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## European and Chinese territoriality and territorial identity: temporal and spatial comparison of the post-war situation in Europe

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“European and Chinese territoriality and territorial identity:  
temporal and spatial comparison of the post-war situation in Europe”

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Abstract

The number of territorially based identities, that every human being has, is countless. Tied with different scales and natures of territorial units, the clearest of them appear to be political, economical and cultural identities of macro-, meso- and microscale.

What are possibly the most important territorial identities of the global province known as Europe? Could these determine the developing trend for all world or are they affected by globalization themselves? And what does look like the development of the identities of China, the claimed to be antagonist of the western civilization, in this light – similar, cross-different or something in between?

## 1. Territorial identity

Identity may be defined as a sense of connection or even sameness with a collection of symbolic elements or ideas. Feelings of identity is of essential necessity for psychical and emotional well-being and contentment of a person.

In surrounding practices individual or collective actor has many different personal and social identities (Cronin 1999, Castells 2000). The measuring of the sense of identification is not an easy task – in most cases it is contextually defined. Different identities dominate in different situations (Murphy 1999).

Hence, territorially based identities are just some of the overall amount.

For identification the place-bound self-interpretation uses environmental meanings (Cuba & Hummon 1993; see Entrikin 1994). The place-bound identities are considered to develop when places as certain locations become permeated with personal, social and cultural meanings (Entrikin 1994).

For delimiting and bounding, in addition to territory itself a complex group of symbols constituted by territorial qualities or elements is needed. These symbols are granting the emergence of the sense of cultural unity that is preconditioning the physical, psychological and social integration of people (Paasi 1996, Herb & Kaplan 1999).

Mediated by symbols with additional meaning, during the process of institutionalization the identity of the region is achieved. This cannot be equalized to the regional consciousness or regional identity of its inhabitants (Paasi 1996). Nevertheless, these two are intertwined – territory becomes the important part of characterizing and self-understanding of local people only with the existence of regional identity. This is important to point out, since the main purpose of this paper is to bridge the character of developing European territorial identity with the evolution of European territories.

### Different natures and scales of territorial identity

More-or-less correctly the institutional practices appealing to the creation of territorial identities can be divided into three bigger groups: the ones tied with culture, politics and economy.

These are what Kleijnsen (1999) calls the spheres of social life. As the identity-creating discourses are different in each, certain identity is closely tied with certain sphere of social life. At the same time they all are influencing each other. So to say the political identity is most influenced by

politics, but also by cultural and economical aspects. It holds similarly for economic and cultural identity.

State territory and three spheres of social life are related by Taylor (1994; see Newman & Paasi 1998), who claims that state as power container tends to preserve existing boundaries, as wealth container it tends towards larger territories and as cultural container prefers smaller ones.

On the basis of most common scales, the territorial units that people identify themselves with, can also be divided to three: globalizing or subglobalizing (macroscale), home region or locality (microscale) and the state (mesoscale) between them.

So the framework proposed by Taylor (1982, 1993b; see Paasi 1996) distinguishes three underlying socio-spatial scales: the scale of experience, the scale of ideology and the scale of reality. The ideological scale of state aims at separating global reality of the world economy from the local everyday experience. The classification presented by Newman and Paasi (1998) is similar. At the global scale we are dealing with geopolitics and economic landscape of the world. Nation-building process in different social practices characterizes the scale of the state. The third significant scale is local sphere of everyday life (where the meanings of state boundaries are reproduced and contested).

The importance of state identity derives from the suitable position between local and global scales. As we are all parts of global community and individual personalities, the national identity that is participating in global actions and at the same time touching personally has been developed considerably influential (Smith 1991, see Kaplan 1999).

The conception of the world territoriality is not merely threefold, of course. It is more like the pattern of many complicated and partly covering, contextual identities that are nested with one another.

Therefore the identities of small scales are not completely understandable when separated from the context of the bigger, constituted by territory that is wholly or partly covering smaller. The identities of big scales, at the same time, are something more than just a sum of their ingredients, depending also on the relations with other big scale identities (Paasi 1996, Herb & Kaplan 1999, Knight 1999).

The limits of a territorial unit are determined by the limits of human consciousness, identities and meaning of places are as diffused and distinguished as places themselves (Tilley 1994). According to the different scales of human consciousness and social experience, the different

scales of territorial identities of the elite and non-elite has to be noticed, as also Tuan (1997) has shown. Depending on the nature and availability of information, it has been even more important historically.

