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Research Report
The costs of Greece's fiscal consolidation

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The costs of Greece’s fiscal consolidation

Abstract

This policy brief reexamines the effects of the Greek austerity experiment on its economy via a counterfactual analysis. We combine the fiscal multipliers from the meta regression analysis in Gechert and Rannenberg (2014) to the fiscal consolidation measures that have been implemented in Greece between 2010 and 2014. We estimate that austerity explains almost the entire collapse of Greek GDP after 2009. This result suggests that - ceteris paribus - , in the absence of austerity, the Greek economy would have entered a prolonged period of stagnation, rather than a depression.

At the same time the path of the government debt-to-GDP ratio would have been somewhat lower. Furthermore, we estimate that if the consolidation would have been postponed until after the recovery of the Greek economy and implemented gradually, almost two thirds of the cost in terms of lost output could have been avoided. Our results suggest that the period 2010-2014 was the wrong time to implement frontloaded spending cuts due to their strong multipliers in downturns. Implementing only the revenue components of the Greek fiscal consolidation would have strongly reduced the output contraction as compared to the actual path of GDP, but would have been much more effective at lowering the debt-to-GDP ratio than the actual fiscal consolidation. A more cautious consolidation would thus have been in the interest of international creditors as well.
The costs of Greece’s fiscal consolidation

Sebastian Gechert¹ and Ansgar Rannenberg¹

The recent Greek election resulted in a new government led by the Syriza party, whose main goal is to end the period of fiscal austerity imposed on successive Greek governments since 2010 by the Troika consisting of the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The attempt by the new government to change course has met strong resistance from Euro Area finance ministers and Germany’s Wolfgang Schäuble in particular. Whether the Greek government will be able to extract substantial concessions over the coming months remains to be seen. In any case, Greek economic policy – and possibly that of the Euro Area more generally – appears to be at the crossroads and has been surrounded by controversy over the last couple of years.

Against this background, this policy brief reexamines the effects of the Greek austerity experiment on its economy. We estimate that austerity almost entirely explains the collapse of Greek GDP after 2009. This result suggests that ceteris paribus in the absence of austerity, the Greek economy would have entered a prolonged period of stagnation, rather than a depression. At the same time the path of the government debt-to-GDP ratio would have been somewhat lower. Furthermore, we estimate that if the consolidation would have been postponed until after the recovery of the Greek economy and implemented gradually, almost two thirds of the cost in terms of lost output could have been avoided. To be sure, we do not argue that the Greek public finances were in good shape when the fiscal consolidation began. However, irrespectively of whether the Greek budget was structurally unbalanced or not, as the economy was in particularly bad shape, our results suggest that the 2010-2014 period was the wrong time to implement spending cuts, and that any expenditure based consolidation should have been phased in gradually after the recovery of the Greek economy. Implementing only the revenue components of the Greek fiscal consolidation would have strongly reduced the output contraction as compared to the actual path of GDP, but would have been much more effective at lowering the debt-to-GDP ratio than the actual fiscal consolidation.

Estimating the value of fiscal multipliers

We employ the multiplier estimates of Gechert and Rannenberg (2014) to assess the impact of the fiscal consolidation in Greece over the period 2010-2014, following Gechert et al. (2015), who use them to assess the effects of the Euro Area’s fiscal consolidation on aggregate Euro Area GDP. Gechert and Rannenberg (2014) conduct a meta-regression analysis of fiscal multiplier estimates based on a broad set of empirical reduced form models, which is extracted from 98 scientific papers. The meta study aims to identify and quantify the dependence of fiscal multipliers of individual fiscal instruments on the economic circumstances in the period in which the multiplier was estimated, controlling for

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model uncertainty and sample uncertainty. Taking averages across all other independent variables, the authors report multiplier estimates for a range of expenditure categories as well as taxes, and for three economic regimes, which are reported in Figure 1 below. The regimes are an “upper regime” (above average economic circumstances), an “average regime” (average economic circumstances), and a “lower regime” (below average economic circumstances). The latter regime clearly corresponds to the state the Greek economy has been in after 2007. For all expenditure categories the cumulative multipliers always exceed one in a downturn. By contrast, tax-impulse multipliers are substantially below one across all regimes.

