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Article
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Costs of Trade and Self-selection into Exporting and Importing: The Case of Turkish Manufacturing Firms

Basak Dalgic, Burcu Fazlioglu, and Michael Gasiorek

Abstract
This paper focuses on self-selection into trade by exporting and importing firms, and on the presence of differential variable and sunk costs between exporters and importers across different categories of imports. The authors use a rich and recent dataset for Turkish manufacturing firms for the period 2003–2010. This allows them to provide a comprehensive analysis of firm heterogeneity and the connection between firm-level performance and international trade. They provide evidence on the remarkable heterogeneity across firms where only-importers (importers) perform better than only-exporters (exporters). The authors detect a self-selection effect for both importing and exporting firms with a stronger effect for importers. The results suggest that the nature of sunk costs varies between importing and exporting activities with importers facing higher sunk costs. Tariffs represent a potentially important source of variation in the variable costs of trading. When taking the tariffs faced by firms into account, the authors find that the self-selection effect associated with sunk costs is still present but greatly reduced with a smaller reduction for importers compared to exporters.

Keywords Firm heterogeneity; self-selection; sunk costs; exports; imports

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1 Introduction

This paper analyzes the relationship between the self-selection mechanisms associated with the trading activities of firms, and the related costs of trade. We focus on the differentials with regard to self-selection and trading costs between exporting and importing activities, and consider the role of both sunk and variable costs across firms by trading status. The paper uses an extensive data set on the trading activities of firms in Turkey and in so doing aims to expand the empirical evidence for developing/emerging countries on firm heterogeneity in international trade.

The international trade literature has witnessed a dramatic change over the past eighteen years where the focus has switched from the investigation of macro-level agents to the micro players in trade, and where firm-level heterogeneity has emerged as a core topic. The microeconometrics of firms’ engagement in international trade was pioneered by Bernard and Jensen (1995), Aw and Hwang (1995) and Roberts and Tybout (1997). The theoretical framework has been largely stimulated by the seminal works of Melitz (2003) and Bernard et al. (2003). With the availability of firm level datasets a substantial empirical literature has shown that internationalized firms show superior performance to the firms who serve only the domestic markets. The majority of the literature focusses on exports, with much less attention paid to imports. In particular, there are relatively few studies on the importing activity and firm-performance nexus for developing countries.

The picture that emerges from this literature suggests that the superior performance of internationalized firms emerges via both self-selection and post-entry effects. Regarding the latter, exporting firms may become more efficient on exporting through learning, or as a result of economies of scale, or via interaction with foreign clients, and being exposed to more intense competition in international markets. The post-entry mechanisms of importing suggest the possibility of learning effects through the importing of intermediate and capital goods via international knowledge spillovers, variety effects and quality effects.

The self selection hypothesis, which emerges from the theoretical literature, suggests that (due to the existence of sunk costs and different productivity levels within the same industry), only the most productive firms self-select into export

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2 For a detailed survey of the learning-by-exporting literature see Silva et al. (2010) and see Martins and Yang (2009) for a detailed analysis of 33 empirical studies.

markets. Specifically, Melitz (2003) builds his monopolistic competition model on the assumption that there exist additional costs for firms selling in international markets. Only firms surpassing some threshold level of productivity can therefore make positive profits in international markets. In a related vein, Bernard et al. (2003) shows that self-selection into exporting occurs also via variable trade costs. Accordingly, these variable costs can also create self-selection of productive firms into foreign markets regardless of the presence of any sunk costs. These sunk and/or variable costs are typically linked to knowledge of markets, transportation, marketing and advertising, and the setting-up of foreign distribution channels.

Similarly, the self-selection of more productive firms into import markets results from the existence of fixed and/or variable costs of importing, such that only firms above some productivity threshold import. This enables firms with high productivity levels to offshore some of their production while low productivity firms limit themselves to sourcing from domestic markets. The nature of import costs are related to issues such as the search costs for foreign suppliers, inspection of goods, negotiation, contract formulation, learning and acquisition of customs procedures. Importers are also likely to face greater informational asymmetries associated with imperfect monitoring of the purchased goods quality and cost of transferring the embedded technology (Altomonte and Békés, 2009).

While there is a substantial empirical evidence supporting the self-selection hypothesis of exporting (see among others Roberts and Tybout, 1997; Bernard and Jensen, 1999; Aw et al., 2000; Bernard and Wagner, 1997; Isgut, 2001, Delgado et al., 2002); there is much more limited evidence on self-selection into importing (Vogel and Wagner, 2010; Eriksson et al., 2009; Sneets and Warzynski, 2010; Altomonte and Békés, 2010), with a small number of recent papers on the possible heterogeneity across importing and exporting activities (Kasahara and Lapham, 2008; Castellani et al., 2010).

In this paper we utilize the most recently available dataset covering the whole population of Turkish manufacturing firms with more than 19 employees matched with firm-level international trade data over the period 2003–2010. Being an emerging economy for whom trade has been an important driver of growth, our case constitutes an interesting -quasi-natural experiment since our data covers a period in which Turkey experienced a trade boom and underwent a structural transformation in terms of its production and trade patterns. The process of integration of the Turkish economy into the world gained momentum following the Customs Union with the EU in the late 1990s and the EU’s decision to start accession talks with Turkey in 2004, accompanied by abundant foreign capital inflows. Following a series of macroeconomic and structural reforms, the Turkish economy recovered relatively quickly from the negative shock of the economic crisis in 2001. We analyze the period after 2002, over which Turkey experiences this recovery and
a dramatic export boom. Over 2002–12 the share of Turkish manufacturing industry in GDP was 23.5 percent on average. With an average share of 80 percent in total exports, Turkey is second to only China among the BRIC countries in terms of the share of manufacturing in exports. Over 2002–12 Turkey’s total trade volume increased by 342 percent with an increase of 325 percent in its exports. This compares to the average export performance of its peers in the same income group (Brazil, China, Mexico, and South Africa) whose exports grew by 212 percent.

