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
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REGIONAL COMPETITION FOR THE LOCATION OF NEW FACILITIES

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Abstract: A model of interregional competition for the location of new (production) facilities by a location decision maker (LDM) is analyzed as a differential game. Two regions try to enhance their attraction by making concessions to the LDM in order to raise the probability that a new facility will be located in a specific region, the benefit of which consists of the number of new jobs, new income etc. It is shown that the prospective benefits and costs of exerting influence are decisive for the final outcomes of the model. The open-loop Nash equilibrium solution – which is also a degenerate feedback solution due to the simple structure of the model – is likely to be inefficient in comparison with the cooperative solution of joint benefit maximization of both regions.

Keywords: Differential Game; Location Theory; Regional Competition

JEL-Classification: R38; C73

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1. Introduction

Interregional competition for the location of new (production) facilities by a location decision maker (LDM) has been recently analyzed in Jutila (1999). Two (or more) regions try to enhance their attraction by making concessions to the LDM, defining *attraction* as the probability that the LDM will locate his facility in a specific region. The benefit of having a new facility located in a region consists of the number of new jobs, new income etc. As Jutila (1999) remarks, it is "rather obvious that regions are competing for jobs and income in a rather dynamically changing environment". However, he describes this dynamical game rather mechanically, without explicitly considering the objective functions of the regions.

The present paper suggests a model of the competition for location decisions between two regions as an explicit differential game.¹ Since the actions of one region in this dynamical setting directly influence the attraction of the other region and since these actions are generally costly and should therefore be set off against the prospective benefits of having a new facility located in the region, this is the typical setting of a differential game.

It should be emphasized that the framework of the present model is entirely different from the one usually employed in location games. According to Thisse (1987, p. 519), "the primary purpose of location theory is to explain the spatial distribution of production activities in an economy". This explanation is attempted by considering the optimum location in space from the viewpoint of competing firms. The theory of location games applies game theoretic concepts to this end.² In contrast, we are considering the game in a dynamical setting from the viewpoint of two competing regions that try to influence an LDM who has announced that he has almost completed his decision process and indicates that his final decision at some future date T depends on the concessions made by both of the regions and their governments, respectively. Thus, we ignore the primary optimization process of the firm and of its LDM with respect to transportation cost minimization etc., and assume that the LDM has already ascertained two almost equally good alternatives (with respect to transportation costs etc.). The last stage of his optimization process then consists in encouraging the two regions considered to make as many concessions as possible. We analyze the actions of these regions to influence the LDM's final decision between the two possible locations.

As far as the empirical relevance of this setting is concerned, the reader is referred to Jutila (1999, p. 1), who remarks that "regions resort to intensified promotional, marketing and public relations activities in order to create a positive attractive image to LDMs." As an example, he gives a detailed description of the profile that Northwest Ohio, U.S.A., uses as a marketing device in order to raise its attraction to LDMs. Moreover, his paper includes a case study of a plant location decision.

Section 2. describes the basic framework of the analysis. A simple example that admits an explicit solution of the model is provided in section 3., whereas some

¹In comparison with Jutila (1999), however, we simplify the model in other respects: We consider only two regions and we neglect the direct influences of the LDM on the ongoing competition process. Our dynamical system describing the development of the probabilities is different from Jutila's.

²For a recent review of the theory of location games, cf. Gabszewicz & Thisse (1992).

more general results are derived in section 4. The efficiency of the outcomes is then analyzed in section 5, by comparing the Nash equilibrium solution with the cooperative solution of joint benefit maximization for both regions. We will finally discuss some possible extensions of the model.

2. The Model

We consider two regions, $R1$ and $R2$, and a location decision maker (LDM) that decides to locate a new facility in one of the two regions. The game starts at time $t = 0$ and the decision is being made at time $t = T$. The flow of the monetary benefit of having the new facility located in region i , $i = 1, 2$, is b_i at every point in time (and zero otherwise). The probability of having the facility located in region i from time T on is $p_i(T)$. In the Nash equilibrium to be considered below, $p_i(T)$ is equal to its expectation at times $0 \leq t < T$. Thus, at times $0 \leq t < T$, the expectation of the flow $U_i(t)$ of monetary benefit can be written as

$$U_i(t) = \begin{cases} 0 & : 0 \leq t < T \\ p_i(T)b_i & : T \leq t < \infty. \end{cases} \quad (1)$$

