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Ready to Reform: How Popular Initiatives Can Be Successful

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Ready to Reform: How Popular Initiatives Can Be Successful

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Abstract

We study whether the number of signatures collected to qualify a popular initiative affects the probability of reforming the status quo. The initiative process is modeled as a sequential game under uncertainty: petitioners make an entry decision and collect signatures to qualify the initiative. Politicians decide about a political compromise - a counter proposal - after which petitioners have the option to withdraw the initiative before the vote. In equilibrium, politicians infer the initiative’s popularity from the number of signatures and collection time. They more likely grant counter proposals to initiatives perceived as a threat to the status quo. To prove their success probability, petitioners sometimes have the incentive to collect more signatures than required for qualification.

We test model predictions based on the data set of all Swiss constitutional initiatives at federal level between 1891 and 2010. Overall, we find supporting evidence for the model mechanisms. Reforms are most likely once a far-reaching counter proposal is issued such that the initiative is withdrawn. We find a significant effect of collecting more signatures than required on the probability of provoking a compromise.

Keywords: Direct democracy; Popular Initiative; Voting; Signatures; Common Learning

JEL Classification Numbers: D72, P16

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1 Introduction

In representative democracies the voters’ main channel to influence politics is via the election and potential reelection of politicians. Direct democratic institutions offer additional ways to challenge the existing policies or propose new measures. Such institutions are deeply rooted in many U.S. states and Switzerland, and constitutional provisions for direct democracy shape politics in a growing number of countries, predominantly at local and state level (Altman, 2010; LeDuc, 2003; Matsusaka, 2005). One direct democratic instrument, the popular initiative, enables citizens to propose policies themselves after successfully qualifying them for ballot by collecting enough signatures.1

This paper deals with the popular initiative process in a setting that allows for political compromise through so called counter proposals.2 When an initiative is voted against the status quo, citizens might accept the - potentially radical - initiative if it comes closer to the median preferred policy than the status quo. If it is approved, office-motivated politicians incur reputational costs while ideologically motivated politicians receive disutility from moving away from their desired policies. Proposing a compromise might be a prudent alternative for both ideologically and office-motivated politicians: it can persuade petitioners to withdraw the initiative if the compromise is satisfactory. Or the counter proposal can win outright at the vote, thus preventing the initiative from winning.3 In some direct democracies like Switzerland, counter proposals constitute an institutionalized element of the initiative regulation. Similar provisions exist in a number of U.S. states like Washington, Maine, and Colorado, and at state and local level in several German states (Center for Direct Democracy, 2014; Initiative and Referendum Institute, 2014; More Democracy, 2014).4

However, at the time when politicians decide about a compromise, they require information about the initiative’s popularity. We argue that the number of signatures collected to qualify the initiative can serve as indication for the initiative’s winning probability. A large amount of signatures collected quickly can demonstrate popular approval, while a slow and hard collection probably reflects less support among voters. Potentially, petitioners collect more signatures than required to endeavor politicians to make a counter proposal.

We develop a sequential initiative game under uncertainty about the initiative’s winning probability. Both petitioners and politicians have symmetric information, but they are uncertain about

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1Initiatives exist in around half of the U.S. states and in Switzerland (Initiative and Referendum Institute, 2014). Similar provisions have been introduced in most German states in the last two decades (Association for More Democracy, 2014) and for example in several Eastern European countries after the fall of communism (Center for Direct Democracy, 2014).

2E.g., in 1971 a Swiss association of women’s rights activists demanded the legalization of abortion without any preconditions. The counter proposal stated that abortion should be legalized under certain conditions in the first weeks of pregnancy only.

3In some U.S. states politicians can put up new laws for popular vote, possibly at the same day as initiatives, as so called referred measures. This comes close to a formal counter proposal (Initiative and Referendum Institute, 2014): the legislature has the possibility to enact laws as alternatives parallel to the initiative process to demonstrate that some action is being taken on the subject.

4In a number of U.S. states, initiatives are dealt with in an indirect way. This means that the legislature can choose to approve the initiative, and it is only put to the popular vote in case the parliament rejects the initiative. This shares some similarities with a counter proposal as well. The indirect initiative is available in nine states for statutory proposals and in two states (Massachusetts and Mississippi) for constitutional amendments (Initiative and Referendum Institute, 2014).
the precise position of the median voter. During signature collection, information about the initiative’s winning probability is revealed thus reducing uncertainty. To qualify the initiative, petitioners have to collect at least a signature requirement but are free to collect more. Politicians decide about making a costly political compromise while taking into account their belief about the initiative’s winning probability from the signature collection. After observing the politicians’ choice, petitioners decide whether to withdraw the initiative or not.

The initiative game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in cutoff strategies. Maximizing their expected payoffs, petitioners collect signatures to either just qualify the initiative, or “over-collect” hoping to positively influence politicians’ belief about the initiative’s winning probability. Politicians are then more likely to compromise if they believe the initiative to be a real threat to the status quo. After a counter proposal the initiative is only withdrawn if the former is sufficiently close to the initiative - a good compromise in other words.

From our model, we derive predictions about the probability that the status quo is amended also depending on the number of signatures collected. We test these predictions based on the complete Swiss dataset of 249 federal initiatives that have completed the initiative process between 1891 and 2010.

The results confirm the model’s prediction that the status quo is most likely to be amended after a counter proposal. If the initiative competes exclusively against the status quo at ballot, change is rarely observed. Collecting more signatures than legally required is related to a higher probability of receiving a counter proposal after which the initiative is withdrawn; by collecting more signatures petitioners seem able to prove that their initiative enjoys high popular support.

In an extensive appendix D, we conduct a comparative statics analysis of our model and test its predictions with major institutional changes. By and large, data fit model predictions well.

Our paper is the first research with a complete initiative model encompassing the qualification stage. We thus extend the literature on direct democratic models (cf. Matsusaka and McCarty (2001) for a referendum game). Our model shares some similarities with Gerber’s (1996) initiative model, but adds the signature collection process and the possibility of a counter proposal as decisive elements. Our paper is also related to the literature on the responsiveness of politics in direct democracies. Gerber and Lupia (2010) examine the effect of political competition on responsiveness. Fatke and Freitag (2013) find that popular initiatives serve as a substitute channel for other forms of political protest. Moreover, our research adds to the literature analyzing various effects of signatures collected to qualify the initiative: the effect of signature requirements on turnout (Barankay, Sciarini & Trechsel, 2003), the motivational effect of petition signing on political knowledge (Neinman & Gotttdiener, 1982), on the probability of turning out (Boehmke & Alvarez, 2014; Parry, Smith & Henry, 2012; Schmid, 2013), and voting in favor of the initiative (Hofer, 2013).

In Section 2 we describe the Swiss institutional setting and the major institutional changes to the initiative process. The model is developed, discussed and solved in Section 3. The data and empirical strategy are presented in Section 4, and the results follow in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Institutional Background

Direct democratic instruments come in two forms depending on who initiates the vote, top down (mandatory referendums regulated by constitution) or bottom up (optional referendums and initiatives proposed by citizens) (Altman, 2010). Our research focuses on Swiss federal initiatives at constitutional level. An initiative text is either a fully formulated constitutional article, or a general suggestion for a constitutional article to be concretized by the legislature. However, since there is more interpretation leeway for the parliament in the latter case, general suggestions occur relatively rarely. The popular initiative process has three stages (Frey, 1994): qualification, political, and voting stage. In the first qualification stage, petitioners, commonly referred to as initiative committees, collect a minimum requirement of signatures. The Swiss signature requirement is constant and not a percentage value of the active electorate as in California.

Upon successful qualification, at the political stage the two chambers of parliament decide whether or not to prepare a direct or indirect counter proposal. A direct counter proposal is at the constitutional level and has to be voted by the people. An indirect counter proposal is a law that does not need ratification from the voters. However, it might be subject to an optional referendum if enough signatures are collected opposing it. Petitioners may withdraw their initiative anytime during the political stage. This happens frequently after a counter proposal has been made. Initiatives can also be withdrawn for other reasons, such as a lack of funding or if it becomes apparent that the initiative has no popular support (Hofer, 2012).

At the voting stage, three different situations can occur. First, the initiative is on the ballot without a counter proposal. Second, only the counter proposal is voted at ballot after the withdrawal of the initiative. Third, both a direct counter proposal and the initiative are put to the vote simultaneously. In the original voting rule from 1891, it takes a majority of the votes from the participating population for the initiative or the direct counter proposal to come into force. In addition, the winning proposal also needs a majority of the Swiss cantons to approve it. The ballot system has a strong federal element: a change to the constitution must win a majority of the votes that are not concentrated in a few populous cantons.

Overall, there were five major institutional changes regarding the initiative process. First, while initiatives were initially not meant to be withdrawn, petitioners started withdrawing initiatives starting in 1928. Second, in 1951 the withdrawal practice was institutionalized and legally recorded. Next, women were given federal political rights in 1971 such that they could sign and vote for initiatives. As a consequence, the signature requirement was increased from 50,000 to 100,000, and collection time restricted to 18 months in 1978. Last, the voting procedure for the case when both counter proposal and initiative are at ballot was changed in 1987: it is possible to vote in favor of

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5 In Switzerland, no federal statutory initiative exists. Cantons and municipalities have their own independent regulations regarding initiatives, but they are not considered here.

6 The National Council represents the citizens in proportion to the size of cantons and vote share of parties, similar to the American House of Representatives. The Council of States represents the cantons (states), similar to the American Senate.

7 In practice, very few indirect counter proposals are challenged by referenda. Indirect counter proposals tend to be a compromise of a broad parliamentarian majority and face little opposition.
both policies and specify in a tie-breaking question which of the two is preferred. If both receive an absolute majority of votes, the tie-breaking question is decisive.

3 Model

We model the initiative process as a sequential game in the spirit of the Swiss institutional setup. A main characteristic of the model is the politicians and petitioners’ uncertainty about the initiative’s winning probability. Petitioners collect signatures to reduce this uncertainty. Afterwards politicians decide whether to propose a compromise. Petitioners have the option to withdraw the initiative before the ballot.

We first describe the model, discuss the main model assumptions, and solve the equilibrium. In a second step we develop testable implications of the model.

3.1 Model Setup

Let A be the elected politicians in parliament and B the petitioners. The players are unitary actors and information is symmetric. Both the status quo \(x_q\) and the initiative \(x_i\) are located on the real line between zero and one as common in games of political economy (Downs, 1957; Black, 1958). They are exogenously given and observed by both players. Without loss of generality, we assume that \(x_q < x_i\). Politicians have the option to make a counter proposal \(x_c\) which is assumed to be a compromise between the current policy and the proposed initiative \(x_q < x_c < x_i\).

There is a continuum of voters with single-peaked and symmetric preferences around their ideal points located on the real line. Ideal points are distributed on a probability function with a single peaked and symmetric density function. The shape of each density function is identical. Its position is determined by the median voter’s position \(\mu\) which is distributed on a uniform function with lower bound \(\underline{\mu} \geq 0\) and upper bound \(\bar{\mu} \leq 1\).

The winning probability of the status quo against the initiative is denoted by \(\pi_q(x_q, x_i)\) with a corresponding vote share \(v_q(x_q, x_i)\) (Osborne, 2000). The status quo wins against the initiative if it receives at least half the votes, i.e., if the median is closer to the status quo than to the initiative.

\[
\pi_q(x_q, x_i) = \text{Prob} \left( v_q(x_q, x_i) \geq \frac{1}{2} \right) = \text{Prob} \left( m \leq \frac{1}{2}(x_q + x_i) \right) = \frac{1}{2} \left( x_q + x_i \right) - \frac{\mu}{\bar{\mu} - \mu}
\]

It follows that the initiative wins with probability \(\pi_i(x_q, x_i) = 1 - \pi_q(x_q, x_i) = \frac{\bar{\mu} - \frac{1}{2}(x_q + x_i)}{\bar{\mu} - \mu}\). The winning probability of the status quo against the counter proposal is defined analogously. To ensure positive winning probabilities for all policy alternatives, we assume that \(\mu \leq x_q\) and \(\bar{\mu} \geq x_i\). This reflects the uncertain outcome of the ballot as no policy wins or loses with certainty. It also reflects

\[\text{Cf. Gerber (1996) for a thorough discussion of this assumption.}\]
that potentially a majority of voters either prefer a more extreme policy than the status quo or the initiative.

With three policy alternatives at ballot, the initiative wins whenever the median is right to the middle point between the counter proposal and the initiative, with winning probability \( \pi_i(x_q, x_c, x_i) = \frac{\mu - \frac{1}{2}(x_q + x_c)}{\mu - \mu} \). The counter proposal wins under two conditions: first, the median must be located in the interval \( \left( \frac{1}{2}(x_q + x_c), \frac{1}{2}(x_c + x_i) \right) \). Second, the vote share must exceed half of the votes. \(^9\)

The counter proposal’s winning probability is independent of its precise position between status quo and initiative (proof in appendix), \( \pi_c(x_q, x_c, x_i) = \frac{b}{\mu - \mu} \). The status quo’s winning probability \( \pi_q(x_q, x_c, x_i) = \frac{\frac{1}{2}(x_q + x_i) - \mu - b}{\mu - \mu} \) follows directly.