There are four main contributions of this paper to the literature on trade and firm heterogeneity. First, in considering the self-selection effects we control for the importing status of exporting firms and vice versa. This is commonly neglected in the literature. Such a comparison is crucial for firms operating in the Turkish manufacturing industry for whom a key characteristic is the dependence on imported intermediate goods. Secondly, in exploring the role of self-selection effects we take variable costs (in particular those associated with tariffs) into account, and assess the impact of these on the estimated sunk costs. Thirdly, and building on the literature suggesting a link between productivity and product complexity, we investigate the differentials between the sunk costs for importing/exporting of capital, intermediate and consumption goods. Finally, but equally importantly to the best of our knowledge our paper is the first attempt to investigate self-selection for Turkey, and contributes to the very limited literature on self-selection in importing for less developed countries (see Table 2 of Wagner 2012).

Overall, and consistent with previous work, we show that firms that engage in both sides of trade perform better than those involved only in one side; and that all types of internationalized firms outperform non-trading firms. The distinction between exporters and importers provides evidence as to the heterogeneity across firms, where only-importers (importers) perform better than only-exporters (exporters). We detect a self-selection effect for both importing and exporting firms with a stronger effect for importers. In contrast with much of the literature which fails to control for importing status of exporting firms and vice versa, when we take trading status of firms into account, we find that the self-selection effect is still present, but greatly reduced. The reduction is smaller for importers compared to exporters.

In accounting for sunk costs by means of past-trade experience we show that the extent and nature of sunk costs varies between importing and exporting activities, with Turkish manufacturing importers facing higher sunk costs compared to exporters. In accounting for the variable costs associated with tariffs we show that the sunk costs associated with importing and exporting decline, but with a smaller

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4 Existing empirical analyses of Turkey on firm heterogeneity either focus on post-entry mechanisms (Yasar and Rejesus, 2005; Yaşar and Paul, 2008; Maggioni, 2012 and Dalgç et al., 2014) or investigate the role of importing, exporting and the joint involvement in both activities on the firm product scope and new product introduction (Lo Turco and Maggioni, 2014).
reduction for importers compared to exporters, hence widening the relative gap between these two. This identifies the importance of variable costs and the need for more research on this. We also show that the sunk costs are higher for capital goods, than intermediate and consumption goods for both of trading activities; and once again with higher sunk costs for importers in terms of each category.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section two introduces the data used in the empirical investigation and gives some descriptive evidence on trading status dynamics. Section three presents the empirical results. Section four concludes.

2 Data and Preliminary Evidence

This paper is based on two different sources of data collected by the Turkish State Institute of Statistics (TURKSTAT). The first is The Annual Industry and Service Statistics and the second is the Annual Trade Statistics.

The Annual Industry and Service Statistics is a census of firms with more than 19 employees, and a representative survey for firms with less than 20 employees. For this study, we select the whole population of private Turkish manufacturing firms with 20 employees or more. Such firms account for 87 percent of the value of production and 75 percent of employment in 2009 of Turkish manufacturing industry. In the Annual Industry and Service Statistics dataset, firms are classified according to their main activity, as identified by Eurostat’s NACE Rev.1.1 standard codes for sectoral classification. The database provides detailed information on a number of structural variables such as revenues, value added, labour cost, intermediate inputs cost, tangible and intangible investment costs together with information on industry and geographical location, foreign ownership and the number of employees. We calculate the capital stock series by applying the perpetual inventory methodology and using the data on investment cost series for machinery and equipment, building and structure, transportation equipment and computer and programming. We use two different measures for firm-level productivity. One is total factor productivity (TFP) calculated using the Levinsohn and Petrin’s (2003) semi-parametric approach. The other is the standard labour productivity (LP), defined as value added (gross output net of intermediate inputs) per employee.

The second source of data we utilize is firm level foreign trade flows, which are sourced from customs declarations. The import and export flows are collected for the whole universe of imports and exports at 12-digit GTIP classification (the first 8 digits of which correspond to the CN classification whereas the last 4 digits are country specific). Information on the origin/destination countries of the trade flows is also available in the dataset. In order to conduct our analysis we merge
the above two datasets. Our unbalanced panel covers longitudinal data of 38223 firms over the period 2003–2010. The original sample size in the merged dataset was slightly larger but we applied a cleaning procedure largely inspired by Hall and Mairesse (1995).

In order to explore the linkages between firm characteristics and the internationalization status of firms we first classify the firms according to their trading status. We define firms serving only the domestic market as ‘non-traders’; firms engaged in exporting activities (including those that only export and those that not only export but also import) as ‘exporters’; firms engaged in importing activities (including those that only import and those that combine their imports with exporting activities) as ‘importers’; firms that do not export or import separately but are simultaneously involved in exporting and importing activities as ‘two-way traders’. We also define ‘only-exporters’ and ‘only-importers’.

In Table 1a, we provide descriptive evidence on our manufacturing industry panel, differentiating between firms according to their participation in foreign markets. From the first column we can see that over 2003–2010, on average 63.3 percent of all firms are internationalized. Two-way traders, representing just over 39 percent of the sample, constitute the largest share of internationalized firms, while firms that engage in only exporting (10.8 percent) or only importing (13.3 percent) are a minority. Exporting firms constitute 50 percent of the panel whereas importing firms’ share is slightly higher at 52 percent.

