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Nationalized Incumbents and Regional Challengers: Opposition- and Incumbent-Party Nationalization in Africa

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Nationalized Incumbents and Regional Challengers:
Opposition- and Incumbent-Party Nationalization
in Africa

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Abstract

The African party literature, especially research prescribing to the long-dominant ethnic voting thesis, has asserted that African party systems exhibit low levels of party nationalization. However, systematic research on nationalization across parties and party systems is still lacking. This study argues that the prospects for building nationalized parties vary substantially between incumbent and opposition parties. Incumbent parties, with their access to state resources, have been successful in creating nationwide operations, even in countries where geographical factors have been unfavorable and ethnic fractionalization is high. The analysis utilizes a new data set of disaggregate election results for 26 African countries to calculate nationalization scores for 77 parties and study the correlates of party nationalization. The results show that factors like ethnic fractionalization, the size of the geographical area, and urbanization affect party nationalization, but only in the case of opposition parties. Incumbent parties, on the other hand, generally remain nationalized despite unfavorable structural conditions.

Keywords: Africa, parties, nationalization, opposition, incumbent, ethnicity

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Nationalized Incumbents and Regional Challengers: Opposition- and Incumbent-Party Nationalization in Africa

Michael Wahman

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1 Introduction

Much discussion on African political representation has revolved around the question of party systems. Scholars have tried to uncover why the level of volatility is high in many African party systems (Mozaffar and Scarritt 2005; Riedl 2014), why or whether party systems are structured around ethnicity rather than policy (Wantchekon 2003; Elischer 2013), and how
we can explain high levels of voter fragmentation in some national contexts (Mylonas and Roussias 2008; Wahman 2014).1 There has also been an important discussion on the general lack of multietnic appeal among African parties, and some scholars have pointed to the fact that parties often lack nationwide operations (Kaspin 1995 and LeBas 2011). Indeed, the maps of electoral results from many African countries tell stories of extremely regionalized voting patterns, where parties’ electoral support is concentrated in limited geographical areas (Ferree and Horowitz 2010).

This paper is the first to systematically study party nationalization in Africa from a cross-national perspective. In contrast to many of the earlier studies on African parties, the analysis focuses on parties rather than party systems. As in Western political contexts, political parties in Africa, even within the same national context, may vary dramatically in their operations; they may attract voters using varying mobilization strategies, invest in party infrastructure to different extents, and be more or less capable of attracting a multietnic following and creating nationwide organizations. The analysis makes this general point by focusing on the effect of incumbency on party nationalization and by systematically analyzing how country-level structures, together with a party’s access to national office, affect nationalization.

Much of the literature on ethnic political mobilization has argued that parties in ethnically diverse societies have generally been more prone to monoethnic mobilization (e.g. Horowitz 1985; Manning 2005; Mozaffar and Scaritt 2005; Franck and Rainer 2012). As a consequence, it has been hypothesized that incumbents in ethnically diverse African countries have been more likely to exercise ethnic favoritism (Easterly and Levine 1997; Franck and Rainer 2012) and to create reciprocal relationships with narrow ethnic interests. Some earlier case-study work emphasized the difference between incumbent and opposition parties (Crook 1997; Kendhammer 2010) in terms of their ability to secure multietnic support, arguing that incumbent parties have been able to use state resources to build nationalized party systems. Similar arguments were also made in earlier quantitative research using relatively small samples (van de Walle 2003; Cheeseman and Ford 2007). This research, however, did not address how incumbency interacts with national-level characteristics and did not rule out the possibility that incumbent parties in more diverse societies tend to build less nationalized operations than their counterparts in more homogenous societies. The study of this interaction between national-level characteristics and incumbency status is this study’s most important contribution.

Empirically, the paper utilizes a new data set on local party support for 77 political parties in 2,730 local constituencies spread across 26 countries. The new data set gives the study

