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**Working Paper**

## The Struggle of Becoming Established in a Deprived Inner-City Neighbourhood

Nota di Lavoro, No. 101.2003

**Provided in Cooperation with:**

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

*Suggested Citation:* May, David (2003) : The Struggle of Becoming Established in a Deprived Inner-City Neighbourhood, Nota di Lavoro, No. 101.2003, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milano

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**The Struggle of Becoming  
Established  
in a Deprived Inner-City  
Neighbourhood**

David May

NOTA DI LAVORO 101.2003

**NOVEMBER 2003**

KNOW – Knowledge, Technology, Human Capital
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# **The Struggle of Becoming Established in a Deprived Inner-City Neighbourhood**

## **Summary**

The theory of established-outsider figurations developed by Norbert Elias is a useful tool for examining deprived neighbourhoods. The case of this paper is Dortmund Nordstadt in Germany, an old inner-city neighbourhood which from its early days has housed the newly arrived immigrants. Elias claims that the social cohesion of the established together with the stigmatisation of the outsiders lead to status and power differentials that exclude the outsiders. In Nordstadt, three levels of established-outsider relations overlap and affect each other. On the first, the societal level, the Germans stand opposite to the immigrants. On the second, the city level, Nordstadt is put into the outsider position. Furthermore, the spatial hierarchy is linked with the first level of established-outsider relations as Nordstadt is a traditional immigrant neighbourhood. On the third, the neighbourhood level, the other established-outsider relations are in part reproduced and in part changed by recent developments.

**Keywords:** Deprived neighbourhoods, Immigration, Integration, Established, Outsider, Elias

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The theory of established-outsider figurations was developed by Norbert Elias and John Scotson in the early 1960s, while conducting a classical community study of a suburban settlement with the pseudonym Winston Parva. A decade later Elias spelled out in his "Theoretical Essay on Established and Outsider Relations" how the concept can be productively applied on a wide variety of figurations with power differentials. What makes Elias' and Scotson's research so valuable is the fact that they studied a community without differences in ethnicity, race, or social class. However, they still observed mechanisms of stigmatisation and exclusion. These mechanisms are also at work in other settings. This article will apply the model to an old inner city neighbourhood that has a long tradition of being a first place to go for newly arrived immigrants: Dortmund Nordstadt. After a brief sketch of the theoretical frame, the model will be used to analyse to the three levels of established-outsider relations: the societal, the city, and the neighbourhood level.

The empirical material forming the basis for this paper comprises first and foremost narrative interviews with Germans and immigrants living in Nordstadt. The immigrant respondents have spent some part of their life in one of the classic guest worker countries. Six interviews were analysed thoroughly using a hermeneutic sequence analysis. Further ten interviews are used to supplement the analysis. All names are pseudonyms and all direct quotes are translations that are adapted to written language.

### ***The Theory of Established-Outsider Figurations***

Elias and Scotson studied Winston Parva, a suburban settlement on the outer fringes of an industrial city located in the Midlands of England. This settlement comprised three parts: some middle-class houses, an old working-class estate, and a new working-class estate. Elias and Scotson are struck by the cleavage between the old and the new estate, and at first they cannot see any reason for this cleavage:

»There were no differences in nationality, in ethnic descent, in "colour" or "race" between residents of the two areas; nor did they differ in their type of occupation, their income and educational levels – in a word, in their social class. Both were working-class areas. The only difference between them was [...]: one group was formed by old residents established in the neighbourhood for two or three generations and the other was a group of newcomers.« (Elias, 1994: xvii)

Put in a nutshell, Elias and Scotson explain the cleavage between the established from the old estate and the outsiders from the new estate as follows: The social *cohesion* of the established together with the *stigmatisation* of the outsiders lead to status and power differentials that *exclude* the outsiders and in turn produce more cohesion and stigmatisation. Elias' and Scotson's most important merit is that they do not fall back on traditional explanations of stigmatisation, discrimination, and exclusion such as cultural, ethnic, religious, or class differences, but explain this by differentials in group cohesion on the basis of social oldness (Elias and Scotson, 1994: 149ff). As a matter of course, the established can instrumentalise other differences in their stigmatisation of the outsiders, and the multitude of ethnic stereotypes bears witness of this.

The *cohesion* of the established is created by the old families that have lived in the same neighbourhood for several generations. They have established a common identification, set of norms, and hierarchy (Elias, 1994: xxxviii). In contrast, the newcomers did not yet have the time to build up social cohesion. They lack a common identification and shared practices. One important mechanism of reproducing the social cohesion is the social control of the established. This social control consists especially of the threat to lose status among the

established should one not comply with the norms of the established (Elias, 1994: xxiv). In addition, social cohesion is reproduced through the potential advantages of being part of the established. The social cohesion of the established can be put to work as social capital in order to secure material and immaterial advantages.<sup>1</sup> Among other things, the established can rely on each other's help in order to monopolise the key position in local organisations (Elias, 1994: xviii). On this basis, cohesion is created and becomes the main source of power differentials between the established and the outsiders.