Tables 1a and 1b report on how many firms changed their status over the period of analysis. According to Table 1a, the distribution of firms according to trading status stays fairly constant. For instance, the share of only-exporters stays in a range between 8.5-12 percent while the share of importers stays in a range between 12.1-14 percent. Column four of Table 1a shows that two-way traders are the group most likely to preserve their status. There is also quite a lot of churning in terms of entry and exit. The share of entrants in 2010 with respect to 2003 is 94.5 percent. The share of entrants is highest in the only-exporters category, while the smallest share of entry was realized by only-importers. Firms that were active in 2003 but not in 2010 (i.e. exiting firms/deaths) are evident in all categories with a share of 51.8 percent in total. The group with the largest share of exits are non-trading firms. This is consistent with the theoretical and empirical view that non-traders are at the bottom end of the productivity distribution. Consistently, the smallest share of deaths is realized by firms engaging in both sides of the trading activities which are also shown to be at the top end of the productivity distribution. Additionally, the rate of exits is higher for only-exporting firms compared to only-importers (49.4 percent for only-exporters vs. 43.6 percent for the latter). This might be attributable to higher productivity thresholds for only-importers relative

5 See Online Appendix for the evolution of the sample over the analysis period.
According to Table 1b, movements of firms between trading categories also shows significant variation. We observe that it is easier for only-importers to switch to two-way trading with respect to only-exporters. Moreover, starting to trade as a two-way trader is a rare event for a non-trader whereas stopping to trade for a two-way trader is the least likely outcome.

Consistent with the existing literature our data confirm that (i) trade is more concentrated than employment and sales; (ii) a high percentage of export volume is performed by a small number of firms which are very diversified in terms of products and destination countries (see Appendix for a detailed analysis of concentration of trade in Turkey).
3 Empirical Analysis

3.1 Do Internationalized Firms Perform Better?

In this part of the paper, starting with Table 2 we identify some stylized facts regarding the performance of internationalised firms. These are in line with the picture that emerged from the literature reviewed earlier. We show a clear ranking of firm types by performance from two-way traders to importers and then to exporters. In particular, we find that non-traders are less productive, are less capital intensive, smaller in terms of number of employees and sales and pay lower wages. Conversely two-way traders are the most productive and capital intensive, have the largest numbers of employees, and pay the highest wages.

Next, we explore the productivity premia between non-traders and trading firms while controlling for other factors that could also impact on performance. For instance, it is well established that larger firms are on average more productive than smaller firms, or that foreign affiliated firms are on average more productive than firms that only serve the domestic market. Similarly, two-way traders are typically found to be larger and have a higher levels of foreign participation than non-traders. To control for these factors in understanding the performance differentials between firms, and following Bernard and Jensen (1999) and several other studies, we explore the relationship between firm level characteristics and international trading status with the following regression:

$$y_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 D_{it}^{two-way} + \beta_2 D_{it}^{only-imp} + \beta_3 D_{it}^{only-exp} + \delta Controls + \varepsilon_{it}$$ \hspace{1cm} (1)

Where the subscript $i$ denotes individual firms and $t$ indexes year. The dependent variable $y_{it}$ measures the logarithm either of firms’ labor productivity (LP) or total factor productivity (TFP). Dummy variables for trading status are denoted by $D_{it}^{two-way}$, $D_{it}^{only-imp}$ and $D_{it}^{only-exp}$, respectively. We utilize a series of control variables denoted by a vector of controls including the logarithm of firm’s employment, capital intensity and wage per employee as a proxy of skill intensity, as well as two-digit sector, region and year dummies.\(^6\) We also include a foreign affiliation dummy where the foreign capital share is greater than zero. The coefficients $\beta_1$, $\beta_2$ and $\beta_3$ in front of the trading dummies in equation (1) reveal the average trading premia in terms of productivity. The traders’ premia can then be computed from the estimated coefficients as $100(exp(\beta) - 1)$, showing the average percentage difference in productivity between a firm in one of the three respective groups of trading firms, and the non-trading firms, while controlling for the characteristics included in the vector of controls.

\(^6\) The region dummies identify 12 Turkish regions distributed according to the NUTS2 classification.
The results from the pooled OLS regressions and FE regressions are reported in Table 3. For each of these, in the first column we give the results for a standard OLS regression; in the second column, and in order to deal with unobserved aspects of firm-level heterogeneity, we include firm specific time invariant fixed effects; and in the final column we give the results for a dynamic FE model. Supporting the descriptive evidence above, the trade premia in terms of productivity are of considerable magnitude and statistically significant. Specifically, internationalized firms have higher productivity levels than non-trading firms even after controlling for size, capital and skill intensity, region, sector and time effects. The magnitude of the trade premia coefficient declines significantly in the FE specifications pointing to the role of unobserved heterogeneity and the importance of firm specific factors. For instance, in terms of TFP in the OLS specification two-way traders are estimated to be 51 percent more productive than non-internationalized firms, while in the FE model this premium reduces to 14 percent.