#### The importance of spatial and temporal comparison

For the following paper it is important to claim that the meaning of personal as well as social territorial unit emerges through comparison. Understanding the nature of territory and identifying with it takes place and is mediated by previous spatial and temporal experiences.

The importance and meaning of place can only be estimated through their relationships with other places. If places are experienced by moving, it is possible to conclude that the understanding of place, movement and landscape has essentially take place mediated by narrative interpreting previous experiences in present context (Tilley 1994). The evaluation of previous experiences is especially important in the context of our fast changing world.

In our perception of territorial units time also forms a significant part, sense of place is tied with changes both in time and space. Collective identity reveals and fixes itself through rituals. Repeating tradition of almost any kind recreates places and expresses its stability and continuity – even in times of fast changes. When rituals and myths lost their meaning, places will alter within short period (Relph 1976). The history of places – layers of meanings settled down according to past events and actions – also helps in creating visions and expectations (Relph 1976, Tilley 1994).

To follow the previous claims, the purpose of two next sections – comparison of temporal and spatial territorial developments in Europe – is therefore aimed at understanding the present situation of European territorial identification more deeply.

## 2. The history of Europe and formation of territoriality

### City-states

The beginning of European spatial construction was laid down by spread of agriculture and villages from Near-East to Balkan in 6th millennium BC. The economic specialization of population and transformation of settlement system from villages to towns was made possible by the surplus of food in the fertile areas of the big rivers around 4000 BC. Two yearthousands later Phoenicians and Cretans founded first commercial towns in the eastern part of Mediterranean – the European cultural space with the structure of city-state was starting to establish (Mägi 1984). The structure of city-state is characterized by existence of centre, from which the territoriality originated whereas hinterlands varied in scale. As clear-cut boundaries were missing in present meaning, outsiders and foreign policy were missing also (Häkli 1994). And even if sometimes the city-states formed military unions or leagues of short duration, political unity did not exist regardless the cultural similarities (Pounds 1990).

The discursive context of territoriality in the ancient city-states existed in the form of administrative elite and functions. The most advanced forms of administration were fiscal system and official censuses (Häkli 1994).

The flourishing of city-states took place in 6th and 5th century BC in Greece and even before that time the Greeks founded their colonies already farther than Aegean. In the form of colonial system, some cultural and economical unity described whole Mediterranean sphere. Situated on coast, the political influence and control of the colonies did not reach wide to the inland, but through their medium a coordinated trade system came into being. As the Greeks made contacts with the coastal inhabitants, they became aware of the differences between them and barbarians (Pounds 1990), and also the similarities between themselves.

At the end of the Peloponnesian war (in 404 BC) the system of city-states was in deep crisis. The towns united into alliances and shortly after became part of the Macedonian empire, which disintegrated following the death of Alexander the Great and formed hellenistic kingdoms (Pounds 1990). This marked the beginning of territorial state-system in Europe.

### The Roman Empire

The possibilities and ambitions of city-state were restricted by the shortage of resources, for territorial state it represented less of a problem. The resource conflicts of Rome led on and on to

successive oppositions first in Latium, then in Italy and western Mediterranean and finally in whole Mediterranean and Western-Europe (Pounds 1990).

Roman Empire can be characterized as a federation of city-states. Cities founded by Romans on conquered territories, provided consumption and administrative centres for local inhabitants. And even if Greek *polis* and Celtic tribal centre lost their meaning as autonomous units, the destruction of the local meaning was not complete – a great amount of city-regions were approximately corresponding to previous tribal territories. City was allowed to express its individuality and identity of local civil population, at the same time through monumental architecture and consumption it had to mediate the romanizing. Earlier perceptions of local meaning unified under Roman control (Pounds 1990).

Between cities and empire third territorial scale had been emerged – administrative province under the strict surveillance of the emperor or senate, which purposes and meanings may force one's fantasies towards the direction of the development of present European regional structure.

Instead of clear borders, the Roman Empire had vague borderlands (*limes*), from which onwards the civilization ended and barbarism began (Häkli 1994). Behind borderlands Rome was surrounded by allied tribes and vassal states, their support strengthened and weakened according to military power of the empire.