Players are uncertain about the initiative’s winning probability because they have incomplete information about the median voter distribution’s lower bound. They know that the lower bound takes the highest possible value \( \mu^h = x_q \) with probability \( p_0 \in [0, 1] \). Else it takes some lower value with equal probability. We refer to the former as high types, and low types to the latter. The players’ initial belief is the expected value \( \mu_0 = E_0[\mu] = p_0 \cdot \mu^h + (1 - p_0) \cdot \frac{1}{2} \mu^h = \frac{1 + p_0}{2} \mu^h \).

To qualify an initiative for ballot, petitioners are required to collect \( s_t \geq \bar{s} \) signatures where \( \bar{s} \) denotes the legal requirement, and \( s_t \) is the cumulative number of collected signatures at any time \( t \). Time is continuous with \( t \in [0, \infty) \). The signature collection is a publicly observed common learning process through which petitioners and politicians receive information about the median distribution. During collection, all petitioners continuously receive \( s_t > 0 \) signatures. High types receive stochastic lump sums of additional signatures \( s_h > 0 \), which arrive independently over time according to a Poisson process with intensity \( \lambda \). During collection, costs of \( \gamma \) continuously accrue. Once collection stops, it cannot be resumed. \(^10\)

**Numerical Example Winning Probabilities:** In Figure 1 the median voter is distributed between zero and one, \( x_q = 0.35 \), and \( x_i = 0.85 \) with the middle point \( \frac{1}{2}(x_q + x_i) = 0.6 \). The initiative wins whenever the median voter is located in the interval \([0.6, 1]\) represented by the dashed line because it is closer to the initiative than to the status quo. Consequently, the initiative wins with probability \( \pi_i(x_q, x_i) = \frac{1 - 0.6}{1 - 0.6} = 0.40 \).

![Fig. 1: Example of Winning Probabilities](image)

Note: Median distribution \( \mu \sim U[0, 1] \), status quo \( x_q = 0.35 \), initiative \( x_i = 0.85 \), and their middle point \( \frac{1}{2}(x_q + x_i) = 0.6 \). The initiative wins when the median voter is located in the interval represented by the dashed line, which happens with probability \( \pi_i(x_q, x_i) = 0.4 \).

\(^9\)Supporters of the initiative and the counter proposal may cumulatively be in the majority. However, if none of them has the absolute majority of voters, the status quo remains in place.

\(^10\)The signature collection process resembles the optimal experimentation strategy of a single decision maker in Strulovici (2010): the petitioners are a single player deciding whether to continue experimentation (signature collection), or to stop the process. The main difference is that players in Strulovici (2010) receive payoffs during
Fig. 2: Median Distribution’s Lower Bound over Collection Time

![Diagram](image)

**Note:** The y-axis displays the belief about the median distribution’s lower bound $\mu_t$ based probability of being a high type $p_t$, and the x-axis collection time. The belief of being a high type $p_t$ decreases with collection time if only low numbers of signatures $s_t$ are observed, and thus the belief about the median distribution’s lower bound decreases. If a lump sum $s_h$ occurs e.g. at time $t_1$, the initiative is a high type with certainty and the median lower bound takes its highest possible value $\mu_t = x_q$.

Figure 2 shows an example of the belief about the median distribution’s lower bound depending on the probability of being a high type $p_t$ as collection time evolves. At collection start at time $t = 0$, the probability that the initiative is a high type is $p_0$ and the belief is $\mu_0$. If no lump sum occurs during collection, the belief that the initiative is a high type decreases monotonically with time according to $\partial p_t / \partial t = -\lambda p_t (1 - p_t)$ and converges to zero as time goes to infinity (Keller & Rady, 2010). Accordingly, the expected belief about the median distribution $\mu_t = \frac{1 + p_0}{2} \mu_h$ decreases with $p_t$: the longer petitioners collect without receiving a lump sum, the smaller is the initiative’s winning probability perceived by the players. Suppose that a lump sum $s_h$ occurs at time $t_1$. Since only high types receive lump sums, players know that the initiative is a high type with certainty, and beliefs are irreversibly at $\mu_t = x_q$. Then players also know that the initiative has the highest possible winning probability.

Politicians’ utility depends on the winning policy. The initiative is their least preferred policy and yields utility $U_i^A = 0$. Utility increases linearly with the distance between the winning policy and the initiative: $U_c^A = x_i - x_c$ is the utility if the counter proposal wins, and $U_q^A = x_i - x_q$ if the status quo wins. Politicians pay a reputation loss of size $r$ if they make a counter proposal that then loses against the status quo wins at ballot. With this assumption we rule out strategic compromises exclusively designed to steal votes from the initiative to help the status quo win. If politicians make a counter proposal, costs $c$ incur. They reflect the politicians’ time and effort to

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11In a citizen-candidate setting, Osborne and Slivinski (1996) show the existence of three-candidate equilibria in which the middle candidate enters just to affect the voting result even though he himself has no chance to win.
debate the details of the counter proposal in parliament.

Similarly, petitioners receive utility from the winning policy. They are rewarded least if the status quo remains in place, \( U_q^B = 0 \), and their utility increases linearly with the distance between the winning policy and the status quo. Their utility is \( U_c^B = x_c - x_q \) if the counter proposal wins, and \( U_i^B = x_i - x_q \) when the initiative wins. Politicians and petitioners thus have symmetric utility functions. Petitioners pay campaigning costs \( \kappa = \frac{k}{\mu - \bar{\mu}} > 0 \) if they do not to withdraw the initiative.\(^{12}\) This reflects that campaigning in favor of the initiative is costly because it takes time, human and monetary resources. The expected campaigning costs amount to \( E[k] = \bar{k} > 0 \) and are publicly known before the signature collection begins. The individual size of \( k \) is disclosed only once the initiative is qualified. Figure 3 displays the extensive-form game tree, summarizing the following rules:

1. Nature chooses the initiative’s winning probability.
2. Petitioners collect at least \( \bar{s} \) signatures in time \( t \) to reduce uncertainty about the median voters position.
3. Politicians decide whether to make a counter proposal at costs \( c \), or not. They pay reputation costs \( r \) if the status quo wins after a counter proposal.
4. Petitioners decide whether to withdraw the initiative or not. They pay campaigning costs \( \kappa \) if they do not.
5. Voters vote sincerely between the policy alternatives.
6. Both players realize their payoffs. The winning policy is implemented.

3.2 Discussion of Modeling Choices

Uncertainty over the initiative’s success probabilities is a key element of our model as it allows for distinct voting outcomes after the same equilibrium combination of voting alternatives. If, for example, the initiative is voted against the status quo, both the options can win the vote with positive probability. Moreover, we explicitly model the initiative’s success probability from information revealed by the signature collection process. The initiative’s winning probability is a function of the status quo and initiative’s positions on the real line, and the bounds of the median voter distribution. Since players need to know the positions of the status quo and the initiative to make decisions about counter proposals and initiative withdrawal, the link between signature collection and the initiative’s winning probability is chosen to work through \( \mu \).

In our model, both the status quo and the initiative are exogenous. We assume that petitioners act out of conviction and want to implement the policy they truly believe is best. In the sense of Kartik and McAfee (2007) they have character, and are unpolitical types (Calvert, 1985; Wittman, 1983). The initiative’ position \( x_i \) thus reflects the petitioners’ preferred policy, maximizing their

\(^{12}\)The functional form of campaigning costs \( \kappa \) is chosen for computational ease.
utility. Petitioners already derive utility from simply writing the initiative and drawing public attention towards their issue, very much in the sense of Habermas’ (1992) discourse theory. Their bargaining power which gives them a positive expected payoff comes mainly from the possibility of withdrawing the initiative. Moreover, since players are uncertain about the initiative’s winning probability, a nonstrategic positioning of the initiative is viable. An obvious extension of the model would be to allow petitioners choose the initiative point strategically. For example, Gerber (1996) develops a model in which proposing an initiative is costly, and therefore for a given status quo not all initiatives points are proposed.

In contrast to Gerber (1996) and Matsusaka and McCarty (2001), we do not assume that the status quo is set while anticipating the threat of a direct democratic initiative or referendum. We prefer to think of it as old regulation, or a topic that has not been regulated so far. It is commonly argued that office-motivated politicians implement policies preferred by the median voter. However, in models with more than two candidates the median voter’s preferred policy is not necessarily implemented. Moreover, politicians are elected to implement a bundle of policies. Even if the elected politicians’ bundle coincided with the median voter’s preferences on average, this does not have to hold for every single policy in the bundle. Direct democracy, on the other hand, allows voters to see their preferences implemented for single issues (Kirchgässner & Frey, 2012).

There are two modeling choices associated with the counter proposal. First, in theory, politicians could design relatively far-reaching counter proposals that would not make the initiative withdraw.
In this way, the counter proposal could serve to split the pro-reform votes to minimize the initiative’s winning probability. This would considerably increase the status quo’s winning probability. However, such counter proposals do not seem to be in line with the tradition of Swiss politics. Moreover, the parliament is legally required to make a positive voting recommendation on behalf of the electorate. This justifies the inclusion of reputation costs if the status quo wins after a counter proposal was made.¹³

Second, politicians decide whether to make a direct (constitutional) or indirect (statutory) counter proposal. Only the former has to be voted upon at the same time as the initiative while the latter can be implemented instantaneously. The decision whether to issue a direct or indirect counter proposal is mostly determined by considerations on the appropriate structure of law. Therefore, it is usually not a strategic decision which form to propose, so that we do not explicitly model this distinction between the two different kinds of counter proposals.¹⁴ In addition to issuing a counter proposal, politicians also have the option to support the initiative and issue a positive voting recommendation to the voters, which, however, happens very infrequently. While we do not include this as an alternative action of the politicians, it would be a straightforward extension of the model.

Regarding the signature collection process, we assume that politicians observe the state of signature collection at each point in time. Signatures are officially verified and counted only after they are filed with the Swiss Federal Chancellery, but very often the media report about the state of the ongoing signature collection before its close.¹⁵ Non-public information channels among politicians most likely lead to even better information about the state of signature collection among members of the political sphere.

### 3.3 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium

We solve the sequential model recursively beginning with the petitioners’ best withdrawal strategy, then determine politician’s best counter proposal strategy given their knowledge about how petitioners react to it. In a next step we derive petitioners’ optimal signatures collection strategy given

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¹³For example, in 1914 the Council of States wanted to issue a counter proposal against the initiative to introduce proportional representation, which was declined by the National Council since it seemed tactically motivated. Similarly, in 1953 the National Council opposed issuing a counter proposal because it was suspected to be proposed by some Members of Parliament for strategic reasons (Hofer, 2012).

¹⁴For example, the initiative for more salary benefits for parents was withdrawn in 2006 in favor of an indirect counter proposal which regulated the matter at the statutory level, since such a detailed regulation was not appropriate for a constitutional article. In contrast, the initiative on complementary medicine was withdrawn in favor of a direct (constitutional) counter proposal and voted on in 2009. The topic of complementary medicine and the possibility to include it into mandatory health insurance was a new subject to the constitution, so it was appropriate to have a constitutional article regulating the matter.

¹⁵E.g., it was widely published that the initiative to introduce inheritance taxes, started by an ad-hoc committee in 2011, was running behind schedule in signature collection (Schaffner, 2012). Similarly, it was well-known that the conservative-liberal party did not have many signatures for the initiative to reduce bureaucracy at an early stage of collection and finally did not qualify in 2012 (Mäder, 2010). In contrast, the Swiss Popular Party was extremely quick in collecting already more than half the required signatures for an initiative about the expulsion of criminal foreigners, which was broadly covered in the media (Fontana, 2012).
their knowledge about the politicians’ equilibrium counter proposal strategy. We close with a brief description of the petitioners’ entry into the initiative process problem.

**Petitioners’ Optimal Withdrawal**

Petitioners either withdraw the initiative ($w = 1$) or not ($w = 0$). The petitioners’ goal is to maximize their expected payoff over all potential voting outcomes. If a counter proposal is made, the maximization problem can be written as an optimal withdrawal rule:

$$w^*(x_c) = \begin{cases} 
1 & \text{if } \pi_q(x_q, x_c)U_q^B + \pi_c(x_q, x_c)U_c^B \\
& \geq \pi_q(x_q, x_c, x_i)U_q^B + \pi_c(x_q, x_c, x_i)U_c^B + \pi_i(x_q, x_c, x_i)U_i^B - \kappa \\
0 & \text{else}
\end{cases}$$

The optimal decision reflects the option that yields the larger expected payoff: withdrawing the initiative such that the counter proposal competes only against the status quo, or not withdrawing such that the initiative competes against both the status quo and the counter proposal. In case of withdrawal, the counter proposal receives all votes that would otherwise have gone to the initiative, and thus the probability of reform increases. Also, campaigning costs do not accrue. At the same time petitioners forgo the chance that the initiative wins. Should both payoffs be equal, we assume that the initiative is withdrawn. The optimal withdrawal rule can be written as a cutoff function of the counter proposal as shown in the appendix.

**Proposition 1 (Equilibrium Petitioners)** There exists a cutoff $\bar{x}_c$ such that the initiative is withdrawn for counter proposals greater or equal to the cutoff, and not withdrawn else:

$$w^*(x_c) = \begin{cases} 
1 & \text{if } x_c \geq \bar{x}_c \\
0 & \text{if } x_c < \bar{x}_c
\end{cases}$$

Intuitively, petitioners withdraw the initiative if the counter proposal is a satisfactory compromise. Otherwise they prefer to try their chances at ballot.

