Neuhoff, Karsten et al.

Working Paper
A coordinated strategic reserve to safeguard the European energy transition

DIW Discussion Papers, No. 1495

Provided in Cooperation with: German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin)

Suggested Citation: Neuhoff, Karsten et al. (2015) : A coordinated strategic reserve to safeguard the European energy transition, DIW Discussion Papers, No. 1495, Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW), Berlin

This Version is available at:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/112279

Terms of use:
Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal and scholarly purposes.
You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public.

If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence.
A Coordinated Strategic Reserve to Safeguard the European Energy Transition

Karsten Neuhoff, Jochen Diekmann, Friedrich Kunz, Sophia Rüster, Wolf-Peter Schill and Sebastian Schwenen
A Coordinated Strategic Reserve to Safeguard the European Energy Transition

Karsten Neuhoff*, Jochen Diekmann**, Friedrich Kunz**, Sophia Rüster*, Wolf-Peter Schill**,#, Sebastian Schwenen*

June 2015

Abstract: In Germany and beyond, various capacity mechanisms are currently being discussed with a view to improving the security of electricity supply. One of these mechanisms is a strategic reserve that retains generation capacity for use in times of critical supply shortage. We argue that strategic reserves have specific advantages compared to other capacity mechanisms in the context of the European energy transition. To date, however, the debate on capacity mechanisms has largely been restricted to national contexts. Against this background, we discuss the feasibility and potential benefits of coordinated cross-border strategic reserves to safeguard electricity supply and aid the energy transition in Germany and neighboring countries at large. Setting aside strategic reserve capacity which is deployed only in the event of extreme supply shortages could improve the security of electricity supply without distorting the EU's internal electricity market. In addition, overall costs may decrease when reserve procurement and activation are coordinated among countries, particularly if combined with flow-based market coupling.

JEL: D47, L51, Q48

Keywords: Capacity mechanisms, strategic reserve, market design, energy policy, energy transition

The authors gratefully acknowledge research grants from the German Ministry of Economic Affairs and Energy ("EUREEM", FKZ 03MAP274) and Stiftung Mercator ("MASMIE“ and “Strommarkt der Zukunft”).

* Climate Policy Department, German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin), Mohrenstraße 58, 10117 Berlin.
** Department of Energy, Transportation, Environment, German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin), Mohrenstraße 58, 10117 Berlin.
# Corresponding author.
1 Introduction

The massive expansion of renewable energy sources in the power sector is a cornerstone of the German energy transition (Energiewende). Germany aims to increase the share of renewables in gross power consumption to 40-45 % in 2020, 55-60 % in 2030 and to at least 80 % by 2050.\(^1\) In 2014, this share was around 28 %, up from only around 3 % in the early 1990s (Figure 1). In EU 28, the respective share was 25.4 % in 2013 according to Eurostat data.

Due to limited potentials of dispatchable renewable sources like hydro power, biomass, and geothermal energy in the German market area, achieving such renewable targets requires drawing on fluctuating renewable sources such as wind power and photovoltaics (PV) to a large extent. Due to the fluctuating nature of these sources, several issues of market and system integration as well as security of supply arise. In particular, additional wind turbines and PV modules cause residual load to decrease substantially in many hours of the year, but hardly contribute to firm capacity (Schill, 2014). Accordingly, other dispatchable capacities, storage, and demand response are required to ensure security of supply. Against this background, the question of how to secure adequate generation capacity – which energy economists have discussed for many years – gains importance.

The transition to a low-carbon power market is a European rather than a German policy ambition only, and the European power market integration is advancing. Likewise, the question on how to guarantee secure supply is discussed among academics and

\(^1\) These targets are explicitly stated in the German Renewable Energy Sources Act of 2014, §1.
policymakers not only in Germany, but in most if not all European countries today. The regulatory toolkit to ensure power supply entails several means which are referred to as capacity mechanisms – mechanisms that pay for the continuous availability of power generating capacity. An overview of capacity mechanisms is provided by FERC (2013), and CREG (2012).

Capacity mechanisms come in different forms, one of which is a strategic reserve. A strategic reserve sets aside sufficient reserve capacity—a given amount of firm generation capacity—for exceptional situations when existing commercial capacity cannot cover demand. An alternative to this are capacity markets which create a separate market segment, where capacity payments ensure that the specified firm power generation capacity is available for a defined period of time. Currently, the UK and most U.S. power markets have some form of a capacity market in place, whereas many countries in continental Europe have not.

This article gives an introduction to the debate around capacity mechanisms in the context of the German energy transition and discusses the specifics of a strategic reserve. We discuss, for instance, the definition of the capacity to be set aside, the question of how the capacity will be procured, and the trigger mechanism for activating the reserve. We also present concepts for cross-border coordination of strategic reserves. To this end, we illustrate the implications of a coordinated cross-border strategic reserve both in a two country case and multiple country setting.

We argue that installing a strategic reserve is a superior option in the context of the German energy transition compared to the introduction of capacity markets. We further propose that cross-border coordination of strategic reserves is not only feasible, but has the potential to reduce costs for guaranteeing a given level of security of supply. Amongst others, costs decrease as less reserves are needed due to balancing of supply and demand fluctuations across large areas and due to a larger sample of plants to choose from. Further, the benefits of coordination improve for flow-based market coupling.