Are these multiplier estimates valid in the case of the fiscal contraction which occurred in Greece? Basically, the multipliers are roughly in line with a recent estimation of regime-dependent multipliers for Greek time series (Monokroussos and Thomakos 2013). However, a common argument is that when embarking on fiscal consolidation, financial markets had severe doubts regarding the sustainability of Greek public finances. By helping to restore investor confidence and thus lowering sovereign bond yields, fiscal consolidation measures would support private expenditure, implying lower fiscal multipliers than in the absence of fiscal stress (Trichet 2010, Corsetti et al. 2012). However, recent empirical evidence suggests that the effect of cuts to government consumption expenditure on GDP is actually higher in the presence than in the absence of fiscal stress (Born et al. 2015), perhaps related to the fact that the effect on the sovereign risk spreads is ambiguous (Born et al. 2015, Cottarelli and Jaramillo 2012).

Another caveat is that the path of the expenditure or tax impulse for which the multipliers in the multiplier database are estimated will in general not equal the changes implemented over the 2010-2014 period in Greece. However, given that any assessment of the effects of

![Figure 1: Cumulative multipliers of fiscal impulses for different regimes, full sample](image-url)
fiscal consolidation is bound to suffer from uncertainties, and that the multipliers reported here are based on a substantial amount of estimates generated by a range of different methodologies, we believe the following exercise to be useful nevertheless.

**Measuring the consolidation effort**

For the exercise conducted below, we would ideally like to use data on the discretionary, exogenous policy changes to government consumption, government investment, transfers to households, and taxes as caused by the implementation of the Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) between the Greek government and the Troika. As we are not aware of such detailed data on the Greek fiscal effort, we take the following route. For changes in government consumption, government investment and transfers, we use AMECO series “Final consumption expenditure of general government”, “Gross Fixed Capital Formation: General Government” and “Social Benefits other than social transfers in kind: General government”, and deflate them using the GDP deflator. These three categories comprise more than 90% of non-interest government expenditure in Greece. Note that we are not able to perform any cyclical adjustment on these measures. This should not pose a big problem with respect to government consumption and investment, whose magnitudes are arguably directly determined by fiscal policy. However, the available figures for transfers are likely to underestimate the discretionary consolidation effort as they are affected by both fiscal policy and economic developments. Benefit claims would be expected to increase when unemployment is on the rise as observed in Greece from 2008 to 2013, thus counteracting the discretionary cuts in transfers.

To measure the discretionary increases in taxes and social security contributions, we used the AMECO series “Discretionary Measures Current Revenue”. This measure is held to be superior to the changes in cyclically adjusted revenue, which will tend to understate the true discretionary fiscal effort due to imperfections of the cyclical adjustment procedure and the fact that the Greek economy was in a severe downturn (European Commission 2013, Gechter et al. 2014).

Table 1a and 1b presents our estimate of the cumulative consolidation effort expressed in billions of 2010 Euros and as a percentage of 2009 real GDP. The table illustrates the biblical scale of austerity in Greece. By 2014, total government expenditure is expected to have been cut by 29.2 bn Euro, the equivalent of 12% of 2009 GDP. As pointed out above, the discretionary cut we would ideally like to observe will likely exceed the decline of actual transfers reported in the table and used in our calculation below, so that to this extent our estimations must be considered conservative.

Estimated discretionary revenue increases are of essentially the same magnitude. By 2014, our measure of combined revenue and expenditure cuts accumulated to 58.6 bn Euro, equivalent to 24.6% of Greek 2009 GDP. This is above the change in cyclically adjusted net

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2 There is a time series on “discretionary measures current and capital revenue” in AMECO. However, the series does not distinguish the different expenditure components which arguably have distinct multipliers.

3 This measure is generated by the country desks of the Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs of the European Commission following the so called bottom-up approach, which cumulates the budgetary effects of changes to tax laws holding the tax base constant.
lending as measured by the European Commission (16.9%) and in the underlying primary balance as measured by the OECD (18.4%) over the same period, which should be due to the different assessment of discretionary changes on the revenue side. However, the broad time profile of our estimated fiscal consolidation effort – a very big initial impulse in 2010, followed by smaller efforts in subsequent years – is roughly in line with the profile of these measures of the fiscal stance.

