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Conflicting modes of political orientation or what happens to the German left?: The case of West-Berlin. Paper prepared for the conference on "Representation and the State - Problems of governability and legitimacy in Western European democracies", Stanford University, October 11-15, 1982

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
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CONFLICTING MODES OF POLITICAL ORIENTATION

OR

WHAT HAPPENS TO THE GERMAN LEFT?

The Case of West-Berlin

by

Hans-Dieter Klingemann
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Paper prepared for the Conference on "Representation and the State: Problems of Governability and Legitimacy in Western European Democracies, Stanford University, October 11-15, 1982

1 Introduction

Many observers would agree that the party systems of Western democracies show signs of increased tension. The pressure is mainly on the parties of the left. In a previous analysis we have attributed most of these strains to differences in political orientations and political skills of the "old" and the "new" Left (Kaase and Klingemann 1979). At that time (1974) the "old" Left and the "new" Left had still found their political home in the established leftist parties. But it appeared to be an open question whether this would continue to be the case in the times to come. Today the future has materialized and what had been an open question in the mid-seventies has almost become reality: There is a good chance that the West-German party system will be broken up by the introduction of a new leftist movement.

This movement - the Alternative List (West-Berlin), the Green-Alternatives (Hamburg), or just the Greens - though still quite small gains momentum. Meanwhile the movement is represented in six out of the eleven German states having won between 5.1 per cent (Bremen) and 8.0 per cent (Hamburg) of the valid votes cast. The failure of the Liberals in Hamburg and Hesse and the inability of both the Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats to win the absolute majority of seats in parliament makes strong government impossible. The alternative movement is not prepared to play the game of representative democracy; they reject the idea of compromising and form coalitions like the Free Democrats did.

What has happened to the German Left? In this paper we shall take up four aspects of that question:

- Is there a meaningful way to differentiate between the currently dominant modes of political orientation; in particular: Can one separate the "old" from the "new" Left?
- Is there a systematic relation of the modes of political orientation to the major social cleavages; in particular: Does the "new" Left have a social base?
- How do modes of political orientation relate to the political parties; in particular: What is the scope of the conflict between the "old" Left and the "new" Left within the Social Democratic Party?
- Finally, we want to speculate about the possible changes of the party system; in particular: Why is it that parts of the "new" Left leave the Social Democratic Party to form an alternative political movement?

Of course, these questions cannot be dealt with comprehensively within the framework of this paper. However, given the current state of affairs in the German Federal Republic they have to be brought on the agenda to stimulate discussion as well as research along these lines.

Our analysis rests on data gathered in West-Berlin. Nevertheless it is not our intention here to stress the unique features of that city. Rather, we take the Berlin case as just another opportunity to test some general propositions which might be tested in other Western democracies as well.

The data base for this study consists of three surveys all of which were taken shortly before the West-Berlin state elections held on May 10, 1981. The first of these surveys addressed all candidates for the West-Berlin city-state parliament (Berliner Abgeordnetenhaus) and for the twelve district assemblies (Bezirksverordnetenversammlungen). The mail questionnaire was sent to 1911 candidates and had a response rate of 46 per cent. The United Socialist Party (Sozialistische Einheitspartei) refused to cooperate; the Social Democrats are over- the Christian Democrats are underrepresented. Thus, marginal distributions should be read with care. Surveys two and three used oral-interview procedures. One was designed to represent the West-Berlin electorate, the other survey was taken in areas which were known to be the strongholds of the Alternative List. These strongholds coincide to a large extent with the major problem areas of the city (that is parts of Tiergarten, Wedding, Kreuzberg, Charlottenburg, Schöneberg, and Wilmersdorf). The latter two surveys were executed by the MARPLAN institute (1).

Although our exercise is not meant to be an election study this was the election result: Christian Democrats: 48%, Social Democrats: 38.3%, Free Democrats: 5.6%, Alternative List: 7.2%, other political parties: 0.9%. And just a reminder for anyone who takes an interest in West-Berlin politics: In 1963 the Social Democrats were able to gain 61.9 per cent of the vote.

2 Measuring Modes of Political Orientation

In this paragraph we propose a new typology of modes of political orientation. The typology is meant to lead to a better understanding of current political conflict in general and of the conflict between the "old" Left and the "new" Left in particular. The modes of political orientation are generated by combining a basic indication of political direction on the one hand and the expression of issue priorities on the other.

With Laponce (1972 : 455) we assume "... that left-right, like other spatial dimensions, is so basic to our perception and interpretation of both our physical and social environments that it belongs to that group of symbolic structures which, when properly mapped, provide a key to man's understanding of himself and his society." Although the terms did not enter the political vocabulary until the end of the eighteenth century, left and right have become some of the most widely used political symbols today. Most certainly they are a major element of European political discourse. When asked to locate their political views on a left-right scale all West-Berlin candidates who sent the questionnaire back did so; for the West-Berlin survey of the electorate and the survey restricted to the strongholds of the Alternative List the respective figures were 84 per cent and 82 per cent (Appendix: Table 1). Previous research has shown that the meaning assigned to Left and Right differs across the populace (Klingerann 1982). Data for the Federal Republic gathered in 1980 demonstrate this point: About 30 per cent of the respondents give an interpretation in terms of societal values (freedom, equality etc.). However, the larger part of the public mentions either ideological movements (socialism,

conservatism etc.) or political parties (SPD, CDU etc.) but is unable or unwilling to comment on what is implied by such labeling (Appendix: Table 2). Thus, we avoid a general conceptualization of Left and Right in terms of value orientation. However, most of the links which are established between specific ideological movements and political parties are "correct" in the culturally defined sense. Therefore we are prepared to regard a symbolic identification with either Left or Right as a valid indication of a basic political direction. The underlying universe of meaning has been aptly summarized by Laponce (1975 : 17): "On the right we find the religious and the stable (the sacred is essentially stable); on the left, the secular and the changing. On the right dominance; on the left, challenge and opposition. While symbolizing these old contrasts, however, left-right continued also to express the ideal of an absence of hierarchies."

Basic political direction is measured by a left-right selfanchoring scale. This instrument leaves it to the respondent to define, on the basis of his own assumptions, perceptions, goals and values, the two anchoring points of the spectrum on which scale measurement is desired (Kilpatrick and Cantril 1960). Thus, the technique is well suited to cope with the wide ranging meaning individuals associate with left-right symbolism. The scale consists of ten horizontally ordered boxes; no numbers or other cues were provided except the words Left and Right at the end points. For the scale has no explicit midpoint, all scale scores can be classified as either being closer to the left or to the right anchoring point.

Social psychology has produced a rich body of research into value priorities (e.g. Rokeach 1973). In this field political science has particularly profited from Inglehart's work (Inglehart 1971, 1977, 1981). We have opted for his approach because he and others have generated a large number of empirical analyses which are supportive to his basic hypotheses. Inglehart assumes that value priorities are shifting from a Materialist emphasis toward a Postmaterialist - from giving top priority to physical sustenance and safety, toward heavier emphasis on belonging, self-expression and the quality of life. This particular pattern of value change, so is the argument, is redefining the basis of political competition by bringing to the fore a new issue-agenda which may dramatically realign the electorate (Inglehart 1982; Dalton and Flanagan 1982). Much of the evidence points to the fact that it is the conflict about a new issue-agenda which separates the "old" Left from the "new".

We measure issue-priorities by a four-item index as proposed by Inglehart (1971, 1977). The instrument asks for a rank-ordering of four issues, two of which were selected as indicators of a material orientation while the other two stand for a postmaterial orientation. "Maintaining order in the nation" and "Fighting rising prices" are regarded as material issues; "Protecting freedom of speech" and "Giving people more say in important political decisions" are meant to indicate the postmaterial issues. We have used these four issue-items for our surveys of the electorate. In the candidate survey we have replaced the item "Fighting rising prices" by "Fighting unemployment". Prices were just not rising in Germany to an extent that political elites might have considered this a meaningful choice.