The probability $p_i(T)$ that the LDM decides to locate the facility in R_i can be influenced by the regions according to the following differential equations, where a dot denotes the derivative with respect to time:³

$$\begin{aligned} \dot{p}_1 &= A - p_1, \\ \dot{p}_2 &= B - p_2. \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

Here, $A = A(u_1, u_2)$ is a differentiable function of the control variables u_1 and u_2 with

$$\begin{aligned} A_1 := \frac{\partial A}{\partial u_1} &> 0, \quad A_{11} < 0, \quad A_2 := \frac{\partial A}{\partial u_2} < 0, \quad A_{22} > 0, \\ A(u_1, u_2) &\in [0, 1] \quad \forall u_1 \geq 0, u_2 \geq 0, \\ \text{and } A(n, m) &= 1 - A(m, n) \quad \forall n \geq 0, m \geq 0. \end{aligned} \quad (3)$$

The control variable u_1 is a force imposed by region 1 shifting attraction from region 2 to region 1, and u_2 is analogously interpreted. Conditions (3) have the following meaning: $R1$ ($R2$) can raise (lower) A and thereby increase its attraction with diminishing returns; the function A is defined for all nonnegative values of u_1, u_2 and can take on values between 0 and 1, which implies that the probabilities cannot escape the same range. Finally, the last assumption in (3) implies that $A(n, n) = 1/2 \forall n \geq 0$, so that the long-run probabilities for $t \rightarrow \infty$ are equal to $1/2$ for both regions if they choose the same value of u_i . Due to this symmetry assumption, the possibility of influencing the LDM is equal in both regions. This is a natural assumption; differences in the endeavor of forcing are taken into consideration by possible differences in the cost functions of both regions that are considered below.

³A similar specification has been used by Asada (1997) in order to model the number of trips using the transportation services of two firms. Without a condition such as (3), however, his assumptions do not appear to be sufficient for keeping the state variable in its domain of definition.

The probabilities $p_i(T)$ are the values of the variables $p_i(t)$ at time T . Clearly, these variables should satisfy

$$p_i(t) \geq 0, \quad p_1(t) + p_2(t) = 1, \quad \text{and} \quad \dot{p}_2 = -\dot{p}_1 \quad \forall t,$$

which is easily seen to be true if we set $B := 1 - A$ and if the initial values $p_1(0) = p_{10}$ and $p_2(0) = p_{20}$ satisfy the constraints⁴

$$p_{20} = 1 - p_{10} \geq 0, \quad p_{10} \geq 0. \quad (4)$$

Therefore, the second equation in (2) can be written as

$$\dot{p}_2 = (1 - A) - (1 - p_1) = p_1 - A;$$

this equation is redundant and can be neglected in the sequel. Thus, it suffices to consider

$$\dot{p}_1 = A(u_1, u_2) - p_1. \quad (5)$$

The cost function of forcing is $C_i(u_i)$ and is assumed to be convex and to involve no fixed costs. For simplicity, we set $C_i(u_i) = c_i u_i$, where $c_i > 0$ is the constant per unit cost of forcing in R_i . This assumption barely restricts the generality of the model, because we have already assumed diminishing returns with respect to the function A . Therefore, the flow of the monetary net benefit at time t is $U_i(t) - C_i(u_i(t))$. We assume that both of the regions are risk neutral, which implies that the integral of the discounted flow of the expected monetary net benefit from time 0 to ∞ is a reasonable objective function to maximize. Let ρ with $0 < \rho < 1$ be the common discount rate for both regions. Using equation (1) and the fact that $u_i(t) = 0$ and therefore $c_i u_i(t) = 0$ is obviously optimal from time T on, the expected cumulated monetary net benefit of R_i is

$$J_i = \int_0^\infty [U_i(t) - C_i(u_i(t))] e^{-\rho t} dt = e^{-\rho T} p_i(T) b_i / \rho - \int_0^T c_i u_i(t) e^{-\rho t} dt, \quad (6)$$

which has to be maximized given equations (5) and (4). Thus, the problem of maximizing over an infinite time interval has been reduced to a finite-time problem with a discounted bequest-value

$$e^{-\rho T} S_i(p_i(T)) := e^{-\rho T} p_i(T) b_i / \rho.$$

We analyze the problem with strategies in *open-loop*, which for the present case means that R_1 (R_2 resp.) maximizes its objective function with respect to $u_1(t)$ ($u_2(t)$ resp.) given the time-path of $u_2(t)$ ($u_1(t)$ resp.) without *feedback* control. The open-loop Nash equilibrium is reached if both regions correctly anticipate the time-path of their respective competitor, each of which is optimal in the indicated sense. No region can put itself at an advantage by unilaterally deviating from the Nash equilibrium strategy to another open-loop strategy. The respective problems of each of the regions can be solved using Pontryagin's maximum principle.