Proposition 1 (Equilibrium Petitioners) states that if politicians do not make a counter proposal, petitioners optimally withdraw the initiative if the campaigning costs exceed the expected payoff difference from having the initiative voted against the status quo and no ballot. If the initiative is withdrawn without counter proposal, the status quo wins unchallenged. The expected payoff from not withdrawing the initiative is $\pi_q(x_q, x_i)U_q^B + \pi_i(x_q, x_i)U_i^B - \kappa$. It follows that petitioners prefer to withdraw the initiative if $\pi_i(x_q, x_i)(U_i^B - U_q^B) < \kappa$, i.e., if campaigning costs are relatively large compared to expected payoffs.
Numerical Example Cutoff Counter Proposal: Figure 4 displays the cutoff counter proposal for the numerical example $b = 0.24$ (winning interval of counter proposal without withdrawal), and $k = 0.1$ (campaigning costs). We get $\bar{x}_c \approx 0.53$ such that petitioners optimally withdraw the initiative for all $x_c \in [0.53, 0.85)$ as represented by the dashed line but not below.

![Fig. 4: Example of Cutoff Counter Proposal](image)

**Note:** Median distribution $\mu \sim U[0, 1]$, status quo $x_q = 0.35$, initiative $x_i = 0.85$, counter proposal winning interval $b = 0.24$, and campaigning costs $k = 0.1$. The cutoff is at $\bar{x}_c \approx 0.53$, such that the initiative is withdrawn when the counter proposal is located on the dashed line.

**Politicians**

Politicians either make a counter proposal $x_c$, or refrain from compromising, $x_c = \emptyset$. In the subgame perfect equilibrium politicians take into account that petitioners withdraw the initiative if the counter proposal is at or above the cutoff $\bar{x}_c$.

The politicians' expected payoff maximization is a two-stage problem. First, they consider which point $x_c \in (x_q, x_i)$ to propose optimally if they were obliged to make a counter proposal. Second, they decide whether to make this optimal counter proposal, or make none at all.

The first-stage problem is a choice between a vote of the status quo against a counter proposal at or above the cutoff $\bar{x}_c$, and a vote with all three alternatives competing against each other.

$$
 x_c^* = \begin{cases} 
 x_c \geq \bar{x}_c & \text{if } \pi_q(x_q, x_c)(U_q^A - r) + \pi_c(x_q, x_c)U_c^A - c \\
 \geq \pi_q(x_q, x_c, x_i)(U_q^A - r) + \pi_c(x_q, x_c, x_i)U_c^A + \pi_i(x_q, x_c, x_i)U_i^A - c \\
 x_c < \bar{x}_c & \text{else}
 \end{cases}
$$

In the appendix we show that a cutoff $\bar{r}$ of reputation costs characterizes the politicians' best strategy:

**Proposition 2 (Counter Proposal Politicians)** \(^{16}\) If politicians were obliged to make a counter proposal, they would optimally choose

$$
 x_c^*(r) = \begin{cases} 
 \bar{x}_c & \text{if } r \leq \bar{r} \\
 x_q + \epsilon, \epsilon \to 0 & \text{if } r > \bar{r}
 \end{cases}
$$

Depending on the reputation costs, politicians either prefer a small compromise $x_c'' = x_q + \epsilon, \epsilon \to 0$ close to the status quo after which the initiative is not withdrawn, or the cutoff counter proposal $\bar{x}_c$ after which petitioners withdraw the initiative. We assume that politicians propose the cutoff

\(^{16}\)This holds if the status quo wins more likely with $x_c = \bar{x}_c$ than with $x_c = x_c''$. Otherwise the condition is reversed and $x_c^*(r) = \bar{x}_c$ if $r > \bar{r}$ and $x_q + \epsilon, \epsilon \to 0$ else.
Numerical Example Median Distribution Cutoff: Keeping all other values constant, we assume that the costs of making a counter proposal are \( c = 0.04 \), and the reputation costs are \( r = 0.2 \). Then \( r \approx 1.3 \) and politicians decide between \( x^*_c = \bar{x}_c \) and \( x^*_c = \emptyset \) in equilibrium. We get that \( \mu^c = 0.14 \). When the belief about the lower bound is \( \mu \in [0, 0.14) \), represented by the thick solid line, the initiative’s winning probability against the status quo is low enough that it is not considered a threat to the status quo, and politicians optimally make no counter proposal. Whenever \( \mu \in [0.14, 0.35] \), which is the dashed part of the line, the initiative has a high enough winning probability to provoke a counter proposal at the cutoff \( \bar{x}_c \). Specifically, if the initiative’s winning probability is greater of equal \( \pi(x_q, x_i) = 0.44 \), politicians make a counter proposal and else not.

![Fig. 5: Example I of Initiative Type and Winning Probability](image)

Note: Median distribution upper bound \( \bar{\mu} = 1 \), status quo \( x_q = 0.35 \), initiative \( x_i = 0.85 \), counter proposal winning probability \( b = 0.24 \), campaigning costs \( k = 0.1 \), cutoff for withdrawal at \( \bar{x}_c = 0.53 \), costs of making counter proposals \( c = 0.04 \), politicians’ reputation costs \( r = 0.2 \). The initiative gets no counter proposal for beliefs \( \mu \in [0, 0.14) \) (thick line), and a cutoff counter proposal for \( \mu \in [0.14, 0.35] \) (dashed line).

With reputation costs are \( r = 1.4 \) we have \( r > \bar{r} \approx 1.3 \) and politicians decide between \( x^*_c = x_q + \epsilon \) and \( x^*_c = \emptyset \) in equilibrium.

![Fig. 6: Example II of Initiative Type and Winning Probability](image)

Note: Parameter values are identical to those in Figure 5 with the exception of politicians’ reputation costs which are set to \( r = 1.4 \).

Politicians’ second-stage optimization problem requires the decision whether to make a counter proposal as laid out in Proposition 2 (Counter Proposal Politicians) and pay costs \( c \), or not to compromise and have a vote between initiative and status quo. The tradeoff politicians face is that by not making a counter proposal they might get a high utility from the status quo, but also risk very low utility in case the initiative wins. In contrast, a counter proposal gives positive winning probability to a policy option with medium-sized utility and a cost \( c \).

The equilibrium strategy depends on cutoffs of the belief regarding the initiative’s winning probability when the equation holds with equality.\(^{17}\)

\(^{17}\)In our model only the narrow counter proposal \( x''_c = x_q + \epsilon, \epsilon \to 0 \) that does not make petitioners withdraw the initiative. This does not mean that all counter proposals without withdrawal are minor political concessions. To be considered a real alternative to the status quo counter proposals have to offer substantial compromise. The model could be easily adapted by requiring a minimal distance \( \delta \) between \( x_q \) and \( x_c \). Politicians would then optimally choose \( x^*_c = x_q + \delta \) if the expected payoff from doing so was larger than from proposing \( x^*_c = \bar{x}_c \). While adding this feature to the model would make it more realistic, it would not be distinguishable from the simpler specification.
probability. Recall that the latter is represented by the lower bound of the median distribution \( \mu \in [0, x_q] \). Above the cutoff the initiative is too likely to win and compromising is the better option, and vice versa below the cutoff (proof in appendix). If beliefs are at the cutoff, we assume that politicians make a counter proposal.

**Proposition 3 (Equilibrium Politicians)** If \( r \leq \bar{r} \) \( (r > \bar{r}) \), there exists a median distribution cutoff \( \mu_c \) \( (\mu'_c) \) below which no counter proposal is made, and above which a counter proposal is optimally made:

\[
x_c^*(r, \mu) = \begin{cases} 
\bar{x}_c & \text{if } r \leq \bar{r} \land \mu \geq \mu_c \\
\bar{x}_q + \epsilon & \text{if } r > \bar{r} \land \mu \geq \mu'_c \\
\emptyset & \text{else}
\end{cases}
\]

It follows that if the cutoff lies in the domain of \( \mu \in [0, x_q] \) and the initiative wins with sufficiently high probability, politicians make a counter proposal.\(^{18}\)

**Optimal Signature Collection**

Petitioners continuously choose whether to collect signatures, or to stop. They have two goals: first, they want to qualify the initiative for ballot; it is thus never optimal to stop collection before the legal threshold \( \bar{s} \) is reached. Second, they know that collection reveals information about the initiative’s winning probability and affects the politicians’ optimal strategy. The longer they collect, the more certain are the players about the winning probability.

The outcome of the signature collection has no impact on the counter proposal if the cutoffs \( \mu_c \) and \( \mu'_c \) are outside the domain of \( \mu \in [0, x_q] \) because in this case politicians’ optimal strategy is independent of \( \mu \), and petitioners optimally stop collecting at the qualifying threshold. In what follows, we focus on the more interesting case in which the politician’s strategy depends on the value of \( \mu \).

If reputation costs are high, \( r > \bar{r} \), politicians either make the small counter proposal or none. Petitioners are indifferent between the two outcomes (cf. appendix for the proof), and therefore they have no incentive to collect more than the signature requirement. If \( r \leq \bar{r} \) politicians either propose the cutoff counter proposal or none, and petitioners always prefer the former to the latter (cf. appendix for the proof). They take into account that politicians’ only make the counter proposal if the belief about the initiative’s winning probability is relatively high.

Consider Figure 7 with time on the x-axis and belief \( \mu_t \) on the y-axis: if the petitioners collect \( \bar{s} \) signatures and beliefs are above \( \mu_c \), they receive the cutoff counter proposal. It follows that petitioners optimally do not over-collect if either initial belief \( \mu_0 \) is sufficiently high, or they receive a lump sum and are a high type with certainty.

The more interesting case occurs if beliefs fall below \( \mu_c \) once the signature requirement is reached and no lump sum has been observed. If they stop collecting, they get no counter proposal, and

\(^{18}\)Note that the cutoff potentially lies outside the domain of \( \mu \), and politicians’ best strategy is independent of \( \mu \) then.
Fig. 7: Politicians’ Best Strategy

No further collection costs accrue. Alternatively, they continue at costs $\gamma$, and get a cutoff counter proposal with the probability of observing a high lump sum $\lambda p_t$ (the product of the probability of being a high type and the lump sum $s_h$ arriving). Denote the belief for which petitioners are indifferent between these options by $\hat{\mu}$. For all beliefs above this threshold, beliefs to be a high type are high enough such that continuing collection is more beneficial than stopping, and vice versa. When beliefs equal the threshold, we assume that collection is preferred.

**Proposition 4 (Optimal Collection)** Petitioners optimally continue collection until they qualify the initiative. If reputation costs are small, $r \leq \bar{r}$, the probability cutoff is in the relevant domain ($\mu_c^* \in [0, x_q]$) and beliefs are sufficiently high ($\mu_t \geq \hat{\mu}$), petitioners optimally over-collect.

In sum, petitioners over-collect only if they believe to be high types with sufficiently high probability even though no lump sum has occurred.

**Entry Decision**

As a final step, we briefly discuss petitioners’ decision to enter the qualification stage. If politicians’ reputation costs are high, $r > \bar{r}$, petitioners have the same expected payoff irrespective of the signature collection, and expect type-weighted costs for collecting the signature requirement.\(^\text{19}\) If

\[^{19}\text{In more detail, } E[\Gamma] = p_0 \int_0^{\bar{s}/(s_l + \lambda s_h)} \gamma \, dt + (1 - p_0) \int_0^{\bar{s}/s_l} \gamma \, dt \text{ where } (s_l + \lambda s_h) \text{ and } s_l \text{ are the expected number of signatures per period for high and low types respectively, and } \bar{s}/(s_l + \lambda s_h) \text{ and } \bar{s}/s_l \text{ is the expected time to collect } \bar{s} \text{ signatures. Integrating over time yields } E[\Gamma] = \gamma \bar{s} \left[ p_0/(s_l + \lambda s_h) + (1 - p_0)/s_l \right].\]

14
reputation costs are low, \( r \leq \tilde{r} \), petitioners get a type- and lump sum probability-weighted payoff of receiving the cutoff counter proposal or none. Expected collection costs take into account the probability of over-collection.

The expected payoff net of expected signature collection costs and expected campaigning costs must be positive for petitioners to start signature collection.

### 3.4 Probability of Amending the Status Quo and Signature Collection

Proposing an initiative amends the status quo either by directly beating it at the vote, or provoking a successful counter proposal. We have the probability of reform \( Pr(x_q \text{ amended}) = 1 - Pr(x_q \text{ wins}) \) which depends on the status quo's winning probability:

\[
\pi_q(x_q, x_i) = \frac{1}{2}(x_q + x_i) - \frac{\mu}{\bar{\mu} - \mu}
\]

\[
\pi_q(x_q, \bar{x}_c) = \frac{1}{2}(x_q + \bar{x}_c) - \frac{\mu}{\bar{\mu} - \mu}
\]

\[
\pi_q(x_q, \bar{x}_c, x_i) = \frac{1}{2}(x_c + x_i) - \frac{\mu - b}{\mu - \bar{\mu}}
\]

The cutoff counter proposal inherits all votes from the initiative when the latter is withdrawn. Moreover, it is closer to the status quo than the initiative, and thus appeals to even more voters. Obviously the status quo is less likely to win in a direct vote against the cutoff counter proposal than against the initiative (\( \pi_q(x_q, \bar{x}_c) < \pi_q(x_q, x_i) \)). Intuitively, the compromise appeals to moderate voters and takes away votes from the status quo.

**Hypothesis 1 (Status Quo)** After a counter proposal the status quo is more likely to be amended than when the initiative is voted exclusively against the status quo.

