and implement separate optimization problems representing the different tasks of generation and grid as well as the various settings (I–IV). We define the generation stage as the

---

\(\text{It should be noticed that despite the linearization and iterative solution, the non-linearity of the subproblem constraints still exists. However, even though not formally, Hagspiel et al. (2014) show that the problem converges for both, small test systems as well as large-scale applications. We confirm these findings in several model runs where we vary starting values over a broad range and did not find evidence against convergence. However, an analytical proof is still missing.}

12
master problem, whereas the subproblem covers the transmission stage. The principle idea of the solution algorithm is to solve the simultaneous generation and transmission stage problem iteratively, i.e., in a loop that runs as long as some convergence criterion is reached. In this process, optimized variables and marginal values are exchanged between the separated generation and grid levels reflecting the configuration of congestion management and TSO organization. For the settings described in the previous section, prices, which are iterated and thus adjusted, differ with respect to the information they contain and hence determine to which degree efficiency can be reached. Compared to nodal pricing (Setting I), the other settings provide prices or products that describe the underlying problem only incompletely – and hence, entail an inefficient outcome.

The numerical algorithm to solve the nodal pricing model is sketched below. Parameters that save levels of optimal variables for usage in the respective other stage are indicated by \((\cdot)\). It should be noticed that for the sake of comprehensibility, we still represent a simplified version of a more complete power system model that would need to account for multiple instances in time, multiple generation technologies, etc. However, the extension is straightforward and does not change the principle approach depicted here.

Information passed from the transmission to the generation stage is captured by \(\alpha\), for which a constraint (lower bound) is added in each iteration \(u\) up to the current iteration \(v\). This constraint consists of total grid costs \(Y^{(u)}\) as well as the marginal costs each unit of trade \(T_{i,j}\) is causing in the grid per node, denoted by \(\kappa^{(u)}_{i,j}\). Both pieces of information are provided in the highest possible temporal and spatial resolution. As these components occur in the objective function of the generation stage (via \(\alpha\)), the optimization will try to avoid the additional costs it is causing on the transmission stage, e.g., by moving power plant investments to alternative locations. The variable \(\alpha\) is needed to correctly account for the impact of the transmission on the generation stage. On the transmission stage, the TSO is coping with the exchange (i.e., trade) of power stemming from the dispatch situation delivered by the master problem, thereby determining the marginal costs the trade is causing on the transmission stage, i.e., \(\kappa\). Power flows are calculated by linearized load-flow equations represented by PTDF matrices mapping. The TSO then expands the grid such that it supports the emerging line flows at minimal costs.

\[
v = 1; \text{ convergence}=false
\text{While (convergence}=false) \{ \]

\(\text{Noticeably, the model could be inverted such that the master problem represents the grid sector which would, however, not change any of the results obtained.}\)
Master problem: generation

\[
\begin{align*}
\min_{G_i, G_i, T_{i,j}, \alpha} & \quad X = \sum_i \delta_i G_i + \sum_i \gamma_i G_i + \alpha \\
\text{s.t.} & \quad G_i - \sum_j T_{i,j} = d_i \quad \forall i \\
& \quad G_i \leq G_i \quad \forall i \\
& \quad Y^{(u)} + \sum_{i,j} \kappa_{i,j}^{(u)} \cdot f(T_{i,j} - T_{i,j}^{(u)}) \leq \alpha \quad \forall u = 1, \ldots, v - 1 | v > 1
\end{align*}
\]

(6a)

(6b)

(6c)

(6d)

\[T_{i,j}^{(v)} = \text{Optimal value of } T_{i,j} \quad \forall i, j\]  

(6e)

Sub-problem: transmission

\[
\begin{align*}
\min_{P_{i,j}, T_{i,j}} & \quad Y = \sum_{i,j} \mu_{i,j} P_{i,j} \\
\text{s.t.} & \quad |P_{i,j}| = f(T_{i,j}^{(v)}) \leq |PTDF \cdot T_{i,j}^{(v)}| \leq P_{i,j} \quad \forall i, j \quad |\kappa_{i,j}^{(v)}| \\
& \quad Y^{(v)} = \text{Optimal value of } Y
\end{align*}
\]

