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Developing Asia's Sovereign Wealth Funds and Outward Foreign Direct Investment

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Developing Asia’s Sovereign Wealth Funds and Outward Foreign Direct Investment

Donghyun Park and Gemma B. Estrada
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Abstract

Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) have emerged in developing Asia as a policy response to an unprecedented accumulation of foreign exchange (FX) reserves since 2000. At the same time, developing countries have become an increasingly important source of outward foreign direct investment (FDI). The central objective of this paper is to evaluate the prospects for SWFs to serve as a major conduit for the region's outward FDI. In principle, FDI represents an attractive means of earning higher returns on FX reserves than traditional reserve assets. In practice, the limited institutional capacity and the political sensitivity of state-led FDI severely constrains the ability of developing Asia's SWFs to undertake FDI on a significant scale. Therefore, the potential for developing Asia’s SWFs to become major sources of outward FDI is more apparent than real. This paper also explores the implications of the Santiago Principles and the global financial crisis on outward FDI by SWFs.
I. Introduction

One of the most significant developments in the global economic landscape since the Asian crisis of 1997–1998 is the transformation of developing Asia from a net capital importer to a net capital exporter. This development was to a large extent driven by the large and persistent current account surpluses developing Asia has run since the Asian crisis. It is important to note that before the Asian crisis, the region as a whole ran current account deficits. Therefore, contrary to popular perception, current account surpluses are a relatively new phenomenon in the region. A significant consequence of those surpluses has been an unprecedented accumulation of foreign exchange (FX) reserves by the central banks of the region. The reserves have grown so fast that there is now a growing consensus that they already exceed all plausible estimates of what are required for traditional liquidity purposes. The emergence of surplus reserves, in turn, has prompted widespread calls for more active management of FX reserves with a view toward maximizing risk-adjusted returns rather than preparing for shortages of international liquidity.

Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) provide a natural blueprint for the proposed shift of surplus FX reserves from passive liquidity management to active profit-seeking investment. Unlike central banks, which traditionally manage reserves for liquidity purposes, SWFs are state-owned institutions that use reserves to pursue commercial profits. The predictable response of regional policymakers to the emergence of large and growing surplus reserves has been to set up SWFs as a means of using those resources more productively. Although SWFs have been largely under the radar until quite recently, they have been around for a long time. In fact, the commercial success of some well-established SWFs has been a major motivation behind the establishment of SWFs in developing Asia. In particular, due to their strong investment track records, Temasek and Government of Singapore Investment Corporation (GIC)—the two Singaporean SWFs—have attracted the attention of regional policymakers as a potential benchmark model. In short, Asian countries are setting up SWFs as a policy tool for coping with the relatively new phenomenon of surplus reserves.

One potential avenue for active profit-oriented foreign investment by SWFs is acquisition of ownership interests in foreign assets. To the extent that such acquisitions involve a long-term relationship and involvement in management, they are viewed as foreign direct investment (FDI). If they are devoid of such elements, they are seen as portfolio investment. The boundary between the two types of foreign investment is not always clear-cut. What is more relevant for us is not the distinction between FDI and portfolio
investment but rather the use of reserves for profit rather than liquidity. Portfolio investment, or the purchase of corporate bonds or small equity stakes without any influence on management, is certainly one way to make money. Nevertheless, the acquisition of substantial stakes that confers some managerial control is also consistent with the pursuit of profit. This is especially true if the SWF can improve management and thus increase the value of the firm. In fact, some SWFs such as Temasek have often acquired enough ownership to exercise some control precisely with such objectives.

Although outward FDI is one of the main potential avenues for managing surplus FX reserves more actively, developing countries have traditionally been recipients of inward FDI rather than sources of outward FDI. The flow of FDI from rich countries to poor countries was an integral part of the broader flow of capital from rich countries to poor countries. Such flows are consistent with economic intuition since it implies that capital is flowing from capital-abundant countries where marginal returns to capital are low to capital-scarce countries where marginal returns to capital are high. Since the mid-1990s, however, capital has been flowing “uphill” from developing countries to developed countries primarily as a result of global imbalances, i.e., large and persistent current account deficits of developed countries, in particular the United States (US), counterbalanced by large and persistent current account surpluses of developing countries, in particular developing Asia and oil-exporting countries. One significant consequence of the uphill flow of capital has been that many developing countries have now become significant outward foreign direct investors in their own right and an increasingly significant source of outward FDI. This trend not only reflects the transformation of developing countries as a whole into net capital exporters but also the broader trend of their fast-rising relative weight in the world economy due to their more rapid economic growth relative to developed countries.

The central objective of the paper is to explore the prospects for developing Asia’s SWFs to serve as a major conduit for the region’s large and growing outward FDI. In principle, outward FDI represents a promising means of earning higher returns on the region’s pool of surplus reserves. However, whether the SWFs are actually able to convert such promise into reality depends on whether they are good at adding value to the assets they acquire, which, in turn, depends on their managerial skills and know-how. It also depends on the policies of host countries toward investment by foreign state-owned institutions. The greater the managerial capacity of the SWFs and the more receptive the governments of the host countries to their investment activities, the more likely it is that SWFs will be able to use FDI as an avenue for profitable investments. Some additional issues we explore in this paper are the implications of the Santiago Principles, a voluntary code of conduct for SWFs, as well as the global financial crisis on outward FDI by SWFs.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we provide a background for the emergence of the SWFs in developing Asia. In Section III, we briefly examine the growth of outward FDI from developing countries. In Section IV, we evaluate the
II. Surplus FX Reserves and the Rise of SWFs in Developing Asia

Prior to the 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis, developing Asia as a whole has run a current account deficit vis-à-vis the rest of the world but since the crisis, the region has run a large and persistent current account surplus. This reversal of the current account position explains much of the region’s unprecedented accumulation of FX reserves in the postcrisis period. In some countries such as the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Republic of Korea (henceforth Korea), substantial amounts of net capital inflows have further added to the reserve build-up. There are two main explanations for the build-up: the precautionary motive and the mercantilist motive.¹ According to the precautionary explanation, in response to the economic and social devastation wrought by the 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis, Asian countries sought to protect their economies against sudden shortages of international liquidity by accumulating a large war chest of reserves. It is difficult to exaggerate the deep impact of the crisis on the collective psyche of the region. According to the mercantilist explanation, developing Asia’s soaring reserves are definitive proof of the region’s overdependence on exports as an engine of growth. Asian central banks purchase foreign exchange to keep their currencies weak and thus promote exports.

