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The Amenity Value of Agricultural Landscape and Rural-Urban Land Allocation

Aliza Fleischer¹,² and Yacov Tsur²

Abstract: We analyze rural-urban land allocation in light of the increasing environmental role of agricultural landscape. The amenity value of farmland varies across crops and as a result affects the optimal crop mix in addition to its effect on rural-urban land allocation. Investigating the effects of population and income growth processes, we find that, contrary to market outcomes, the socially optimal allocation may call for more farmland preservation under both processes. In an empirical application to a region in Israel we find that the extent of market undersupply of farmland is substantial and that population growth calls for more farmland preservation at the expense of urban land.

Keywords: rural-urban, land allocation, landscape amenities, willingness to pay

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1. Introduction

The increasing role of farmland as a provider of environmental amenities, in addition to its traditional role as a primary input of agricultural production, has long been recognized in developed countries. Rising living standards, population growth and added leisure all operate to increase the demand for environmental amenities, including agricultural landscape. At the same time, these processes also increase the demand for urban land. The balance between these competing trends underlies rural-urban land allocation. The public good nature of agricultural landscape renders land market allocations suboptimal – an argument often used to justify some of the agricultural support policies in developed countries [6, 29].

In this article we analyze the role of agricultural landscape in rural-urban land allocation, allowing for the amenity value of farmland to vary across crops. For example, highly profitable cash crops grown in greenhouses typically elicit low landscape value while extensively cultivated field crops generate a more desirable landscape. This feature implies that, in addition to land allocation between farming and housing, environmental considerations should also affect land allocation within the agricultural sector (between crops) and this feature bears upon farm policies. Investigating the effects of population and income growth processes, we find that, contrary to market outcomes, the socially optimal allocation may call for more farmland preservation under either process. Indeed, in our empirical study, social farmland allocation increases with population.

Our work is related to the large body of literature that deals with the positive external effects of agricultural landscape (see, e.g., [28, 30]). Noticeable examples in the context of urban-rural land allocation include McConnell [26], Lopez et al. [25] and Brunstad et al. [6]. Rural landscape values have been estimated in a number of countries, including Austria [17], USA [4, 3, 19, 31], Canada [5] and Israel [14]. However, in these works, as in McConnell [26] and Lopez et al. [25], the amenity value of farmland does not vary across crops. Drake [8] and Brunstad et al. [6] differentiate the amenity value between agricultural activities (they considered tilled land, pasture and woodland) but ignore the rural-urban land allocation issue. The present contribution analyzes rural-urban land allocation under heterogeneous amenity values of farmland across crops within a unified framework.

The next section describes the regional land economy. Section 3 characterizes the market and socially optimal land allocations. An empirical analysis applied to
Northern Israel is presented in Section 4 and the final section concludes with a few policy remarks.

2. The regional land economy

The urban sector: The regional urban sector consists of $N$ households, each deriving utility from the consumption of private goods and a public good in the form of environmental quality. The latter depends on a variety of factors, such as availability of parks and beaches, air and water pollution, and aesthetic landscape. Here we concentrate on environmental benefits generated by agricultural landscape, allowing for heterogeneity with respect to different agricultural crops. Accordingly, the representative household's utility depends on the consumption of a composite private good $z$, housing land $l_H$ (ha) and environmental quality as represented by land allocation among $J$ crop groups $L_j$, $j = 1,2,\ldots,J$, and a non-agricultural open space (e.g., parks), denoted $L_0$, in the household's locality (region) of area $M$. We use boldface $L$ to represent crop group areas, retaining the symbol $l$ for individual crop areas. The use of crop groups is needed when households demand for agricultural landscape is the same for two or more crops.

The household’s utility is assumed to be additively separable with respect to the private goods ($z,l_H$) and land allocation $L = (L_0,L_1,L_2,\ldots,L_J)$:

$$u(z,l_H,L) = u_p(z,l_H) + u_e(L). \quad (1)$$

Maximizing utility with respect to $z$ and $l_H$ subject to the budget constraint $pz + r_H l_H = y$ gives the demands $z(r_H,y)$ and $l_H(r_H,y)$, where $y$ is household's income and $r_H$ is urban land rental rate (the price of $z$, $p_z$, is assumed given and is therefore suppressed as an argument for convenience). Inverting $l_H(r_H,y)$ gives the inverse demand for urban land $D_H(\ell_H,y)$: at a land rental rate $r_H$, a household's housing land demand satisfies $D_H(\ell_H,y) = r_H$. In terms of aggregate urban land, $L_H = N\ell_H$, this relation is expressed as

$$D_H(L_H/N,y) = r_H. \quad (2)$$

Define the indirect utility

$$v(y,L) = u_p(z(r_H,y)l_H(r_H,y)) + u_e(L). \quad (3)$$

The willingness to pay (WTP) to preserve the landscape pattern $L = (L_0,L_1,L_2,\ldots,L_J)$, denoted $wtp(y,L)$, is defined from (see, e.g., Freeman, 2003)

$$v(y+wtp(y,L),0) = v(y,L) \quad (4)$$
The conditional WTP to preserve crop group \( j \) area \( L_j \) given land allocation for all crop groups other than \( j \) \( L - j = (L_1, L_2, ..., L_{j-1}, L_{j+1}, ..., L_J) \) is defined by

\[
\text{wtp}_j(y, L_j, L_{-j}) = \int_0^{L_j} \left[ \frac{\partial \text{wtp}(y, s, L_{-j})}{\partial s} \right] ds, \quad j = 0, 1, 2, ..., J.
\] (5)

We shall use the conditional WTPs in the empirical analysis.