Our model shows that signature collection is an important information source when politicians decide whether to propose a counter proposal or not. Only initiatives considered a threat to the status quo receive a counter proposal.

**Hypothesis 2 (Signatures)** Conditional on not over-collecting, fast collectors are more likely to get a counter proposal than slow collectors. If initiatives over-collect, they are more likely to receive a counter proposal \( x^*_c = \bar{x}_c \) and withdraw the initiative in case they are a high type. There is no incentive to over-collect if petitioners expect to receive a counter proposal after which they do not withdraw the initiative.

Depending on initial beliefs and the probability of receiving lump sums, all high types potentially receive a counter proposal after collecting the required threshold \( \bar{s} \). Over-collection only becomes relevant if signature collection is slow but petitioners believe the odds of being a high type are sufficiently high. However, they may not receive a counter proposal despite of over-collection.
4 Data and Empirical Strategy

4.1 Data

We collected a dataset of all 249 Swiss initiatives at the federal level that successfully gathered the legally required number of 50,000 or 100,000 signatures (since 1978) respectively. It covers the entire time span from the introduction of the initiative in 1891 to 2010.\(^{20}\)

We collected information on whether the initiative was put to the ballot or withdrawn, whether there was a direct, indirect or no counter proposal at all, and whether the initiative or a counter proposal finally came into force after popular vote.\(^{21}\) Let \(\sigma_{\text{pol}} \in \{CP, nCP\}\) denote the politicians’ decision about the counter proposal where \(CP\) stands for a counter proposal and \(nCP\) indicates that none has been made. Analogously, \(\sigma_{\text{pet}} \in \{w, nw\}\) reflects whether petitioners withdrew the initiative \((w)\) or not \((nw)\). Combined, we have four mutually exclusive observed profiles of politicians’ and petitioners’ choices: \(\sigma = (\sigma_{\text{pol}}, \sigma_{\text{pet}}) \in \{(CPnw), (CPw), (nCPnw), (nCPw)\}\). The profile frequencies are 27, 54, 145, and 23 respectively.

Figure 8 shows how the profiles evolve over time measured by the share of all initiatives per period. With the exception of period 3 (1951-1970), initiatives that were not withdrawn and had no counter proposal make up the largest share of initiatives, varying between 40 and 90%. For the first three decades there are almost no initiative withdrawals after a counter proposal, \((CPw)\). The share considerably increases to roughly 50% of all initiatives by period 3 (1951-1970) and afterwards fluctuates between 10 and 30% per period. Profiles \((CPw)\) and \((nCPnw)\) are almost mirror functions of each other suggesting a certain tradeoff between the two. The two remaining profiles show little variation over time. Profile \((CPnw)\) makes up between 10 and 20% of all initiatives per period with a slightly increasing trend between 1928 and 1986. The share drops markedly from its 20% high in 1987 to below 10% thereafter.

In Switzerland all signatures are subject to verification in contrast to random sampling procedures common in many US states. We assembled the number of collected, valid and invalid signatures. As it is of particular importance for the model, let \(\text{over-collection} = \text{signatures} - \bar{s}\) denote the number of valid signatures collected above the legal threshold \(\bar{s}\). Time is the signature collection time measured from collection begin to submitting the signatures.\(^{22}\) We also collected

\(^{20}\)We omit four initiatives that had been declared invalid by the parliament and were not further discussed thereon. We also drop two initiatives that collected the necessary number of signatures, but were postponed by the government and parliament for exceptionally long periods of time until they became irrelevant and were written off by parliament (cf. Swiss Federal Chancellery, 2013). Furthermore, we omit three initiatives that were withdrawn after a counter proposal to a similar, but different initiative had been made. The three cases are the initiative “Special justice in cases of urgency (Notrecht und Dringlichkeit)” (withdrawn 1940) and two initiatives on old age insurance (“Initiative for an entirely public-based pension scheme (Für die Einführung einer Volkspension)” (withdrawn in 1974) and “Further expansion of insurances against old age and invalidity (Für einen weiteren Ausbau der Alters-, Hinterlassenen- und Invalidenversicherung)” (withdrawn in 1968). For these initiatives the reaction of both the parliament and the petitioners cannot be clearly allocated to one initiative, but was mainly driven by other contemporaneous initiatives on similar subjects (Hofer, 2012).

\(^{21}\)As explained, indirect counter proposals may be subject to a facultative referendum but this rarely occurs. However, in the few cases in which this happened, we took into account the outcome of the referendum vote.

\(^{22}\)For four initiatives collection time is not available. As all four belong to periods before the collection time restriction, we assume the mean collection time before 1978 for them.
Fig. 8: Period Mean Shares of Observed Profiles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Mean status quo amended</th>
<th>Mean (CPnw)</th>
<th>Mean (CPw)</th>
<th>Mean (nCPnw)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


According to the Swiss Federal Chancellery, 23 initiatives without a counter proposal were withdrawn for “other reasons” (as opposed to withdrawal after a counter proposal). We collected complementary data on the initiative from the detailed descriptions of each initiative in Hofer (2012) and Rohner (2012). They provide additional insight into smaller policy concessions by the parliament which were not explicitly registered as counter proposals, but still represent some policy change induced by the initiative. We recoded 10 of the 23 initiatives of profile \((nCPw)\) that yielded minor policy changes according to Rohner (2012) and Hofer (2012) as having a de facto counter proposal and thus profile \((CPw)\). We run our estimates with the officially coded data, but repeat all estimates including the de facto counter proposals.

We collect data on control variables regarding the petitioners’ and initiative’s characteristics potentially influencing the initiative process. Petitioners can be distinguished depending on their experience in raising initiatives and resources: \(committee = 1\) denotes an experienced and resourceful committee. We consider a committee experienced if it already raised at least one initiative.

---

23 The precise description of the rules to allocate the initiatives to the six institutional periods can be found in the appendix.
Table 1: Descriptives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>over-collection</td>
<td>38.496</td>
<td>51.220</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>334.760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>time</td>
<td>362.9</td>
<td>188.8</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>1173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>committee</td>
<td>0.3133</td>
<td>0.4648</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>topic</td>
<td>0.4297</td>
<td>0.4960</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>indirect</td>
<td>0.1807</td>
<td>0.3856</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>de facto</td>
<td>0.2329</td>
<td>0.4236</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Summary statistics for the complete sample. Over-collection is defined as valid signatures – legal threshold in thousands. Time is measured in days from collection begin to submitting the signatures. Speed is the number of signatures collected per day. Dummy committee is one if the initiating committee is experienced and powerful. If a topic is economically framed (and not ideologically or state-related), the dummy topic is 1. Form is 1 if the initiative is a general suggestion. Indirect and de facto counter proposal takes value 1 if an initiative received an indirect or de facto counter proposal respectively.

before, and inexperienced if it raises an initiative for the first time. A committee is considered powerful if it is formed by a large party (more than 10% vote share in the last parliamentary election) or large, well-established associations or organizations (many members or large material interest). For example, when the Social Democrats qualified their first initiative in 1893, they are coded as committee = 0 because they were inexperienced though powerful. For its next initiative in 1899, they had already gained experience in the initiative process, and are thus coded as committee = 1. In total, there is a total of 31.33% committees that are both experienced and powerful.

As a second control variable we attribute an economic, ideological or state-related topic to each initiative according to initiative titles, its precise wording ((2013)), and contextual information (Hofer (2012)).24 The dummy economic takes value 1 if the topic is economic, and value 0 otherwise. 42.97% of the initiatives deal with an economic topics. The remaining ones are split among ideological (48.59%) and state-related topics (8.43%).

The dummy indirect reflects if an initiative had an indirect counter proposal or a direct one (i.e., at constitutional level). 51.85% of counter proposals are indirect compared to 48.15% direct counter ones. After indirect counter proposals, initiatives tend to be withdrawn (80.95%) and come to a vote. Direct counter proposals are evenly spread among withdrawn (55.55%) and not withdrawn

24For example, the initiative for a tax on capital gains (voted in 2001) is a good example for an initiative that focuses primarily on monetary redistribution of economic assets. On the other hand, the initiative “for mother and child - protection of the unborn child and help to the mother in need” against abortion (voted in 2002) was raised for non-economic, cultural or ideological reasons. A similar example is the initiatives raised against nuclear power plants, such as the initiative “electricity without nuclear energy” (voted in 2003). Finally, initiatives on state-related topics include the initiatives to switch from majoritarian to proportional representation (for example, “proportional election of the National Council” voted in 1918) or the proposal to allow popular referendums in the case of international treaties (voted in 1977).
initiatives (44.44%).

To sum up, we have initiative-specific control variables committee, topic, form, and indirect. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics, a detailed overview of the data sources can be found in Table 5 in the appendix.

4.2 Empirical Strategy

To test model predictions and estimate its quantitative importance, we link the equilibrium strategies to their empirical counterparts. E.g., our model predicts that the initiative is withdrawn after counter proposals at the cutoff: from observing profile (CPw), it follows that the cutoff counter proposal is made. Similarly, observing profile (CPnw) means that a small counter proposal is made after which the initiative is not withdrawn. Profiles (nCPw) and (nCPnw) reflect the cases when no counter proposal is issued and petitioners either do or do not withdraw the initiative.

The first outcome to be explored is the impact of counter proposals on the probability of amending the status quo. Initiatives are indexed by $i$, and $p$ denotes their institutional period. The binary dependent variable $amended_{ip}$ is 1 if the status quo is amended (either initiative or counter proposal wins), and 0 else. The dummy $CP_{ip}$ takes value 1 if initiative $i$ receives a counter proposal. Profile (nCPnw) without counter proposals serves as reference category. We exclude initiatives of the fourth profile (nCPw) which is a perfect predictor for initiative failure. Vector $z_{ip}$ controls for initiative-specific variables as explained in the data section. We also add institutional period fixed effects $\xi_p$ to account for period-specific changes in the regulation regarding the initiative process. We thus estimate within-period variations, and not the effect of institutional changes on the probability of reform. Versions of the following regression equation are estimated:

$$amended_{ip} = \alpha + \beta_1(CP)_{ip} + \beta_2 z_{ip} + \xi_p + \epsilon_{ip}$$ (1)

Coefficient $\beta_1$ reflects the impact of receiving a counter proposal on the probability of amending the status quo. $\alpha$ is the intercept and $\beta_2$ is the vector of coefficients of initiative controls. Since the dependent variable is a dummy variable, a probit estimator is the most appropriate estimation method. Then, $\epsilon_{ip}$ is a normally distributed error term with zero mean.

In alternative specifications, we disaggregate counter proposal into two dummies for the profiles (CPw) and (CPnw) respectively. We also run regressions taking into account de facto counter proposals which are officially not coded as such.

Hypothesis 2 (Signatures) postulates a positive effect of over-collection on the probability of receiving a cutoff counter proposal, but not on the small counter proposal. To allow variation in the signature collection process, we introduce a one-time idiosyncratic signature shock $u_i$ with $E[u_i] = 0$ in the empirical specification. The shock realizes once $\bar{s}$ signatures are collected and generates variations in signatures and collection time of low-type initiatives.

We use two distinct dummies $CP_{ip}$ as dependent variables for the profiles (CPw) and (CPnw). We separate the two profiles because the model makes different predictions for each of them.
Both profiles without counter proposals \((nCPw)\) and \((nCPnw)\) serve as reference category. 

*over-collection* is the main explanatory variable. We estimate several variants of the following estimation equation and we also include period fixed effects \(\xi_p\) in the regressions:

\[
CP_{ip} = \alpha + \beta_1 over\text{-}collection_{ip} + \xi_p + \epsilon_{ip}
\]  

(2)

As the data spreads over almost 120 years, time effects potentially play a role. Institutional period fixed effects account for the main institutional changes. Moreover, technology improvements and development of the media affect the initiative and signature collection process over time (Matsusaka, 1992). Possibly political developments influence the initiative process as well, so for robustness we include linear and quadratic time trends in the regressions.

Despite including various controls and fixed effects in the regressions, we cannot claim to identify a causal effect. Potentially we omit important variables such as individual initiative characteristics, voter preferences or the political context.

## 5 Results

### 5.1 Probability of Amending the Status Quo

Hypothesis 1 states that change is most likely after a counter proposal. As descriptive evidence, we report the number of initiatives and shares per observed profile by winning policy in Table 2. In total (column 5), the status quo prevails most likely (68.3%). The initiative wins with a probability of merely 7.2%. In 24.5% of all cases, the counter proposal was adopted.

By definition the status quo always stays in place if the initiative is withdrawn and has not generated a counter proposal (column 4). After votes between status quo and initiative, the status quo wins in 90.3% of the cases. Reform is much more likely once a counter proposal is made the status quo remains in only 37.0% (without withdrawal) and 11.1% (withdrawal) of the cases.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Profile</th>
<th>(CPnw)</th>
<th>(CPw)</th>
<th>(nCPnw)</th>
<th>(nCPw)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q wins</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(37.04)</td>
<td>(11.11)</td>
<td>(90.34)</td>
<td>(100)</td>
<td>(68.27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP wins</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(48.15)</td>
<td>(88.89)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(24.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I wins</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(14.81)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(9.66)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(7.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The table shows the number of initiatives by winning policy and profile. Percentages are in brackets.
respectively. Counter proposals are most likely to win (88.9%) if the initiative is withdrawn, and are consequently the driver of reform. Counter proposals still have a 48.2% success probability even if the initiative is not withdrawn. The initiative is more likely to win when also voted against the counter proposal (14.8%), but has a winning probability of only 9.7% when competing against the status quo alone.