*Stigmatisation* often works as a double-sided process. The established award to themselves a special »group charisma« that confirms their virtue and superiority, while the established at the same time accuse the outsiders of a special »group disgrace« that proves the anomie and inferiority of the latter (Elias, 1994: xxii). Especially the fact to belong to the old residents with a long family tradition connected to the community, one's social oldness, is regarded to be an extraordinary quality (Elias and Scotson, 1994: 149). The newcomers lack this quality by definition. Furthermore, the established regard the existing status and power differentials as proof of their moral superiority and employ a wide variety of techniques of stigmatisation to reproduce power and status differentials. The most prominent are:

- The established define the indicators that "prove" the inferiority and anomie of the outsiders (Elias, 1994: xxxivf).
- The established reproach the outsiders for invented or factual actions that supposedly are the result of the latter's inferiority (Elias, 1994: xxv).
- The established apply a *pars pro toto* distortion by comparing the anomic minority of the outsiders with the best members of the established (Elias, 1994: xix).

*Exclusion* results from the stronger cohesion among the established in combination with the stigmatisation of the outsiders (Elias, 1994: xviiiiff). This leads on the one hand to the disadvantage of the outsiders by being excluded from social capital, and on the other hand to deprivation by the misrecognition of status. In this course, the status and power differentials between the established and the outsiders are reproduced and reinforced.

Elias (1994) gives a multitude of examples of established-outsider figurations. On the smallest level, one can find tightly integrated old-established groups with a high degree of cohesion, such as the residents of the old working-class estate in Winston Parva. Here the social cohesion is built upon daily interactions and face-to-face relations in combination with a common identification. Elias maintains that this explanation on the basis of greater social cohesion also applies in other settings (Elias, 1994: xix). Unfortunately, Elias does not recognise that established groups in larger settings cannot build cohesion on the basis of face-to-face relations and daily interactions. Drawing upon Anderson (1991) and Portes (1988), one can argue that the imagined community of the established together with the bounded solidarity within this imagined community can replace the social cohesion of face-to-face relations. Implicitly, Elias (1994: xxviiiff) goes even further and gives examples where it is sufficient when there is a prevailing attitude among a powerful group to stigmatise and deprive a less powerful group. Stigmatisation and deprivation can lock the group in question into a subaltern position with significant status and power deficits. With respect to larger groups, the model of established-outsider figurations is turned upside down. Existing status and power differentials allow the stigmatisation and exclusion of the outsiders and lead to a certain form of agreement among the established.

Elias and Scotson studied Winston Parva as if it was a closed system. This is not possible in the ethnicised setting of a deprived inner-city neighbourhood such as Nordstadt. Here the

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<sup>1</sup> Elias and Scotson do not use the term "social capital" although their examples invite to do so (1994: 50).


influences from the general society and relations with the rest of the city of Dortmund play a crucial role.

### ***The Frame of the German Society***

The structural framework of German law assigns to people without a German passport the status of the outsiders. On the basis of the differentiation between Germans and aliens, the administrative system grounds a multitude of regulations and practices that disadvantage immigrants. This disadvantage results in immaterial and material exclusion. Aliens are excluded from voting rights but also from various social benefits depending on their status of residence (Faist and Häußermann, 1996: 87-90). The state disadvantages immigrants by giving restrictive work permits or by being restrictive when acknowledging foreign certificates of education. These mechanisms of exclusion directly limit the options available to the immigrants. As a matter of course, there are large differences in the disadvantage caused by the legal framework with respect to various immigrant groups.


The fact that aliens are disadvantaged by the law leads to deprivation in other sectors of society through two mechanisms. First, the limitations that result from work and residence permits result in a less powerful position of the aliens in other sectors of society such as the labour and housing markets. Second, the disadvantage of the aliens by the law has the function of a signal that induces the disadvantage by other actors. The legal framework creates *ab initio* status and power differentials that develop into a large-scale established-outsider figuration with the natives as the established and the aliens as the outsiders.

In public discourse, media, and daily interactions, passports play less of a role. The ethnicised discourses mark the hierarchies between the Germans and the foreigners. Here, a wide variety of techniques of stigmatisation are used to exclude foreigners. One recent example of this stigmatisation is the suspicion of terrorism and fundamentalism many Muslims are met with. Status and power differences as established by the public discourse are manifested and reproduced in many different ways which again become subject of public discourse. One extreme version of such manifestations are racist hate crimes. Also the public discourse of the German society has a fine scale of differentiation between the various types of foreigners.