(6f)

(6g)

if(convergence criterion < threshold; convergence=true)

\[v = v + 1\]

);

As regards the representation of settings II-IV, only very few modifications are needed compared to the nodal pricing regime (Setting I). The numerical algorithmic implementation of the various settings and modifications directly follows the procedure discussed in Section 2 and is thus not discussed again in detail here.\(^{16}\)

4. Large-scale application

In this section, we apply the previously developed methodology to a detailed representation of the power sector in the Central Western European (CWE) region up to the year 2030. The application demonstrates the suitability of the modeling framework for large-scale problems and allows to assess and quantify the welfare losses in the considered region caused by different congestion management designs.

Given its historical, current and foreseen future development, the CWE region appears to be a particularly timely and relevant case study for different congestion management designs. In order to increase the market integration of European electricity markets towards an internal energy market, the European Union (EU) has declared the coupling of European electricity markets, which are organized in uniform price zones, an important stepping stone (see e.g. Glachant (2010), Commission de Régulation de l’Énergie (2009)). As for the cross-border capacity allocation, after a phase of NTC (Net Transfer Capacities) based market coupling,

\(^{16}\)Nevertheless, for the sake of completeness and reproducibility, we have included one more complete model formulation illustrating the main differences of the other settings in Appendix A.
the CWE region is currently implementing a flow-based market coupling which is expected to increase the efficiency of the utilization of transmission capacities as well as overall social welfare (Capacity Allocating Service Company (2014)). Even though nodal pricing regimes have often been discussed for the European power sector (see, e.g., Ehrenmann and Smeers (2005) or Oggioni and Smeers (2012)), it can be expected that uniform price zones that correspond to national borders will remain. In fact, zonal markets coupled via a flow-based algorithm have been declared the target model for the European power sector (ACER (2014)).

In each zonal market, the respective zonal (i.e., national) TSO is responsible for the transmission network. Thereby, TSOs are organized and regulated on a national level, such that they can be assumed to care mainly about grid operation and expansion planning within their own jurisdiction. Although there are an umbrella organization (ENTSO-E) and coordinated actions, such as the (non-binding) European Ten-Year-Network-Development-Plan (TYNDP), the incentives of the national regulatory regime to intensify cross-border action might fall short of effectiveness. At the same time, Europe is heavily engaged in the large-scale deployment of renewable energies, hence causing fundamental changes in the supply structure. Generation is now often built with respect to the availability of primary renewable resources, i.e. wind and solar irradiation, and not necessarily close to load. This implies that the current grid infrastructure is partly no longer suitable and needs to be substantially redesigned, rendering an efficient congestion management even more important than before.

4.1. Model configuration and assumptions

The applied model for the generation stage belongs to the class of partial equilibrium models that aim at determining the cost-optimal electricity supply to customers by means of dispatch and investments decisions based on a large number of technological options for generation. As power systems are typically large and complex, these models are commonly set up as a linear optimization problem which can efficiently be solved. Our model is an extended version of the linear long term investment and dispatch model for conventional, renewable, storage and transmission technologies as presented in Richter (2011) and applied in, e.g., Jägemann et al. (2013) or Hagspiel et al. (2014). In contrast to previous versions, the CWE region, i.e. Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and Netherlands, is considered with a high spatial (i.e., nodal) resolution. In order to account for exchanges with neighboring countries, additional regions are defined, but at an aggregated level: Southern Europe (Austria, Italy and Switzerland), South-West Europe (Portugal and Spain), North-West Europe (Ireland and UK), Northern Europe (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden), and Eastern Europe (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia). Figure 2 depicts the regional coverage and aggregation as they are represented in the model. In total, the model represents 70 nodes (or markets) and 174 power lines (AC and DC).

The model determines a possible path of how installed capacities will develop and how they are operated in the future assuming that electricity markets will achieve the cost-minimizing mix of different technologies which is obtained under perfect competition and the absence of market failures and distortions. Among a number of techno-economic constraints, e.g., supply coverage or investment decisions, the model also includes a number of politically implied constraints: nuclear power is phased-out where decided so, and then only allowed in countries already using it; a CO$_2$-Quota is implemented corresponding to currently discussed targets for the European energy sector, i.e. 20% reduction with respect to 1990 levels in 2020, and 40% in 2030 (European Commission (2013, 2014)); nation-specific 2020 targets for renewable energy sources are
assumed to be reached until 2020 whereas from 2020 onwards there are no further specific renewable energy targets. At the same time, endogenous investments into renewable energy technologies are always possible.