⁴Note that $\dot{p}_1 + \dot{p}_2 = A - p_1 + 1 - A - p_2 = 1 - p_1 - p_2 = 0 \quad \forall t$ if $p_{20} = 1 - p_{10}$.

Due to the simple structure of the model, it is state-separable, that is, the determination of the controls and the costate variables is separated from the determination of the state variables. This implies in turn that the open-loop Nash equilibrium, if it exists, is also a degenerate feedback Nash equilibrium that does not depend on the initial state and is therefore subgame perfect.⁵

The current value Hamiltonians for regions 1 and 2 are

$$\begin{aligned} H_1 &= -c_1 u_1 + \lambda_1 [A(u_1, u_2) - p_1], \\ H_2 &= -c_2 u_2 + \lambda_2 [A(u_1, u_2) - p_1]. \end{aligned} \quad (7)$$

As with (7), henceforth the first equation concerns $R1$ and the second concerns $R2$. While the respective equations for the individual regions describe their relevant optimization problems, the simultaneous solution of all equations together yields the Nash equilibrium of the game.

The necessary equilibrium conditions with respect to the control variables u_1 and u_2 include

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial H_1}{\partial u_1} &= -c_1 + \lambda_1 \frac{\partial A}{\partial u_1} = 0, \\ \frac{\partial H_2}{\partial u_2} &= -c_2 + \lambda_2 \frac{\partial A}{\partial u_2} = 0, \end{aligned} \quad (8)$$

where for the moment we assume an interior solution for simplicity. Note that the assumptions (3) together with the convexity of the cost functions imply that the equations (8) determine the unique maxima of the Hamiltonians with respect to the controls u_1 and u_2 respectively, because it is seen from (9) and (10) below that λ_1 is positive while λ_2 is negative. The costate variables λ_i must satisfy

$$\begin{aligned} \dot{\lambda}_1 &= \rho \lambda_1 - \frac{\partial H_1}{\partial p_1} = \rho \lambda_1 + \lambda_1, \\ \dot{\lambda}_2 &= \rho \lambda_2 - \frac{\partial H_2}{\partial p_1} = \rho \lambda_2 + \lambda_2. \end{aligned} \quad (9)$$

Finally, the transversality conditions are

$$\begin{aligned} \lambda_1(T) &= \frac{\partial S_1}{\partial p_1(T)} = b_1/\rho, \\ \lambda_2(T) &= \frac{\partial S_2}{\partial p_1(T)} = -b_2/\rho. \end{aligned} \quad (10)$$

Given that $\lambda_1 > 0$ for all $t \in [0, T]$ and $\lambda_2 < 0$ for all $t \in [0, T]$, it is easily shown that the Hamiltonians H_1 respectively H_2 are concave in (u_1, p_1) respectively (u_2, p_1) . Since $S_1(p_1(T))$ and $S_2(1 - p_1(T))$ are concave in $p_1(T)$, this implies that the necessary conditions (8), (9), and (10) are also sufficient conditions for a Nash equilibrium.

⁵See Fershtman (1987). For the concept of state-separability cf. Dockner, Feichtinger & Jørgensen (1985). A comprehensive account of the theory of noncooperative differential games as well as a short introduction to Pontryagin's maximum principle can be found in Başar & Olsder (1995).

The equations (8), (9), and (10) together with (5) and (4) can be reduced to a system of three differential equations with one initial and two transversality conditions, either in p_1 , λ_1 and λ_2 , or in p_1 , u_1 and u_2 . The solution of this boundary-value problem yields the Nash equilibrium trajectories $u_i(t)$ of the game. We start with the solution of a simple example in the next section and then return to the more general case.

