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Modernization and Islamist Conflict

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Modernization and Islamist Conflict

Abstract

This contribution studies the impact of modernization on the onset of Islamist conflict. To capture the multi-dimensional phenomenon of modernization, we create a unique modernization index. Our empirical analysis for 154 countries for the 1971-2006 period provides robust evidence that modernization—rather than economic underdevelopment or a lack of democracy—increases the likelihood of the onset of Islamist conflict. This relationship especially matters to Islamist groups that aim at a regime change, i.e., the establishment of an Islamic state, while separatist groups seem to be more strongly affected by minority discrimination. We argue that from a rational-economic point of view the adverse effects of modernization lower the opportunity costs of conflict and raise its benefits. Additionally, an Islamist framing of modernization grievances affects the cost-benefit considerations of potential Islamist militants in ways that make violence even more likely (e.g., by offering spiritual rewards). An Islamist interpretation of modernization grievances furthermore provides Islamist militants with a political objective (the establishment of an Islamic state) to remedy the perceived ills of modernization.

Keywords: Islamism, modernization, conflict, globalization

Word Count: 10,377

1. Introduction

In defiance of recent counter-terrorism successes (e.g., the killing of Osama bin Laden in 2011), militant Islamism is still very much alive. For instance, recent years saw new Islamist groups surfacing in Syria (*Al-Nusra Front to Protect the Levant*) and Mali (*Ansar Dine*) as well as the further rise of groups such as *Boko Haram* in Nigeria and the *Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant* in Syria and Iraq. In fact, as shown in Figure 1, the emergence of new Islamist groups has become gradually more likely over time, consistent with the notion of a new wave of Islamist violence that has replaced left-wing militancy associated with the Cold War. Here, armed Islamist campaigns do not only threaten domestic security but may also spill-over to foreign countries (e.g., the 2015 attack by members of the Yemeni group *Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula* on the French satirical weekly newspaper *Charlie Hebdo* in Paris). In addition to jeopardizing security, militant Islamism may also impair economic development. For example, when affected countries—as is common in the heartlands of militant Islamism, the Middle East and parts of Africa and Asia—suffer from low levels of economic robustness, they are likely to experience reduced economic performance as a consequence of militant activity (Meierrieks and Gries, 2013).

—Figure 1 here—

Given the scale of the recent wave of Islamist violence and its associated negative implications for (domestic and international) security and social stability (e.g., in terms of economic development), it is important to know more about the roots of Islamist violence. Here, conflicting explanations relate its emergence to a variety of economic, political and social causes such as (i) political underdevelopment, i.e., authoritarianism exercised in artificial, post-colonial and thus weak states, (ii) socio-economic underdevelopment (e.g., in the form of unemployment and housing and public health problems), (iii) perceived threats to Islamic identity emerging through globalization and Western politico-cultural influence and (iv) foreign policies perceived as hostile to the Islamic world, especially in relation to the Arab-Israeli conflict and American military presence on the Arabian peninsula (Kepel, 1985, 2002; Tibi, 1998; Hafez, 2003; Juergensmeyer, 2006; for a summary of some of these arguments, see Freeman, 2008).

The existing case-study and cross-national empirical evidence indeed suggests that political repression, state fragility and political instability, ethnic and sectarian conflict, economic

grievances (e.g., poor economic growth, lack of social services) and foreign policy issues (e.g., the U.S. occupation of Iraq) matter to political violence (i.e., terrorism and civil wars) that involves Islamist groups or takes place in the heartlands of Islam (e.g., Testas, 2002, 2004; Sørli et al., 2005; Piazza, 2007, 2009; Fielding and Shortland, 2010).

We add to this body of research by focusing on another source of Islamist militancy, its opposition to *modernization* and the (perceived) failures modernization produces. In empirical research, the impact of modernization on Islamist violence as so far been almost completely neglected. However, in the Islamist mindset hostility towards modernization is essential. For one, modernization is considered to be a root cause of the social ills (e.g., poor living conditions, the collapse of the traditional social order) that trouble the Islamic world, giving rise to grievances that motivate Islamist violence. As put by Lewis (1990: 59):

“The [Islamist] war against modernity [...] is directed against the whole process of change that has taken place in the Islamic world in the past century or more and has transformed the political, economic, social, and even cultural structures of Muslim countries. Islamic fundamentalism has given an aim and a form to the otherwise aimless and formless resentment and anger of the Muslim masses at the forces that have devalued their traditional values and loyalties and, in the final analysis, robbed them of their beliefs, their aspirations, their dignity, and to an increasing extent even their livelihood.”

For another, modernization—perceived to be propagated by alien forces, i.e., the West and most importantly the United States—is the very antithesis to the “ideal” social ordering as envisioned by radical Islamist thinkers, i.e., an Islamic state guided by Sharia law. As such, there is not only a material but also a spiritual dimension to Islamist opposition to modernization. Indeed, anti-modernity sentiment has been common among influential radical Islamist thinkers. For instance, Sayyid Qutb¹ considered

¹ Qutb (1906-1966) was an Egyptian author and Islamic theorist. He is considered to be one of the key figures in the genesis of modern militant Islamism, having directly inspired, amongst many others, Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri. Tibi (1998: 56) argues that Qutb’s works “[...] can be compared, in terms of spread and influence, with the Communist Manifesto”.

“[...] modernity [as] the cause of the deadly disease that has befallen the West and is now turning to infect Islam. For this reason [Qutb] was at pains to replace modernity with an unrestrained theocentrism [...] [advocating a] violent understanding of jihad to empower an 'Islamic world revolution' based on religious legitimacy and the use of force in the form of irregular war.” (Tibi, 1998: 56-58)

Given this discussion, in this contribution we study in more detail how modernization may shape the emergence of Islamist conflict. Here, we translate the material and spiritual repercussion of modernization as felt by Islamist thinkers and militants into an *economic model of Islamist conflict* in which—as we shall discuss below in more detail—higher levels of modernization stimulate the onset of Islamist conflict by reducing the costs of waging religiously motivated warfare, limiting the benefits from non-violent religious activity and reducing the opportunity costs of Islamist conflict. To empirically test this hypothesis and adequately consider the various economic, cultural and social dimensions of modernization (e.g., associated with globalization, capitalism, women empowerment, urbanization), we create an *index of modernization* for 154 countries for the 1971-2006 period. To preview our main result, we show that higher levels of modernization are indeed associated with a higher likelihood of Islamist conflict onset, especially for Islamist groups that pursue the goal of a regime change. We are also able to show that the multidimensional phenomenon of modernization—as indicated by our index—has superior predictive power in our binary and multinomial regression models compared to variables that merely account for economic development (per capital income) or political institutions (democracy), suggesting that our approach does not simply capture the role of economic or political underdevelopment in conflict onset. This latter finding is also relevant to Western policymakers who want to contain the spill-over of Islamist conflict. Our findings suggest that rather than promoting economic development or democracy, a more viable policy option is to control and moderate the potentially inflammatory influences of modernization with respect to both modernity’s material and spiritual dimensions.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss in more detail the relationship between modernization and Islamist conflict. In Section 3 we introduce the data and

Qutb’s life and impact on the emergence of Islamist militancy is discussed in more detail in Kepel (1985), Tibi (1998) and Toth (2013).

empirical methodology to test our main research hypothesis that modernization contributes to the emergence of Islamist conflict. We discuss our empirical results in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.