During the Barbarian Invasions and in the conditions of rivalry with the Eastern Empire, the central authority of the Western Empire could not any longer control the partly teuton-formed mercenary army and situation in state territory. Year 476 is considered to be the end of Western Roman Empire, power was divided by provincial regents, warlords and barbarian kings. Eastern Rome or Byzantine Empire lasted with stronger and weaker periods almost thousand more years (Mägi 1984).

Christianity organized in 2nd, administrative system originating from 3rd and legal system from 6th century AD, together with spread of latin as official language formed the basis of European culture. Centuries long relatively peaceful period during the following confusion brought forth images of Rome as an empire of golden peace, also memorized as the last sanctuary of western christianity (*Imperium Christianum*) and if not only possible then at least the best form of European territorial formation.

Compared that many administrative ideas of Rome were widely practiced for a long time and some are still in use, my main suggestion here is to learn also from the identificational structure

of the empire, which I'd like to characterize as plurality in unity. As the core values of Roman civilization are still uniting Europe, the common cultural identity may well be based on the territorial pattern of Roman kind.

#### Europe of feudal domains

After the disintegration of Roman Empire, the European spatial arrangement was characterized by territorial fragmentation. On the one hand, economical disunion caused political dispersion, on the other, the lack of trade relationships was affected by the instability of political power. Such plural environment was appropriate for the formation of new institutional structures.

During the early Medievals the Roman Empire was still acting as the main model of space regulation in Europe, even to the degree that Teutons, who became the rulers of the Western Europe, followed its lead in forming their states. In the era of Charlemagne the Frankish empire was a smaller model of Rome, culturally more united but poorer by economical relations. Primal territorial actors were the empire and kingdoms, although weakened by inner struggles and outward pressure. With the purpose of better administration, the Frankish empire was divided to provinces (*Gaue*), governed by counts (*Graf*), who were nominated strictly by the emperor (Pounds 1990).

After the death of Charles the Great the actual power was represented by the kings of France, Germany and Italy. In the end of 9th century these kingdoms detached officially and the century-long empire was disintegrated. Also the kingdoms were divided into provinces. This, as well as abatement of trading relations, caused the spread of natural economy and gave rise to the feudalism (Pounds 1990).

Anarchy at the end of the 9th century was successfully overcome first by the Eastern Frankish kingdom, which soon incorporated northern Italy and Burgundy under the German hegemony and named itself the Holy Roman Empire. However, the unity that had characterized the Roman Empire, was vanishing – step by step the emperor was losing control over the half-independent vassal-states. When in the 11th century benefice (deserved feudal domain) turned to feud (inherited feudal domain), the nobility needed central power no more. Within the territories of Austrian Habsburgs feudal disunion lasted on even for so late as the 19th century (Pounds 1990).

In addition to the contradictions between territorial scales the emperor of Holy Roman Empire had to share his universal power, his spiritual and secular authority, with the pope (Strayer 1970; see Taylor 1995) – this caused tensions and struggles for the supreme hegemony. As the



transformation of sovereignty from universal situation to plurality is considered a conceptual development of key importance in the modern policy (Adshead 1995, Taylor 1995), these contradictions as first appearances of accepted pluralism were of major importance. Acceptance of the idea of plurality was also an important presumption of the development of the idea of nation-state – unlike the confrontations between “barbarians” and “civilized” it made possible the intranational “us” vs “them” distinction.

Besides the approval of plurality as a form of political arrangement, the most significant territorial phenomenon in feudal Europe was the maintenance and spread of Roman cultural heritage that guaranteed the unity of continent. The need of participation in and preservation of European culture especially seemed to be in nature of the nations inhabiting cultural periphery, like Magyars, Poles and Swedes. Interestingly enough the attendance at Palestinian crusades, that had originally had political purpose, was supposed to characterize europeanness, which was cultural phenomenon. The term *lingua franca* in the notion of widely used language also derives from the era of crusades.

#### Europe of absolutistic kingdoms

In the beginning of Modern times the political sphere saw the increase in territorial scale and strengthening of central government – as a consequence of extensive use of cannons during the Renaissance the city-states were integrated by the bigger-scale kingdoms.

State governments started to penetrate the feudal structures during the modern times. The will to reign the state in all levels directed the attention to political borders (Pounds 1990), the outcome of this was the emergence of foreign policy of sovereign states and development of diplomatic system – in short: the beginning of contemporary state system (Häkli 1994, Taylor 1995). By direct colonization as well as through the medium of the world system dictated by Europe this system was distributed also to other continents.