**The agricultural sector**: The agricultural sector in the region consists of \( N_A \) identical farmers growing \( K \) crops. Let \( F_k(x_k, \ell_k) \) represent crop \( k \)'s production function for the representative farm, using land input \( \ell_k \) and an \( m \)-dimensional vector of other inputs \( x_k \). Let \( \ell_A \) denote farm size, so that total agricultural land in the region equals \( N_A \ell_A \). For a given cropland assignment \( \ell_k, k = 1, 2, ..., K \), satisfying \( \sum \ell_k \leq \ell_A \), the representative farmer chooses crop \( k \)'s input vector \( x_k, k = 1, 2, ..., K \), in order to maximize

\[
\sum_{k=1}^K \left( p_k F_k(x_k, \ell_k) - p_x x_k \right)
\]

Taking as given the crop prices \( p_k, k = 1, 2, ..., K \), and the vector of \( x \) prices \( p_x \). Necessary conditions for this problem are

\[
\frac{\partial F_k(x_k, \ell_k)}{\partial x_k} = p_x \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{\partial F_k(x_k, \ell_k)}{\partial \ell_k} = p_k, \quad k = 1, 2, ..., K.
\]

These conditions define the optimal choice of \( x_k \) as a function of \( \ell_k, p_k \) and \( p_x \), denoted \( x_k(\ell_k), k = 1, 2, ..., K \).

Substituting \( x_k(\ell_k) \) in crop \( k \)'s profit gives crop \( k \)'s returns to land function

\[
\pi_k(\ell_k) = p_k F_k(x_k(\ell_k), \ell_k) - p_x x_k(\ell_k), \quad k = 1, 2, ..., K.
\] (6)

The agricultural output and input prices \( p_x \) and \( p_k \), \( k = 1, 2, ..., K \), are assumed exogenous to the region under study (and in particular to the individual farmers' decisions) and are therefore suppressed as arguments.

The representative farm's inverse derived demand for crop \( k \)'s land is given by the value of marginal product (VMP) of land in crop \( k \) production \( \pi_k'(\ell_k) \). When \( F_k(x, \ell) \) exhibits decreasing returns to scale (e.g., due to the fixed quantity of the farmer's own labor and managerial skills) and \( \pi_k(\ell_k) \) is strictly concave, \( \pi_k'(\ell_k) \) is decreasing and can be inverted to give the derived demand function \( \pi_k^{-1}(r) \). At a land rental rate \( r \), the demand for crop \( k \)'s land is \( \pi_k^{-1}(r) \) (or 0 if \( \pi_k'(0) \leq r \)). The aggregate land allocation for crop \( k \) is \( L_k = N_A \ell_k \) and the inverse derived demands for land can be expressed as \( \pi'_k(L_k/N_A), k = 1, 2, ..., K \).
The regional inverse derived demand for agricultural land is obtained by horizontally summing the aggregate crop demands \( \pi_k'(L_k/N_A) \) and is denoted \( \Pi'(L/N_A) \). When land rental rate equals \( r \), the \( K \) crops land demands are the \( L_k \) values satisfying

\[
\pi_k'(L_k/N_A) = r, \quad k = 1, 2, \ldots, K, \tag{7}
\]

and aggregate agricultural land demand is obtained from \( \Pi'(L/N_A) = r \), provided \( \Pi^{-1}(r) \leq \ell_A \).

When \( F_k(x, \ell), \quad k = 1, 2, \ldots, K \), exhibit constant returns to scale (CRS), the individual crop return-to-land functions \( \pi_k(\ell_k) \) are linear and the land VMPs in crop \( k \) production, \( \pi_k', \quad k = 1, 2, \ldots, K \), are constants, independent of the \( L_k \) values. In the absence of additional constraints, the farmer will grow only the crop with the highest VMP (i.e., the crop with the highest \( \pi_k' \)). With additional constraints (e.g., marketing quotas), the crop with the highest VMP will be grown first until it hits its constraint, then the second highest value crop, and so on.

3. Agricultural–urban land allocation

Focusing attention on agricultural-urban land allocation, we take the non-agricultural open area \( L_0 \) (parks) as given. The total land available for allocation is thus \( L = M - L_0 \) such that

\[
L = \sum_{k=1}^{K} L_k \leq L. \tag{8}
\]

Since the crop groups are a priori defined, a crop land allocation \( L_k, \quad k = 1, 2, \ldots, K \), induces a crop-group allocation \( L_j, \quad j = 1, 2, \ldots, J \) (\( J \leq K \)), such that

\[
\sum_{k=1}^{K} L_k = \sum_{j=1}^{J} L_j.
\]

Condition (8) can therefore be specified in terms of the crop-group areas \( L_j, \quad j = 1, 2, \ldots, J \) as well.

