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Lending Standards, Credit Booms and Monetary Policy

by

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Abstract
This paper investigates the risk channel of monetary policy on the asset side of banks’ balance sheets. We use a factor-augmented vector autoregression (FAVAR) model to show that aggregate lending standards of U.S. banks, such as their collateral requirements for firms, are significantly loosened in response to an unexpected decrease in the Federal Funds rate. Based on this evidence, we reformulate the costly state verification (CSV) contract to allow for an active financial intermediary, embed it in a New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model, and show that – consistent with our empirical findings – an expansionary monetary policy shock implies a temporary increase in bank lending relative to borrower collateral. In the model, this is accompanied by a higher default rate of borrowers. Keywords: Bank lending standards, Credit supply, Monetary policy, Risk channel

JEL classification: E44, E52

1. Introduction

One of the narrative explanations of the credit boom preceding the recent financial crisis and the Great Recession is that financial intermediaries took excessive risks because monetary policy rates had been “too low for too long” (see Taylor, 2007). On the one hand, loose monetary policy lowers the wholesale funding costs of banks and other financial intermediaries, which might contribute to higher leverage and thus risk on the liability side of banks’ balance sheets. On the other hand, low monetary policy rates may also induce banks to lower their lending standards, i.e.

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to grant more and riskier loans. While risk taking on the liability side has received a lot of attention in the recent macroeconomic literature (see, e.g., Angeloni et al., 2013; Gertler and Karadi, 2011; Gertler et al., 2012; de Groot, 2014), much fewer studies have so far addressed the aggregate implications of a risk channel of monetary policy on the asset side. The present paper aims at filling this gap, focusing on the ex-ante risk attitude of banks. First, we provide empirical evidence of an asset-side risk channel of monetary policy in the aggregate lending behavior of U.S. banks. Based on this evidence, we develop a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model, where financial intermediaries choose how much to lend against a given amount of borrower collateral.

Prior research based on microeconomic bank-level data, as in Jimenez et al. (2014) and Bonfim and Soares (2014), has shown that a lower overnight interest rate might induce banks to commit larger loan volumes with fewer collateral requirements to ex-ante riskier firms. For macroeconomic time series, however, the results have been rather ambiguous. Angeloni et al. (2013), for example, use a small-scale vector autoregression (VAR) model and find no statistically significant response of lending standards in the U.S. banking sector. Based on a comprehensive data set of 140 macroeconomic variables, Buch et al. (2014) find evidence in favor of such a channel, albeit only for small U.S. banks.

The use of macroeconomic data in this context is complicated by the limited availability of adequate measures of banks’ risk attitude and, hence, a comparatively short sample period. As a consequence, econometric models are easily prone to overfitting due to an excessive number of parameters. To overcome this curse of dimensionality, we employ a factor-augmented vector autoregression (FAVAR) model, as in Bernanke et al. (2005), which allows us to parsimoniously extract information from a large set of macroeconomic time series, thereby mitigating the concern of overfitting. While the FAVAR specification is sufficiently parsimonious to be estimated even on a relatively short sample, it is less likely to be subject to “omitted-variable bias” than a small-scale VAR model. This is crucial, given that omitted-variable bias might invalidate the coefficient estimates and thus the impulse response functions to a monetary policy shock (see, e.g., Bernanke et al., 2005).

To capture the credit-risk attitude of banks, we use the quantified qualitative measures from the Federal Reserve’s Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices (SLOOS), which reflect changes in lending standards of 80 large domestic and 24 U.S. branches and agencies of foreign banks at a quarterly frequency, starting in 1991Q1. In contrast to the prior empirical literature, we employ 19 different measures of lending standards, such as the net percentage of banks increasing collateral requirements, tightening loan covenants, etc. for various categories of loans, borrowers and banks, in order to extract the comovement in the underlying time series.

Our baseline specification contains three common factors, the Federal Funds rate as the only observable variable, and a lag order of two in quarterly data. We use the one-step Bayesian estimation approach by Gibbs sampling from Bernanke et al. (2005) and Amir Ahmadi and Uhlig (2009) and find that, together with the observable variable, a small number of factors is already sufficient to explain a substantial share of the variation in lending standards, ranging from .41 to .85 in terms of adjusted $R^2$. Following Bernanke et al. (2005), monetary policy shocks are identified recursively,
with the Federal Funds rate ordered last in the transition equation of the FAVAR model.

We find that all 19 measures of lending standards decrease in response to an expansionary monetary policy shock. The corresponding impulse response functions are both statistically and economically significant, suggesting a non-trivial role for monetary policy in the ex-ante risk attitude of banks in the U.S. Our findings are qualitatively robust to variations in the FAVAR lag order, the number of unobservable factors, the number of observable variables, the sample period, and the two-step estimation approach based on a principal component analysis in Bernanke et al. (2005).

Motivated by the above empirical evidence, we aim to provide microeconomic foundations for a bank’s decision to change its lending standards in response to monetary policy. To this end, we reformulate the costly state verification (CSV) contract in Townsend (1979) and Gale and Hellwig (1985) in order to allow for a nontrivial role of financial intermediaries. The CSV contract provides a natural starting point, given that its parties decide on both the quantity of credit (via the amount lent) and the quality of credit (via the borrower’s ex-ante implied default risk). However, in the original implementation of the contract in DSGE models of the financial accelerator, e.g. in Bernanke et al. (1999) and Christensen and Dib (2008), financial intermediaries are passive and do not bear any risk.

We drop this assumption and show that the resulting contract is incentive-compatible, robust to ex-post renegotiations, and resembles a standard debt contract (compare Gale and Hellwig, 1985). Moreover, it implies a unique partial equilibrium solution and the well-known positive relation between the expected external finance premium (EFP) and the borrower’s leverage ratio, as in Bernanke et al. (1999). In response to an exogenous increase in the expected EFP, e.g. due to a monetary expansion, banks find it profitable to lend more against a given amount of borrower collateral, although this implies an increase in leverage and thus a higher default probability of the borrower.

We then embed our version of the CSV contract in an otherwise standard New Keynesian DSGE model with sticky prices, partial indexation, and investment adjustment costs. In contrast to most of the prior literature, an expansionary monetary policy shock can cause a hump-shaped increase in the expected EFP. As a consequence, our model implies an increase in bank lending relative to borrower collateral and thus a higher leverage ratio of borrowers. This general-equilibrium result is in close correspondence with our prior empirical finding that, in the U.S., the “net percentage of banks increasing collateral requirements for firms” and similar measures of lending standards decrease significantly in response to an unexpected monetary easing by the Federal Reserve. We further show that the effect increases with the degree of interest-rate smoothing in the monetary policy rule.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sketches our econometric approach and presents new empirical evidence of an asset-side risk-attitude channel of monetary policy in the U.S. banking sector. Section 3 derives and discusses the qualitative properties of the optimal debt contract under asymmetric information and CSV. The optimal debt contract is then incorporated into a quantitative New Keynesian DSGE model. Section 4 concludes and gives directions for future research.
2. Empirical Evidence

The empirical relevance of a risk-taking channel of monetary policy on the asset side has been shown mostly based on microeconomic banking-level data (see, e.g., Jimenez et al., 2014). When macroeconomic time series are used, however, the results are less clear cut. Angeloni et al. (2013) set up a small-scale vector autoregression (VAR) model, including one of the SLOOS measures of bank lending standards among the endogenous variables as a proxy for asset-side risk taking. They find no significant evidence of aggregate risk taking of the U.S. banking sector on the asset side.¹ Using a rich panel of banking data containing 140 time series and a FAVAR model, Buch et al. (2014) find evidence in favor of a risk-taking channel on the asset side only for small U.S. banks. Notably, Buch et al. (2014) use a different measure of asset risk – the riskiness of new loans provided in the Survey of Terms of Business Lending of the U.S. Federal Reserve, which restricts their sample period to 1997Q2-2008Q2.

Taking a similar approach, we use the quantified qualitative measures from the Federal Reserve’s SLOOS, which are available from 1991Q1 onwards, to capture changes in banks’ lending standards. In order to corroborate that the latter are suitable proxies for the risk appetite of banks, Figure 2 plots the fraction of domestic banks reporting that a certain reason was important for loosening their lending standards.² Besides the “economic outlook” category, higher risk tolerance was the main determinant of banks’ decision to loosen their lending standards prior to the financial crisis of 2007-2008, whereas their capital position and industry-specific problems featured less prominently. The importance of the general economic outlook illustrates that lending standards are an ex-ante measure of asset risk. Suppose, for example, that a bank’s expectation about future economic activity justify a higher risk tolerance and proves to be true, then ex-ante risk taking does not necessarily result in a riskier loan portfolio in terms of higher borrower default and potential losses to the bank, ex post. If the bank’s risk tolerance is not in line with the economic outlook or the latter proves to be wrong, however, then ex-ante risk taking translates into ex-post asset risk.

Similar to Buch et al. (2014), we employ a FAVAR model, which allows us to parsimoniously extract information from a large number of macroeconomic time series, thereby reducing the risk of omitted-variable bias, which might contaminate the identification of monetary policy shocks (see also Bernanke et al., 2005). In order to corroborate this argument, consider the following example of a small-scale VAR model of the U.S. economy including four observable variables: real activity (non-farm employment and real GDP respectively), prices (CPI), banks’ risk attitude in lending (the net percentage of domestic banks tightening standards for C&I loans), and a monetary policy instrument (the Federal Funds rate). The VAR model is estimated using quarterly data for 1991Q2-2008Q2 and two lags. Following Angeloni et al. (2013), we detrend the non-stationary variables in logarithms and the stationary variables in levels using the HP-filter (Hodrick and Prescott, 1997) with \( \lambda = 1,600 \). Monetary policy shocks are identified recursively,

¹In particular, Angeloni et al. (2013) use the net percentage of banks tightening credit standards on C&I loans to large and medium-sized firms.
²A balanced panel of the reasons for easing lending standards of domestic banks can be constructed only after 1997Q1. Since the picture for foreign banks is qualitatively very similar, it is omitted here to conserve space.
ordering the Federal Funds rate last in the VAR. A similar identifying assumption will later be made in the FAVAR analysis.

Figure 3 plots the impulse response functions to a monetary easing of 25 basis points for two different specifications of the VAR model. In the upper panel, we include non-farm employment as a proxy for real economic activity, whereas we include real GDP in the lower panel. Note that the other three variables as well as the identifying assumptions are identical across the two specifications. In the upper panel, bank lending standards do not seem to respond significantly, according to the two standard error confidence bands, while the corresponding point estimate suggests a tightening of standards with a peak around ten quarters after the expansionary monetary policy shock. In the lower panel, however, where real economic activity is measured by real GDP rather than employment, the impulse response functions suggest a statistically significant easing of bank lending standards in response to the same monetary policy shock.

Arguably, there is yet another dimension in which the identification of monetary policy shocks could be improved. Policy makers must decide in real time, based on preliminary estimates of the relevant variables, which are available at a given point in time and might later be subject to revision. Orphanides (2001) illustrates the importance of real-time data for the estimation of univariate Taylor rules. Accordingly, we repeat the above exercise, this time using real-time rather than revised observations of the four variables. Both measures of real activity, i.e. real GDP and employment, as well as CPI are subject to revisions, whereas lending standards and the Federal Funds rate are never revised. We find that, although error bands widen somewhat when using real-time data, our qualitative conclusions remain unchanged. In response to a monetary easing, lending standards are significantly loosened when real GDP is used as a measure of real economic activity, whereas they are insignificantly tightened when employment is used instead. Note that our results suggest only a minor role for real-time data in the identification of monetary policy shocks in the small-scale VAR model. This is consistent with previous findings in the literature, such as Croushore and Evans (2006).

Given the apparent sensitivity of the results to our selection of variables in a small-scale VAR, we extract so-called factors from a comprehensive set of real economic activity measures including several indicators of employment and production, thus mitigating the omitted-variable bias illustrated beforehand. In order to detect a possible risk-taking channel of monetary policy, we augment these macroeconomic and financial time series, which are commonly used in the FAVAR literature, by 19 different measures of lending standards, such as the net percentage of banks increasing collateral requirements, tightening loan covenants, etc. for various categories of loans, borrowers, and banks, for a total of 138 variables. Figure 1 illustrates the substantial comovement between the SLOOS measures of bank lending standards, which should be captured well even by a relatively small number of common factors.

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3In order to retain our benchmark sample period until 2008Q2, we consider the 2008Q3 vintage as real-time data and the 2014Q3 vintage as fully revised data. The corresponding impulse response functions are available from the authors upon request.

4A detailed description of the data can be found in Appendix A.1.
2.1. Econometric Specification

Suppose that the observation equation relating the $N \times 1$ vector of informational time series $X_t$ to the $K \times 1$ vector of unobservable factors $F_t$ and the $M \times 1$ vector of observable variables $Y_t$, with $K + M << N$, is

$$X_t = \Lambda^f F_t + \Lambda^y Y_t + e_t,$$

(1)

where $\Lambda^f$ is an $N \times K$ matrix of factor loadings of the unobservable factors, $\Lambda^y$ is an $N \times M$ matrix of factor loadings of the observable variables, and $e_t$ is an $N \times 1$ vector of error terms following a multivariate normal distribution with mean zero and covariance matrix $R$.

Suppose further that the joint dynamics of the unobserved factors in $F_t$ and the observable variables in $Y_t$ can be captured by the transition equation

$$\begin{bmatrix} F_t \\ Y_t \end{bmatrix} = \Phi(L) \begin{bmatrix} F_{t-1} \\ Y_{t-1} \end{bmatrix} + \nu_t,$$

(2)

where $\Phi(L)$ is a lag polynomial of order $d$ and $\nu_t$ is a $(K + M) \times 1$ vector of error terms following a multivariate normal distribution with mean zero and covariance matrix $Q$. The error terms in $e_t$ and $\nu_t$ are assumed to be uncorrelated.

Estimation of the FAVAR model in (1) and (2) requires transforming the data to induce stationarity of all variables.\(^5\) Our baseline sample contains quarterly observations for 1991Q1-2008Q2. The start of this sample period is determined by the availability of the SLOOS measures of bank lending standards, while we exclude the period after 2008, because, after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, U.S. monetary policy was effectively operating through the balance sheet of the Federal Reserve rather than through the Federal Funds rate. The predominance of unconventional policy measures would require a different strategy for identifying monetary policy shocks during this period, as in Peersman (2011).

Following Bernanke et al. (2005), we identify monetary policy shocks recursively, ordering the Federal Funds rate last in equation (2). In our case, this implies that the unobserved factors do not respond to monetary policy innovations within the same quarter, while the idiosyncratic components of the informational time series in $X_t$ are free to respond on impact.\(^6\) One could argue that senior loan officers take into account the current monetary stance when deciding on their lending standards. However, the SLOOS is conducted by the Federal Reserve, so that results are available before the quarterly meetings of the Federal Open Market Committee, in line with our identification scheme.

Building on Bernanke et al. (2005) and Amir Ahmadi and Uhlig (2009), we estimate the FAVAR model in (1) and (2) by a one-step Bayesian approach.\(^7\) Due to the fundamental indeterminacy of factor models, the unobserved factors

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\(^5\)The transformation of each variable is detailed in Appendix A.1. Note that the measures of bank lending standards enter the FAVAR model in (standardized) levels, i.e. without first-differencing or detrending, given that they are stationary by construction.

\(^6\)Note that Bernanke et al. (2005) apply the same recursive ordering to a FAVAR model in monthly data.

\(^7\)Alternatively, the model could be estimated using a two-step approach based on principal components analysis, as in Bernanke et al. (2005). However, the latter method turns out to be more prone to overfitting in our relatively short sample, especially with many lags. For a lag order of one quarter, the results based on the two-step approach are very similar to those based on the one-step Bayesian estimation approach.
can only be estimated up to a rotation. For this reason, we must impose a set of standard restrictions on the observation equation in order to identify the factors uniquely. Following Bernanke et al. (2005), we eliminate rotations of the form \( F_t^* = AF_t + BY_t \). Solving this expression for \( F_t \) and plugging the result into the observation equation in (1) yields

\[ X_t = \Lambda^f A^{-1} F_t^* + (\Lambda^x + \Lambda^f A^{-1} B)Y_t. \]  

(3)

Hence, the unique identification of factors requires that \( A^{-1} F_t^* = F_t \) and \( \Lambda^f A^{-1} B = 0 \). Bernanke et al. (2005) suggest imposing sufficient (overidentifying) restrictions by setting \( A = I \) and \( B = 0 \). Moreover, the one-step estimation approach requires that the first \( K \) variables in the vector \( X_t \) belong to the set of slow-moving variables (see Table 4).

We apply multi-move Gibbs sampling in order to jointly sample from the unobserved factors and the model parameters. Appendix A.2 provides details on the prior distributions, the Gibbs sampler, and how we monitor convergence of the latter. In the baseline model, we set the lag order of the transition equation to two quarters and consider the Federal Funds rate as the only observable variable in (2), i.e. \( M = 1 \).