In both the OLS and FE specifications, two-way traders have the highest premia followed by firms that only import, while firms that only export have the smallest estimated premia. Note that the hierarchy suggesting that two-way traders perform best followed by only-importers, and then only-exporters and finally non-traders remains after the inclusion of time invariant fixed effects into the equation (1). In order to compare the coefficients within each regression, we have performed the Wald test of the difference between the coefficients on only-export and only-import dummies. Our F-statistics are highly significant rejecting the hypothesis that the two coefficients are equal.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>LP</th>
<th>TFP</th>
<th>Employee</th>
<th>Capint</th>
<th>Wage_L</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exporters</td>
<td>10.16</td>
<td>7.76</td>
<td>138.89</td>
<td>10.83</td>
<td>8.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importers</td>
<td>10.24</td>
<td>7.83</td>
<td>144.23</td>
<td>10.91</td>
<td>8.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two-traders</td>
<td>10.29</td>
<td>7.87</td>
<td>164.06</td>
<td>10.96</td>
<td>8.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-traders</td>
<td>9.49</td>
<td>7.17</td>
<td>48.93</td>
<td>9.97</td>
<td>8.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only-Exporters</td>
<td>9.67</td>
<td>7.35</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>10.34</td>
<td>8.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only-Importers</td>
<td>10.07</td>
<td>7.69</td>
<td>85.18</td>
<td>10.79</td>
<td>8.68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The fact that importers are more productive than exporters can be attributed to two different but not mutually exclusive explanations. The first is to do with self-selection effects and associated sunk/fixed costs; and the second is to do with the possible impact of importing on productivity. Indeed, regarding the latter Dalgıç et al. (2014) show that importing has a greater impact on productivity compared to exporting in Turkish manufacturing industry.

Regarding the former, advocates of self-selection suggest that only more productive firms will be able to import due to the presence of fixed costs of importing. That the evidence from both the descriptive statistics and regressions suggest higher performance premia for only-importers (importers) than only-exporters (exporters), reinforces the idea of a stronger self-selection mechanism associated with importing at work with respect to exporting. In turn this may be driven by higher fixed costs associated with importing, in comparison to exporting. In the next section we therefore turn to analyzing the existence of self selection mechanisms with a special focus on the question of whether a stronger mechanism is at work for importing activities in comparison to exporting in Turkish manufacturing industry.

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McCann (2009) working with data for Irish firms, and Vogel and Wagner (2010) on data for East and West Germany find that only exporting firms out-perform only importing firms.
Note that, so far the analysis should be largely seen as providing correlations/associations between firm performance and international trade engagement as opposed to unequivocally showing causality. The existing literature frequently fails to employ dynamic specifications in order to address issues of endogeneity. Hence, in order to shed light on possible endogeneity associated with the FE regressions, we test a dynamic specification, and this also serves as a robustness check. We run a series of fixed effects regressions in which we incorporate the lagged dependent variable as an additional regressor. Including the lagged dependent variable may produce biased and inconsistent parameter estimates because of its correlation with the individual specific effects. While in such cases, GMM estimators are generally used (Blundell and Bond, 1998; Bond, 2002), in large samples as ours the standard results for the dynamic model indicate that the OLS levels estimator is biased upward, while the within-group estimator is biased downward (Bond, 2002; Bernard and Jensen, 2004). We report on the FE estimates with lagged dependent variables for equation (1) in Table 3. The results from the dynamic specifications are consistent with our previous finding indicating the positive correlation between firm productivity and trade engagement as well as the clear pattern of performance ordering among the types of internationalization status. Further, the significant coefficient of the lagged dependent variables in these regressions confirms that a firm’s performance history affects its current position.

3.2 Self-Selection & Sunk Costs: Exporting vs Importing

Evidence from Tables 1a and 1b demonstrated a substantial number of firms switching their internationalization status. This variation in our data signals the importance of identifying the self-selection mechanisms at work. In addition, in Table 1a we observe a more persistent behavior for importing firms with respect to exporters and, in Table 1b we observe that a higher percentage of importers switch to two-way trading than is the case for exporters. This may suggest higher sunk costs for importing with respect to exporting in Turkey. We therefore proceed by shedding light on whether firms self select into trade and whether this effect is stronger for importing and finally consider the driving forces behind this.

We start with addressing the question whether being a trader is associated with firms’ ex-ante superior performance. If more productive firms become traders then we should expect to find significant differences in productivity between future trade starters and future non-starters several years before entry. In order to do so, we define an only-export-starter as a firm which had never traded in the previous two years \((t - 2 \text{ & } t - 1)\) and starts to exporting-only in year \(t\). In this way, we can compare firms which did not trade internationally in years \(t - 2 \text{ & } t - 1\) and

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Silva et al. (2013) is the only study that employs such a dynamic specification in this context.
start to export in year $t$ with firms that did not trade at all. Only-import-starters and two-way-starters are defined similarly. We thus have six cohorts and each corresponds to a year between 2005 and 2010. To explore the pre-entry differences in productivity between trade-starters and non-traders, we estimate the following equation with the usual controls:

$$y_{it-\rho} = \beta_0 + \alpha_i + \beta_1 D_{iStarter} + \delta Controls_{t-\rho} + \epsilon_{it}, \text{ with } 1 \leq \rho \leq 2. \quad (2)$$

where $D_{iStarter}$ is a dummy variable taking value one if the firm is a starter and zero if the firm is always a non-trader. The results are reported in Table 4, where we consider the premia with regard to both labour productivity and total factor productivity. The coefficients show the average percentage performance differential at $t-2$ between starters at $t$ and firms with no international trade activity over the whole period. Overall, and in line with previous studies we find a self-selection effect for both importing and exporting firms. Specifically, the results confirm that internationalized firms are ex-ante more productive than non-traders. The productivity premia is highest for two-way starters, and this applies both to labour productivity and total factor productivity.