Market allocation: Ignoring distributional aspects, the particular structure of land ownership in the economy is immaterial for welfare evaluation so long as it can support land market transactions. When land rental rate is the same for housing and for crop production, we obtain from (2) and (7),

\[
D_y(L_{hy}/N, y) = \pi_k'(L_k/N_A), \quad k = 1, 2, \ldots, K. \tag{9}
\]

Equations (8) and (9) provide \( K+1 \) relations to solve for the \( K+1 \) market allocations \( L_{hy}^M \) and \( L_k^M, \quad k = 1, 2, \ldots, K \). The total agricultural area under market allocation is

\[
L_A^M = \sum_{k=1}^{K} L_k^M.
\]
**Social allocation:** A feasible land allocation \(L_H, L_1, L_2, \ldots, L_K\) (that satisfies equation 8) gives rise to the crop-group land allocation \(L = (L_1, L_2, \ldots, L_i)\) and generates the surplus \(\int_0^{L_H/N} D_H(\ell, y) d\ell + wtp(y, L)\) to the representative household and the profit \(\sum_{k=1}^K \pi_k(L_k / N_A)\) to the representative farmer. The allocation thus generates the social welfare

\[
W(L_H, L_1, L_2, \ldots, L_K) = N \left[ \int_0^{L_H/N} D_H(\ell, y) d\ell + wtp(y, L) \right] + N_A \sum_{k=1}^K \pi_k(L_k / N_A).
\]  

(10)

The socially optimal land allocation maximizes (10) subject to the feasibility constraint (8). Defining the Lagrangean \(\mathfrak{J} = W + \mu[\mathcal{T} - L_H - \sum_{k=1}^K L_k]\), the necessary conditions for optimum include:

\[
D_H(L_H / N, y) = \mu
\]  

(11a)

and

\[
N \frac{\partial wtp(y, L)}{\partial L_k} + \pi_k'(L_k / N_A) = \mu, \ k = 1, 2, \ldots, K,
\]  

(11b)

where \(\partial wtp(y, L) / \partial L_k = \partial wtp(y, L) / \partial L_{j_k}\) and \(j_k\) is the group index to which crop \(k\) belongs.

Conditions (11a-b) imply

\[
D_H(L_H / N, y) = N \frac{\partial wtp(y, L)}{\partial L_k} + \pi_k'(L_k / N_A), \ k = 1, 2, \ldots, K.
\]  

(12)

The \(K+1\) relations (8) and (12) solve for the \(K+1\) social land allocations \(L_H^S\) and \(L_k^S\), \(k = 1, 2, \ldots, K\). They differ from the market allocation rule (9) due to the marginal WTP for agricultural landscape.

The regional demand for agricultural land is obtained as follows. Let \(L_A = \sum_{k=1}^K L_k = \sum_{j=1}^J L_j\) denote total (regional) agricultural land and \(D_A(L_A, y)\) represent the social (farmers and households) inverse demand for \(L_A\). Let \(r_m = \text{Max}_y \{N \partial wtp(y, 0) / \partial L_k + \pi_k'(0)\}\) be the social demand (households and farmers) for the first hectare of agricultural land and define \(D_A(0, y) = r_m.\) For any \(r \in [0, r_m],\)

\(1\) Notice that the household’s WTP is multiplied by \(N\) since in its environmental role agricultural land serves as a public good but as an input for agricultural production it is a private good.
let $L_k(r, y), k = 1, 2, \ldots, K$, be the cropland allocations that solve (11b) with $\mu = r$ and $L_j(r, y) = \sum_{k \in \text{group } j} L_k(r, y), j = 1, 2, \ldots, J$. Then,

$$L_A(r, y) = \sum_{k=1}^{K} L_k(r, y) = \sum_{j=1}^{J} L_j(r, y)$$ and $D_A(L_A, y)$ is defined as the inverse of $L_A(r, y)$, i.e., it satisfies

$$D_A(L_A(r, y), y) = r. \tag{13}$$

In view of (11b) and (13)

$$D_A(L_A(r, y), y) = N \frac{\partial \text{wtp}(y, L(r, y))}{\partial L_k} + \pi'_{k}(L_k(r, y) / N_A), k = 1, 2, \ldots, K,$$

and using (12) we find that the social agricultural land allocation $L^s_A$ satisfies

$$D_A(L^s_A, y) = D_H((\bar{L} - L^s_A) / N, y) \tag{14}$$

(in 14) it is assumed that constraint (8) is binding so that $L^s_h = \bar{L} - L^s_A$). The social land rental rate is

$$r^s = D_A(L^s_A, y) = D_H(L^s_A / N, y) \tag{15}$$

and the social cropland allocations are $L^s_k = L_k(r^s, y), k = 1, 2, \ldots, K$ with

$L^s_j = \sum_{k \in \text{group } j} L^s_k, j = 1, 2, \ldots, J$. By construction, $L^s_A = \sum_{k=1}^{K} L^s_k = \sum_{j=1}^{J} L^s_j$.

Population and income effects: We investigate the effects of population and income on the social agricultural land allocation $L^s_A$, assuming for simplicity a single agricultural crop ($K = 1$) and a constant number of farmers $N_A$. When $K = J = 1$, the crop and crop group indexes $k$ and $j$ are dropped and condition (12) reduces to

$$D_H((\bar{L} - L^s_A) / N, y) = N \times \text{wtp}_L(y, L^s_A) + \pi'(L^s_A / N_A)$$

where $\text{wtp}_L(y, L) = \partial \text{wtp}(y, L) / \partial L$ is the representative household's marginal WTP for agricultural land. Differentiating with respect to $N$ and rearranging gives

$$L^s_A'(N) = \frac{(N \times \text{wtp}_L(y, L^s_A) - D_H(\ell^s_H, y) / \eta_H(\ell^s_H, y) / N) / N - D_H'(\ell^s_H, y) / N - N \times \text{wtp}_{LL}(y, L^s_A) - \pi''(L^s_A) / N_A)}{N} \tag{16}$$

where $D_H' = \partial D_H(\ell^s_H, y) / \partial \ell^s_H$, $\text{wtp}_{LL} = \partial^2 \text{wtp}(y, L) / \partial L^2$, and $\eta_H = -(1 / D_H')(D_H / \ell^s_H)$ is the (representative household's) demand elasticity for urban land (recall that $\ell^s_H = L_H/N$). The denominator on the right-hand side of (16) is clearly positive (the household's demands for urban and agricultural land and the marginal WTP are downward sloping and $\pi$ is concave), hence the sign of $L^s_A'(N)$ is the same as the sign of $N \text{wtp}_L - D_H \eta_H$. 