The utilized model for the transmission stage is based on PTDF matrices which are calculated using a detailed European power flow model developed by Energynautics (see Ackermann et al. (2013) for a detailed model description). The number of nodes (70) corresponds to the nodal markets implemented in the generation market model and represents generation and load centers within Europe at an aggregated level. Those nodes are connected by 174 high voltage alternating current (AC) lines (220 and 380kV) as well as high voltage direct current (HVDC) lines. Even though the model is generally built for AC load flow calculations, it is here used to determine PTDF matrices for different grid expansion levels. As in Hogan et al. (2010), the law of parallel circuits is applied for the reactances’ dependency on line capacity. Hence, each time an existing line with reactance $x_1$ is expanded by some amount characterized by reactance $x_2$ (dependent on the added line capacity), the new reactance becomes $1/x = 1/x_1 + 1/x_2$.

As a starting point, the optimization takes the situation of the year 2011, based on a detailed database developed at the Institute of Energy Economics at the University of Cologne which in turn is largely based on the Platts WEPP Database (Platts (2009)). From these starting conditions, the development for the
years 2020 and 2030 is optimized.\textsuperscript{17} As for the temporal resolution, we represent the operational phase by nine typical days representing weekdays and weekend as well as variations in and interdependencies between demand and power from solar and wind. One of the typical days represents an extreme day during the week with peak demand and low supply from wind and solar. Specific numerical assumptions for the generation and transmission model can be found in the Appendix B.

As in Settings II-IV zonal markets are being considered, assumptions about the cross-border price function \(g(\kappa_{i,j})\) are necessary. For the NTC-based coupling of market zones, we define function \(g(\kappa_{i,j}) = 1.43 \cdot \frac{\kappa_{i,j} P_{i,j}}{\sum_{i,j} P_{i,j}}\) \(\forall i,j \in \mathbf{m}_{cb}\) for each market border. The function consists of the weighted average of cross-border line marginals multiplied by a security margin. The security margin is the inverse of the ratio of NTC capacity to technical line capacity and has been derived heuristically by comparing currently installed cross-border grid capacities with NTC values reported by ENTSO-E for the CWE region. For flow-based market coupling, we set this security margin to one, in order to account for enhanced cross-border capacities provided to the power market.\textsuperscript{18} In the case of zonal TSOs, we have made the following two assumptions: Differing interest of TSOs regarding cross-border line extensions are aligned by taking the smaller one of the two expansion levels.\textsuperscript{19} The costs of cross-border lines are shared half-half by the two TSOs concerned, i.e. \(\sigma_{i,j} = 0.5\).

As suggested in Conejo et al. (2006), we define our convergence criterion as the difference between an upper bound (total generation and grid costs) and a lower bound (total generation costs and grid costs that are visible to the generator) of the overall problem and demand it to undershoot a 2.5\% threshold. This definition is based on the empirical observation that further improvements on the optimality error have little impact on the objective value and optimized capacities.

4.2. Results and discussion

We found that all settings converge to the optimal level in a range from around 20 to 60 iterations (corresponding to a solution time of 2 to 7 days). For practical reasons, we let all settings solve for one week and – after having double-checked that our convergence quality is met – take the last iteration for obtaining our final results.

To illustrate the convergent behavior of our problem, the following Figure 3, left hand side, shows the development of the optimality error (relative difference between the upper and lower bound of the optimization) along with the (absolute) rate of change of the lower bound obtained during the iterative solution of the nodal pricing setting. The lower bound is observed to change only slightly, reaching change rates smaller than 0.01\% after some 40 iterations. Moreover, as can be derived from the numbers presented in Figure 3, the relative error decreases at much faster rates with a ratio of approximately 200 for an estimated

\textsuperscript{17}Technically, we implement the optimization routine up to 2050, but only report results until 2030. This is necessary to avoid problematic results at the end of the optimization timeframe.