To determine the appropriate number of unobservable factors in our FAVAR specification, we consult different selection criteria, monitor the joint explanatory power of \( F_t \) and \( Y_t \) for bank lending standards, and check the robustness of our results by adding more factors than suggested by the above criteria. The tests of Onatski (2009) and Alessi et al. (2010) point to three and five factors, respectively. Given that our main interest is in explaining the fluctuations in lending standards, we report the adjusted \( R^2 \) for each of the 19 SLOOS measures for one, two, and three unobservable factors in Table 1. It turns out that the first factor exhibits a high correlation with most measures of bank lending standards, with the adjusted \( R^2 \) ranging from .41 to .85. Adding further factors improves the good fit only marginally. Nevertheless, we also tried specifications with a larger number of factors and found that our results are not affected substantially, even when including seven factors. Based on these results, we refer to the specification with three unobservable factors as the baseline FAVAR model in what follows.

2.2. Empirical Results

2.2.1. Historical Variance Decomposition

We are primarily interested in the response of the 19 measures of bank lending standards to expansionary monetary policy shocks, on average over the sample period. In order to assess the plausibility of our FAVAR specification and the resulting monetary shock series, we consider the historical variance decomposition (HVD) of the standardized changes in lending standards. Figure 4 plots the cumulative contributions of monetary policy shocks to fluctuations in

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Note that there are many other admissible identifying assumptions satisfying \( A^{-1} F_t^* = F_t \) and \( \Lambda^f A^{-1} B = 0 \).

Results for lag orders one and three are very similar. Including CPI as an additional observable (\( M = 2 \)) does not affect our qualitative results.

Moreover, our results are consistent with the so-called “scree plot”, which plots the eigenvalues of \( X_t \) in descending order against the number of principal components. In our case, the scree plot displays a steep negative slope and a kink around the sixth principal component, supporting the results based on the selection criteria and the robustness checks.
the Federal Funds rate and lending standards for a single candidate draw from the Gibbs sampler, after discarding a sufficiently long burn-in phase.\textsuperscript{11}

Over the second half of the sample, we find that unexpected monetary policy shocks contribute to the reduction in the Federal Funds rate after the dot-com bubble and, to a lesser extent, to the gradual change in the monetary policy stance during the boom preceding the Great Recession.\textsuperscript{12} Moreover, the FAVAR model attributes a sizeable share of the initial tightening and subsequent loosening of bank lending standards between 1998 and 2005 to monetary shocks. Note that this HVD pattern is shared by all 19 measures. In line with conventional wisdom, the abrupt tightening of lending standards in 2008 is not associated with unexpected monetary policy shocks.

2.2.2. Impulse Response Functions

Figure 5 plots the impulse responses of the Federal Funds rate and the 19 measures of bank lending standards to an expansionary monetary policy shock, i.e. an unexpected 25bps decrease in the Federal Funds rate, based on the baseline FAVAR model with $K = 3$ unobservable factors. All impulse response functions are in terms of standard deviations, while one period on the $x$-axis corresponds to one quarter. The dashed and dotted lines around the median responses indicate the pointwise $16^{th}/84^{th}$ and $5^{th}/95^{th}$ percentiles, respectively, containing 68 and 90% of the probability mass.\textsuperscript{13}

We find that all 19 measures of lending standards decrease in response to an expansionary monetary policy shock. The response of lending standards is gradual, peaking after eight to nine quarters before returning to steady state. Note that this effect is both statistically and economically significant. Given that an average standard deviation in lending standards equals 21 net percentage points, a 100bps decrease in the Federal Funds rate on an annual basis corresponds to a maximum effect on lending standards of 16-20 net percentage points, on average.

Figure 6 illustrates that this finding is robust to using a FAVAR specification with only one unobserved factor, while Figures 7 and 8 illustrate the robustness for 5 and 7 factors, respectively. Moreover, we challenge our findings by examining two shorter sample periods, starting in 1994Q1 and 1997Q1, respectively, in order to eliminate potentially distorting effects of the Savings and Loan crisis and the ensuing U.S. recession of the early 1990s on our results. It turns out that the results based on these subsamples are quantitatively very similar to our baseline results.

To sum up, we provide strong empirical evidence for the existence of an ex-ante risk-taking channel of monetary policy on the asset side of banks’ balance sheet. In contrast to Buch et al. (2014), for example, this channel seems to be present and statistically significant also for large domestic and foreign banks in the U.S. banking industry.

\textsuperscript{11}The reason for plotting the HVD based on a single model is that pointwise median contributions based on all draws imply jumping between different candidates and are thus not interpretable in a sensible way. Nevertheless, the latter results are qualitatively and quantitatively very similar to those in Figure 4, which can therefore be considered as representative, and available from the authors upon request.

\textsuperscript{12}It is well-known that the HVD contributions go through a transition phase that can be protracted if the time series in question are serially correlated. In our case, the transition phase lasts until roughly 1998 and the discussion therefore focuses on the results thereafter.

\textsuperscript{13}The impulse response functions are based on a chain of an effective length of 140,000 iterations with a burn-in phase of 40,000 iterations.
3. Theoretical Model

In the remainder of this paper, we develop a theoretical model that is capable of replicating the response of banks to a monetary easing identified in the previous empirical analysis. In particular, we want to show that it can be optimal for a bank to increase the amount of lending per unit of borrower collateral in response to an expansionary monetary policy shock, even though this raises the default probability of a given borrower and the default rate across borrowers. In other words, the bank lowers its lending standards.

For this purpose, we draw on the CSV contract proposed by Townsend (1979) and Gale and Hellwig (1985), and first incorporated into a New Keynesian DSGE model by Bernanke et al. (1999). The CSV framework accounts for both dimensions of a credit expansion: (i) the quantity of credit, i.e. the amount lent, and (ii) the quality of credit, i.e. the associated default threshold of the borrower that a bank is willing to tolerate. It thus provides a micro-foundation for banks’ optimal decision on lending standards during a credit expansion. In contrast to Bernanke et al. (1999) and most recent contributions (see, e.g., Piffer, 2013), however, we reformulate the optimal debt contract from the lender’s perspective. Recall that, in the former, there is no active role for the so-called “financial intermediary”, which merely diversifies away the idiosyncratic productivity risks of entrepreneurs and institutionalizes the participation constraint of risk-averse depositors, along which the firm moves when making its optimal capital and borrowing decision.14

Instead, we assume that a risk-neutral lender – the bank – chooses the size of the loan for a given amount of borrower collateral and thus the corresponding default threshold. As a result, the bank determines the entrepreneur’s total capital expenditure. We further assume that market power in the credit market is in the hands of the bank, which makes a “take-it-or-leave-it” loan offer to borrowers, similar to that in Valencia (2011). In order for a firm to accept this offer, it must be at least as well off as without the loan. The details of the optimal loan contract in partial equilibrium with and without aggregate risk will be specified in the following. Assuming that each entrepreneur borrows from at most one bank, the latter can enter a contract with one entrepreneur independently of its relations with others, and we can consider a representative bank-entrepreneur pairing (compare Gale and Hellwig, 1985).

3.1. The Optimal Loan Contract in Partial Equilibrium

Suppose that, at time $t$, entrepreneur $i$ purchases capital $Q_i K_i^t$ for use at $t+1$, where $K_i^t$ is the quantity of capital purchased and $Q_i$ is the price of one unit of capital in period $t$. The gross return per unit of capital expenditure to entrepreneur $i$, $\omega_{i+1}^t R_{i+1}^t$, depends on the ex-post aggregate return to capital, $R_{i+1}^t$, and an idiosyncratic component, $\omega_{i+1}^t$. Following Bernanke et al. (1999), we assume that the random variable $\omega_{i+1}^t \in [0, \infty)$ is i.i.d. across entrepreneurs $i$ and across time $t$, with a continuous and differentiable cumulative distribution function ($cdf$) $F(\omega)$ and an expected value of unity.

---

14Given the lenders’ passiveness, Brunnermeier et al. (2013) do not even categorize Bernanke et al. (1999) as a model of financial intermediation.
Entrepreneur \( i \) finances any capital purchases at the end of period \( t \) using accumulated net worth \( N_i^t \) as well as the borrowed amount \( B_i^t \), so that

\[
Q_tK_i^t = N_i^t + B_i^t. \tag{4}
\]

Given that we abstract from alternative investment opportunities of entrepreneurs, the maximum equity participation (MEP) condition in Gale and Hellwig (1985) is trivially satisfied.\(^{15}\) As in Valencia (2011), entrepreneur \( i \) borrows the amount \( B_i^t \) from a monopolistic bank, that is endowed with end-of-period-\( t \) net worth or bank capital \( N_b^t \) and collects deposits \( D_t \) from households. Defining aggregate lending to borrowers as

\[
B_t \equiv \int_0^1 B_i^t di,
\]

the bank’s aggregate balance sheet identity in period \( t \) is given by

\[
B_t \equiv N_b^t + D_t. \tag{5}
\]

Following Bernanke et al. (1999), we motivate the need for borrower collateral by the presence of a state-verification cost, the lender must pay in order to observe entrepreneur \( i \)’s realization of \( \omega_{i+1} \), which is private information initially. We assume that this cost corresponds to a fixed proportion \( 0 < \mu \leq 1 \) of the entrepreneur’s total return on capital in period \( t+1 \), \( \omega_{i+1}^t R_{k+1}^t Q_i K_i^t \), so that initially uninformed agents may become informed by paying a fee which depends on the invested amount and the state (compare Townsend, 1979; Gale and Hellwig, 1985).

Both the borrower and the lender are assumed to be risk-neutral and to care about expected returns only, whereas depositors are risk-averse. Accordingly, the bank promises to pay the risk-free gross rate of return \( R_n^t \) on deposits in each aggregate state of the world, as characterized by the realization of \( R_{k+1}^t \).

Denote the gross non-default rate of return on the period-\( t \) loan to entrepreneur \( i \) by \( Z_i^t \). Given \( R_{k+1}^t, Q_i K_i^t, \) and \( N_i^t \), the financial contract specifies a relationship between \( Z_i^t \) and an ex-post cutoff value

\[
\tilde{\omega}_{i+1} \equiv \frac{Z_i^t B_i^t}{R_{k+1}^t Q_i K_i^t}, \tag{6}
\]

such that the borrower pays the lender the fixed amount \( \tilde{\omega}_{i+1} R_{k+1}^t Q_i K_i^t \) and keeps the residual \( (\omega_{i+1} - \tilde{\omega}_{i+1}) R_{k+1}^t Q_i K_i^t \), if \( \omega_{i+1} \geq \tilde{\omega}_{i+1} \). If \( \omega_{i+1} < \tilde{\omega}_{i+1} \), the lender monitors the borrower, incurs the CSV cost, and extracts the remainder \( (1 - \mu) \omega_{i+1} R_{k+1}^t Q_i K_i^t \), while the entrepreneur defaults and receives nothing.

In contrast to Bernanke et al. (1999), we assume that the bank chooses the amount of credit to entrepreneur \( i \), \( B_i^t \), for a given amount of borrower collateral, \( N_i^t \). However, the entrepreneur will only accept the bank’s loan offer if the

---

\(^{15}\)Proposition 2 in Gale and Hellwig (1985) states that any optimal contract is weakly dominated by a contract with MEP, where the firm puts all of its own liquid assets – here \( N_i^t \) – on the table.
corresponding expected return is at least as large as in “financial autarky”, i.e. without the bank loan:

\[
E \left\{ \int_{\omega_{t+1}}^{\infty} (\omega - \bar{\omega}_{t+1}) R^k_{t+1} Q_i K^i dF (\omega) \right\} \geq E \left\{ \int_{0}^{\infty} \omega R^k_{t+1} N^i dF (\omega) \right\} = E_t R^k_{t+1} N^i, \tag{7}
\]

where the last equality uses the assumption that \( \int_{0}^{\infty} \omega dF (\omega) = E (\omega) = 1 \). Hence, the bank must promise the borrower an expected return no smaller than the expected return from investing just his or her own net worth \( N^i_t \).\(^{16}\)

The bank’s expected gross return on a loan to entrepreneur \( i \) can be written as

\[
E_t \left\{ \bar{\omega}_{t+1} \left[ 1 - F (\bar{\omega}_{t+1}) \right] + (1 - \mu) \int_{0}^{\bar{\omega}_{t+1}} \omega dF (\omega) \right\} R^k_{t+1} Q_i K^i.
\]

Given that the bank pays the risk-free rate of return \( R^e_t \) on deposits, while we assume that no costs accrue on its own net worth, \( N^b_t \), the bank’s aggregate funding costs equal

\[
R^e_t D_t = R^e_t \left( B_t - N^b_t \right) = R^e_t \left( Q_t K_t - N_t - N^b_t \right).
\]

Suppose that the bank assigns \( N^b_t \) of its total net worth, \( N^b_t \), to the loan to entrepreneur \( i \).\(^{17}\) Then the bank’s constrained profit maximization problem for the \( t \)-th loan is given by

\[
\max_{K^i_{t+1}, \bar{\omega}_{t+1}} E_t \left\{ \bar{\omega}_{t+1} \left[ 1 - F (\bar{\omega}_{t+1}) \right] + (1 - \mu) \int_{0}^{\bar{\omega}_{t+1}} \omega dF (\omega) \right\} R^k_{t+1} Q_i K^i - R^e_t \left( Q_t K^i_t - N^i_t - N^b_t \right), \tag{8}
\]

s. t. \( E_t \left\{ \int_{\bar{\omega}_{t+1}}^{\infty} (\omega - \bar{\omega}_{t+1}) R^k_{t+1} Q_i K^i dF (\omega) \right\} \geq E_t R^k_{t+1} N^i_t.
\]

### 3.1.1. The Contract without Aggregate Risk

As a starting point, consider the case when the aggregate return to capital, \( R^k_{t+1} \), is known in advance, so that there is no aggregate uncertainty. As a consequence, the only uncertainty in the loan contract between the bank and entrepreneur \( i \) arises from the idiosyncratic productivity realization, \( \omega_{t+1} \).

Given that the non-default repayment on the loan to entrepreneur \( i \), \( Z_t^i B_t^i \), is constant across all unobserved \( \omega \)-states and the CSV cost is a fixed proportion \( \mu \) of the entrepreneur’s total return, the financial contract is incentive-compatible according to Proposition 1 in Gale and Hellwig (1985). The contract without aggregate uncertainty further resembles a standard debt contract (SDC), since (i) it involves a fixed repayment to the lender as long as the borrower is solvent,

---

\(^{16}\)Note that the participation constraint in (7) differs from that in Valencia (2011), where the outside option of entrepreneurs is the risk-free rate \( R^e_t \), implying that investment projects have a minimum size larger than \( N^i_t \), while entrepreneurs have unlimited access to the risk-free alternative investment opportunity.

\(^{17}\)We only consider cases where aggregate shocks are small enough, so that the bank never defaults. As a consequence, the assignment of bank capital to a particular loan \( i \) is without loss of generality and mainly for notational consistency.
(ii) the borrower’s inability to repay is a necessary and sufficient condition for bankruptcy, and (iii) if the borrower defaults, the bank recovers as much as it can.\textsuperscript{18} Hence, the optimal contract between the bank and each entrepreneur is a SDC with MEP, as in Bernanke et al. (1999). Moreover, the optimal contract is robust to ex-post renegotiations, if $\mu$ represents a pure verification cost rather than a bankruptcy cost. In the latter case, it would be optimal ex post to renegotiate the terms of the loan in order to avoid default, whereas, in the former case, incentive compatibility requires monitoring the borrower whenever he or she cannot repay.\textsuperscript{19}

In period $t$, entrepreneur $i$ approaches the bank for a loan and brings his or her net worth to the counter. Given $N_i^t$, the bank decides on the amount of the loan and thus on the total amount of the capital expenditure, $Q_iK_i^t = N_i^t + B_i^t$. For notational convenience, define the expected share of total profits accruing to the lender in period $t$ as

$$\Gamma\left(\bar{\omega}_i^t\right) \equiv \bar{\omega}_i^t \left[1 - F\left(\bar{\omega}_i^t\right)\right] + \int_{0}^{\bar{\omega}_i^t} \omega dF\left(\omega\right),$$

where $0 < \Gamma\left(\bar{\omega}_i^t\right) < 1$ by definition, define the expected CSV costs of the lender as

$$\mu G\left(\bar{\omega}_i^t\right) \equiv \mu \int_{0}^{\bar{\omega}_i^t} \omega dF\left(\omega\right),$$

and note that

$$\Gamma'\left(\bar{\omega}_i^t\right) = 1 - F\left(\bar{\omega}_i^t\right) > 0, \quad \Gamma''\left(\bar{\omega}_i^t\right) = -f\left(\bar{\omega}_i^t\right) < 0, \quad \mu G'_\bar{\omega}\left(\bar{\omega}_i^t\right) \equiv \mu \bar{\omega}_i^t f\left(\bar{\omega}_i^t\right) > 0.$$

We can then write the expected share of total profits net of monitoring costs going to the lender and the expected share of total profits going to the borrower as $\Gamma\left(\bar{\omega}_i^t\right) - \mu G\left(\bar{\omega}_i^t\right)$ and $1 - \Gamma\left(\bar{\omega}_i^t\right)$, respectively.