Although we cannot exactly know the effect of the alteration our validation efforts proved to be positive. The technique allows for an identification of pure types (material or postmaterial issues ranked first and second) and mixed types (material ranked first and postmaterial ranked second or the reverse). For the purpose of this analysis we have collapsed the pure materialists and the materialist/postmaterialist type on the one hand and the pure postmaterialists and the postmaterial/material type on the other.

Controversy rages whether or not Inglehart's operationalization really taps the dimension of human values (Herz 1979; Böltken and Jagodzinski 1982; van Deth 1981). This controversy does not concern us very much in the present context. Our interpretation of the measure is in terms of current issue-priorities and we believe that there is more than face validity that this rank-order scale is an excellent indicator for at least this aspect (Appendix: Table 3).

Left-right selfplacement and material-postmaterial issue-priorities are combined in a dichotomized format(2). The resulting four modes of political orientation should be regarded as ideal types; they are not meant to describe reality in detail which is, of course, much more differentiated. We label the types for what they are in terms of their measurement and thus distinguish between: (1) Left Materialists, (2) Left Postmaterialists, (3) Right Materialists, (4) Right Postmaterialists. For reasons of economy we shall abbreviate these names by L-M, L-PM, R-M, and R-PM in the following sections.

As we have mentioned earlier it is of major importance to this analysis to shed some light on what happens to the Left. Thus, the typology would not meet the expectation would it not distinguish within the camp of the Left. The two variables share about 20 per cent (candidates) to 29 per cent (stronghold of the alternative movement sample) of their variance. Postmaterialists tend to identify with the Left; Materialists are found more often to the Right. However, as Table 1 demonstrates, the overlap is not perfect. The split of the Left is clearly visible. The L-PM type ranges from 46 per cent in the candidate sample to 31 per cent in the survey of the Berlin electorate; the proportion of the L-M type is 22 per cent among the candidates and 16 per cent among the electorate. The R-M type is most numerous in the West-Berlin electorate, makes up a third of those respondents living in the strongholds of the alternative movement, and comprises a good fifth of the candidates. The R-PM remains a rare case in all our samples.

In this first step we have separated both the Left and the Right according to their issue-priorities. It is hypothesized by theories of value change that these differences in issue-priorities lead to political conflict and may even cause a break-up of the party system. Before we shall proceed to test this assertion we shall first analyze the social structural location of the four modes of political orientation.

Table 1

Modes of Political Orientation

	Candidates	Electorate	
		West-Berlin	Strongholds of the Alternative Movement
	%	%	%
Left Materialists	22	16	16
Left Postmaterialists	46	31	43
Right Materialists	21	46	33
Right Postmaterialists	11	7	8
N	875	913	437
Missing values	-	2%	2%

3 The Social Structural Location of Modes of Political Orientation

Much of the viability of the different modes of political orientation will depend on their social structural base. It may turn out that the L-PM has no such social structural base. In this case we would be inclined to speak of short-term influences or cleavage neutral attitude change which are independent of the group structure of the population. If, however, these modes of political orientation are systematically related to the major social cleavages, we would rate their potential as a source of political conflict much higher.

The importance of social cleavages such as those derived from social class and religion in structuring the political orientation of mass publics is widely recognized. In the comparative literature social class has been singled out as the most important cleavage line (Rose 1974). In his now classic study "Political Man", Lipset (1960 : 223-224) states that: "The most important single fact about political party support is that in virtually every economically developed country the lower income groups vote mainly for the parties of the Left, while the higher income groups vote mainly for the parties of the Right." Today class voting seems to be on the decline (Lipset 1981).

Inglehart has argued that this decline is caused by the rise of the Post-materialists. "The postmaterialist outlook is linked with having spent one's formative years in conditions of economical and physical security; hence it is far more prevalent among the postwar generation than among

older cohorts, throughout Western society; and tends to be concentrated among the more prosperous strata of any given age group. ... Postmaterialists give top priority to such goals as a sense of community and the non-material quality of life, but they live in societies that have traditionally emphasized economic gains above all. Hence though they tend to come from the most privileged and economically most favored strata of society, they tend to be relatively dissatisfied with the kind of society in which they live, and relatively favorable to social change. Though recruited from the higher income groups that have traditionally supported the parties of the Right, they themselves tend to support the parties of the Left when they become politically engaged." (Inglehart 1982 : 4). Thus, we would expect the L-PM to belong to the middle class rather than to the working class.

Taking up some of Gouldner's (1979) hypotheses about the role of the intellectuals as a new class Feist and Liepelt (1983) emphasize the effects of education on modes of political orientation. They show that the young and educated left is, indeed, characterized by such attitude patterns that Inglehart would call postmaterial. Their final conclusion reads as follows: "Zu den historischen Konfliktlinien, die durch Konfessionsteilung, Merkantilisierung und Industrialisierung das Gesicht des modernen Parteiensystems geprägt haben, könnte als Nebenfolge der Bildungsreform der siebziger Jahre eine abermalige Spaltung der politischen Gesellschaft eingetreten sein. Das Kennzeichen: eine neue Bildungsschicht, die politischen Freiraum fordert, in welchem sie das ihr im öffentlichen Bildungssystem zugewachsene Kulturkapital investieren kann, die nach institutionellen Formen sucht, in denen sie ihrem Kommunikationsstil gemäß die eigenen Interessen aggregieren kann." Thus, we would expect to find the L-PM among the higher educated of the postwar generation.

Pappi and Terwey (1982) in contrast are not prepared to make the far reaching assumption of a "new politics" dimension. For them the old cleavage system remained basically stable despite of value change. "The value change which was without doubt going on during the last two decades, fitted the already existing religious dimension of German politics. The old party system was a perfect mechanism to transform the demands of the increasing segments of secular voters." Thus, they explain the growing support of the social-liberal government among white collar workers in the seventies in terms of the affinity of their progressive orientation in religious matters to the program of inner reforms. Pappi and Terwey analyzed data up to 1976, that is up to a point in time where the alternative movement was barely visible in population surveys and the "new" Left still adhered to the Social Democratic Party. However, from this study we learn that the L-PM should be among the secularized.

A systematic review of the literature is clearly beyond the scope of this paper. However, most of the variables that figure prominently in many studies have already been mentioned: social class, religion, education and generation. For our own analysis only two additional variables will be included: trade union membership and church attendance.

We have appended tables to show in detail the bivariate relation of modes of political orientation to these social structural variables (Appendix: Tables 4 to 9). The inspection of these tables demonstrates that there is some truth in all of the analyses cited. We find, indeed, the L-PM among the managerial new middle class, among the secularized, the higher educated and the younger generation. However, much of the interpretation of these bivariate relations will depend on the pattern in which the variables are combined. Discriminant analysis allows for such higher order description (Klecka 1980). Results are surprisingly clear for all the three samples. The first discriminant function, shown in Table 2, is interpreted as the secularization dimension. Church attendance in combination with education and generation separate the L-PM and the R-M. The dimension is of an overriding importance as is indicated by the canonical correlation coefficient and the proportion of variance it binds. Those values which have been supported by the church no longer reach the well educated young. And it is them who need a new worldview the most. Maybe the school, the home of much of the new intelligentsia - as Gouldner would argue - has taken over the churches' role. The second discriminant function shows the class dimension. In the candidate sample the old middle class confronts the unionized managerial new middle class; in the survey of the West-Berlin electorate the function is defined by the old middle class on the one side and the unionized working class on the other while in the strongholds of the Alternative List the very same unionized working class faces the managerial new middle class. This dimension separates the L-M from the R-PM. The L-PM and the L-M, those groups that interest us most, are separated on both dimensions. The L-M are less secularized and occupy the lower position in the class cleavage. In fact, as is shown in Figures 1a to 1c, their spatial location is closer or at least as close to the R-M than to their Left comrades. No doubt, their social structural location is different. And we have to conclude that the L-PM do have a social structural base; this mode of political orientation cannot be described as cleavage neutral. The political conflict between the two groups on the Left will be with us for a while.