In the following, we first provide the rationale for introducing capacity mechanisms. In section three, we introduce the concepts that are discussed in Germany and argue that strategic reserves are a reasonable concept to be applied in the current situation. Section four presents a brief presentation of selected international experiences with strategic reserves. In sections five and six, we discuss important design elements of strategic reserves and how these could be coordinated and managed jointly across country borders. Section seven includes a stylized numerical model illustration on the implications of coordinated strategic reserves in a two-country and a multi-country setting. The final section concludes.
2 Rationale for capacity mechanisms

The academic debate on the requirement for and the design of capacity mechanisms did not start with the German energy transition, but originated in the context of power market restructuring, which took place since the early 1990s in many countries around the world (Sioshansi and Pfaffenberger 2006). In electricity spot markets, the price is usually determined by the marginal costs of the most expensive operating plant. Yet such prices generally only cover the marginal costs, but not the capacity costs of generators. According to peak load pricing theory, all generators cover their capacity costs at least partly not only by inframarginal rents, but also by scarcity rents in a long-run equilibrium (Stoft 2002). Scarcity rents occur in peak hours when generation capacity is exhausted\(^2\) and prices rise above marginal costs, only limited by price-elastic demand. A power market that draws on scarcity prices for financing generation capacities is referred to as an “energy only” market.

Yet the feasibility of energy only markets is put into question for a number of reasons (Cramton et al. 2013). Most importantly, it has been argued that the demand-side in power markets is far from robust. Most consumers cannot respond to short-term fluctuations of wholesale prices, and consumers typically cannot be curtailed selectively. Accordingly, electricity demand may not be sufficiently price-elastic in order to ensure market clearing during scarcity events (Joskow and Tirole 2007). In addition, power markets are generally vulnerable to the exertion of market power, particularly during peak demand, and the political acceptability of scarcity prices may be low. Implicit or explicit price caps are therefore present in many electricity markets. This gives rise to a missing money problem, according to which the scarcity rents necessary to sustain the power plant portfolio cannot be earned by investors.\(^3\) Accordingly, adequate capacity may have to be ensured by additional measures.

Yet in reality, the missing money problem may be mitigated by an increasingly flexible demand-side, which could be enabled, for example, by smart grid innovations and advances in information and communication technologies. What is more, spot prices may in fact be higher than short-run marginal costs in real-world power markets, for example because of market power exertion, or because actual market participants do not behave as under textbook assumptions. In addition, it may be possible for generators to cover some part of the fixed costs by additional revenues from the co-generation of heat, or from the provision of balancing reserves as well as other ancillary services. Finally, long-term contracts can mitigate spot price risks in bilateral markets. If most of the power demand is hedged for one

\(^2\) In practice, scarcity rents may already occur before capacity is exhausted, e.g., in case of a contingency, or if some predetermined reserve margin is enforced by the system operator.

\(^3\) In fact, the missing money problem may already realize without the existence of price caps, if investors only expect that future scarcity prices will be suppressed by regulatory interventions or technical measures by system operators.
year or even longer, as is currently the case in Germany, the practical relevance of scarcity prices in the spot market may be small, and regulatory interventions are less likely.

In the German debate on the requirement of capacity mechanisms, such fundamental considerations coincide with other aspects. On the one hand, the expansion of wind and solar power, which have nearly zero marginal costs, depresses average wholesale prices. In case of renewable surplus generation, prices can fall to zero or even become negative in the presence of binding flexibility restrictions of thermal generators or production-based renewable support schemes. Yet in other periods, in which fluctuating renewable generators produce less, the marginal costs of conventional generators still set the price. The build-up of renewables thus does not fundamentally challenge the functioning of the energy-only market per se; yet it tends to increase price volatility and the relevance of scarcity prices. On the other hand, currently there is excess generation capacity not only in Germany, but in many European countries (ENTSO-E 2014). This is caused by many factors. First, much of the current thermal generation portfolio has been built under the old regime of regulated regional monopolies, which tended to install excess capacity. Second, European market integration and the advances in international exchanges increased the efficiency of the capacity usage. Moreover, power consumption is below former projections in several countries, partly as a result of the recent economic crisis. What is more, plant owners may avoid short-term costs and barriers related to shutting down power plants. The ongoing debate on the introduction of capacity mechanisms may also provide incentives to keep some plants online.

3 Capacity mechanisms discussed in Germany

While capacity mechanisms come in many forms in power markets around the world, four types have drawn particular attention by politicians, market participants and researchers alike in the German debate (Table 1). The different types can be distinguished, amongst others, with respect to the responsibility for capacity planning and procurement, selection of plants, participation in the wholesale market, and important regulatory parameters.

4 The overview is based on Neuhoff et al. (2013b). There are many other forms of capacity mechanisms, for example, decentralized capacity obligations as proposed by Frontier and Formaat (2013). In centrally dispatched power markets, an operative reserve demand curve may also be applied (Hogan 2013).
Table 1: Types of capacity mechanisms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strategic reserve</th>
<th>Capacity market with reliability options</th>
<th>Focused capacity market with reliability options</th>
<th>Decentralized capacity market</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Capacity planning and procurement</strong></td>
<td>Centralized</td>
<td>Centralized</td>
<td>Centralized</td>
<td>Decentralized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Selection of plants</strong></td>
<td>No / limited</td>
<td>No*</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Participation in wholesale market</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type of market</strong></td>
<td>Auction / bilateral</td>
<td>Auction Call option</td>
<td>Auction Call option</td>
<td>Exchange</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Product</strong></td>
<td>Reserve capacity, trigger price, activation rule</td>
<td>Firm capacity, strike price</td>
<td>Firm capacity, strike price</td>
<td>Reliability certificate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regulatory parameters</strong></td>
<td>Allocation</td>
<td>Allocation</td>
<td>Allocation</td>
<td>Market price</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Financing mechanism</strong></td>
<td>Temporary or permanent</td>
<td>Permanent</td>
<td>Permanent</td>
<td>Permanent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Time horizon</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* There may be differentiation between existing and new plants with respect to the duration of the contracts, but not with respect to capacity payments.