3. A Specific Example

In order to derive an explicit solution of the game, we use a concrete version of the function $A(u_1, u_2)$. A reasonable and simple candidate that satisfies the assumptions (3) is

$$A(u_1, u_2) = \frac{1}{2} - \frac{1}{2(1+u_1)} + \frac{1}{2(1+u_2)}.$$

This specification given, the solutions of the equations (8) with respect to u_i are

$$\begin{aligned} u_1 &= \sqrt{\lambda_1/(2c_1)} - 1, \\ u_2 &= \sqrt{-\lambda_2/(2c_2)} - 1. \end{aligned} \tag{11}$$

From (9) and (10), the solutions of the linear differential equations for $\lambda_i(t)$ are easily calculated to be

$$\begin{aligned} \lambda_1(t) &= \frac{b_1}{\rho} e^{(1+\rho)(t-T)}, \\ \lambda_2(t) &= -\frac{b_2}{\rho} e^{(1+\rho)(t-T)}. \end{aligned} \tag{12}$$

Substituting (12) into (11) now yields the open-loop Nash equilibrium trajectories

$$\begin{aligned} u_1(t) &= \sqrt{b_1/(2c_1\rho)} e^{(1+\rho)(t-T)/2} - 1, \\ u_2(t) &= \sqrt{b_2/(2c_2\rho)} e^{(1+\rho)(t-T)/2} - 1, \end{aligned} \tag{13}$$

which, as mentioned before, are independent of the initial state and therefore are subgame perfect degenerate feedback strategies. It should be noted that, for the sake of notational simplicity, we do not use extra symbols for the optimum strategies and denote them simply as $u_i(t)$.

The equations (13) are only valid if the nonnegativity conditions are not violated. However, the assumption of interior solutions seems reasonable, because b_i/ρ , the present value of the new facility in R_i calculated at time T , should be a much greater number than c_i in order to have a reasonable problem. Therefore, if the planning horizon T is not too large, both of the u_i are positive for all $t \in [0, T]$. A necessary but not sufficient condition for an interior solution is $b_i/(2c_i\rho) > 1$. On the other hand, if T is large enough, the nonnegativity conditions may be effective at the beginning of the game even if $b_i/(2c_i\rho)$ is much greater than one. In this case, as can be seen from (11), the equilibrium strategies are $u_i(t) = 0$ during a period lasting

from $t = 0$ to some $T_i \in (0, T)$ defined by $\lambda_i(T_i) = 2c_i$. From T_i on, the strategy of R_i is given by (13).

We neglect the case of effective nonnegativity constraints in the following, because it involves only minor variations of the main arguments. Equation (5) now reads

$$\dot{p}_1 = \frac{1}{2} - \frac{1}{2(1+u_1)} + \frac{1}{2(1+u_2)} - p_1, \quad p_1(0) = p_{10}.$$

Substitution of (13) into this equation yields the nonautonomous linear differential equation for p_1 :

$$\dot{p}_1 = -p_1 + \frac{1}{2} + K e^{-(1+\rho)(t-T)/2},$$

where K is the constant

$$K = \frac{\sqrt{b_1/(2c_1\rho)} - \sqrt{b_2/(2c_2\rho)}}{2\sqrt{b_1/(2c_1\rho)}\sqrt{b_2/(2c_2\rho)}}.$$

The general solution of the homogeneous part of the equation is Ce^{-t} , where C is an arbitrary constant, and a particular solution of the nonhomogeneous equation can be found using the variation of the constant formula. The solution of the initial value problem turns out to be

$$p_1(t) = \left(p_{10} - \frac{1}{2} - \frac{2K}{1-\rho} e^{(1+\rho)T/2} \right) e^{-t} + \frac{1}{2} + \frac{2K}{1-\rho} e^{-(1+\rho)(t-T)/2}. \quad (14)$$

The most important result concerning $p_1(t)$ is its value at time T . From (14),

$$p_1(T) = \frac{1}{2} + \left(p_{10} - \frac{1}{2} \right) e^{-T} + \frac{2K}{1-\rho} (1 - e^{(\rho-1)T/2}), \quad (15)$$

and it should be recalled that $p_2(T) = 1 - p_1(T)$. Note also that $1 - e^{(\rho-1)T/2} > 0$ because $0 < \rho < 1$.

The main conclusions of this example are drawn from considering the equations (13) and (15) and are summarized as follows:

1. From (13), the optimum subgame perfect policy functions $u_i(t)$ of both regions in an open-loop Nash equilibrium are strictly monotonously increasing in time t (except for a possible initial interval of inactivity). As one would have suspected, forcing $u_i(t)$ at every given point in time rises with the benefit b_i and falls with the per unit cost of forcing c_i and the discount rate ρ . At every point in time is $u_1(t) > u_2(t)$ if and only if $b_1/c_1 > b_2/c_2$.⁶

⁶It is important to notice that these results, especially the result concerning the monotonous increase of $u_i(t)$ in t , do not depend on the discount rate ρ being positive. For $\rho = 0$, the problem has to be modeled slightly differently in order to have a convergent objective function. For example, it could be assumed that the benefit b_i is only positive until a certain point in time $\bar{T} > T$. Other things being equal, the results of such a specification with $\rho = 0$ are similar to the results obtained so far for $\rho > 0$.