Using the above notation and further defining the ex-ante expected external finance premium (EFP) $s_t \equiv R_{t+1}^k / R_t^n$, the entrepreneur’s capital/net worth ratio $k_i^t \equiv Q_iK_i^t / N_i^t$, and $n_i^t \equiv N_i^b / N_i^t$, the bank’s constrained profit maximization problem in (8) can equivalently be written as

$$\max_{k_i^t, \bar{\omega}_i^t, s_{t+1}} \left[\Gamma(\bar{\omega}_i^{t+1}) - \mu G(\bar{\omega}_i^{t+1})\right] s_t k_i^t - (k_i^t - 1 - n_i^t) \quad \text{s. t.} \quad \left[1 - \Gamma(\bar{\omega}_i^{t+1})\right] s_t k_i^t = s_t,$$

where we have dropped the expectations operator, because $R_{t+1}^k$ and thus $s_t$ are assumed to be known in advance. The

\textsuperscript{18}Proposition 3 in Gale and Hellwig (1985) states that any optimal contract is weakly dominated by a SDC with the above three features.

\textsuperscript{19}The central assumption is that the bank incurs the CSV cost in order to verify the entrepreneur’s idiosyncratic realization of $\omega$ before agreeing to renegotiate, because the borrower cannot truthfully report default without the risk of being monitored (compare Covas and Den Haan, 2012).
corresponding first-order conditions with respect to \( k_i^t, \bar{\omega}_{i+1}^t \), and the Lagrange multiplier \( \lambda_i^t \) are

\[
\begin{align*}
k_i^t : & & \left[ \Gamma(\bar{\omega}_{i+1}^t) - \mu G(\bar{\omega}_{i+1}^t) \right] s_i - 1 + \lambda_i^t \left[ 1 - \Gamma(\bar{\omega}_{i+1}^t) \right] s_i = 0, \\
\bar{\omega}_{i+1}^t : & & \left[ \Gamma' (\bar{\omega}_{i+1}^t) - \mu G'(\bar{\omega}_{i+1}^t) \right] s_i k_i^t - \lambda_i^t \Gamma'(\bar{\omega}_{i+1}^t) s_i k_i^t = 0, \\
\lambda_i^t : & & \left[ 1 - \Gamma(\bar{\omega}_{i+1}^t) \right] s_i k_i^t - s_i = 0.
\end{align*}
\]

Appendix B.1 shows that the optimal contract implies a positive relation \( k_i^t = \psi(s_i) \), where \( \psi'(s_i) > 0 \), between the EFP and the optimal capital/net worth ratio. Note that the same qualitative relationship emerges from the optimal contract without aggregate risk in Bernanke et al. (1999), where the entrepreneur rather than the bank determines the amount of lending given collateral. An exogenous increase in the expected EFP, e.g. due to a reduction in the risk-free interest rate, \( R_n^t \), induces the bank to lend more against a given amount of borrower net worth and thus collateral.

The mechanism driving this partial equilibrium result is illustrated in Figure 9, where we suppress time subscripts and index superscripts for notational convenience. Note that the lender’s iso-profit curves (IPC) and the borrower’s participation constraint (PC) can be plotted in \((k, \bar{\omega})\)-space and that the constrained profit maximum of the bank is determined by the tangential point between the IPC and the PC.\(^{20}\) The corresponding expressions for the lender’s IPC and the borrower’s PC are

\[
\begin{align*}
k_{IPC} &= \frac{\pi_b^* - 1 - n}{\left[ \Gamma(\bar{\omega}) - \mu G(\bar{\omega}) \right] s - 1}, \\
k_{PC} &\geq \frac{1}{1 - \Gamma(\bar{\omega})},
\end{align*}
\]

where \( \pi_b^* \) denotes an arbitrary level of bank profits.

From (10), the PC is not affected by the EFP, \( s \). In the absence of aggregate risk, the borrower’s expected share of total profits, \( 1 - \Gamma(\bar{\omega}) \), must be no smaller than his or her “skin in the game”, \( 1/k \equiv N/QK \). For any given value of \( \bar{\omega} \) and thus an expected share of total profits, the borrower’s PC determines a minimum value of \( k \) and thus of the lender’s “skin in the game”, below which the entrepreneur would not accept the offered loan contract. The bank’s IPC in (9) accounts for expected monitoring and funding costs. The bank maximizes expected profits by choosing the tangential point between the borrower’s PC and its lowest IPC in \((k, \bar{\omega})\)-space, i.e., the bank tries to minimize its “skin in the game” given an expected share of total profits, \( \Gamma(\bar{\omega}) \).

The first panel of Figure 9 illustrates the tangential point between the borrower’s PC and the lender’s IPC for the calibration in Bernanke et al. (1999). Note that, for \( QK = N \), the borrower is fully self-financed, will never default \( (\bar{\omega} = 0) \), and retains all profits \( (1 - \Gamma(0) = 1) \).

\(^{20}\)Appendix B.1 proves that the optimal contract yields a unique interior solution.
Now consider the effects of a monetary expansion when $R^k$ is known in advance, i.e. a decrease in $R^n$ and thus an increase in $s \equiv R^k/R^n$. While the borrower’s PC remains unaffected, the lender’s IPC are tilted upwards, as shown in the second panel. Although the borrower would accept any point above its PC on the new IPC, this is no longer optimal from the lender’s perspective. Instead, the bank can move to a lower IPC, which implies a higher profit share, as indicated in the third panel. In doing so, however, it must satisfy the borrower’s PC, as in the new optimal contract $(k^*_{new}, \omega^*_{new})$, where both the bank’s expected profit share, $\Gamma(\tilde{\omega})$, and its “skin in the game”, $k$, have increased.

The previous discussion illustrates an important feature of the optimal debt contract in partial equilibrium. For a profit-maximizing bank, it is optimal to respond to an increase in the EFP, e.g. due to a monetary expansion, by lending more to entrepreneurs against a given amount of collateral, thus increasing the default threshold. This result squares nicely with our empirical finding that U.S. banks lower their lending standards for firms in response to an unexpected decrease in the Federal Funds rate.

3.1.2. The Contract with Aggregate Risk

In the dynamic model, the aggregate return to capital is ex ante uncertain. As a consequence, the default threshold $\tilde{\omega}_{t+1}$ characterizing a loan contract between the bank and entrepreneur $i$ will generally depend on the ex-post realization of $R^k_{t+1}$. Bernanke et al. (1999) circumvent this complication by simplifying the risk-sharing agreement between the borrower and the lender. Given the risk aversion of depositors, they assume that the lender’s participation constraint must be satisfied ex post, so that the entrepreneur bears any aggregate risk. Similarly, we assume that the borrower’s PC must be satisfied ex post and that the bank absorbs any aggregate risk. This assumption is only viable, if the bank’s capital buffer, $N^b_t$, is sufficient to shield depositors from any fluctuations in $R^k_{t+1}$, so that the bank never defaults.21

In order to understand the implications of our assumption, recall the PC in equation (10). Given that the borrower’s capital expenditure, $Q_t K^i_t$, and net worth, $N^i_t$, are predetermined in period $t+1$, the ex-post share of total profits, $1 - \Gamma(\tilde{\omega}_{t+1})$, and the corresponding default threshold, $\tilde{\omega}_{t+1}$, can not be made contingent on the aggregate state of the economy. From the definition of the cutoff in (6), however, this implies that the non-default rate of return $Z^i_t$ must be state-contingent in order to absorb unexpected changes in $R^k_{t+1}$. In contrast to Bernanke et al. (1999), where both $\tilde{\omega}_{t+1}$ and $Z^i_t$ are state-contingent and countercyclical (e.g., a higher than expected realization of $R^k_{t+1}$ lowers the default threshold and thus also the non-default rate of return required by the lender), here $\tilde{\omega}_{t+1}$ is predetermined and acyclical, while $Z^i_t$ is procyclical. For example, a higher than expected realization of $R^k_{t+1}$ raises $Z^i_t$, whereas the borrower’s and the lender’s expected profit shares continue to be determined by their “skin in the game”, i.e. by the relative shares of $N^i_t$ and $B^i_t$ in $Q_t K^i_t$. In other words, we assume that borrowers

\[ \int_0^1 \left[ \Gamma(\tilde{\omega}_{t+1}) - \mu G(\tilde{\omega}_{t+1}) \right] R^k_{t+1} Q_t K^i_t d\tilde{\omega}, \]

are small enough to be absorbed without the bank defaulting. Recall that both the lender and the borrower are assumed to be risk-neutral, whereas depositors are risk-averse. Accordingly, different risk-sharing agreements in the loan contract are equally conceivable, while the absence of frictions between the bank and its depositors is for simplicity.

\[ \text{In other words, we assume that the fluctuations in the bank’s return on lending net of monitoring costs, } \int_0^1 \left[ \Gamma(\tilde{\omega}_{t+1}) - \mu G(\tilde{\omega}_{t+1}) \right] R^k_{t+1} Q_t K^i_t d\tilde{\omega}. \]

14
default only due to idiosyncratic risk rather than due to aggregate risk.

The ex-post version of the financial contract is **incentive-compatible** and resembles a standard debt contract, if and only if $R^{k}_{t+1}$ is observed by both parties without incurring a cost (compare Gale and Hellwig, 1985). Otherwise, the non-default rate of return on the loan, $Z^i_t$, can not be made contingent on the aggregate state of the economy, whereas entrepreneurs generally have no incentive to misreport a true observed state. As in the case without aggregate risk, the optimal debt contract is robust to ex-post renegotiations, if $\mu$ represents a pure verification cost.

Appendix B.2 shows that the optimal debt contract between the bank and entrepreneur $i$ implies a positive relation between the expected EFP, $s_t \equiv E_t \{ R^{k}_{t+1} \} / R^i_t$, and the optimal capital/net worth ratio, $Q_t K^i_t / N^i_t$, i.e.

$$Q_t K^i_t = \psi(s_t) N^i_t, \quad \psi'(s_t) > 0. \quad (11)$$

In what follows, we embed the partial-equilibrium loan contract into an otherwise standard dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model.

### 3.2. The General Equilibrium Model

The full New Keynesian DSGE model incorporates seven types of economic agents: A representative household, a representative capital goods producer, a representative intermediate goods producer, a continuum of monopolistically competitive retailers, a continuum of entrepreneurs, a monopolistic bank, and a monetary authority.

The representative household supplies labor to intermediate goods producers, consumes, and saves in terms of risk-free bank deposits. The representative capital goods producer buys the non-depreciated capital stock from entrepreneurs, takes an investment decision subject to adjustment costs and sells the new capital stock to entrepreneurs within the same period without incurring any capital gains or losses. The representative intermediate goods producer hires labor from households and rents capital from entrepreneurs in competitive factor markets and sells intermediate output to retailers in a competitive wholesale market. Retailers diversify the homogeneous intermediate good without incurring any costs and are thus able to set the price on final output above their marginal cost, i.e. the price of the intermediate good. Monetary policy follows a standard Taylor (1993) rule. Since the optimization problems of these agents are standard in the literature, we defer their detailed discussion until later, focusing instead on the dynamic behavior of competitive entrepreneurs and the monopolistic bank in general equilibrium.

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22 One could argue that, holding a perfectly diversified loan portfolio, the bank can deduce the ex-post realization of $R^{k}_{t+1}$, unless entrepreneurs misreport their returns in an unobserved state in a systematic way across $i$. However, we already know that entrepreneurs have no incentive to lie, if $Z^i_t$ is independent of $\omega_{t+1}^i$. Note that a similar argument must implicitly hold in Bernanke et al. (1999) for optimality.

23 Retailers are introduced in order to allow for nominal price rigidities without unnecessarily complicating the production and investment decisions (compare Bernanke et al., 1999).
3.2.1. Entrepreneurs

At the end of period \( t \), entrepreneurs use their accumulated net worth, \( N_t \), to purchase productive capital, \( K_t \), from capital goods producers at a price \( Q_t \) in terms of the numeraire. To finance the difference between net worth and total capital expenditures, \( Q_t K_t \), entrepreneurs must borrow an amount \( B_t = Q_t K_t - N_t \) in real terms from banks, where variables without an index superscript denote economy-wide aggregates.

The aggregate real rate of return per unit of capital in period \( t \) depends on the real rental rate of capital, \( r^k_t \), and the capital gain in real terms of the non-depreciated capital stock, \((1 - \delta)K_{t-1}\), between period \( t-1 \) and period \( t \), i.e.

\[
R^k_t = \frac{r^k_t + (1 - \delta)Q_t}{Q_{t-1}}.
\]

We assume a continuum of risk-neutral entrepreneurs, indexed \( i \in [0, 1] \), which are subject to an idiosyncratic disturbance \( \omega^i_t \) in period \( t \), so that the ex-post rate of return of entrepreneur \( i \) per unit of capital equals \( \omega^i_t R^k_t \). Following Bernanke et al. (1999), we assume that \( \omega^i_t \) is i.i.d. across time \( t \) and across entrepreneurs \( i \), with a continuous and differentiable cumulative distribution function \( F(\omega) \) over a non-negative support, and \( E\{\omega^i_t\} = 1 \forall t \).24

In contrast to Bernanke et al. (1999) and variations thereof, we assume that entrepreneurs can also operate in financial autarky, purchasing \( Q_t K_t = N_t \) in period \( t \). In order for an entrepreneur to accept a loan offer, the terms of the loan, i.e. the amount \( B_t \) and the nominal non-default rate of return \( Z_t \), must be such that the entrepreneur expects to be no worse off than in financial autarky. Assuming constant returns to scale (CRS), the distribution of net worth, \( N^i_t \), across entrepreneurs is irrelevant. For this reason, the aggregate version of the participation constraint in equation (7) can be written as

\[
E_t \left\{ \int_{\bar{\omega}_{t+1}}^{\infty} \omega R^{k}_{t+1} Q_t K_t - \frac{Z_t}{\pi^t_{t+1}} dF(\omega) \right\} \geq E_t \{R^{k}_{t+1}\} N_t,
\]

where the expectation is over \( R^{k}_{t+1} \), and \( \bar{\omega}_{t+1} \) denotes the expected default threshold in period \( t+1 \), which is defined by

\[
E_t \{\bar{\omega}_{t+1} R^{k}_{t+1}\} Q_t K_t = E_t \{Z_t / \pi^t_{t+1}\} B_t.
\]

Using the definition of \( \bar{\omega}_{t+1} \) to substitute out \( E_t \{Z_t / \pi^t_{t+1}\} \) and expressing the aggregate profit share of entrepreneurs in period \( t \) as \( 1 - \Gamma(\bar{\omega}_t) \), equation (13) can equivalently be written as

\[
E_t \left\{ [1 - \Gamma(\bar{\omega}_{t+1})] R^{k}_{t+1} \right\} Q_t K_t \geq E_t \{R^{k}_{t+1}\} N_t.
\]

Note that the ex-post realized value of \( \Gamma(\bar{\omega}_{t+1}) \) generally depends on the realization of \( R^{k}_{t+1} \) through \( \bar{\omega}_{t+1} \). Similar to Bernanke et al. (1999), we assume that this constraint must be satisfied ex post. Implicit in this is the assumption that \( R^{k}_{t+1} \) is observed by both parties without incurring a cost, and that the non-default repayment, \( Z_t \), can thus be made

\[24\text{We also assume that the corresponding hazard rate } h(\omega) \equiv f(\omega) / [1 - F(\omega)] \text{ satisfies } \partial h(\omega) / \partial \omega > 0.\]
contingent on the aggregate state of the economy.

In order to avoid that entrepreneurial net worth grows without bound, we assume that an exogenous fraction \((1 - \gamma')\) of the entrepreneurs’ share of total realized profits is consumed in each period.\(^{25}\) Accordingly, entrepreneurial net worth at the end of period \(t\) evolves according to

\[
N_t = \gamma' [1 - \Gamma(\bar{\omega}_t)] R_t^k Q_{t-1} K_{t-1}.
\]  

(15)

To sum up, the entrepreneurs’ equilibrium conditions comprise the real rate of return per unit of capital in (12), the ex-post participation constraint in (14), the evolution of entrepreneurial net worth in (15), and the real amount borrowed, \(B_t = Q_t K_t - N_t\). Moreover, the definition of the expected default threshold, \(E_t \bar{\omega}_{t+1}\), determines the expected non-default repayment per unit borrowed by the entrepreneurs, \(E_t [Z_t / \pi_{t+1}]\).

3.2.2. Banks

For tractability, we assume a single monopolistic financial intermediary, which collects deposits from households and provides loans to entrepreneurs. In period \(t\), this bank is endowed with net worth or bank capital \(N^b_t\). Abstracting from bank reserves or other types of bank assets, the balance sheet identity in real terms is given by equation (5). The CSV problem in Townsend (1979) implies that, if entrepreneur \(i\) defaults due to \(\omega^i_t R^i_t Q_t K_t < Z^i_t B^i_t\), the bank incurs a proportional cost \(\mu \omega^i_t R^i_t Q_t K_t\) and recovers the remaining return on capital, \((1 - \mu) \omega^i_t R^i_t Q_t K_t\).