Between the coronation of Charles V (1519) and French revolution the correlation of forces in Europe changed little. The domination was held by the empires of France and Habsburgs – both equal in might. Around the 1500s the Habsburgs were the military leaders of Europe whereas France dominated culturally (Mägi 1984). The rise of France as a political leader took place during the Thirty Years' War, a position consolidated with the Treaty of Westphalia. Most powerful by military means was France during the Napoleonic era.

In the beginning of Modern times, when transportation moved to the seas, the economic sphere gained in reach. Due to this Holland first and England afterwards became economical superpowers. At the same time cultural sphere experienced disintegration on the one hand (reformation and counterreformation) and unification (cultural renaissance) on the other. The image of “us” was created with the help of “other” (the attacks of Ottomans, Great discoveries).

To illustrate the territoriality preceding and characterizing the nation-state, the terms “system integration” and “national integration” are convenient to use. System integration marks the development by which administrative power is consolidated, national integration refers to the horizontal standardization and rationalization processes that help to homogenize the space (Häkli 1994). During the era of absolutistic kingdoms, the first dominated over the latter, but together with the horizontalization of administration and homogenization of space the larger-scale identities tied with territory, its history and shared experiences, began to emerge (Häkli 1994).

#### Development of nationalism

Before the Napoleonic wars the situation in Europe was complicated. Since the reformation Austrian Habsburgs and strengthening Prussia were enemies, Austrian contradictions with France and Russia for dominating position in Europe, added to it (Cronin 1999).

The Napoleonic wars has been considered the great event that altered relations among states. Together with the onmoving French armies the serfdom was abolished throughout central and eastern Europe, the ideas of citizenship and nationalism were institutionalized within the conquered territories, revolutionary ideas took root all over the Europe. The concept of nationalism as legitimizing principle eroded European political order, up to that point legitimacy had not been so important consideration in justifying state rule (Cronin 1999).

Napoleonic administration had either consolidated or reorganized most city-states and ancient republics into modern states. The 234 territories that comprised the empire at the beginning, were reduced to 39. The driving out of French rule from the territories it had occupied, left nearly half of Europe without government. In many cases it was not clear which territories constituted states at all (Cronin 1999).

At the Congress of Vienna, the territorial pattern of Europe was attempted to reconstruct, for that purpose the Great Powers tried to adopt a more systemic approach. Out of the changes in the social structure of Europe the development of European consciousness had grown out – the continent was referred to as conceptual society, the focus had shifted to the restoration of

European equilibrium (Cronin 1999). The concert system from the beginning of the 19th century was attempt to create an elitist europeanness.

However, balance did not last long and nation-state began its rise. As the processes in society (urbanization, juvenation of population) also favoured nationalism, it achieved the position of the most important basis for territorial identification, promoted by national romantism. At the same time it turned into intolerance towards alternative possibilities of the same kind.

The emergence of the nation-state may be contemplated consisting of three parts: systemic integration (the bureaucratization of state), national integration (the deepening of the feeling of shared experience) and conditions for political economy (industrialism and capitalism) (Häkli 1994, Taylor 1994a; see Taylor 1995). Absolutistic state system provided nation-state with its administrative component, French revolution added nation for legitimacy, industrialization set off about the same time. With the support of modernization, the idea of nation-state spreaded from Europe all over the world.

### 3. The history of China and formation of territoriality

#### Territorial development in traditional era

For spatial comparision of European territorial developments I have picked up China. The main reason for this action is the fact, that China has a long history and along that history it has developed quite separated from the influences of Europe and the world system Europe ruled. As such it has gained some attention as an antagonist of Europe as well as European thinking and culture. In the conditions of changing equilibrium of the world system, it is important to see and understand the differences and similarities of Europe and China.

The periodization of the development of Chinese and European territoriality and statehood likewise is complicated. Europeans saw their traditional world as cosmogonic and teleologic, for chinese it was dynamic, autogenerative and self-organizing.

Developments in Europe have been evolutionary and progressive by nature, in China time was cyclical – shorter periods of confusion rotated with periods of strong central authority and dynastic order. Changes of revolutionary character, in the realm of material as well as spiritual culture, have only been the appearance of the 20th century. Before that seldom events forced chinese to change their world view.