Both causes of power differentials and stigmatisation – the legal framework and the public discourse – lead to a pattern that time and again causes the exclusion of immigrants. However, this form of agreement in the imagined community of the "righteous Germans" is not enforced in face-to-face relation. In fact, there are various smaller or larger groups among the natives that object to this disadvantage of immigrants. However, these groups do not have the power to offset the stigmatisation and exclusion of the immigrants that is backed by the majority of the natives.



The significantly higher unemployment rates, lower occupational status, and lower household income among the immigrants are in part caused by disadvantage. E.g. in July 1998 the overall unemployment rate for Germany was 11.9 % while the unemployment rate among foreigners was as high as 19.1 % (isoplan 98: 10/11). Consequently, immigrants have to suffer from exclusions in all parts of society.

### ***Dortmund vs. Nordstadt***

The spatial situation of Nordstadt needs special attention. The development of Nordstadt began with the construction of the railway lines north of the medieval city walls in the mid-19th century. This was followed by the establishment of coal pits and steelworks in the east and west of Nordstadt. At the end of the 19th century, the opening of the port completed the industrial development of Nordstadt. The city officials did choose not to regulate the development of Nordstadt and consequently the residential zones of Nordstadt were interspersed with smaller and larger workshops, businesses, and factories. Furthermore, Nordstadt became surrounded by railway lines and large industrial areas and is cut off from the rest of the city (see Figure 1).

Nordstadt has been a workers neighbourhood with an extraordinary high population density ever since its early days. Nordstadt was and still is an important destination for immigrants because of its cheap lodgings and its proximity to workplaces (see Figure 2). From the outset, Nordstadt was markedly different from other neighbourhoods and Nordstadt found itself in an established-outsider relation as opposed to the rest of Dortmund and especially the southern parts of Dortmund's inner and outer city (Caesperlein and Gliemann, 1999: 115f). As in the case of the established-outsider relation on the level of the German society, this established-outsider relation is not built on the basis of social cohesion of the established, but on the negative image of Nordstadt.

*The stigmatisation of Nordstadt* reproduces the negative image of Nordstadt as a dirty workers and immigrants neighbourhood. Mr Anker, a ca. 70-year-old former skilled worker, union functionary, and parish councillor, points out the severe stigmatisation by people from the rest of the city. When he as a boy dared to go out of Nordstadt, he was abused because he came from Nordstadt: »"They stink, Polacks from the North, dirty drudges." There were many such

expressions and sometimes they were really bad. [...] There are still people today, that don't know the north of Dortmund, because they say "There, I have lost nothing there. The Polacks live there."« This way of stigmatising Nordstadt for some Polish residents refers back to a phase of immigration that took place about 100 years ago. Nowadays, many Germans from outside of Nordstadt take offence at the high – often overestimated – percentage of Turks in Nordstadt. Yet the core of the explanation stays the same: Some people from outside of Nordstadt instrumentalise the low status of the non-Germans living in Nordstadt in order to continue the stigmatisation and exclusion of Nordstadt and all of its residents.

Ms Vicente is about 35 years old, went to school in Nordstadt, spent her adolescence in Portugal, got married there, and returned to Dortmund in the 1980s. She tells about her sons experiences from the south of Dortmund:

»The younger one is playing football in the South. Because we come from Nordmarkt, they look upon us with other eyes. We are not so well-bred, and many believe that all from the North are criminals. [...] I am really angry with those people from up there. But I don't withdraw the boy [from the football club]. He stays there until they understand that we are human beings.«

Vicente feels on behalf of her sons unjustly discriminated against as somebody from Nordstadt and demands recognition from the people in the south of Dortmund.

The stigmatisation of the low social status of Nordstadt and its residents becomes particularly obvious in phrases where Nordstadt is described as something "down there". According to the logic of a map, something in the north is described as "up there", thus Nordstadt would be in most relations up there. However, none of the interviewees describes Nordstadt as being "up there". Topographically seen, Nordstadt is "down there" in relation to the South of Dortmund. Several interviewees pick up this relation as it also coincides with the hierarchy of social status (see Vicente's quote above). Ms. Grass, a former canteen leaseholder, is about 70 years old. She is active in a church of Nordstadt especially by visiting elderly parish members, but she has recently moved out of the Nordstadt. Grass goes both against the cartographic and the topographic logic and says: »I don't know if I ever again want to live in Nordstadt. I am often down there visiting many people. I pity the old people.« Nowadays, Grass lives east of Nordstadt where there is no clear topographic difference and the cartographic idea of the North in the upper part of the map does not work for her either. So there is only the logic of the social hierarchy left to explain Grass' choice of words.