Table 1a: Consolidation actions in Greece - Cumulative revenue increases and expenditure cuts, 2010 Billion Euro

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>2011</th>
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<td>25.1</td>
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Table 1b: Consolidation actions in Greece - Cumulative revenue increases and expenditure cuts, % of 2009 GDP

<table>
<thead>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>16.1</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>24.5</td>
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</table>

Source: AMECO, Eurostat, own calculations. 2014 values based on DG ECFIN forecasts as of February 2015.

Gauging the effect of Greece’s fiscal consolidation

We now combine the changes of the fiscal instruments reported in Table 1 with the multipliers reported in Figure 1. We account for the fact that the Greek share of imports is somewhat higher than the average in the fiscal multiplier database on which the Gechert and Rannenberg (2014) estimates are based, implying that the actual multipliers are somewhat below the values reported in Figure 1.\(^4\) Table 2 shows the impact on GDP.

We find that the fiscal consolidation in Greece reduced GDP by more than 10% in 2010, with the cumulative GDP decline increasing to 28% in 2013, after which it decreases to about 26% in 2014, as – according to our estimates – fiscal austerity was relaxed somewhat on the expenditure side in 2014. Thus the austerity measures came at a huge cost.\(^5\) By far the

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\(^4\) The share of imports in GDP ranges from 23.7% in 2010 to 28.2% in 2014. By contrast, the sample average equaled 22.8%. Multipliers are accordingly reduced by between 0.07 and 0.13.

\(^5\) This finding is consistent with Wren-Lewis (2015), who argues, based on some alternative fiscal measures, that changes in the underlying primary balance since 2009 explain all of the change in the output gap.
biggest contribution to the GDP decline comes from cuts to government consumption, which is driven by its high share in the overall consolidation effort and its high multipliers. By contrast, the contribution of tax increases to the GDP decline is much lower due to the lower tax multipliers.

Table 2a: Estimated cumulative GDP effect of Greece’s fiscal consolidation, Billion Euro

<table>
<thead>
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Table 2b: Estimated cumulative GDP effect of Greece's fiscal consolidation, % of 2009 GDP

<table>
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<th>2011</th>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Expenditures</td>
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<td>-17.2</td>
<td>-21.8</td>
<td>-28.0</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2: Greek real GDP under various scenarios, 2007=100

Source: AMECO, own calculations.
We can use our estimates of the GDP decline induced by fiscal austerity to gauge the path of Greek GDP in the absence of the austerity measures as displayed in Table 1. Figure 2 compares this scenario of no austerity to several benchmarks, including the actual path of Greek GDP. According to our estimate, in the absence of fiscal consolidation, Greek GDP would be at roughly the same level as in 2009, instead of suffering a decline of more than 25%. This result is driven by the aforementioned scale of austerity in Greece, and our fiscal multipliers. The average multiplier of the cumulated spending reduction and revenue increases amounts to 1.1.

We also report an estimate of the path of the Greek primary budget balance and the government debt-to-GDP ratio in the absence of fiscal consolidation. This exercise requires further assumptions. First, we have to estimate the feedback of the GDP contraction caused by the fiscal consolidation on the primary balance. This feedback effect partly offsets the direct effect of the discretionary fiscal measures summarized in Table 1 by reducing tax revenues and increasing benefit claims. To capture this automatic stabilizer effect, we assume a semi-elasticity of the primary budget balance with respect to GDP of 0.47, as estimated by Girouard and André (2005) for the Greek economy. Furthermore, we assume that the average interest rate on the outstanding stock of government debt equals its actual value over the 2010 to 2014 period in all scenarios considered below.

Finally, we have to assume a path for the GDP deflator, which is relevant in shaping the dynamics of the government debt-to-GDP ratio. As can be obtained from Figure 3, the change in the Greek GDP deflator decelerated substantially after 2008 and turned negative in 2013. This development is most likely caused by the collapse of GDP and the associated emergence of big spare capacities and mass unemployment, which reduced wage and price pressures. It appears likely that under the essentially flat GDP path in the scenario of no fiscal consolidation, the annual change in the GDP deflator would have avoided negative territory. As the path of Greek GDP under the no austerity scenario is very similar to the post-2009 path of GDP in the Euro Area, we assume that starting in 2010, the Greek GDP deflator in the absence of austerity would have grown at the same pace as the Euro Area GDP deflator.