2. Modernization and Islamist Conflict

Modernization refers, broadly speaking, to the (continuous) transition of societies from a “traditional” to a “modern” stage. Which variables and developments are important descriptors of “modernity” is, however, not definite. Influential economists, historians, political scientists and sociologists (e.g., Durkheim, Weber, Marx, Rostow, Myrdal, Lerner, Huntington, Lipset, Parsons; for an overview see Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005) have proposed various potential constituent elements of modernization. While it is well beyond the scope of this contribution to discuss these ideas in-depth, most important to our study is that modernization is best described as a *multi-dimensional phenomenon* that involves a series of (potentially interrelated) developments in a country’s *economic, politico-institutional, demographic, cultural and societal sphere*, suggesting that the following developments distinguish “traditional” from “modern” societies:

- Industrialization, i.e., an economic transformation that emphasizes the modern economic (industrial) sector over traditional agricultural production
- Urbanization and greater geographic mobility, usually coinciding with industrialization as the industrial sector tends to be more urban
- Capitalist development, i.e., an economic system more strongly based on markets and anonymous transactions than networks and personal exchanges
- Globalization, i.e., an increased cross-border movement of goods, capital, services but also of ideas and culture
- Greater importance of science, technology and rational thought (rationalization) vis-a-vis traditional values, habits and methods of decision-making; e.g., this implies a stronger emphasis of universalist/liberal values (individualism, equality, tolerance etc.) over traditional values that may be strongly influenced by religion

As we shall discuss below in more detail, we argue that these modernization phenomena create “modernization losses”, i.e., material and spiritual strain. With respect to violent Islamism, for some segments of society (the “modernization losers”) these losses increase the appeal of

radical/militant Islamist ideologies (e.g., Qutbism, Salafism, Wahabism, Islamist separatism) which based on Islamic teachings argue to provide answers to the social ills ostensibly created by modernization. Ultimately, followers of militant Islamist ideologies may turn to violence to reach their objectives, providing a causal mechanism through which a higher level of modernization (via the creation of grievances) ought to increase the likelihood of Islamist conflict. This implies an economic model of Islamist conflict, where the decision (of self-interested, utility-maximizing individuals) to engage in (Islamist) violence is guided by the (opportunity) costs, benefits, risks and constraints associated with violent behavior.² That is, we argue that militant Islamism—just as other forms of ideologies that underlie violent movements—is motivated by *identifiable grievances* and, ultimately, associated with *concrete political aims*.

Religion matters to such an economic modeling of conflict in two ways. First, it frames the conflict, e.g., by providing religious interpretations of and answers to real grievances. Second, it warps the cost-benefit considerations of potential religious militants, e.g., by offering additional spiritual rewards that may make the use of violence more likely. These ideas are also put forward by Juergensmeyer (2006: 141-142):

“In looking at the variety of cases [of religiously-motivated conflict] [...], it is clear to me that in most cases there were real grievances: economic and social tensions experienced by large numbers of people. These grievances were not religious. [...] But in this present moment of late modernity, these secular concerns have been expressed through rebellious religious ideologies [...], articulated in religious terms and seen through religious images, and the protest against them is organized by religious leaders through the medium or religious institutions. [...] What is problematic about the religious expression of antimodernism [...] is that it brings new aspects to conflicts that were otherwise not part of them [...] It provides personal rewards—for example, religious merit, redemption, or the promise of heavenly luxuries—[...], it gives legitimacy of moral justification for

² Economic models of conflict are commonly used to explain the emergence of political violence, most prominently civil wars (e.g., Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Blattman and Miguel, 2010) and terrorism (e.g., Sandler and Enders, 2004; Schneider et al., 2015).

political encounter [...] [and] it provides justification for violence that challenges the state's monopoly on morally sanctioned killing.”

Indeed, violent Islamist opposition to modernization is religiously framed. Central to this opposition is the Islamist idea of *jahiliyya*, a Qur'an term which can be translated as “ignorance”, “paganism” or “barbarism” (Kepel, 1985: 44). In the radical Islamist interpretation, a *jahiliyya* society is a modern-day society that does not conform to Islamic governance and law and consequently threatens the "pure" Islamic world (e.g., Kepel, 1985).³ Importantly, the state of *jahiliyya* is almost synonymous with modernization and its consequences. As stressed by Toth (2013: 125):

"Jahiliyya is the vile, detestable world that includes both Western secularism and the local Muslim community permeated by Western influence [...] Jahiliyya stands for everything barbaric and evil: secularism, narcissism, charismatic personality cults, democratic legislatures, knowledge (epistemology), tyranny, free (unrestricted) capitalist markets, usury, family disintegration, immorality [...] It is hard to avoid the conclusion [...] that almost everything modern [...] defines jahiliyya. Similarly, everything in the Muslim world that is tainted by Westernization or modernization is also jahiliyya and must be purified."

There is thus a theological argument against modernization and in favor of anti-modernization *jihad* “in its totality, from the personal effort to contemplate the Book to combat arms-in-hand” (Kepel, 1985: 54). In the radical Islamist mind, the social ills and grievances of modernization are translated into religious terms (*jahiliyya*) and a religious answer to them is provided (the creation of a “true” Islamic society), with violence against Westerners but also Muslims who are

³ Traditionally, *jahiliyya* only refers to the "days of ignorance" spent by the Arab population in the times before the revelation of the Quran to Muhammad (i.e., before 609 CE). For the radical Islamists (like Qutb), *jahiliyya* is a trans-historical concept that also refers to modern-day apostate societies that are Communist or Western as well as "the societies that proclaim themselves Muslim" (Qutb, in Kepel, 1985: 47) but do not completely abide to Islamic governance and law.

“infected” by jahiliyya being permitted on religious grounds as these groups prevent “the establishment of the ‘reign of God on earth’” (Kepel, 1985: 55).

In a rational-economic model of (religious) conflict, this religious framing of anti-modernization violence, on the one hand, lowers the costs of conflict. For instance, it lowers mobilization costs as militant groups may capitalize on a large pool of believers and existing religious networks. It also provides a moral-religious justification to harm others or to sacrifice oneself for the cause, which also ought to enter the calculus of Islamist militants. For another, an Islamist framing of anti-modernization violence is expected to increase the benefits of such conflict. In case of success, there are high—potentially infinite—spiritual rewards on earth and in paradise; in case of non-success, radical militants can still expect to reap heavenly rewards (martyrdom). These spiritual benefits ought to matter to a militant’s calculus, too, making violence more attractive.⁴

Even though religious incentives may influence the calculus of militant Islamists, the impact of real grievances remains crucial. As stressed by, e.g., Juergensmeyer (2006), these *material grievances* are usually also at the heart of religiously-charged conflicts.⁵ Considering the nexus between modernization and Islamist conflict, these material losses are expected to matter to those parts of the population that lose due to modernization and may consequently choose violence to counter this.