If \((D_H / \eta_H) / N\) decreases with \(N\), there exists a critical urban population above which \(L^S_A(N)\) is positive. For example, when \(D_H(\ell_H, y) = y / \sqrt{\ell_H}\), the elasticity \(\eta_H = 2\). \(D_H / \eta_H = y / (2 \sqrt{L_H / N})\) and \((D_H / \eta_H) / N = (y / (2 \sqrt{L_H / N})) / \sqrt{N}\). As \(N\) increases, \(D_H / \eta_H\) diminishes with \(N\) and eventually must fall below the representative household's marginal WTP for agricultural land (which, if anything, should increase with \(N\)). In this case, for large enough \(N\), the public-good nature of agricultural landscape outweighs the scarcity cost of land, and agricultural land should increase with urban population. Indeed, this turns out to be the case in our application (Section 4).

The income effect on agricultural land allocation is similarly calculated to yield
\[
L^S_A(y) = \frac{N \partial wtp / \partial y - \partial D_H / \partial y}{D_H / N - N wtp_{L_H} - \pi'' / N_A}. \tag{17}
\]
We see that the sign of \(L^S_A(y)\) depends on the balance between the income effects of aggregate urban marginal WTP for the amenity \((N \partial wtp / \partial y)\) and the income effect of the individual household's urban land demand \((\partial D_H / \partial y)\). As in the previous case, it is possible that the income effect on agricultural land will be positive for a large enough urban population.

It is straightforward to verify that both \(L^S_A'(N)\) and \(L^M_A'(y)\) are always negative. Thus, land markets will decrease agricultural land allocation in response to either population or income growth, which may contradict the socially desirable outcome.

4. Application

The densely populated, northern half of Israel (the area above the thick line in the map – Figure 1) has been undergoing massive rural-to-urban land relocation, particularly near urban centers where the amenity value of open space in general and farmland in particular is large (Fleischer and Tsur, 2003). Table 1 compares population densities in a number of counties. Figure 1 presents a map and table 2 gives cropland pattern for northern Israel.
Table 1: Some Population Density Data (inhabitants per km²).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1961</th>
<th>2000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel (north-central region)</td>
<td>180 (270)</td>
<td>291 (691)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources:
2) Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (2002)

Table 2: Agricultural Data and Land Use Distribution of the Study Region.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land use (1,3)</th>
<th>Revenue (2) ($/ha)</th>
<th>Cost (2) ($/ha)</th>
<th>Profit = revenue - cost (2) ($/ha)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Flowers (greenhouses)</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>98,358</td>
<td>83,596</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other orchards</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>20,780</td>
<td>14,224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetables</td>
<td>2,080</td>
<td>53,587</td>
<td>47,078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citrus groves</td>
<td>1,670</td>
<td>10,173</td>
<td>7,669</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrigated field crops</td>
<td>670</td>
<td>2,224</td>
<td>1,956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unirrigated field crops</td>
<td>840</td>
<td>740</td>
<td>651</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural open space</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>4,100</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: (1) Israeli Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (2002); (2) Hadas (2003); (3) Frenkel (2001)
We will evaluate the market and social land allocations and the associated welfare measures for a particular sub-region (number 421 in Figure 1), representing non-metropolitan regions in Israel's inhibited costal strip. The region's size is 10,190 ha, of which $L_0 = 200$ ha are reserved for parks, leaving $L = 9,990$ ha for allocation between crop production and housing. The number of households in the region is currently around 70,000; we will increase this number to study population effects.
Farmers' land demand: Aggregate production data are available on area planted, input costs (excluding land cost but including interest payment on capital investment) and revenue for six major crops (in descending order of value of marginal productivity of land): (1) flowers grown in greenhouses; (2) orchards (not including citrus); (3) vegetables; (4) citrus groves; (5) irrigated field crops; and (6) unirrigated field crops. Table 2 presents returns per hectare (profits) excluding land costs. It also lists the reserved open area ($L_0$) that, although cannot be reallocated, will play a role in the derivation of the WTP for agricultural landscape below.

CRS production technology is assumed for each crop. Under CRS, the VMP of land for each crop is calculated as the return per hectare (revenue minus cost), excluding land rental cost (Table 2). As discussed in Section 2, without exogenous constraints, farmers will grow only the highest value crop – flowers in the present case. But exogenous constraints, such as marketing quotas, restrict planting area. Consequently, we let the actual planting areas represent these implicit restrictions and obtain the region's inverse derived demand for agricultural land depicted in Figure 2.