In period \(t\), the risk-neutral bank observes entrepreneurs’ net worth, \(N^i_t\), and makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to each entrepreneur \(i\). As a consequence, it holds a perfectly diversified loan portfolio between period \(t\) and period \(t+1\). Although the bank can thus diversify away any idiosyncratic risk arising from the possible default of entrepreneur \(i\), it is subject to aggregate risk through fluctuations in the ex-post rate of return on capital, \(R^k_{t+1}\), and the aggregate default threshold, \(\bar{\omega}_{t+1}\). In order to be able to pay the risk-free nominal rate of return \(R^n_t\) on deposits in each state of the world, the bank must have sufficient net worth to protect depositors from unexpected fluctuations in \(R^k_{t+1}\).

Now consider the bank’s problem of making a take-it-or-leave-it offer to entrepreneur \(i\) with net worth \(N^i_t\) in period \(t\). The contract offered by the bank specifies the real amount of the loan, \(B^i_t\), and the nominal gross rate of return in case of repayment, \(Z^i_t\). Given that \(N^i_t\) is predetermined at the end of period \(t\), the bank’s choice of \(B^i_t\) also determines the entrepreneur’s total capital expenditure, \(Q_t K^i_t = B^i_t + N^i_t\). Moreover, given \(Q_t K^i_t\) and \(N^i_t\), the bank’s choice of \(Z^i_t\) implies an expected default threshold \(E_t \bar{\omega}_{t+1}\) through \(E_t \left[\bar{\omega}_{t+1} R^k_{t+1}\right] Q_t K_t \equiv E_t [Z_t / \pi_{t+1}] B_t\). Hence, we can equivalently

\(^{25}\)In the literature, it is common to assume that an exogenous fraction of entrepreneurs “dies” each period and consumes its net worth upon exit. The dynamic implications of either assumption are identical.
rewrite the bank’s constrained profit-maximization problem for a loan to entrepreneur \( i \) as

\[
\max_{K'_i, \omega_{t+1}^i} E_t \left( \Gamma(\bar{\omega}_{t+1}^i) - \mu G(\bar{\omega}_{t+1}^i) \right) R_{t+1}^k Q_i K'_i - \frac{R_{t+1}^e}{\pi_{t+1}} \left( Q_i K'_i - N_i^i - N_t^{b,i} \right),
\]

where \( \Gamma(\bar{\omega}_i) = \int_0^{\omega_i} \omega dF(\omega) + \bar{\omega}_i \left[ 1 - F(\bar{\omega}_i) \right], \mu G(\bar{\omega}_i) = \mu \int_0^{\omega_i} \omega dF(\omega), \) and \( N_t^{b,i} \) denotes the share of the bank’s total net worth assigned to the loan to entrepreneur \( i \), subject to the entrepreneur’s participation constraint in (7).

The corresponding first-order conditions with respect to \( \{K_i^j, E_t \bar{\omega}_{i+1}^j, \lambda_t^{b,j} \} \), where \( \lambda_t^{b,j} \) is the ex-post value of the Lagrange multiplier on the participation constraint, are

\[
K_i^j : \quad E_t \left( \Gamma(\bar{\omega}_{t+1}^j) - \mu G(\bar{\omega}_{t+1}^j) + \lambda_t^{b,j} \left( 1 - \Gamma(\bar{\omega}_{t+1}^j) \right) \right) R_{t+1}^k = E_t \left( \frac{R_{t+1}^e}{\pi_{t+1}} \right), \quad (17)
\]

\[
E_t \bar{\omega}_{t+1}^j : \quad E_t \left( \Gamma(\bar{\omega}_{t+1}^j) - \mu G'(\bar{\omega}_{t+1}^j) R_{t+1}^k \right) = E_t \left( \lambda_t^{b,j} \Gamma(\bar{\omega}_{t+1}^j) R_{t+1}^k \right), \quad (18)
\]

\[
\lambda_t^{b,j} : \quad \left[ 1 - \Gamma(\bar{\omega}_{t+1}^j) \right] R_{t+1}^k Q_i K'_i = R_{t+1}^e N_i^i. \quad (19)
\]

Following Bernanke et al. (1999), Appendix B.2 shows that the optimal debt contract between entrepreneur \( i \) and the bank implies a positive relationship between the ex-ante expected EFP, \( s_i \equiv E_t \left( R_{t+1}^k / R_t^e \right) \), and the optimal capital/net worth ratio, \( k_i^j \equiv Q_i K'_i / N_i^i \).

Here, however, we go beyond this “reduced-form” result and make use of the entire information incorporated in the above first-order conditions. Note that equation (17) equates the expected marginal return of an additional unit of capital to the bank and the entrepreneur to the expected marginal cost of an additional unit of bank deposits in real terms and, assuming that the participation constraint is satisfied ex post, implies a positive relationship between \( E_t \left( R_{t+1}^k / R_t^e \right) \) and \( E_t \left( \bar{\omega}_{t+1}^i \right) \). Moreover, equation (19) equates the entrepreneur’s expected payoff with and without the bank loan and implies a positive relation between \( E_t \left( \bar{\omega}_{t+1}^i \right) \) and \( Q_i K'_i / N_i^i \). Together, these two equations determine the positive ex-ante relationship between the expected EFP in period \( t+1 \) and the leverage ratio chosen by the bank in period \( t \), while the first-order condition with respect to \( E_t \left( \bar{\omega}_{t+1}^i \right) \) pins down the ex-post value of the Lagrange multiplier, \( \lambda_t^{b,i} \).

Given \( N_i^i, Q_i K'_i, \) and \( E_t \left( R_{t+1}^k \right) \), the definition of the expected default threshold \( E_t \left( \bar{\omega}_{t+1}^i \right) \) implies an expected non-default real rate of return on the loan to entrepreneur \( i \), \( E_t \left( Z_t^i / \pi_{t+1} \right) \), while the same equation – evaluated ex post – determines the actual non-default repayment conditional on \( N_i^i, Q_i K'_i, E_t \left( \bar{\omega}_{t+1}^i \right), \) and the realization of \( E_t \left( R_{t+1}^k \right) \).

\[26\] This becomes evident, when we use the ex-post assumption that \( R_{t+1}^k \) and \( \bar{\omega}_{t+1} \) are uncorrelated and rewrite (19) as

\[
[1 - \Gamma(\bar{\omega}_{t+1}^i)] \geq \frac{N_i^i}{Q_i K'_i} = \frac{1}{K_i^j},
\]

i.e., entrepreneur \( i \)'s expected return on capital with the loan relative to financial autarky must be no smaller than the entrepreneur’s “skin in the game”. Since \( [1 - \Gamma(\bar{\omega}_{t+1}^i)] \) is strictly decreasing in \( E_t \left( \bar{\omega}_{t+1}^i \right) \), the participation constraint implies a positive relationship between \( E_t \left( \bar{\omega}_{t+1}^i \right) \) and \( k_i^j \).
By the law of large numbers, $\Gamma(\bar{\omega}_t) - \mu G(\bar{\omega}_t)$ denotes the bank’s expected share of total period-$t$ profits (net of monitoring costs) from a loan to entrepreneur $i$ as well as the bank’s realized profit share from its diversified loan portfolio of all entrepreneurs. Accordingly, we can rewrite the bank’s aggregate expected profits in period $t + 1$ as

$$E_t V^b_{t+1} = E_t \left\{ \left[ \Gamma(\bar{\omega}_{t+1}) - \mu G(\bar{\omega}_{t+1}) \right] R^b_{t+1} Q_t K_t - \frac{R^i_t}{\pi_{t+1}} \left( Q_t K_t - N_t - N^b_t \right) \right\},$$

(20)

where the expectation is over possible realizations of $R^k_{t+1}$ and $\pi_{t+1}$, while $V^b_{t+1}$ is free of any idiosyncratic risk. The entrepreneurs’ participation constraint in (14) implies that $\bar{\omega}_{t+1}$ and thus $[\Gamma(\bar{\omega}_{t+1}) - \mu G(\bar{\omega}_{t+1})]$ are predetermined in period $t + 1$. In order to keep the problem tractable, we assume that aggregate uncertainty is small relative to the bank’s net worth, $N^b_t$, so that bank default never occurs in equilibrium.

To avoid that its net worth grows without bound, however, we assume that an exogenous fraction $(1 - \gamma^b)$ of the bank’s share of total realized profits is consumed each period.\(^{27}\) Accordingly, bank net worth at the end of period $t$ evolves according to

$$N^b_t = \gamma^b V^b_t.$$  

(21)

### 3.2.3. Households

The representative household is risk-averse and derives utility from a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate of imperfectly substitutable consumption goods

$$C_t = \left[ \int_0^1 C_t(j)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}} d j \right]^\frac{1}{1-\sigma}. \quad (22)$$

Households are infinitely lived and discount their future expected utility with the subjective discount factor $\beta < 1$. They can transfer wealth intertemporally by saving in terms of bank deposits, which pay risk-free nominal interest $R^a_t$ between period $t$ and period $t + 1$.\(^{28}\) Therefore, the household’s constrained optimization problem can be written as

$$\max_{C_t, H_t, D_t} E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left\{ C_t^{1-\sigma} \left( \frac{H_t^{1+\frac{1}{\eta}}}{1+\frac{1}{\eta}} \right)^{1-\sigma} - \chi \left( \frac{H_t^{1+\frac{1}{\eta}}}{1+\frac{1}{\eta}} \right) \right\},$$

s. t. $C_t + D_t \leq W_t H_t + \frac{R^a_{t-1}}{\pi_t} D_{t-1},$

where $D_t$ are nominal deposits, $W_t$ denotes the real wage, $\pi_t = P_t / P_{t-1}$ is the gross inflation rate, and $P_t \equiv \left[ \int_0^1 P_t(j)^{1-\sigma} d j \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}$ is the corresponding aggregate price index.

\(^{27}\)Alternatively, one could think of this “consumption” as a distribution of dividends to share holders or bonus payments to bank managers, which are instantaneously consumed.

\(^{28}\)Note that deposits are risk-free despite the fact that the bank bears the aggregate risk, as long as the bank carries sufficient net worth to shield its depositors from fluctuations in the aggregate return on capital.
The household’s first-order conditions with respect to \{C_t, H_t, D_t\} are

\[
C_t : \quad C_t^{-\sigma} = \lambda_t, \\
H_t : \quad \chi H_t^{\frac{1}{\eta}} = \lambda_t W_t, \\
D_t : \quad \lambda_t = \beta E_t \left\{ \frac{R_t^n}{\pi_{t+1}} \right\},
\]

where \(\lambda_t\) denotes the Lagrange multiplier of the budget constraint.

3.2.4. Capital Goods Producers

After production in period \(t\) has taken place, capital producers purchase the non-depreciated capital stock from entrepreneurs, invest in a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate of imperfectly substitutable investment goods, \(I_t \equiv \int \frac{I_t(j) \omega_t}{j} \frac{\epsilon - 1}{\epsilon - 1} d j\), and sell the new stock of capital to entrepreneurs at a real price of \(Q_t\). We assume that turning final output into productive capital, i.e. gross investment, is costly due to possible disruptions of the production process, replacement of installed capital, or learning. The capital accumulation equation can then be written as

\[
K_t = (1 - \delta)K_{t-1} + \left[ 1 - S \left( \frac{I_t}{I_{t-1}} \right) \right] I_t, \quad (23)
\]

where \(S \left( \frac{I_t}{I_{t-1}} \right) = \frac{\phi}{2} \left( \frac{I_t}{I_{t-1}} - 1 \right)^2, S(1) = S'(1) = 0, \text{ and } S''(1) = \phi\) (compare, e.g., Christiano et al., 2005).

The problem of the representative capital goods producer, subject to the capital accumulation equation in (23), is

\[
\max_{I_t} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left[ Q_t [K_t - (1 - \delta)K_{t-1}] - I_t \right].
\]

The corresponding FOC with respect to investment is given by

\[
Q_t \left[ 1 - \frac{\phi}{2} \left( \frac{I_t}{I_{t-1}} - 1 \right)^2 - \phi \left( \frac{I_t}{I_{t-1}} - 1 \right) \frac{I_t}{I_{t-1}} \right] + \beta \phi E_t \left[ Q_{t+1} \left( \frac{I_{t+1}}{I_t} - 1 \right) \left( \frac{I_{t+1}}{I_t} \right)^2 \right] = 1. \quad (24)
\]

3.2.5. Intermediate Goods Producers

Intermediate goods producers rent the productive capital stock from entrepreneurs and hire labor from households, paying a competitive rental rate of capital and a competitive wage rate, respectively. To convert capital and labor into intermediate or wholesale goods, they use the deterministic Cobb-Douglas production function

\[
Y_t = K_t^\alpha H_t^{1-\alpha},
\]

where a shock to total factor productivity (TFP) has been omitted for notational convenience.
Suppose that the price of the homogeneous wholesale good in terms of the numeraire is $1/X_t$, i.e., the gross flexible-price markup of retail goods over the wholesale good is $X_t$. The static optimization problem of the intermediate goods producer can be written as

$$\max_{K_{t-1},H_t} \frac{1}{X_t} K_t^{a-1} H_t^{1-\alpha} - r_t K_{t-1} - W_t H_t,$$

which yields the following FOCs:

$$K_{t-1} : \quad X_t r_t K_{t-1}^{\alpha} = \alpha Y_t H_t,$$

$$H_t : \quad X_t W_t = (1 - \alpha) Y_t H_t.$$

### 3.2.6. Retailers

Monopolistically competitive retailers purchase homogeneous intermediate output, diversify it at no cost, and sell it to households and capital goods producer for consumption and investment purposes. We assume staggered price setting à la Calvo (1983), where $\theta$ denotes the exogenous probability of not being able to readjust the price.

A retailer allowed to reset its price in period $t$ chooses the optimal price, $P^*_t$, in order to maximize the present value of current and expected future profits, subject to the demand function for the respective product variety in period $t + s$, $s = 0, ..., \infty$, $Y_{t+s}(j) = (P_{t,s}/P_{t+s})^\gamma Y_{t+s}$, where $P_{t,s}$ is the price of a retailer that was last allowed to be set in period $t$.\(^{29}\)

Hence, the profit maximization problem of a retailer in period $t$ is

$$\max_{P_t} E_t \left\{ \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \theta^s \Lambda_{t,s} \Pi_{t,s} \right\} ,$$

where $\Lambda_{t,s} \equiv \beta^s E_t \left[ \frac{U(C_t) P_{t,s}}{U(C_{t+1}) P_{t+1}} \right]$ denotes the stochastic discount factor and

$$\Pi_{t,s} \equiv (P_{t,s} - MC_{t,s}) \left[ \frac{P_{t,s}}{P_{t+1}} \right]^{-\epsilon} Y_{t+s},$$

$$P_{t,s} = P_t \left( \frac{P_{t+s-1}}{P_{t-1}} \right)^\gamma .$$

Note that $\gamma \in [0, 1]$ allows for (partial) indexation of non-adjusting prices to past inflation, while $MC_{t,s}$ denotes the retailer’s nominal marginal cost in period $t + s$. The corresponding optimality condition is given by

$$E_t \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \theta^s \Lambda_{t,s} Y_{t+s} P_{t,s}^\gamma \left( \frac{P_{t+s-1}}{P_{t-1}} \right)^{-\gamma \epsilon} \left[ P_t \left( \frac{P_{t+s-1}}{P_{t-1}} \right)^\gamma - \frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon - 1} MC_{t,s} \right] = 0 .$$

\(^{29}\)The isoelastic demand schedule for the product of retailer $j$ is derived from the definitions of aggregate demand $Y_t = \int_0^1 Y(j)^{1-\epsilon} d\hat{j}$ and the aggregate price index $P_t = \left[ \int_0^1 P(j)^{1-\epsilon} d\hat{j} \right]^{1/\epsilon}$. 

21
In order to arrive at the New Keynesian Phillips curve, we combine the above FOC with the definition of the aggregate price index,

\[ P_t = \bigg\{ \theta \left[ P_{t-1} \left( \frac{P_{t-1}}{P_{t-2}} \right)^{\gamma} \right]^{1-\epsilon} + (1 - \theta) \left( P_t^* \right)^{1-\epsilon} \bigg\}^{\frac{1}{1-\epsilon}}. \]

### 3.2.7. Monetary Policy and Market Clearing

We assume that the central bank sets the nominal interest rate, \( R_n^t \), according to the following standard Taylor rule:

\[
\frac{R_n^t}{R_{nss}^t} = \left( \frac{\pi_t}{\pi_{ss}} \right)^{\rho_\pi} \left( \frac{\bar{Y}_t}{\bar{Y}_{ss}} \right)^{\phi_\pi} e^{\nu_t}. \tag{25}
\]

Hence, the central bank reacts to deviations of inflation and output from their respective steady-state values and might smooth interest rates over time with a weight \( \rho \). Unsystematic deviations from the Taylor rule in (25) are captured by the mean-zero i.i.d. random term \( \nu_t \).