For one, the adverse effects of modernization are expected to be felt by the *traditional elites* that have benefitted from pre-modern conditions. Broadly speaking, these elites lose power, influence and wealth (economic rents) due to modernization, meaning lower opportunity costs of conflict

⁴ As argued by Juergensmeyer (2006), comparable rewards cannot be offered by secular (e.g., nationalist) militants.

⁵ This observation is also consistent with the notion that many Islamist fighters lack a sound theological-religious education. One example is the 2013 case where two would-be fighters purchased the books *Islam for Dummies* and *The Koran for Dummies* before leaving the United Kingdom to join the ranks of for the *Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant* (<http://tinyurl.com/nfa8lbz>). A general lack of religious literacy ought to make it more likely that the average Islamist militant is driven by this-worldly grievances rather than complex religious thoughts.

and higher conflict benefits, i.e., incentives to instigate a conflict so as to counter modernization and return to the traditional status quo. For instance, Mousseau (2002-2003) argues that the advent of capitalism (i.e., the carrying out of economic transactions via markets) supplants traditional modes of economic exchange that rely on personal contacts and networks. These traditional modes of exchanges, however, have produced economic rents for the traditional elites; for instance, members of the elite (e.g., chiefs of tribal clans) may have collected dues for arranging economic transactions (Mousseau, 2002-2003). The loss of such rents then creates an incentive to resort to (Islamist) violence to restore them. As another example for adverse modernization effects for the elite, modernization is also characterized by urbanization, which can be expected to coincide with a loss of economic influence of rural elites (i.e., land owners) that have drawn their power from dominating agricultural production and low labor mobility depressing wages. This may stimulate the onset of conflict instigated by the rural elite that aims at recovering its socio-economic position in society. As a final example, Cronin (2003) stresses that globalization—another dimension of modernization—is accompanied by the inflow of modern ideas and values (e.g., consumerism, materialism, religious freedom, women’s rights) that are expected to antagonize traditional cultures and the religious-cultural elites presiding over them. For these elites, threats to their religious-cultural hegemony may also mean a loss of political influence (and associated economic rents), resulting in lower opportunity costs of conflict and a stronger incentive to resort to violence and religious imagery to counter the modernization process.

For another, modernization is also likely to negatively affect the life of lower segments of Islamist societies. Consequently, these lower segments may provide an Islamist rebellion with *foot soldiers* or other forms of (indirect) *popular support* (e.g., small donations, sanctuary). In an economic sense, the socio-economic strain (unemployment, inequality, poverty etc.) these lower segments associate with modernization lowers their opportunity costs of conflict (meaning they have less to lose), while simultaneously increasing the benefits of participating in or supporting a conflict that aims at returning to pre-modernization conditions. For example, Mousseau (2011) finds that support for Islamist violence correlates with urban poverty. That is, the urban poor—a class created by modernization, i.e., economic transformation and urbanization—may support or even join militant Islamist groups because such groups seem to offer ways to overcome economic insecurity. Stiglitz (2005) also notes that globalization—another dimension of

modernization—may produce adverse economic effects (e.g., poverty, socio-economic insecurity, unemployment), e.g., due to increased foreign competition, technological change or economic transformation. Such socio-economic grievances, on the one hand, reduce the opportunity costs of violence and, on the other hand, provide incentives (i.e., potential conflict benefits) to start a conflict. Here, radical Islamism “provides an alternative ideology that makes sense of the failures of modernization and provides the believer with the tools to restore social and economic stability” (Freeman, 2008: 50).

In sum, there are two dimensions to the nexus between modernization and the emergence of Islamist conflict, both of which can be represented in a rational-economic cost-benefit model. First, modernization creates real grievances. For the “modernization losers” modernization lowers the opportunity costs of conflict (due to losses in wealth, power, influence etc.), while at the same time incentivizing conflict (i.e., making it more attractive to start a conflict to recoup losses and restore pre-modern conditions). Second, religion (i.e., Islamist thought) frames—i.e., gives meaning to—the economic, cultural and social grievances that result from modernization and offers alternatives (i.e., political objectives) to it. Importantly, this is expected to amplify conflict due to further effects on militants' cost-benefits matrix, e.g., by offering additional (religious-spiritual) benefits from conflict rooted in anti-modernism.⁶ Thus, both material grievances and religious considerations are anticipated to sway the cost-benefit considerations in ways that ought to make Islamist conflict more likely (i.e., less costly with respect to conflict's direct and opportunity costs and more promising with respect to its benefits). This leads to our main hypothesis:

⁶ Interestingly, their opposition to modernization does not keep Islamist fundamentalists from using the products of scientific and technological innovation (e.g., modern weapons or means of communication), as long as this use does not corrupt “Islamic purity” by infusing the Islamic world with jahiliyya. As put by Tibi (1998:74):

“Muslim fundamentalists very much favor the adoption of modern science and technology by contemporary Islam. But they restrict what may be adopted to selected instruments, that is, to the products of science and technology, while fiercely rebuffing the rational worldview that made those achievements possible.”

Hypothesis: A higher level of modernization is associated with a higher likelihood of Islamist conflict onset.

3. Data and Methodology

We compile data on Islamist conflict, indicators measuring various dimensions of modernization and further control variables for 154 countries for the 1971-2006 period. We use this data to empirically compare those country-year observations that saw Islamist violence to those country-year observations that were conflict-free in order to assess whether modernization indeed contributes to Islamist militancy. The summary statistics are reported in Table 1. A country list is given in the appendix.

—Table 1 here—

3.1 Dependent Variables

The data to construct our dependent variables is drawn from Jones and Libicki (2008). They provide a list of over 600 groups that were involved in armed conflicts (i.e., terrorist campaigns and/or civil wars) between 1971 and 2006. Other forms of political violence, e.g., unorganized Islamist violence (e.g., in the form of riots, intercommunal violence or “lone wolf” terrorist activity) as well as activity by political movements that do not resort to violence (such as the Islamist-leaning Turkish *Justice and Development Party*) are not considered.

To isolate those groups relevant to our study (i.e., Islamist groups), we proceed as follows. First, we identify groups with Islamist agendas, using information from the *START Terrorist Organization Profiles*⁷ and other auxiliary sources (web pages, lexica etc.). We include separatist groups when Islamism plays a key role in their armed struggle such as in Russia, Thailand and the Philippines, while we exclude separatist groups operating in Islamic countries when these groups have secular agendas (such as the Turkish *PKK*). During this coding process, we also exclude a number of groups from the Jones/Libicki list to avoid double-counting; for instance, we do not include groups that only serve as front groups or armed wings of already existing organizations (e.g., the *Popular Resistance Committees* and its armed wing, the *Salah al-Din Battalions*, are listed as separate groups in the Jones/Libicki list). Finally, we use the

⁷ http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data_collections/tops/.