### 3.1 Strategic reserves

Different types of strategic reserves have been proposed to be applied in Germany, for example, by Consentec (2012), BMU et al. (2013), and BMWi (2014).\(^5\) A strategic reserve sets aside a certain volume of generation capacity which is then not available on the wholesale energy market. Instead, this reserve capacity is typically sold at a high predefined trigger price on spot markets, or times of exceptional scarcity, when available capacity is unable to cover demand. With a strategic reserve comprising a pool of select power plants financed and used separately, combined with a provision that reserve capacities may never return to the wholesale market, distortions on the electricity market are intended to be minimized.

An independent regulator centrally sets the volume of the reserve and also procures the respective capacities, preferably in an auction. In doing so, some selection of plants is possible, for example, with respect to existing or new plants. The operators of the selected

\(^5\) A related concept of a reserve, a so-called safety net (Fangnetz) has been proposed by a German transmission system operator (E-Bridge (2014). In contrast to a classic strategic reserve, it is intended to be in place only for a short period of time, and capacities may return to the wholesale market afterwards.
plants receive remuneration for the reserved capacity. To ensure that power plant operators are willing to provide reserve capacity, the payment they receive must cover at least the opportunity costs of earnings on the spot market. At the same time, variable costs of dispatching reserve capacities have to be reimbursed, for example, calculated on the basis of the bids submitted during procurement of the respective capacities. What remains is the difference between the electricity price of the dispatch period (trigger price or higher) and the variable costs. This difference, which constitutes a kind of revenue for the system operator in charge of dispatching the reserve, is deducted from the fixed costs, and the remaining costs or any remaining revenue is—as is the case with network access charges—allocated to consumers.

A strategic reserve can take many different forms, depending on the procurement process, the trigger price, the activation mechanism, the structure of the capacity payment mechanism, and the time horizon. For example, the reserve may either be installed as a permanent solution (e.g., BMU et al. 2013), or for a transitory period, as recently proposed by the German government in the so-called green book on power market design (BMWi 2014). If one assumes that capacity mechanisms may not be required permanently, but only for some time until the demand-side becomes more flexible, strategic reserves appear to be favourable compared to capacity markets, as they are smaller in size and are more easily abolished again in the future.

3.2 Capacity markets with reliability options
Under textbook assumptions, the introduction of a comprehensive capacity market, combined with reliability options, is an efficient approach to solving the missing money problem (Cramton et al. 2013, BMWi 2013b). It has been proposed to be implemented in Germany by EWI (2012). According to this concept, the regulator centrally determines an adequate level of overall installed capacity and procures this capacity in an auction. Importantly, all installations that provide firm capacity may participate without discrimination, which makes the capacity market “comprehensive.” Yet new and existing plants may be differentiated with respect to the duration of capacity provision and lead times. All successful bidders receive a uniform capacity payment which complements their revenues from selling power in the spot market.

At the same time, all generators that receive capacity payments are obliged to issue call options which hedge power consumers against high wholesale prices. The strike price of the call option is administratively set to a level just above the highest marginal generation cost in the market. If the spot price is higher than the strike price, generators that have issued the call option are obliged to pay the difference between the spot price and the strike price to consumers. This gives an incentive not to withhold capacity during times of scarcity and thus should mitigate market power. Yet the interactions of reliability options and bilateral

---

6 In general, demand-side resources may also participate. Yet this requires adequate prequalification procedures, which may be challenging in practice.
long-term contracts raises several questions which are not fully answered so far. Moreover, previous experiences in U.S. power markets have shown that designing capacity markets for real-world applications is a rather complex task that requires repeated adjustments and redesign, which in turn may decrease the efficiency of this type of capacity mechanism.

3.3 Focused capacity markets with reliability options
The concept of a focused capacity market, which is sometimes also referred to as a “targeted” or “selective” capacity market, has been introduced to the German policy debate by Öko-Institut et al. (2012). It builds upon the capacity market concept sketched out in the previous section, but introduces two different segments of firm capacity, with separate auctions and differentiated capacity prices. One market segment comprises existing power plants and demand-side resources, which are granted capacity payments for one or four years. Another segment comprises new power plants and storage facilities, which receive capacity payments for 15 years. New plants have to comply with predetermined standards with respect to flexibility and emissions in order to be eligible for participation. The rationale for creating two different capacity market segments is to reduce windfall profits for existing plants and to support the transformation towards a highly flexible, low-emission power plant portfolio that complements the ongoing expansion of fluctuating renewable generation capacities. The focused capacity market concept may also be combined with reliability options in order to hedge demand from high spot prices.

It has been argued that this approach may be less efficient than a comprehensive capacity market (Growitsch et al. 2013). In any case, a focused capacity market requires the regulator to set more parameters and accordingly to have more knowledge about the market, for example, regarding the size of the two capacity market segments as well as flexibility and emission benchmarks. Accordingly, implementing a well-functioning focused capacity market may be even more of a challenge for the regulator compared to a “standard” capacity market.

3.4 Decentralized capacity market
While both comprehensive and focused capacity markets foresee centralized capacity planning and procurement, these tasks may alternatively be carried out by market participants in a decentralized way. The concept of a decentralized capacity market has been proposed to be introduced in Germany by two important industry associations (VKU et al. 2013 and BDEW 2013). Here, the regulator neither sets a capacity volume, nor procures any capacity, but just obliges electricity retailers to hold sufficient amounts of firm capacity. This is facilitated by issuing, trading and holding standardized certificates for security of supply (Versorgungssicherheitsnachweise). Generators issue these certificates and commit to supply the respective capacity particularly during scarcity periods. Importantly, retailers may decide for themselves how much firm capacity they need, and only have to verify ex post that they held enough certificates during scarcity periods. The main role for the regulator, aside from defining a trigger price which defines the periods during which the
obligation to hold certificates is enforced, is to set appropriate penalties for generators and retailers in case they do not meet their obligations.