Urban land demand: About 95% of Israel's land is owned by the state and managed by Israel's Land Authority (ILA). An effective farmland protection policy made the development of rural land very difficult in the past, but this policy has been
loosening up recently (Feitelson, 1999). Rural land developers pay the ILA a fee determined by land appraisers based on existing plots sold in the market in the same location. We use these data as a proxy for prices of rural land designated for development.

Regarding the quantity variable in the urban land demand equation, we use the average housing area (ha) per household in each of the 34 regional councils of the northern half of Israel. Averaging the price data for each of the regional councils gives 34 price-quantity observations. Data are also available on various socioeconomic characteristics of each regional council and an index that ranks them based on eight demographic, education and standard-of-leaving variables. Table 3 presents summary statistics of the urban demand data.

Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of the Regional Councils’ Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(p_h)</td>
<td>Payment to the ILA ($ per ha) (^{(1)})</td>
<td>758,357</td>
<td>828,568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\ell_h)</td>
<td>Developed land per household (ha) (^{(2)})</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>distance</td>
<td>Measured in distance rings from metropolitan center(3)</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rank</td>
<td>Socio-economic ranking of local authority (^{(4)})</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>age</td>
<td>The median age in the Regional Council(^{(4)})</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>permatriculation</td>
<td>Percent of high-school graduates receiving matriculation certificate as a share of the age group 18-19(^{(4)})</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>area</td>
<td>Total area of Regional Council in km(^2) (^{(2)})</td>
<td>285.1</td>
<td>186.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>motorate</td>
<td>Percent of car owners (^{(4)})</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (2002)
(3) The rings are measured in 16 km increments from the center of the nearest metropolitan. Local authority located less than 16 km from the center receives the value 1, local authority located between 16 and 32 km receives the value 2 and so forth.

A log-log specification is assumed for the urban demand equation (other forms were tested without improving the fit):

\[
\log(p_{hi}) = \beta_h \log(\ell_{hi}) + [\alpha_{g0} + \alpha_{gd} \log(distance_i) + \alpha_{hr} \log(Rank_i)] + \varepsilon_i. \tag{18}
\]
To test for exogeneity of $\ell_h$, we use Davidson and MacKinnon's variant of Hausman's [21] test (see, e.g., [7]) with the intercept, distance, rank, permatriculation, area, age and motorate as instruments (see table 3 for variable descriptions). The test does not reject the hypothesis that log $\ell_h$ is uncorrelated with $\varepsilon$, justifying the use of OLS. The OLS estimates of the urban demand equation are reported in table 4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>SE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha_{h0}$</td>
<td>10.65**</td>
<td>1.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log($\ell_h$)</td>
<td>-0.712***</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log(distance)</td>
<td>-1.36**</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log(rank)</td>
<td>0.56*</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$R^2$: 0.60
N: 33

*** significant at 6% against the alternative that the parameter is nonnegative.

and * denote significance at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively.

The coefficient of log $\ell_h$ is negative, as expected. Also expected are the positive estimate of the coefficient of rank and the negative estimate of the coefficient of distance (housing prices are higher in localities that have higher levels of socio-economic characteristics and that are closer to metropolitan centers).

The urban land prices include infrastructure cost such as sewerage, roads, electricity and communication. To put them on a par with marginal values of farmland and landscape WTP, the infrastructure cost should be accounted for and the annual (rental) equivalent should be calculated. With $r$ denoting the interest rate and $\rho$ the part of the urban land price due to infrastructure cost, the rental rate of urban land net of the infrastructure costs is $r_h = r(1-\rho)p_h$, which in view of (18) is given by $r_h = e^{\alpha_h \ell_h} e^h$, where $\alpha_h = \alpha_{h0} + \alpha_{hd} \log(distance) + \alpha_{hr} \log(rank) + \log(r(1-\rho))$.

We use the OLS estimate $\hat{\beta}_h = -0.712$ (table 4) for $\beta_h$, and calibrate $\alpha_h$ so that the market allocation of urban land in the region under consideration is larger than the observed allocation. In doing so we account for existing administrative restrictions that mitigate land-markets operation [11, 22]. In particular we assume, based on Feitelson [11], that the market allocation of urban land is about a third larger than the observed allocation of 4,100 ha and set it at 5,500 ha. The corresponding agricultural land market allocation is $9,990 - 5,500 = 4,490$ ha, which falls over the irrigated field-
crop area (see Figure 2). We thus calibrate $\alpha_h$ such that the urban land demand at $L_H=5,500$ ha equals $268$ per ha – the value of the marginal product of land at irrigated field crop production (see Table 2 and Figure 2). The calibrated $\hat{\alpha}_h$, thus, satisfies

$$268 = e^{\hat{\alpha}_h \left( \frac{N_H}{N} \right)^{0.712}} = e^{\hat{\alpha}_h \left( \frac{5500}{70000} \right)^{0.712}},$$

giving $\hat{\alpha}_h = 3.78$. We thus obtain the following inverse demand for urban land:

$$r_h = e^{3.78 \left( \frac{L_H}{N} \right)^{-0.712}}. \quad (19)$$

**Market allocation:** In Figure 3, farmland is measured (on the horizontal axis) from left to right and urban land from right to left. The private (farmers’) derived demand for farmland and the urban land demand (equation (19)) are denoted $D^M_A$ and $D_H$, respectively. The market allocation occurs at the intersection of the two curves, giving $L^M_A = 4,490$ ha and $L^M_H = 9,990 - 4,490 = 5,500$ ha, which is larger than the observed urban land allocation of 4,100 ha by about 33% (see discussion above equation 19).