Jones/Libicki datasets and further auxiliary sources to determine the year of conflict onset and the country of origin of the Islamist groups we previously classified.⁸ In total, we were able to identify 117 episodes of Islamist armed struggle in over 30 countries located in the Islamic world, but also in Europe, the Americas, Asia and Africa.⁹

From this dataset we construct two dependent variables. The first variable measures the *onset of Islamist conflict*. The variable is coded 1 when there is a conflict onset and 0 otherwise. The second variable we construct is a more refined variation of the first. This variable considers the onset of Islamist conflict, while also differentiating between the *specific goals* Islamist groups pursue. Indeed, as shown in Table 2, Islamist groups tend to differ with respect to their political objectives, with most Islamist groups either aiming for *territorial change* (i.e., separatist groups) or a *regime change* (i.e., the creation of an Islamic state that may potentially transcend national borders). There are also groups that aim for social domination (e.g., by oppressing other Islamic sects) or specific (limited) policy goals (e.g., a change in foreign policy or anti-drug activism). We use the information provided by Jones and Libicki (2008) to code the goals of the terrorist and insurgent groups in our dataset accordingly.¹⁰ Taking into account the goals armed Islamist groups ought to provide a richer picture of how modernization affects the onset of Islamist conflict. In particular, we may see that separatist groups are less strongly influenced by modernization than regime change groups, given that the latter are more likely to operate in

⁸ Sometimes, the Jones/Libicki dataset suggests that a group is active in more than one country. In such cases, we assign the group to its main host country. For instance, in the Jones/Libicki dataset the *Tunisian Combatant Group (Jama'a Combattante Tunisienne)* is found to have been active in Tunisia, Afghanistan and Western Europe. Using auxiliary sources, we were able to assign the conflict onset associated with this group to Tunisia.

⁹ A full list of these Islamist campaigns is available upon request.

¹⁰ Jones and Libicki (2008) differentiate between six goals of armed groups: “regime change”, “territorial change”, “policy change”, “empire”, “social revolution” and “status quo”. While we adopt their “territorial change” classification, we combine the “regime change” and “empire” groups into one category (labeled “regime change”) and the “policy change” and “status quo” into another category (labeled “other goal”). There are no Islamist groups aiming for a “social revolution”.

Islamic majority countries where the creation of an Islamic state that relies on Islamic governance (e.g., by adapting Sharia law) is a viable political option.

—Table 2 here—

3.2 Measuring Modernization

As previously emphasized, we consider modernization to be a phenomenon that has economic, demographic, politico-institutional and cultural dimensions. To account for this multi-dimensionality, we apply *principal component analysis* (Jolliffe, 2002) to create a new *modernization index*. As argued by Jolliffe (2002), principal component analysis is used to reduce the dimensionality of a dataset with a large number of interrelated variables (accounting for various dimensions of modernization), while retaining as much information and variation as possible. This reduction is achieved by creating a new set of variables (principal components), where the computation of the components “reduces to the solution of an eigenvalue-eigenvector problem for a positive-semidefinite symmetric matrix” (Jolliffe, 2002: ix) and where first principal component contains most of the variation present in the original variables.

To create the index, we collect data on cultural globalization, political globalization, energy consumption, per capita life insurance contracts (as an indicator of capitalist development; see Mousseau, 2012 for a discussion), women fertility rates and urbanization. The definition and data sources of all variables is given in Table 3.¹¹

The results of the principal component analysis are also given in Table 3. Here, the first extracted component already accounts for almost 70 per cent of the variation in the original six modernization indicators. This component is positively associated with political and cultural globalization, energy consumption, capitalist development and urbanization and negatively associated with women fertility rates. These associations are in line with what we expect from a

¹¹ We do not consider a domestic political modernization dimension (e.g., with respect to the development of democratic institutions). This is because the relationship between modernization and democratization appears to be rather weak (Przeworski and Limongi, 1997). We do, however, include control variables accounting for a country’s level of political development in our empirical analysis.

“modern” society. Consequently, we treat this first principal component as our composite modernization index and use it in our subsequent statistical analysis.

—Table 3 here—

Figure 2 plots our modernization index against a country’s level of economic development. First, this figure shows that Western countries (e.g., Belgium) exhibit the highest levels of modernization. This is consistent with the Islamist mindset that equates modernization with Westernization (e.g., Toth, 2013). Second, Figure 2 shows that many Islamic countries (e.g., Saudi Arabia) are less modern than their level of economic development would predict. Finally, the figure indicates that there is positive correlation between our modernization index and the level of economic development. To rule out that we only capture the effect of economic development on the onset of Islamist conflict, we therefore routinely substitute in our analysis our modernization index with a measure of national economic development (*per capita income*) and compare the results.

—Figure 2 here—

As shown in Figure 3, between 1971 and 2006 there was a clear trend towards higher levels of modernization as indicated by our modernization index, even though this trend was not always monotonically increasing. In sum, our observation period (1971-2006) thus saw higher levels of modernization and more Islamist militant activity (cf. Figure 1). This tentatively suggests that there may indeed be an association between modernization and the onset of Islamist violence.

—Figure 3 here—

3.3 Control Variables

3.3.1 Baseline Controls

To avoid detecting only spurious effects of modernization on Islamist conflict, we control for a variety of further factors. The operationalizations and data sources of all control variables are given in Table 1.

First, we consider the impact of *democracy*. Possibly, the onset of Islamist violence is less likely in democratic countries. A lack of political representation limits the means to achieve change

(e.g., religiously motivated legislation) non-violently, thus making conflict more likely by lowering its opportunity costs (e.g., Freeman, 2008).

Another variable we control for is *regime age*. A young regime is expected to invite conflict because, e.g., low regime age may coincide with state weakness and disorganization (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). These factors ought to lower the cost of conflict and raise the probability of insurgent success because of the comparatively lower strength of young regimes relative to the strength of potential insurgent groups.

Furthermore, we expect the likelihood of Islamist violence to increase with the overall potential for Islamist mobilization in terms of a country's *Muslim population share* and *population size*. For one, a larger Muslim population share ought to make it more likely (e.g., due to a larger pool of recruits and a wider audience) that Islamist violence occurs. For another, Islamist violence is expected to become increasingly more likely with population size. For instance, a positive relationship between population size and the occurrence of Islamist violence may be due to higher policing costs due to larger populations (which makes it more costly for the state to counter violence) or a larger pool of potential recruits and supporters.

Discrimination against Islamic minorities may also favor the onset of Islamist violence. Gurr (1993) argues that minority discrimination—i.e., deep grievances due to unequal treatment vis-à-vis the majority—may lead to political violence, presumably as the specific calculus of minorities makes violence a particularly attractive option (e.g., because non-violent opportunities are particularly sparse for minority group members). Besides producing grievances, Gurr (1993) also stresses that group size and a strong sense of community among a minority may further aid mobilization for political violence. For instance, the relative size and spatial concentration of Islamic minorities—e.g., in Southern Thailand, Western China and the urban centers of Western Europe—and their dissociation from the beliefs and culture of the majority may facilitate the emergence of militant Islamist groups. To measure discrimination, we use the Minorities at Risk Dataset (Minorities at Risk Project, 2009) which provides a list of all (relevant) minorities in the countries of our sample that are subject to discrimination. We use this list to create a (time-invariant) dummy variable indicating the presence of an Islamic minority that is discriminated against. For one, our variable measures politico-economic discrimination within Muslim majority countries, e.g., directed against Muslim sects (e.g., the Ahmadiyya in Pakistan) or

associated with the Sunni-Shia conflict (e.g., in Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan). On the other hand, the variable also captures the discrimination of Muslim minorities in non-Muslim majorities (e.g., in the Russian Caucasus).