The social structural changes that have supported the growth of the L-PM in West-Berlin have mainly occurred during the last two decades. If we take the church weddings as a proportion of the total number of weddings and accept this as an indicator of secularization we find that their proportion has dropped from about 40 per cent in the late sixties to a bare 15 per cent in 1980 (Figure 2). The number of workers in the economically active population has fallen from about 55 per cent in the late fifties to about 40 per cent in 1980 (Figure 3). And as Figure 4 demonstrates the changes in the occupational structure were accompanied by a dramatic rise of the service sector, growing from about 28 per cent in 1958 to almost 50 per cent in 1980. Would these trends continue then the L-PM occupy a rather comfortable place in the social cleavage system, at least as far as West-Berlin is concerned.

Table 2

Social Structure and Modes of Political Orientation: A Discriminant Analysis

Discriminating variables	Discriminant Functions		
	Secularization	Social Class	3rd function
<u>Candidates</u>			
Church attendance	.75 (.69)	.00 (-.11)	-.17 (-.41)
Education	-.45 (-.56)	.44 (.48)	-.04 (.14)
Generation	-.33 (-.25)	-.15 (-.20)	-.22 (-.24)
Old middle class	.08 (.04)	.80 (.67)	-.37 (-.27)
Union membership	-.20 (-.20)	-.53 (-.23)	.30 (.20)
New middle class: Managerial	-.14 (.00)	-.20 (-.06)	.13 (.02)
Catholic	.43 (.24)	.29 (.28)	.66 (.80)
Working class	.02 (-.11)	-.00 (.22)	.44 (.43)
Percent of variance	86%	10%	3%
Significance	.00	.15	.58
Canonical correlation	.38	.14	.08
<u>Electorate</u>			
<u>West-Berlin</u>			
Generation	.88 (.73)	.19 (.33)	-.24 (-.51)
Education	.56 (.44)	.18 (-.24)	.36 (.45)
Church attendance	-.42 (-.17)	.21 (.14)	-.39 (-.62)
Union membership	.17 (.06)	-.66 (-.67)	-.11 (-.06)
Working class	-.03 (.14)	-.58 (-.52)	.15 (.43)
Old middle class	-.05 (-.04)	.29 (.16)	.23 (.28)
New middle class: Managerial	.19 (-.02)	.27 (.26)	.37 (.40)
Catholic	-.17 (-.14)	.33 (.27)	.35 (.52)
Percent of variance	82%	15%	3%
Significance	.00	.00	.35
Canonical correlation	.44	.21	.09

Cell entries are correlations between canonical discriminant functions and discriminating variables; in parantheses: standardized canonical discriminant function coefficients.


Table 2 (continued)

Social Structure and Modes of Political Orientation: A Discriminant Analysis

Discriminating variables	Discriminant Functions		
	Secularization	Social Class	3rd function
<u>Electorate</u>			
<u>Strongholds of the Alternative Movement</u>			
Generation	.74 (.51)	-.16 (-.23)	-.13 (-.32)
Church attendance	-.64 (-.48)	-.05 (-.09)	.06 (-.09)
Education	.63 (.33)	.28 (-.11)	.43 (.85)
Union membership	.06 (.13)	-.65 (-.52)	-.18 (.19)
Working class	-.35 (-.12)	-.52 (-.33)	.17 (.29)
New middle class: Managerial	.29 (.11)	.44 (.47)	.12 (-.24)
Old middle class	.10 (-.06)	.44 (.38)	-.51 (-.69)
Catholic	-.26 (-.10)	.35 (.29)	.44 (.42)
Percent of variance	89%	7%	4%
Significance	.00	.01	.09
Canonical correlation	.61	.21	.16


Cell entries are correlations between canonical discriminant functions and discriminating variables; in parantheses: standardized canonical discriminant function coefficients.

Figure 1a




The Spatial Location of Groups With Different Modes of Political Orientation (group centroids)

Figure 1b



The Spatial Location of Groups With Different Modes of Political Orientation (groups centroids)

Figure 1c



The Spatial Location of Groups With Different Modes of Political Orientation (group centroids)

Figure 2

Church Weddings as a Proportion of Total Weddings



Figure 3

Occupation: (Economically Active Population)




Figure 4

Economic Sector (Economically Active Population)



4 Modes of Political Orientation and Political Parties

Results of the social structural analysis point to the fact that the L-PM will not be gone with the wind. What then are the consequences of the different modes of political orientation for the political parties in West-Berlin? This question is mainly a question addressed to the Social Democratic party and asks for their integrative capabilities. Our data nicely illustrate the problem (Tables 3 and 4).

Of the West-Berlin electorate about 80 per cent of the L-M prefer the Social Democrats over their competitors; 55 per cent of the L-PM support the Social Democratic Party while 29 per cent feel close to the newly formed Alternative List. If we look at Berlin's problem areas it is the alternative movement which has taken the place of the Social Democrats among the L-PM: 61 per cent are partisans of the Alternative List while only about a third (35%) still support the Social Democratic Party. This must be alarming for the traditional party of the Left.

If we focus on the internal homogeneity of the political parties' followers with respect to modes of political orientation we have to conclude that major intra-party conflict due to the issue-agenda is most unlikely for both the Christian Democrats and the Alternative List. About 80 per cent share a common mode of political orientation: the R-M dominate the Christian Democrats; the L-PM dominate the Alternative List. The Social Democrats and the Free Democrats on the other hand have to accomodate large groups with differing modes of political orientation. The Free Democrats have to come to grips with their L-PM and R-M; the Social Democrats have to integrate an additional group, the L-M. The situation for the candidate sample and the "strongholds-of-the-alternative-movement sample" is slightly different but we do not want to go into too much detail in this paper. However, the conclusion of intra-party conflict over the issue-agenda is valid for all three samples with respect to the Free Democrats and the Social Democrats.

The assertion of intra-party conflict for these two parties is almost commonplace for the informed observer. However, before we can safely assume that this is due to the different modes of political orientation we have to check for the effect of partisanship on issue concerns in a more systematic way. It is at least a logical possibility that the impact of partisanship makes the effect of modes of political orientations negligible.

We shall test the effect of partisanship for the following set of issues:

--- Economic issues

- attitudes towards the welfare state
- attitudes towards "more influence for trade unions"
- attitudes towards "technological progress and economic growth"
- attitudes towards "nuclear energy"

Table 3

Relation of Party Affiliation to Modes of Political Orientation

Party Affiliation	Modes of Political Orientation				Total
	Left	Left Post	Right	Right Post-	
	Materialists	materialists	Materialists	materialists	
	%	%	%	%	%
<u>Candidates</u>					
CDU	23	10	72	52	31
FDP	10	21	4	14	14
SPD	64	49	24	33	45
AL	3	20	-	1	10
N	194	390	182	86	852
<u>Electorate</u>					
<u>West-Berlin</u>					
CDU	10	8	74	68	42
FDP	3	8	3	9	5
SPD	78	55	21	18	41
AL	9	29	2	5	12
N	144	280	398	63	885
<u>Electorate</u>					
<u>Strongholds of</u>					
<u>the Alternative</u>					
<u>Movement</u>					
CDU	4	1	64	27	24
FDP	1	3	7	9	4
SPD	80	35	22	27	38
AL	15	61	7	37	34
N	69	186	136	33	424