2. From (15), the probability of having the new facility located in R_1 is greater than the probability of a location in R_2 if and only if the sum of the last two terms is positive. For example, if the LDM is indifferent between both regions at time 0 (i. e. $p_{10} = p_{20} = 1/2$), it depends on the value of K which region is more likely to be preferred at time T . Clearly, $K = 0$ if both regions are identical. If the regions are not identical, however,

$$K \gtrless 0 \quad \text{if} \quad b_1/c_1 \gtrless b_2/c_2,$$

that is, whether $p_1(T)$ or $p_2(T)$ is greater depends on the ratios of the flows of the respective benefit to the respective per unit cost of forcing.

3. The preceding discussion has not necessarily determined that the probability $p_i(T)$ is higher for the region with a higher flow of benefit b_i even if $p_{10} = p_{20}$, because this effect can easily be outweighed by the cost effect. If, for example, $b_1 < b_2$ but c_1 is sufficiently smaller than c_2 , $p_1(T)$ can be greater than $p_2(T)$. Thus, if a region has lower per unit costs of forcing – e. g. due to a closer familiarity with the LDM – it may be more likely preferred with a relatively low net benefit. Therefore, the LDM's decision may be inefficient from a social point of view.

4. Generalization

We return to the more general case with an unspecified function $A(u_1, u_2)$ satisfying conditions (3). We are going to investigate whether the three main conclusions drawn from the specific example in the last section continue to be valid or not. While it is naturally impossible to get explicit solutions for the strategies now, the solutions for the costate variables are given by (12) as before.

If we substitute (12) into equations (8), then we get a system of two equations describing implicitly the evolution of the $u_i(t)$:

$$\begin{aligned} A_1(u_1, u_2) &= \frac{c_1 \rho}{b_1} e^{(1+\rho)(T-t)}, \\ A_2(u_1, u_2) &= -\frac{c_2 \rho}{b_2} e^{(1+\rho)(T-t)}. \end{aligned} \quad (16)$$

At any given point in time, u_1 and u_2 can be viewed as given by (16) as functions of c_i and b_i , $i = 1, 2$. Now, define the function $\phi(t) := \rho e^{(1+\rho)(T-t)}$ and the parameters $a_i := b_i/c_i$, $i = 1, 2$, and differentiate (16) with respect to u_i and a_i to get

$$\begin{pmatrix} A_{11} & A_{12} \\ A_{21} & A_{22} \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} du_1 \\ du_2 \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} -(\phi(t)/a_1^2) da_1 \\ (\phi(t)/a_2^2) da_2 \end{pmatrix}, \quad (17)$$

where the matrix on the left-hand side is abbreviated as A . From assumptions (3) and if A is twice continuously differentiable ($A \in C^2$), it follows that $|A| = A_{11}A_{22} - A_{12}A_{21} < 0$, because $A_{11} < 0 < A_{22}$ and $A_{12} = A_{21}$ for all $u_1 \geq 0$, $u_2 \geq 0$. Thus, all principal minors of the Jacobian do not vanish for $u_1 \geq 0$, $u_2 \geq 0$, which, by a well known theorem of Gale & Nikaidô (1965, p. 91), implies the global univalence of the mapping on the left-hand side of (16). Hence, assuming enough variation of the first order derivatives of the function A , this system of equations has globally

unique solutions for $u_1(t)$ and $u_2(t)$. (If one or both of the nonnegativity constraints are effective, (16) has no positive solution. This case will be neglected in the sequel.) Since \mathbf{A} is invertible, the solution of the matrix equation (17) is

$$\begin{pmatrix} du_1 \\ du_2 \end{pmatrix} = \frac{1}{|\mathbf{A}|} \begin{pmatrix} A_{22} & -A_{12} \\ -A_{21} & A_{11} \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} -(\phi(t)/a_1^2)da_1 \\ (\phi(t)/a_2^2)da_2 \end{pmatrix}. \quad (18)$$