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1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association (APSA), Washington, D.C., 28–31 August 2014. The author is indebted to Catherine Boone for continuous support and theoretical inspiration and to Jonathan van Eerd and Staffan Lindberg for invaluable comments. Parts of the data have been generously provided by Jeffrey Conroy-Krutz, Ian Cooper, Adrienne LeBas, and Gerhard Seibert. The Swedish Research Council has provided financial support [VR DNR 2012-6653].
an empirical scope far beyond any previous study on similar topics. The analysis is performed using multilevel mixed-effects OLS regression, with political parties nested in countries as the units of analysis. The results reveal that both social structures and institutional factors correlate with the nationalization of political parties. Parties in countries with a low average district magnitude, large territories, high ethnic fractionalization, a low level of democracy, and a low level of urbanization are generally less nationalized. Also, incumbent parties are significantly more nationalized than opposition parties. More interestingly, several of the factors generally impeding nationalization, including urbanization and a country’s territorial size, are significantly correlated with the nationalization of opposition parties but have no significant effect on the nationalization of parties in government. Most importantly, African incumbent parties are not negatively affected by ethnic diversity in the creation of nationalized party organizations. This finding runs counter to many earlier arguments on political mobilization in ethnically diverse societies (e.g. Horowitz 1985; Norris and Mates 2003; Franck and Rainer 2012).

The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the broader literature on party nationalization, developed mostly in the Western European and Latin American contexts. The third and fourth sections discuss party development and party nationalization in sub-Saharan Africa. These sections also introduce the hypotheses for the empirical analysis. Section 5 discusses the methods and introduces the new data set, and sections 6 and 7 present the empirical analysis. The conclusion summarizes the results, considers some further implications, and proposes some avenues for further research.

2 Party Nationalization from a Comparative Perspective

Party nationalization refers to the degree of homogeneity in the geographical distribution of a party’s votes. Highly nationalized parties receive relatively equal shares of votes in all geographical areas of a country, whereas non-nationalized parties receive the bulk of their support from a limited geographical area (Caramani 2004). Although party nationalization in Africa is still a largely unstudied topic, the issue has received much attention in other parts of the world, including Western Europe (ibid.), the United States (Chhibber and Kollman 1998), Southeast Asia (Hicken 2009), Eastern Europe (Bochsler 2010), and South America (Mainwaring and Jones 2003). Although these earlier studies of party nationalization are of great relevance for understanding nationalization in Africa, it is worth noting that most of the previous research has been more interested in explaining differences between party systems or within a party system over time than in studying the nationalization of different groups of parties across national units.

Party nationalization has a key influence on the nature of political representation and the aggregation of the popular will (e.g. Chhibber and Kollman 1998; Crisp et al. 2013). It has also been attributed great significance in terms of policy outcomes. The existence of a national-
ized party system has been acknowledged as a favorable factor that promotes effective resource allocation by discouraging parochial policies tailored to satisfy the needs of political parties’ own narrow political bases (Rose and Urwin 1975). Parties in nationalized party systems are expected to promote policies more targeted towards public goods than clientelistic club goods (Cox and McCubins 2001; Casteneda-Angarita 2013). Looking especially at Africa, several studies have shown how regions loyal to the incumbent have been rewarded with more public resources (Caldeira 2011; Briggs 2012; Franck and Rainer 2012). However, in order to understand the way in which African parties produce policy outputs, a systematic analysis is needed, not only to determine the general character of party systems at large but also to uncover the differences between parties within those same systems. If nationalized parties occupy national offices in generally non-nationalized party systems, the idea of the regionalist African incumbent would be seriously misinformed. Franck and Rainer (2012) have argued that ethnic favoritism in Africa during the last 50 years has been higher in ethnically diverse societies, as illustrated by the provision of education and health services. If we apply this argument to the multiparty African state, it is reasonable to expect that parties create more narrow ethnic appeals in ethnically heterogeneous societies. However, this assumption is built on the idea that ethnic homogeneity affects not only opposition parties but also the incumbent parties that control the distribution of state resources.

3 The Nationalization of Incumbent and Opposition Parties in Africa

During the last 20 years of African political research, an important debate has taken place about how the transition from single to multiparty rule has transformed basic African political dynamics (e.g. Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Boone 2013; Bates and Block forthcoming). One of the key discussions in this debate concerns how the popular base of African ruling parties may or may not have been extended as a consequence of multipartyism. Whereas some one-party regimes in the one-party era were based on powerful (often anticolonial) founding mythologies and created significant local infrastructure to incorporate the (predominantly rural) masses, other ruling parties were more elitist organizations with the primary purpose of co-opting rival elites through the distribution of economic resources (Liebenow 1986; Hyden 1980). It has been argued that in ethnically diverse and largely rural societies, African incumbents often propped up their rule by tailoring policies to urban elites and co-ethnic constituencies (e.g. Lipton 1977). Such regimes were thus stabilized through the creation of a relatively small supporting coalition. Several observers of contemporary African politics (e.g. Manning 2005; Mozaffar and Scaritt 2005) have observed that political parties have remained fractionalized, often along ethnic lines, even after the introduction of multipartyism. This conclusion is puzzling. Multiparty competition has opened up the political arena and provided opportunities for minority groups to gain at least limited political representation; indeed, several groups have made use of such opportunities. However, multipar-
tyism has also increased the need for political entrepreneurs to forge larger political coalitions to successfully compete for national office.