The regression results confirm the tentative conclusions from the descriptive analysis above. We show the marginal effects from a probit regression of reform dummies on counter proposals in Table 3. The sample consists of all 226 initiatives with profiles other than \((nCPw)\). In every other specification period fixed effects are included. In columns (1) to (4) we aggregate all counter proposals in the variable \(CP\). Counter proposals are split into the respective profiles \((nCPw)\) and \((nCPnw)\) in columns (5) to (8).

In all specifications the dummies for profiles including counter proposals are positive and highly significant. On average, initiatives provoking counter proposals are around 36 to 38 percentage points more likely to lead to reform. Once we control for initiative characteristics, the effect decreases to 16 to 18 percentage points. The drop is due to controlling for indirect counter proposals, i.e., compromises at the legislative level which almost always lead to reform.

### Table 3: Probability of Amending the Status Quo

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
<th>(7)</th>
<th>(8)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CP</td>
<td>0.380***</td>
<td>0.363***</td>
<td>0.162***</td>
<td>0.179***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.046)</td>
<td>(0.049)</td>
<td>(0.051)</td>
<td>(0.051)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPw</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.505***</td>
<td>0.510***</td>
<td>0.412***</td>
<td>0.419***</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.028)</td>
<td>(0.032)</td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
<td>(0.048)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPnw</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.327***</td>
<td>0.361***</td>
<td>0.239***</td>
<td>0.276***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.048)</td>
<td>(0.052)</td>
<td>(0.056)</td>
<td>(0.057)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirect CP</td>
<td>0.483***</td>
<td>0.462***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.201***</td>
<td>0.202***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.059)</td>
<td>(0.060)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.067)</td>
<td>(0.065)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>-0.039</td>
<td>0.069</td>
<td>0.058</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.063)</td>
<td>(0.068)</td>
<td>(0.056)</td>
<td>(0.059)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Experienced</td>
<td>-0.096*</td>
<td>-0.068</td>
<td>-0.104**</td>
<td>-0.093*</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.058)</td>
<td>(0.059)</td>
<td>(0.051)</td>
<td>(0.051)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>-0.035</td>
<td>-0.065</td>
<td>-0.091*</td>
<td>-0.109**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.052)</td>
<td>(0.053)</td>
<td>(0.047)</td>
<td>(0.048)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>0.141</td>
<td>0.183</td>
<td>0.342</td>
<td>0.375</td>
<td>0.435</td>
<td>0.471</td>
<td>0.500</td>
<td>0.538</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Period FE</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Probit regressions, marginal effects reported. Standard errors in brackets. Dependent variable: dummy is 1 if status quo was amended. Observations with profile \((nCPw)\) are dropped because they predict initiative failure perfectly. Committee = 1 for experienced and powerful petitioners. Topic = 1 for economically framed initiatives. Indirect = 1 if counter proposal made was not at constitutional level. Period fixed effects are based on 6 institutional periods.
Having a counter proposal after which the initiative is withdrawn increases the probability of amending the status quo by 41.9 percentage points when including controls and period fixed effects (column 8). The effect of receiving a counter proposal after which the initiative is not withdrawn is smaller, reaching approximately 27.6 percentage points in the most extensive specification. Controlling for indirect counter proposals, particularly reduces the effect from profile profile (CPw) (as expected) since most indirect counter proposals are subsumed in this profile.

Experienced initiative committees are significantly less likely to amend the status quo. At first glance this result is puzzling. Potentially, less experienced committees are more likely to spot voter preferences that are either new or have shifted away from the status quo. Moreover, more experienced committees are more likely to be entrenched in the standard political debate. Initiatives proposed by parties do not have significantly different reform probabilities than initiatives proposed by associations or private organizations. Initiatives with an economic topic are on average significantly less successful in changing the status quo than initiatives dealing with ideological or state-related issues. Potentially, there is less uncertainty about the median voter’s position on economic issues through the availability of other proxies. Descriptives show that economically-framed initiatives are less likely to receive a counter proposal, which can be interpreted as an indication of their low success probability.

We find supportive evidence for Hypothesis 1 (Status Quo) that reform is more likely if a counter proposal is made. Additionally, we show that reform is more likely after a generous compromise that made the initiative withdraw as compared to a counter proposals after which the initiative is still running for ballot.

5.2 Signature Collection

Figure 9 depicts over-collection in thousands against collection time in days by profile. There is more variation in time and signatures before 1978 than after 1978, when collection time was restricted and signature requirements doubled. After the 1978 policy change there is less over-collection and collection time is concentrated more strongly close to the maximum time of 18 months (approximately 548 days).

Though we observe over-collection in all panels, it is most frequent in profile (CPw), combined with fast collection. Though there are no incentives in the model to over-collect in order to get a counter proposal after which the initiative is not withdrawn, there is some over-collection in profile (CPnw). It probably reflects that empirically those counter proposals are not as close to the status quo as our model predicts. If they yield higher utility to petitioners than the status quo, it would explain the incentive to over-collect in this case as well.

Initiatives without counter proposals display less over-collection. Some of them are slow collectors which reflects their low type. However, many of them are fast collectors who from the model would be expected to receive a counter proposal. There are two explanations for this observation. First, potentially politicians had a low initial belief about the initiative’s winning probability such
that regardless of fast collection it was not perceived as a threat to the status quo. Second, positive signature collection shocks might have allowed them to collect the required amount of signatures relatively quickly.

Table 4 shows the regression results for over-collection. Columns 1 to 4 report the results for the outcome profile \((CPw)\), columns 5 to 8 for profile \((CPnw)\). Period fixed effects are included in some specifications. We include controls for resourceful and experienced committees, and initiatives with economic topics. In columns (3), (4), (7) and (8) we drop initiatives with indirect counter

Fig. 9: Signatures and Collection Time by Observed Profiles

![Graphs showing signatures and collection time by observed profiles before and after 1978 for CPw, CPnw, and nCPw, nCPnw.](image)

Note: Over-collection is defined as valid signatures - legal threshold in thousands. Collection time is measured in days.
proposals and general suggestions.

The effect of over-collection on the probability of observing a counter proposal after which the initiative is withdrawn is positive and highly significant, in line with Figure 9. Over-collecting by 10,000 signatures is associated with an increased probability of profile (\(CPw\)) by 1 to 2 percentage points. Columns 5 to 8 also show a 1 percentage point increase in the probability of observing profile (\(CPnw\)). The effect is insignificant once we exclude initiatives with indirect counter proposals and include controls as well as period fixed effects. All results are robust to accounting for de facto counter proposals, linear and quadratic time trends (results on request). To account for the doubling of the signature requirement in 1978, we rerun the main regression with two subsamples before and after 1978. We find a highly significant increase of 2 percentage points on the probability of receiving a counter proposal (\(CPw\)) and no effect on (\(CPnw\)) before 1978. After 1978, we do not consistently find significant effects (only the counterparts of columns 1, 4 and 5 are significant). Potentially this can be explained by higher over-collection prior to the increased requirement (51,200 and 27,600 on average) and more variation in signatures collected.

In sum, over-collection leads to a higher probability of receiving a cut-off counter proposal as predicted in the model. The effect is particularly strong with the pre-1978 requirement of 50,000 signatures in combination with the collection time restriction. Figure 9 also shows that many initiatives engaging in over-collection do not receive a counter proposal despite their collection efforts. Conversely, most counter proposals are issued for initiatives collecting quickly and over-collecting little. This means that for many initiatives politicians are able to assess the initiative’s chances of success once the official signature requirement is reached.

Though the model predicts no incentive to over-collect to induce a counter proposal after which the initiative is not withdrawn, we observe some over-collection in this case, particularly after 1978. Alternatively, over-collection may have other reasons than the purely strategic motive to receive a counter proposal. It also serves as insurance for invalid votes, or it may be the result of coordination failures in the collection process as modeled by the idiosyncratic collection shock.

6 Concluding Remarks

We presented a popular initiative model under uncertainty about the initiative’s success in which petitioners collect signatures, politicians decide about making a counter proposal and the petitioners decide whether to withdraw the initiative or not. The model can rationalize the number of signatures collected, why counter proposals are made and under which conditions the initiative is withdrawn. Moreover, it enables predictions about the probability that the status quo policy is amended, and the initiative is able to break the agenda setting monopoly of the politicians. We generally find supportive evidence for the mechanisms predicted by the model.

Reaching a counter proposal is the main channel for an initiative to shape politics and to achieve a policy deviation from the status quo. The chance for policy change is higher in the case of far-reaching political compromise that makes the initiative withdraw. The credible threat of a pending
### Table 4: Effect of Over-Collection on Counter Proposals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dep. var.</th>
<th>(1) (CPw)</th>
<th>(2) (CPw)</th>
<th>(3) (CPw)</th>
<th>(4) (CPw)</th>
<th>(5) (CPnw)</th>
<th>(6) (CPnw)</th>
<th>(7) (CPnw)</th>
<th>(8) (CPnw)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Over-collection</td>
<td>0.022*** (0.005)</td>
<td>0.018*** (0.005)</td>
<td>0.012*** (0.004)</td>
<td>0.012*** (0.004)</td>
<td>0.011** (0.005)</td>
<td>0.011** (0.005)</td>
<td>0.009* (0.005)</td>
<td>0.007 (0.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee</td>
<td>-0.044 (0.050)</td>
<td>-0.035 (0.050)</td>
<td>-0.056 (0.049)</td>
<td>-0.041 (0.050)</td>
<td>-0.041 (0.049)</td>
<td>-0.041 (0.050)</td>
<td>-0.041 (0.049)</td>
<td>-0.041 (0.050)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topic</td>
<td>0.040 (0.046)</td>
<td>0.046 (0.046)</td>
<td>0.072* (0.043)</td>
<td>0.058 (0.044)</td>
<td>0.072* (0.043)</td>
<td>0.058 (0.044)</td>
<td>0.072* (0.043)</td>
<td>0.058 (0.044)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. $R^2$</td>
<td>0.075</td>
<td>0.175</td>
<td>0.080</td>
<td>0.114</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.098</td>
<td>0.061</td>
<td>0.127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
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<td>222</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>195</td>
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<td>177</td>
<td>177</td>
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<tr>
<td>Period FE</td>
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<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Probit regressions, marginal effects reported. Standard errors in brackets. Dependent variable is dummy for profile (CPw) in columns 1-4, and profile (CPnw) in columns 5-8. Observations from profile (CPnw) are dropped in columns 1-4, and from profile (CPw) in columns 5-8. Initiatives with indirect counter proposals and general suggestions are dropped in columns 3, 4, 7, and 8. Over-collection is defined as valid signatures - legal threshold in 10,000. Committee = 1 for experienced and powerful petitioners. Topic = 1 for economically framed initiatives. Period fixed effects are based on 6 institutional periods.

Popular initiative mobilizes politicians to deviate from the previous status quo to some extent. The decision whether to issue a counter proposal or not is influenced by the perceived popularity of the initiative. Counter proposals after which the initiative is not withdrawn are associated with a higher probability of policy change as well, but to a lesser extent, since in some cases, initiative and counter proposal are competing for votes in favor of a policy change.

Our data suggest that when politicians decide whether to make a counter proposal or not, collecting a high number of signatures could play a role in the decision. More signatures are associated with a higher probability of establishing a counter proposal.
A Proofs

Proof of Winning Probability Counter Proposal

Proof. The proof is laid out in two steps. We first show that for a given $x_c$ there exists an interval $[b_c, \bar{b}_c] \subseteq [\frac{1}{2}(x_q + x_c), \frac{1}{2}(x_c + x_i)]$ with length $b_c = \bar{b}_c - b_c$ in which $x_c$ receives more than half of the votes. Second, we show that $b_c = b$ for all $x_c \in (x_q, x_i)$, and the expected vote share is identical for all $x_c \in (x_q, x_i)$.

For a given $x_c \in (x_q, x_i)$, the vote share for a given realization of the median $m$ is $v^m_c(x_q, x_c, x_i) = F_m(\frac{1}{2}(x_c + x_i)) - F_m(\frac{1}{2}(x_q + x_c))$. By symmetry and single-peakedness of the density function of $F_m$ it is obvious that for a given $x_c$ the vote share is maximized when the median sits in the middle of $(\frac{1}{2}(x_q + x_c), \frac{1}{2}(x_c + x_i))$. Let $\hat{m}_c$ denote this point. If $x_c$ has $\pi_c(x_q, x_c, x_i) > 0$, then $v^\hat{m}_c(x_q, x_c, x_i) > \frac{1}{2}$, the vote share at the vote maximizing $m = \hat{m}_c$ must be strictly larger than one half (if the vote share is below half at this point, the winning probability is zero for all $x_c$). Vote shares for symmetric $m = \hat{m}_c - \delta$ and $m = \hat{m}_c + \delta$ are identical. Note further that $v^\hat{m}_c(x_q, x_c, x_i)$ at $m = \frac{1}{2}(x_q + x_c)$ and $m = \frac{1}{2}(x_c + x_i)$ are at most 0.5 such that $x_c$ would lose with certainty for these median realizations. It follows that there exists a symmetric interval $[b_c, \bar{b}_c]$ around $m = \hat{m}$ that has a vote share larger than $\frac{1}{2}$ and thus positive winning probability.