The model is closed by the economy-wide resource constraint,

\[
Y_t = C_t + C_{t}^e + C_{t}^b + I_t + \mu G(\bar{\omega}_t) R_k^t Q_t^{K-1} K_{t-1}, \tag{26}
\]

where \( C_t^e \) and \( C_t^b \) denote the real consumption of entrepreneur and bank net worth, respectively, while \( \mu G(\bar{\omega}_t) R_k^t Q_t^{K-1} K_{t-1} \) denotes aggregate monitoring costs in period \( t \).

### 3.3. Calibration and Steady State

The New Keynesian DSGE model described in the previous subsection is parsimoniously parameterized and standard in many dimensions. For this reason, we follow the related literature in calibrating most of the parameter values.

We assume a coefficient of constant relative risk aversion, \( \sigma \), equal to 2 and a Frisch elasticity of labor supply, \( \eta \), equal to 3. The relative weight of labor in the utility function, \( \chi \), is determined by a steady-state target value of 1/3 for \( H \). The representative household discounts future utility with a subjective discount factor, \( \beta \), of 0.995, which implies a steady-state real interest rate of 2% per annum. Following Basu (1996) and Chari et al. (2000), we assume an elasticity of substitution between different consumption and investment varieties, \( \epsilon \), equal to 10.

The productive capital stock depreciates with a quarterly rate, \( \delta \), of 2.5%. Given the absence of habit formation in consumption, we calibrate the investment adjustment cost parameter, \( \phi \), to a moderate value of 0.1.\(^{30}\) The role of investment adjustment costs for the dynamics in the model will be discussed further below.

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\(^{30}\)Christiano et al. (2005) evaluate the role of real and nominal rigidities for parameter estimates in a similar model. Using the same formulation of investment adjustment costs and excluding habit formation in consumption, they obtain a point estimate of the adjustment cost parameter equal to 0.91 with a standard deviation of 0.18. However, their specification also includes nominal wage rigidity and money in the utility function.
As in Bernanke et al. (1999), the elasticity of output with respect to the previous period’s capital stock, \( \alpha \), is set to 0.35, and the Calvo probability that a retailer can adjust its price in any given period, \( \theta \), is assumed to be 0.75 – a value in the middle of the range of estimates in Christiano et al. (2005). In addition, we allow for a modest degree of price indexation to past inflation, i.e., \( \gamma = 0.2 \).

We assume a substantial amount of interest rate inertia in monetary policy by setting \( \rho \) to 0.95, while the central bank’s responsiveness to contemporaneous deviations of inflation and output from their steady-state values, \( \phi_\pi \) and \( \phi_y \), equals 1.5 and 0.5, respectively. The only exogenous disturbance in the model – the shock to the Taylor rule, \( \nu_t \) – follows a mean-zero \( i.i.d. \) process with an unconditional standard deviation, \( \sigma_\nu \), of 0.25.

The remaining parameters relate to the financial contract between the bank and the continuum of entrepreneurs. In order to avoid that either the bank or an entrepreneur grows indefinitely, we assume that 5% and 1.5% of their net worth is consumed each quarter, implying an average survival rate of 5 and 16 years, respectively.\(^{31}\) The relative monitoring cost in case of default, \( \mu \), is set to 20%, a value at the lower end of the range reported in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) and in the middle of the range of estimates reported in Levin et al. (2004).

Moreover, we assume that idiosyncratic productivity draws are log-normally distributed with unit mean and a variance of 0.18 and that the default threshold, \( \bar{\omega} \), is 0.35 in the steady state. Together, these parameter values imply an annual default rate of entrepreneurs close to 4.75%, an annual non-default interest rate on bank loans of 4.8%, and a leverage ratio of entrepreneurs equal to 1.537, which corresponds to the median value of leverage ratios for U.S. non-financial firms in Levin et al. (2004). Their sample of quoted firms ranges from 1997Q1 to 2003Q3. Table 2 summarizes the benchmark calibration of parameter values.

The benchmark calibration implies an annual capital-output ratio of 1.945, a consumption share of households, entrepreneurs, and bankers of 0.696, 0.078, and 0.025, respectively, and an investment share in output of 0.195 in the steady state. The share of net worth and loans in total capital purchases amounts to 0.651 and 0.350, respectively, and implies an equivalent distribution of gross profits between entrepreneurs and the bank. Monitoring costs amount to less than 0.6% of steady-state output. Bank loans are funded through deposits and bank capital with relative shares of 0.824 and 0.176. The implied leverage ratio of entrepreneurs of 1.537 was explicitly targeted in the calibration.

We assume that there is no trend inflation in the steady state. Accordingly, all interest rates can be interpreted in real terms, while price dispersion and indexation do not affect the results. From the benchmark calibration, we obtain an annualized risk-free rate of return on deposits of 2%, an annualized aggregate rate of return on capital of 6.2%, a non-default rate of return on bank loans of 6.8%, and an annualized EFP of 4.2%.

The steady-state default rate of entrepreneurs increases with the default threshold, \( \bar{\omega} \), and the exogenous variance

\(^{31}\)Note that, in addition to this exogenous consumption, an endogenous fraction of entrepreneurs defaults in each period due to an insufficient idiosyncratic realization of \( \omega_i \). Total exit of entrepreneurs is thus given by the sum of the exogenous consumption and the endogenous default rate.
of idiosyncratic productivity realizations, $\sigma^2_{\omega}$. For our preferred calibration, the annualized default rate equals 4.7%.

Note that this default accounts for only part of the overall turnover of entrepreneurs in the steady state. Each period, 1.5% of entrepreneurial and 5% of bank net worth are consumed exogenously. The steady-state values of selected variables and ratios are summarized in Table 3.

3.4. Dynamic Simulation

Figure 10 plots selected impulse responses to an expansionary monetary policy shock, i.e. an exogenous reduction in the unsystematic component of the Taylor rule by 25 basis points on a quarterly or 1 percentage point on an annual basis, for our benchmark calibration. All impulse response functions, except for bank interest rates and the EFP, are expressed in terms of relative deviations from the respective variable’s steady-state value.

In response to the monetary expansion, the policy rate $R_n$ decreases on impact, albeit not by the full amount of the shock, since the interest rate rule implies a contemporaneous reaction to inflation and output, which are both above their steady-state values. The reduction in the policy rate is passed through to the non-default rate of return on loans, $Z_t$, which also decreases on impact and follows virtually the same pattern as the policy rate.

Assuming that the entrepreneurs’ participation constraint must be satisfied ex post, their share in gross profits, $1 - \Gamma(\bar{\omega}_t)$, is predetermined in the period of the shock. Accordingly, the default threshold $\bar{\omega}_t$ and the default rate $F(\bar{\omega}_t)$ of entrepreneurs do not respond on impact. Nonzero investment adjustment costs imply an unexpected increase in the price of capital, $Q_t$, and thus in the gross return on capital, $R^k_t$, as well as in the ex-post realized EFP.32

The fact that gross profits are split according to the predetermined leverage ratio, $Q_{t-1}K_{t-1}/N_{t-1}$, implies that both entrepreneurs and the bank benefit from the monetary expansion. Hence, bank net worth, $N^b_t$, and entrepreneurial net worth, $N_t$, increase on impact and remain above their steady-state values for more than 20 quarters.

From period $t+1$ onwards, the price of capital starts to decline, implying capital losses of the entrepreneurs, which are correctly anticipated by the economic agents under rational expectations (RE) in the absence of further shocks. Nevertheless, the expected EFP for period $t+1$ is above its steady-state value by about 0.2 basis points, which induces the bank to grant more loans both in absolute terms and relative to entrepreneurs’ net worth. As a consequence, the leverage ratio of entrepreneurs increases from the end of period $t$ onwards and peaks after 4 quarters at 7.4 basis points above its steady-state value of 1.537.

This increase in borrower leverage allows the bank to demand a larger share of gross expected profits realized in period $t+1$. The distribution of profits, however, hinges on the non-default rate of return on bank loans, $Z_t$, and the implied expected default threshold, $E(\bar{\omega}_{t+1})$. Together with the latter, the default rate of entrepreneurs, $F(\bar{\omega}_{t+1})$, rises above its steady-state value. The maximum effect is attained after 5 quarters, when the default threshold is about 0.049

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32The impulse response function in Figure 10 shows the ex-ante expected rather than the ex-post realized EFP and does therefore not reflect the unexpected increase in the period of the monetary policy shock.
or 0.14% above its steady-state value of 0.35, and the default rate of entrepreneurs is 1 basis point or 0.86% above its steady-state value of 1.18%.

While the effects of an expansionary monetary policy shock on the entrepreneurs’ leverage ratio and default rate and on the expected EFP appear quantitatively small in our baseline simulation, they can be magnified substantially by a slight change in the monetary policy rule, for example. Suppose that the monetary authority does not respond to deviations of output from its steady-state value, i.e., \( \phi_y = 0 \). In this case, the maximum effect on the leverage ratio and the default threshold increases from 7 to 23 basis points and from 14 to 43 basis points, respectively.

More importantly, the impulse responses in Figure 10 replicate our empirical results qualitatively. In particular, the entrepreneurs’ leverage ratio, \( Q_t K_t / N_t \), which can be interpreted as the model equivalent of the SLOOS lending standards measures 5 and 11, i.e. “domestic banks increasing collateral requirements for large and middle firms” and “domestic banks increasing collateral requirements for small firms”, respectively, follows a hump-shaped response and decreases below its steady-state value after 12 quarters. The slightly earlier peak in the theoretical model is due to the fact that the maximum reduction in the policy rate occurs on impact rather than with a lag, as in the FAVAR model.

3.5. Sensitivity Analysis

An important question is whether the theoretical results in the previous subsection are sensitive to our choice of parameter values. For this reason, we perform a number of robustness checks within the range that is commonly used in the related literature.

First, our findings are qualitatively robust to habit formation in consumption. More precisely, a nonzero weight on consumption in period \( t - 1 \) raises the peak response of the entrepreneurs’ leverage ratio and default rate without affecting their persistence, thus strengthening the risk channel of monetary policy in the model.

Second, our findings are qualitatively robust to the introduction of nonzero trend inflation. E.g., an annualized steady-state inflation rate of 1% lowers the peak response of the entrepreneurs’ leverage ratio and default rate without affecting their persistence.\(^{33}\)

Third, our qualitative findings do not depend on the assumption of price indexation to past inflation. In particular, a higher degree of price indexation lowers both the peak response and the persistence of the entrepreneurs’ leverage ratio and default rate, and vice versa. This is also true in combination with nonzero trend inflation.

Fourth, our results are qualitatively robust to alternative specifications of the interest rate rule in equation (25), such as a response to past or expected future rather than current inflation, as in Bernanke et al. (1999), a response to past or expected future rather than current output, or a stronger response of monetary policy to inflation deviations \(^{33}\)Higher rates require a stronger response of monetary policy to deviations of inflation from trend inflation in order to avoid indeterminacy (compare Ascari and Ropele, 2009).
from steady state, for example. The latter reduces both the peak response and the persistence of the entrepreneurs’
leverage ratio and default rate.34

The only critical parameter seems to be the coefficient of investment adjustment costs, \( \phi \). Given our reformulation
of the CSV contract from the bank’s perspective, we require a low value of \( \phi \) in order to overturn the theoretical result in
Bernanke et al. (1999) and the subsequent literature that a monetary expansion reduces the expected EFP and thus the
leverage ratio and default rate of entrepreneurs. While our result is qualitatively robust to the particular specification
of adjustment costs in investment or capital, the latter must generally be low relative to empirical estimates in the
literature. The reason is that the degree of adjustment costs determines the dynamics of the capital price, \( Q_t \), and thus
the gross return on capital, \( R^k_t \). The higher the value of \( \phi \), the larger will be the initial increase in \( Q_t \) and the lower will
therefore be \( E_t R^k_{t+1} \) as well as the expected EFP from period \( t + 1 \) onwards. From the analysis of the contract in partial
equilibrium, we know that the leverage ratio \( Q_t K_t / N_t \) is positively related to the expected EFP. Hence, a decrease in
the latter due to a large expected devaluation of capital between period \( t \) and \( t + 1 \) would lead to a decrease rather than
an increase in the entrepreneurs’ leverage ratio, in contrast to our empirical finding in Section 2.

3.6. The Role of the Optimal Debt Contract

The sensitivity of our results to the parameter \( \phi \) raises the question, whether the impulse responses of the expected
EFP and borrower leverage in Figure 10 can indeed be attributed to our reformulation of the optimal financial contract,
or merely to our assumption of low investment adjustment costs. For this reason, we are embedding the CSV contract
of Bernanke et al. (1999) in our general equilibrium model, while maintaining the benchmark calibration.

Recall that the original formulation of the contract implies that entrepreneur \( i \) determines the optimal amount of the
loan, \( B_i^t \), and thus the leverage ratio for a predetermined amount of net worth, \( N_i^t \), while the “financial intermediary”
corresponds to a mere participation constraint. Assuming perfect diversification across borrowers and the risk-sharing
agreement in Bernanke et al. (1999), the passive financial intermediary must break even in each aggregate state of the
economy. Hence, there is no role for bank capital and consumption, i.e. \( N^b_t = C^b_t = 0 \) \( \forall t \).

Figure 11 plots selected impulse responses to the same expansionary monetary policy shock for “Our contract”
and the “BGG contract”. Note that the formulation of the optimal financial contract is the only dimension in which
the two models differ and that all impulse response functions are expressed in terms of percentage deviations from the
corresponding steady-state values.35 Our main result is that, for the BGG contract, the entrepreneurs’ default threshold,
default rate, and leverage ratio as well as the expected EFP all decrease on impact, before monotonically converging
back to steady state. However, a sustained decrease in the leverage ratio of borrowers is at odds with our empirical

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34 Note that our results are not affected by a response of monetary policy to the so-called “output gap”, i.e. the deviation of actual from potential
output, under flexible prices. Due to the neutrality of money, potential output is identical to steady-state output in the absence of nominal rigidities.

35 It is important to note that, apart from \( N^b_{ss} = C^b_{ss} = V^b_{ss} = 0 \), the effects of reformulating the contract on the steady-state values are negligible.
evidence that banks lower their collateral requirements in response to an expansionary monetary policy shock.

Given that the leverage ratio of entrepreneurs, \( Q_t K_t / N_t = (N_t + B_t) / N_t \), the reduction in the latter might be due to the dispensability of bank capital in the BGG contract, which implies that any profits above the risk-free return on household deposits will raise the borrowers’ net worth. Yet, the leverage ratio of borrowers decreases not only due to the more pronounced increase in their net worth, but also due to a reduction in the aggregate amount of credit, \( B_t \). Note that the latter prediction is both in stark contrast to the expansion of bank lending in our contract and at odds with the common perception of the bank lending channel of expansionary monetary policy.

As a consequence, we believe that our reformulation of the optimal CSV contract is more plausible in the narrative dimension, i.e., the bank determines the amount of credit for a given amount of borrower collateral, as well as in terms of its qualitative prediction that the bank optimally lowers its lending standards in response to a monetary easing.

3.7. “Too Low for Too Long”

Inspired by the motivation of Taylor (2007), we conduct an informal test of the “too-low-for-too-long” hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, a prolonged deviation of monetary policy from what is justified by economic conditions might lead to excessive risk taking in the financial sector. Note that, in our model, a transitory deviation from the Taylor rule becomes more persistent, the higher the degree of interest-rate inertia. In this subsection, we therefore compare the effects of a typical expansionary monetary policy shock for two different values of the Taylor-rule coefficient on the lagged policy rate, \( \rho \), without modifying the other parameters of the model.

Figure 12 illustrates that higher interest-rate inertia and thus a more persistent reduction in the policy rate, \( R_n^p \), implies an increase in both the peak effect and the persistence of the impulse responses of the entrepreneurs’ leverage ratio and default threshold to a monetary easing. According to our model, the optimal loosening of lending standards, as measured by the increase in bank lending relative to borrower collateral, and the subsequent increase in the default rate of borrowers is more pronounced, when the nominal policy rate is more inertial.

In the current example, an increase in the Taylor-rule coefficient, \( \rho \), from 0.90 to 0.95 almost doubles the maximum response of the leverage ratio from 3.9 to 7.4 basis points above its steady-state value of 1.537 and postpones the turning point in the leverage ratio (from above to below its steady state) by 1 quarter. The effects on the impulse response functions of output, consumption, and investment are qualitatively the same and of a similar order of magnitude.

4. Concluding Remarks

In this paper, we provide empirical evidence for the popular notion that expansionary monetary policy induces financial intermediaries to grant loans to ex-ante riskier borrowers. In particular, we include quarterly observations of 19 measures of bank lending standards from the Federal Reserve’s Senior Loan Officers Opinion Survey (SLOOS) in a FAVAR model and show that U.S. banks significantly lower their lending standards, such as the collateral requirements
for firms, in response to an unexpected reduction in the effective Federal Funds rate. We interpret our empirical results as evidence for a risk channel of monetary policy on the asset side of banks’ balance sheets.