Whatever the motive behind the accumulation of reserves, and both precautionary and mercantilist motives probably played some role, what is beyond doubt is that the accumulation has been truly phenomenal in its scope and speed. Figure 1 shows the growth in developing Asia’s total FX reserves between 1990 and 2008 in both nominal and real terms. During this period, developing Asia’s reserves surged from $202 billion to $3,371 billion in nominal terms, and from $267 billion to $2,697 billion in inflation-adjusted terms. During the subperiod 1990–2000, the region’s reserves rose from $202 billion to $710 billion in nominal terms and from $267 to $710 billion in real terms. During the more recent subperiod of 2000–2008, the growth of regional reserves has further picked up, rising from $710 billion to $3,371 billion in nominal terms, and from $710 billion to $2,697 billion in real terms. In nominal terms, the average annual growth rate of the reserves was 16.9%, 13.4%, and 21.5% for 1990–2008, 1990–2000, and 2000–2008, respectively. In real terms, the average annual growth rate was 13.7%, 10.3%, and 18.2% during the same periods. The overall picture is one of secular growth in developing Asia’s reserves since 1990, punctuated by a noticeable acceleration of growth since 2000.

¹ In their empirical analysis, Aizenman and Lee (2005) find that the precautionary motive was more important than the mercantilist motive in explaining the reserve build-up.
The growth of FX reserves in absolute terms over time partly mirrors developing Asia’s economic growth over time. Therefore, to put the region’s reserve build-up in better perspective, we scale its absolute reserves by its gross domestic product (GDP). Figure 2 shows the amount of reserves relative to GDP. The reserves–GDP ratio shows a similar pattern as the amount of reserves: an uninterrupted increase. Developing Asia’s reserves–GDP ratio rose from 13.1% in 1990 to 21.9% in 2000 and further to 40.2% in 2008.

Yet another measure worth looking at to bring the region’s FX reserve accumulation into sharper focus is the share of the region’s reserves in total world reserves. A tangible rise in the region’s share would give further credibility to the global significance of developing Asia’s reserve growth. Figure 3 shows that the region’s share of global reserves rose...
from 22.4% in 1990 to 34.7% in 2000 and 48.1% in 2008. This suggests that developing Asia has indeed been accumulating reserves at a faster pace than the rest of the world, in fact more than twice as fast. However, the region’s reserve accumulation is an integral part of a broader trend of accelerated reserve accumulation by developing countries, whose share of global reserves has risen from 27.7% to 64.8% in 2008. The PRC accounts for more than 50% of developing Asia’s total reserve growth between 1990 and 2008. Therefore, while the contribution of the PRC to the reserve build-up is notable, the build-up is a regionwide rather than a PRC-specific phenomenon. Table 1 below lists the region’s top 10 reserve holders as of the end of 2008.

![Figure 3: Developing Asia's Share of World Reserves, 1990-2008 (percent)](image)


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Stock of Foreign Exchange Reserves (billions of US$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>China, People's Rep. of</td>
<td>1,946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Taipei, China</td>
<td>292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Korea, Rep. of</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Hong Kong, China</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: CEIC Data Company Ltd.; International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics online database, both downloaded 15 June 2009.
The notion of surplus reserves is linked with the concept of optimal reserve levels. Holding reserves entails both benefits and costs, which implies that the optimal reserve level is neither zero nor infinite. The primary benefit of reserves is that it protects a country from sudden and unexpected shortages of international liquidity, and thus from financial crises such as the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998. Reserve accumulation not only yields benefits but entails costs as well. One major potential cost of reserve accumulation is inflation. A central bank’s issuance of domestic currency to purchase foreign currency increases the monetary base, which in turn leads to inflation, even though such inflationary impact can be sterilized through the issuance of bonds. The optimal reserve level is where the marginal benefit equals marginal cost. There is now a growing consensus that developing Asia’s reserves now exceed the optimal level. That is, the region now has “too much” reserves and hence surplus reserves.

To estimate the magnitude of developing Asia’s surplus reserves, we now turn to some well-known measures of reserve adequacy. While these measures are informal rules of thumb based on intuition rather than rigorously derived theoretical concepts, they perform quite well in empirical studies of reserve adequacy and thus provide useful guidance for policymakers. Many such studies find one such rule of thumb—the ratio of reserves to short-term external debt—in particular to be a significant determinant of an economy’s vulnerability to financial crisis. According to the so-called Greenspan-Guidotti rule, the critical value of this ratio is one, with a value below one signaling danger. The underlying idea here is that country that has reserves equal to or more than all external debt falling due within one year should be able to service its immediate external obligations even during a financial crisis. Figure 4 below clearly reveals that developing Asia comfortably passes the Greenspan-Guidotti test of reserve adequacy. The implication is that the region has substantial amounts of surplus reserves.

Another widely used indicator of reserve adequacy is the ratio of reserves to M2 or broad money. This ratio is especially relevant for countries that are subject to a significant risk of capital flight. The underlying intuition is that the higher the ratio, the greater the confidence of the general public in the value of the local currency and hence the lower the likelihood of crisis-provoking flights into other currencies. While there is no general consensus on the critical value of the reserves–M2 ratio, which is understandable given the inherent difficulty of measuring capital flight, the suggested values range from 5% to 20%. Figure 5 shows that the reserves–M2 ratio falls comfortably within 5–20% for the major reserve holders of developing Asia. In fact, the ratio is above 20%, in some cases well above 20%, for most of the countries in many years. A look at the reserves–M2 ratio confirms that developing Asia’s reserve build-up may have resulted in substantial amounts of surplus reserves.

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2 Edison (2003), ECB (2006) and Green and Torgerson (2007) discuss the various reserve adequacy measures in detail.

3 Park and Estrada (2008) provide a comprehensive empirical analysis of developing Asia’s reserve adequacy, and confirm the presence of substantial amounts of surplus reserves in the region.
Figure 4: Ratio of Foreign Exchange Reserves to Short-Term External Debt in Developing Asia’s Top 10 Reserve Holders, 1990-2008

Figure 5: Ratio of Foreign Exchange Reserves to M2 in Developing Asia’s Top 10 Reserve Holders, 1990-2008

Sources: Authors’ estimates based on data from CEIC Data Company Ltd.; Deutsche Bank Research, available: [www.dbresearch.de/servlet/reweb2.ReWEB?rwsite=DBR_INTERNET_EN-PROD]; International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics online database; and World Bank, Global Development Finance Online database, all downloaded 5 June 2009.
The presence of large and growing surplus reserves suggests that the region would be better off by investing those reserves more actively to maximize risk-adjusted returns. The alternative of continuing to use excess reserves to purchase safe and liquid but low-yielding traditional reserve assets is indeed a costly waste of valuable resources. Therefore, the notion that developing Asia should manage at least some of its growing stockpile of reserves more actively is not only politically popular but economically sound. A group of state-owned financial institutions known as SWFs have a long history of using publicly owned foreign exchange to pursue commercial profits. In contrast to central banks, which managed foreign exchange assets largely to protect the country from sudden shortages of international liquidity, SWFs used foreign exchange assets to maximize risk-adjusted returns. As such, the shift from passive to more active, profit-oriented management of excess reserves is analytically equivalent to a shift from central banks to SWFs. As such, SWFs provide a natural institutional model for more active, profit-oriented management of developing Asia’s excess reserves. This is especially true when a number of existing SWFs have established solid track records for consistently successful investment performance. Within the region, Singapore is widely seen as a role model in light of the extraordinary success of its two SWFs (Temasek and GIC). New SWFs are already emerging in Asia and many more are in the planning stages. New SWFs are already emerging in Asia and many more are in the planning stages. Korea set up the Korea Investment Corporation (KIC) in 2005 and the PRC has followed suit with the China Investment Corporation (CIC) in 2007. Table 2 lists the major SWFs of developing Asia.