The electorate's party affiliation is defined by the following indicators: (1) party identification, (2) rank-ordering CDU, FDP, SPD and AL, and (3) sympathy ratings (Skalometer-question) of CDU, FDP, SPD, and AL. The indicators were used in that order, that is (2) classified the cases left unclassified by (1), (3) classified the cases left unclassified by (1) and (2)

Table 4

The Relation of Modes of Political Orientation to Party Affiliation

Modes of Political Orientation	Party Affiliation				Total
	CDU	FDP	SPD	AL	
	%	%	%	%	%
<u>Candidates</u>					
Left Materialists	17	17	32	7	23
Left Post-materialists	15	67	50	92	46
Right Materialists	51	6	11	-	21
Right Post-materialists	17	10	7	1	10
N	262	120	384	86	853
<u>Electorate</u>					
<u>West-Berlin</u>					
Left Materialists	4	9	31	12	16
Left Post-materialists	6	47	43	78	32
Right Materialists	79	31	23	7	45
Right Post-materialists	11	13	3	3	7
N	374	45	361	105	885
<u>Electorate</u>					
<u>Strongholds of the Alternative Movement</u>					
Left Materialists	3	(5)	34	7	16
Left Post-materialists	2	(26)	41	79	44
Right Materialists	86	(53)	19	6	32
Right Post-materialists	9	(16)	6	8	8
N	101	19	159	145	424

--- Security issues

--- attitudes towards "law and order"

--- attitudes towards "roads to peace in Europe"

--- Participation issues

--- attitudes towards "more citizen participation"

--- attitudes towards "less influence for political parties and more influence for citizen initiatives"

With the exception of "attitudes towards the welfare state" and "attitudes towards roads to peace in Europe" all of the questions were couched in terms of "degree of importance". Thus a respondent could rate an item as "very high, high, low, or very low" in importance or he could state that she or he was totally opposed to the issue. For our analysis we have collapsed all response categories indicating low and very low importance or opposition. Attitudes towards the welfare state allow for these alternatives: (1) the welfare state should be improved, (2) the welfare state should stay as is, (3) individuals should take care of themselves. Roads to peace in Europe were described as (1) favor strong NATO, (2) favor arms limitation, (3) favor dissolving military alliances in East and West and establishing a nuclear free zone in Europe.

In the present context we do not want to discuss the substantive results. The interested reader finds all the details in Tables 10 to 25 in the appendix. We solely use these data here to test the impact of partisanship. We shall ask how similar or dissimilar the distribution of the responses are for each of these items across the groups with different modes of political orientation with and without controlling for political party. As a measure we have selected a coefficient of dissimilarity as proposed by Duncan et al. (1961 : 83). These coefficients range from 0 to 100. Zero means that the per cent distributions of the two groups compared are the same; 100 indicates that these distributions are totally different. We first compute between-group dissimilarities not controlling for party and in a second round we hold the effect of party constant. The sum of the dissimilarity measures for both cases will be compared. Per cent reduction is reported as the ultimate effect of partisanship.

We are not interested in the conflict between different modes of political orientation within the Christian Democratic Party and the Alternative List. As we have already indicated these two parties are characterized by a high degree of homogeneity of political orientations. Our concern here is with the Social Democratic Party in the first place. Given the sample sizes of our surveys we are unable to obtain reliable estimates for the Free Democrats. For the same reason we have to leave out the R-PM. Thus, the analysis is based on a systematic comparison of the following three groups: the L-M, L-PM, and the R-M.

A total of 72 dissimilarity coefficients has to be computed for each of the three surveys (3 groups to be compared to each other for each of the 8 issues). Results for all these three surveys point in the same direction:

The common party affiliation reduces the degree of conflict about the issue-agenda. The issue positions of the L-M, L-PM, and R-M come closer together when - as in our test-case - they are all Social Democrats. However, and this is the more important message, the degree of conflict reduction is small, indeed. Dissimilarities due to modes of political orientation are reduced by a third (32%) as far as the candidates are concerned. The respective conflict reduction is lower for the two population surveys: It is 26 per cent for the West-Berlin electorate, and 18 per cent for the electorate living within the boundaries of the strongholds of the Alternative List. Thus, although there certainly is an effect of party, the effect is low. Given this general result for a set of issue-items which are selected from the material-postmaterial issue-universe we are safe to conclude that the distribution of modes of political orientation within the political parties provides us with a valid indicator of intra-party conflict. And what it indicates is conflict about the issue-agenda within the Berlin Social Democratic Party as well as within the Berlin Free Democratic Party. A similar result for the Federal Republic is highly probable.

5 Change of the Party System?

A high degree of conflict has been observed for the Social Democrats since long (Feist et al. 1977). The growing support for the Social Democratic Party among the secularized new middle class since the programmatic reorientation of the party at Godesberg has steadily altered the distribution of modes of political orientation among their followers. And with the growing support the intra-party conflict potential was growing, too. However, for quite some time both the "old" Left and the "new" Left had found their political home in the traditional Left party of the German party system. In this sense Pappi and Terwey (1982) rightfully speak of a stable party system in the seventies. We think that this situation is changing today and that a sizeable part of the L-PM is tired of the "long march through the institutions"; they are looking out for a political movement of their own. But why does this change occur now and for what reasons?

For lack of over-time data we can only speculate about these questions. But we would be prepared to argue that the integrative capability of the Social Democratic Party had failed to "process" the different modes of political orientation of the L-M and the L-PM programmatically and to represent them convincingly. In addition, we have to take into account the high degree of political effectiveness of the "new" Left. No longer prepared to compromise and suffer frustration they play out their political skills.

There are some hints in our data that seem to justify the speculation. Those L-PM who have joined the Alternative List hold postmaterial issue positions in a much clearer fashion. Thus, those L-PM who are most concerned about the new issue-agenda might have left their old party first.

We can also observe that the L-PM is highly participation oriented. This he should be almost by definition but it is reassuring that the analysis bears it out so nicely (Tables 26 to 29 in the appendix). The action repertory typology (in a behavioral intention version) as developed by Barnes, Kaase et al. (1979) shows that the proportion of activists among the L-PM is about six times higher than among the L-M. But while there are 14 per cent activists among the Social Democratic L-PM we find this proportion to be 51 per cent among the L-PM who have supported the Alternative List.

The secularized, young, and educated have started to break up the traditional German party system to pursue their postmaterial issue-agenda. Their rather high political skills gives them a good chance to succeed.

Table 5

The Relation of Political Action Repertory to Modes of Political Orientation

Political Action Repertory	Modes of Political Orientation				Total
	Left	Left Post-	Right	Right Post-	
	Materialists	materialists	Materialists	materialists	
	%	%	%	%	%
<u>Electorate</u>					
<u>West-Berlin</u>					
Inactives	42	18	54	29	39
Conformists	25	13	26	32	22
Reformists	14	30	13	20	19
Activists	4	24	1	5	9
Protesters	15	15	6	14	11
N	133	245	378	59	815
<u>Electorate</u>					
<u>Strongholds of the Alternative Movement</u>					
Inactives	36	7	60	25	30
Conformists	26	5	18	19	14
Reformists	17	27	14	22	21
Activists	9	51	3	31	27
Protesters	12	10	5	3	8
N	65	172	131	32	400

Notes

- (1) The study is a collaborative effort of a research group of the Zentralinstitut für sozialwissenschaftliche Forschung (ZI6), Free University of Berlin, headed by Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Dietrich Herzog, and the Forschungsgruppe Wahlen e.V., Mannheim. The Berlin group is funded by the Stiftung Volkswagenwerk and the Free University of Berlin. The Second German Television Network provided funds for the Forschungsgruppe Wahlen e.V. This support is gratefully acknowledged.
- (2) Cases with missing values on either the left-right selfplacement scale or the material-postmaterial rank-order scale have been assigned to the L-PM (left or postmaterial response) and to the R-M (right or material response). Analysis of variance showed that there were no significant differences in the mean of a test variable.