In summary, the people of Nordstadt are stigmatised because of the following issues:

- dirt and pollution especially in relation to the steel and coal industry ("they stink"),
- anomie and moral inferiority ("criminals"),
- low status and class ("drudges", "not so well-bred", "down there"), and
- high ratio of immigrants ("Polacks" and Turks).

Especially the last issue of stigmatisation shows how the established-outsider figurations on the societal level and on the city level overlap. The city wide stigmatisation of Nordstadt is explained and justified with the stigmatisation of aliens/foreigners on the societal level, even though both cases are in form and content substantially different and in principle independent of each other. At any time the majority of people living in Nordstadt was recognised as Germans. Even today more than half the residents of Nordstadt hold a German passport. The fact that the stigmatisation of Nordstadt partly refers to a phase of migration that took place about 100 years ago documents the persistence of established-outsider relations.

*The exclusion of Nordstadt* will be dealt with only briefly. Most obvious is the material disadvantage and exclusion of the residents of Nordstadt on the labour market. Both in

absolute and in relative numbers, the postcode districts of Nordstadt have more unemployed than any other postcode district of Dortmund (DO, 1996: VI<sup>2</sup>). Furthermore, the postcode districts of Nordstadt have in absolute numbers more unemployed workers, legal aliens, youths up to 25 years of age, and long term unemployed (more than one year unemployed) than any other postcode district of Dortmund (DO, 1996: VII).

In more general terms, Nordstadt suffers from the decline of the coal and steel industry, which decisively influenced the development of Nordstadt though the last 1½ centuries. In 2000 the coke works Kaiserstuhl, and in 2001 the steelworks Westfalenhütte closed down. Nordstadt is cut off from the lively economic development in the South of Dortmund along the B1. Instead, Nordstadt has to content itself with the less prestigious institutions such as the new employment office.

The immaterial disadvantagement of Nordstadt is more difficult to evaluate. On the basis of the present data it is not possible to evaluate whether or not residents of Nordstadt are excluded from powerful positions in institutions and associations of Dortmund. Such an evaluation would need a thorough investigation of the power distribution in important city-wide institutions such as the Social Democratic Party or the Workers Welfare Association. The unpleasant reception of Vicente's sons in the sports clubs of the south of Dortmund suggests this.

The residents of Nordstadt can react in various ways to stigmatisation and exclusion. Some people, especially older Germans like Anker, resort to a kind of working-class romanticism, and develop a pride of having lived in Nordstadt all their lives. Anker has experienced recognition outside of Nordstadt as union functionary. It is thus easier for him to resort to this strategy. Immigrants that are in most cases not socialised into a traditional workers milieu are less likely to make use of this strategy.

Others try to escape the bad image of Nordstadt by moving out as soon as possible. This is common both among Germans and immigrants. Vicente would like to move out of Nordstadt, but sees for the time being no opportunity to realise this plan. Still, she strategically chooses spare time activities for her sons in the south of Dortmund. Mr Clar, a ca. 60-year-old self-employed, German craftsman who does not at all identify with Nordstadt, speaks with great respect about people who manage to move out of Nordstadt and plans to follow them as soon as possible. He defines his living in Nordstadt as an accidental and unfortunate stopover. Grass has already moved out of Nordstadt. These people take over the negative image of Nordstadt and by wishing to live elsewhere they reproduce the spatial status hierarchy. Finally the residents of Nordstadt can deal with stigmatisation and exclusion within Nordstadt e.g. by handing the stigmatisation further down or by retreating into an ethnic colony as discussed in the following section.

### ***Established-Outsider Relations within Nordstadt***

The two other established-outsider figurations on the societal level and the city level heavily affect the relations between the residents of Nordstadt. The Germans of Nordstadt try to implement the societal established-outsider figuration on the neighbourhood level by stigmatising and excluding the immigrants of Nordstadt and to hold the immigrants responsible for the spatial established-outsider figuration on the city level. Yet, the Germans of Nordstadt do no longer have the cohesion of earlier days to implement and enforce the exclusion of the immigrants on the neighbourhood level.

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<sup>2</sup> The postcode districts are smaller than the boroughs, but some postcode districts cross borough borders. The western postcode district of Nordstadt also contains some parts of the neighbouring borough.