The interval $(\frac{1}{2}(x_q + x_c), \frac{1}{2}(x_c + x_i))$ in which realizations of $m$ make $x_c$ potentially win has length $b < \frac{1}{2}(x_i - x_q) \forall x_c \in (x_q, x_i)$. Also vote shares $v^\hat{m}_c(x_q, x_c, x_i) = v^\hat{m}_c(x_q, x_c, x_i)$ are identical for all $x_c \in (x_q, x_i)$. From this it follows that $b_c = \bar{b} - b = b \forall x_c \in (x_q, x_i)$, and consequently $\pi_c(x_q, x_c, x_i) = Prob(b \leq m \leq \bar{b}) = \frac{b}{\mu - \bar{\mu}} \forall x_c \in (x_q, x_i)$ which concludes the proof. ■

Proof of Proposition 1 (Equilibrium Petitioners)

Proof. The proof proceeds by first establishing that petitioners’ difference in expected payoffs between withdrawing and not withdrawing the initiative after a counter proposal is a quadratic function of $x_c$. Second, we show that the minimum of the parabola is right to $x_i$, such that the function is monotonically decreasing in $x_c$ over the relevant range $(x_q, x_i)$. We then establish conditions, such that petitioners prefer not to withdraw the initiative for counter proposals close to the status quo and vice versa for counter proposals close to the initiative. Since the payoff difference is monotonically decreasing in $x_c$, this proves the existence of a cutoff counter proposal above which the initiative is withdrawn.

Solving the optimal withdrawal problem yields a quadratic function of $x_c$ such that petitioners prefer to withdraw the initiative if:

$$\frac{1}{2}x_c^2 - [\bar{\mu} + \frac{1}{2}(x_i - x_q) - b]x_c < [b - \frac{1}{2}(x_i - x_q)]x_q + \frac{1}{2}(x_i - \bar{\mu})x_i + k$$

(3)

Taking the first derivative with respect to $x_c$ and setting it to zero yields the minimum of the left-hand side, $x_c^* = \mu + \frac{1}{2}(x_i - x_q) - b > 0$. Then $x_i < x_c^*$ as long as $\bar{\mu} > x_i$. Plugging $x_c = x_q$ into equation (3), yields that the expected payoff from not withdrawing after the counter
The larger the left-hand side of (4). It is therefore maximized for reputation costs. Taking the derivative of the left-hand side with respect to make counter proposals just stealing votes from the initiative. Thus, the smaller \( P \), proposal, \( x_c = x_i \) into equation (3) yields the the expected payoff from withdrawing the initiative is larger than without withdrawing whenever \( k > \frac{1}{2}(x_q + x_i) - b\bar{x}_i - x_q < 0 \), which is always true. Due to monotonicity there exists a cutoff counter proposal \( \bar{x}_c \) that characterizes the petitioners' optimal withdrawal strategy. ■

Proof of Proposition 2 (Counter Proposal Politicians)

Proof. We proceed by first considering two lemmas from which the proof directly follows.

Lemma 1 Politicians never have an incentive to make a more favorable counter proposal than the cutoff \( x_c' > \bar{x}_c \).

Taking the first derivative of the expected payoff of an initiative that is withdrawn after a counter proposal, \( P_A(x_c \geq \bar{x}_c) \), with respect to \( x_c \), yields \( \frac{\delta}{\delta x_c} = \frac{1}{\bar{\mu} - \bar{\mu}}(\frac{1}{2}x_c - \bar{\mu} - \frac{1}{2}r) < 0 \) because \( \frac{1}{2}x_c < \bar{\mu} \). Thus, the higher \( x_c \), the lower is the expected payoff. Thus, politicians never make a counter proposal above the cutoff \( \bar{x}_c \).

Lemma 2 If reputation costs \( r \) are sufficiently large, there exists a counter proposal \( x_c'' = x_q + \epsilon < \bar{x}_c, \epsilon \rightarrow 0 \) which is preferred to the cutoff \( \bar{x}_c \).

Suppose \( x_c'' = x_q + \epsilon < \bar{x}_c, \epsilon > 0 \) yields a higher payoff to politicians than \( x_c = \bar{x}_c \). Then

\[
\pi_q(x_q, x_c'', x_i)(U^A_q - r) + \pi_c(x_q, x_c'', x_i)U^A_c(x_c'') + \pi_i(x_q, x_c'', x_i)U_i^A > \pi_c(x_q, \bar{x}_c)(U^A_q - r) + \pi_c(x_q, \bar{x}_c)U^A_c(\bar{x}_c)
\]

Taking the derivative of the left-hand side with respect to \( x_c'' \), yields a negative number whenever reputation costs \( r > x_i - x_q - 2b \). We impose this condition since we assume that politicians do not make counter proposals just stealing votes from the initiative. Thus, the smaller \( x_c'' \) (and hence \( \epsilon \)), the larger the left-hand side of (4). It is therefore maximized for \( \epsilon \rightarrow 0 \). Solving the above inequality (4) for \( \epsilon \), letting it converge to zero, we have to show that \( \epsilon \) can be positive for the existence of \( x_c'' \).

Solving for \( r \) yields an inequality depending on the sign of the term \( b - \frac{1}{2}(x_i - \bar{x}_c) \) which depends on the status quo's winning probabilities when voted against both kinds of counter proposals after which the initiative is (not) withdrawn. It is straightforward to show that \( b - \frac{1}{2}(x_i - \bar{x}_c) > 0 \) if \( \pi_q(x_q, \bar{x}_c) > \pi_q(x_q, x_c', x_i) \). I.e., the status quo wins more likely when the initiative is withdrawn. Then the solution is:

\[
\bar{r} = (x_i - \bar{x}_c)\frac{\bar{\mu} - \frac{1}{2}(x_i + \bar{x}_c)}{b - \frac{1}{2}(x_i - \bar{x}_c)} < r
\]

This is the sufficient condition to guarantee the existence of \( x_c'' = x_q + \epsilon < \bar{x}_c, \epsilon \rightarrow 0 \) which makes politicians better off than proposing the cutoff \( \bar{x}_c \). The converse is true if \( \pi_q(x_q, \bar{x}_c) < \pi_q(x_q, x_c'', x_i) \).
and consequently $b - \frac{1}{2}(x_i - \bar{x}_c) < 0$ such that the inequality sign in 5 would reverse. Hence, equilibrium conditions would switch such that politicians would choose between $x_c^* = \emptyset$ and $x_c^* = \bar{x}_c''$ if $r < \bar{r}$. Other than that, the model remains unaffected. For the remainder of the model, we assume that $\pi_q(x_q, \bar{x}_c) > \pi_q(x_q, x_q + \epsilon, x_i)$. 

Proof of Proposition 3 (Equilibrium Politicians)

Proof. The politicians’ optimal choice between $x_c^* = \bar{x}_c$ and $x_c^* = \emptyset$ is:

$$x_c^*(\mu | r \leq \bar{r}) = \begin{cases} \emptyset & \text{if } \pi_q(x_q, x_i)U_q^A + \pi_i(x_q, x_i)U_i^A \\
\pi_q(x_q, \bar{x}_c)(U_q^A - r) + \pi_c(x_q, \bar{x}_c)U_c^A(\bar{x}_c) - c & > \pi_q(x_q, \bar{x}_c)(U_q^A - r) + \pi_c(x_q, \bar{x}_c)U_c^A(\bar{x}_c) - c \end{cases}$$

Their optimal choice between $x_c^* = \bar{q} + \epsilon$ and $x_c^* = \emptyset$ is:

$$x_c^*(\mu | r > \bar{r}) = \begin{cases} \emptyset & \text{if } \pi_q(x_q, x_i)U_q^A + \pi_i(x_q, x_i)U_i^A \\
\pi_q(x_q, x''_c, x_i)(U_q^A - r) + \pi_c(x_q, x''_c, x_i)U_c^A(\bar{x}_c) + \pi_i(x_q, x''_c, x_i)U_i^A - c & > \pi_q(x_q, x''_c, x_i)(U_q^A - r) + \pi_c(x_q, x''_c, x_i)U_c^A(\bar{x}_c) + \pi_i(x_q, x''_c, x_i)U_i^A - c \end{cases}$$

Politicians choose whichever action maximizes their expected payoff. We take the differences between the expected payoffs of the respective counter proposal and no counter proposal and take derivatives with respect to $\mu$. We find that the payoff differences are monotonically increasing in $\mu$ and thus in the initiative’s winning probability: the more likely the initiative wins, the higher is the expected payoff from making a counter proposal compared to making none. This proves that there exists a cutoff $\mu_c$ above which counter proposals are made, and below which they are not. However, the cutoff $\mu_c$ does not necessarily have to lie in the domain of $\mu \in [0, x_q]$. The belief about $\mu$ only plays a role for the politician’s best action if the cutoff is located in the domain. This concludes the proof. 

Proof of Petitioners’ Preference Ranking

Proof. Petitioners’ payoff from a vote of the initiative against the status quo taking into account that $U_q^B = 0$ is

$$P_B(x_c^* = \emptyset) = \pi_q(x_q, x_i)U_q^B + \pi_i(x_q, x_i)U_i^B - \kappa$$

$$= \pi_i(x_q, x_i)U_i^B - \kappa$$

(6)

Petitioners’ payoff from a vote of the initiative against the cutoff counter proposal after which the
initiative is withdrawn, taking into account that $U_q^B = 0$, is

$$P_B(x_c^* = \bar{x}_c) = \pi_q(x_q, \bar{x}_c)U_q^B + \pi_c(x_q, \bar{x}_c)U_c^B(\bar{x}_c) = \pi_c(x_q, \bar{x}_c)U_c^B(\bar{x}_c)$$

(7)

Petitioners’ payoff from a vote of the initiative against the counter proposal after which the initiative is not withdrawn, taking into account that $U_q^B = 0$, $x_c'' \rightarrow x_q$ and $U_c^B(x_c'') \rightarrow U_q^B = 0$, is

$$P_B(x_c^* = x_c'') = \pi_q(x_q, x_c'', x_i)U_q^B + \pi_c(x_q, x_c'', x_i)U_c^B(x_c'') + \pi_i(x_q, x_c'', x_i)U_i^B - \kappa$$

$$= \pi_c(x_q, x_c'', x_i)U_c^B(x_c'') + \pi_i(x_q, x_c'', x_i)U_i^B - \kappa$$

$$= \pi_i(x_q, x_i)U_i^B - \kappa$$

(8)

We get that $P_B(x_c^* = x_c'') - P_B(x_c^* = \emptyset) = 0$ such that petitioners are indifferent between receiving no counter proposal and the counter proposal after which they do not withdraw the initiative. This is very intuitive since the counter proposal is close to the status quo.

Taking the difference between the payoffs yields $P_B(x_c^* = \bar{x}_c) - P_B(x_c^* = \emptyset) = \frac{1}{2}(x_i - \bar{x}_c)(x_i - x_q) + \pi(x_q, \bar{x}_c)U_c^B(\bar{x}_c) + \kappa > 0$. Therefore, petitioners are better off if they receive the cutoff counter proposal than if they do not receive a counter proposal. Though the cutoff counter proposal yields lower utility than the initiative, it has a considerably higher winning probability. ■
B Data Appendix

The data source for the main variables is the Swiss Federal Archive which collects the Federal Announcements issued by the Swiss Federal Chancellery. All information is available online from the home pages of the Swiss Federal Chancellery and the Swiss Federal Archive. The data can be accessed on the following home pages: for an overview with links to federal announcement of more recent initiatives http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/pore/vi/vis_2_2_5_1.html (Swiss Federal Chancellery), and for all federal announcements http://www.amtsdruckschriften.bar.admin.ch/showHierarchyContent.do (Swiss Federal Archive). Some of the data we collected have been assembled independently by swissvotes.ch (a project of the Institute of Political Science at the University of Bern, Switzerland, and the Année Politique Suisse). However, their database only comprises information on initiatives that have been voted on, and the most recent initiatives are not included. For validation of our data collection, we have compared our data with this dataset.

For the identity of the initiative committee, we rely on data provided by the Swiss Federal Chancellery (2013), and on complementary information in Hofer (2012). The Swiss Federal Chancellery (2013) recorded some petitioners as committees formed especially for the purpose of raising the initiative, so called “ad-hoc-committees”. With additional context information in Hofer (2012), we are able to allocate 5 of these committees to the groups behind them. If the composition of the committee remains unclear, these committees are coded as inexperienced and not powerful. A detailed overview of all variables, their sources and short descriptions is given in Table 5.
Table 5: Overview of Variables and Data Sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Source(s)</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Counter proposal</td>
<td>Swiss Federal Chancellery (2013)</td>
<td>Dummy variable whether any formal counter proposal was made</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct counter proposal</td>
<td>Swiss Federal Chancellery (2013)</td>
<td>Dummy variable whether formal direct counter proposal was made</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirect counter proposal</td>
<td>Swiss Federal Chancellery (2013)</td>
<td>Dummy variable whether formal indirect counter proposal was made</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De facto counter proposal</td>
<td>Hofer (2012)</td>
<td>Dummy variable whether informal, related policy compromise was made</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time points related to initiative</td>
<td>Swiss Federal Chancellery (2013)</td>
<td>All time points of initiative process (begin of collection, submission, eventual withdrawal or official statement of non-qualification, voting day, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voting combinations</td>
<td>Swiss Federal Chancellery (2013)</td>
<td>Indicates which proposals were voted on, and what the final voting outcome was</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of (valid and invalid) signatures</td>
<td>Swiss Federal Chancellery (2013)</td>
<td>Number of signatures collected for all initiatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Form of initiative</td>
<td>Swiss Federal Chancellery (2013)</td>
<td>Indicates whether initiative was a general suggestion or a formulated constitutional article</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initiative committee</td>
<td>Swiss Federal Chancellery (2013), Hofer (2012), Rohner (2012)</td>
<td>Type, experience and power of initiative committee</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: This table provides an overview of the variables used in the empirical part with a short variable description, and the source from which it was retrieved.
C Coding of Time Periods for Initiatives

The allocation of initiatives into time periods takes into account the timing of the institutional changes and the relevant time points in the initiative process of each initiative.