Traditional China was situated in the middle of the world, centrality of the state has already been noted in the eldest written sources from Shang dynasty (1600 – 1027 BC). The term Central Kingdom (*Zhongguo*), that Chinese use to name their state, appears as early as in the writings of the Western Zhou (1027 – 771 BC) (He 1995).

Public culture practiced by aristocracy and officialdom, different rites and ceremonies, behavioural norms, the form of art and music, and the institutions of the society all have their origins in the era of Eastern Zhou (771 – 221 BC) (He 1995).

The Warring Kingdoms emerged after the collapse of the Zhou central authority. Qin dynasty (221 – 207 BC) overthrew and united them, during its legalist power practice the state was divided into administrative counties, network of roads was created, writing scripts and measurements unified. Understanding of Chinese ethnic unity apparently crystallized during the Han dynasty (206 BC – 220 AD), ethnical Chinese keep on calling themselves the Han (He 1995).

The collapse of the Han empire was followed by three centuries of disunion, within northern China a number of barbarian states was established. The renaissance of Tang and Song dynasties was followed by the conquest of the state by Mongols in 13th century, in 16th century Ming dynasty was replaced by Manchu superiority which lasted until the beginning of 20th. Loss to barbarians caused change in sinocentric world view – belief emerged, according to which the cultural (*wen*) superiority of *Zhongguo* inevitably dominates over the military (*wu*) violence of the barbarians. Throughout Chinese history in several occasions the widening empire has incorporated barbarian tribes, using Han culture as a medium. On the other hand the invading barbarian non-Han Chinese, that became the rulers of China, always seemed to adapt the achievements of Han culture and eventually assimilated (He 1995).

#### Territorial development in revolutionary era

The traditional Chinese held their monistic view of culture until the intrusion of modern Western world. As Chinese culturalism was based on a comparison between Chinese society and neighbouring barbarians, a notion existed that Chinese higher spiritual life is unique. Modernizing meanings of culture had to accept the notion that each society has a unique spirit and a distinctive way of life (He 1995, Tuan 1996).

Change from centre to periphery shattered the Chinese world view and caused identity crisis. Many attempts were made to create a new conception of China, in the beginning of 20th century three of them were the most important.

a) The traditionalist perception of China's social identity can be summarized as expression "you have material prowess, we have the spirit". Ethical norms, the holy way and mentality were the substance (*ti*) of Chinese civilization, they could not be abandoned. Laws and institutions, technical equipment and craftsmanship on the other hand made up functions (*yong*), that needed change and even replacement by foreign substitutes. The way to modernize without westernizing were searched (He 1995, Tuan 1996, Dreyer 1999).

b) Radical anti-traditionalist stance saw tensions between the values of Chinese culture and the rationalization of modernizing social and economic organization. Chinese traditional culture considered to be impoverished, radicals suggested to adopt the modern scientific-industrial culture. Western culture was claimed to have its own essence, which manifested itself through practical production, it was impossible to take over Western *yong* without *ti*.

c) The eclectic stance coloured the perception of the Chinese identity of many national scholars, who began to see the legitimacy of traditional Chinese values and ethics. China's cultural tradition was no more blamed for economic and military backwardness. Together with accepting Western political forms and technology, they called for a cultural renaissance (He 1995).

Marxist theorists adopted a critical attitude towards the values of Chinese past. But they also criticized modern capitalism, believing that its last stage would soon be replaced by communism. The new culture the people were seeking, had to incorporate with Marxism and Leninism the finest cultural traditions of China's past (Wylie 1980; see He 1995).

The anti-governmental demonstration at Tian An Men Square in 1976 marked the end of Maoist perception of Chinese identity. China opened to the outside world and calmed down ideologically, economical reforms were carried through, the search for a new identity began once more (He 1995). The idea of modernizing without Westernizing still held ground. Many scholars tried to find the core ideas of Chinese culture from the past, to reconstruct the cultural identity (the similarity with present Europe is noticeable). Values like the idea of harmony, the notion of propriety, ethicalism, conceptualization by image and practical propensity, were singled out and perceived to characterize traditional Chinese society (He 1995).

As one possibility for the institutional reform a theory called "the New Authoritarianism" has emerged. In the early stages of industrialization, it is claimed, the authoritarian state backed by the military and commanding an efficient bureaucracy, can more effectively than parliamentary

democracy suppress political opposition , maintain social order and provide a peaceful environment for modernization. The proper reform strategy is hence based upon a platform consisting of a free market economy and an authoritarian state (He 1995).