**Table 2: Sovereign Wealth Funds of Developing Asia**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economy</th>
<th>Name of Fund</th>
<th>Assets (US$ billion)</th>
<th>Year of inception</th>
<th>Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>Government of Singapore Investment Corporation</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Noncommodity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>Temasek Holdings</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Noncommodity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong, China</td>
<td>Investment Portfolio (Hong Kong Monetary Authority)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Noncommodity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brunei Darussalam</td>
<td>Brunei Investment Agency</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Commodity: Oil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea, Rep. of</td>
<td>Korea Investment Corporation</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Noncommodity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>Khazanah Nasional BHD</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Noncommodity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>National Oil Fund</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Commodity: Oil, gas, metals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taipei, China</td>
<td>National Stabilization Fund</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Noncommodity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>State Oil Fund</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Commodity: Oil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timor Leste</td>
<td>Petroleum Fund</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Commodity: Oil and gas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>Fund for Reconstruction and Development Fund</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Commodity and noncommodity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiribati</td>
<td>Revenue Equalization Reserve Fund</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>1956</td>
<td>Commodity: Phosphate mining</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nauru</td>
<td>Nauru Phosphate Royalties Trust</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Commodity: Phosphate + mining</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>To be named</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>Noncommodity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>To be named</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>Noncommodity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: A number of trust funds in the Pacific, which have been financed by government and donor funds, are not included in the above list and have an aggregate size of about $500 million. Due to lack of official information from the funds themselves, asset sizes are largely estimates from unofficial sources such as Jen (2007).

Sources: Jen (2007), Rozanov (2005), and Setser and Ziemba (2007).

Park (2007) provides a comprehensive review of the emergence of SWFs in developing Asia.
III. The Rise of Outward FDI from Developing Countries

One significant symptom of the transformation of developing Asia into net capital exporters has been the emergence of SWFs in the region. Another significant symptom is the rapid growth of outward FDI from the region. More generally, rising outward FDI from developing Asia is a consequence of its rapid economic growth and development, which has given birth to growing numbers of companies with the capacity to acquire and manage overseas assets. The growth of outward FDI from developing Asia is part of a broader trend of outward FDI from developing countries as a whole. This trend has been an integral part of the fast-growing share of developing countries in the global economy. Developing countries as a group have been growing significantly faster than developed countries over the past few decades. Indeed growth has been remarkably rapid in some parts of the world, especially PRC, India, and East Asia. The upshot is that the global economic landscape today is very much different from that of 30 years ago when global economic activity was dominated by developed countries, and developing countries merely played a secondary supporting role. One interesting element of this change has been the growing importance of developing countries as a source of outward FDI.

The primary vehicle for outward FDI has been multinational corporations (MNCs) operating across borders. The predominant majority of those firms have traditionally come from developed countries. Large and well-established MNCs such as Coca Cola, Toyota, or Siemens almost invariably hail from the European Union (EU), Japan, and US. The role of developing countries in the context of MNCs was largely limited to hosting MNCs from developed countries. Examples include US software companies setting up research facilities in India, Japanese manufacturers establishing production facilities in the PRC, or British banks acquiring financial institutions in Brazil. Until quite recently, this stereotype of developed countries as homes of MNCs, and developing countries as hosts of MNCs, had been firmly rooted in empirical reality (Dunning 1993). Although it is true that there were MNCs from developing countries in the past, they were nowhere near as active or visible as they are today.

Reflecting the fast-rising relative weight of developing countries in the world economy, many developing countries are now becoming significant outward foreign direct investors in their own right (UNCTAD 2006). Therefore, at a broader level, the growth of MNCs from developing countries reflects the rapid economic development and growth of those countries (Dunning and Narula 1996). The four newly industrialized economies of Hong Kong, China; Korea; Singapore; and Taipei, China have almost reached developed country per capita income levels. Some developing countries have thus become rich enough to

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5 UNCTAD (2006) defines "developing and transition economies" as comprising all developing countries plus countries in South-East Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States. Occasionally, the term "South" or "Third World" is also used to denote these economies. In this paper, the term "developing countries" is more narrowly defined and refers to the major sources of FDI from the "South", including Argentina; Brazil; Chile; PRC; Colombia; Hong Kong; China; India; Korea; Malaysia; Mexico; Nigeria; Russia; Singapore; South Africa; Turkey; Taipei, China; and Venezuela, which accounted for 90% of FDI from developing countries in 2004.
export capital to the rest of the world. However, the growth of MNCs from developing 
countries is by no means limited to the most successful developing countries. Countries 
as diverse as the two Asian giants that are the PRC and India; major Latin American 
economies such as Brazil and Mexico; and the African powerhouse that is South Africa 
have all spawned their own MNCs. The growth of such MNCs can be viewed as evidence 
of the growing ability and willingness of developing-country firms to make investments 
outside their home countries (Bartlett and Ghoshal 2000, Mathews 2006). Indeed some 
of these firms, such as Korea’s Samsung; South Africa’s AngloAmerican; India’s Tata; 
Mexico’s CEMEX; Brazil’s Vale; Egypt’s Orascom; the PRC’s Huawei; Malaysia’s Sime 
Darby; and Taipei,China’s Acer, have become truly global players with operations all over 
the world (UNCTAD 2006).

Given the concomitant rise of MNCs and outward FDI from developing countries, one 
might expect a considerable rise in the share of developing countries in global outward 
FDI. By the same token, in light of the well-publicized flow of FDI into the PRC and other 
developing countries, it is plausible to expect an increase in the share of developing 
countries in global inward FDI. However, as Table 3 below shows, somewhat surprisingly, 
the share of developing countries in the global stock of inward and outward FDI has 
remained fairly stable since 1980. A likely explanation for this is the massive volume 
of cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) within the G3 (EU, Japan, US) in the 
1990s. One important indicator that has clearly changed is the ratio between outward 
and inward FDI stock of developing countries, which supports the notion that developing 
countries are no longer almost exclusively a destination for FDI but also an increasingly 
significant source of FDI.

Table 3: Inward and Outward FDI Stock in Developed and Developing Countries, 
1980–2007 (billions of US dollars)

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$ billion</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>$ billion</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developed countries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inward FDI</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>1,413</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outward FDI</td>
<td>499</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>1,640</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outward/Inward</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>1.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing countries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inward FDI</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>529</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outward FDI</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outward/Inward</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FDI = foreign direct investment. 
Note: The percentages refer to percent of total—developed and developing countries. 
Sources: UNCTAD (2004 and 2008); authors’ calculations.