\textsuperscript{18}Of course, this is just a simple representation of the cross-border capacity allocation. However, a more detailed representation is rather complex and would go beyond the scope of this paper. For more sophisticated models of flow-based capacity allocation, the reader is referred to Kurzidem (2010).

\textsuperscript{19}Equation (A.1l) in Appendix A. Note that this assumption may influence the equilibrium solution of the coordination between the TSOs. Due to the fact that the minimum of the line capacities is chosen, the solutions for the TSOs are no longer continuous. Hence, some equilibria might be omitted during the iterative solution of the problem. We accept this shortfall in our numerical approach for the sake of the large-scale application. The general approach, however, remains valid, and a process for determining all equilibria could be implemented in the numerical solution method (e.g., through randomized starting values).
exponential trend and an iteration count of 60. Taking into account that the decomposition-based algorithm ensures a monotonically changing lower bound, it can be expected that the error further decreases mainly due to changes in the upper bound. Consequently, we argue that the lower bound can be taken as a good guess for the optimal objective value if our convergence criterion is met. A closer analysis of the optimized variable levels that reach stable levels during the same number of iterations is supporting this argument. As an example, the right hand side of Figure 3 shows aggregated AC line capacities obtained in the final runs of the nodal pricing setting.

\[ y = 0.0002e^{-0.021x} \]

Costs are reported as accumulated discounted system costs.\(^{20}\) In the generation sector, costs occur due to investments, operation and maintenance, production as well as ramping, whereas in the grid sector, investment as well as operation and maintenance costs are considered. Overall costs of electricity supply can be considered as a measure of efficiency and are reported in the following Figure 4 for the different settings. Besides the absolute costs, which are subdivided into generation and grid costs, the relative cost increase with respect to the overall costs of the nodal pricing setting is also depicted.

\[ \text{System costs [bn. € 2011]} \]

As expected, nodal pricing (Setting I) is most efficient, with total costs summing up to 899.0 bn. €\(_{2011}\) (874.3 bn. for generation and 24.7 bn. for the grid). Overall, costs increase by up to 4.6% relative to Setting I for the other settings. Thereby, NTC-based market coupling induces highest inefficiencies of 3.8% and 4.6%.

\(^{20}\)The discount rate is assumed to be 10% throughout all calculations.
for one single TSO or zonal TSOs, respectively, both with the possibility to do redispatch on a national basis (Setting II-NTC and Setting III-NTC). Hence, offering few amounts of trading capacity to the generation market, as implied by NTC-based market coupling, induces significant inefficiencies. In fact, by increasing trading capacities via flow-based market coupling, system costs can be lowered and inefficiencies amount to 2.5% for the single TSO, respectively 3.5% for zonal TSOs compared to nodal pricing (Setting II-FB and Setting III-FB). Hence, efficiency gains of 1.1-1.3 % of total system costs can be achieved by switching from NTC to flow-based market coupling. In turn, enhanced trading activities induced by flow-based market coupling entail greater TSO activity, both in the expansion as well as in the redispatch. For this reason, TSO costs are higher for flow-based than for NTC-based market coupling. However, these additional costs are overcompensated by lower costs in the generation sector. The net effect of a switch from NTC to flow-based market coupling is beneficial for the overall system.

Somewhat surprisingly, the national g-component (Setting IV) hardly performs better than the same setting with redispatch (Setting III-FB). Hence, the optimal allocation of power generation within market zones is hardly influenced by grid restrictions within that zone. In contrast, the optimal allocation induced by nodal prices throughout the CWE region entails substantial gains in efficiency due to reduced system costs. The setting that comes closest to nodal pricing consists of flow-based coupled zonal markets with a single TSO and induces an inefficiency of 2.5% in comparison to nodal pricing (Setting II-FB vs. Setting I).