The situation is even more complicated as the dominance of the official rule of the North is set under suspicion by the economic boom of the South. During the long history of China it has happened before – like in the eras of Tang cosmopolite empire and Song economic flowering. More democracy and spontaneity paralleled with less planning has characterized the southern culture as a rule, it has been created according to the material interests of common people (Tuan 1996).

#### Different scales of territorial identities

Traditional Chinese state was magnificent product of a society that believed in orderly bureaucratic organization and ceremonial procedures. Specificities of places were disregarded in favour of an imperial impersonal space, this view was also valid for certain attempts at spatial organization for practical purposes (Tuan 1996).

Even if the Chinese elite saw the wide acceptance and homogeneity of han civilization, people living within that uniformity were aware of differences. They appreciated and valued the unique personality of places (Tuan 1996).

The national integration at the end of 19th century also started among the people who had migrated into cities from the various localities of China (see Mitter 1999). The development of such urban nationalism was shaped by the interplay between two constructions of territorial identity – notions of native place and developing nation state (Goodman 1995).

The justification of ideological connection between native place identity and Chinese national identity was grounded in traditional ideas of concentric circles of cultural and territorial identity, suggested by Confucian text *The Great Learning (Daxue)*. As China was made up of provinces, counties and villages, love for the nation place could not harm the nationalism. Native place associations supported the narrative of common Chinese nationalism, although they simultaneously served as markers of cultural dissimilarities among different ethnic groups (Goodman 1995).

The intensity towards national and regional identity varied according to situation. During the periods of political and economical instability, when the greatest hazard originated from China itself, the attraction of regional autonomy was strong (Mitter 1999).

Certain markers are indicating, that some provinces and regions perceive their interests separated from China as a whole also in present time. Affected by historical background, ethnical composition, societal organization and uneven amount of resources, increasing social and economic differences between coastal and inland regions, in favour to the first, are adding to it (see Funabashi 1993, Wei 1999, Castells 2000).

Tied with native places, the developing territorial conception of sovereign nation state fitted different non-territorial discourses of race and culture into the service of territorial nation – so preparing ground for appealing the loyalty of communities overseas (Duara 1999). Hence the territorial identities of smaller and greater scales than that of the nation state, even during the construction of the nation existed and developed in China.

In addition to ethnocentric conception of nationalism in China, Pan-Chinese concept is recently gaining more and more support. Membership of the cultural Pan-Chinese nation is free, it embraces all ethnic groups that accept Confucian principles (Yingjie & Baogang 1999). The idea of cultural China allows to redefine the meaning of being Chinese, leaving out the geographical or political space known as *Zhongguo* (Cohen 1993).

The perception of cultural China has influenced the extension of economic relations between different Chinas, so supporting the economic growth of the mainland. This in turn has psychologically pushed the strenghtening of the cultural identity. The Great China has become cultural as well as economic reality (Duara 1999, Huntington 1999).

Talking about the cultural identity of Pan-China or Great China, it seems suitable to use the term “deterritorialized nation”, as Duara (1999) has shown. Deterritorialized nation does not necessarily differ structurally from territorial nation, but its territorial borders have been replaced by strong cultural boundaries. In the context of globalizing forces, however, it may prove difficult to establish borders of any kind (Duara 1999).

#### 4. Present nation-state and its changing nature

Today state and nation are united symbiotically: The dualism of political functions of the state and cultural ones of the nation are integrated into whole. State needs nation for its legitimacy and nation needs state to achieve its goals (Kaplan 1999).

To leave out the rare exceptions, the spatial patterns of state and nation do not overlap. This causes the tensions between identities and is illustrated by division of cultural and political nation

(Smith 1991; see Kaplan 1999). Likewise the division of cultural nationalism and political patriotism has to be noted.

Analogically to the differentiation of cultural and political nation, it is possible to treat state as national unit and as a general form of government (Dicken *et al.* 1997; see Kelly 1999) or administrative form of elite's territorial identity. Meaning the general form of government, the shape and functions of the state as the key element and generator as well as the production of dynamics are always in transformation (MacLeod & Goodwin 1999).

As modern nationalism is more oriented to the past than to the future, it is more cultural than political by nature, more oriented towards the construction and preservation of institutionalized culture than state (Castells 2000). Such a split of political and cultural goals can coincide with the split of the nation as horizontal (territorial or deterritorialized) identity and the state as vertical administrative territoriality. Changing nature of the nation-state leads again to the division of political, economical and cultural identities and their formation of different scales, which most likely are based upon the territorial constructs, that existed already before the hegemony of nation-states.