Note also that, the pre-entry levels of the productivity indicators are larger for only-import starters than those of only-export starters. For instance, two years before entering the import market, import starters are 31.9 percent more productive, in terms of TFP, and 26.6 percent in terms of labour productivity than always non-traders, while the corresponding figures for export starters are 28.3 percent and 20.4 percent. The differentials are even greater when looking at one year before entry (36.8 percent and 36.9 percent for importers with respect to TFP and labour productivity, and 29.1 percent and 21.1 percent for exporters). This suggests that importing-only firms exhibit ex-ante performance advantages with respect to those that export-only, in turn indicating a stronger self-selection for importing than exporting.\textsuperscript{10}

Failing to control for the importing status of exporting firms and vice versa might lead to overstating the role of self-selection in exporting and importing respectively. Thus, we further investigate the productivity premia of future two-way traders compared to future only-exporters and future only-importers. In this way, we account for importers that start to export by comparing firms that imported but not exported in years $t-2$ and $t-1$ and start to export in $t$ with firms that always imported but not exported at all. Similarly, we investigate the productivity

\textsuperscript{10}To provide an alternative approach, instead of estimating equation 2 and comparing the coefficients on only-export and only-import starters, we estimate a version of equation 2 for exporters and importers using the Seemingly Unrelated Regressions methodology. We test for the equivalence of the coefficients on export/import dummies, and the results indicate that they are statistically different. See Appendix for details.
premia of exporters that start to import. This can be seen in the last four columns of Table 4 where, analogously to before, the coefficients show the average percentage productivity difference at \( t - 2 \), between only-exporters that start to import at \( t \) (only-importers that start to export at \( t \)) and only-exporters (only-importers) that do not start to import at all. We find that when taking into account the importing status of export starters, the performance premium of export starters is still present but greatly reduced. The premium is 6.7 percent with respect to TFP and 7.4 percent with regard to labour productivity. Similarly, the productivity premium of import starters goes down, but by considerably, and is 21.8 percent with respect to TFP, and 24.7 percent with regard to labour productivity.

Hence, taking into account the importing (exporting) status of exporters (importers) respectively serves to accentuate the higher productivity associated with importing in contrast to exporting firms. In addition, these findings indicate that the initial pre-entry premia reported in Table 4 may overstate the extent to which export and import starters have higher initial productivity levels. We therefore conclude that for Turkish manufacturing firms the self-selection effect is evident in both exporting and importing activities but is stronger with respect to importing. A limited number of studies control for the importing status of exporting firms or vice versa in investigating self-selection effect associated with entering into foreign
markets. Following a similar analysis and using Hungarian data, Altomonte and Békés (2009) also find that ex-ante productivity of importing is larger than that of exporting.

A stronger self selection effect at work for import starters compared to export starters might suggest higher sunk costs of importing. Accordingly, we shed some light on the differentials between the sunk costs of importing and exporting. In order to do so, we estimate three dynamic models for firms that only-export, only-import and those involved in both activities. Following Roberts and Tybout (1997), Bernard and Jensen (2004) and Muûls and Pisu (2009), we interpret the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable as a measure of the importance of sunk costs. The rationale behind our interpretation is that sunk costs generate hysteresis in export (import) market participation thus we account for sunk costs by means of past trade experience. We estimate the following random effects panel probit regression where we include lagged TFP, and number of employees as firm-level performance controls:

\[
P(y_{it} = 1; x_{it}, y_{it-1}, u_i) = f(\alpha + \rho y_{it-1} + \beta' x_{it} + u_i)
\]

Subscript \(i\) and index \(t\) denotes the individual firms and years, respectively. The binary variable \(y_{it}\) indicates whether the firm is a trader or not in one of three subsequent forms (exporting-only, importing-only or being a two way trader); \(x\) consists of our firm level performance controls including the mean of these controls as well as region, sector and year dummies; \(u_i\) captures the firm level unobservables where \(f\) denotes the cumulative normal distribution and where \(u_i\) can be expressed as:\(^{11}\)

\[
u_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 y_{i0} + \beta_2 x_i + \epsilon_i
\]

The results of the random effects dynamic probit model are presented in Panel A of Table 5. As is standard in the literature, we confirm that the more productive the firms are, the more likely they are to self select into trade. Looking at the coefficients on the lagged dependent variables, we find that Turkish firms face sunk costs of engaging into international markets and the nature of these sunk costs varies between importing and exporting activities.\(^{12}\) Specifically, we see that the coefficient associated with the lagged import status is higher than exporter

\(^{11}\) In order to deal with the initial condition bias existing in dynamic limited dependent variable models and the possible correlation between the controls and unobserved heterogeneity we utilize Wooldridge’s (2005) methodology which models firm specific effects \(u_i\) as a function of the initial condition and other explanatory variables. Accordingly, the model becomes a random effects probit model.

\(^{12}\) The initial trade status coefficients are high in magnitude and statistically significant correcting for the bias introduced by the ‘initial condition’ problem.
This suggests that the sunk costs of importing-only are higher than the sunk costs of exporting-only for Turkish manufacturing firms.