There was *cohesion* among the residents of Nordstadt up to World War II, according to the accounts of some German respondents. Neighbours helped each other, and relatives often lived in the same neighbourhood. Anker underlines the solidarity, community, and mutual help in the neighbourhood: »We were poor together.« »There was actually a beautiful harmony among the people on the street. But that was really based upon the fact, that the social differences between people were not that big.«

The war and its aftermath changed the population make-up of Nordstadt with deportation and murder, bombing and evacuation, captivity and occupation. As a result, family networks and the old milieus were destroyed. Furthermore, Nordstadt experienced after the war a great influx of German expellees from Eastern Europe. However, large parts of the residential buildings were bombed. As Anker reports, the old population usually tried to rebuild the houses where they had lived previously. Because the administration considered the housing situation of expellees to be the worst, newly built flats were often let to them. Among old residents, such as Anker, this engendered anger: »We were really astonished that those people were treated exceptionally advantageously. They were advantaged in the housing.« In this atmosphere of envy, new cohesion could not flourish.

The last elements in the decline of cohesion were the effects of the Economic Miracle and of individualisation. Social differences increased and undermined cohesion. Anker as well as Grass describe how the more successful wanted to dissociate from the other residents of Nordstadt. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s many people moved out of Nordstadt in order to escape its polluted environment and bad reputation (Caesperlein and Gliemann, 1999: 112f). Family ties could no longer hold them in a poor, dirty working-class area. Furthermore, projects of urban redevelopment destroyed not only the old houses, but also deeply rooted social relations. Beck argues that the unity of neighbourhood, milieu, and lifeworld is broken up by the various processes of individualisation. Nowadays, individuals »regard themselves as organizers of their own circles of contacts and relationships« (Beck, 1992: 97).

This statement is repeated almost literally by Mr Berger, a ca. 35-year-old German and former miner: »Everybody has build up his own group of special neighbours.« People living in the same neighbourhood no longer see themselves as sharing a common fate. Anker mourns the lack of neighbourhood community and neighbourhood help, while Clar avoids any kind of closer contact with people from Nordstadt beyond a casual chat on the street. This decline of cohesion among the Germans is paralleled by a decline of control over the physical structures as well as over the formal and informal institutions of Nordstadt (Caesperlein and Gliemann, 1999: 114). Thus, these resources can no longer serve as the basis for cohesion among the Germans of Nordstadt to the same degree as they did in the early days of the guest worker migration.

*The Stigmatisation* of immigrants and other outsiders by the Germans continues, despite the changes in the cohesion among the Germans. They most often do so by passing on the stigmatisation to those they deem to be less powerful than themselves. Berger, for example, names in the following order: homeless, pimps, prostitutes, junkies, alcoholics, unemployed, Turks. This list illustrates that immigrants are only one among several targets of stigmatisation, but they are a particular big group that is easy to target.

Because of the lack of cohesion, there is no obvious group within Nordstadt the Germans can associate with and take part in its charisma. But as the newcomers to Nordstadt have a different nationality and ethnicity, the old residents of Nordstadt can refer to a different

community as their source of group charisma: the Germans.<sup>3</sup> Alber (1994: 339) describes a similar reaction in the case of the xenophobia of the East Germans. By stigmatising the immigrants both East Germans and Germans from Nordstadt can at least for a while forget their own relative powerlessness. Furthermore, the Germans of Nordstadt can employ a myth in order to redefine the city-wide established-outsider figuration: Were the immigrants not living in Nordstadt, it would be a respectable and respected neighbourhood.

Anker provides a good illustration of this feeling of group charisma that builds upon the assumption of the moral superiority of the Germans vis á vis the group disgrace of the immigrants. »This foreign way of living is just not German. We Germans with our order and our sense of justice. That is not at all nonsense. But everything has to have its rules. And the esteem for each other. A certain hierarchy has to be adhered to.« In this established-outsider figuration on the neighbourhood level, a number of the techniques of stigmatisation can be found. In the quote given above, Anker defines the criteria that "prove" the inferiority of the immigrants: they lack respect for justice, order, and hierarchies.

All German interviewees in some way allege that immigrants, and especially Turks, are amoral and anomic. Almost without fail immigrants are described as unclean, disregarding of norms, and violating the laws. Especially the acquisition of property by the immigrants causes Germans to suspect illegal practices. Berger gives a particularly crude example of these allegations:

»They run around with a knife in the pocket and a gun in the pocket, dealing drugs, getting the people addicted. [...] Every Turk drives a big BMW, a big Porsche. Where do they get the cash from? They come with a small suitcase – its really like that, I'm not telling lies – they come with a small suitcase and after a few days they have all they need. There is something fishy about it«.

In the case of Turks and Muslims, several German respondents pick out what they see as manifestation of wrong gender relations. Gender relations are instrumentalised to "prove" the human inferiority of the immigrants.