Van de Walle (2003) made the observation that African party systems have generally been structured around a dominant incumbent party, with smaller opposition parties operating in the periphery of the political system. Although nationalized party structures would be in the interest of parties competing for national power, not all parties have the capacity to build such operations. When multipartyism resurfaced on the African continent in the early 1990s, it did so in the context of a weak postcolonial and postauthoritarian civil society and a largely statist economy that concentrated political and economic resources in the hands of powerful local and national elites (LeBas 2011). As the state machinery and civil service can be mobilized in campaigning for incumbent parties, ruling parties are able to reach most parts of the country – even those where the party lacks a substantial party structure. As regions supportive of the incumbent party continue to benefit materially from their loyalty, power brokers have strong incentives to join forces with the incumbent and rival elites can be co-opted into the party (Arriola 2013; Koter 2013).

Based on the theory of resource asymmetry and nationalization, I formulate the following hypothesis:

HI: Incumbent parties are more nationalized than opposition parties.

An important caveat is needed here: although previous research linking incumbency to party nationalization (or multiethnic appeal) (e.g. van de Walle 2003; Cheeseman and Ford 2007) has been an important addition to our understanding of African party politics, there is certainly a large degree of endogeneity in the relationship between incumbency and nationalization. Clearly, a party with broad nationwide support will be more likely to maintain or win power. I hence regard the systematic study of the interaction between social and geographical factors and incumbency as the main contribution of this study.

4 Ethnic Diversity and Nationalization

It is now widely held that party systems are the product of both institutions and social cleavages (Moser and Scheiner 2013). Several studies have shown that more socially diverse countries generally have more parties at the national level (Clark and Golder 2006; Odershook and Shvetsova 1994). In the analysis of political cleavages in Africa, much of the debate has concerned the importance of ethnicity. Some authors have highlighted ethnicity as the most important cleavage in multiparty competition, characterizing elections as an ethnic headcount (Lever 1979; Horowitz 1985; Posner 2005). Others have argued that ethnicity as a political cleavage has been exaggerated and that ethnicity often masks other less visible differences between voters (Lindberg and Morrison 2005; Bratton et al. 2012; Lieberman and McClendon 2013).
An important realization is that the extent to which ethnicity is a structuring political cleavage or the extent to which parties attract a multiethnic following is likely to vary between party systems and, even more importantly, between parties in the same party system. Indeed, analyses of ethnic diversity among party supporters have revealed important differences between parties within the same political context (Basedau et al. 2011; Basedau and Stroh 2012). Cheeseman and Ford (2007) argued that the alleged monoethnic appeal of political parties in many African party systems more accurately described parties in opposition than parties occupying the presidency. However, the authors did not consider how the multiethnic character of incumbent parties depended on ethnic heterogeneity at the national level. Arriola (2013) has argued that African parties with access to private or state resources have been more capable of building multiethnic coalitions because they can offer financial compensation in order to incorporate junior coalition partners. Similarly, Koter (2013b) has argued that African parties have often not issued direct ethnic appeals but have instead forged multiethnic coalitions by distributing clientelistic resources to local political elites (often traditional authorities). Such clientelistic strategies, however, require significant resources often not available to opposition parties. In an analysis of the ethnically heterogeneous Nigeria, Kendhammer (2010) notes how the ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP) has successfully attracted a wide array of local elites from different ethnic groups seeking access to oil rents.

For incumbent parties, ethnic heterogeneity can sometimes even be beneficial in building a multiethnic following. In countries with several smaller groups that do not have a realistic chance of winning outright majorities, political elites may be more tempted to build multiethnic coalitions within the realm of the ruling party. However, leaders who are left outside the ruling coalition and who lack the resources necessary to build multiethnic coalitions may still be able to issue a more monoethnic appeal with the goal of cultivating enough of a local following to gain at least limited political influence. As a result, we can expect incumbent parties to effectively create multiethnic parties, even in the case of high ethnic heterogeneity, whereas opposition parties will be more likely to make a more narrow ethnic appeal designed to create a limited following among smaller, often regionally concentrated, segments of the electorate.

H2: Nationalization is lower in countries with a high degree of ethnic fractionalization.