It is also possible that self-selection mechanisms may be linked to variable costs of trade. As in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) and Bernard et al. (2003) higher variable costs of trading also mean only more productive firms will be able to enter into trade markets. That is they present different selection mechanisms based on variable trade costs instead of sunk costs of trading. In their model setting, market size and variable costs determine the toughness of competition and hence the strength of the self-selection effect. Data from the World Bank Doing Business Surveys suggests that there are indeed higher costs of importing for Turkey. Exporting a standard container of goods requires larger number of documents, takes more time and costs higher for an importing firm than with

### TABLE 5

Dynamic Panel Probit Regressions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Panel A (without tariffs)</th>
<th>Panel B (with tariffs)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Only-exporter</td>
<td>Only-importer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only-exporter (t-1)</td>
<td>0.921***</td>
<td>(0.0269)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only-importer (t-1)</td>
<td>0.959***</td>
<td>(0.0225)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two-way trader (t-1)</td>
<td>1.072***</td>
<td>(0.0217)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employee(t-1)</td>
<td>0.0889**</td>
<td>(0.0371)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFP(t-1)</td>
<td>0.0214***</td>
<td>(0.0067)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wage_L(t-1)</td>
<td>0.0100</td>
<td>(0.0449)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>85412</td>
<td>85412</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The table reports dynamic panel probit regressions. (t – 1) indicates that the variable is lagged. Reported are the estimated regression coefficients and the robust standard errors (in parentheses) from estimations of the dependent variables as binary outcome variables of being an only exporter, only importer and two way trader respectively. Asterisks denote significance levels (***, p < 1%; **, p<5%; *, p<10%). All regressions include means of the continuous explanatory variables and initial values of the dependent variables as well as region, sector, foreign affiliation and year dummies as controls.
respect to those of exporting for Turkish firms. Over 2005–2012, the period in which the data is available, one can see that cost of importing in all dimensions is higher than that of exporting for Turkey.\footnote{The data suggests that exporting a standard container of goods requires 7 documents, takes 13 days and costs $990. Importing the same container of goods requires 8 documents, takes 14 days and costs $1063 in 2010.}

Such data is not available neither at the product or bilateral levels hence making it impossible to include such information as a variable in our regressions. However, another key variable cost are the tariffs faced by the firms both with regard to importing and in export markets. In order to control for the variable costs of trading we re-run the dynamic probit regressions in Panel B of Table 5 including import and export tariffs as additional controls. In calculating the firm level tariffs, we use import and export tariffs at HS6 digit product category from WITS-Trains database. We then calculate firm level tariffs by weighting each product-country level (e.g. export line) tariff rate with the share of that product in the total exports of the firm. In this way, we get an average tariff rate which is specific to each firm.

The results in Panel B of Table 5 reinforces our previous finding that there is a stronger self-selection effect for importers than exporters, and with the strongest effect for two-way traders. We see that when we control for tariffs, the coefficients representing the sunk costs for exporting and importing shrink to 0.878 and 0.949 from 0.921 and 0.959, respectively; and that the biggest reduction takes place with regard to exporters. This suggests that the tariff-related variable cost element is a more important component of the forces driving self-selection effect for exporters than with respect to importers. However, in addition, now the sunk costs of importing-only become relatively higher than previously in comparison to the sunk costs of exporting-only. Hence failing to consider the variable costs of trade may underestimate the sunk cost differences between importers and exporters.

Next, and given the previous finding that importing is associated with higher sunk costs we try and shed more light on the sunk costs that firms might face while selecting into trade markets. Altomonte and Békés (2010) argue that importers face uncertainty in their trading relationships (e.g. with regard to the quality of the product). This uncertainty is likely to be higher the more complex is the good being traded; therefore the fixed costs of trading are likely to be higher for more complex goods. They show that importers are more productive than exporters and associate this with higher import complexity. One way of looking at the different types of goods and at the complexity of goods is to classify them according to their final use. Therefore, we utilize United Nations’ Classification by Broad Economic Categories (BEC) and define products traded in three broad categories as: consumption goods, intermediate goods and capital goods. Capital
goods (e.g., machinery) are frequently more complex and may require after-sales service etc. with respect to other categories (Keller and Yeaple, 2008).

The descriptive evidence for Turkey reveals that the share of capital goods imports in total imports is higher compared to capital goods exports in total export. Thus Turkish imports seem to be more complex than exports. We distinguish between three types of firms: capital goods importers/exporters; intermediate goods importers/exporters and consumption goods importers/exporters. An only-importer (only-exporter) firm is defined to be capital goods importer (exporter) if the share of capital goods imports (exports) in its total value of imports (exports) is equal to or greater than 0.5. We define the other categories similarly.

Table 6 presents the random effects dynamic probit regressions run with these categories of firms in question. Given the importance of including the variable cost element associated with tariffs, all these regressions include the import and

Table 6
Dynamic Probit Regressions w.r.t. BEC Classification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WITH TARIFFS</th>
<th>Capital Exporter Only</th>
<th>Intermediate Exporter Only</th>
<th>Consumer Exporter Only</th>
<th>Capital Importer Only</th>
<th>Intermediate Importer Only</th>
<th>Consumer Importer Only</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capital Exporter Only (t-1)</td>
<td>0.919*** (0.0187)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate Exporter Only (t-1)</td>
<td>0.914*** (0.0248)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumption Exporter Only (t-1)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.820*** (0.0386)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital Importer Only (t-1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.974*** (0.0387)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate Importer Only (t-1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.923*** (0.0277)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumption Importer Only (t-1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.831*** (0.0737)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>82869</td>
<td>83105</td>
<td>83278</td>
<td>82696</td>
<td>83278</td>
<td>83278</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The table reports dynamic panel probit regressions. \((t-1)\) indicates that the variable is lagged. Reported are the estimated regression coefficients and the robust standard errors (in parentheses) from estimations of the dependent variables as binary outcome variables of being an only exporter, only importer and two way trader respectively. Asterisks denote significance levels (***, p < 1%; **, p<5%; *, p<10%). All regressions include means of the continuous explanatory variables and initial values of the dependent variables as well as region, sector, foreign affiliation and year dummies as controls.
export tariffs faced by each firm. We show that the sunk costs are higher for capital goods, than intermediate goods, followed by consumption goods, and this applies to both importers and exporters. The coefficient of the lagged dependent variable associated with sunk costs of importing-only are 0.974, 0.923 and 0.831 for capital, intermediate and consumption goods importers respectively. While, the coefficients associated with the sunk costs of exporting-only are 0.919, 0.914 and 0.821 for capital, intermediate and consumption goods importers respectively. Note, first, that in each case these coefficients are higher for importers with respect to those for exporters. Second, that the differential is the largest with regard to capital goods. Once again these results reinforce our previous finding that sunk costs, to the extent that they drive self-selection, are more important in the case of importing than exporting in Turkey. As the sunk costs of capital goods are higher, this also lends support to the notion that this arises because of the higher complexity associated with such imports (as in Altomonte and Békés, 2010).