In terms of the sectoral composition of the developing countries’ outward FDI, in 2006 
around 85% of the stock of their outward FDI was in services such as trade, finance, 
and business activities, compared to 50% in 1990, as we can see in Figure 6. The
corresponding shares for developed-country FDI were 46% in 1990 and 61% in 2006. The share of primary and secondary sectors in developing-countries’ outward FDI is declining, as is the case for developed-country outward FDI. The increase in the share of services in the outward FDI of developing countries mirrors the increase in the share of services in their GDP. For example, as demand for telecom services in developing countries grows as a result of economic growth, developing-country telecom firms may venture abroad. Furthermore, service-oriented developing economies such as Singapore and Hong Kong, China invest abroad primarily in services (especially offshore centers and financial services) and thus help to raise the share of services in outward FDI of developing economies as a whole.

**Figure 6: Sectoral Distribution of the Outward FDI Stock of Developed and Developing Countries, 1990 and 2006**

Table 4 shows the share of outward FDI stocks accounted for by different developing economies. In 1980 Latin American countries accounted for nearly four fifths of the total outward FDI from developing countries. By 2007, their share had fallen sharply to 22%. On the other hand, the corresponding share of Asian developing economies, and especially that of the Chinese-speaking economies, rose sharply from 11% to 75%. Table 4 shows that Hong Kong, China led the way with $1 trillion stock of outward FDI in 2007,
a sum exceeded only by France, Germany, United Kingdom (UK), and US. Brazil; PRC; Korea; Singapore; and Taipei, China are the other main sources of outward FDI from developing economies. These five economies and Hong Kong, China jointly accounted for around 70% of the stock of outward FDI from developing economies in 2007 and 10% of the global stock of outward FDI. The corresponding figures for 1995 were 68 % and 7%.

Table 4: Origin of Outward FDI Stock of Developing Economies

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$ million</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>$ million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China, People's Rep. of</td>
<td>nsa</td>
<td></td>
<td>15,802</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong, China</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>78,833</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>neg</td>
<td>264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea, Rep. of</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>10,231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>11,042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>3,718</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>35,050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taipei,China</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>25,144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>neg</td>
<td>2,274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>46,915</td>
<td>77.9</td>
<td>86,263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>5,997</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>10,696</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>38,545</td>
<td>64.0</td>
<td>44,474</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>2,425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1,027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>2,572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>6,884</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>33,297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of which</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>5,722</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>23,305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>60,239</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>308,624</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

nsa = not separately available, neg = negligible.
Sources: UNCTAD (2004 and 2008); authors' calculations.

The home economies of developing-country MNCs differ widely in terms of size, income level, economic structure, natural resources, technological capabilities, trade openness, government policies, and other characteristics (Hoskisson et al. 2000). For example, the economies range from geographically small economies such as Singapore and Hong Kong, China to continental ones such as Brazil, PRC, India, and Russia. Some home economies such as PRC, India, and Korea have modest endowments of natural resources, whereas others such as Brazil, Malaysia, and Russia are blessed with abundant endowments of natural resources. East Asian economies are relatively more dependent on manufacturing and exports than other developing countries.

It is therefore not surprising that each developing economy has its own particular FDI objectives, which are shown in Table 5. For example, Singapore’s FDI is associated with market access and low labor costs; Korea’s FDI with escaping high labor costs and militant labor unions at home; the PRC’s FDI with the search for markets and natural resources; India’s FDI with new market access and escape from home-country government restrictions; Brazil’s FDI with substantial investment in the financial and business sectors; Mexico’s FDI with access to markets and knowledge; and Russia’s FDI with the energy and mining industries and privatization programs in transition economies.
Table 5: Motives for Outward FDI, Selected Developing Economies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economy</th>
<th>Characteristics</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Largely regional, e.g., Latin America, but recent expansion into Canada; substantial financial investment; significant petroleum investments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China, People’s Rep.</td>
<td>Largely market and natural resource seeking, but recently knowledge/brand names; considerable state support directly or indirectly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong, China</td>
<td>Mainly in the People’s Republic of China, but some in other poorer Asian and African countries; motivated both by cost reduction and market seeking in both manufacturing and service sectors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>Initially to penetrate new markets and escaping government restrictions, but recently more on accessing and acquiring technology/brand names.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea, Rep. of</td>
<td>Escaping high cost and difficult labor markets at home, as well as saturated product markets; increasing asset seeking FDI in Europe and the US.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>Importance of offshore banking, transport, and a range of diversified activities; some asset augmenting FDI in Europe and the US.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Largely within North and South America; market access and knowledge seeking, e.g., major global multinational corporations, Cemex.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Largely energy and mining investments; avoidance of domestic regulatory constraints.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>Market access dominates, but low cost labor seeking also a factor; for some more technology-intensive activities, following the client becomes important; exploiting its own advantages as a regional service center.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Initially opportunistic and ill-planned, and then regional market access seeking.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FDI = foreign direct investment.  

IV. Are Sovereign Wealth Funds an Appropriate Vehicle for Developing Asia’s Outward FDI?

In Section II, we have seen that SWFs have emerged in developing Asia as a policy response to manage the region’s surplus reserves more actively with a view toward pursuing commercial profit rather than managing liquidity. In Section III, we have seen that developing countries, in line with their growing weight in the world economy, are no longer just recipients of FDI inflows but also an increasingly significant source of FDI outflows. In the case of developing Asia, a further impetus for outward FDI has been its transformation into a net capital exporter. Taken together, these two trends suggest that outward FDI would be an attractive channel for pursuing the SWFs’ central objective of maximizing risk-adjusted returns. Clearly, in principle, outward FDI represents one potential alternative for shifting the region’s surplus reserves from low-return traditional reserves to more profitable uses. However, in practice, it will be a tough challenge for the region’s SWFs to engage in outward FDI, as will be explained in greater detail below.
Nevertheless, SWFs are beginning to play a bigger role in FDI through their growing involvement in M&As. According to UNCTAD (2008), the investments of SWFs are increasingly directed toward FDI rather than portfolio investment. The mode of FDI by SWFs is predominantly M&A rather than greenfield investment (i.e., the establishment of new production facilities) or joint ventures with partners in host countries. However, SWFs still invest very little in the form of FDI, which accounted for only an estimated 0.2% of their total assets in 2007. At the same time, this form of investment has been growing noticeably in recent years. According to the UNCTAD report, of the $39 billion of FDI made by SWFs during 1987–2007, as much as $31 billion or almost 80% was committed in 2005–2007. In addition, the number of cross-border M&As involving SWFs jumped from one in 1987 to 30 in 2007. Over the past two decades, 73% of FDI by SWFs has flowed into developed countries while $10.5 billion or 27% of FDI has flowed into developing countries. Among developing countries, developing Asia has received the bulk of FDI by SWFs with Africa and Latin America receiving only very limited amounts. The overall picture of outward FDI by SWFs is one of rapid growth from a miniscule base.