It has been put forward that such decentralized capacity markets may result in efficient—i.e., lower—overall capacity requirements. In particular, demand-side resources may be activated to a larger extent compared to other capacity mechanisms, as retailers probably have knowledge on how to make best use of such resources in order to decrease their capacity requirements. Yet these potential benefits come at the expense of unclear security of supply, as market participants may have ex ante wrong expectations about their capacity needs, or they may have an incentive to gamble the system. What is more, synergies of an integrated power market may get lost: the peak loads of different retailers generally do not coincide perfectly, such that the overall load peak is somewhat smaller than the sum of the peak loads of all retailers. Accordingly, the decentralized capacity market may result in higher overall capacity than actually required.

3.5 Comparison of strategic reserves and capacity markets

In principle, both a strategic reserve and the diverse capacity market types discussed above may ensure security of supply, if the regulator makes appropriate parameter choices. Yet for all mechanisms, the implementation details matter. For example, capacity planning may be flawed, which may either lead to expensive overcapacities or to security of supply concerns. Yet this appears, at least in the short term, to be a smaller problem for the strategic reserve, as it only concerns a relatively small portion of the overall power plant portfolio.

Capacity markets mitigate a portion of investment risks by means of capacity payments, which are stable at least in the short term. Yet risks with respect to regular wholesale revenues remain. In addition, capacity markets may decrease the opportunities for market participants to engage in bilateral long-term contracts, which in turn may impede individual strategies to hedge investment risks. In contrast, a strategic reserve hardly influences such contracts. What is more, a strategic reserve may enable to mitigate default-risks in the wholesale market, as it factually sets a price cap.

As regards potential distributional impacts of capacity markets, a strategic reserve may also lead to smaller distortions. The introduction of a capacity market tends to decrease average spot prices, which decreases producer surplus and increases consumer surplus. Yet a capacity market also generates additional capacity-related revenues for producers, which have to be financed by consumers. The latter effect is likely to dominate the first, such that capacity markets may involve substantial redistribution from consumers to producers. A strategic reserve, which is much smaller in size, should generally have smaller distributional impacts, as indicated by Traber (2014) in a quantitative analysis.

Even more important, strategic reserves are likely to give better incentives for flexibility in the wholesale market, both regarding supply- and demand-side assets as well as power storage. This is important in the context of increasing fluctuations of residual load caused by
higher shares of variable renewables in the system. From today's perspective, future flexibility requirements as well as the optimal mix of flexibility options are hard to project. Accordingly, it appears to be beneficial to signal the value of flexibility as undisturbed as possible via fluctuating wholesale prices. This is best achieved by a strategic reserve.

Another important criterion for all potential capacity mechanisms is their compatibility with the regulations that apply to the EU's internal market for electricity (European Commission 2014). For a strategic reserve, this equates to guaranteeing energy supply, also in a cross-border context, without distorting energy trading with neighboring countries. Like the European Commission, the German government also stresses the importance of ensuring that capacity mechanisms do not affect electricity market integration in Europe (BMWi 2013a and b). Glachant and Ruester (2014) argue that if individual countries pursue national interests when it comes to capacity mechanisms, the individual energy markets run the risk of becoming fragmented (once again) and the EU's internal market for electricity being neither solvent nor efficient. The European Commission (2014) and the European Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators, in ACER (2013), are therefore calling for supply security mechanisms to be compatible with the regulations of the EU's internal market for electricity. A proposal for a cross-border energy union put forward by Poland underlines the important role played by international cooperation and coordination in the area of energy supply security in the ongoing debate on energy policy in Europe. The European Commission (2014) has already pointed out that introducing national capacity payment schemes could be detrimental to operational and investment decisions within the internal electricity market. Yet the Commission considers the implications of a strategic reserve less serious than those resulting from all-encompassing capacity markets.

Given the many advantages of strategic reserves, particularly in the context of the ongoing energy transformation in Germany and its European neighbors, we focus on this type of capacity mechanism in the remainder of the article. A strategic reserve is concretely planned to be introduced by the German government (BMWi 2014), and comparable reserves have already been introduced central and northern European countries (see next section). Accordingly, both the specific design features of strategic reserves as well as their potential cross-border coordination are of high interest for researchers and policymakers alike.

4 International experience with strategic reserves
A strategic reserve has been an integral part of the energy market design for several years in Finland (since 2006) and Sweden (since 2003), with reserve capacities available from mid-November to mid-March. The volumes of these strategic reserves are limited. In Sweden, for example, the reserve is capped at two GW.7 To qualify to submit a bid, the plant operator

---

7 In 2012, for example, around 4.8 percent (1.7 GW) of the total installed capacity were put out to tender. See CREG (2012).
must guarantee that the capacity can be made available within less than 12 hours. The reserve energy trigger price is based on the highest bid for the last available unit on the balancing market and thus reflects the value of the last commercial unit of energy generated.

Other countries in Europe—Poland (since 2013), Belgium and the United Kingdom (as of 2014/15) and Denmark (as of 2016)—also use, or are planning to introduce, a strategic reserve in their energy systems (Figure 2). Belgium entered into a contract for a strategic reserve capacity of about 800 MW for 2014/15. Poland introduced a centralized conventional power-generation reserve totaling 454 MW in 2013.8 In the United Kingdom, the network operator has introduced two forms of reserve. One of these is the ‘demand-side balancing reserve’ which is intended to promote demand flexibility. The second is the ‘supplemental balancing reserve’ that entails predominantly conventional power plants. The first procurement took place in winter 2014/15.9 This last instrument, in particular, is essentially a traditional strategic reserve, since the reserve capacity is auctioned off, is only to be used once commercial bids are exhausted (as in Sweden and Finland), and the earnings from the sale of reserve electricity are based on balancing energy market prices.