3.3.2 Further Controls

We also amend our baseline model with additional control variables to further assess the robustness of our findings.¹² The operationalization and data sources are also given in Table 1. First, we account for the impact of *military dependence from the U.S.*, where we expect military dependence from the U.S. to facilitate the onset of Islamist violence. As argued by Freeman (2008), military support by the “far enemy” (the U.S.) for local apostate governments, the “near enemy” of Islamist groups, is likely to create feelings of humiliation and heteronomy. Second, we amend our model with the age dependency ratio as a measure of demographic pressure due to a particularly young population. A young population is expected to increase both the opportunities (e.g., by creating more recruits) and motives (e.g., by creating stronger conflict for scarce resources) for political violence (Urdal, 2006). Third, *government size* is expected to correlate with higher government intrusiveness into a society’s public life and the consolidation of a (secularized) nation-state. As radical Islamists reject both secularism and the nation-state (e.g., Lewis, 1990; Tibi, 1998), we expect government size to positively predict the onset of Islamist violence. Finally, a country experiencing a *political transition* may be especially vulnerable to Islamist conflict. For instance, political transitions may coincide with the emergence of political vacuums and reduced military capacity due to socio-political disorganization, which ought to favor the onset of conflict by lowering the direct costs of militant activity and raising the prospect of insurgency success (e.g., Fearon and Laitin, 2003).

3.4 Empirical Methodology

As discussed above, we use two dependent variables. The first one is a binary dependent variable coded as *1* for the positive outcome of an onset of armed Islamist conflict in a country during a five-year period and *0* for a non-event. For this variable we use a *binary logit regression model*

¹² In addition to these controls, we also consider the influence of variables indicating oil wealth, international conflict (inter-state war), state capacity and trade openness (results not reported but available upon request). We find that these variables do not affect our main finding concerning the influence of modernization on Islamist conflict onset.

to examine how a set of explanatory variables affects the probability of a conflict onset occurring (Long and Freese, 2006).

Our second dependent variable considers the onset of Islamist conflict associated with specific goals. It can take on four values: peace (coded 0), the onset of Islamist conflict with the goal of regime change (coded 1), with the goal of territorial change (coded 2) or with other goals (coded 3). Here, we are particularly interested in studying whether the ultimate goals of armed Islamist groups matter to the role modernization plays in their respective conflicts in comparison to non-violence as the base category. For this dependent variable we use a *multinomial logit model* (Long and Freese, 2006).

To minimize potential endogeneity issues, we lag all independent variables by one year.¹³ To further add to the robustness of our findings, we amend all statistical models (if not indicated otherwise in the table notes) with regional dummies and time controls, so as to consider the possible effect of time- and region-specific effects. While the regional effects are operationalized as dummy variables for Western, Eastern European, Latin American, Sub-Saharan African and Asian countries (with the MENA region as the baseline group), to control for time dependence we follow Carter and Signorino (2010) and use t , t^2 and t^3 (where t refers to the time since the last conflict onset was observed) in our model specifications. The inclusion of these time controls ought to account for the fact that countries with past Islamist rebellions may be more vulnerable to future conflict. Not accounting for this time dependence would violate the independence assumption of our ordinary logistic regression model, potentially yielding misleading results (Carter and Signorino, 2010).

4. Empirical Results

4.1 Logit Regression Results

¹³ For our main variable of interest, the modernization index, we also consider reverse causation by running a series of OLS regressions with the index as the explanatory and conflict onset as an independent variable. We do not find that conflict onset exerts a statistically significant effect on the modernization index.

The logit regression results are reported in Table 4. Considering our main variable of interest, we find that a higher level of the modernization index is robustly associated with a higher likelihood of Islamist conflict onset. This is consistent with our main hypothesis and suggests that both material grievances and religious considerations due to modernization sway the cost-benefit considerations in ways that make Islamist conflict more likely (i.e., less costly with respect to conflict's direct and opportunity costs and more promising with respect to its benefits). This finding also holds when we run probit and rare events logit estimations. Finally, when we substitute the modernization index with per capita income, we do not find that the latter affects the onset of Islamist conflict in a statistically significant way. In other words, when using the modernization index we do not merely pick up the effect of economic development.

—Table 4 here—

To evaluate the quantitative effects of our findings, we use specification (1) of Table 4. First, we find that a one-unit increase in the modernization index is associated with 30 per cent increase in the likelihood of Islamist conflict.¹⁴ Indeed, many Islamic countries in our sample (e.g., Saudi Arabia, Pakistan) saw an increase in their respective national modernization index values of two or more units during the observation periods, coupled with repeated onsets of Islamist violence. In sum, this suggests that the impact of modernization on Islamist conflict is also economically substantive. Second, considering the marginal effect of modernization (holding the other covariates at their respective means), Figure 4 shows that modernization is positively and linearly related to the likelihood of Islamist conflict onset. However, the relationship between the two variables is no longer statistically significant for very high levels of modernization (90 per cent confidence intervals plotted). Potentially, sufficiently modernized countries no longer have strong traditional elites that are opposed to modernization and/or have overcome the material ills that accompany modernization. However, very high modernization levels were only reached by few (small) Islamic countries (Qatar, Singapore, United Arab Emirates) in addition to many Western and some Asian countries during the 1971-2006 period. It is therefore not surprising that very high levels of modernization do not correlate with Islamist conflict onset.

¹⁴ We calculate the strength of the effect using the *listcoef* Stata command of Long and Freese (2006).

—Figure 4 here—

After having discussed our main finding concerning the influence of modernization on Islamist conflict, we now briefly consider the results for the control variables as reported in Table 4. First, we consistently find that democratic institutions do not affect the onset of Islamist conflict. For one, this suggests that our modernization index does not merely capture the role of political development in the onset of Islamist conflict. For another, finding no effect of democracy on conflict onset is also consistent with the Islamist mindset. Democracy is considered heretical—just as Communism or other forms of authoritarianism—because it is interpreted as a means of governance replacing “God’s rule” with man-made laws (Tibi, 1998). Consequently, it is intuitive to find that democratic rule does not accommodate Islamist militancy.

Second, we do not find that older regimes are less susceptible to the onset of Islamist conflict. However, there is a positive association between political transitions and conflict onsets. Potentially, this suggests that abrupt political change and severe political instability (as indicated by political transitions) are needed to provide conditions that sufficiently lower the costs of conflict (e.g., reduced state capacity or legitimacy).

Third, discrimination of Islamic minorities favors the onset of Islamist violence. This is not surprising, given that the variable we employ measures discrimination directed against Muslim sects, against Sunni or Shia minorities and against Muslim minorities in non-Muslim majorities, and thus ought to be associated with a vast set of politico-economic grievances related to discrimination. These grievances, in turn, can be expected to promote Islamist conflict (e.g., Gurr, 1993).