Most investments by SWFs are in services, particularly business services; finance; hotels and restaurants; and transport, storage, and communications. Outside the services sector, the chemical and chemical product sector has also captured a significant portion of SWF investments. Further, SWFs have channeled their investments primarily in Germany, UK, and US (UNCTAD 2008). Recent investments by SWFs have been largely influenced by developments in the global economic landscape, in particular the distress of western financial institutions. Many of SWFs’ major investments have been made in the financial services sector of developed countries, and have helped to bolster the capital base of distressed banks in the EU and US. As such, such investments have played a stabilizing role in the global financial turmoil. Apart from investments in the financial sector, SWFs have also secured large stakes in private equity funds, which have turned to SWFs as new sources of funds for private equity firms in light of their reduced access to bank credit. However, despite the growing significance of SWFs as outward investors, concerns remain about their lack of institutional capacity as well as host-country doubts about their investment motives.

### A. Lack of Institutional Capacity

Temasek and GIC are widely respected and admired throughout developing Asia, and have inspired the creation of SWFs in the region. Such emulation is evident in the fact that the PRC and Korea have gone so far as to name their own SWFs after GIC. These two Singaporean SWFs are interesting for our purposes because some of their foreign investments, especially in the case of Temasek, have the attributes of FDI, i.e., long-term acquisition with substantial influence on management. The major reason Temasek and GIC have attracted so much attention from the region’s emerging SWFs is their exceptional investment performance. According to Temasek (2008), the total average compounded annual shareholder return between 1974 and 2008 was a remarkable
18% in terms of market value. During the same period, the market value of Temasek’s portfolio rose from $170 million to $134 billion. Just like Temasek, GIC has established a solid track record of consistently good investment performance. According to company sources, between 1981 and 2008, the average annual return has been 5.8% in Singapore dollar terms. The average annual return above global inflation has been 4.5%. Moreover, GIC has added value in both equities and bonds against the relevant industry indices. Although both funds are believed to have suffered heavy losses during the global financial crisis and there are some doubts about the reliability of their financial statements given the lack of external verification, there is nevertheless a fairly firm consensus within financial circles that Temasek and GIC are savvy investors with a superior track record.

Although Temasek has the luxury of adopting either long or short investment horizons, in practice its guiding principle has been to manage for long-term value. While it might be tempting for outsiders to dismiss the commercial orientation of a government-owned institution, it is in fact accurate to say that Temasek has been run on a purely commercial basis. In addition to its bread and butter of equity stakes in domestic and foreign companies, Temasek has ventured into areas such as private equity, real estate, and venture capital. For GIC, the range of asset classes includes government and corporate bonds, equity, foreign exchange, commodities, real estate, private equity, venture capital and infrastructure. Indeed real estate and special investment (private equity, venture capital, infrastructure) are significant enough to be managed as separate investment groups within GIC, alongside the main investment group for public market assets.

A feature of an SWF’s investment strategy that may increase profits is to actively exercise hands-on control or influence on the management of the companies in which it buys equity stakes. In the case of Temasek, around 50–60% of its portfolio in 2006–2008 consisted of investments where the company’s share of total equity exceeded 20%. It is not clear, however, if Temasek actually adopts a hands-on approach in its investments in which it has large equity stakes. Take the case of Bank Danamon Indonesia, the fifth largest commercial bank in Indonesia, which is 58% owned by Temasek. Temasek does not manage Bank Danamon directly but through Fullerton Fund Management, a wholly owned subsidiary of Temasek that manages its outward FDI in financial services. Still, there is no evidence that Fullerton, which is basically an investment agency with a few staff, has sufficient control over the management of Bank Danamon or of other banks acquired by Temasek. This casts some doubt on Temasek’s capacity to directly manage the firms it buys. While the managerial capacity of Temasek is subject to debate, its strong financial position throughout its long existence and its generally superior investment performance attests to its financial prudence and commitment in maximizing shareholder return, which are attributes worth emulating by newer SWFs.

The key question for our purposes is the extent to which the Singaporean model of SWFs, i.e., substantial amounts of FDI and, more generally, high-risk, high-return investments, is applicable and relevant to the new SWFs of developing Asia. The simple
answer is that the relevance and applicability of the Singaporean model to other Asian SWFs is low. The biggest difference between Temasek and GIC on one hand and the likes of CIC and KIC on the other hand is a huge gap in institutional capacity. It is not only unrealistic but downright dangerous for CIC, KIC, and other Asian SWFs to believe that they can earn Temasek- or GIC-types of return on their investments in the short run. It would be a serious mistake for regional policymakers to believe that it is possible to build a Temasek or a GIC overnight. That is, it takes a lot of time and effort to build up the institutional capacity, which is an absolute precondition for taking and managing the risks required to realize high risk-adjusted returns.

Both Temasek and GIC have accumulated a large stock of institutional knowledge, experience, and capacity from their many years of operations. Furthermore, aside from Hong Kong, China, it is only Singapore that has long been a major international financial hub in developing Asia. Therefore, unlike the rest of the region, the infrastructure, human capital, and regulatory framework of a sophisticated and well-functioning financial system are all already well in place in Singapore. The likes of CIC or KIC do not yet have the capacity to invest competently in areas like private equity, venture capital, and real estate, let alone equity stakes in start-up companies in emerging industries such as biotech. The practical implication is that a gradualist approach of learning-by-doing is preferable to a cold-turkey approach of a big bang. It is better to start from less risky asset classes and build up investment management capacity before moving on to more adventurous asset classes. In addition, in the absence of adequate institutional capacity, it makes much more sense to start out as passive portfolio investors with limited equity stakes before acquiring larger stakes and exercising influence over management.

At a more fundamental level, Temasek and GIC are both a cause and consequence of Singapore’s unique style of capitalism in which the government plays a leading role in producing goods and services. Although labels such as Japan Inc., Korea Inc., and Asia Inc. have been widely tossed around, it is in fact Singapore that much more closely fits the notion of the state as the entrepreneur. While it might be tempting to attribute the PRC’s intense interest in Temasek and GIC to the PRC’s state capitalism, the private sector already accounts for a large and growing share of output in the PRC. Moreover, the PRC’s state-owned firms are nowhere near as efficient or commercially successful as their Singaporean counterparts. Indeed inefficient and loss-making SOEs are a major drag on the PRC’s economic growth and a major headache for the PRC’s policymakers. The broader point here is that the two Singaporean funds are essentially vehicles for managing the wealth of a commercially active and successful government. Therefore, to the extent that Singapore’s SWF model reflects its unique state-led capitalism, there are clear limits to its relevance for the other SWFs of developing Asia, in particular with respect to their willingness and ability to engage in outward FDI.
B. Financial Protectionism

In addition to lack of adequate institutional capacity, another major risk to outward FDI by developing Asia’s SWFs is financial protectionism. SWFs invest abroad rather than at home so their investments necessarily affect the interests of citizens and governments of the countries in which they buy real and financial assets. As Truman (2007) points out, the SWF’s investments must conform to the laws and regulations of the host countries. For example, US law requires any investor that holds more than 5% of a publicly listed stock to reveal that position, and the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is concerned about how state-owned foreign companies report their investments in US-listed stocks. Large investments by foreign SWFs may affect the stability of local financial markets, the level and volatility of asset prices, and more generally, the economy and national welfare. For example, such investments may contribute to the formation of bubbles in the local stock or property markets. Foreign investors, whether state-owned or not, have to conform to host-country laws and regulations. However, host-country governments and citizens are sometimes more wary and suspicious of state-owned investors than private sector investors.