Figure 3: The market allocation of farmland occurs at the intersection of the farmers' ($D^M_A$) and urban ($D_H$) demand curves.

We see (Figure 3) that the market allocation occurs over the irrigated field crops area, with the 4,490 ha of farmland allocated as follows: $L_1 = 190$ ha (flowers), $L_2 = 440$ ha (orchards), $L_3 = 2080$ ha (vegetables), $L_4 = 1,670$ ha (citrus) and $L_5=110$
ha (irrigated field crops). We know that the social allocation can only increase the agricultural area. Given the farmers' land demand depicted in Figure 2, an increase in farmland (above the market allocation) implies an increase in land allocated to irrigated field crops ($L_3$) and possibly to unirrigated field crops ($L_d$). This property facilitates the evaluation of the social land allocation, to which we now turn.

**WTP data and crop-group classification:** Data of WTP for agricultural landscape was collected using a double-bounded-dichotomous-choice elicitation method (also called take-it-or-leave-it-with-a-follow-up by Mitchell and Carson [27]; see also Hanemann et al. [20] and Bateman et al. [2] with six random levels of annual tax bids. The WTP data were collected from Israel's urban population during the autumn of 2002. The questionnaire was designed based on three focus groups that served to establish crop groups, to assess the bid range, and to test different scenarios of landscape transformation (further details can be found in [33]).

Individuals in the focus groups received over 30 cards with photos of crop landscapes in the Hula Valley, located at the northeast tip of Israel\(^2\), and were asked to classify the landscapes according to their aesthetic value. This led to the classification of agricultural landscapes into three crop groups: group 1 includes orchards and citrus; group 2 includes field crops (irrigated and unirrigated), vegetables and natural open spaces; and group 3 consists of flowers grown in greenhouses. Respondents were indifferent between crop landscapes within each group and ranked group 1 (orchards and citrus) as having the highest landscape value, followed by group 2 (field crops, vegetables and open spaces) and group 3 (greenhouses). We thus had six crops ($K = 6$) and three crop groups ($J = 3$). The crop-group classification is summarized in table 5.

---

\(^2\) For practical reasons it is hard to provide respondents with landscape pictures taken from their own regions and the Hula Valley served to illustrate the landscape types (see Shuttleworth, 1980 and Dunn, 1976 for the use of photos as surrogates for on-site visual assessment).
The annual bids for agricultural landscape were set between $2.5 and $55. Based on the focus groups, a preliminary questionnaire was created and pre-tested in a pilot of 47 respondents, after which the final questionnaire was designed.

A face-to-face survey was conducted among a representative sample of the urban population (cities above 50,000 inhabitants) to obtain WTP for each landscape type. The sample was designed as follows: the relevant cities were divided into small (50,000 – 100,000 inhabitants), medium (100,000 – 200,000 inhabitants) and large (above 200,000 inhabitants). From each of the 4 large and 9 medium cities, a sample size proportional to the city's population was randomly drawn. Regarding the small cities, 9 were selected at random and a random sample was drawn from each. Altogether, the sample contained 350 respondents.

Each respondent received pictures of the three landscape types and was confronted with the scenario under which the agricultural landscape would be developed (transformed into urban land). Preserving the agricultural landscape requires imposing a tax (at the bid level) and respondents were asked if they were willing to pay it. Those that answered "yes" were given a higher tax level (bid) and those that refused to pay were given a lower tax bid. This procedure was repeated for each of the three landscape types (crop groups). In this way, the upper and lower bounds for the WTP range of each respondent for each landscape type were set.

Finally, we need to obtain the landscape allocation between the three crop groups for each respondent's locality. To that end, we use land allocation data for 43

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crops</th>
<th>Crop groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Index $k$</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Flowers (greenhouses)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Orchards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Vegetables</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Citrus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Irrigated field crops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Unirrigated field crops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Reserved open space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index $j$</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Orchards and citrus ($k=2, 4$)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Field crops, vegetables and open space ($k = 3, 5, 6, 0$)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Flowers ($k=1$)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
"natural" sub-regions, determined by Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics (see Figure 1). For each of these sub-regions, data are available on population density (number of inhabitants per square kilometer) and cropland areas for the three crop groups. By identifying the sub-region of residence, we can associate these data with each respondent. Table 6 presents summary statistics of various socio-economic and demographic variables for the 43 sub-regions.

Table 6: Summary Statistics of Explanatory Variables in WTP Equations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Years, head of household</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>Monthly income after tax ($)</td>
<td>1,674</td>
<td>788</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(L_1)</td>
<td>Area of crop group 1 (citrus and other orchards)</td>
<td>2,124</td>
<td>1,184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(L_2)</td>
<td>Area of crop group 2 (field crops, vegetables, open space)</td>
<td>4,804</td>
<td>5,279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(L_3)</td>
<td>Area of crop group 3 (greenhouses)</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (1) Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (2002)