Fourth, mobilization variables are found to matter. Both a larger population size and Muslim population size predict a higher likelihood of conflict onset. Arguably, mobilization is facilitated when there is a large pool of potential recruits and supporters, while policing costs increase, both of which ought to mean lower costs of conflict. We also find that conflict becomes more likely with a high age dependency ratio. This may tentatively indicate that demographic stress also contributes to conflict onset, e.g., by lowering its opportunity costs.

Fifth, adding additional controls for military dependence from the U.S. and government size also does not affect our main result. However, the findings related to these variables provide further

insights into the motivating factors of Islamist violence. For one, the onset of Islamist conflict becomes more likely with U.S. military support for a local government. This support may be regarded by Islamist groups as yet another channel through which foreign ideas and influence “infects” the Islamic world, creating local apostate governments. This creates an incentive to attack governments that are dependent on the United States.¹⁵ For another, the likelihood of Islamist conflict onset increases with government size. Interpreting government size as an indicator of the government intrusiveness of a (secularized) nation-state, our finding is again consistent with expectations, given that radical Islamists also reject secularization (e.g., Lewis, 1990; Tibi, 1998).

As a final robustness check, we stepwise reduce our sample to only consider countries with sizeable Muslim population shares countries. As shown in Table 5, however, using increasingly smaller country samples does not affect our main finding to a strong extent. Higher levels of modernization remain associated with a higher likelihood of Islamist conflict, even if we only focus our analysis on Muslim-majority countries. We are also again able to show that per capita income and democracy do not exert an effect on the onset of conflict, which supports our earlier interpretation that our modernization index does not simply pick up the impact of economic and/or political underdevelopment. In sum, the results reported in Table 5 indicate that our main result is not due to sample selection.

—Table 5 here—

4.2 Multinomial Logit Regression Results

In this subsection we consider whether Islamist groups with different goals are differently affected by modernization. As discussed above, for this part of the analysis we consider a dependent variable that can take on four values: peace (coded 0), the onset of Islamist conflict with the goal of regime change (coded 1), conflict onset with the goal of territorial change

¹⁵ What is more, U.S. support for local governments also makes the U.S. itself a likelier target of foreign attacks (i.e., transnational terrorism). Neumayer and Plümper (2011) argue that anti-American attacks not only increase popular support for attacking militant groups at home, but may also weaken local governments (depending on U.S. support) when the United States withdraws its support as a consequence of anti-American violence.

(coded 2) or with other goals (coded 3). We run a multinomial logit model to assess how modernization affects the onset of conflict associated with these specific goals.

As reported in Table 6, we find that Islamist groups pursuing territorial changes (e.g., the Moro Islamic Liberation Front) are not affected by modernization. Rather, as evidenced by Table 6, their fight is more robustly associated with the presence of Islamic minorities which are discriminated against. This suggests that separatist Islamist groups are motivated by specific grievances tied to discrimination (e.g., religious persecution) rather than by anti-modernization sentiment. Similarly, Islamist groups with opaque goals (which may include, e.g., foreign policy changes) that neither aim at regime or territorial change are also not affected by modernization.

—Table 6 here—

However, modernization is positively associated with the onset of armed activity by Islamist groups aiming at a regime change.¹⁶ As before, we are able to show (by replacing the modernization index with per capita income) that we do not simply pick up the effect of economic development on conflict onset. Finding that modernization especially matters to regime change groups is consistent with our expectations. Given that regime change groups tend to operate in countries with large Muslim majorities (e.g., the *Egyptian Islamic Jihad*), creating an Islamic state with Islamic governance and law is a viable political option that may meet sufficient public support. What is more, the very goal of establishing an Islamic state (as pursued by Islamist regime change groups) can be seen as direct response to the (perceived) material and spiritual challenges posed by modernization. A modern society is a *jahiliyya* society (e.g., Toth, 2013). The goal of Islamist regime change groups is to replace this “pagan” society with an Islamic society (e.g., Kepel, 1986), which promises to undo the “infection” of the Islamic world by the forces of modernization. Given this rationale, it is highly intuitive that regime change groups become active in those countries where modernization is more visible.

5. Conclusion

¹⁶ These findings also hold when we add additional control variables (e.g., indicating U.S. military support or government size) to our models (results available upon request).

In this contribution we study the impact of modernization—a multi-dimensional phenomenon affecting a country's economic, cultural and social sphere—on the onset of Islamist conflict. Our empirical analysis for 154 countries for the 1971-2006 period provides robust evidence that modernization—rather than economic underdevelopment or a lack of democracy—is a source of Islamist conflict. This relationship especially matters to Islamist groups that aim at a regime change, i.e., the establishment of Islamic states, while separatist Islamist groups seem to be more strongly affected by minority discrimination.

We argue that an interaction between material grievances due to modernization and the anti-modernization impetus of radical Islamist fundamentalism explains this finding. Translated into a simple cost-benefit model, the adverse effects of modernization (e.g., loss of power and wealth for traditional elites and socio-economic instability felt by lower population segments) lower the opportunity costs of conflict and raise its benefits. Additionally, an Islamist framing of these grievances further affects the cost-benefit considerations of potential Islamist militants in ways that make violence even more likely (e.g., by offering spiritual rewards). What is more, an Islamist interpretation of modernization grievances provides Islamist militants with a political objective (i.e., the establishment of an Islamic state) to remedy the perceived ills of modernization.

With respect to its policy implications, our study suggests that it ought to prove helpful to alleviate the social and economic grievances that may accompany the modernization process. For instance, efficient welfare policies may better shield the economically vulnerable (e.g., urban migrants, the unemployed) from adverse economic effects that coincide with modernization (e.g., rural-urban migration or job losses due to foreign competition). Also, Islamic countries may try to better integrate traditional elites disenchanted by modernization into modern nation-states (e.g., by supplying them with leading positions in the administrative sector) and globalized market-economies (e.g., by supporting the transformation of traditional economic sectors controlled by these elites). In addition to the material dimension of the modernization-conflict nexus, it, however, also seems to be necessary to reconcile Islam with modernization, i.e., to provide alternative (peaceful) answers to the modernization process beyond the pure, violent opposition of radical Islamism. Such religious-theological reform of Islam may help to further shape cost-benefit considerations of (potential) Islamist militants in ways that make violence less

attractive. Finally, it is important to acknowledge that the radical Islamist mindset tends to equate modernization with Westernization. Consequently, anti-modernization violence by militant Islamist groups may not only matter to Islamic countries and regimes “infected” by modernization but also to the main (Western) sponsors of modernization.¹⁷ Our statistical findings may thus also inform Western policymakers who want to contain the spill-over of Islamist conflict. Here, our findings suggest that rather than promoting economic development or democracy, a more viable policy option is to moderate the potentially inflammatory influences of modernization, e.g., through trade policies that reduce the adverse effects of globalization or economic and technical aid that helps Islamic countries to cope with pressures from urbanization, marketization, new family models or “immorality” due to the inflow of foreign ideas and values.