The natives of Nordstadt apply in two ways a *pars pro toto* distortion with respect to immigrants. First, Turks are seen as the archetype of the immigrant. Although Germans in principle can differentiate between groups of immigrants, the terms "Turks" and "foreigners" are very often used synonymously. The following four indicators underpin this statement. First, some non-Turkish immigrant respondents complain about being suspected for being Turkish. Second, most German respondents greatly exaggerate the relative numbers of Turks living in Nordstadt. Grass says for example »You could build a wall around it [Nordstadt] then it would be all Turkish.« Third, the German respondents often answer question about immigrants in general as if there were only Turks and Muslims to talk about. Fourth, word counts from the transcribed interviews with German respondents show that collective terms that refer to Turkey are by far the most important category associated with immigrants. Those terms are equally important as terms that relate to Germany.

The second type of *pars pro toto* distortions is seen when natives persistently refuse to acknowledge the positive examples among the immigrants. They are thus comparing the worst immigrants with the best natives. Grass, for example, turns the positive example of a Turkish family that helps an elderly German lady with household work into the opposite: »I know some people, that live together with Turks and they get along. You can find that. She is

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<sup>3</sup> This option did not exist in ELIAS' AND SCOTSON'S case of Winston Parva as all people living there were British.

doing some cleaning for that woman. [...] Yeah, you can also find that. But what really bothers me, are those masses, all the many that they placed here.« This positive example of "good" Turks (*pars pro toto* for all immigrants) is only seen as exception to the rule. Would this positive example be the rule, Grass would not need to fear anything from "those masses". Both types of *pars pro toto* distortions complement each other.

The concrete *exclusion* of immigrants is hardly mentioned by the German respondents. However they wish to deprive immigrants of rights and privileges. This is most often expressed through envy, e.g. Anker and Grass complain about the fact, that immigrants are preferentially treated in the allocation of council flats. Clar and Berger complain about what they see as illegitimate access of immigrants to social benefits. Most explicit is Mr. Erlek, a ca. 60-year-old house owner, who married into Nordstadt in the 1960s. He is under no circumstances willing to accept the right for immigrants to vote in local elections not even for immigrants who have become naturalised. However, this kind of exclusion does not build on the cohesion of the Germans from Nordstadt. Erlek and other respondents hope that other institutions from outside of Nordstadt will exclude and disadvantage immigrants and thus tip the power balance within Nordstadt in favour of the natives.

Direct exclusion that is exercised on the local level within Nordstadt can only be realised as exclusion of immigrants from important posts in local institutions. It is still rather rare that immigrants wish to become active and are accepted in associations or clubs run by a majority of Germans. This is even true for institutions with a liberal and immigrant friendly rhetoric. Anker, who is active in a parish, a union, and a party, gives an interesting example. A black man has been elected to the parish council, but the way Anker talks about him shows that he is not interested in getting to know that man and prefers to ignore him. Ignorance is only a weak form of exclusion, but if it is exercised by many Germans, this effectively keeps immigrants from being seen as active and eventually from being elected to posts. As a matter of course, not all immigrants wish to participate in associations or parties of the natives. But still, the Germans more or less obviously try to close ranks and exclude the immigrants.

Contrary to the native's decline of *cohesion*, the immigrant groups gradually succeed in establishing themselves and in developing *cohesion* within their respective groups. Immigrants often bring some personal networks with them through various forms of chain migration. Moreover, ethnic colonies develop out of processes of ethnicisation and self-ethnicisation. Immigrants often retreat into their ethnic colonies where they seek refuge from the confrontation with the new society. In the course of time, the different ethnic networks get more and more institutionalised through tearooms, community centres, religious associations, and the like. Most immigrant respondents are to some degree active in such institutions of their respective ethnic colonies.

The bounded solidarity within immigrant communities, as Portes (1998: 7/8) emphasises, is an important source of social capital to assist immigrants in their attempt to come to terms with the new society and to get established. Vicente exemplifies how immigrants make use of their social capital when looking for jobs and accommodation. When her husband came to Dortmund, Ms Vicente's parents had arranged beforehand a job and flat for him.

As a matter of course, this cohesion does not encompass all the different ethnic groups at once. Among the respondents, only Mr Tejo, an about 60-year-old welder, who came from Lisbon in the mid-1960s, calls for solidarity and a meeting of all immigrants regardless of their ethnic classification, although he himself has almost exclusively contact to other Portuguese. The immigrant's cohesion is partitioned along the commonly recognised ethnic boundaries. Furthermore, these groups are often subdivided according to regional or congregational differences. However within these ethnic communities, people frequently

perceive themselves as a group with a common fate and common origin. Thus bounded solidarity and cohesion can develop. The classic relation between the established old residents with high cohesion vs. the helpless outsiders without cohesion is turned upside down, even though the cohesion of immigrants is cut up by ethnic boundaries.