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APPENDIX

Table 1

Symbolic Political Location: The Left-Right Selfanchoring Scale

	Candidates	Electorate	
		West-Berlin	Strongholds of the Alternative Movement
	%	%	%
Left	8	1	4
	11	4	7
	21	10	18
	14	14	17
	15	21	19
	16	18	16
	8	15	6
	5	10	9
	1	5	4
Right	1	2	0
N	875	785	366
Missing values	-	16%	18%

Table 2

Modes of Understanding of "Left" and "Right" in Politics. Federal Republic 1980

Modes of Understanding	Left %	Right %
Understanding in terms of:		
--- societal values	31	29
--- ideological movements	33	24
--- political parties	15	23
--- ideosyncratic understanding	6	9
--- no understanding	15	16
N	1864	1864

Table 3

Political Priorities: The Materialism - Postmaterialism Rank Order Scale

	Candidates	Electorate	
		West-Berlin	Strongholds of the Alternative Movement
	%	%	%
Materialists	17	33	20
Materialist/ Postmaterialist	28	29	30
Postmaterialist/ Materialist	28	17	23
Postmaterialists	27	21	27
N	847	855	421
Missing values	3%	9%	5%

Inglehart's 4 - item indicator was used for the surveys of the electorate (Materialist items: Kampf gegen die steigenden Preise; Aufrechterhaltung von Ruhe und Ordnung. Postmaterialist items: Schutz des Rechtes auf freie Meinungsäusserung; Mehr Einfluß der Bürger auf die Entscheidung der Regierung). In the candidate survey the item "Kampf gegen die steigenden Preise" (fight rising prices) was replaced by the item "Kampf gegen die Arbeitslosigkeit" (fight unemployment).

Table 4

Relation of Modes of Political Orientation to Social Class

Modes of Political Orientation	Old Middle Class	New Middle Class		Working Class	Total
		Managerial	Non-Managerial		
	%	%	%	%	%
<u>Candidates</u>					
Left Materialists	12	23	25	25	22
Left Postmaterialists	48	49	44	42	46
Right Materialists	24	18	22	19	21
Right Postmaterialists	16	10	9	14	11
N	111	346	247	59	763
<u>Electorate</u>					
<u>West-Berlin</u>					
Left Materialists	10	9	15	22	16
Left Postmaterialists	29	44	29	30	31
Right Materialists	53	40	47	44	46
Right Postmaterialists	8	7	9	4	7
N	92	93	373	295	853
<u>Electorate</u>					
<u>Strongholds of the Alternative Movement</u>					
Left Materialists	13	5	17	24	17
Left Postmaterialists	47	66	44	26	42
Right Materialists	24	17	32	46	33
Right Postmaterialists	16	12	7	4	8
N	55	59	162	137	413

Old middle class: Selbständige und Freie Berufe (self employed and the professions); New middle class, managerial: leitende und wissenschaftliche Angestellte, Beamte des gehobenen und höheren Dienstes (high qualified white collar workers and higher civil servants), New middle class, non-managerial: ausführende und qualifizierte Angestellte, Beamte des einfachen und mittleren Dienstes (lower qualified white collar workers and lower civil servants); Working class: un- oder angelernte Arbeiter und Facharbeiter (blue collar workers). Candidates: own occupation, if student or apprentice: fathers occupation. Electorate: own occupation, if housewives: occupation of head of household or father's occupation, respondents without occupation: father's occupation.

Table 5

Relation of Modes of Political Orientation to Union Membership

Modes of Political Orientation	Union Membership		
	Members	Non-Members	Total
	%	%	%
<u>Candidates</u>			
Left Materialists	24	20	22
Left Postmaterialists	49	42	46
Right Materialists	18	26	21
Right Postmaterialists	9	12	11
N	469	406	875
<u>Electorate</u>			
<u>West-Berlin</u>			
Left Materialists	26	14	16
Left Postmaterialists	37	30	31
Right Materialists	33	49	46
Right Postmaterialists	4	7	7
N	162	751	913
<u>Electorate</u>			
<u>Strongholds of the Alternative Movement</u>			
Left Materialists	23	14	16
Left Postmaterialists	48	41	43
Right Materialists	25	36	33
Right Postmaterialists	4	9	8
N	114	323	437

Table 6

Relation of Modes of Political Orientation to Denomination

Modes of Political Orientation	Denomination			Total
	Catholic	Protestant and others	No church affiliation	
	%	%	%	%
<u>Candidates</u>				
Left Materialists	25	23	21	22
Left Postmaterialists	25	41	60	46
Right Materialists	32	27	10	21
Right Postmaterialists	18	9	9	11
N	120	436	316	872
<u>Electorate</u>				
<u>West-Berlin</u>				
Left Materialists	11	17	17	16
Left Postmaterialists	25	30	43	31
Right Materialists	57	46	34	46
Right Postmaterialists	7	7	6	7
N	177	563	173	913
<u>Electorate</u>				
<u>Strongholds of the Alternative Movement</u>				
Left Materialists	13	22	10	16
Left Postmaterialists	28	34	68	43
Right Materialists	53	36	14	33
Right Postmaterialists	6	8	8	8
N	94	215	128	437

Table 7

Relation of Modes of Political Orientation to Church Attendance

Modes of Political Orientation	Church attendance				
	High	Medium	Low	No church affiliation	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
<u>Candidates</u>					
Left Materialists	25	22	24	21	22
Left Postmaterialists	29	41	49	60	46
Right Materialists	32	25	21	10	21
Right Postmaterialists	14	12	6	9	11
N	238	212	102	316	868
<u>Electorate</u>					
<u>West-Berlin</u>					
Left Materialists	15	16	15	17	16
Left Postmaterialists	22	26	39	43	31
Right Materialists	56	49	41	34	46
Right Postmaterialists	7	9	5	6	7
N	231	278	220	173	902
<u>Electorate</u>					
<u>Strongholds of the Alternative Movement</u>					
Left Materialists	14	28	14	10	16
Left Postmaterialists	12	23	48	68	43
Right Materialists	71	41	29	14	33
Right Postmaterialists	3	8	9	8	8
N	59	116	129	128	432

High church attendance: jeden Sonntag, fast jeden Sonntag und ab und zu (every Sunday, nearly every Sunday, here and then); medium church attendance: einmal im Jahr und seltener (once a year, less than once a year); low church attendance: nie (never).

Table 8

Relation of Modes of Political Orientation to Education

Modes of Political Orientation	Education			Total
	Low	Medium	High	
	%	%	%	%
<u>Candidates</u>				
Left Materialists	31	23	20	22
Left Postmaterialists	31	38	52	46
Right Materialists	30	27	17	21
Right Postmaterialists	8	12	11	11
N	156	163	552	871
<u>Electorate</u>				
<u>West Berlin</u>				
Left Materialists	18	11	14	16
Left Postmaterialists	24	31	57	31
Right Materialists	52	46	25	46
Right Postmaterialists	6	12	4	7
N	532	215	166	913
<u>Electorate</u>				
<u>Strongholds of the Alternative Movement</u>				
Left Materialists	23	15	9	16
Left Postmaterialists	21	43	69	43
Right Materialists	48	38	13	33
Right Postmaterialists	8	4	9	8
N	194	84	159	437

Low education: Volksschule ohne und mit abgeschlossener Lehre (compulsory level); Medium: Mittelschule, Oberschule ohne Abitur, Fachschule, Handelsschule (secondary level); High: Abitur, Hochschule, Universität (university level).