4 Concluding Remarks

This paper uses a rich and recent dataset for Turkish manufacturing firms from 2003 to 2010 to provide the first comprehensive analysis of firm heterogeneity connecting firms’ performance to international trade. More importantly, we investigate self selection into foreign markets systematically for Turkey, with a particular focus on the differential between importing and exporting with regard to the self-selection effect, and the role of variable and sunk costs in importing and exporting.

Overall, in line with the picture emerging from the existing literature we show a clear ranking of firm types by performance from two-way traders to importers-only and then to exporters-only. The evidence suggests higher performance premia for only-importers (importers) than only-exporters(exporters), which in turn implies a stronger self-selection mechanism associated with importing with respect to exporting. Indeed, we confirm the self-selection effect for both importing and exporting firms with a stronger effect for importers in Turkey.

In so doing so we show that: (i) being a trader is associated with firms’ ex-ante superior performance; (ii) the pre-entry levels of firm’s productivity are larger for only-importers than those of only-exporters; (iii) the self-selection effect is still present but is somewhat reduced with a smaller reduction for importers compared to exporters after controlling for the importing status of exporting firms and vice versa; (iv) the nature of sunk costs varies between importing and exporting activities with importers facing higher sunk costs.

We also show that the self-selection mechanism is associated with both variable and sunk costs. In particular, if we take the tariff related variable costs of trade into account, we find that the relative sunk costs for importing are even higher.
than for exporting. We further show that the sunk costs are highest for capital goods, than intermediate and consumption goods for both of trading activities, with higher sunk costs for importers in terms of each category. These results suggest the importance of further research exploring the determinants of both sunk and variable costs in trade, and the differential costs which are likely to be present between importers and exporters.

Acknowledgment:

We are grateful to the Turkish State Institute of Statistics (TURKSTAT) for providing access to firm-level data under a confidential agreement. In particular, we thank TURKSTAT staff Doğan Bönctime, Nusret Kılıç, Nilgün Arıkan, Erdal Yıldırım, Kenan Orhan, Bülent Tungul, Akın Bodur, Gürneri Yığıt, Sabit Cengiz Ceylan and Ferhat İrmak. We are grateful to Erol Taymaz for his valuable suggestions. We also thank anonymous referees for their suggestions and comments, which helped improve our study. An earlier draft was presented at the ETSG Conference 2013 in Birmingham.

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5 Appendix

5.1 Evolution of the Sample

Table A1 presents the number of firms and total number of employees in each year. On average we have 17000 firms over the analysis period. There is a big growth in the number of firms over 2003–2010. Accordingly, we observe that between the starting (2003) and the end period (2010) the entire sample of manufacturing firms has increased by 42 percent. The total number of employees hired by these firms was over 1232802 at the beginning of the period and reached 1957774 towards the end of the period. It is not surprising to observe a significant slump in the sample size in 2009 since Turkish economy was seriously hit by the global crisis in 2008.

5.2 Concentration of Trade in Turkey

Empirical evidence highlights that trade is more concentrated than employment or sales. In Table A2, we record Gini and Theil coefficients and confirm this finding for Turkish manufacturing industry. Investigating by sectors, while there is clear sectoral heterogeneity, trade is more concentrated than sales and employment, for every Turkish manufacturing sector.

These findings could be attributable to inter-industry trade specialization (where trade is concentrated in few sectors) and also intra-industry trade specialization (where within the sector a subset firms carry out most of the trade). To clarify whether the trade patterns in Turkey are consistent with traditional trade theories or with the moderns ones we decompose our entropy concentration measure, Theil index, into its within and between industry components in Table A3. When we decompose the Theil index, it is the intra-industry component of the Theil index that explains the largest proportion of the concentration of trade i.e. trade is typically concentrated in a handful of firms within an industry.

Our data also provides some evidence on the negative relationship between the product/country extensive margins and number of firms. This finding is consistent with the theoretical view that exporters (importers) incur additional costs of engaging in foreign markets and thus only a small number of firms can exist in international markets. In Tables A4 and A5, we present the share of exporting firms (importing firms respectively) along with country and product extensive margins in 2003 together with firms’ share of trade volumes.