To evaluate the signs of du_i , we need some more information on the function A that can be obtained from (3). The condition $A(n, m) = 1 - A(m, n)$ implies $A_1(n, m) = -A_2(m, n)$ and $A_{12}(n, m) = -A_{21}(m, n)$. If $A \in C^2$, $A_{12}(u_1, u_2) = A_{21}(u_1, u_2)$. Therefore, if $u_1 = u_2 = n$, the last two equations imply $A_{12}(n, n) = 0$. Next, observe that $a_1 = a_2$ implies $u_1 = u_2$,⁷ and therefore $A_{12}(n, n) = A_{21}(n, n) = 0$. Thus, starting from a symmetric situation with $a_1 = a_2$ and $da_1 > 0 = da_2$, (18) implies

$$\frac{\partial u_1}{\partial a_1} = -\frac{\phi(t)}{a_1^2} \frac{A_{22}}{|\mathbf{A}|} > 0, \quad \frac{\partial u_2}{\partial a_1} = 0. \quad (19)$$

While this is only a local result at a first glance, a deeper investigation shows that it establishes $u_1(t) > u_2(t)$ for all $t \in [0, T]$, if $a_1 > a_2$, because both functions are continuous in a_i and (19) shows that u_1 rises – starting at a symmetric situation – with a_1 above u_2 and $u_1 = u_2$ would imply $a_1 = a_2$ from (3) and (16).

The next step is to investigate the dependence of $u_i(t)$ on time t . Differentiating (16) with respect to t yields, similar to (18),

$$\begin{pmatrix} \dot{u}_1 \\ \dot{u}_2 \end{pmatrix} = \frac{1}{|\mathbf{A}|} \begin{pmatrix} A_{22} & -A_{12} \\ -A_{21} & A_{11} \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} \dot{\phi}(t)/a_1 \\ -\dot{\phi}(t)/a_2 \end{pmatrix}. \quad (20)$$

Because $\dot{\phi}(t) < 0$ and $|\mathbf{A}| < 0$, it is straightforward to show that the assumptions (3) imply that $\dot{u}_1 > 0$, if $A_{12} > -(a_2/a_1)A_{22}$, and $\dot{u}_2 > 0$, if $A_{21} < -(a_1/a_2)A_{11}$. In other words, $\dot{u}_1 > 0$, if A_{12} is not too negative, and $\dot{u}_2 > 0$, if A_{21} is not too positive. Both control variables will be increasing in t , if

$$-\frac{a_1}{a_2}A_{11} > A_{12} > -\frac{a_2}{a_1}A_{22},$$

which moreover implies that at least one of them is increasing in time. In the special case with $a_1 = a_2$, we have seen before that $A_{12} = 0$; thus, the inequality is satisfied and \dot{u}_1 and \dot{u}_2 are positive in this case. In summary, although the first of the three

⁷To prove this, suppose that $a_1 = a_2$ and $u_1 = n \neq u_2 = m$. From (16), $a_1 = a_2$ implies $A_1(n, m) + A_2(n, m) = 0$. Let $\Delta u_1 = (m - n)/2$ and $\Delta u_2 = (n - m)/2$ to get $n' := n + \Delta u_1 = m + \Delta u_2 =: m'$ and therefore $A_1(n', m') + A_2(n', m') = 0$ from (3). Taylor's theorem implies the existence of $(n'', m'') = (n + k\Delta u_1, m + k\Delta u_2)$ for a $k \in (0, 1)$ such that

$$\underbrace{A_1(n', m') + A_2(n', m')}_{=0} = \underbrace{A_1(n, m) + A_2(n, m)}_0 + [A_{11}(n'', m'') + A_{21}(n'', m'')]\Delta u_1 + [A_{12}(n'', m'') + A_{22}(n'', m'')]\Delta u_2.$$

Since $\Delta u_1 = -\Delta u_2$ and $A_{12}(n'', m'') = A_{21}(n'', m'')$, it follows that $A_{11}(n'', m'') = A_{22}(n'', m'')$, which contradicts assumption (3). Thus, $a_1 = a_2$ implies $u_1 = u_2$.

main conclusions of section 3. cannot be definitely answered in the affirmative for the general case, it is approximately valid.