Based on this evidence, we reformulate the well-known application of Townsend’s (1979) CSV contract in Bernanke et al. (1999) from the perspective of a monopolistic bank that chooses the amount of risky lending to a continuum of entrepreneurs against collateral, subject to an ex-post participation constraint of the borrower. We assume that both the bank and the entrepreneurs are risk-neutral. While the bank can diversify any idiosyncratic default risk of borrowers, it bears (part of) the aggregate uncertainty. We show that, in partial equilibrium, the debt contract has a unique interior solution for the default threshold of entrepreneurs, which implies a positive relationship between the expected EFP and the optimal leverage ratio chosen by the bank. I.e., an exogenous increase in the expected EFP induces the bank to lend more against a given amount of borrower collateral in order to gain a larger “share of the pie”. As a consequence, however, entrepreneurs become more leveraged and thus more likely to default ex post.

We then embed our version of the CSV contract in an otherwise standard New Keynesian DSGE model with sticky prices, partial indexation to past inflation, and a moderate degree of investment adjustment costs. In contrast to most of the prior literature, an expansionary monetary policy shock leads to a hump-shaped increase in the expected EFP. As a consequence, our model implies an increase in bank lending relative to collateral and thus a higher leverage ratio of entrepreneurs. This theoretical result strongly resembles our prior empirical finding that, in the U.S., the share of “domestic banks increasing collateral requirements for firms” and similar lending standards decrease significantly in response to an unexpected monetary easing by the Federal Reserve. We further show that this effect increases with the degree of interest-rate smoothing in the monetary policy rule, in line with the “too low for too long” hypothesis.

While the focus of this paper is on merging new empirical evidence with a theoretical model of the effects of expansionary monetary policy on banks’ lending standards, we stop short of analyzing the implications of this channel for the stability of the banking sector as a whole. In our model, the bank is endowed with sufficient equity to avoid bankruptcy in all aggregate states of the world. Models of financial intermediation that allow for bank default, such as Valencia (2011) and Malherbe (2011), frequently simplify in other dimensions, e.g. by not building on a general equilibrium framework. Nevertheless, we believe that our model potentially lends itself to the future analysis of the virtues and vices of monetary policy and macroprudential regulation.
### Table 1: Adjusted $R^2$ for the Measures of Lending Standards, sample 1991Q1 - 2008Q4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Lending Standard Description</th>
<th>1 factor</th>
<th>2 factors</th>
<th>3 factors</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>domestic banks tightening standards on C&amp;I loans to large and middle firms</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>domestic banks increasing the costs of credit lines to large and middle firms</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>domestic banks tightening loan covenants for large and middle firms</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>domestic banks reducing the maximum size of credit lines to large and middle firms</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>domestic banks increasing collateral requirements for large and middle firms</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>domestic banks increasing spreads of loan rates over banks’ cost of funds to large and middle firms</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>domestic banks tightening standards for C&amp;I loans to small firms</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>domestic banks increasing the cost of credit lines to small firms</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>domestic banks tightening loan covenants for small firms</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>domestic banks reducing the maximum size of credit lines to small firms</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>domestic banks increasing collateral requirements for small firms</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>domestic banks increasing spreads of loan rates over banks’ cost of funds to small firms</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>domestic banks tightening standards for commercial real estate loans</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>foreign banks tightening standards for approving C&amp;I loans</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>foreign banks increasing costs of credit lines</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>foreign banks tightening loan covenants</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.68</td>
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<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>foreign banks reducing the maximum size of credit lines</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.60</td>
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<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>foreign banks increasing collateral requirements</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.65</td>
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<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>foreign banks tightening standards for commercial real estate loans</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.41</td>
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### Table 2: Benchmark Calibration of Parameter Values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Household and production sector</th>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>coefficient of relative risk aversion</td>
<td>$\sigma$</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frisch elasticity of labor supply</td>
<td>$\eta$</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>relative weight of labor in the utility function</td>
<td>$\chi$</td>
<td>5.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>quarterly discount factor of households</td>
<td>$\beta$</td>
<td>0.995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>elasticity of substitution between retailer varieties</td>
<td>$\epsilon$</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>quarterly depreciation rate of physical capital</td>
<td>$\delta$</td>
<td>0.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coefficient of quadratic investment adjustment costs</td>
<td>$\phi$</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>elasticity of output with respect to capital</td>
<td>$\sigma$</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calvo probability of quarterly price adjustments</td>
<td>$\theta$</td>
<td>0.75</td>
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<tr>
<td>automatic price indexation to past inflation</td>
<td>$\gamma$</td>
<td>0.2</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Monetary policy</th>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>interest-rate persistence in the monetary policy rule</td>
<td>$\rho$</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>responsiveness of monetary policy to inflation deviations</td>
<td>$\phi_r$</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>responsiveness of monetary policy to output deviations</td>
<td>$\phi_y$</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>standard deviation of unsystematic monetary policy shocks</td>
<td>$\sigma_{\nu}$</td>
<td>0.25</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Optimal financial contract</th>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>exogenous consumption rate of entrepreneurial net worth</td>
<td>$\gamma^e$</td>
<td>0.985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>exogenous consumption rate of bank net worth</td>
<td>$\gamma^b$</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>monitoring cost as a fraction of total return on capital</td>
<td>$\mu$</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>variance of idiosyncratic productivity draws</td>
<td>$\sigma_{\omega}^2$</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>steady-state default threshold of entrepreneurs</td>
<td>$\bar{\omega}$</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 3: Selected Steady-State Values for Benchmark Parameter Calibration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Steady-State Variable or Ratio</th>
<th>Computation</th>
<th>Value</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>capital-output ratio</td>
<td>$K/ (4 \cdot Y)$</td>
<td>1.9451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>household consumption relative to output</td>
<td>$C/Y$</td>
<td>0.6963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>entrepreneur consumption relative to output</td>
<td>$C^e/Y$</td>
<td>0.0784</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bank consumption relative to output</td>
<td>$C^b/Y$</td>
<td>0.0251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>capital investment relative to output</td>
<td>$I/Y$</td>
<td>0.1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>employment as a share of time endowment*</td>
<td>$H$</td>
<td>1/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gross price markup of retailers*</td>
<td>$\epsilon/ (\epsilon - 1)$</td>
<td>1.1111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>leverage ratio of entrepreneurs*</td>
<td>$QK/N$</td>
<td>1.5372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>default monitoring costs relative to output</td>
<td>$\mu G (\bar{\omega}) R^k QK/Y$</td>
<td>0.0057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>annualized default rate of entrepreneurs*</td>
<td>$4 \cdot F (\bar{\omega})$</td>
<td>4.735%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>annualized risk-free policy interest rate*</td>
<td>$4 \cdot (R^o - 1)$</td>
<td>2.010%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>annualized interest rate on bank loans*</td>
<td>$4 \cdot (Z - 1)$</td>
<td>6.816%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>annualized rate of return to capital</td>
<td>$4 \cdot (R^k - 1)$</td>
<td>6.195%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>annualized external finance premium</td>
<td>$4 \cdot (R^k / R^o - 1)$</td>
<td>4.164%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Steady-state values targeted in benchmark calibration
Figures

Figure 1: Lending Standard Measures, 1991Q1-2008Q2

Notes: See Appendix A.1 for a detailed description of lending standard measures.

Figure 2: Reasons of Domestic Banks for Adjusting their Lending Standards, 1997Q1-2008Q2
Figure 3: Impulse Responses to an Expansionary Monetary Policy Shock in a Small VAR.

Notes: Point estimates with two standard error confidence bands.
Figure 4: Cumulative Contribution of Monetary Policy Shocks to the Historical Variance Decomposition of the FFR and Lending Standards in the Model with Three Unobserved Factors.

Notes: Point estimates for a single candidate draw from the Gibbs sampler. See Appendix A.1 for a detailed description of lending standard measures.
Figure 5: Impulse Responses of Lending Standard Measures to a 25bps Expansionary Monetary Policy Shock in the Model with Three Unobserved Factors.

Notes: Median responses with pointwise $16^{th}/84^{th}$ and $5^{th}/95^{th}$ percentiles. See Appendix A.1 for a detailed description of lending standard measures.
Figure 6: Impulse Responses of Lending Standard Measures to a 25bps Expansionary Monetary Policy Shock in the Model with One Unobserved Factor.

Notes: Median responses with pointwise 16th/84th and 5th/95th percentiles. See Appendix A.1 for a detailed description of lending standard measures.
Figure 7: Impulse Responses of Lending Standard Measures to a 25bps Expansionary Monetary Policy Shock in the Model with Five Unobserved Factors.

Notes: Median responses with pointwise 16/84th and 5/95th percentiles. See Appendix A.1 for a detailed description of lending standard measures.
Figure 8: Impulse Responses of Lending Standard Measures to a 25bps Expansionary Monetary Policy Shock in the Model with Seven Unobserved Factors.

Notes: Median responses with pointwise 16th/84th and 5th/95th percentiles. See Appendix A.1 for a detailed description of lending standard measures.
Figure 9: Illustration of the Optimal CSV Contract without Aggregate Risk and the Effects of Expansionary Monetary Policy.
Figure 10: Selected Impulse Response Functions to an Expansionary Monetary Policy Shock of 25 Basis Points for $\rho = 0.95$. 
Figure 11: Selected Impulse Response Functions to an Expansionary Monetary Policy Shock for Different Optimal Financial Contracts.
Figure 12: Selected Impulse Response Functions to an Expansionary Monetary Policy Shock of 25 Basis Points for $\rho = 0.90$ and $\rho = 0.95$. 
### Appendix A. Econometric Methodology

#### Appendix A.1. Data

Table 4: Data and Data Transformation in the FAVAR

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Overall No.</th>
<th>No. in Block</th>
<th>Series ID</th>
<th>Slow</th>
<th>Transformation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>INDPRO</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Industrial Production Index: Total (2007=100, SA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>IPBUSEQ</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Industrial Production: Business Equipment (2007=100, SA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>IPCONGD</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Industrial Production: Consumer Goods (2007=100, SA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>IPDCONGD</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Industrial Production: Durable Consumer Goods (2007=100, SA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>IPDMAN</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Industrial Production: Durable Manufacturing (NAICS) (2007=100, SA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>IPDMAT</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Industrial Production: Durable Materials (2007=100, SA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>IPFINAL</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Industrial Production: Final Products (Market Group) (2007=100, SA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>IPMAN</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Industrial Production: Manufacturing (NAICS) (2007=100, SA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>IPMAT</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Industrial Production: Materials (2007=100, SA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>IPMINE</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Industrial Production: Mining (2007=100, SA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>IPNCONGD</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Industrial Production: Nondurable Consumer Goods (2007=100, SA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>IPNMAN</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Industrial Production: Nondurable Manufacturing (NAICS) (2007=100, SA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>IPNMAT</td>
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<td>Industrial Production: Nondurable Materials (2007=100, SA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>IPUTIL</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Industrial Production: Electric and Gas Utilities (2007=100, SA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>BSCURT02USM160S</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Business Tendency Surveys for Manufacturing: Rate of Capacity Utilization (% of Capacity), SA</td>
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<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>RPI</td>
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<td>Real personal income, Billions of 2009 chained USD, SAAR</td>
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<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>PIECTR</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Real personal income excluding current transfer receipts, Billions of 2009 chained USD, SAAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>GDPC1</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Real Gross Domestic Product, Billions of 2009 USD chained, SAAR</td>
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<tr>
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<td>CE16OV</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Civilian Employment (thous., SA)</td>
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<td>20</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>DMANEMP</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>EMRATIO</td>
<td>yes</td>
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<td>Employment-Population Ratio (Percent, SA)</td>
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<td>22</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>All Employees: Manufacturing (thous., SA)</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>PAYEMS</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>All Employees: Total Nonfarm (thous., SA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>SRVPRD</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>All Employees: Service Providing Industries (thous., SA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>USCONS</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>All Employees: Construction (thous., SA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>USGOVT</td>
<td>yes</td>
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<td>All Employees: Government (thous., SA)</td>
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<td>27</td>
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<td>All Employees: Information Services (thous., SA)</td>
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<td>28</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>USMINE</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>All Employees: Mining and Logging (thous., SA)</td>
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<td>29</td>
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<td>USPRIV</td>
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<td>All Employees: Total Private Industries (thous., SA)</td>
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<td>30</td>
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<td>yes</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Average Weekly Hours of Production and Nonsupervisory Employees: Trade, Transportation, Utilities (SA)</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overall No.</th>
<th>No. in Block</th>
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<td>19</td>
<td>CES60000000007</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>Average Weekly Hours of Production and Nonsupervisory Employees: Professional and Business Services (SA)</td>
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<td>38</td>
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<td>PCECC96</td>
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<sup>36</sup>We thank Esteban Prieto for providing this time series.
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<td>Charge-off rate on commercial real estate loans (excluding farmland), booked in domestic offices; All commercial banks, NSA</td>
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<td>12</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>Delinquency rate on loans; All commercial banks, NSA</td>
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<td>no</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Delinquency rate on commercial real estate loans (excluding farmland), booked in domestic offices; All commercial banks, NSA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Macroeconomic time series are taken from the FRED database, lending standards measures are taken from the Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey (SLOOS) of the Federal Reserve.

* If yes, a variable is assumed to be slow-moving when estimated with a principal component approach.

* Variable transformations codes are as follows: 1 - no transformation, 2 - difference, 4 - logarithm, 5 - log-difference.
Appendix A.2. Bayesian Estimation

In order to jointly estimate equations (1) and (2) using Bayesian methods it is convenient to rewrite the model in state-space form:

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
X_t \\
Y_t
\end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix}
\Lambda^f & \Lambda^y \\
0 & I
\end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix}
F_t \\
Y_t
\end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix}
e_t \\
0
\end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix}
e_t \\
0
\end{bmatrix}
\] (27)

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
F_t \\
Y_t
\end{bmatrix} = \Phi(L) \begin{bmatrix}
F_{t-1} \\
Y_{t-1}
\end{bmatrix} + \nu_t,
\] (28)

where \(Y_t\) is the \(M \times 1\) vector of observables, \(F_t\) is the \(K \times 1\) vector of unobservable factors, and \(X_t\) is the \(N \times 1\) vector of informational time series. We restrict the loading coefficient matrices \(\Lambda^f\) of dimension \(N \times K\) and \(\Lambda^y\) of dimension \(N \times M\) in order to identify the factors uniquely. The vector error terms \(e_t\) and \(\nu_t\) are assumed to be normally distributed and uncorrelated, i.e. \(e_t \sim N(0, R)\) and \(\nu_t \sim N(0, Q)\), where \(R\) is a diagonal matrix.

In one-step Bayesian estimation, all parameters are treated as random variables. The parameter vector \(\theta\) contains the factor loadings and the variance-covariance matrix of the observation equation in (1) as well as the VAR coefficients and the variance-covariance matrix of the transition equation in (2), i.e., \(\theta = (\Lambda^f, \Lambda^y, R, \text{vec}(\Phi), Q)\). In addition, the unobservable factors are treated as random variables and sampled. The observation and transition equations can be rewritten as

\[
X_t = \Lambda F_t + e_t,
\] (29)

\[
F_t = \Phi(L)F_{t-1} + \nu_t,
\] (30)

where \(\Lambda\) is the loading matrix, \(X_t = (X'_t, Y'_t)\), \(e_t = (e'_t, 0)\), and \(F_t = (F'_t, Y'_t)\). Let \(\tilde{X}_t = (X_1, X_2, \ldots, X_T)\) and \(\tilde{F}_t = (F_1, F_2, \ldots, F_T)\) denote the respective histories from time 1 to \(T\). Our goal is to obtain the marginal densities of the parameters and factors, which can be integrated out of the joint posterior density \(p(\theta, \tilde{F}_T)\). Hence, we are interested in the following objects:

\[
p(\tilde{F}_T) = \int p(\theta, \tilde{F}_T) d\theta,
\] (31)

\[
p(\theta) = \int p(\theta, \tilde{F}_T) d\tilde{F}_T.
\] (32)

Gibbs Sampling

We use the multi-move Gibbs sampling approach of Carter and Kohn (1994), which alternately samples from the parameters and the factors as follows:

Step 1: Choose a starting value for the parameter vector \(\theta_0\).

Step 2: Draw \(\tilde{F}_T^{(1)}\) from the conditional density \(p(F_T|\tilde{X}_T, \theta_0)\).
Step 3: Draw $\theta^{(1)}$ from the conditional density $p(\theta|\tilde{X}_T, \tilde{F}^{(1)}_T)$. Repeat steps 2 and 3 until convergence.