Table 9

Relation of Modes of Political Orientation to Period of Political Socialization

Modes of Political Orientation	Weimar and earlier	National-Socialism	Bonn, CDU dominance	Bonn, SPD dominance	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
<u>Candidates</u>					
Left Materialists	22	22	24	13	22
Left Postmaterialists	37	37	47	59	46
Right Materialists	35	29	18	20	21
Right Postmaterialists	6	12	11	8	11
N	51	161	565	98	875

Electorate

West-Berlin

Left Materialists	20	13	16	12	12
Left Postmaterialists	11	16	37	56	35
Right Materialists	65	64	38	24	46
Right Postmaterialists	4	7	9	8	7
N	243	148	300	222	913

Electorate

Strongholds of the Alternative Movement

Left Materialists	17	14	27	9	16
Left Postmaterialists	4	12	45	63	43
Right Materialists	72	69	21	19	33
Right Postmaterialists	7	5	7	9	8
N	71	42	132	192	437

Weimar and earlier: - 1932; National Socialism: 1933-1945; Bonn, CDU-dominance: 1946-1965; Bonn, SPD-dominance: 1966 - . The "formative years" were defined from age 10 to age 18. A respondent was assigned to that period in which he spent at least 5 years when he was 10 to 18 years old. The actual age at the time of the survey was: Weimar and earlier: 63 and older; National Socialism: 50-62 years old; Bonn, CDU-dominance: 30-49 years old; Bonn, SPD-dominance: 18-29 years old.

Table 10

The Issue Agenda: The Welfare State

Issue Position	Modes of Political Orientation				Total
	Left Materialists	Left Post-materialists	Right Materialists	Right Post-materialists	
	%	%	%	%	%
<u>Candidates</u>					
Improve the Welfare State	34	41	12	10	30
Stay as is	55	47	55	64	52
Individuals should take care of themselves	11	12	33	26	18
N	192	391	185	92	860
<u>Electorate</u>					
<u>West-Berlin</u>					
Improve the Welfare State	39	39	29	23	34
Stay as is	53	54	59	60	56
Individuals should take care of themselves	8	7	12	17	10
N	144	282	418	64	908
<u>Electorate</u>					
<u>Strongholds of the Alternative Movement</u>					
Improve the Welfare State	38	57	35	36	45
Stay as is	58	39	55	55	49
Individuals should take care of themselves	4	4	10	9	6
N	72	185	145	33	435

Question wording: "Die Bundesrepublik und Berlin werden als Sozialstaat angesehen. Darunter versteht man Schutzmaßnahmen des Staates für die Bürger, damit diese z.B. bei Arbeitslosigkeit, Krankheit oder im Alter nicht in Not geraten. Die Berufstätigen müssen dafür Arbeitslosen- und Kranken- und Sozialversicherung zahlen. Was meinen Sie: Sollten derartige sozialstaatliche Maßnahmen: (1) noch stärker ausgebaut werden; (2) gerade so bleiben wie sie jetzt sind oder (3) sollen jeder einzelne für sich selbst sorgen?"

Table 11

The Issue Agenda of the SPD: The Welfare State

Issue Position	Modes of Political Orientation				SPD Total
	Left	Left Post-	Right	Right Post-	
	Materialists	materialists	Materialists	materialists	
	%	%	%	%	%
<u>Candidates</u>					
Improve the Welfare State	44	45	19	*	41
Stay as is	50	52	64	*	53
Individuals should take care of themselves	6	3	17	*	6
N	121	188	42	28	379
<u>Electorate</u>					
<u>West-Berlin</u>					
Improve the Welfare State	38	30	36	*	34
Stay as is	55	62	57	*	59
Individuals should take care of themselves	7	8	7	*	8
N	112	152	82	11	357
<u>Electorate</u>					
<u>Strongholds of the Alternative Movement</u>					
Improve the Welfare State	31	33	60	*	37
Stay as is	67	62	40	*	59
Individuals should take care of themselves	2	5	-	*	4
N	55	63	30	9	157

Question wording: "Die Bundesrepublik und Berlin werden als Sozialstaat angesehen. Darunter versteht man Schutzmaßnahmen des Staates für die Bürger, damit diese z.B. bei Arbeitslosigkeit, Krankheit oder im Alter nicht in Not geraten. Die Berufstätigen müssen dafür Arbeitslosen- und Kranken- und Sozialversicherung zahlen. Was meinen Sie: SOLLTE derartige sozialstaatliche Maßnahmen: (1) noch stärker ausgebaut werden; (2) gerade so bleiben wie sie jetzt sind oder (3) sollte jeder stärker für sich selbst sorgen?"

Table 12

The Issue Agenda: The Relative Importance of "More Influence for Trade Unions"

Degree of Importance	Modes of Political Orientation				Total
	Left Materialists	Left Post- materialists	Right Materialists	Right Post- materialists	
	%	%	%	%	%
<u>Candidates</u>					
Very important	10	9	3	2	7
Important	33	33	12	10	26
Not so important	57	58	85	88	67
N	189	374	172	90	825
<u>Electorate</u>					
<u>West-Berlin</u>					
Very important	12	9	5	3	7
Important	41	45	24	33	34
Not so important	47	46	71	64	59
N	145	282	416	63	906
<u>Electorate</u>					
<u>Strongholds of the Alternative Movement</u>					
Very important	10	14	9	15	12
Important	35	40	17	21	30
Not so important	55	46	74	64	58
N	72	187	145	33	437

Item wording: "Die Gewerkschaften sollten in unserer Gesellschaft mehr Einfluß erhalten."

Table 13

The Issue Agenda of the SPD: The Importance of "More Influence for Trade Unions"

Degree of Importance	Modes of Political Orientation				SPD Total
	Left	Left Post-	Right	Right Post	
	Materialists	materialists	Materialists	materialists	
	%	%	%	%	%
<u>Candidates</u>					
Very important	14	11	10	*	12
Important	45	52	46	*	47
Not so important	41	37	44	*	41
N	118	177	39	27	361
<u>Electorate</u>					
<u>West-Berlin</u>					
Very important	14	11	10	+	12
Important	36	51	29	*	41
Not so important	50	38	61	*	47
N	113	152	82	11	358
<u>Electorate</u>					
<u>Strongholds of the Alternative Movement</u>					
Very important	11	15	10	*	13
Important	36	48	17	*	37
Not so important	53	37	73	*	50
N	55	65	30	9	159

Item wording: "Die Gewerkschaften sollten in unserer Gesellschaft mehr Einfluß erhalten."

* = too few cases

Table 14

The Issue Agenda: The Relative Importance of Technological Progress and Economic Growth

Degree of Importance	Modes of Political Orientation				Total
	Left Materialists	Left Post-materialists	Right Materialists	Right Post-materialists	
	%	%	%	%	%
<u>Candidates</u>					
Very important	13	5	29	20	14
Important	43	21	48	48	34
Not so important	44	74	23	32	52
N	188	378	174	90	830
<u>Electorate</u>					
<u>West-Berlin</u>					
Very important	20	10	26	16	19
Important	51	37	57	66	50
Not so important	29	53	17	18	31
N	144	283	419	64	910
<u>Electorate</u>					
<u>Strongholds of the Alternative Movement</u>					
Very important	22	10	35	33	22
Important	43	17	48	18	32
Not so important	35	73	17	49	46
N	72	186	145	33	436

Item wording: "Der technische Fortschritt und das wirtschaftliche Wachstum sollten unbedingt weitergehen."