The concerns of host countries center on the investment motives of SWFs. More specifically, there are doubts about whether the investments of SWFs are motivated by purely commercial considerations. The underlying fear is that unlike the investments of their private sector counterparts, SWFs may be partly driven by ulterior political or geopolitical motives in their investment strategy. For example, the acquisition of a foreign company with sophisticated dual-use technology that can be used for either civilian or military use entails both economic and military benefits for the investor. To some extent financial protectionism is directed at foreign investors in general rather than government-owned foreign investors. Both developed and developing countries are highly sensitive about foreign acquisitions of domestic national champions or strategically important industries, regardless of whether the investor is private or public. Nevertheless, investments by foreign state-owned companies seem to arouse especially strong opposition in the host countries, due to concerns about noncommercial objectives. An additional reason for the hostility is that SWFs are predominantly from developing countries, often with different political systems than those of the developed countries. This explains why developed countries subject investments by foreign state-owned institutions to intense scrutiny.

While there are some legitimate grounds for fears about the noncommercial orientation of SWFs from developing Asia and other developing countries, those fears tend to be exaggerated. We should remember that the driving force behind why new SWFs emerged in developing Asia in the first place was to earn higher returns on large amounts of surplus reserves than they were earning on safe but low-return traditional reserve assets such as US government securities. The primary impetus behind the birth of the region’s SWFs was to shift reserves from passive liquidity management to active profit-seeking
investment. At a purely intuitive level, it seems strange to question the commercial orientation of developing Asia when their very purpose is to make as much money as possible subject to acceptable risk. Furthermore, the distinction between commercial and geopolitical objectives is not always clear-cut. For example, if CIC acquires oil fields in Africa, such an acquisition may make commercial sense and, at the same time, promote the PRC’s geopolitical self-interest by contributing to its energy security. A more plausible ground for host-country concern about SWFs is that they enjoy commercial advantages vis-à-vis private sector financial institutions when their investments go wrong due to implicit guarantees of government bail-out. Such guarantees give SWFs an unfair advantage by enabling them to bid more aggressively for foreign assets than their private sector counterparts.

In a sense, the issue of whether the financial protectionism of host countries is motivated by legitimate concerns, for example, about noncommercial objectives or unfair competitive advantages arising from government ownership, or are merely a symptom of politically driven aversion to foreign acquisition of domestic industries and firms is secondary. Financial protectionism, regardless of its underlying causes, constrains how and where developing Asia’s SWFs can invest, and thus imposes a significant cost. For example, when the government of a host country prevents a foreign SWF from making a commercially profitable acquisition on national security grounds, the SWF is deprived of a profit opportunity. Furthermore, to the extent that financial protectionism is directed toward state-owned foreign firms rather than foreign firms in general, it puts SWFs at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis private sector financial institutions. What matters is the perception of host-country governments and the public toward SWF investments rather than the actual effect of those investments. As long as there is a perception that those investments are harmful to the national interest, host countries will impose regulatory restrictions that amount to a significant additional cost from the SWF’s perspective. If a large number of countries impose restrictions, the investment universe of SWFs may be severely constrained.

There are numerous real-world examples of financial protectionism against state-owned firms from developing countries. This suggests that the risks financial protectionism poses to outward FDI by SWFs are all too real. One widely publicized example is the unsuccessful $18.4 billion bid in 2005 by China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) to acquire Unocal Corporation, a US oil producer and the world’s ninth largest oil company. CNOOC met strong opposition from the US Congress, which expressed reservations that CNOOC was a foreign company owned by the PRC government and had the unfair advantage of financial support from the PRC government. Some US lawmakers expressed fears that a take-over of Unocal by CNOOC could threaten both national security and economic interests. Legislations were introduced in Congress to discourage CNOOC’s bid. Although CNOOC initially offered a higher bid price than Chevron, which was also interested in acquiring Unocal, CNOOC was forced to withdraw its offer due to the political opposition (Hufbauer, Wong, and Sheth 2006). More recently,
Western countries, including Australia, have been particularly wary of Chinese investment in strategic sectors. For example, in June 2009, Rio Tinto, one of the world’s largest mining companies based in Australia and the UK, scrapped an agreement it had forged with the Aluminum Corporation of China (CHINALCO). Under that agreement, CHINALCO would have invested $19.5 billion in Rio Tinto, which would have doubled CHINALCO’s stake in Rio to 18% and given it two seats on the board. The regulatory authorities in Australia had expressed serious misgivings about growing ownership by the PRC in one of Australia’s largest companies.

Financial protectionism is not only restricted to developed countries, and not only directed toward the PRC firms. A prominent example of developing-country economic nationalism hindering FDI by state-owned firms is Temasek’s purchase of large stakes in Thailand’s Shin Corporation from the family of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra in 2006. The sale drew controversy on the grounds that Thaksin sold a major company with sizeable interests in telecommunications, satellites, media, and aviation to a foreign entity, and thus was perceived as putting national security at risk. The controversy, which was partly motivated by the fact that the acquirer was a state-owned company from a country long identified with state capitalism, added fire to the political turmoil arising from anti-Thaksin sentiment and eventually led to the ouster of the Thaksin government. Another well-known example of politically motivated financial protectionism relates to the failure of Dubai Ports World, a state-owned company based in the United Arab Emirates, to acquire Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Co., a British company managing several port facilities around the world, including six major US ports. The purchase met with fierce resistance from US legislators on national security grounds. The huge political uproar eventually forced Dubai Ports to sell the US port facilities it acquired through Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Co. to a US company.