Choice of Starting Values

An obvious choice for $\theta_0$ is the solution implied by principal component analysis (compare Bernanke et al., 2005), which we use as a baseline in most runs. However, starting the chains (even very long ones) from the same point may not be sufficient to achieve the target distribution, in practice, even if the chain appears to have converged. Therefore, we experimented with “agnostic” starting values, e.g. $vec(\Phi) = 0$, $Q = I$, $\Lambda_f = 0$, $\Lambda_y = OLS$ of the regression of $X$ on $Y$ and $R =$ fitted residual covariance matrix from the OLS regression of $X$ on $Y$, without substantial effects on our results. We furthermore ran multiple consecutive chains of 1 million draws each, setting the starting values of the subsequent to the values obtained in the last iteration of the previous chain. Given that the chains were highly autocorrelated for some of the parameters, we applied thinning and kept only every fifth draw.

Conditional Densities and Priors

In order to draw from $p(\tilde{F}_T|\tilde{X}_T, \theta)$, we apply Kalman filtering techniques (see Kim and Nelson, 1999). Due to the memoryless Markov property of $F_t$, the conditional distribution of the history of factors can be expressed as a product of the conditional distributions of factors at date $t$:

$$p(\tilde{F}_T|\tilde{X}_T, \theta) = p(F_T|\tilde{X}_T, \theta) \prod_{t=1}^{T-1} p(F_t|F_{t+1}, \tilde{X}_t, \theta).$$

The original model is linear-Gaussian, which implies

$$F_T|\tilde{X}_T, \theta \sim N(F_{T|T}, P_{T|T})$$

$$F_t|F_{t+1}, \tilde{X}_t, \theta \sim N(F_{t|F_{t+1}}, P_{t|F_{t+1}}),$$

where

$$F_{T|T} = E(F_T|\tilde{X}_T, \theta)$$

$$P_{T|T} = cov(F_T|\tilde{X}_T, \theta)$$

$$F_{t|F_{t+1}} = E(F_t|F_{t+1}, \tilde{X}_t, \theta) = E(F_t|F_{t+1}, F_{t|F_{t+1}})$$

$$P_{t|F_{t+1}} = cov(F_t|F_{t+1}, \tilde{X}_t, \theta) = cov(F_t|F_{t+1}, F_{t|F_{t+1}}),$$

$$51$$
\(F_t\) and \(P_t\) are calculated by the Kalman filter for \(t = 1, \ldots, T\), conditional on \(\theta\) and the respective data history \(\tilde{X}_t\). The Kalman filter starting values are zero for the factors and the identity matrix for the covariance matrix. Further, a Kalman smoother is applied to obtain the updated values of \(F_{T-1|T-1,F_T}\) and \(P_{T-1|T-1,F_T}\).

The priors on the parameters in \(\Lambda\) and the variance-covariance matrix \(R\) of the observation equation are as follows. Since \(R\) is assumed to be diagonal, estimates of \(\Lambda\) and the diagonal elements \(R_{ii}\) of \(R\) can be obtained from OLS equation by equation. Conjugate priors are assumed to have the form

\[
R_{ii} \sim IG(\delta_0/2, \eta_0/2) \quad (40)
\]

\[
\Lambda_i | R_{ii} \sim N(0, R_{ii} M_0^{-1}), \quad (41)
\]

where, following Bernanke et al. (2005), we set \(\delta_0 = 6, \eta_0 = 2 \cdot 10^{-3}\) and \(M_0 = I\). Given the above priors, it can be shown that the corresponding posterior distributions have the form

\[
R_{ii} | \tilde{X}_T, \tilde{F}_T \sim IG(\delta_i/2, \eta/2) \quad (42)
\]

\[
\Lambda_i | R_{ii}, \tilde{X}_T, \tilde{F}_T \sim N(\tilde{\Lambda}_i, R_{ii} \tilde{M}_i^{-1}), \quad (43)
\]

where

\[
\delta_i = \delta_0/2 + \hat{e}_i' \hat{e}_i + \hat{\Lambda}_i [M_0^{-1} + (\tilde{F}_T' \tilde{F}_T)^{-1}]^{-1} \hat{\Lambda}_i \quad (44)
\]

\[
\eta = \eta_0/2 + T \quad (45)
\]

\[
\tilde{\Lambda}_i = \tilde{M}_i^{-1} (\tilde{F}_T' \tilde{F}_T) \hat{\Lambda}_i \quad (46)
\]

\[
\tilde{M}_i = M_0 + \tilde{F}_T' \tilde{F}_T \quad (47)
\]

The priors on the transition (state) equation are as follows. As the transition equation corresponds to a standard VAR, it can be estimated by OLS equation by equation to obtain \(\text{vec}(\hat{\Phi})\) and \(\hat{Q}\). We impose a conjugate Normal-Inverse-Wishart prior,

\[
Q \sim IW(Q_0, K + M + 2) \quad (48)
\]

\[
\text{vec}(\Phi)|Q \sim N(0, Q \otimes \Omega_0), \quad (49)
\]

where the diagonal elements of \(Q_0\) are set to the residual variances of the corresponding univariate regressions, \(\hat{\sigma}_i^2\), as in Kadiyala and Karlsson (1997). The diagonal elements of \(\Omega_0\) are set in the spirit of the Minnesota prior, i.e. the
prior variance of the coefficient on variable $j$ at lag $k$ in equation $i$ is $\sigma_i^2/k\sigma_j^2$. This prior yields the following conjugate posterior:

$$Q|\tilde{X}_T, \tilde{F}_T \sim iW(Q, T + K + M + 2)$$  \hspace{1cm} (50)

$$vec(\Phi)|Q, \tilde{X}_T, \tilde{F}_T \sim N(vec(\tilde{\Phi}), Q \otimes \tilde{\Omega})$$  \hspace{1cm} (51)

where

$$\tilde{Q} = Q_0 + \hat{V}' \hat{V} + \hat{\Phi}'[\Omega_0 + (\tilde{F}_{t-1}' \tilde{F}_{t-1})^{-1}]^{-1} \hat{\Phi}$$  \hspace{1cm} (52)

$$\tilde{\Phi} = \tilde{\Omega}(\tilde{F}_{t-1}' \tilde{F}_{t-1}) \tilde{\Phi}$$  \hspace{1cm} (53)

$$\tilde{\Omega} = (\Omega_0^{-1} + \tilde{F}_{t-1}' \tilde{F}_{t-1})^{-1}$$  \hspace{1cm} (54)

and $\hat{V}$ is the matrix of OLS residuals. Following Bernanke et al. (2005) and Amir Ahmadi and Uhlig (2009), we enforce stationarity by truncating draws of $\Phi$ where the largest eigenvalue exceeds 1 in absolute value.

**Monitoring Convergence**

Geman and Geman (1984) show that both joint and marginal distributions will converge to their target distributions at an exponential rate as the number of replications approaches infinity. In practice, however, the Gibbs sampler may converge slowly and requires careful monitoring. We monitor convergence by (i) plotting the coefficients against the number of replications (level shifts and trends should not occur); (ii) comparing the medians and means of the coefficients at different parts of the chain (large differences should not occur); (iii) plotting and comparing the medians of the factors obtained from first and second half of the chain (large and frequent deviations should not occur). The corresponding figures for our baseline model with 3 factors are reported below. It turns out that convergence is quite slow and becomes increasingly difficult to achieve, if we increase the number of unobserved factors.
Figure 13: Monitoring of Factor Convergence and Factor Uncertainty for the Baseline FAVAR Model

(a) Factor 1: Median of first and second half of draws after burn-in

(b) Factor 1: Median of all draws after burn-in with 90% coverage

(c) Factor 2: Median of first and second half of draws after burn-in

(d) Factor 2: Median of all draws after burn-in with 90% coverage

(e) Factor 3: Median of first and second half of draws after burn-in

(f) Factor 3: Median of all draws after burn-in with 90% coverage
Appendix B. Optimal Loan Contract

This appendix provides details on the optimal financial contract, following the logic in Bernanke et al. (1999). Given the different assumptions about the roles of borrowers and lenders, however, we deviate from the latter, where this is necessary.

Appendix B.1. Without Aggregate Risk

In the absence of aggregate uncertainty, the loan contract between the bank and entrepreneur \(i\) is only affected by the entrepreneur’s idiosyncratic risk \(\omega^i\). Consequently, the bank’s constrained profit maximization problem can be formulated as in equation (9), where all terms are defined in the main text.

Given the borrower’s net worth, the bank chooses the volume of the loan and thus \(k\). For any value of \(k\), the entrepreneur’s participation constraint (PC) pins down the default threshold \(\bar{\omega}^i\), which splits the expected total profits from the investment project between the borrower and the lender. Given \(\bar{\omega}^i\), the non-default rate of return on the loan to entrepreneur \(i\), \(Z^i_{t+1}\), will then be determined by (6).

For notational convenience, we suppress any time subscripts and index superscripts throughout the appendix, while our aim remains to derive the properties of the optimal contract between the bank and entrepreneur \(i\).

The EFP and Loan Supply

In what follows, we establish a positive relation \(k = \psi(s)\), \(\psi'(s) > 0\), between the external finance premium (EFP) \(s \equiv R^k/R\) and the bank’s optimal choice of the capital/net worth ratio \(k \equiv R^k/\). The Lagrangian corresponding to the problem in (9) is given by

\[
\mathcal{L} = [\Gamma(\bar{\omega}) - \mu G(\bar{\omega})] sk - (k - 1 - n) + \lambda \{1 - \Gamma(\bar{\omega})\} sk - s,
\]

where \(n \equiv N^b/N\) and \(\lambda\) is the Lagrangian multiplier on the borrower’s PC. The first-order conditions (FOC) are

\[
\begin{align*}
  k & : \quad [\Gamma(\bar{\omega}) - \mu G(\bar{\omega})] s - 1 + \lambda \{1 - \Gamma(\bar{\omega})\} s = 0, \\
  \bar{\omega} & : \quad [\Gamma'(\bar{\omega}) - \mu G'(\bar{\omega})] sk - \lambda \Gamma'(\bar{\omega}) sk = 0, \\
  \lambda & : \quad [1 - \Gamma(\bar{\omega})] sk - s = 0.
\end{align*}
\]

Note that the assumptions made about \(\Gamma(\bar{\omega})\) and \(\mu G(\bar{\omega})\) imply that the bank’s expected profit share net of expected default costs satisfies

\[
\Gamma(\bar{\omega}) - \mu G(\bar{\omega}) > 0 \quad \text{for} \quad \bar{\omega} \in (0, \infty)
\]
and
\[
\lim_{\bar{\omega} \to 0} \Gamma (\bar{\omega}) - \mu G (\bar{\omega}) = 0, \quad \lim_{\bar{\omega} \to 0} \Gamma (\bar{\omega}) - \mu G (\bar{\omega}) = 1 - \mu.
\]

In order for the bank’s profits to be bounded in the case where the borrower defaults with probability one, we therefore assume that \( s < 1/(1 - \mu) \) (compare Bernanke et al., 1999).

We further assume that \( \bar{\omega} h (\bar{\omega}) \) is increasing in \( \bar{\omega} \), where \( h (\omega) \) denotes the hazard rate \( f (\bar{\omega}) / [1 - F (\bar{\omega})] \). Hence, there exists an \( \bar{\omega}^* \) such that

\[
\Gamma' (\bar{\omega}) - \mu G' (\bar{\omega}) = [1 - F (\bar{\omega})] [1 - \mu \bar{\omega} h (\bar{\omega})] \geq 0 \quad \text{for} \quad \bar{\omega} \geq \bar{\omega}^*,
\]
i.e., the bank’s expected net profit share reaches a global maximum at \( \bar{\omega}^* \). Moreover, the above assumption implies

\[
\Gamma'' (\bar{\omega}) G'' (\bar{\omega}) - \Gamma'' (\bar{\omega}) G' (\bar{\omega}) = \frac{d [\bar{\omega} h (\bar{\omega})]}{d \bar{\omega}} [1 - F (\bar{\omega})]^2 > 0 \quad \forall \bar{\omega}.
\]

Consider first the FOC w.r.t. \( \bar{\omega} \), which implies that

\[
\lambda (\bar{\omega}) = \frac{\Gamma' (\bar{\omega}) - \mu G' (\bar{\omega})}{\Gamma'' (\bar{\omega})}.
\]

Taking the partial derivative w.r.t. \( \bar{\omega} \), we obtain

\[
\lambda' (\bar{\omega}) = \frac{\Gamma'' (\bar{\omega}) \Gamma'' (\bar{\omega}) G' (\bar{\omega}) - \Gamma'' (\bar{\omega}) G' (\bar{\omega}) \Gamma' (\bar{\omega})}{\Gamma'' (\bar{\omega})^2} < 0,
\]
because \( \Gamma'' (\bar{\omega}) = 1 - F (\bar{\omega}) > 0 \) and \( \Gamma'' (\bar{\omega}) G' (\bar{\omega}) - \Gamma' (\bar{\omega}) G'' (\bar{\omega}) < 0 \) for all \( \bar{\omega} \). Taking limits,

\[
\lim_{\bar{\omega} \to 0} \lambda (\bar{\omega}) = 1, \quad \lim_{\bar{\omega} \to \bar{\omega}^*} \lambda (\bar{\omega}) = 0.
\]

Hence, in contrast to Bernanke et al. (1999), \( \lambda (\bar{\omega}) \) is a decreasing function of the cutoff. This is a logical consequence of the borrower’s PC, since the borrower’s expected share of total profits is a decreasing function of \( \bar{\omega} \).

From the FOC w.r.t. \( k \), we can furthermore define a function

\[
\rho (\bar{\omega}) \equiv \frac{1}{\Gamma (\bar{\omega}) - \mu G (\bar{\omega}) + \lambda [1 - \Gamma (\bar{\omega})]} = s.
\]

\[37\] Given that we borrow the definitions of \( \Gamma (\bar{\omega}) \) and \( \Gamma (\bar{\omega}) - \mu G (\bar{\omega}) \) from Bernanke et al. (1999), our assumption about the hazard rate and its implications are identical to those in their Appendix A.
Taking the partial derivative w.r.t. $\bar{\omega}$, we obtain

$$\rho'(\bar{\omega}) = -\rho(\bar{\omega})^2 \{ \Gamma'(\bar{\omega}) - \mu G'(\bar{\omega}) + \lambda'(\bar{\omega}) [1 - \Gamma(\bar{\omega})] - \lambda(\bar{\omega}) \Gamma'(\bar{\omega}) \}$$

$$= -\rho(\bar{\omega})^2 \{ \lambda(\bar{\omega}) \Gamma'(\bar{\omega}) + \lambda'(\bar{\omega}) [1 - \Gamma(\bar{\omega})] - \lambda(\bar{\omega}) \Gamma'(\bar{\omega}) \}$$

where the second equality uses the FOC w.r.t. $\bar{\omega}$. Taking limits,

$$\lim_{\bar{\omega} \to 0} \rho(\bar{\omega}) = 1 \quad \text{(due to } \lim_{\bar{\omega} \to 0} \lambda(\bar{\omega}) = 1 \text{ and } \lim_{\bar{\omega} \to 0} G(\bar{\omega}) = 0),$$

$$\lim_{\bar{\omega} \to \bar{\omega}^*} \rho(\bar{\omega}) = \frac{1}{\Gamma(\bar{\omega}^*) - \mu G(\bar{\omega}^*)} \equiv s^* \quad \text{(due to } \lim_{\bar{\omega} \to \bar{\omega}^*} \lambda(\bar{\omega}) = 0).$$

Accordingly, there is a one-to-one mapping between the optimal cutoff $\bar{\omega}$ and the premium on external funds $s$, as in Bernanke et al. (1999). Inverting the function $s = \rho(\bar{\omega})$, we can therefore express the cutoff as $\bar{\omega} = \bar{\omega}(s)$, where $\bar{\omega}'(s) > 0$ for $s \in (1, s^*)$.

From the FOC w.r.t. $\lambda$, i.e. the borrower’s PC, we finally define

$$\Psi(\bar{\omega}) = \frac{1}{1 - \Gamma(\bar{\omega})} = k.$$ 

Taking the partial derivative w.r.t. $\bar{\omega}$, we obtain

$$\Psi'(\bar{\omega}) = -\Psi(\bar{\omega})^2 \{ -\Gamma'(\bar{\omega}) \}$$

$$= \Psi(\bar{\omega})^2 \{ [1 - F(\bar{\omega})] > 0 \}.$$

Hence, the qualitative implications are the same as in Bernanke et al. (1999). Taking limits,

$$\lim_{\bar{\omega} \to 0} \Psi(\bar{\omega}) = 1, \quad \lim_{\bar{\omega} \to \bar{\omega}^*} \Psi(\bar{\omega}) = [1 - \lambda(\bar{\omega}^*)]^{-1} < \infty.$$

Combining $k = \Psi(\bar{\omega})$ and $\bar{\omega} = \bar{\omega}(s)$, where $\Psi'(\bar{\omega}) > 0$ and $\bar{\omega}'(s) > 0$, we can thus express the capital/net worth ratio $k = QK/N$ as a function $k = \psi(s)$, where $\psi'(s) > 0$ for $s \in (1, s^*)$.