Even though the share of TSO costs on total costs is very small compared to the share of generation costs in all settings (1.3-2.7%)\(^1\), the amount of grid capacities varies greatly between the different settings. Figure 5 shows the aggregated high voltage (HV) AC and HVDC line capacities.

\[ \text{Figure 5: Aggregated line capacities AC and DC} \]

Grid capacities are generally lower in the case of zonal TSOs where they only agree on the smaller of the two proposed expansion levels for cross-border lines (Setting III-FB and Setting III-NTC). In these cases, overall AC grid capacities increase from 331GW in 2011 to 398GW (Setting III-NTC) respectively 418GW (Setting III-FB) in 2030, corresponding to an increase of 20-28%. In case of a single TSO, cross-border along with overall line expansions are significantly higher compared to zonal TSOs, with 2030 levels reaching 519GW (Setting II-NTC) to 724GW (Setting II-FB). Especially in Setting II-FB, the TSO is obliged to cope with inefficiently allocated generation plants by excessively expanding the grid, while not being able to avoid those measures with suitable price signals. DC line expansions appear to be crucial for an

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\(^1\)The rather minor role of grid costs compared to costs occurring in the generation sector has already been identified, e.g., in Fürsch et al. (2013).
efficient system development, especially towards the UK where large wind farms help to reach CO\textsubscript{2}-targets and to supply the UK itself as well as the continent with comparatively cheap electricity. Thereby, the high DC expansion level in the nodal pricing regime is remarkable. Whereas in zonal markets prices are "averaged" across the zone, nodal prices reveal the true value of connecting specific nodes via DC-lines and thus enable efficient investments in those projects. In consequence, in the nodal pricing regime, DC line capacities are about double as high as in the other settings. This helps to reduce overall costs to a minimum (Setting I).

Besides the overall level of grid and generation capacities, their regional allocation also differs between the various settings, mainly due to differences in the (local) availability of transmission upgrades. As has been seen, higher grid expansion levels result from a single TSO (Setting I and Setting II), enabling a better utilization of renewable energies at favorable sites (i.e., sites where the specific costs of electricity generation are lowest). In Figure 6, we exemplarily illustrate this effect based on a cross-border line between France and Germany (line 80 in our model). However, the same effect is observable for other interconnections, e.g., between France and Belgium. Higher grid capacities allow the use of high wind speed locations in Northern France and thus foster more expansion of wind capacities in this area. In case of zonal TSOs (Setting III and Setting IV) only low amounts of wind capacity are built in France (e.g., in node FR-06) as these areas cannot be connected with the rest of the system. To still meet the European CO\textsubscript{2}-target, PV power plants are built in the southern part of Germany (e.g., in node DE-27). Obviously, these locations are non-optimal with respect to other options as they are not used in the setting with one TSO. Thus, implemented market designs significantly influence the amount and location of renewable energies within the system.\textsuperscript{22}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{grid_expansion.png}
\caption{Exemplary grid expansion and regional allocation of renewable energies}
\end{figure}

5. Conclusions

In the context of liberalized power markets and unbundled generation and transmission services, the purpose of this paper was to develop a modeling framework for different regulatory designs regarding congestion management including both, the operation as well as the investment perspective in the generation and transmission sector. We have presented an analytical formulation that is able to account for different regulatory designs of market areas, a single or zonal TSOs, as well as different forms of measures to relieve congestion. Conventional capacities are also affected. However, the effect is less pronounced as the differences between the site-specific costs of generation are smaller.
congestion, namely grid expansion, redispatch and g-components. We have then proposed an algorithm to numerically solve these problems, based on the concept of decomposition. This technique has shown to entail a number of characteristics that work to our advantage, especially flexible algorithmic implementation as well as consistency of the grid flow representation through PTDF update.

Calibrating our model to the CWE region, we have demonstrated the applicability of our numerical solution algorithm in a large-scale application consisting of 70 nodes and 174 lines along with a detailed bottom-up representation of the generation sector. Compared to nodal pricing as the efficient benchmark, inefficiencies induced by alternative settings reach additional system costs of up to 4.6%. Major deteriorative factors are TSOs activities restricted to zones as well as low trading capacities offered to the market. These findings may serve as a guideline to better design and regulate international power markets. For instance, our results confirm ongoing efforts to implement flow-based market coupling and to foster a closer cooperation of TSOs in the CWE region. In fact, we find that such a setting (flow-based market coupling and coordinated TSOs) could come close to the nodal pricing benchmark, with an efficiency difference of only 2.5%. Noticeably, the magnitude of these results should be interpreted as the lower bound of efficiency gains, since we focus on frictions in the congestion management only.