The German respondents often notice and fear the stronger cohesion of immigrants, namely that of the Turks. Ms. Holte, an about 30-year-old German woman living in a milieu of rookies and social dropouts, claims: »We know very precisely that – should we attack a Turk – there would immediately come thirty others. But, I mean, we are as fast.« Thus Holte – at least rhetorically – fights back the cohesion and collective defence among the Turks with an equally strong cohesion in her own milieu. But the example shows that the Turks no longer can be confined to the position of the powerless outsiders.

Today, about forty years after the beginning of the guest-worker regime, the first material results of becoming established can be seen. Over the recent decades, many immigrants have saved up for the illusion of returning to the homeland. By now some have accumulated enough capital to purchase real estate in Nordstadt. Often enough they can make use of their social capital by drawing upon the material and immaterial resources from their ethnic and family networks. This kind of social capital might take the form of kinship money lending or of manual help with renovating the flat or house.

Heiße, Radegast, and Timme (1999: 66ff) describe this kind of exchange of social capital very nicely in the case of one family. Family A. comprises four households with the families of two brothers, the brothers' parents, and one brother-in-law. The brothers' parents came as classical guest workers from Turkey to Nordstadt. In the late-1980s, both brothers wanted to bring their wives to Dortmund. As they could not find reasonable accommodation, their wives could not get a residence permit. Family A made a virtue out of necessity, asked friends and acquaintances to help out with some financial contribution, and finally they bought a house in Nordstadt. The house was renovated and modernised again with the help of friends and acquaintances. Minor parts of the house are rented out, while the family occupies four flats.

Also among the small businessmen, immigrants manage to get established, while more and more old established businesses run by Germans have to close (Caesperlein and Gliemann, 1999: 108ff). Also family A (Heiße, Radegast, and Timme, 1999: 66ff) is running two shops on the high street of Nordstadt. With respect to the control over the physical resources of Nordstadt, one can make out a convergence of the various ethnic groups. However, when taking into consideration that the networks of the Germans fail to attract younger people and that the cohesion is tighter within immigrant groups, then it becomes obvious that the established-outsider figuration of the societal level cannot be reproduced on the neighbourhood level, but that it in fact might be tilting. Only a few respondents can see the positive sides of the fact that Turks (*pars pro toto* for all immigrants) are investing in and renovating houses of Nordstadt. The previous owners most often did not do so. Most German respondents, however, perceive the current convergence of power levels as an unbearable dominance of Turks. This perception directly feeds into a fear of alienation, most drastically expressed by Clar: »The day will come, when we will have to submit to them. As things develop right now, that appears to be certain. Then they will have put us – as you say here in Westphalia – in the sack.«

Elias (1994: xliiif) explicitly mentions that once-powerful groups often perpetuate their self-image of the righteous and virtuous and consequently stigmatise the once powerless. Although the power differentials between the Germans and the immigrants of Nordstadt have diminished, they still exist through the overlapping of the local, the city-wide, and the societal power structure. On the local level the Germans have lost a considerable part of their power

surplus. But this effect is still outweighed by the societal established-outsider relation that disadvantages immigrants and aliens.

According to Elias (1994: xxvi) the stigmatisation is internalised by the outsiders. On the local level it becomes clear that the immigrants do not come to regard themselves as being of lesser worth, as takes place on the city level where many residents of Nordstadt come to dislike Nordstadt. The immigrants can block this negative perception fairly easily by claiming that the Germans are racist. The process of self-ethnicisation often prevents the immigrants from doubting their own qualities.

*Stigmatisation* by immigrants of Nordstadt occurs in two ways. On the one hand, they stigmatise other immigrant groups which they regard as anomic, on the other hand, they stigmatise Germans. The immigrants' stigmatisation applies the same pattern as or the Germans' stigmatisation. Especially the non-Turkish non-Muslim immigrants stigmatise Turks and Muslims in the same way as Germans do. Ms Webic, a ca. 50-year-old unskilled worker, who came from Vojvodina to Dortmund in the 1960 and who is married to a German, misses the greater cohesion she grew up with in Yugoslavia. Among other things, she accuses the Turkish to use their cohesion for illegal purposes.

Vicente is the only immigrant interviewee who dares to stigmatise the Germans of Nordstadt in front of a German interviewer. She wants to dissociate from the Germans of Nordstadt, whom she associates with junkies, tramps, disturbers of peace, and people living on social assistance. She pits the virtuous Portuguese, who go with the family to the café, against the morally corrupt Germans, who go alone to the pub to get drunk.