The example employed in section 3. has the special property that $A_{12}(u_1, u_2) = 0$ for all values of (u_1, u_2) and therefore both \dot{u}_1 and \dot{u}_2 are positive. As an example involving non-vanishing cross partial derivatives, consider the function A given by

$$A(u_1, u_2) = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{2} \sqrt{u_1/u_2} & : u_2 \geq u_1 \geq 0, \\ 1 - \frac{1}{2} \sqrt{u_2/u_1} & : u_1 > u_2 \geq 0. \end{cases}$$

This function fulfills the conditions in (3) but is only C^1 (not C^2), however. Substituting the first order derivatives into (16) yields the following Nash equilibrium trajectories:

$$\begin{aligned} u_1(t) &= \frac{1}{4} \sqrt{\frac{b_1 b_2}{c_1 c_2 \rho^2}} e^{(1+\rho)(t-T)}, & u_2(t) &= \frac{1}{4} \sqrt{\frac{c_1 b_2^3}{b_1 c_2^3 \rho^2}} e^{(1+\rho)(t-T)}, & \text{if } a_1 = \frac{b_1}{c_1} > \frac{b_2}{c_2} = a_2, \\ u_1(t) &= \frac{1}{4} \sqrt{\frac{c_2 b_1^3}{b_2 c_1^3 \rho^2}} e^{(1+\rho)(t-T)}, & u_2(t) &= \frac{1}{4} \sqrt{\frac{b_1 b_2}{c_1 c_2 \rho^2}} e^{(1+\rho)(t-T)}, & \text{if } a_1 = \frac{b_1}{c_1} \leq \frac{b_2}{c_2} = a_2. \end{aligned}$$

These equilibrium strategies show that conclusion 1. of section 3. may be valid even if the cross partial derivatives of A do not vanish.

In order to analyze the validity of the second and third of the three conclusions in section 3., the solution of equation (5) - evaluated at $t = T$ - can be written symbolically as

$$p_1(T) = e^{-T} \left[p_{10} + \int_0^T A(u_1(t), u_2(t)) e^t dt \right] \quad (21)$$

by the variation of the constant formula. As we have seen before, $u_1(t) \geq u_2(t)$ for all t if $a_1 \geq a_2$. Since $A(u_1, u_2) \geq 1/2$ if $u_1(t) \geq u_2(t)$, it follows that

$$\int_0^T A(u_1(t), u_2(t)) e^t dt \geq \int_0^T \frac{1}{2} e^t dt = \frac{1}{2} e^T - \frac{1}{2} \iff a_1 \geq a_2.$$

We can use this result along with (21) to obtain the second conclusion:

$$p_1(T) \geq \frac{1}{2} + \left(p_{10} - \frac{1}{2} \right) e^{-T} \iff a_1 \geq a_2.$$

For example, if $p_{10} = 1/2$, then $R1$ is more likely to be preferred at time T if $a_1 > a_2$. Finally, we note that the third conclusion is obviously valid in view of the results obtained so far.

5. Pareto-Efficiency

In order to evaluate the efficiency of the open-loop Nash equilibrium, it is useful to consider the cooperative solution of joint benefit maximization of both regions. The

objective function in this case is

$$J = J_1 + J_2 = \sum_{i=1}^2 \int_0^{\infty} [U_i(t) - C_i(u_i(t))] e^{-\rho t} dt$$

$$= e^{-\rho T} [p_1(T)(b_1 - b_2) + b_2] / \rho - \int_0^T [c_1 u_1(t) + c_2 u_2(t)] e^{-\rho t} dt,$$

and it should be maximized with respect to u_1 and u_2 subject to

$$\dot{p}_1 = A(u_1, u_2) - p_1, \quad p_1(0) = p_{10} \in (0, 1).$$

It is well known that the solution of this problem will be Pareto-efficient from the point of view of the two regions together, that is, it satisfies the criterion of group-rationality.

In contrast to the noncooperative Nash equilibrium, for the present case it is important to take the nonnegativity constraints explicitly into account right from the beginning, because it is likely that one of the u_i should be set to zero for all $t \in [0, T]$, regardless of the parameter values. Thus, we have to impose the constraints $u_i \geq 0$, $i = 1, 2$.

The current value Hamiltonian is

$$H = -[c_1 u_1 + c_2 u_2] + \lambda[A(u_1, u_2) - p_1],$$

and, taking the nonnegativity constraints into consideration, the necessary conditions for an optimum include

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial H}{\partial u_1} &= -c_1 + \lambda \frac{\partial A}{\partial u_1} \leq 0, \quad u_1 \geq 0, \quad \frac{\partial H}{\partial u_1} u_1 = 0, \\ \frac{\partial H}{\partial u_2} &= -c_2 + \lambda \frac{\partial A}{\partial u_2} \leq 0, \quad u_2 \geq 0, \quad \frac{\partial H}{\partial u_2} u_2 = 0, \\ \dot{\lambda} &= \rho \lambda + \lambda, \\ \lambda(T) &= (b_1 - b_2) / \rho. \end{aligned} \tag{22}$$