1. Period 1 starts with the introduction of the popular initiative in 1891.

2. Period 2 begins when withdrawals of initiatives become a de-facto routine. The relevant time point is the time of withdrawal (30 October 1930) of the initiative that marks the beginning of more frequent withdrawals. All initiatives that passed the political discussion afterwards arguably face a different game setup. Fortunately, no initiatives were being dealt with at this point of time (the next initiative was only started in 1931 and all previous initiatives had already been voted upon).

3. Period 3 begins with the formal legalization of withdrawal clauses on 1 February 1951. The most relevant time point is the start of the signature collection (since legalized withdrawal clauses could be included in the initiative text). No initiatives were going through the signature collection process at this time, so coding is straightforward.

4. Period 4 starts when women were enfranchised to vote and allowed to sign popular initiatives as well on 16 March 1971. Since the main effect on our model comes from the doubled population of potential signers, all initiatives that were still at the signature collection stage at this point of time would have been affected by the change. By coincidence, there were again no initiatives at collection stage at this point in time, so there are no initiatives that were only partly affected by the change, and the assignment into period 4 is clear.

5. Period 5 starts when the signature requirement was doubled (on 27 December 1977) and a maximum time period for signature collection was introduced (on 1 July 1978). The time limit of 18 months was only a binding for initiatives handed in 18 months after the new law was in force. Thus, the two reforms came into force shortly after each other, but were not effective from exactly the same date. There was only one initiative which already had to collect 100,000 signatures but did not face the limit of 18 months. However, there was a de-facto limit for this initiative as well, as the old regulation phased out at some point of time. The initiative took slightly more than two years to collect the signatures. 16 days after the signatures were handed in, the old regulation phased out definitely. Thus, there was a de-facto limit of 26 months collection time (instead of 18 months afterwards), whereas there was no time limit at all for earlier initiatives. For that reason and because the signature requirement was already enhanced, we code the initiative as obeying to the new regulation. Apart from this special case, coding is straightforward.

6. The last period 6 starts when the tie-breaking question between counter proposal and initiative was introduced by popular vote on 5 April 1987. The relevant time point for an initiative to be affected by the new regulation is its date of ballot.
D Comparative Statics

In this additional section, we conduct a comparative statics analysis regarding the cost of signature collection, collection requirement, maximum collection time, and an alternative voting rule including a tie-breaking question. Afterwards, we test the model predictions based on large institutional changes: the enfranchisement of women in 1971, a doubling of the signature requirement paired with a collection time restriction, and a change in the voting rules. By testing theoretical implications, we checked the model for empirical plausibility, making use of major institutional changes in Switzerland over time.

D.1 Institutional Changes

The Swiss constitutional initiative at federal level was first introduced in 1891. Five major institutional changes to the initiative process lead to six regulatory periods as outlined in Table 6.\footnote{Other, though minor institutional changes include the creation of the 26\textsuperscript{th} Swiss canton Jura separating from the canton Bern in 1978, the introduction of cantonal postal voting between 1978 and 2005, and the reduction of voting age from 20 to 18 in 1991.}

The “Early Period” (1891-1927) is marked by the lack of a formal clause that would have allowed petitioners to withdraw the initiative at any time. The first initiative was withdrawn in 1908, and it remained the only one until 1928.

The second period “De Facto Withdrawal” starts in 1928 when withdrawal of initiatives became more frequent after receiving a counter proposal, arguably out of political learning (Swiss Federal Chancellery, 2013). While this institutional change did not take place at a formally fixed date, the sudden start of withdrawals after 1928 is a clear change to the political game.

The “Formal Withdrawal” period 3 (1951-1970) begins in 1951 when initiative withdrawal was officially legalized conditional on all members of the initiative committee unanimously agreeing to withdraw (Hofer, 2012). This provision was relaxed in 1962 to two thirds of the committee, and further decreased to the absolute majority in 1978. We consider these adjustments in withdrawal rules as too small to define a new period.

The “Female Voting” period 4 (1971-1977) starts when women were enfranchised at federal level on 7 February 1971, giving them also further political rights like to sign initiative petitions.

Period 5 (1978-1986) begins when new “Collection Restrictions” were introduced as a consequence of female suffrage in 1978. First, the signature requirement was increased from 50,000 to 100,000 signatures. Second, a maximum of 18 months for signature collection was introduced (Hofer, 2012).

The sixth period “Tie-Break” (1987-2010) commences with a new voting rule for the case in which initiative and counter proposal are voted simultaneously. Before 1987 voters had to decide in favor of either the initiative or the counter proposal, or oppose both of them. Since April 1987 it is possible to vote in favor of both initiative and counter proposal. In a tie-breaking question, voters declare what alternative they prefer in case both proposals win a majority of votes.
Table 6: Overview of Main Institutional Changes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Subject of Reform</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Early Period</td>
<td>1891-1927</td>
<td>No legal provision regarding initiative withdrawal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 De Facto Withdrawal</td>
<td>1928-1951</td>
<td>De-facto introduction of initiative withdrawal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Formal Withdrawal</td>
<td>1951-1970</td>
<td>Official formalization of possibility to withdraw if petitioners agree unanimously (2/3 majority since 1962, absolute majority since 1978); parliament has 2 years to deal with initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Female Voting</td>
<td>1971-1977</td>
<td>Introduction of female voting and political rights like initiative signing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Collection Restrictions</td>
<td>1978 -1986</td>
<td>Signature requirement doubled to 100,000, collection time restricted to 18 months, mandatory withdrawal article, extension of parliamentary discussion period to 4 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Tie-Break</td>
<td>1987-2010</td>
<td>Introduction of tie-breaking question when both initiative and counter proposal are voted</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: This table gives an overview of the 6 institutional periods, the relevant years and a short description of the main institutional changes defining the period.

D.2 Equilibrium outcomes after institutional changes and hypotheses

Costs of Signature Collection

When signature collection costs decrease, qualifying an initiative becomes relatively more attractive. As a consequence the number of initiatives entering the qualification stage increases, and the mix of initiatives changes: the new initiatives have lower expected payoffs due to lower expected winning probabilities of the initiative. In expectation, decreasing collection costs thus increases the share of low type initiatives that are less likely to receive a counter proposal. From Hypothesis 1 (Status Quo) we know that a lower probability of counter proposal decreases the probability of reform. We should expect the status quo to win more often.

Hypothesis 3 (Signature Collection Costs) Lower signature collection costs $\gamma$ lead to an increase in the number of initiatives entering the qualification stage. In expectation, the share of low type initiatives increases. The probability of receiving a counter proposal and amending the status quo decreases.

Collection Time Restriction

In our model, collection time is not constrained. With a collection time restriction $t_{\text{max}} = T$ initiatives do not qualify if petitioners are unable to collect the signature requirement sufficiently quickly. In expectation, low types are slower collectors such that initiatives with low winning probabilities are less likely to qualify for ballot. Since the expected payoff from not qualifying an initiative is negative - the status quo remains and collection costs accrue - we should observe fewer low types entering the qualification stage, and some initiatives not qualifying even though they begin collecting. This leads to a higher share of counter proposals and a higher probability of reform.
Hypothesis 4 (Collection Time Restriction) As a consequence of restricted collection time some initiatives do not qualify, the overall number of initiatives starting signature collection decreases. On average, the share of counter proposals increases, and reform becomes more likely.

Signature Requirement

A higher signature requirement forces petitioners to spend more time collecting signatures leading to higher collection costs. Petitioners with low expected payoffs might therefore choose not to begin with signature collection in the first place. In expectation the number of initiatives decreases and the share of high types increases. Intuitively, with a higher signature requirement politicians observe the signature collection process for a longer time and wait if a high lump sum is realized. Eventually, they are more certain about the initiative’s type. Since high types are more likely to receive a counter proposal, the share of initiatives with counter proposals increases, and reform becomes more likely.

Hypothesis 5 (Signature Requirement) Increasing the signature requirement $\bar{s}$ renders qualification more costly. On average fewer initiatives begin collection, the shares of initiatives receiving a counter proposal as well as the probability of amending the status quo increase.

The model predicts that both the increase in $\bar{s}$ and the time restriction lead to a reduction in the number of initiatives and to higher shares of high type initiatives, thus more counter proposals and more reforms. However, only the collection time restriction makes some initiatives not qualify.

Voting Rule: Tie-Breaking Question

When initiative and counter proposal are voted simultaneously and there is a tie-breaking question, voters have to make three choices: $x_q$ vs. $x_i$, $x_q$ vs. $x_c$, and $x_c$ vs. $x_i$ (tie-breaking question). If either initiative or counter proposal receives more than half of the votes against the status quo, it wins. In case both receive more than half of the votes versus the status quo, the tie-breaking vote of $x_c$ against $x_i$ is decisive. In all remaining cases the status quo wins.

The tie-breaking voting rule, introduced in 1987, implies different winning probabilities of the status quo and counter proposal in comparison to the baseline model in which all policy alternatives are voted simultaneously (cf. proof in the appendix).

Proposition 5 (Tie-Break) With a tie-breaking question, the counter proposal is more likely to win in a vote against both the status quo and the initiative than in the original setup. The status quo is less likely to win, and the initiative wins with the same probability as before.
Proof of Proposition 5 (Tie-Break)

Proof. Let a), b), c) and d) denote the four possible sincere preference rankings of voters where a) is \( x_q \succ x_c \succ x_i \), b) is \( x_c \succ x_q \succ x_i \), c) is \( x_c \succ x_i \succ x_q \), and d) is \( x_i \succ x_c \succ x_q \). Note that whoever prefers the initiative to the status quo also prefers the counter proposal to the status quo. However, the reverse is not always true (it is violated by preference ranking \( x_c \succ x_q \succ x_i \)).

The proof proceeds by checking who wins depending on what preference rankings have the majority of voters. First, if a) is in the majority (\( m \leq \frac{1}{2}(x_q + x_c) \)), then \( v_i(x_q, x_c, x_i) \geq \frac{1}{2} \) and the status quo wins. Second, if a) and b) have jointly the majority (\( m \in (\frac{1}{2}(x_q + x_c), \frac{1}{2}(x_q + x_i)) \)), then \( v_i(x_q, x_i) < \frac{1}{2} \) and \( v_i(x_q, x_c) > \frac{1}{2} \) s.t. the counter proposal wins. Third, if c) and d) jointly have the majority (\( m \in (\frac{1}{2}(x_q + x_i), \frac{1}{2}(x_c + x_i)) \)), then \( v_i(x_q, x_i) > \frac{1}{2} \), \( v_i(x_q, x_c) > \frac{1}{2} \), and \( v_i(x_c, x_i) > \frac{1}{2} \). I.e., the counter proposal wins in the tie-break. Last, if d) is in the majority (\( m > \frac{1}{2}(x_c + x_i) \)), then \( v_i(x_q, x_i) > \frac{1}{2} \), \( v_i(x_q, x_c) > \frac{1}{2} \), and \( v_i(x_c, x_i) > \frac{1}{2} \). I.e., the initiative wins in the tie-break. •

The main difference to the baseline model is that the counter proposal wins for all realizations of the median voter between the midpoints \( \frac{1}{2}(x_q + x_c) \) and \( \frac{1}{2}(x_c + x_i) \) (\( b \) was strictly smaller before) at the expense of the status quo. The petitioners’ payoff from receiving a counter proposal below the cutoff increases with its winning probability. By Proposition 1 (Equilibrium Petitioners), to make the petitioners indifferent between withdrawing and not withdrawing the initiative, at the cutoff, the cutoff counter proposal has to move closer to the initiative to yield a higher utility. However, the further away the cutoff counter proposal from the status quo, the smaller is its winning probability. We should thus expect lower winning probabilities of counter proposals after which the initiative is withdrawn.

In the new scheme, politicians’ expected payoffs change. Making the small counter proposal yields a higher payoff because of the counter proposal’s higher winning probability. Issuing the cutoff counter proposal leaves them worse off since due to smaller utility (cf. Lemma 1 in the Appendix). This decreases the reputation costs cutoff \( \bar{r} \) such that politicians more frequently make a choice between the small counter proposal and no counter proposal than before. Since their payoff from these counter proposals increases relatively to no counter proposal, politicians grant small counter proposals to initiatives with lower winning probabilities than previously. In contrast, an initiative must have a higher chance of winning to generate a counter proposal at the cutoff.

The petitioners’ preference ranking remains the same. But counter proposals at the cutoff yield higher payoffs. This increases the incentive to over-collect if no lump sum was received after collecting the required number of signatures. The equilibrium impact on the number of initiatives entering the qualification stage is ambiguous. While the chance of receiving a counter proposal is smaller, the more generous cutoff counter proposal leads to a higher expected payoff. The former suggests a decrease in the number of initiatives and low types, the latter an increase.

The next hypothesis summarizes the testable implications of the change in the voting mode.