H3: The difference in the level of nationalization between incumbent and opposition parties is greater in countries with a high degree of ethnic fractionalization.

5 Data and Dependent Variable

Research on African elections and parties has long suffered from a lack of adequate cross-national and disaggregated data. Long time series with detailed election data have been available for countries in the industrialized world, and ambitious new data sets, including those created by Brancati (2013) and Kollman et al. (2012), have extended data availability far
beyond the realm of consolidated Western democracies. However, data on elections in Africa have remained scarce. This study presents a new data set of cross-national constituency-level election data for 26 African countries and analyzes constituency-level election results from approximately 2,730 parliamentary constituencies. To the best of my knowledge, the data set represents the most extensive data source by far for constituency-level election data on Africa. Some of the data have been taken from Brancatti’s (2013) and Kollman et al.’s (2012) global constituency-level data sets, but most have been collected on a country-by-country basis from the websites of various African electoral commissions. A full list of data sources for all the elections in the sample is provided in the appendix.

The study’s main unit of analysis is political parties participating in legislative elections. I use legislative elections rather than presidential elections for two reasons. First, presidential election results are often not presented at an adequately disaggregated level. Second, using legislative data makes it possible to have comparable data for both presidential and parliamentary systems. All parties participating as a separate list have been counted individually, although they may or may not be part of a larger coalition. Individual candidates are not counted as parties. A particular problem with doing systematic party research in Africa is that many noninstitutionalized party systems hide de facto individual candidates behind the shallow party labels of so-called “briefcase parties” (Kelly 2014). Following Jones and Mainwaring (2003), I adopt a particular threshold of party support for parties to be included in the sample. Jones and Mainwaring (ibid.) only include parties that receive at least 10 percent of the national vote in their sample of American states. However, due to the lack of competitiveness in many African countries, I have opted for a lower threshold of 5 percent. Also, to make the threshold neutral to the electoral formula, I also include parties that win more than 5 percent of the seats in parliament.

According to the data set compiled by Wahman et al. (2013), there were 37 democracies or multiparty autocracies with elected legislatures in Africa as of 2010.2 Of these 37 countries, I have excluded four (Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and Guinea), because only the government party surpasses the 5 percent support threshold. Unfortunately, I have also had to exclude six more countries (Benin, Burundi, Comoros, Ethiopia, Madagascar, and Mali) due to the unavailability of reliable constituency-level election results. I have used the most recent available data for each country. To record the geographical patterns of party support, I have used data from the constituency level; constituencies may be multimember (for example, South Africa), single member (Malawi), or both (Senegal).

Bochsler (2010) identifies four major ways that nationalization has been measured in the literature: competition indices (Lago and Montero forthcoming), indices of variance (Caramani 2004), distribution coefficients (Jones and Mainwaring 2003), and inflation measures

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2 These 37 states exclude the Central African Republic, Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mauritania, Guinea-Bissau and Sudan, which did have multiparty elections but are classified as military multiparty regimes by Wahman et al. (2013).
(Chhibber and Kollman 1998). This study utilizes the distribution coefficient approach, first introduced by Jones and Mainwaring (2003) and also adopted in a number of recent studies (e.g. Morgenstern et al. 2009; Crisp et al. 2013; Elischer 2013; Jurado forthcoming). This approach is especially suitable when parties rather than party systems are the unit of analysis. In Jones and Mainwaring’s distributional coefficient approach, the authors make use of the Gini coefficient, well known from research on wealth distribution. The Gini coefficient provides an easily interpreted, standardized, and bounded measure of the variation in support for a party across electoral units. A Gini coefficient is calculated for every party that fits the description above (receives more than 5 percent of the national vote or 5 percent of the seats in parliament), yielding the following function:

\[ (1) \quad \text{PNS} = 1 - G_i \]

The Gini coefficient is subtracted from 1 to facilitate interpretation, so that high values for party nationalization (PNS) indicate high levels of nationalization. In the descriptive statistics I also measure the level of party system nationalization (PSNS). This index is based on a weighted accumulated score for all parties in the system. In this index the nationalization of every party \( (P) \) is calculated and weighted by its share of the national vote \( (P_N) \), thereby giving greater weight to larger parties.\(^3\)

\[ (2) \quad \text{PSNS} = \sum (1 - G_i P) P_N \]

5.1 Independent Variables Measurement and Controls

As described in more detail below, the data structure used for this study is hierarchical, with parties clustered in countries. The independent variables included in the statistical models are collected on two levels, level 1 (individual parties) and level 2 (the entire country).