Table 15

The Issue Agenda of the SPD: The Importance of Technological Progress and Economic Growth

Degree of Importance	Modes of Political Orientation				SPD Total
	Left	Left Post-	Right	Right Post-	
	Materialists	materialists	Materialists	materialists	
	%	%	%	%	%
<u>Candidates</u>					
Very important	8	6	27	*	10
Important	43	25	42	*	35
Not so important	49	69	31	*	55
N	118	183	41	28	370
<u>Electorate</u>					
<u>West-Berlin</u>					
Very important	20	11	18	*	16
Important	52	48	53	*	51
Not so important	28	41	29	*	33
N	112	153	82	11	358
<u>Electorate</u>					
<u>Strongholds of the Alternative Movement</u>					
Very important	25	15	33	*	23
Important	46	29	53	*	40
Not so important	29	56	14	*	37
N	55	65	30	9	159

Item wording: "Der technische Fortschritt und das wirtschaftliche Wachstum sollten unbedingt weitergehen."

* = too few cases

Table 16

The Issue Agenda: The Relative Importance of Nuclear Energy

Degree of Importance	Modes of Political Orientation				Total
	Left	Left Post-	Right	Right Post-	
	Materialists	materialists	Materialists	materialists	
	%	%	%	%	%
<u>Candidates</u>					
Very important	16	7	49	34	21
Important	36	19	42	42	30
Not so important	48	74	9	24	49
N	185	383	176	89	833
<u>Electorate</u>					
<u>West-Berlin</u>					
Very important	22	10	23	20	19
Important	38	23	47	58	39
Not so important	40	67	30	22	42
N	143	281	416	64	904
<u>Electorate</u>					
<u>Strongholds of the Alternative Movement</u>					
Very important	22	4	46	24	22
Important	32	10	35	21	23
Not so important	46	86	19	55	55
N	72	187	145	33	437

Item wording: "Die Energieversorgung sollte auch durch die Nutzung von Atomkraft gesichert werden."

Table 17

The Issue Agenda of the SPD: The Importance of Nuclear Energy

Degree of Importance	Modes of Political Orientation				SPD Total
	Left Materialists	Left Post-materialists	Right Materialists	Right Post-materialists	
	%	%	%	%	%
<u>Candidates</u>					
Very important	6	6	44	*	12
Important	34	21	39	*	29
Not so important	60	73	17	*	59
N	116	182	41	27	366
<u>Electorate</u>					
<u>West-Berlin</u>					
Very important	23	13	15	*	16
Important	42	30	45	*	38
Not so important	35	57	40	*	46
N	111	151	82	11	355
<u>Electorate</u>					
<u>Strongholds of the Alternative Movement</u>					
Very important	24	9	33	*	18
Important	35	22	47	*	32
Not so important	41	69	20	*	50
N	55	65	30	9	159

Item wording: "Die Energieversorgung sollte auch durch die Nutzung von Atomkraft gesichert werden."

* = too few cases

Table 18

The Issue Agenda: The Relative Importance of "Law and Order"

Degree of Importance	Modes of Political Orientation				Total
	Left	Left Post-	Right	Right Post-	
	Materialists	materialists	Materialists	materialists	
	%	%	%	%	%
<u>Candidates</u>					
Very important	11	1	35	9	11
Important	20	9	42	39	22
Not so important	69	90	23	52	67
N	184	378	174	88	824
<u>Electorate</u>					
<u>West-Berlin</u>					
Very important	23	5	40	12	24
Important	43	17	42	50	35
Not so important	34	78	18	38	41
N	145	281	419	64	909
<u>Electorate</u>					
<u>Strongholds of the Alternative Movement</u>					
Very important	17	2	44	24	20
Important	22	9	32	21	20
Not so important	61	89	24	55	60
N	72	187	145	33	437

Item wording: "Die staatlichen Ordnungskräfte sollten weiter ausgebaut werden, um Sicherheit und Ordnung zu gewährleisten."

Table 19

The Issue Agenda of the SPD: The Importance of "Law and Order"

Degree of Importance	Modes of Political Orientation				SPD Total
	Left	Left Post-	Right	Right Post-	
	Materialists	materialists	Materialists	materialists	
	%	%	%	%	%
<u>Candidates</u>					
Very important	5	0	28	*	6
Important	16	12	33	*	17
Not so important	79	88	39	*	77
N	115	182	39	27	363
<u>Electorate</u>					
<u>West-Berlin</u>					
Very important	24	7	27	*	17
Important	49	21	45	*	36
Not so important	27	72	28	*	47
N	113	152	82	11	358
<u>Electorate</u>					
<u>Strongholds of the Alternative Movement</u>					
Very important	18	3	27	*	13
Important	22	17	37	*	24
Not so important	60	80	36	*	63
N	55	65	30	9	159

Item wording: "Die staatlichen Ordnungskräfte sollten weiter ausgebaut werden, um Sicherheit und Ordnung zu gewährleisten."

* = too few cases

Table 20

The Issue Agenda: Roads to Peace and Security in Europe

Issue Position	Modes of Political Orientation				Total
	Left	Left Post	Right	Right Post-	
	Materialists	materialists	Materialists	materialists	
	%	%	%	%	%
<u>Candidates</u>					
Strong NATO	17	5	52	34	21
Arms limitation	61	51	42	57	52
Dissolve military alliances/nuclear free zone	22	44	6	9	27
N	193	397	185	91	866
<u>Electorate</u>					
<u>West-Berlin</u>					
Strong NATO	48	13	57	37	41
Arms limitation	32	38	31	41	34
Dissolve military alliances/nuclear free zone	20	49	12	22	25
N	143	277	414	63	897
<u>Electorate</u>					
<u>Strongholds of the Alternative Movement</u>					
Strong NATO	33	4	47	36	25
Arms limitation	43	30	28	24	31
Dissolve military alliances/nuclear free zone	24	66	25	40	44
N	70	186	145	33	434

Question wording: "In Europa stehen sich (das westliche Militärbündnis), die NATO und (das östliche Militärbündnis), der Warschauer Pakt, gegenüber. Es gibt drei unterschiedliche Positionen, wie der Frieden und die Sicherheit in Europa aufrechterhalten werden können. Welcher neigen Sie am ehesten zu?

- (1) Mit einer starken NATO als Gegengewicht zum Warschauer Pakt.
- (2) Mit einer Rüstungsbegrenzung von NATO und Warschauer Pakt.
- (3) Mit der Auflösung von NATO und Warschauer Pakt und der Schaffung einer atomwaffenfreien Zone in Europa.

Table 21

The Issue Agenda of the SPD: Roads to Peace and Security

Issue Position	Modes of Political Orientation					SPD Total
	Left	Left Post-	Right	Right Post-		
	Materialists	materialists	Materialists	materialists		
	%	%	%	%		%
<u>Candidates</u>						
Strong NATO	6	2	12	*		6
Arms limitation	69	63	74	*		67
Dissolve military alliances/nuclear free zone	25	35	14	*		27
N	121	188	43	28		380
<u>Electorate</u>						
<u>West-Berlin</u>						
Strong NATO	50	17	32	*		32
Arms limitation	33	47	48	*		43
Dissolve military alliances/nuclear free zone	17	36	20	*		25
N	112	149	81	11		353
<u>Electorate</u>						
<u>Strongholds of the Alternative Movement</u>						
Strong NATO	37	8	23	*		23
Arms limitation	43	55	37	*		46
Dissolve military alliances/nuclear free zone	20	37	40	*		31
N	54	64	30	9		157

Question wording: "In Europa stehen sich (das westliche Militärbündnis), die NATO und (das östliche Militärbündnis), der Warschauer Pakt, gegenüber. Es gibt drei unterschiedliche Positionen, wie der Frieden und die Sicherheit in Europa aufrechterhalten werden können. Welcher neigen Sie am ehesten zu?

- (1) Mit einer starken NATO als Gegengewicht zum Warschauer Pakt.
- (2) Mit einer Rüstungsbegrenzung von NATO und Warschauer Pakt.
- (3) Mit der Auflösung von NATO und Warschauer Pakt und der Schaffung einer atomwaffenfreien Zone in Europa.