Although immigrants might look down upon the Germans of Nordstadt, they do not have the means to exclude the Germans. The immigrant cannot, as the Germans of Nordstadt do, rely on the exclusion that is enforced by the established-outsider figuration on the societal level. Immigrants are only in one respect able to make use of their greater cohesion, they can put their cohesion to work as social capital and thus gain some advantages. Furthermore they can exclude other ethnic groups, especially Germans, from the social capital of their respective networks. The Germans, however, assuming that they are the established, are not at all interested in gaining access to the networks of the immigrants, even though many of the Germans, especially lonely and elderly people, have to pay for professional help or do without because of the lack of social capital among the Germans.

Despite this exclusion along the commonly recognised ethnic boundaries, singular relations with neighbourhood help arise here and there that cut across these ethnic boundaries. Such help relates first and foremost to women's reproductive work (cf. Grass quote about the Turkish family). Nevertheless, these singular relations do not perforate the general pattern of exclusion along the ethnic boundaries.

### ***Conclusion***

In this article, Elias' and Scotson's theory of established-outsider relations has proved to be useful to analyse the three overlapping established-outsider relations relevant to the setting of a deprived inner-city neighbourhood in Germany. These three levels effect each other. On the first, the societal level, two groups - the Germans and the immigrants - stand opposite to each other. This structure is taken up on the levels below, reproduced, and at the same time superimposed by other relations. On the second, the city level, the status of the outsiders is decided upon spatial criteria. However these criteria are time and again linked with the first level as the neighbourhood in question is a traditional immigrant neighbourhood. On the third, the neighbourhood level, the other established-outsider relations are in part reproduced and in part changed by recent developments. Here, the immigrants can to increasingly greater



degrees establish themselves due to their greater cohesion and due to their growing control over material resources in the neighbourhood. To some extent, immigrants begin stigmatising Germans. However, the Germans of Nordstadt assume themselves being the established in their relation to the immigrants, attempt to implement the established-outsider relation from the societal level, and hold the immigrants responsible for being regarded as outsiders on the city level. Yet, the Germans of Nordstadt do not have enough local cohesion to exclude and disadvantage the immigrants to the widest possible extent. On the contrary, the immigrants often can make use of the social capital of their ethnic network and thus gain a relative advantage over the Germans, who do not have that much social capital. However, this advantage is more than outweighed by the disadvantage on the societal level of established-outsider relations.

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- (l) This paper was presented at the Workshop “Growth, Environmental Policies and Sustainability” organised by the Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Venice, June 1, 2001
- (li) This paper was presented at the Fourth Toulouse Conference on Environment and Resource Economics on “Property Rights, Institutions and Management of Environmental and Natural Resources”, organised by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, IDEI and INRA and sponsored by MATE, Toulouse, May 3-4, 2001
- (lii) This paper was presented at the International Conference on “Economic Valuation of Environmental Goods”, organised by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei in cooperation with CORILA, Venice, May 11, 2001
- (liii) This paper was circulated at the International Conference on “Climate Policy – Do We Need a New Approach?”, jointly organised by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Stanford University and Venice International University, Isola di San Servolo, Venice, September 6-8, 2001
- (liv) This paper was presented at the Seventh Meeting of the Coalition Theory Network organised by the Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei and the CORE, Université Catholique de Louvain, Venice, Italy, January 11-12, 2002
- (lv) This paper was presented at the First Workshop of the Concerted Action on Tradable Emission Permits (CATEP) organised by the Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Venice, Italy, December 3-4, 2001
- (lvi) This paper was presented at the ESF EURESCO Conference on Environmental Policy in a Global Economy “The International Dimension of Environmental Policy”, organised with the collaboration of the Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Acquafredda di Maratea, October 6-11, 2001
- (lvii) This paper was presented at the First Workshop of “CFEWE – Carbon Flows between Eastern and Western Europe”, organised by the Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei and Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung (ZEI), Milan, July 5-6, 2001
- (lviii) This paper was presented at the Workshop on “Game Practice and the Environment”, jointly organised by Università del Piemonte Orientale and Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Alessandria, April 12-13, 2002
- (lix) This paper was presented at the ENGIME Workshop on “Mapping Diversity”, Leuven, May 16-17, 2002
- (lx) This paper was presented at the EuroConference on “Auctions and Market Design: Theory, Evidence and Applications”, organised by the Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Milan, September 26-28, 2002
- (lxi) This paper was presented at the Eighth Meeting of the Coalition Theory Network organised by the GREQAM, Aix-en-Provence, France, January 24-25, 2003
- (lxii) This paper was presented at the ENGIME Workshop on “Communication across Cultures in Multicultural Cities”, The Hague, November 7-8, 2002
- (lxiii) This paper was presented at the ENGIME Workshop on “Social dynamics and conflicts in multicultural cities”, Milan, March 20-21, 2003



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