The individual EU member states use different instruments to safeguard their energy

---

8 See the 2013 Annual Report of the Polish system operator, PSE.
9 Operational and procurement methodologies can be found on www.nationalgrid.com.
markets. In central and northern Europe, strategic reserves are used to address potential capacity shortage. In southern Europe and France, various capacity mechanisms are in place (CREG 2012). Germany has responded to regional supply bottlenecks by introducing a so-called “grid reserve”\(^\text{10}\) as an interim solution, a tool to counteract congestion in the south of Germany. To compensate for the lack of network transmission capacity or the failure to factor in scarcity prices in southern Germany, the German Federal Network Agency introduced this temporary reserve instrument. Power plants in southern Germany and Austria are under direct contract with network operators and—irrespective of wholesale prices, which may be rather low—are used to meet demand in southern Germany in the event of transmission network bottlenecks in Germany. One shortcoming of this instrument, however, is that it does not help power plants that are not included in the reserve in southern Germany to operate economically, which is why discussions on the post-2017 situation have already been underway for some time (BMWi 2014). Unlike the existing “grid reserve”, a strategic reserve is a market-based tool that does not come into play until a predefined (high) price is reached, thus preventing distortions on the energy market. If the German grid reserve was to be substituted by a strategic reserve, existing transmission network problems would have to be resolved either by expanding the network or by means of regional pricing.

5 Important design elements of national strategic reserves

When implementing a strategic reserve, the regulator has to make several parameter choices. In particular, it has to be decided how reserve capacity is procured and how their dispatch is triggered. In addition, if plants contained in the reserve have significant lead times for starting up, it has to be made sure that these capacities are activated well in advance of the actual trigger event.\(^\text{11}\)

5.1 Procurement

Reserve capacities may in principle either be put out to tender or procured on a bilateral basis between the regulator or the transmission system operator and the plant owners. When reserve capacities are put out to tender, there may be a variety of prequalification criteria relating to both technical parameters and policy objectives such as climate targets. A strategic reserve might comprise old or new power plants, i.e., it could theoretically comprise existing coal-fired power plants and new gas turbines. When procuring the strategic reserve, however, it is important to bear in mind that these power plants might only be in operation for a few hours a year. In light of this, the CO\(_2\) emissions levels ought not to be pertinent to the decision as to what plants to utilize for the strategic reserve; in fact, it may make more sense to use power plants with high CO\(_2\) levels in the reserve and shift power production on the regular energy market to less carbon-intense power generation plants. The capacity is procured at a price (capacity payment) determined in the

\(^{10}\) The grid reserve was first referred to as „winter reserve“.

\(^{11}\) The following sections are based on Neuhoff et al. (2014).
call for tenders. This price can be identical for all capacities, based on highest accepted bid (uniform price). Alternatively, each successful bid may receive its own price (pay-as-bid). Besides bids for the capacity payment, the call for tenders could also include location- and flexibility-related criteria.

### 5.2 Trigger

The reserve capacity can be activated in one of two scenarios: either electricity is in short supply and demand cannot be met (in this case, the last commercial bid accepted could define the market price for electricity from reserves), or a predefined fixed market price that is transparent to all participants is exceeded. In the second case, the strategic reserve goes online as soon as the relevant market price exceeds a fixed level known as the reserve energy trigger price.

Several factors play a role when it comes to defining the trigger price. Literature contains proposals stating that the strategic reserve should not be dispatched until the bid cap on the spot market has been reached, for example, 3,000 euros per MWh on the European Power Exchange (BMWi 2013b). From the perspective of a traditional power system with rather few critical peak load hours, high trigger prices are of secondary importance. However, given the continued growth of renewable energy, the strategic reserve may not only be needed in single peak hours, but also during, for instance, a cold, windless winter spell, meaning that a high trigger price would ultimately result in very high electricity prices for consumers over many hours and entail risks for bilateral energy contracts. This would clearly affect the political acceptance of the energy market design. For this reason, it is important for the trigger price of the strategic reserve to be kept below the specified upper bid cap, or below the price cap of the energy wholesale market.

When defining a practical lower limit for the trigger price, two points must be taken into account. First, the trigger price must not be lower than the variable costs of demand-side flexibility (usually estimated at 400 euros per MWh) and allow for contribution margins for costs related to demand-side flexibility measures at the same time. Second, the contribution margins for peak load power plants on the energy market must be high enough to facilitate (re-)investment.

The trigger price also indirectly affects the volume of the strategic reserve. In the case of a predefined trigger price—assuming that no further commercial capacities exist above the trigger price—the reserve should be able to cover the expected demand at the trigger price.

---

12 If the strike price is high, the signatories of bilateral energy supply contracts have to make correspondingly high payments in the event of supply shortage. Alternatively, they buy electricity from a third party at the high strike price to compensate for the supply shortage.

13 EWI (2012) assume strike prices of 1,000 and 1,780 euros/MWh. For example, for the latter strike price, in 2020, the strategic reserve was shown to have to be in use for a minimum of 26 hours per year for the peak load power plants not to operate at a loss.

14 See German Regulation on Load Shedding (Verordnung zu abschaltbaren Lasten, AbLaV) passed on December 28, 2012.
The alternative trigger method (based on the last commercial bid accepted) tends to involve greater uncertainty with regard to the amount of reserve capacity, since, depending on how high the bid is, various scenarios for the use of the power generation reserve capacity are feasible. This uncertainty also applies to the operators. With a pre-defined fixed trigger price, it is more easy for market participants to calculate to what extent and for how many hours contribution margins for peak load power plants can be achieved.

5.3 Activation
For both of the aforementioned triggers, a mechanism is needed to ensure that the different power plants contained in the reserve, which may have very different flexibility constraints, are activated early enough. In conventional power plants, in particular, activation or ramp-up can take several hours. A cold start of a hard-coal-fired power plant, for example, can take around ten hours or even more. For this reason, in accordance with the given start-up time, the decision to activate a reserve has to be taken well in advance. Here, price developments could take a positive or negative turn (see Figure 3). Yet if a decision to dispatch a strategic reserve has to be made several hours in advance, there may well be no supply shortage in real-time after all and the market price will remain below the trigger price.