**Proof of an Interior Solution**

Bernanke et al. (1999) use a general equilibrium argument to justify the assumption of an interior solution, i.e. an optimal contract where $\bar{\omega} < \bar{\omega}^*$ and $s < s^*$. In particular, they argue that, “as $s$ approaches $s^*$ from below, the capital
stock becomes unbounded. In equilibrium this will lower the excess return $s$.” (compare Bernanke et al., 1999, p. 1384).

Here, we follow an analytical argument instead. Recall that the lender’s iso-profit curves (IPC) and the borrower’s PC in $(k, \bar{\omega})$-space can be written as

$$k_{IPC} = \frac{\pi^b - 1 - n}{[\Gamma(\bar{\omega}) - \mu G(\bar{\omega})] s - 1},$$

$$k_{PC} \geq \frac{1}{1 - \Gamma(\bar{\omega})},$$

where $\pi^b$ denotes an arbitrary level of bank profits.

Recall further that, in $(k, \bar{\omega})$-space, the optimal contract is determined by the tangential point of the lender’s IPC (from below) with the borrower’s PC. Consider first the borrower’s PC. Since $\Gamma'(\bar{\omega}) > 0$, $k_{PC}$ is a strictly increasing function for $\bar{\omega} \in [0, \infty)$, i.e., the borrower’s PC has a positive slope everywhere in $(k, \bar{\omega})$-space.

Consider next the lender’s IPC. Taking the partial derivative of $k_{IPC}$ w.r.t. $\bar{\omega}$,

$$\frac{\partial k}{\partial \bar{\omega}} \bigg|_{IPC} = \left(1 - \pi^b + n\right) \frac{[\Gamma'(\bar{\omega}) - \mu G'(\bar{\omega})] s}{[\Gamma(\bar{\omega}) - \mu G(\bar{\omega})] s - 1}$$

$$\begin{cases} > 0 & \text{for } \bar{\omega} \in [0, \bar{\omega}^*) \\ = 0 & \text{for } \bar{\omega} = \bar{\omega}^* \\ < 0 & \text{for } \bar{\omega} \in (\bar{\omega}^*, \infty) \end{cases}$$

i.e., the lender’s IPC has a positive slope in $(k, \bar{\omega})$-space left of $\bar{\omega}^*$ but a negative slope right of $\bar{\omega}^*$. Since the optimal contract requires that

$$\frac{\partial k}{\partial \bar{\omega}} \bigg|_{IPC} = \frac{\partial k}{\partial \bar{\omega}} \bigg|_{PC},$$

at the tangential point, and we already know that

$$\frac{\partial k}{\partial \bar{\omega}} \bigg|_{IPC} = \frac{\Gamma'(\bar{\omega})}{[1 - \Gamma(\bar{\omega})]^2} > 0 \quad \text{for } \bar{\omega} \in [0, \infty),$$

the optimal contract can only be obtained for $\bar{\omega} < \bar{\omega}^*$, which implies an interior solution to the bank’s constrained profit maximization problem.\(^38\)

**Proof of Uniqueness**

As was shown above, the tangential point of the borrower’s participation constraint (PC) and the lender’s iso-profit curve (IPC) is located on the interval $[0, \bar{\omega}^*)$. To show uniqueness, we proceed in two steps. First, we show that at the

\(^38\)Note that this argument also applies to the formulation of the financial contract in Bernanke et al. (1999), likewise implying an interior solution.
tangency point the curvature of the participation constraint is higher than the curvature of the iso-profit curve. Second, we discuss under which conditions the convexity (concavity) of PC and IPC are warranted on the interval \([0, \bar{\omega}^*])

Given the differences in curvature at the tangency point shown in step 1, convexity implies a unique solution at \(\bar{\omega} > 0\) whereas concavity implies a unique solution at \(\bar{\omega} = 0\).

**Step 1:** At the tangency point it holds that

\[
\frac{1}{1 - \Gamma(\bar{\omega})} = \frac{\pi^b - 1 - n}{[\Gamma(\bar{\omega}) - \mu G(\bar{\omega})]s - 1},
\]

i.e., the levels of \(k\) implied by PC and IPC are equal. Furthermore, it holds:

\[
\frac{\Gamma'(\bar{\omega})}{(1 - \Gamma(\bar{\omega}))^2} = \frac{(1 - \pi^b + n)s(\Gamma' - \mu G')}{([\Gamma(\bar{\omega}) - \mu G(\bar{\omega})]s - 1)^2},
\]

i.e. \(\frac{\partial k}{\partial \omega}|_{PC} = \frac{\partial k}{\partial \omega}|_{IPC} \) at the tangency point. Denote \(A(\bar{\omega}) = (\partial^2 k/\partial \omega^2)|_{PC}\) and \(B(\bar{\omega}) = (\partial^2 k/\partial \omega^2)|_{IPC}\). In what follows, we suppress dependence of \(\Gamma\) and \(G\) on the argument \(\bar{\omega}\) to simplify notation:

\[
A(\bar{\omega}) = \frac{\Gamma''(1 - \Gamma)^2 + 2(1 - \Gamma)(\Gamma')^2}{(1 - \Gamma)^4}
\]

\[
B(\bar{\omega}) = (1 - \pi^b + n)s(\Gamma'' - \mu G'')(\Gamma - \mu G)s - 1)^2 - 2s(\Gamma' - \mu G')^2(\Gamma - \mu G)s - 1
\]

\[
= (1 - \Gamma^b - n)s(\Gamma'' - \mu G'')(\Gamma - \mu G)s - 1)^2 - 2s(\Gamma' - \mu G')^2(\Gamma - \mu G)s - 1
\]

We need to know \(A(\bar{\omega}) \leq B(\bar{\omega})\). After some algebra and using the two relations holding at the tangency point stated above, we get

\[
A(\bar{\omega}) \leq B(\bar{\omega}) \Leftrightarrow \Gamma'' + \frac{2(\Gamma')^2}{1 - \Gamma} \leq \frac{\Gamma'(\Gamma'' - \mu G'')}{\Gamma' - \mu G'} - \frac{2s(\Gamma' - \mu G')\Gamma'}{(\Gamma - \mu G)s - 1} \Leftrightarrow
\]

\[
\Leftrightarrow \mu(G''\Gamma' - \Gamma''G') - \frac{2(\Gamma')^2(\pi^b - 1 - n)}{(\Gamma - \mu G)s - 1} \leq 0 \Leftrightarrow
\]

\[
\Rightarrow \frac{\mu(G''\Gamma' - \Gamma''G')}{\Gamma' - \mu G'} + \frac{2(\Gamma')^2(\pi^b - 1 - n)}{(\Gamma - \mu G)s - 1} + \frac{2(\Gamma' - \mu G')s\Gamma'}{1 - (\Gamma - \mu G)s} > 0 \Rightarrow A(\bar{\omega}) > B(\bar{\omega})
\]

Note in particular that

\[
\frac{\mu(G''\Gamma' - \Gamma''G')}{\Gamma' - \mu G'} > 0,
\]

since \(G''\Gamma' - \Gamma''G' > 0 \forall \bar{\omega}\) and \(\Gamma' - \mu G > 0\) for \(\bar{\omega} \in [0, \bar{\omega}^*]\). Furthermore,

\[
\frac{2(\Gamma')^2(\pi^b - 1 - n)}{(\Gamma - \mu G)s - 1} > 0
\]

\[39\]This follows from the assumption in Bernanke et al. (1999) that the product of the default threshold and the hazard rate \(\bar{\omega} \cdot h(\bar{\omega})\) is increasing in \(\bar{\omega}\).
since \((\pi^b - 1 - n) < 0\) and \((\Gamma - \mu G)s - 1\) < 0. And finally,
\[
\frac{2(\Gamma' - \mu G')s \Gamma'}{1 - (\Gamma - \mu G)s} > 0,
\]
since \((\Gamma' - \mu G') > 0\) on \([0, \bar{\omega}^*]\), \((1 - (\Gamma - \mu G)s) > 0\) and \(\Gamma' = 1 - F > 0\). This proves that, at the tangency point, the participation constraint has a higher curvature than the iso-profit curve.

Step 2: Note that the sign of second partial derivatives \(A(\bar{\omega})\) and \(B(\bar{\omega})\) defined above is generally dependent on the parameters of the log-normal distribution assumed for \(\omega\). In particular, the sign of \(A(\bar{\omega})\) on \([0, \bar{\omega}^*]\) is determined by the sign of the following expression\(^{40}\):
\[
\Gamma''(1 - \Gamma) + 2(G')^2 \leq 0 \iff -f(\bar{\omega})(1 - \Gamma(\bar{\omega})) + 2(1 - F(\bar{\omega}))^2 \leq 0 \iff f(\bar{\omega})(1 - \Gamma(\bar{\omega})) \leq 2(1 - F(\bar{\omega}))^2
\]
While \(0 < (1 - \Gamma(\bar{\omega})) < 1\) and \(0 < (1 - F(\bar{\omega})) < 1\) for all distributional parameters of \(F(\bar{\omega})\), the size of \(f(\bar{\omega})\) can vary substantially depending on the mean and variance of \(F(\bar{\omega})\). Given the distributional assumptions of Bernanke et al. (1999) \((\ln \tilde{\omega} \sim N(-0.5\sigma^2, \sigma^2))\) one can show that there is a threshold \(\tilde{\sigma}\) such that:
\[
f(\bar{\omega})(1 - \Gamma(\bar{\omega})) > 2(1 - F(\bar{\omega}))^2 \iff A(\bar{\omega}) < 0 \quad \text{for } \sigma > \tilde{\sigma}
\]
\[
f(\bar{\omega})(1 - \Gamma(\bar{\omega})) < 2(1 - F(\bar{\omega}))^2 \iff A(\bar{\omega}) > 0 \quad \text{for } \sigma > \tilde{\sigma}
\]
In other words, for \(\sigma > \tilde{\sigma}\) the participation constraint is concave and for \(\sigma < \tilde{\sigma}\) the participation constraint is convex. As Figure 14 illustrates, in the first case the solution is unique and \(\bar{\omega} > 0\), whereas in the second case the solution is unique at \(\bar{\omega} = 0\). For realistic parameterizations of \(\sigma\), such as in Bernanke et al. (1999), where \(\sigma^2 = 0.28\), the convexity case applies, i.e., there is a unique solution on \((0, \bar{\omega}^*)\).

Appendix B.2. With Aggregate Risk

In the presence of aggregate uncertainty, the loan contract between the bank and entrepreneur \(i\) is affected both by the entrepreneur’s idiosyncratic risk \(\omega^i\) and by the ex-post realization of \(R_{t+1}^i\). In this appendix, we establish a positive relation between the capital/net worth ratio \(Q_i R_{t+1}^i / N_{t+1}^i\) and the ex ante (expected) EFP \(s_i \equiv E_i \left( R_{t+1}^i / R_{t+1} \right)\). Again, we suppress any time subscripts and index superscripts.

For this purpose, it is convenient to write the profits per unit of capital expenditures as \(\tilde{u}_i \omega R_t\), where \(\tilde{u}\) denotes an aggregate shock to the gross rate of return on capital, and \(\omega\) continues to denote the idiosyncratic shock, with

\(^{40}\)The analysis for the IPC would be very similar, as the sign of \(B(\bar{\omega})\) depends on the sign of the following iso-morphic expression: \((\Gamma'' - \mu G'' \|\Gamma - \mu G\|s - 1\) \sim 2(\Gamma' - \mu G')^2 \leq 0.\)
\[ E(\tilde{u}) = E(\omega) = 1. \] Using the definitions from the main text and Appendix B.1, we can then rewrite the bank’s constrained profit maximization problem in equation (9) as

\[
\max_{k, \tilde{\omega}} E \left[ \Gamma(\tilde{\omega}) - \mu G(\tilde{\omega}) \right] \tilde{u}sk - (k - 1 - n) \quad \text{s. t.} \quad E \left[ (1 - \Gamma(\tilde{\omega})) \tilde{u}sk - \tilde{u}s \right] \geq 0
\]

The corresponding Lagrangian,

\[
\mathcal{L} = E \left[ \Gamma(\tilde{\omega}) - \mu G(\tilde{\omega}) \right] \tilde{u}sk - (k - 1 - n) + \lambda \left( [1 - \Gamma(\tilde{\omega})] \tilde{u}sk - \tilde{u}s \right),
\]

yields the first-order conditions (FOC)

\[
k: \quad E \left[ \left( \Gamma(\tilde{\omega}) - \mu G(\tilde{\omega}) \right) \tilde{u}sk - (k - 1 - n) \right] + \lambda \left( [1 - \Gamma(\tilde{\omega})] \tilde{u}sk - \tilde{u}s \right) = 0,
\]

\[
\tilde{\omega}: \quad E \left[ \left( \Gamma'(\tilde{\omega}) - \mu G'(\tilde{\omega}) \right) \tilde{u}sk - \Lambda \Gamma'(\tilde{\omega}) \tilde{u}sk \right] = 0,
\]

\[
\lambda: \quad E \left( [1 - \Gamma(\tilde{\omega})] \tilde{u}sk - \tilde{u}s \right) = 0.
\]

As discussed in the main text, we assume that the borrower’s PC must be satisfied \textit{ex post}, i.e. conditional on the realization of \( \tilde{u} \). As a consequence, \( \tilde{\omega} \) and all functions thereof, such as \( \Gamma(\tilde{\omega}) \) and \( \Gamma'(\tilde{\omega}) \), are independent of \( \tilde{u} \). Using this assumption, the FOCs simplify to

\[
k: \quad E \left[ \left( \Gamma(\tilde{\omega}) - \mu G(\tilde{\omega}) \right) \tilde{u}sk + \lambda \left( [1 - \Gamma(\tilde{\omega})] \tilde{u}sk - \tilde{u}s \right) \right] = 1,
\]

\[
\tilde{\omega}: \quad \left[ \Gamma'(\tilde{\omega}) - \mu G'(\tilde{\omega}) \right] = \lambda \Gamma''(\tilde{\omega}),
\]

\[
\lambda: \quad [1 - \Gamma(\tilde{\omega})]k = 1.
\]
Taking partial derivatives of the borrower’s *ex-post* PC w.r.t. $k$ and $\bar{\omega}$, we obtain

\[
\frac{\partial}{\partial k} = 1 - \Gamma(\bar{\omega}) - \Gamma'(\bar{\omega}) k \frac{\partial \bar{\omega}}{\partial k} = 0 \quad \Rightarrow \quad \frac{\partial \bar{\omega}}{\partial k} = \frac{1 - \Gamma(\bar{\omega})}{\Gamma'(\bar{\omega}) k} > 0
\]

and

\[
\frac{\partial}{\partial s} = -\Gamma'(\bar{\omega}) k \frac{\partial \bar{\omega}}{\partial s} = 0 \quad \Rightarrow \quad \frac{\partial \bar{\omega}}{\partial s} = 0.
\]

Following Bernanke et al. (1999), define $\Upsilon(\bar{\omega}) \equiv \Gamma(\bar{\omega}) - \mu G(\bar{\omega}) + \lambda [1 - \Gamma(\bar{\omega})]$. Then totally differentiating the FOC w.r.t. $k$,

\[
E \left\{ \tilde{u}'(\bar{\omega}) + \tilde{s}'(\bar{\omega}) \left( \frac{\partial \bar{\omega}}{\partial s} ds + \frac{\partial \bar{\omega}}{\partial k} dk \right) \right\} = 0
\]

\[
\Leftrightarrow \quad E \left\{ \tilde{u}'(\bar{\omega}) \frac{\partial \bar{\omega}}{\partial k} \right\} dk = -E \left\{ \tilde{u}'(\bar{\omega}) + \tilde{s}'(\bar{\omega}) \frac{\partial \bar{\omega}}{\partial s} \right\} ds
\]

\[
\Rightarrow \quad \frac{dk}{ds} = \frac{-E \left\{ \tilde{u}'(\bar{\omega}) + \tilde{s}'(\bar{\omega}) \frac{\partial \bar{\omega}}{\partial s} \right\}}{E \left\{ \tilde{u}'(\bar{\omega}) \frac{\partial \bar{\omega}}{\partial k} \right\}} = -\frac{E \left\{ \tilde{u}'(\bar{\omega}) \right\}}{E \left\{ \tilde{s}'(\bar{\omega}) \frac{\partial \bar{\omega}}{\partial k} \right\}} > 0,
\]

where we use the previous findings that $\partial \bar{\omega}/\partial k > 0$, $\partial \bar{\omega}/\partial s = 0$, and

\[
\Upsilon'(\bar{\omega}) = \frac{\Gamma'(\bar{\omega}) - \mu G'(\bar{\omega}) - \lambda(\bar{\omega}) \Gamma'(\bar{\omega}) + \lambda' (\bar{\omega}) [1 - \Gamma(\bar{\omega})]}{\lambda'} (\bar{\omega}) k^{-1} < 0.
\]

Hence, the optimal contract implies a positive relation between the capital/net worth ratio $k$ and the ex-ante EFP $s$ also in the case with aggregate risk, similar to Bernanke et al. (1999).
5. References


Piffer, Michele (2013). “Monetary Policy, Leverage, and Default,” Mimeo, London School of Economics