*WTP specification:* A quadratic WTP function has been adopted

\[
wt_{pi} = \sum_{j=1}^{3} (\alpha_j L_{ij} + \frac{1}{2} \beta_j L_{ij}^2) + \gamma_{1j} L_{i1} + \gamma_{2j} L_{i2} + \gamma_{3j} L_{i3} + 0.5 \beta_j L_{ij}^2, \tag{20}
\]

where \(L_{ij}\) is crop group \(j\)'s land allocation in respondent \(i\)'s locality (sub-region), \(\alpha_j = \alpha_j + \alpha_j y_i + \alpha_j Age_i\), \(j=1,2,3\), and \(y_i\) and \(Age_i\) represent respondent \(i\)'s income and age characteristics, respectively. In view of equation (5) the conditional WTP functions for landscape type 1 (orchards and citrus), 2 (vegetables, field crops and parks) and 3 (greenhouses) are specified, respectively, as:

\[
\begin{align*}
wt_{p1i} &= (\alpha_1 + \alpha_1 y_i + \alpha_1 Age_i) L_{i1} + (\gamma_{12} L_{i2} + \gamma_{13} L_{i3}) L_{i1} + 0.5 \beta_1 L_{i1}^2, \\
wt_{p2i} &= (\alpha_2 + \alpha_2 y_i + \alpha_2 Age_i) L_{i2} + (\gamma_{21} L_{i1} + \gamma_{23} L_{i3}) L_{i2} + 0.5 \beta_2 L_{i2}^2, \\
wt_{p3i} &= (\alpha_3 + \alpha_3 y_i + \alpha_3 Age_i) L_{i3} + (\gamma_{31} L_{i1} + \gamma_{32} L_{i2}) L_{i3} + 0.5 \beta_3 L_{i3}^2.
\end{align*}
\tag{21}
\]

*Estimation:* Our observations entail the conditional WTPs, specified in (21), rather than the unconditional WTP of (20). Adopting Hanemann et al.’s [20] logistic specification, the likelihood of crop group \(j\)'s conditional WTP of household (respondent) \(i\) is specified as:
where $BL_{ij}$, $B_{ij}$ and $BU_{ij}$ represent, respectively, the lower bid, the initial bid and the upper bid of the double-bounded dichotomous-choice procedure, yy means a "yes" response to the initial bid and a "yes" response to the following (upper) bid, yn indicates a "yes" followed by "no" and so on. Assuming independence of the conditional WTPs across crop groups, the likelihood of the $i$th respondent is given by

$$
\mathcal{Z}_i = \mathcal{Z}_{n1} \times \mathcal{Z}_{n2} \times \mathcal{Z}_{n3}.
$$

The maximum likelihood estimates are presented in Table 7.

Table 7: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of WTP Parameters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group 1 (orchards and citrus)</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Std. Err.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\beta_1/\sigma_1$ (own effect)**</td>
<td>-5.4×10^{-7}</td>
<td>1.86×10^{-7}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma_{13}/\sigma_1$ (interaction with greenhouse)**</td>
<td>7.41×10^{-7}</td>
<td>3.9×10^{-7}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma_{12}/\sigma_1$ (interaction with field crops)</td>
<td>-2.2×10^{-8}</td>
<td>1.99×10^{-8}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha_{1}/\sigma_1$ **</td>
<td>0.00127</td>
<td>0.00044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha_{1y}/\sigma_1$ (income) *</td>
<td>4.28×10^{-8}</td>
<td>2.28×10^{-8}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha_{1A}/\sigma_1$ (age)**</td>
<td>-1.19×10^{-5}</td>
<td>5×10^{-6}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$1/\sigma_1$ **</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td>0.0053</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group 2 (vegetables, field crops and open areas)</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Std. Err.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\beta_2/\sigma_2$ (own effect)</td>
<td>-8.65×10^{-9}</td>
<td>9.6×10^{-9}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma_{23}/\sigma_2$ (interaction with greenhouses)</td>
<td>1.42×10^{-7}</td>
<td>2.02×10^{-7}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha_{2}/\sigma_2$ **</td>
<td>2.81×10^{-4}</td>
<td>1.43×10^{-4}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha_{2y}/\sigma_2$ (income)</td>
<td>6.83×10^{-9}</td>
<td>7.97×10^{-9}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha_{2A}/\sigma_2$ (age)**</td>
<td>-4.57×10^{-6}</td>
<td>1.67×10^{-6}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$1/\sigma_2$ **</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td>0.0068</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group 3 (greenhouses)</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Std. Err.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\beta_3/\sigma_3$ (own effect)**</td>
<td>-1.5×10^{-5}</td>
<td>6.89×10^{-6}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha_{3y}/\sigma_3$</td>
<td>0.00545</td>
<td>0.00468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha_{3y}/\sigma_3$ (income)</td>
<td>-1.17×10^{-7}</td>
<td>2.97×10^{-7}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha_{3A}/\sigma_3$ (age)</td>
<td>-7×10^{-7}</td>
<td>7.8×10^{-7}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$1/\sigma_3$ **</td>
<td>0.069</td>
<td>0.0066</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** and * denote significance at the 5% and 10%, respectively.
As expected, the own-effect parameters ($\beta_1$, $\beta_2$ and $\beta_3$) are negative, verifying the diminishing marginal WTP for agricultural landscape: the larger the crop group area, the smaller the WTP for an additional land of the same crop group. The cross-effects parameters, $\gamma_{ij}$, can be of either sign, depending on the interaction between crop groups. For example, a negative $\gamma_{12}$ implies that the marginal WTP for group 2 landscape decreases with group 1 area, in which case we say that the two crop groups are substitutable. A positive $\gamma_{12}$ value indicates that crop groups 1 and 2 are complementary.