![Figure 3: Scenarios for the development of intraday market prices](image)

These uncertainties, however, are not insurmountable obstacles, as the following example of a strategic reserve consisting of coal-fired power plants shows (cf. NationalGrid 2013). As soon as there is a reasonable possibility of the trigger price being reached, the network operator activates the relevant reserve capacities. For instance, 24 hours before the electricity is in fact supplied, the expected market price is still lower than the trigger price; the possible price variations (within the gray areas shown in Figure 3), however, do not rule
out this being the case when the time reaches $t = 0$. The network operator selects a coal-fired power plant with an output of, say, 1,000 MW, which is then ramped up to partial load (500 MW). The power generated by this plant replaces the production of the equivalent amount of flexible capacity from a gas-fired power station in the wholesale market. The latter plant ceases to generate power, and the coal-fired plant in the reserve assumes the obligation to supply power. From this moment on, a 1,000 MW strategic reserve is available: the coal-fired power plant can ramp up from partial to full load (500 MW), and the output of the gas-fired plant can also be increased to reach the normal capacity that has been taken off the market (another 500 MW).

6 Coordinating cross-border strategic reserves
To date, strategic reserves—irrespective of their form—have invariably been utilized within a national context. International coordination on cross-border reserve capacities, however, could reduce operating costs and mitigate environmental impacts, and potentially even improve the security of supply. The importance of regional cooperation for improving the security of electricity supply has also been stressed in a recent joint declaration signed by twelve central European countries (BMWi 2015).

6.1 Procurement
The strategic reserves can be procured by means of national tendering mechanisms as described above. In doing so, depending on the national context, all available tendering mechanisms including bilateral negotiations should be used in order to keep the procurement costs as low as possible. For instance, a location-specific call for tenders with just a few power plant operators may result in low competition and thus higher capacity payments. While coordination in the procurement processes may not be necessary, with a view to achieving a sound basis for the effective shared use of resources, coordination in determining the capacity reserve volume appears to make sense. This requires a coordinated calculation, taking into account transmission capacity constraints.

6.2 Trigger
Cross-border cooperation on the establishment of a harmonized reserve trigger mechanism should prevent distortions on the wholesale market. Assuming country A selects a fixed trigger price, while in neighboring country B the trigger price is based on the last (and highest) commercial bid, what might happen here is that the predefined trigger price activates the strategic reserve in country A, while commercial bids in country B are still available. Country A’s strategic reserve would then crowd out commercial capacity in country B.

This may give network operators an incentive to reduce the trigger price for their own strategic reserve, which could then more frequently be used at a profit.15 This is why a

---

15 Such profits could be used by transmission system operators to lower network fees.
uniform solution should apply to the strategic reserves of neighboring countries—either an identical fixed trigger price or the reserves are activated on the basis of the last commercial bid. A further advantage of having a uniform trigger price is that it will boost the participants’ faith in the stability of the trigger mechanism and, consequently, their confidence in the economic viability of investment measures.

6.3 Activation
Given the different power plant portfolios in the European countries, it is very likely that different technologies will also be used in the strategic reserves of the individual European countries. While individual countries could tailor early reserve capacity activation and ramp-up rules according to their respective technology portfolio, a common solution is needed in the international context in order to enable both flexible and inflexible generators to be used for the strategic reserves. For example, a strategic reserve in Germany based on coal-fired power plants would not be able to respond to short-term activation in a neighboring country. Given the fact that flexible power plants should mainly be used in the wholesale market and not in the strategic reserve, it is likely that inflexible power plants will play a relatively larger role in the strategic reserve. For this reason, coordinated early reserve capacity activation is indispensable if certain generation technologies used by different countries are not to be discriminated against, and if existing flexible generators are to be used predominantly in the wholesale market.

6.4 Cost allocation
An important question that arises in connection with cross-border coordinated strategic reserves for the European power market is that of cost allocation. First and foremost, this must provide an incentive for setting up coordinated cross-border reserves in the first place. One possibility would be for costs to be allocated on the basis of the trigger price, meaning each national network operator would receive the difference between the trigger price (or the current market price during activation periods) and the unit price of reserve energy activated within their network region.

On the whole, in order to establish a common European strategic reserve, cross-border coordination appears to be essential—or at the very least beneficial—and feasible with respect to all criteria discussed above (Table 2).
Table 2: Design elements of national and cross-border coordinated strategic reserves

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>National strategic reserve</th>
<th>Cross-border coordinated strategic reserves</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Procurement</strong></td>
<td>National procurement mechanism</td>
<td>National procurement mechanism, international co-ordination of volume preferable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Trigger</strong></td>
<td>Fixed trigger price or based on last commercial bid</td>
<td>Coordination necessary, fixed trigger price preferable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Activation</strong></td>
<td>Early activation preferable</td>
<td>Coordinated early activation necessary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cost allocation</strong></td>
<td>Not necessary</td>
<td>Necessary, could be based on the difference between trigger price and unit price</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7 Numerical illustration of the implications of coordinated cross-border strategic reserves

In the following, two exemplary cases illustrate the implications of coordinated cross-border strategic reserves: a two-country case involving two neighboring countries and a multi-country case.

To analyze the implications of coordinated strategic reserves in an interconnected multi-country setting, a numerical modelling approach is applied to a stylized, exemplary setting.\(^\text{16}\) The approach optimizes the dispatch of generation and strategic reserve capacities by minimizing total system cost consisting of generation costs and costs for the strategic reserve dispatch. The dispatch is restricted by an energy balance (equations 3 or 7 in the Appendix), country-specific maximum generation capacity (2 or 6), and the available transmission capacity of interconnections (4 or 8). We consider two different specifications of international trade: an approach based on net transfer capacity (NTC), which limits direct commercial trades between two adjacent countries, and a flow-based approach which takes the flow characteristics of electricity into account. A so-called “DC loadflow” approach is applied to determine the flow-based physical exchanges between the different countries. Both congestion management approaches are currently applied in European power system.