Table 22

The Issue Agenda: The Relative Importance of Citizen Participation

Degree of Importance	Modes of Political Orientation				
	Left Materialists	Left Post- materialists	Right Materialists	Right Post- materialists	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
<u>Candidates</u>					
Very important	18	56	12	24	35
Important	56	38	43	50	44
Not so important	26	6	45	26	21
N	190	387	173	92	842
<u>Electorate</u>					
<u>West-Berlin</u>					
Very important	21	59	14	42	31
Important	60	37	59	50	52
Not so important	19	4	27	8	17
N	145	282	419	64	910
<u>Electorate</u>					
<u>Strongholds of the Alternative Movement</u>					
Very important	22	71	23	91	48
Important	57	28	51	3	39
Not so important	21	1	26	6	13
N	72	187	145	33	437

Item wording: "Die Bürger sollten mehr Mitsprache bei politischen Entscheidungen haben."

Table 23

The Issue Agenda of the SPD: Importance of Citizen Participation

Degree of Importance	Modes of Political Orientation				SPD Total
	Left	Left Post-	Right	Right Post-	
	Materialists	materialists	Materialists	materialists	
	%	%	%	%	%
<u>Candidates</u>					
Very important	14	43	10	*	29
Important	60	48	41	*	51
Not so important	26	9	49	*	20
N	119	186	39	28	372
<u>Electorate</u>					
<u>West-Berlin</u>					
Very important	19	52	19	*	33
Important	62	41	49	*	51
Not so important	19	7	32	*	16
N	113	152	82	11	358
<u>Electorate</u>					
<u>Strongholds of</u>					
<u>the Alternative</u>					
<u>Movement</u>					
Very important	18	55	13	*	36
Important	60	45	50	*	48
Not so important	22	-	37	*	16
N	55	65	30	9	159

Item wording: "Die Bürger sollten mehr Mitsprache bei politischen Entscheidungen haben"

* = too few cases

Table 24

The Issue Agenda: The Relative Importance of Political Parties and Citizen Initiatives

Degree of Importance	Modes of Political Orientation				Total
	Left	Left Post-	Right	Right Post-	
	Materialists	materialists	Materialists	materialists	
	%	%	%	%	%
<u>Candidates</u>					
Very important	3	14	1	1	7
Important	9	17	3	9	12
Not so important	88	69	96	90	31
N	186	375	176	90	827
<u>Electorate</u>					
<u>West-Berlin</u>					
Very important	11	21	5	9	11
Important	30	49	24	40	34
Not so important	59	30	71	51	55
N	145	279	412	63	899
<u>Electorate</u>					
<u>Strongholds of the Alternative Movement</u>					
Very important	15	46	9	49	29
Important	28	39	19	18	29
Not so important	57	15	72	33	42
N	72	186	145	33	436

Item wording: "Parteien sollten weniger Einfluß haben, Bürgerinitiativen dagegen mehr."

Table 25

The Issue Agenda of the SPD: Importance of Political Parties and Citizen Initiatives

Degree of importance	Modes of Political Orientation				
	Left Materialists	Left Post-materialists	Right Materialists	Right Post-materialists	SPD Total
	%	%	%	%	%
<u>Candidates</u>					
Very important	1	1	-	*	1
Important	8	11	5	*	8
Not so important	91	88	95	*	91
N	115	179	42	27	363
<u>Electorate</u>					
<u>West-Berlin</u>					
Very important	11	9	5	*	9
Important	28	53	29	*	39
Not so important	61	38	66	*	52
N	113	150	79	10	352
<u>Electorate</u>					
<u>Strongholds of the Alternative Movement</u>					
Very important	7	20	3	*	14
Important	24	45	23	*	33
Not so important	69	35	74	*	53
N	55	65	30	9	159

Item wording: "Parteien sollten weniger Einfluß haben, Bürgerinitiativen dagegen mehr."

* = too few cases

Table 26

Relation of Selected Indicators of Political Participation to Modes of Political Orientation

Indicators of Political Participation	Modes of Political Orientation				
	Left Materialists	Left Post-materialists	Right Materialists	Right Post-materialists	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
<u>Electorate</u>					
<u>West-Berlin</u>					
Strong and very strong political interest	27 (145)	55 (282)	33 (414)	37 (64)	39 (905)
Intention to vote in '81 Berlin election	88 (145)	92 (285)	87 (419)	84 (64)	89 (913)
Signing of petition (Volksbegehren)	10 (145)	22 (284)	19 (418)	27 (64)	19 (911)
<u>Electorate</u>					
<u>Strongholds of the Alternative Movement</u>					
Strong and very strong political interest	47 (70)	75 (181)	32 (143)	58 (33)	55 (427)
Intention to vote in '81 Berlin election	88 (72)	93 (187)	74 (145)	85 (33)	81 (437)
Signing of petition (Volksbegehren)	11 (72)	48 (187)	21 (145)	39 (33)	32 (437)

Table 27

The Relation of Conventional Political Participation to Modes of Political Orientation (Guttman scale)

Conventional Political Participation	Modes of Political Orientation				Total
	Left	Left Post-	Right	Right Post-	
	Materialists	materialists	Materialists	materialists	
	%	%	%	%	%
<u>Electorate</u>					
<u>West-Berlin</u>					
No participation	24	9	23	11	18
Read about politics	34	23	38	31	33
Discuss politics	20	26	18	20	21
Convince friends	10	21	12	19	15
Attend campaign meetings	5	14	6	11	8
Campaign for candidates or party	7	7	3	8	5
N	140	270	411	64	885

Electorate

Strongholds of
the Alternative
Movement

No participation	8	6	23	3	12
Read about politics	39	11	42	28	27
Discuss politics	14	21	7	24	16
Convince friends	16	17	11	12	14
Attend campaign meetings	4	20	8	6	12
Campaign for candidates or party	19	25	9	27	19
N	70	185	139	33	427

Table 28

The Relation of Unconventional Political Participation Disposition
to Modes of Political Orientation (Guttman scale)

Unconventional Political Participation	Modes of Political Orientation				Total
	Left	Left Post-	Right	Right Post-	
	Materialists	materialists	Materialists	materialists	
	%	%	%	%	%
<u>Electorate</u>					
<u>West-Berlin</u>					
No participation	45	22	56	42	42
Signing petitions	22	10	24	19	19
Joining in citizen initiatives	14	17	15	22	16
Lawful demonstrations	10	15	3	5	8
Boycotts	4	12	1	5	5
Blocking traffic	1	6	-	3	3
Refusing to pay rent or taxes	3	7	1	2	3
Occupying buildings	1	11	-	2	4
N	135	259	384	59	837

<u>Electorate</u>					
<u>Strongholds of the Alternative Movement</u>					
No participation	54	7	61	35	35
Signing petitions	9	5	17	9	10
Joining in citizen initiatives	16	9	11	3	10
Lawful demonstrations	10	14	4	16	10
Boycotts	2	12	4	3	7
Blocking traffic	8	10	1	25	8
Refusing to pay rent or taxes	1	10	1	6	6
Occupying buildings	-	33	1	3	14
N	67	173	133	32	405

Table 29

Relation of Potential for Political Violence to Modes of Political Orientation

Potential for Political Violence	Modes of Political Orientation				Total
	Left	Left Post-	Right	Right Post-	
	Materialists	materialists	Materialists	materialists	
	%	%	%	%	%
<u>Electorate</u>					
<u>West-Berlin</u>					
Damaging property or personal violence	4 (136)	15 (267)	1 (407)	5 (60)	6 (870)
<u>Electorate</u>					
<u>Strongholds of the Alternative Movement</u>					
Damaging property or personal violence	6 (67)	35 (172)	3 (140)	26 (31)	18 (410)