Scalar changes of identification are simple to illustrate with the help of loyalty shifts terminology as Knox (1995) has done. In case of outward shifts the loyalty is moving towards supranational constructs, inward shifts are useful when talking about the social creation of place (Knox 1995, Kaplan 1999).

Border transcending relations and reformation of territorial system are causing the change of traditional territoriality to a more vague concept, a space of overlapping interdependency and power relations (Paasi 1996). While state is continually important, its shape and functions are changing. Its potentiality is reorganized territorially and functionally, its power keeps moving to the higher, lower and parallel levels – its comparatively privileged level is disappearing (Peck & Jessop 1998; see MacLeod & Goodwin 1999). Different functions are partly taken over by alternative bigger and smaller scale units, together with multilayered organizations they deal actual problems on certain levels (Taylor 1996; see Kaplan 1999).

As nodal points of international policy's wider network, the central function of the states would be guaranteeing the legitimacy of supra- and subnational governing mechanisms and ensuring their responsibility (Hirst & Thompson; see Castells 2000). Even if states preserve significant



influence, separated from supranational macropowers and subnational microprocesses they may not contain much power in the future (Castells 2000).

The rearrangement of state power to higher and lower levels is well described by the duality of Swyngedouw's (1997a) term "glocalizing" (see Kelly 1999).

### 5. The post-war Europe

While nation-state gathered cultural, political and economical spheres into mesoscale, it became uncompromizing towards bigger and smaller scales and other nation-states as well. The outcome of this brought ruins to Europe in every sphere and scale during two world wars. It was made clear that continent is too small and diverse for practising exceptional territorial nationalism.

Being the very heart of two worldwide wars, Europe is now the most successful part of the world in demolishing the structure of nation-states. What we can see from the temporal as well as spatial comparison is the development and survival of alternative territorial identities during the hegemony of the nation-state, regardless of the government and cultural background. The identities now threatening to replace the nation-state, have undoubtedly their roots somewhere in history. Such is the manner in which previous experiences of different places are still affecting us.

As institutional – political and economic – restructuration of Europe has been carried through with quite a few major problems, also the time has come to deal with the macro-scale cultural identity-building.

Analyzing the constructing of conceptual Europe and europeanness, the most arguable has been the questions of European Union as a state and the nature of European identity in this case. Generally speaking, it looks like the adherents of statist Europe and European identity are basing their claims on institutional, their opponents on cultural sphere of Europe. Hence the majority of questions are reduced to the question of different scales and natures of the identities participating in the process of overall European identity creation.

As the level of the nation-state has maintained to preserve special position in European Union, it is widely accepted that national feelings are influencing the project as individual nation-states wish to gain their individual profit out of the unification (see Buruma 1991, Kleijnsen 1999, Foucher 2000). In the restructuration of the meaning of inner borders, stateless nations like scots,

basks and catalans have seen their possibility to claim formal sovereignty within the frame structure of European Union (Foucher 2000).

Together with the ethnic regions, an economic regionalization without any significant political claims has become important in Europe. The occurrence of economic regions is thought to be due to the situation, where nationally operating state is no more able to manage regional demands within the global conditions. As the individual interests has linked up in the new way (Murphy 1999) and local ones do not overlap with these of state, the European regions are connecting themselves strictly to the world economy (Newhouse 1997).

Without noticing the wider definition of European identity (unity in plurality), it is almost impossible to understand the changing regional meanings in Europe – we are dealing at the same time with the growth and decline on the basis of territorial identification. Europe constitutes a framework, which is reflecting and shaping regional changes. Different regional initiatives, in turn, have strengthen the idea, that Europe is more than a collection of state interests (Murphy 1999). And we can not cast aside the territorial identities of the mesoscale, no matter if they are based on nation, state or nation-state.

It is difficult to judge, which of the different scales of European identities is most important. We do not even have an answer whether European identity is local, national or European – or if there is just one form of identification (Kleijssen 1999).

It is possible to conclude, that European identity exists together with the others in a manner, which is not necessarily hierarchic. The meanings tied with the concept of Europe are influencing the conceptualization and understanding of the other territorial constructs, but the latter don't themselves have to be derivative for Europe itself (Murphy 1999).

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