The modelled system comprises three countries A, B, and C, where one country represents one node (Figure 4). The countries have a generation capacity of four GW each with different cost structures. The residual load amounts to three GW in each country and is assumed to be completely price-inelastic. Each country is connected to the other two countries through a single transmission line. One of the three symmetric connections (from...
A to B) has a transmission capacity of three GW, whereas the other connections are assumed to be unlimited. In addition to the existing generation portfolio, the strategic reserve offers an additional ten percent generation capacity. For the analysis, demand in one of the three countries (B) is increased successively in order to reflect a supply shortage. The actual capacity available for exports depends, of course, on the regional demand and generation capacity in the other nodes, which is kept constant. Since, however, both generation capacity and demand are not entirely correlated, the load peaks are better covered because of a pooling effect.

![Figure 4: Setting of the multi-country case](image)

### 7.1 Two-country case

The first case considers two countries A and B. Let us postulate that both countries have a strategic reserve, with country A being the reference country in the comparison. The description can, of course, equally be applied to the other country.

If the spot market price in A is lower than the strategic reserve trigger price, there is no shortage of electricity supply. Irrespective of the prices in country B, reliable electricity supply in A is guaranteed. If, however, the market price in A reaches the trigger price, the strategic reserve is dispatched. In this case, the extent to which reserve capacities in country B can improve cross-border supply security depends on the market price in this country.

In the event that the trigger price is reached in A but not in the neighboring country, the commercial transmission capacity for power supply to A will be fully utilized. The degree to which generation capacity including strategic reserve in the neighboring country can help improve supply security in A depends on the available transmission capacity between the two countries. If transmission capacities between the two countries were allocated on the basis of market coupling, i.e., integrated in the market clearing process of the spot markets
in both countries, there would be a guarantee that the entire commercial transmission capacity is automatically used for import to the high-priced country. Without market coupling, cross-border transmission capacity would have to be booked for imports and exports prior to the market clearing. Here, the use-it-or-sell-it principle is applied. According to this principle, transmission capacity that is booked, but not scheduled, is reallocated—in the case of scarcity, this transmission capacity could also be assigned to imports from the neighboring country. If, in certain cases, it is feared that transmission capacity might go unused as a result of strategic behavior or a lack of market liquidity, transmission capacities could be reserved for reserve capacities in advance, similar to the proposed rules for balancing reserves (ENTSO-E 2013).

If the trigger price is reached in both countries, the amount of available transmission capacity becomes important. If available commercial transmission capacity between the two countries was available, the entire reserve capacity in both countries could be used. Since the occurrence and the amount of supply shortages in the two countries may vary depending on the national demand pattern, the availability of fossil fuels, and renewable energy feed-in patterns, the pooled strategic reserve is a more effective approach of securing energy supply than separate national strategic reserves.

Accordingly, a strategic reserve can improve supply security also in a cross-border context—to varying degrees, depending on the relative supply shortage in the respective countries. In case of supply shortage in one country only, clear rules for the use of transmission capacities are necessary. In case of supply shortages in both countries, a coordinated strategic reserve can also improve supply security.

7.2 Multi-country case
If transmission bottlenecks occur between multiple neighboring countries, transmission capacity allocation mechanisms gain relevance, since they can ensure that available transmission capacities are used as efficiently as possible. This can also have a positive effect on the utilization of strategic reserves in neighboring countries. For many years, European cross-border transmission capacities were defined for commercial transactions between two neighboring countries and then made available for spot market trade (NTC approach). Once the transmission capacity is fully used, no additional electricity can be imported from the European network, particularly from neighboring countries.

In the Central Western European region (CWE), the next stage of market integration is to implement a so-called “flow-based” transmission capacity allocation. In this flow-based approach, transmission capacities are simultaneously allocated for all cross-border network connections based on physical flow patterns, and are integrated into the market-clearing

---

17 This principle could also apply to the continuous intraday market for which coordinated auctions based on market coupling do not yet exist.

18 The CWE region comprises the Benelux countries, France, and Germany. The same process is also planned for the Central Eastern Region (CEE) according to a Memorandum of Understanding from February 2014.
process of the spot markets. In other words, if the price in one country increases, the transmission capacity between the countries is allocated such that additional imports into this country are possible, given the technical constraints of the underlying transmission lines. Flow-based transmission capacity allocation thus make the internal market for electricity in Europe more effective, since electricity can increasingly be transmitted to the countries where demand is highest. In the exemplary setting described above, this leads to a substantial increase of supply in country B (Figure 5).\(^ {19} \)

In this context, cross-border coordinated strategic reserves offers another important advantage. In case of supply shortage in one country, the national strategic reserve continues to be dispatched first also in case of cross-border coordination of reserves. In situations where there are no transmission bottlenecks, the strategic reserves from neighboring countries are also dispatched – which comes at the expense of higher national prices in these countries. In case of binding transmission capacity constraints, the market price may have to increase further, but additional import capacity is made available through the flow-based mechanism, such that the strategic reserves of other countries are

\(^ {19} \) In a flow-based market coupling, the usage of a particular transmission line varies by node in a meshed network setting. In our setting, an export from country A to B utilizes the constrained transmission line (A-B) by 2/3 of the export amount. The remaining amount flows over the indirect link (A-C)-(B-C). On the other hand, the same amount of exports from country C to B uses only 1/3 of the transmission capacity of (A-B) while exporting the same amount. Therefore, exports to country B can be increased beyond the NTC-based trade as the strategic reserve in country C is available due to its lower impact on the constrained transmission link.
additionally used (Figure 6). Thus—even in case of binding transmission constraints—coordinated strategic reserves combined with a flow-based capacity allocation mechanism can improve the security of energy supply in a country with a supply shortage.  