Figure (3) reveals that the market allocation occurs at the at the irrigated field crops area, where the areas of greenhouses ($L_1 = L_3$), orchards and citrus ($L_2+L_4=L_1$), vegetables ($L_3$) and parks ($L_0$) are fixed. Observing equation (12), the social allocation requires marginal WTP for field crops area, i.e., $\partial wtp/\partial L_2$, which, in view of (20), is given by

$$\partial wtp/\partial L_2 = (\alpha_2 + \alpha_{23}y + \alpha_2Age + \gamma_{12}L_1 + \gamma_{23}L_3) + \beta_2 L_2. \quad (23)$$

Evaluating (23) at the parameter estimates, using the region’s levels of $y_i$ and $Age_i$, and setting greenhouses ($L_1 = L_3=190$ ha), orchards and citrus ($L_1=L_2+L_4 =2,110$ ha), vegetables ($L_3 = 2080$) and parks ($L_0= 200$) at their observed levels, we obtain

$$\frac{\partial wtp}{\partial L_2} = \begin{cases} 
\text{0.003316} - 1.51245 \times 10^{-7} (200 + 2080 + L_5 + L_6) & \text{if } 0 \leq L_5 + L_6 \leq 670 + 840 \\
\text{0.003316} - 1.51245 \times 10^{-7} (200 + 2080 + 670 + 840) & \text{otherwise}
\end{cases} \quad (24)$$

Social demand for farmland: The social demand for farmland is the sum of marginal value of land from crop production and the marginal WTP for the crop groups multiplied by the number of households, (c.f. the right-hand side of equation 12). Due to the interaction effects, the marginal WTP for each crop group depends on land allocated to the other crop groups as well. In general, the land allocation must be determined simultaneously for all crops (according to equations 8 and 12). In the present case, the CRS assumption and the WTP estimates simplify matters, allowing to consider only field crops allocation while taking the other crops land allocations at their observed levels.

Social allocation: In Figure 4, we add the marginal WTP for field crops, specified in equation (24), to the private (farmers’) demand and obtain the social demand for farmland. In doing so we exploit the CRS and the WTP pattern under which the land allocations of the other crops (flowers, orchards, vegetables and citrus)
remain unchanged. The social allocation is obtained at the intersection of the social demand for agricultural land and the urban land demand, giving: $L_A^S = 5,061$ ha and $L_H = 4,929$ ha.

Accounting for the amenity value of farmland reduces urban land allocation from 5,500 ha to 4,929 ha (a decrease of about 10%) and increases farmland allocation by about 13% -- from 4,490 ha to 5,061 ha (see Table 8). Evaluating equation (20) at the parameter estimates, we can calculate the WTP for an average household at the market and social farmland allocation. Multiplying by the number of households in the region gives the aggregate WTPs of $3.478$ million and $3.595$ million for the market and social allocations, respectively (see Table 8). As shares of farming profits, these WTPs are 15.5% and 16% under the market and social allocations, respectively.

Figure 4: The social allocation of farmland ($L_A^S$) occurs at the intersection of the social ($D_A^S$) and urban ($D_H$) demand curves.

*Population effect:* The above allocations are calculated at the current population level. At the prevailing growth rate (2.5%), Israel's population will double in less than 30 years. We thus repeat the calculations under regional population of 140,000 households. The land allocation results are reported in Table 8 and shown in
Figure 5. Indeed, in the present case a growing population calls for more farmland preservation rather than less (the agricultural land increases from 4,380 ha to 5,234 ha while the urban land decreases from 5,610 ha under the market allocation to 4,756 ha under the social allocation). The aggregate WTPs under the market and social allocations are, respectively, $6.9 million and $7.26 million, which amount to 31.6% and 33.5% of the farmers' profits.

Table 8: Land allocation and WTP for agricultural landscape.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total area: 10,190 ha</th>
<th>Reserved open space: 200 ha</th>
<th>Area for allocation between crop production and housing: 9,990 ha</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N= 70,000 households</td>
<td>N = 140,000 households</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$L_A$ (ha)</td>
<td>Market</td>
<td>Social</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$L_A$ (ha)</td>
<td>4,490 ha</td>
<td>5,061 ha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$L_H$ (ha)</td>
<td>5,500 ha</td>
<td>4,929 ha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggregate WTP ($)</td>
<td>3,478,350</td>
<td>3,594,780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTP as a share of return from farming (%)</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5: Population effect: doubling of the population increases agricultural land allocation from 5,061 ha to 5,234 ha and decreases urban land from 4,929 ha to 4,756 ha.

Concluding comments

Disappearing farmlands due to urban sprawls are commonplace in developed and densely populated regions. This is indeed the inevitable outcome of the invisible-hand’s response to population and income pressures. We show that accounting for the
amenity value of agricultural landscape mitigates these trends and may even reverse them – as happens in our empirical study. In our framework the optimal farmland allocation depends not only on the amenity value of agricultural landscape in general but also on its distribution across agricultural crops. Crop areas differ in their return to farming and in the amenity value they generate. The amenity value of farmland, thus, bears both on the overall rural-urban land allocation and on the allocation of farmland between the different crops. These observations should be considered in any agricultural policy intervention.

The failure of land markets to account for the amenity value of farmland can be addressed by a variety of policy interventions. Examples include strict regulation such as zoning [1], market-based mechanisms such as rural tourism infrastructure aimed at internalizing the landscape externality [12], and incentive-based approaches such as agricultural landscape subsidies [10]. If the current farm programs in developed countries are to be justified by this market failure, they should pay close attention to the heterogeneity of the amenity value of farmland across crops.

References