C. Impact of the Global Financial Crisis and the Santiago Principles

Prior to the global financial crisis, which was rooted in the US subprime mortgage crisis and intensified after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in August 2008, SWFs were viewed as one of the biggest threats to global financial stability. The sheer size of SWFs, which now control as much as $2.5 trillion in assets, will clearly have repercussions for global financial markets in terms of relative asset prices, for example, bonds versus equity, and emerging-market assets versus developed-country assets. Furthermore, as the International Monetary Fund (2007) points out, their mixture of size and opacity raises concerns about systemic risks to global financial stability. Their size means that they have the power to move markets, and their opacity means that it will be difficult to track their investments. Furthermore, implicit government guarantees of their investments, in conjunction with their relative lack of expertise and experience, may induce SWFs to take on more risks than they can handle. In addition to their perceived threat to global financial stability, it was noted that out of legitimate concerns as well as economic nationalism, the investment activities of SWFs have been viewed with suspicion and hostility in host countries. In short, the precrisis investment climate was decidedly unfavorable for SWFs due to their negative perception in host countries, especially in the west.
The global financial crisis has brought about a sea change in the attitude of the US and other industrialized countries toward SWFs and their investments. The change was driven by cold hard economic necessity, in particular the acute shortage of capital afflicting financial institutions in the EU and the US as a result of the crisis. Whereas the SWFs were once viewed as big threats to global financial stability, they were now widely viewed as potential saviors of the global financial system, in particular as providers of much needed capital. In fact, developing Asia’s SWFs have recently made a number of high-profile acquisitions of equity stakes in troubled western financial institutions. These include CIC’s investments of $3 billion in Blackstone and $5 billion in Morgan Stanley. CIC also entered into an agreement with US firm J.C. Flowers to start a $4 billion private equity fund that would focus on US financial assets, and committed $800 million to a global real estate fund to be managed by Morgan Stanley. KIC has invested $2 billion in convertible preferred Merrill Lynch Securities and subsequently converted them into common shares. The more mature Singaporean SWFs, Temasek and GIC, have also made substantial investments in the global financial industry, including $10.3 billion in UBS, $4 billion in Standard Chartered, $2 billion in Barclays, $5.9 billion in Merrill Lynch and $6.9 billion in Citigroup.

Although the fundamental shift in the attitude of host countries in the aftermath of the global financial crisis has created a far more favorable investment climate for SWFs, a number of factors have limited their willingness and ability to venture abroad. For one, developing Asia’s SWFs have suffered heavy financial losses on their investments in western financial institutions, which have experienced sharp declines in market values as the crisis intensified. For example, between December 2007, when CIC invested $5 billion in the company, and the end of May 2009, the share price of Merrill Lynch has plummeted from $50 to $30. The main reason that KIC converted its convertible preferred Merrill Lynch securities almost 2 years ahead of schedule was to cut the mounting losses on its investment. The more experienced Singaporean funds have not been spared financial losses arising from the global turmoil. Most strikingly, the share price of Citigroup has collapsed from $27 to less than $4 since the time of GIC’s investment. The lesson for developing Asia’s SWFs is a sobering one, i.e., successfully navigating the turbulent waters of global financial markets is a difficult challenge even for sophisticated, well-established investors, let alone fledgling novices such as CIC or KIC.

In addition, the unwinding of global imbalances that underlie the global financial crisis implies that the US will no longer run large and persistent current account deficits as it had prior to the crisis. This means that developing Asia will experience a considerable deceleration in the speed and scale of its FX reserve accumulation relative to the precrisis period. Furthermore, governments around the region are likely to become more conservative in their reserve management as a result of the crisis. The devastation of the global financial industry has rekindled painful memories of the Asian financial crisis and strengthened the precautionary motive for holding reserves. In the context of reserve management, this favors the passive liquidity management of central banks over the
active profit-seeking investment of SWFs. The slower pace of reserve accumulation and more conservative reserve management will both reduce the amount of funds available for SWFs. To sum up, while the global financial crisis may have softened the attitude of host countries toward foreign investment, the heavy losses suffered by SWFs as a result of the crisis and the reduction of resources available to SWFs will constrain outward FDI by SWFs. On balance, the impact of the global crisis on outward FDI by SWFs is likely to be negative rather than positive.

A significant recent development that impinges upon FDI by SWFs was the establishment of the Generally Accepted Principles and Practices, better known as the Santiago Principles, a voluntary code of conduct for SWFs, in October 2008. The Santiago Principles were set up by International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds (IWG) whose 23 members are primarily developing countries with SWFs, including PRC, Korea, and Singapore. The code includes 24 principles that cover the legal framework, objectives, coordination with macroeconomic policies, institutional framework, governance structure, and investment and risk management framework of SWFs. The principles were prepared by IWG members with the assistance and coordination of the International Monetary Fund, and are the result of several months of work by the IWG. The principles are strictly voluntary and do not have any binding force but are nevertheless expected to be implemented by SWFs in all of the IWG member countries. The Principles are largely a response of SWF home countries to the concerns of western governments about the activities of SWFs and the growing specter of financial protectionism in host countries. They are intended to improve outsiders’ understanding of fundamentally commercial institutions so as to prevent protectionist measures targeting SWFs.

The Santiago Principles cover three general areas: (i) principles 1–5 cover the legal framework, objectives, and coordination with macroeconomic policies; (2) principles 6–17 cover the institutional framework and governance structure; and (3) principles 18–23 cover the investment and risk management framework. The last principle calls for a process of regular review of the implementation of the principles. Underlying the Santiago Principles are four guiding objectives for the conduct of SWFs: (i) help support a stable global financial system and free flow of capital and investment; (ii) comply with regulatory and disclosure requirements in the countries in which they invest; (iii) invest on the basis of economic and financial risk and return-related considerations; and (iv) erect and maintain a transparent and sound governance structure that provides for adequate operational control, risk management, and accountability.

The Santiago Principles will help to mitigate the concerns and fears of host countries about SWFs to the extent that they explicitly formalize and standardize the commitment of SWFs to comply with the rules and regulations of host countries and, more generally, to refrain from engaging in activities detrimental to the interests and welfare of host countries. In this sense, the principles will lessen the pressures for financial protectionism and create a more favorable climate for outward FDI by SWFs. However, there are some
doubts as to whether the Santiago Principles are really necessary when the principles and practices they recommend are in the best self-interest of SWFs to implement anyway. For example, the Principles recommend that SWFs operate on a purely commercial basis without any political or strategic objectives. Upon reflection, this is redundant for developing Asia’s SWFs, which are commercial entities with the overriding objective of earning the highest possible risk-adjusted returns.

The broader point here is that the primary purpose of SWFs is to fend off protectionism, but the profit motive suggests that SWFs are unlikely to engage in activities that invite protectionism in the first place. The underlying reason is that, as discussed earlier, protectionism constrains the type of investments a SWF can pursue and thus represents a substantial cost of doing business. Nevertheless, adherence to the Santiago Principles performs a valuable signaling role about the commitment to address the host countries’ concerns about SWFs just as membership in the World Trade Organization signals a commitment to free trade. The primary value of the Principles lies not so much in their impact on actual behavior but in their role as an explicit signal of goodwill and absence of motives. Given that the investments of SWFs necessarily affect the interests and welfare of both investor and host countries, what is urgently needed is a rational and sober dialogue about SWFs between investors in the two groups of countries. Such a dialogue will eventually have to take place within a multilateral framework due to the global nature of SWFs and their activities, and will be beneficial for both investor countries and host countries. Most crucially, it will help to push back the specter of financial protectionism and protect global financial integration, which ultimately benefits all countries. The Santiago Principles mark an important first step in the dialogue, but a code of conduct for host countries will also be required for a more comprehensive and balanced dialogue.