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¹⁷ For instance, Krieger and Meierrieks (2015) find that the role of the United States in promoting capitalist development leads to more anti-American terrorism due to the effects that the advent of capitalist development has in traditional societies. This result suggests that anti-modernization violence may indeed have cross-border implications and contribute to anti-Western violence.

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


Figure 1: Onset of Islamist Conflict, 1971-2006




Figure 2: Modernization Index and Per Capita Income (Year 2000)




Figure 3: Global Average of the Modernization Index, 1971-2006




Figure 4: Marginal Effects of the Modernization Index

Variable	N*T	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Operationalization	Data Source
Islamist Conflict Onset	4933	0.024	0.152	0	1	See main text	See main text
Modernization Index	4819	0	2.040	-4.017	5.006	See main text	See Table 3
Democracy	4933	0.405	0.491	0	1	Dichotomous variable indicating whether a country is democratic (taking into account the presence of opposition parties, free elections etc.)	Cheibub et al. (2010)
Regime Age	4933	24.578	24.520	1	137	Number of consecutive years that a country has been a democracy or dictatorship	Cheibub et al. (2010)
Population Size	4933	9.034	1.525	4.901	14.089	Total population size, logged	Heston et al. (2009)
Islamic Minority	4933	0.165	0.372	0	1	See main text	Minorities at Risk Project (2009)
Muslim Population Share	4933	0.282	0.380	0.001	0.998	Share of Muslim to total population	Fearon and Laitin (2003)
U.S. Military Assistance to Domestic Military Spending	4697	1.342	1.769	0	9.726	Ratio of U.S. military assistance to domestic military spending, logged+1	Singer (1987) and USAID (2010)
Age Dependency Ratio	4933	64.254	23.685	19.558	111.845	Ratio of dependents younger than 15 to the working-age population	World Bank (2010)
Government Size	4933	18.358	9.862	1.438	83.350	Ratio of public consumption to real GDP	Heston et al. (2009)
Political Transition	4933	0.020	0.140	0	1	Dummy variable coded 1 for the first year a country is observed or a new regime (from democracy to dictatorship or vice versa) emerges	Cheibub et al. (2010)
Per Capita Income	4933	8.446	1.162	5.032	11.474	Real per capita income, logged	Heston et al. (2009)

Note: We use a recent update of Singer (1987).

Table 1: Summary Statistics

Type of Group	Main Objectives	Example
Regime Change Groups	1) Domestic Regime Change: Establishment of an Islamic state based on Sharia law 2) International Regime Change: Creation of a (global) caliphate superseding existing nation-states that potentially involves the whole <i>Ummah</i> (i.e., Islamic Nation)	Egyptian Islamic Jihad (Egypt, 1978) al Qa'ida (Afghanistan, 1988)
Separatist Groups	Territorial Change: Secession from an existing nation-state to form a new Muslim-dominated state	Moro Islamic Liberation Front (Philippines, 1977)
Other Islamist Groups	1) Social Domination: Preservation of the God-given order (status quo) and carrying out of religious cleansing 2) Limited Policy Change: Use of violence to achieve a policy goal without having further territorial or extensive political claims	Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (Pakistan, 1985) Committee of Solidarity with Arab and Middle East Political Prisoners (France, 1985)

Table 2: Forms and Main Objectives of Islamist Militancy

<i>Panel A: Principal Component Variables Summary Statistics</i>							
Variable	N*T	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Operationalization	Data Source
Cultural Globalization	4889	22.369	27.574	1	97.318	Index accounting for cultural globalization (uses information on the number of McDonald's restaurants per capita, Number of Ikea shops per capita and a country's trade in books as percentage of GDP)	Dreher (2006)
Political Globalization	4889	55.762	21.546	4.276	98.561	Index accounting for political globalization (uses information on the number of embassies in a country, a country's membership in international organizations, its participation in U.N. Security Council missions and the number of international treaties a country has signed)	Dreher (2006)
Energy Consumption	4933	0.294	1.620	-6.280	4.849	Per capita energy consumption, logged	World Bank (2010)
Capitalist Development	4863	2.988	1.700	0.131	8.850	Per capita number of life insurance contracts, logged	Mousseau (2012)
Women Fertility Rate	4933	4.225	2.058	1.076	8.667	No. of births per woman	World Bank (2010)
Level of Urbanization	4933	47.997	24.159	2.970	100	Ratio of urban population to total population	World Bank (2010)
<i>Panel B: Principal Component Analysis Results</i>							
Variable	First Component (=Modernization Index) Factor Loadings						
Cultural Globalization	0.413						
Political Globalization	0.369						
Energy Consumption	0.409						
Capitalist Development	0.429						
Women Fertility Rate	-0.419						
Level of Urbanization	0.408						
Eigenvalue of first component	4.16						
Percentage of variance accounted for by first principal component	69.34%						
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy	0.89						
<i>Notes:</i> Number of observations is 4,819 for principal component analysis. All other extracted components exhibit eigenvalues below 1 and are therefore not presented.							

Table 3: Principal Component Data and Analysis

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Modernization Index $t-1$	0.275 (0.095)***	0.360 (0.098)***	0.444 (0.131)***	0.334 (0.099)***	0.273 (0.096)***		0.131 (0.047)***	0.274 (0.089)***
Per Capita Income $t-1$						0.073 (0.172)		
Democracy $t-1$	0.038 (0.369)	-0.059 (0.369)	0.026 (0.350)	-0.011 (0.357)	-0.017 (0.369)	0.133 (0.355)	0.045 (0.178)	0.039 (0.266)
Regime Age $t-1$	-0.009 (0.009)	-0.013 (0.009)	-0.009 (0.009)	-0.012 (0.008)	-0.006 (0.009)	-0.009 (0.007)	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.008 (0.008)
Population Size $t-1$	0.501 (0.123)***	0.654 (0.107)***	0.589 (0.123)***	0.582 (0.126)***	0.561 (0.125)***	0.616 (0.136)***	0.272 (0.051)***	0.549 (0.090)***
Islamic Minority	0.963 (0.238)***	1.042 (0.264)***	0.875 (0.255)***	0.883 (0.237)***	0.950 (0.244)***	0.892 (0.250)***	0.487 (0.118)***	0.949 (0.228)***
Muslim Population Share	1.947 (0.471)***	1.806 (0.419)***	1.823 (0.498)***	2.151 (0.457)***	1.935 (0.478)***	1.635 (0.503)***	0.953 (0.212)***	1.911 (0.388)***
U.S. Military Assistance to Domestic Military Spending $t-1$		0.165 (0.062)***						
Age Dependency Ratio $t-1$			0.017 (0.009)*					
Government Size $t-1$				0.030 (0.010)***				
Political Transition $t-1$					1.280 (0.529)**			
Estimation Technique	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Probit	REL
Wald χ^2	227.79	236.10	270.51	284.17	255.68	248.91	236.39	282.65
(Prob.> χ^2)	0.00***	0.00***	0.00***	0.00***	0.00***	0.00***	0.00***	0.00***
Pseudo R ²	0.321	0.325	0.323	0.327	0.325	0.311	0.326	
Log Pseudolikelihood	-361.19	-335.51	-360.28	-358.27	-358.90	-368.52	-358.35	
Number of Observations	4,665	4,441	4,665	4,665	4,665	4,779	4,665	4,665