We show that a small proportion of firms account for a high proportion of the value of trade and this can be seen both the product and country extensive margins. For instance, according to the upper panel of Table 4, in 2003 46 percent of all exporting firms serve in up to 5 countries and 5 products, whereas 2.5 percent of firms export more than 20 products to more than 20 countries. From the lower
### TABLE A1

Number of Firms and Total Employment over 2003-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of Firms</th>
<th>Number of Employees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>14,788</td>
<td>123,2802</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>16,446</td>
<td>148,2741</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>18,463</td>
<td>171,7504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>19,536</td>
<td>181,7297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>18,481</td>
<td>187,4599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>17,926</td>
<td>185,3687</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>15,487</td>
<td>163,1150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>21,089</td>
<td>195,7774</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE A2

Concentration of Trade, Employment and Sales

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Gini</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Thell</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employee</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>2.42</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.63</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>2.39</td>
<td>2.84</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Trade</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
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TABLE A3

Decomposition of Trade Concentration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Within 2003</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>Between 2003</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2009</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employee</td>
<td>96.07</td>
<td>96.52</td>
<td>96.83</td>
<td>96.69</td>
<td>3.93</td>
<td>3.48</td>
<td>3.17</td>
<td>3.31</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sales</td>
<td>86.42</td>
<td>86.92</td>
<td>87.33</td>
<td>87.37</td>
<td>13.53</td>
<td>13.08</td>
<td>12.67</td>
<td>12.63</td>
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<tr>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>86.49</td>
<td>85.02</td>
<td>83.70</td>
<td>85.11</td>
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<td>14.98</td>
<td>16.03</td>
<td>14.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>78.89</td>
<td>77.58</td>
<td>77.49</td>
<td>78.07</td>
<td>21.11</td>
<td>22.42</td>
<td>22.51</td>
<td>21.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Trade</td>
<td>82.37</td>
<td>81.68</td>
<td>80.56</td>
<td>81.74</td>
<td>17.63</td>
<td>18.92</td>
<td>19.44</td>
<td>18.26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE A4

Distribution of Exports Along the Extensive Margins (2003)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>%Exporting Firms</th>
<th>NCE</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1—5</td>
<td>6—10</td>
<td>11—20</td>
<td>21+</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPE</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>58</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>63</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>100</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% Export Volume</th>
<th>NCE</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NPE</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
panel of Table 4 one can infer that this small share of firms performs approximately 41 percent of total export volume in Turkish manufacturing industry.

5.3 Results of the Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR)

We jointly estimate the following equations using SUR methodology:

\[ y_{it-\rho} = \beta_0 + \alpha_i + \beta_1 D_{it}^{Exp} + \delta \text{Controls}_{t-\rho} + \epsilon_{it}, \]  
where the subscript \( i \) denotes individual firms and \( t \) indexes year. The dependent variable \( y_{it} \) measures the logarithm of either firms’ labor productivity (LP) or total factor productivity (TFP). Dummies for the trading status are denoted by \( D_{it}^{Imp} \) and \( D_{it}^{Exp} \), respectively, dummy variables for a importer and exporter. We utilize a series of control variables denoted by the vector of controls including the logarithm of firm’s employment, capital intensity and wage per employee as a proxy of skill intensity as well as foreign affiliation, two-digit sector, region

\[ y_{it-\rho} = \gamma_0 + \alpha_i + \gamma_1 D_{it}^{Imp} + \delta \text{Controls}_{t-\rho} + u_{it}, \]  
with \( 1 \leq \rho \leq 2. \) (A2)

where the subscript \( i \) denotes individual firms and \( t \) indexes year. The dependent variable \( y_{it} \) measures the logarithm of either firms’ labor productivity (LP) or total factor productivity (TFP). Dummies for the trading status are denoted by \( D_{it}^{Imp} \) and \( D_{it}^{Exp} \), respectively, dummy variables for a importer and exporter. We utilize a series of control variables denoted by the vector of controls including the logarithm of firm’s employment, capital intensity and wage per employee as a proxy of skill intensity as well as foreign affiliation, two-digit sector, region
and year dummies. Results are reported in Table A6. We test for the equivalence of the coefficients on export/import dummies, and observe that they are statistically different. However, note that these coefficients do not directly provide insights on the self-selection effect since an exporter/importer firm might have also been exporting/importing at $t - 2$ and/or $t - 1$. 

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>LP</th>
<th></th>
<th>TFP</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>($t-2$)</td>
<td>($t-1$)</td>
<td>($t-2$)</td>
<td>($t-1$)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exporter in $t$ (dummy)</td>
<td>0.00444***</td>
<td>0.00496***</td>
<td>0.00443***</td>
<td>0.00494***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00119)</td>
<td>(0.00109)</td>
<td>(0.00122)</td>
<td>(0.00111)</td>
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<td>Observations</td>
<td>70101</td>
<td>88832</td>
<td>70101</td>
<td>88832</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.364</td>
<td>0.369</td>
<td>0.805</td>
<td>0.806</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importer in $t$ (dummy)</td>
<td>0.0114***</td>
<td>0.0127***</td>
<td>0.0114***</td>
<td>0.0127***</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.00126)</td>
<td>(0.00115)</td>
<td>(0.00129)</td>
<td>(0.00118)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
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<td>88832</td>
<td>70101</td>
<td>88832</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.365</td>
<td>0.371</td>
<td>0.805</td>
<td>0.807</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Reported are the estimated regression coefficients and the robust standard errors (in parentheses) from estimations of the dependent variables as labor productivity (LP) and total factor productivity (TFP) at time $t-2$ and $t-1$ respectively. Asterisks denote significance levels (***, p < 1%; **, p<5%; *, p<10%). All regressions include region, sector, foreign affiliation and year dummies as well as lagged values of capital intensity, wages per employee and logarithm of firms’ number of employees as controls. All dependent variables are in natural logarithms.
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