More generally, we find that a single TSO (or enhanced coordination between the zonal TSOs) is key for an efficient development of both, grid and generation infrastructures. Whereas the expansion of grid infrastructure is immediately affected, the generation sector indirectly takes advantage of increased grid capacities and hence, can develop more efficiently. Better allocation of generation units with respect to grid costs through high resolution price signals gains importance for larger geographical areas and larger differences between generation costs and expansion potentials (such as wind or solar power). This has been found for the CWE region, and may prove even more important for the whole of Europe. It should be noted, however, that efficiency gains need to be put into the context of transaction costs occurring from the switch to a different congestion management design. In addition, socio-economic factors such as acceptance for grid expansion are not considered in the analysis, but might also play a role considering the large differences of necessary grid quantities.

Limitations of our approach that leave room for extensions and improvement stem from the fact that we assume linear transmission investments, and do not consider strategic behavior of individual agents, imperfectly regulated TSOs, or uncertainty about future developments (e.g., delays in expansion projects). The assumption of an inelastic demand probably reduces the magnitude of the measured inefficiencies, since demand does not react to any price changes and hence only supply-side effects are captured. Algorithmically, the effectiveness of our solution process could be further improved, e.g., through better usage of numerical properties of the problem (such as gradients, etc.). Nevertheless, in its present form, our framework may serve as a valuable tool to assess a number of further relevant questions, such as the tradeoff between different flexibility options (such as grids, storages or renewable curtailment), the impact of different forms of congestion management in other European regions, or the valuation of grid expansion projects.

References


Capacity Allocating Service Company (2014, May). Documentation of the CWE FB MC solution - As basis for the formal approval-request.


Appendix A. Model of NTC-coupled zonal markets, zonal TSOs, and zonal redispatch

In Section 3, we have shown the numerical implementation of the nodal pricing regime. For the sake of clarifying the major changes needed to represent the alternative Settings II-IV, we here present the model for \( m \) zonal (instead of nodal) markets that are coupled via NTC-based capacity restrictions, along with multiple zonal TSOs (instead of only one), all having the possibility to deploy zonal redispatch as an alternative to grid expansion. Hence, the model corresponds to Setting III with NTC-based market coupling.

Compared to nodal pricing, no more nodal or time-specific information about grid costs is provided. Instead, an aggregated price \( \kappa_{m,n}^{(v)} \) for each border is calculated via a function \( g_{NTC} \) and passed on to generation level.

\[
\kappa_{m,n}^{(v)} = g_{NTC}(\kappa_v) (A.1k)
\]

\[
P_{i,j}^{(v)} = \min \{ \bar{P}_{i,j}^{(v)} \in I_{m,cb}, \bar{P}_{i,j}^{(v)} \in I_{n,cb} \} = \min \{ \bar{P}_{i,j}^{(v)} \in I_{m,cb}, \bar{P}_{i,j}^{(v)} \in I_{n,cb} \} (A.1l)
\]

\( v = 1 \); convergence=false

While(convergence=false) {

Master problem: generation

\[
\begin{align*}
\min_{\bar{G}_i, G_i, T_{m,n}, \alpha} & \quad \sum_{i} \delta_i \bar{G}_i + \sum_{i} \gamma_i G_i + \alpha \\
\text{s.t.} & \quad \sum_{i} G_i - \sum_{n} T_{m,n} = \sum_{i} d_i \quad \forall m \\
& \quad G_i \leq \bar{G}_i \quad \forall i \\
& \quad \sum_{m} Y_m^{(u)} + \sum_{m,n} \kappa_{m,n}^{(u)} \cdot (T_{m,n} - T_{m,n}^{(u)}) \leq \alpha \quad \forall u = 1, \ldots, v - 1 \mid v > 1 \quad (A.1d)
\end{align*}
\]

\( G_{i}^{(v)} = \text{Optimal value of } G_i \quad \forall i \) (A.1e)