Hypothesis 6 (Tie-Break) In a voting regime including a tie-breaking question between the initiative and the counter proposal, the counter proposal’s winning probability after which the initiative is not withdrawn increases while the winning probability of the status quo decreases (and reform
becomes more likely). If the initiative is withdrawn after the counter proposal, the probability of reform decreases.

D.3 Estimation and Data

To test Hypotheses 3 to 6 concerning signature collection costs, collection time restriction, signature requirement, and tie-breaking question, we use four institutional changes corresponding to different sets of model parameters. First, when women were enfranchised at federal level on 16 March 1971, they were also given the right to sign initiative petitions. As a consequence the pool of potential signers roughly doubled while leaving the signature requirement unchanged. Signature collection costs decreased discontinuously on that day.\(^26\) This allows us to test Hypothesis 3 (Signature Collection Costs) which predicts a decrease in the signature collection cost parameter \(\gamma\).

Two important institutional changes occurred almost simultaneously in 1978: collection time was restricted to 18 months from previously no time constraint, and the signature requirement was increased from 50,000 to 100,000 signatures. We use these major changes to the initiative process to test Hypotheses 4 (Collection Time Restriction) and 5 (Signature Requirement) respectively. The time restriction introduces a cap for the signature collection time at \(t_{\text{max}} = T\) to the model, and the raise in the signature requirement corresponds to an increase in \(\bar{s}\). Both institutional changes coincide and the two corresponding hypotheses are very similar. Consequently, the setup does not allow to disentangle both changes empirically, and we can only estimate the aggregate effect.

The fourth institutional change relates to the introduction of a tie-breaking question (Hypothesis 6 (Tie-Break)).

Institutional changes are not necessarily exogenous to the initiative process. The introduction of female voting rights, for example, not only reduced signature collection costs, but also changed the composition of the electorate. This can have two effects. First, it probably affects the kind of initiatives that are proposed. However, on average the initiative process takes 4.5 years such that this effect takes time to unfold. Second, voter preferences might be affected in general. The tie-breaking question was introduced by referendum vote. Potentially, it reflects a general change in the attitudes towards more give-and-take.\(^{27}\) Arguably the most likely exogenous change to the process was the increase in the signature requirement paired with the collection time restriction, since it was a belated adjustment to female franchise.

Each hypothesis makes predictions about the number of initiatives, the probability of receiving a counter proposal, and the probability of amending the status quo. We estimate the effect of above mentioned institutional changes on each of these outcomes. Let \(\text{change}_{ip}\) denote a binary variable taking value 1 after the institutional change, and 0 before the change. The first estimation equation

\(^{26}\)Even if directly after their enfranchisement women were supposedly politically less active than their male counterparts (cf. Lott and Kenny (1999) for some evidence from the USA), the change in the electorate was large enough to expect an impact on the initiative process.

\(^{27}\)Politically, the introduction of a tie-breaking question was already debated starting with the first simultaneous vote of initiative and counter proposal (Swiss Federal Chancellery, 2013).
regarding the number of initiatives per year with intercept $\alpha$ and error term $\epsilon_{ip}$ is:

$$\text{initiatives}_{ip} = \alpha + \beta \text{change}_{ip} + \epsilon_{ip}$$ (9)

We use two dummies for the profiles including counter proposals ($CP_w$) and ($CP_{nw}$) to estimate the effect of the institutional change on the probability to receive a counter proposal. All initiatives without counter proposals serve as the reference category.

$$CP_{ip} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{change}_{ip} + \epsilon_{ip}$$ (10)

The effect of institutional change on the probability of reform is estimated using the simple regression

$$\text{amended}_{ip} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{change}_{ip} + \epsilon_{ip}$$ (11)

We use the same data of qualified initiatives as in the main paper. Additionally, for 77 not qualified initiatives we collected the titles, the dates of the beginning of signature collection and the date when non-qualification was officially communicated (Swiss Federal Chancellery, 2013). For each year we then calculated the number of successfully submitted initiatives as well as the number of initiatives not qualified.

For all estimations, we limit the sample to initiatives in the two periods adjacent to the institutional change. This weakens the influence of time trends and minor institutional changes, however, it does not completely exclude them. The coefficients identify the average change in the dependent variable after the institutional change. To estimate a causal effect, we obviously lack an untreated control group. For robustness, we estimate versions with initiatives in smaller, symmetric bins around the institutional change at the price of reducing the number of observations. We also run regressions including linear and quadratic time trends.

Table 7 summarizes the hypotheses and relates them to their institutional periods.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Affected Variables</th>
<th>Change</th>
<th>Institutional Periods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Decrease signature collection costs $\gamma$</td>
<td>Female suffrage</td>
<td>3: Formal Withdrawal &amp; 4: Female Voting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Maximum collection time $T$</td>
<td>18 months cap</td>
<td>4: Female Suffrage &amp; 5: Collection Threshold</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Signature requirement $\bar{s}$</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>4: Female Suffrage &amp; 5: Collection Threshold</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Voting regime</td>
<td>Tie-breaking question</td>
<td>5: Collection Threshold &amp; 6: Tie-Break</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: This table relates the hypothesis and affected model parameter to the institutional change as well as the periods used for the estimation.
D.4 Results

Signature Collection Costs

Hypothesis 3 (Signature Collection Costs) predicts more initiatives when the costs of qualifying an initiative drop. Initiatives under lower qualifying costs are more likely to be of low type and thus have a smaller likelihood to receive counter proposals and to amend the status quo. We compare the institutional periods before and after female suffrage. We observe 35 initiatives in the “Formal Withdrawal” period between 1951 and 1970, and 26 in the “Female Voting” period between 1971 and 1977. Of these initiatives 1 and 4, respectively, were withdrawn without receiving a counter proposal (profile \((nCPw)\)).

Regression results are in Table 8. After female suffrage, the yearly number of initiatives submitted and qualified increases significantly by 2.4 (column 1), corresponding to more than a 100% increase in the yearly number of initiatives. The probability to receive a counter proposal which is satisfactory enough to make the initiative withdraw drops significantly by 40.1 percentage points. However, there is no significant change with respect to the share of counter proposals without withdrawal. The coefficient only turns significantly negative once we control for time trends. After the institutional change the probability of amending the status quo is significantly reduced by 36.3 percentage points (column 4). In accordance with our model, this reflects the increased share of low type initiatives receiving fewer counter proposals and consequently being less likely to lead to reform. Reducing the number of years around the institutional change to eight, the coefficients of the probability to receive counter proposals turn insignificant due to considerably fewer observations (all results on request.)

Table 8: Signature Collection Costs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dep. var.</th>
<th>(1) initiatives p.a.</th>
<th>(2) ((CPw))</th>
<th>(3) ((CPnw))</th>
<th>(4) amended</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Change</td>
<td>2.350***</td>
<td>-0.401***</td>
<td>0.060</td>
<td>-0.363***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.798)</td>
<td>-0.093</td>
<td>-0.133</td>
<td>-0.101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.235</td>
<td>0.147</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Results from ordinary least squares regressions (1). Probit regressions, marginal effects reported, pseudo R² (2-4). Standard errors in brackets. Dependent variables in first row: *initiatives p.a.* are the average number of initiatives per year in an institutional period. \((CPw)\) and \((CPnw)\) are dummies for the respective profile, amended is one if the status quo was amended. Estimates are based on observations from periods “Formal Withdrawal” and “Female Voting”. Observations from profile \((CPnw)\) are dropped in column 2, from profile \((CPw)\) in column 3, and from profile \((nCPw)\) in column 4.
Collection Time Constraint and Signature Requirement

Hypotheses 4 (Collection Time Restriction) and 5 (Signature Requirement) predict that some initiatives are unsuccessful in qualifying the initiative, such that the share of high types receiving counter proposals and changing the status quo increases.

We focus on the periods “Female Voting” and “Collection Restrictions” adjacent to the change. During the period “Female Voting” (1971-1977) there are 26 qualified initiatives, and 23 in the following period “Collection Restrictions” (1978-1986). In total, there were 4 initiatives withdrawn without counter proposal before the change, and 2 thereafter (profile $nCPw$).

Regression results are in Table 9. The first prominent change in outcomes is that 11 initiatives (or 0.8 initiatives annually) did not qualify for ballot in the period after the institutional changes in 1978 due to not collecting enough signatures within the restricted time. In contrast, between 1891 and 1978 only two initiatives did not qualify for ballot.\(^{28}\) The number of annually qualified initiatives remains unchanged (columns 1 and 2).

The probability of receiving counter proposals ($CPw$) and ($CPnw$) increases. However, only the former is significant at conventional levels (column 3 and 4). There is a significant increase in the probability of amending the status quo by almost 30 percentage points (column 5) after the institutional changes. When accounting for time trends and initiatives closer to the institutional

\[\begin{array}{cccccc}
\text{Dep. var.} & \text{qualified} & \text{not qualified} & \text{(CPw)} & \text{(CPnw)} & \text{amended} \\
\text{Change} & 0.200 & 0.800** & 0.234* & 0.093 & 0.280** \\
& (1.257) & (0.338) & (0.121) & (0.138) & (0.116) \\
R^2 & -0.108 & 0.316 & 0.070 & 0.010 & 0.080 \\
Observations & 11 & 11 & 39 & 39 & 43 \\
\end{array}\]

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Results from ordinary least squares regressions (1-2). Probit regressions, marginal effects reported, pseudo R\(^2\) (3-5). Standard errors in brackets. Dependent variables in first row: (not)qualified p.a. are the average yearly number of initiatives (not) qualified. ($CPw$) and ($CPnw$) are dummies for the respective profile, amended is one if the status quo was amended. Estimates are based on observations from periods “Female Voting” and “Collection Restrictions”. Observations from profile ($CPnw$) are dropped in column 3, from profile ($CPw$) in column 4, and from profile ($nCPw$) in column 5.

\(^{28}\)These two cases occurred in 1894 (“Initiative for free healthcare and a monopoly on tobacco”, which did not qualify because it collected too few signatures) and in 1922 (“Initiative for a reform of the federal administration, including federal railways” - this initiative did not qualify because of too many invalid signatures). Cf. Hofer (2012) for details.
change, only the change in not qualified initiatives remains significant.

The data generally support Hypothesis 4 (Collection Time Restriction) regarding the number of initiatives and the probability of reform. However, we find only weak evidence for an increase in the probability of receiving counter proposals. Time trends seem to be important for the sampling period. This might be due to concurrent shifts in politics that are not accounted for in the model, or the strong population growth between 1971 and 1978 which further lowered the signature collection costs (Wili, 1982).

Voting Rule: Tie-Breaking Question

As the last institutional change we analyze the impact of a tie-breaking question. Hypothesis 6 (Tie-Break) states that more counter proposals without initiative withdrawal should be observed, and that such counter proposals should be more successful. The counter proposal’s winning probability with initiative withdrawal should decrease. We explore changes between the periods “Collection Restrictions” (1978-1986) and “Tie-Break” (1987-2010). The latter period is considerably longer than the other periods and has thus more observations (23 vs. 111 qualified, 11 vs. 67 not qualified). Of all initiatives, 2 and 12 belong to profile (nCPw) respectively.

Results are shown in Table 10. On average the number of initiatives increased. Approximately two more initiatives per year did not qualify after 1987 than in the previous period. In the model, the increase corresponds to a rise in the share of low type initiatives trying to qualify for ballot but not succeeding. The number of qualified initiatives remained roughly constant, suggesting no

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dep. var.</th>
<th>(1) qualified p.a.</th>
<th>(2) not qualified p.a.</th>
<th>(3) (CPw)</th>
<th>(4) (CPnw)</th>
<th>(5) amended</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Change</td>
<td>0.120 (1.277)</td>
<td>2.040** (0.879)</td>
<td>-0.195** (0.080)</td>
<td>-0.163** (0.067)</td>
<td>-0.202** (0.097)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>-0.035</td>
<td>0.131</td>
<td>0.045</td>
<td>0.068</td>
<td>0.027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Results from ordinary least squares regressions (1-2). Probit regressions, marginal effects reported, pseudo R² (3-5). Standard errors in brackets. Dependent variables in first row: (not)qualified p.a. are the average yearly number of initiatives (not) qualified. (CPw) and (CPnw) are dummies for the respective profile, amended is one if the status quo was amended. Estimates are based on observations from periods “Collection Restrictions” and “Tie-Break”. Observations from profile (CPnw) are dropped in column 3, from profile (CPw) in column 4, and from profile (nCPw) in column 5.
The frequency of counter proposals decreases strongly and significantly after the institutional change. The share of counter proposals after which initiatives are withdrawn (\(CPw\)) drops significantly by 19.5 percentage points (column 3). This is in line with the reduction in the politicians' expected payoff from cutoff counter proposals, and shift in preferences towards not making counter proposals.

The probability of observing initiatives with profile (\(CPnw\)) decreases significantly by 16.3 percentage points (column 4). The coefficient is less significant when accounting for de facto counter proposals and a quadratic time trend. It turns insignificant when we control for a linear time trend. When using a symmetric number of years around the change, the effect is significant for 9 and 8 years, but insignificant for 7 years. This result does not align with the model prediction that we should observe more such counter proposals.

The probability of amending the status quo decreases significantly by 20.2 percentage points (column 5). After profile (\(CPw\)) the status quo is significantly less likely to be amended by 37.2 percentage points (column 6). However, F-tests of profile dummies, periods and their interactions are jointly significant for both kinds of counter proposals.

Conducting t-test of winning probabilities of both types of counter proposals separately, we find no significant change in winning probabilities.
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