Notes: Constant not reported. Robust standard errors clustered over countries in parentheses. All specifications include regional dummies and control for time effects (results not reported). REL = Rare Events Logit. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

Table 4: Baseline Regression Results

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Modernization Index $t-1$	0.283 (0.101)***		0.192 (0.084)**		0.247 (0.108)**		0.237 (0.127)*		0.230 (0.118)*	
Per Capita Income $t-1$		0.080 (0.175)		-0.038 (0.166)		0.182 (0.176)		0.106 (0.179)		0.081 (0.174)
Democracy $t-1$	0.101 (0.355)	0.171 (0.354)	-0.206 (0.373)	-0.208 (0.388)	0.129 (0.420)	0.203 (0.407)	-0.291 (0.392)	-0.232 (0.300)	-0.351 (0.396)	-0.296 (0.298)
Regime Age $t-1$	-0.008 (0.009)	-0.008 (0.007)	-0.008 (0.009)	-0.008 (0.007)	0.002 (0.010)	0.001 (0.008)	-0.007 (0.012)	-0.004 (0.008)	-0.006 (0.010)	-0.004 (0.007)
Population Size $t-1$	0.544 (0.120)***	0.592 (0.134)***	0.622 (0.121)***	0.638 (0.144)***	0.608 (0.113)***	0.610 (0.138)***	0.652 (0.135)***	0.675 (0.154)***	0.667 (0.109)***	0.692 (0.121)***
Islamic Minority	0.893 (0.240)***	0.832 (0.253)***	0.767 (0.226)***	0.731 (0.237)***	0.954 (0.253)***	0.886 (0.271)***	0.852 (0.311)***	0.796 (0.359)**	0.848 (0.291)***	0.819 (0.346)**
Muslim Population Share	1.712 (0.499)***	1.384 (0.529)***	1.088 (0.625)*	0.685 (0.694)	2.103 (0.541)***	1.860 (0.651)***	2.397 (1.420)*	2.197 (1.971)	1.514 (2.081)	1.131 (2.825)
Wald χ^2 (Prob. > χ^2)	221.31 0.00***	244.79 0.00***	178.54 0.00***	147.72 0.00***	180.98 0.00***	202.75 0.00***	93.63 0.00***	111.61 0.00***	91.31 0.00***	114.95 0.00***
Pseudo R ²	0.284	0.274	0.267	0.261	0.239	0.225	0.207	0.198	0.197	0.191
Log Pseudolikelihood	-336.31	-343.65	-290.25	-296.30	-282.76	-290.95	-237.26	-243.40	-227.82	-233.64
Muslim Population Share	>1%	>1%	>5%	>5%	>10%	>10%	>33%	>33%	>50%	>50%
Number of Countries	98	98	70	70	65	65	48	48	42	42
Number of Observations	2,943	3,048	2,035	2,140	1,909	1,987	1,368	1,446	1,207	1,285

Notes: Constant not reported. Robust standard errors clustered over countries in parentheses. All specifications control for time effects (results not reported). Regional dummies included in specifications (1) to (4) (results not reported). *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

Table 5: Regression Results for Sub-Samples

	(1)			(2)		
	(Regime Change)	(Territorial Change)	(Other Goal)	(Regime Change)	(Territorial Change)	(Other Goal)
Modernization Index $t-1$	0.320 (0.149)**	0.187 (0.156)	0.227 (0.237)			
Per Capita Income $t-1$				0.126 (0.172)	0.262 (0.260)	0.482 (0.305)
Democracy $t-1$	-0.537 (0.513)	0.314 (0.573)	0.463 (0.866)	-0.379 (0.475)	0.336 (0.603)	0.466 (0.766)
Regime Age $t-1$	-0.007 (0.011)	-0.022 (0.023)	-0.023 (0.025)	-0.002 (0.008)	-0.023 (0.023)	-0.026 (0.023)
Population Size $t-1$	0.546 (0.129)***	0.724 (0.317)**	0.750 (0.324)**	0.599 (0.128)***	0.766 (0.338)**	0.857 (0.308)***
Islamic Minority	0.654 (0.350)*	2.350 (0.619)***	1.106 (0.587)*	0.562 (0.365)	2.329 (0.624)***	1.024 (0.600)*
Muslim Population Share	4.183 (0.634)***	0.880 (0.588)	2.168 (0.646)***	3.901 (0.723)***	0.682 (0.631)	2.043 (0.694)***
Wald χ^2		919.32			768.58	
(Prob.> χ^2)		0.00***			0.00***	
Pseudo R ²		0.316			0.308	
Log Pseudolikelihood		-435.08			-442.23	
Number of Observations		4,664			4,779	

Notes: Constant not reported. Robust standard errors clustered over countries in parentheses. All specifications include time controls (results not reported). Base category = No Islamist Conflict. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

Table 6: Multinomial Logit Regression Results

List of Countries

Afghanistan	Costa Rica	India	Mozambique	Sri Lanka
Albania	Cote d'Ivoire	Indonesia	Namibia	Sudan
Algeria	Croatia	Iran	Nepal	Suriname
Angola	Cuba	Iraq	Netherlands	Swaziland
Argentina	Cyprus	Ireland	New Zealand	Sweden
Armenia	Czech Republic	Israel	Nicaragua	Switzerland
Australia	Denmark	Italy	Niger	Syria
Austria	Djibouti	Jamaica	Nigeria	Tajikistan
Azerbaijan	Dominican Republic	Japan	Norway	Tanzania
Bahrain	Ecuador	Jordan	Oman	Thailand
Bangladesh	Egypt	Kazakhstan	Pakistan	Togo
Belarus	El Salvador	Kenya	Panama	Trinidad & Tobago
Belgium	Equatorial Guinea	Kuwait	Papua New Guinea	Tunisia
Benin	Eritrea	Kyrgyzstan	Paraguay	Turkey
Bhutan	Estonia	Laos	Peru	Turkmenistan
Bolivia	Ethiopia	Latvia	Philippines	Uganda
Bosnia & Herzegovina	Fiji	Lebanon	Poland	Ukraine
Botswana	Finland	Lesotho	Portugal	United Arab Emirates
Brazil	France	Liberia	Qatar	United Kingdom
Bulgaria	Gabon	Libya	Romania	Uruguay
Burkina Faso	Gambia	Lithuania	Russia	Uzbekistan
Burundi	Georgia	Macedonia	Rwanda	Venezuela
Cambodia	Germany	Madagascar	Saudi Arabia	Vietnam
Cameroon	Ghana	Malawi	Senegal	Yemen
Canada	Greece	Malaysia	Sierra Leone	Zambia
Central African Republic	Guatemala	Mali	Singapore	Zimbabwe
Chad	Guinea	Mauritania	Slovak Republic	
Chile	Guinea-Bissau	Mauritius	Slovenia	
China	Guyana	Mexico	Somalia	
Colombia	Haiti	Moldova	South Africa	
Comoros	Honduras	Mongolia	South Korea	
Congo (Republic)	Hungary	Morocco	Spain	