Sub-problem: transmission

\[
\begin{align*}
\min_{\bar{P}_{i,j} \in I_{m,cb}, \bar{P}_{i,j} \in I_{n,cb}} & \quad Y_m = \sum_{i,j} \mu_{i,j} \bar{P}_{i,j} + \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i,j} \mu_{i,j} \bar{P}_{i,j} + \sum_{i} R_i \gamma_i \quad \forall m \\
\text{s.t.} & \quad |P_{i,j}| = |\bar{f}(G_{i}^{(v)}, d_i)| = \sum_{i'} PTD \cdot (G_{i}^{(v)} - d_i) \leq \bar{P}_{i,j} \quad \forall i, j \mid G_{i}^{(v)} \quad (A.1g) \\
& \quad 0 \leq R_i + G_{i}^{(v)} \leq \bar{G}_i \quad \forall i \in I_m \\
& \quad \sum_{i} R_i = 0 \quad (A.1h) \\
& \quad Y_m^{*} = \text{Optimal value of } Y_m \quad (A.1j) \\
& \quad \kappa_{m,n} = g_{NTC}(\kappa_{i,j}) \quad (A.1k) \\
& \quad \bar{P}_{i,j} \in I_{m,cb} = \bar{P}_{i,j} \in I_{n,cb} = \min \{ \bar{P}_{i,j} \in I_{m,cb}, \bar{P}_{i,j} \in I_{n,cb} \} \quad (A.1l)
\end{align*}
\]

if(convergence criterion < threshold; convergence=true)

\( v = v + 1 \)
};

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Appendix B. Numerical assumptions for the large-scale application

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>2030</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>573</td>
<td>612</td>
<td>629</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>466</td>
<td>524</td>
<td>559</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>436</td>
<td>465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>528</td>
<td>594</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southwest</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>481</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table B.3: Assumptions for the gross electricity demand [TWh]

To depict the CWE region in a high spatial resolution, we split the gross electricity demand per country among the nodes belonging to this country according to the percentage of population living in that region.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Technology</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>2030</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wind Onshore</td>
<td>1253</td>
<td>1188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wind Offshore (&lt;20m depth)</td>
<td>2800</td>
<td>2350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wind Offshore (&gt;20m depth)</td>
<td>3080</td>
<td>2585</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Photovoltaics (roof)</td>
<td>1260</td>
<td>935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Photovoltaics (ground)</td>
<td>1110</td>
<td>785</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biomass gas</td>
<td>2398</td>
<td>2395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biomass solid</td>
<td>3297</td>
<td>3295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biomass gas, CHP</td>
<td>2597</td>
<td>2595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biomass solid, CHP</td>
<td>3497</td>
<td>3493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geothermal</td>
<td>10504</td>
<td>9500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compressed Air Storage</td>
<td>1100</td>
<td>1100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pump Storage</td>
<td>1200</td>
<td>1200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lignite</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>1500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lignite Innovative</td>
<td>1600</td>
<td>1600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal</td>
<td>1200</td>
<td>1200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal Innovative</td>
<td>2025</td>
<td>1800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGCC</td>
<td>1700</td>
<td>1700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCGT</td>
<td>711</td>
<td>711</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCGT</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear</td>
<td>3157</td>
<td>3157</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table B.4: Assumptions for the generation technology investment costs [€/kW]
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fuel type</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>2030</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lignite</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>58.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gas</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>25.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table B.5: Assumptions for the gross fuel prices [€/MWh\textsubscript{th}]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grid Technology</th>
<th>Extension costs</th>
<th>FOM costs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AC overhead line incl. compensation</td>
<td>445 €/(MVA*km)</td>
<td>2.2 €/(MVA*km)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DC overhead line</td>
<td>400 €/(MW*km)</td>
<td>2.0 €/(MW*km)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DC underground</td>
<td>1250 €/(MW*km)</td>
<td>6.3 €/(MW*km)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DC submarine</td>
<td>1100 €/(MW*km)</td>
<td>5.5 €/(MW*km)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DC converter pair</td>
<td>150000 €/MW</td>
<td>750.0 €/MW</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table B.6: Assumptions for the grid extension and FOM costs