V. Concluding Observations

While FDI inflows have made important contribution to the rapid industrialization and growth of developing Asia in the past, the region has now itself become an increasingly significant source of FDI. Part of this transformation has to do with the growing relative weight of the region in the global economy and the emergence of globally competitive companies with the willingness and capacity to venture abroad. Developing Asia is no longer merely the recipient of investments from internationally active multinationals but the home region of a rising number of companies with operations all over the world. Another major rationale behind the growth of outward FDI from the region is its transformation from a net importer of capital to a net exporter of capital since the Asian crisis of 1997–1998. Prior to that crisis, developing Asia was a capital-scarce region that relied on FDI and other external inflows to fuel its rapid growth. For the most part, the intermediation of developing Asia’s surplus savings was performed by the public sector
rather than the private sector. In particular, the region’s central banks accumulated FX reserves on an unprecedented scale and speed since the crisis, and invested them mostly in safe and liquid but low-yield assets (i.e., traditional reserve assets) such as US government bonds. Therefore, although the region’s outward FDI have grown rapidly, it remains small relative to its large and growing amounts of capital outflows.

The FX reserves have reached levels where there is a consensus that the region now has substantially more reserves than all plausible estimates of what it needs for liquidity purposes. SWFs have emerged in developing Asia as a policy response to political pressures for more active management of surplus reserves or reserves that are in excess of liquidity needs, with a view toward maximizing risk-adjusted returns. Therefore, notwithstanding the concerns of host countries about noncommercial ulterior motives, SWFs are fundamentally commercial creations created with the very purpose of making as much money as possible for their owners—the government—subject to tolerable risk. FDI, which typically involves equity shares large enough to influence the management and a long-term relationship, is certainly one mode of investment available for earning higher returns than can be earned from traditional reserve assets. Indeed some older well-established SWFs, most notably Temasek but also others such as Norway’s GPF, have achieved superior investment performance partly by undertaking active hands-on investments in which they seek to exercise some control over the management of companies in which they invest. This suggests that FDI is a viable investment option for SWFs seeking more profitable uses of surplus reserves.

Unfortunately, it should be abundantly clear from the analysis of this paper that the potential for SWFs to engage in successful FDI and, more generally, pursue profit-oriented commercial investments, is quite limited. The underlying reason is that inadequate institutional capacity and the political sensitivity of state-led FDI severely constrains the ability of developing Asia’s SWFs to undertake FDI on a significant scale. It should be emphasized that SWFs are a relatively new phenomenon in the region and they do not yet have the stock of knowledge or expertise to successfully invest abroad. Until they build up their institutional capacity to a level that enables them to effectively handle the substantial risks associated with foreign investment, a process that inevitably will take some time, developing Asia’s SWFs are unlikely to become major sources of outward FDI. An additional cause for pessimism about the prospects for outward FDI by the region’s SWFs is the threat of financial protectionism. A number of high-profile attempts by state-owned firms from developing countries to purchase foreign assets have been aborted due to politically motivated opposition from host countries. The threat of financial protectionism has receded as a result of the global financial crisis but the crisis has also served as a sobering reminder to SWFs about the high risks involved in investing abroad. The Santiago Principles will further blunt financial protectionism by signaling the commitment of SWFs to comply with the rules and regulations of the host countries.
One additional specific factor that casts a big cloud over the SWFs’ ambition to become major sources of outward FDI is a growing backlash against FDI in both developed and developing countries. This backlash is part and parcel of financial protectionism but targeted more specifically toward inward FDI. It is true that in the past few decades countries around the world have adopted a much more open, welcome, and receptive stance toward FDI, which has come to be seen as a source of investment, know-how, technology, jobs, and growth. In particular, due to its greater stability and longer time horizon, FDI has generally been viewed much more favorably than portfolio inflows or “hot money”, which has sometimes been volatile and disruptive. However, as Sauvant (2006) points out, the pendulum may be shifting toward a more hostile environment for FDI, especially FDI which takes the form of cross-border M&A. Such hostility tends to be more pronounced when the cross-border M&A targets domestic firms that are regarded by the host-country government and public as national champions. The underlying concern relates to national security, cultural identity, or economic development in the case of industries considered “commanding heights” of an economy. This deterioration of the investment climate for M&A FDI is especially relevant for SWFs, since M&A FDI is, as noted earlier, their preferred mode of FDI.

As discussed, due to a number of factors, the potential for developing Asia’s SWFs to become major conduits for the region’s growing outward FDI is limited at best. Nevertheless, although FDI currently accounts for only 0.2% of all assets held by SWFs, it has been growing rapidly in recent years, albeit from a very small base. In the short run, one major promising option for SWFs to become better at identifying and taking advantage of profitable FDI opportunities is to form strategic partnerships with other domestic companies from industries in which the SWF is investing. For example, a SWF may partner a domestic clothing and textiles company to make investments in foreign cotton fields. Or, a SWF may partner a domestic technology company to purchase a foreign technology company with access to superior technology. The strategic partner will be in a better position to evaluate a target firm since, unlike the SWF, it will have a stock of knowledge and experience in the same or related industry. Such strategic partnerships are potentially win-win alliances in which the SWF can provide the capital, and the partner firm can provide industry-specific knowledge and experience. Strategic partnerships also increase the scope for increasing the market value of the acquired firm and hence the chances of a successful, profitable FDI.

In the longer run, it is unclear why the public sector should be in charge of intermediating developing Asia’s surplus savings. Quite apart from the more fundamental issue of whether running large current account surpluses (i.e., surplus savings) is in the region’s best self-interest, there is no obvious reason why the public sector should be better than the private sector at intermediating the region’s capital exports. To the contrary, since the private sector tends to be better than the public sector in seeking out and realizing profit opportunities, including profit opportunities in foreign countries, it is desirable to allocate a greater role to the private sector in the intermediation of the region’s surplus savings.
Encouraging the region’s private sector to invest abroad, including undertaking FDI, will not only lighten the burden on the region’s public sector to make foreign investments for which it is ill prepared, but it will reduce the amount of surplus reserves, which subtract from rather than add to national welfare. To help break down the initial inertia against foreign investment, the government may give tax breaks and other fiscal incentives to encourage the private sector to venture overseas. Measures to stimulate outward FDI will be an integral part of a broader effort to stimulate all types of foreign investment by domestic residents.

References

About the Paper

In theory, outward FDI represents a promising investment option for developing Asia’s sovereign wealth funds (SWFs). Donghyun Park and Gemma Estrada point out that in practice, SWFs’ lack of institutional capacity limits their ability to exercise managerial control and thus add market value to their investments. This severely constrains the scope for outward FDI by SWFs in the short run.

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