Source: Eurostat, own calculations.
Note: The paths of primary balances exclude one-off measures, while the paths of government debt-to-GDP ratios include one-off measures and stock-flow adjustments. Excluding or including these measures would affect all scenarios in the same manner. Source: AMECO, Eurostat, own calculations.

Figure 4 shows that in the absence of austerity, although the primary deficit would have remained close to its 2009 level over the 2010-2014 period, the 2014 debt-to-GDP ratio would actually be somewhat lower than in the presence of fiscal consolidation, chiefly as a consequence the more favorable path of real GDP.

Alternative consolidation scenarios

According to the multiplier estimates reported in Figure 1, spending cuts have much smaller adverse effects on GDP during average economic circumstances than during economic downturns. We therefore also consider a scenario where Greece would have backloaded its fiscal consolidation until after the recovery of its economy - a situation which could be classified as average economic circumstances. In this case, the cumulative negative GDP effects would have amounted to only 9.1% of GDP. That is to say, almost two thirds of the negative impact on GDP are due to the frontloading of measures and could have been avoided by postponing and gradually implementing fiscal consolidation. The effect on the primary balance would also be more favorable: Under average economic circumstances, the measures displayed in Table 1 would cause a cumulative improvement in the primary budget balance of about 20 percentage points. As the overall contractionary fiscal impulse is rather big, even in average economic circumstances, a fiscal consolidation of Greek proportions would have preferably been spread over a number years, in order to avoid a return to recession. Our finding that, ceteris paribus, backloading the fiscal consolidation would have had strongly beneficial effects is in line with findings of other authors, using different models and empirical methods (Batini et al. 2012, ECLM / IMK / OFCE 2012).
Interestingly, the overall multiplier in the backloading scenario is close to the value which was used by the IMF and other international institutions at the start of World Financial Crisis and after to quantify the effects of fiscal consolidation (Blanchard and Leigh 2013). This coincidence suggests that the Troika did not adequately take into account the prevailing crisis conditions causing higher than average multipliers when designing the Greek structural adjustment program. In doing so, it was ignoring some of the latest research (see for instance Eggertsson (2009) and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2011), which was first circulated in 2009 as well).

Furthermore, Figure 1 shows that during economic downturns, estimated tax multipliers are much smaller than spending multipliers. We therefore investigate the effect of implementing only the tax increases but not the spending reductions listed in Table 1. As illustrated by Figure 1, the path of GDP would be somewhat lower than under the no consolidation scenario, but still a lot more favorable than the actual path. To estimate the implied paths of the primary balance and the debt-to-GDP ratio, we assume that with a tax-only consolidation, the GDP deflator would have remained at its 2009 level until 2014, as the economy would have been weaker still. The much lower estimated decline in GDP allows an improvement in the primary balance almost as big as under the actual consolidation, illustrating that the spending cuts displayed in Table 1 contribute very little to fiscal consolidation, as their consolidation effects are almost self-defeating. At the same time, the lower GDP decline directly lowers the trajectory of the debt-to-GDP ratio, implying that the 2014 estimated debt-to-GDP ratio would be almost 40 percentage points below its actual level if only the revenue increases listed in Table 1 had been implemented. These findings are in line with Erceg and Lindé (2013), who show in the context of a New Keynesian model that during a deep downturn, front loaded tax hikes are more effective to reduce government debt quickly than expenditure cuts due to the smaller adverse effect on GDP.

To be sure, backloading the Greek fiscal consolidation would have faced considerable political and institutional challenges. In 2010, the Greek political establishment was not considered trustworthy by its European partners as a consequence of the persistent misreporting of the Greek government debt and deficits revealed in the previous year. Establishing mechanisms ensuring that the Greek government would eventually consolidate after having been granted financial assistance would have been difficult. Euro Area governments might also have resisted focusing the consolidation on the revenue side to the extent that they discounted the Greeks’ ability to reform its tax collection system. However, these challenges must be weighed against the cost of frontloaded consolidation based on spending cuts. Our estimates suggest that this cost was very high. Frontloading fiscal consolidation has thus made the repayment of the Greek government debt more difficult, which – if nothing else— should have been of concern to Euro Area governments keen on recuperating their domestic taxpayers’ money.