In sum, it becomes evident that individual countries may indeed have incentives to coordinate their strategic reserves. The shared use of strategic reserves can help to effectively increase the security of supply across country borders and price zones. Through coordinated trigger criteria, the revenue from dispatching the reserves become calculable and the costs that consumers ultimately have to bear may become lower. In addition, coordinated strategic reserves can reduce the overall volume of the reserve capacity and thus also the related costs.

8 Conclusions
In the context of the ongoing transition toward low-carbon power markets in Germany and other European countries, the question of how to secure adequate generation capacity gains importance. It is discussed, whether capacity mechanisms may be required particularly where demand side response is week and forward contracting limited. In such circumstances, price spikes would likely be rare and uncertain but high. If load is not

---

Figure 6: Structure of flow-based supply curve in country B with supply shortage

---

20 The illustrative calculations are based on a simplified model with three nodes. However, the effect of increased flexibility gained by the flow-based allocation of transmission capacity is also found to occur in more sophisticated network models. See Neuhoff et al. (2013a).
covered by forward contracts and thus fully exposed to the short-term prices, then this creates risks of regulatory interference at times of high prices and thus could give rise to the missing money problem.

This points to the importance of flexibility arrangements including demand side flexibility, interaction with heat and transport sector, and national and international storage options. Equally, aspects that can contribute to additional forward contracting to ensure that demand is hedged against high spot prices both support investment and enhance regulatory stability at times of high prices by providing a hedge for consumers. Therefore priority needs to be a sound market design that appropriately remunerates flexible demand and generation technologies, suitably reflects the power network topology, and reinforces efficient spot and forward markets.

Beyond this, different capacity mechanisms have been proposed, of which four have drawn particular attention in Germany: a strategic reserve, comprehensive and focused capacity markets, as well as a decentralized capacity market. Among these, a strategic reserve appears to be the most beneficial concept to be applied in Germany and its neighboring countries in the context of the energy transformation. Compared to centralized or decentralized capacity markets, a strategic reserve is smaller in size and may thus also result in less severe and less expensive errors in the—rather likely—case that a regulator makes suboptimal parameter choices. In particular, a reserve is more easy to be abolished again in the future. This may be an important feature if one assumes the viewpoint that capacity mechanisms may not be required permanently, but only as an additional insurance during a rapid transition of the power system. Important design elements of strategic reserves comprise procurement, trigger mechanisms, and activation procedures.

Several countries in Europe already have or are currently considering introducing capacity mechanisms to secure energy supply. These discussions tend to be conducted at national level, while the potential for the use of cross-border synergies in the development of capacity mechanisms is often neglected. A strategic reserve also appears to be the preferable type of capacity mechanism in a European context, in particular if national reserves are implemented in a coordinated way. The reserve capacity kept aside from the regular energy market barely affects the spot markets or the forward markets, which are vital for investment decisions. This also applies to Europe-wide energy trading, meaning the strategic reserve does not distort the EU’s internal electricity market.

In this article, we have illustrated that cross-border coordination of strategic reserves is both beneficial and feasible. Even with coordinated strategic reserves, when supply shortages occur, it is still possible to ensure that commercial means of meeting demand are employed first. Coordinated strategic reserves offer the added benefit of using reserves from abroad when generation capacity is short. The benefits are even more marked in combination with a flow-based allocation of cross-border transmission capacities. This
positive effect may be further enhanced by a joint calculation of the reserve capacity volume, since larger systems generally have to deliver less reserve capacity, because individual demand peaks occur at different times. This, in turn, should also result in lower overall costs of cross-border coordinated reserves. Quantifying these advantages as well as defining concrete parameters for real-world implementations of coordinated strategic reserves in Germany and its neighboring countries remain questions for further research.

References


### Table 3: Nomenclature: Sets, parameters, variables

#### Sets/indices:

- $i \in \{\text{conventional}, \text{reserve}\}$: Generation technologies
- $n, nn \in \{A, B, C\}$: Country nodes
- $l \in \{(A - B), (B - C), (A - C)\}$: Transmission lines

#### Parameters:

- $a_{i,n}, b_{i,n}$: Parameter of linear generation cost function
- $g_{i,n}^{\text{max}}$: Maximum generation capacity
- $\text{cap}_l$: Transmission capacity
- $\text{ptdf}_{l,n}$: Power-transfer-distribution matrix
- $\text{ntc}_{n,nn}$: Net transfer capacity
- $q_n$: Demand/load

#### Variables:

- $G_{i,n}$: Generation
- $NI_n$: Net input
- $TF_{n,nn}$: Transfer
Model formulation with NTC-based trade

\[
\min \sum_{i,n} a_{i,n} G_{i,n} + \frac{1}{2} b_{i,n} G_{i,n}^2
\]

(1)

\[
0 \leq G_{i,n} \leq g_{i,n}^{\max}
\]

\(\forall i, n\) \hspace{1cm} (2)

\[
\sum_{i} G_{i,n} - q_n - \sum_{nn} (TF_{n,nn} - TF_{nn,n}) = 0
\]

(3)

\[
0 \leq TF_{n,nn} \leq ntc_{n,nn}
\]

\(\forall n, nn\) \hspace{1cm} (4)

Model formulation with NTC-based trade

\[
\min \sum_{i,n} a_{i,n} G_{i,n} + \frac{1}{2} b_{i,n} G_{i,n}^2
\]

(5)

\[
0 \leq G_{i,n} \leq g_{i,n}^{\max}
\]

\(\forall i, n\) \hspace{1cm} (6)

\[
\sum_{i} G_{i,n} - q_n + NI_n = 0
\]

(7)

\[
0 \leq \sum_{n} ptd_{i,n} NI_n \leq cap_i
\]

\(\forall l\) \hspace{1cm} (8)