We do not need the explicit solution here, because the main conclusions are easily derived from the necessary conditions. From the last two equations of (22) it follows immediately that

$$\lambda(t) \geq 0 \quad \forall t \in [0, T] \quad \Longleftrightarrow \quad b_1 \geq b_2.$$

Using this result in the other relations of (22), the properties (3) of the function A imply that

$$\begin{aligned} (u_1(t) \geq 0 \quad \text{and} \quad u_2(t) = 0 \quad \forall t \in [0, T]) &\quad \text{if} \quad b_1 > b_2, \\ (u_1(t) = 0 \quad \text{and} \quad u_2(t) = 0 \quad \forall t \in [0, T]) &\quad \text{if} \quad b_1 = b_2, \\ (u_1(t) = 0 \quad \text{and} \quad u_2(t) \geq 0 \quad \forall t \in [0, T]) &\quad \text{if} \quad b_1 < b_2. \end{aligned}$$

Thus, at least one of u_1 and u_2 is zero for all t . If $b_1 = b_2$, it is clearly irrelevant from the point of view of both regions together in which region the facility will be

located; therefore, $u_1 = u_2 = 0$ for all t is optimal. If, for example, b_1 is greater than b_2 , it may be sensible to try to raise the probability of having the facility located in R_1 . Thus, $u_2 = 0$ and $u_1 \geq 0$ for all t (whether the strict inequality for u_1 will hold depends on the parameter values).

These results indicate that the open-loop Nash equilibrium is highly inefficient from the point of view of both regions together and therefore for the inhabitants of these regions. For example, if $b_1 = b_2$, the joint benefit maximization requires to spend nothing on forcing, while the expenditures for forcing are likely to be positive in both regions in the Nash equilibrium (cf. the discussion following equation (13)). This result resembles that of Asada (1997) for the case of the transportation competition, who claims that the competition between two firms is not necessarily inefficient compared to the case of cooperation from the social point of view because the expenditures of his firms will improve the quality of the transportation means. In the present case, however, this line of argument is not valid: Forcing of a region in order to influence its own attraction with respect to the LDM involves costs by definition; so far as these actions would have a value by themselves, rational regional governments would carry them out without regard to the possible location of a new facility. The costs of forcing should therefore be interpreted as net costs that have no direct compensation in terms of the utility for the region's inhabitants. Thus, these costs have to be subtracted from the benefit provided by the new facility.

On the other hand, the LDM would ignore the expenditures on forcing if they would not be beneficial to him. From the point of view of the two regions and the LDM together, the LDM's extra benefit has to be taken into account. Apart from the distributional problem involved, however, it is most likely that the gain of the LDM does not outweigh the loss of the regions.

In summary, from a social point of view, the regions should not compete for the LDM but should solve their problem of joint benefit maximization – the solution of which may be that no forcing at all is optimal –, wait for the LDM's decision and come to an agreement on the payments that the preferred region passes to the losing region. (By the way, this is an argument for the German *Länderfinanzausgleich*.)

6. Concluding Remarks

We have dealt with regional competition for the location of new facilities in the framework of a differential game, the simplicity of which enables its quantitative and/or qualitative solution. Moreover, state-separability implies that the open-loop Nash equilibrium of the model is also a degenerate subgame perfect feedback equilibrium. Despite this simplicity, the model seems to be reasonably well suited for analyzing the problem at hand, thereby providing interesting insights into this process of regional competition.

The concept of a Nash equilibrium is sensible if both regions play symmetrical roles with symmetrical information structures. A possible extension of the model analyzed here is the consideration of the Stackelberg equilibrium, with one region being the leader and the other being the follower. This setting, where the leader informs the follower about his own strategy in advance, may be a realistic description of some actual competition processes. Note that in order to obtain a reasonable

Stackelberg equilibrium it is not possible to use the specific example of section 3., because the function A employed there uncouples the decision processes of both players. The functional form used as an example in section 4. does not exhibit this property.

Another possible extension is the explicit analysis of the LDM as a third player that tries to influence the actions of the regions by giving feedbacks about special requirements important for his decision process. The analysis of these interactions belongs to the primary purposes of the model that Jutila (1999) has in mind.

Finally, it would be interesting to analyze how a Pareto-efficient outcome of the kind considered in section 5. could be reached by cooperative modes of play with possible side-payments. With regard to the competing regions, this seems to be the most important question from the practical point of view. We leave all these extensions for future research.

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