**On the plausibility of the Greek GDP path under the no-austerity scenario**

Regarding the scenario that abstains from any consolidation effort, the fact that our estimate attributes the entire decline in Greek GDP since 2009 to fiscal consolidation may seem surprising. At the time the fiscal consolidation began, the Greek economy was widely
held to suffer from severe problems, most notably a big decline in price competitiveness during pre-crisis years, a massive current account deficit and private capital outflows driven by fear about the solvency of the government and the Greek financial system.

However, we believe the GDP path implied by our counterfactual scenario to be plausible on the following grounds. First, it is important to recall that in our hypothetical scenario, everything stays the same, except for the fiscal policy changes reported in Table 1a and 1b. In particular, Greece does not exit the Euro. The Greek fiscal bailout and the associated bailout of the Greek banks do take place and the Greek banks still receive funding via the ECBs unconventional measures. These helped to replace the flight of private capital and thus allowed for a more gradual current account adjustment, and thus a more gradual adjustment of private expenditure, than in the absence of such support.

What is more, the performance of the Greek economy under the counterfactual scenario of no austerity is by no means stellar, but amounts to a prolonged period of stagnation. In 2014, Greek GDP would still be 3.5% below the pre-crisis peak of 2007. Thus the Greek economy in the absence of domestic austerity would have fared worse than the Euro Area, whose fiscal consolidation over the period 2010-2014 cumulated to between 3.3% and 4.5% of 2009 real GDP. The Greek performance in the absence of austerity would also have been dismal by past Greek standards. From 2001 to 2007, the average annual growth rate of the Greek economy amounted to 4.1%. While the high growth observed during this period might be related to high capital inflows associated with Greece’s accession to the Euro and thus might be considered unsustainable, during the preceding decade (1991-2000), average GDP growth still equaled 2.5%. Furthermore, in 2007, Greece was still the third poorest member of the Euro Area, with GDP per capita measured at purchasing power standards falling 17% short the Euro Area average, thus suggesting the possibility of growth rates above the Euro Area average. As Figure 2 shows, if the Greek economy had grown at its average growth rate of the 1990s since, its 2014 GDP would have exceeded the 2007 figure by almost 19%, rather than falling short by 3.5% as in the no-austerity scenario. All in all, the no-austerity scenario appears consistent with an economy correcting past excesses and undergoing a process of current account adjustment, and thus does not appear excessively optimistic.

Conclusion

The debate on Greek economic policy since the outbreak of the European sovereign debt crisis as well as its future is set to continue over the coming months and years. We contribute to the assessment of the former by estimating the effect of the Greek tax increases and expenditure cuts. We find that austerity in Greece almost exclusively explains the decline of Greek GDP since 2009 and actually increased the government debt-to-GDP ratio somewhat as compared to a no-austerity scenario. We also estimate that most of the costs of fiscal consolidation could have been avoided by postponing and gradually implementing it after the recovery of the Greek economy, due to the lower expenditure growth rate.

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6 If measured as the real change in cyclically adjusted net lending excluding interest, calculated by multiplying its share in potential GDP with real potential GDP as estimated by the European Commission, the consolidation effort cumulated to 3.3% of real GDP in 2009. The estimated magnitude of the effort would amount to 4.8% of 2009 real GDP if calculated as the sum of discretionary revenue and expenditure measures cumulated over the 2010 to 2014 period and deflated using the GDP deflator, also reported by the European Commission.
multipliers during normal times. Finally, a much lower path of the Greek debt-to-GDP ratio could have been achieved by implementing only the revenue increases but not the expenditure cuts which were part of the consolidation package. It appears that those who warned against the Greek austerity experiment early on (e.g. Horn et al 2011) were right.

To be sure, we do not argue that the Greek public finances were in good shape when the fiscal consolidation began. However, irrespectively of whether the Greek budget was structurally unbalanced or not, as the economy was in particularly bad shape, our results suggest that the 2010-2014 period was the wrong time to implement spending cuts, and that any expenditure based consolidation should have been phased in gradually after the recovery of Greek economy.

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