Two level-1 variables are included in the analysis. First, a dummy variable for whether a party is a government party is included in all models. I count the party of the government’s chief executive before the election (president or prime minister depending on regime type) as the government party. All other parties are considered opposition parties. Second, I include a control for the age of a party, as I would expect older parties to be more nationalized. Data are taken from the Database of Political Institutions (DPI) (Beck et al. 2001) and complimented and modified by consulting secondary sources. To measure ethnic fractionalization I use the

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3 Bochsler (2010) leveled important criticism at the original application of the Gini-based approach and advocated the use of a weighted Gini coefficient, where the Gini was weighted by the number of districts used to calculate the coefficient and the size of these districts (in terms of eligible voters). However, this study does not make use of the weighted measure suggested by Bochsler (2010). The reason is that the electoral system used and the discrepancies in terms of constituency size have often been a deliberate strategy to minimize opposition parties’ national appeal. Through strategic malapportionment and gerrymandering, the electoral challenge posed by opposition parties was often diminished at the introduction of multipartyism (Mozaffar and Vengroff 2002; Smith 2002; Barkan et al. 2006). I do, however, control for average district magnitude in all models.
ethic fractionalization index provided by Alesina (2003). The definition of ethnicity involves a combination of racial and linguistic characteristics.\footnote{Though Posner (2004) has made a good case for measuring fractionalization by looking only at politically relevant ethnic groups (PREG). However, the formation of distinct political parties is one of the indicators for recognizing PREGs, making the index close to tautological for this particular study.}

I also test a number of country-level variables, independently and in combination with party characteristics. A growing literature on African elections is concerned with the lack of political competition in rural areas. Local clientelistic networks, which provide ample opportunities for voter monitoring and strong social control, have enabled systems of local one-party dominance in many African multiparty states (Koter 2013a). To account for the level of urbanization, I utilize the World Bank data on the share of the population living in urban areas. Since urbanization should reduce the difference in nationalization between opposition and incumbent parties, I also include a model with an interaction effect to see if urbanization is yet another structural feature that affects incumbent and opposition parties differently.

In African countries, where parties are financially weak and infrastructure is limited, covering large areas during campaigning is often very costly, especially if such areas are sparsely populated. I use the natural log of a country’s total area (km$^2$) to measure geographical space. Here again, there are likely to be differences between opposition and incumbent parties, and I again include interaction effects between geographical space and incumbency status.

Comparative political scientists have long debated the importance of district magnitude. Classic Duvergerian logic (Duverger 1954) postulates that a smaller district magnitude will decrease the number of candidates at the district level. It has, hence, been argued that larger district magnitude enhances ethnic minority representation by enabling parliamentary representation of smaller groups (Lijphart 1984; Schugart 1994). Smaller district magnitude creates more interconstituency differences in the social composition of voters, enabling parties to issue much more narrow appeals directed to specific constituencies (Potter forthcoming), especially if parties mobilize voters according to cleavages that are typically clustered geographically (for example, ethnicity). I account for average district magnitude using data from the DPI (Beck et al. 2001).

I also include a dummy variable for whether the country holds national elections for an executive. This information is obtained from the Institutions and Elections Project (IAEP 2013). The literature on “presidential coattails” has argued that legislative party nationalization increases in presidential systems, as legislative parties have to coordinate between districts to mount a credible challenge in the presidential election (Golder 2005; Hicken and Stoll 2011; Stoll forthcoming). It has also been argued that high levels of political and economic centralization increase nationalization (Chhibber and Kollman 1998; Hicken 2009). Although centralization broadly refers to the centralization of both state resources and political power, data restrictions in the African context limit this study to assessing the decentralization of political
power. As a proxy I use a dummy for whether a country holds direct elections for local executives (councilors or governors). The data have been taken from the DPI (Beck et al. 2001) and updated when necessary. I have also included controls for GDP/capita (WDI 2013) and level of democracy, measured as the average of a country’s Freedom House political rights and civil liberties score. Finally, I have included a dummy variable for turnover, which shows whether the party in power has been the same throughout a country’s history of multiparty politics.

5.2 Estimation Strategy

In contrast to most studies on party nationalization (e.g. Chibber and Kollman 1998; Caramanzi 2004; Hicken 2009), this study’s primary interest is the nationalization of parties, not party systems. However, political parties are part of a national electoral context, which also has to be accounted for in the specification of the statistical models. Following Morgenstern et al. (2009), I hence use a hierarchical model where each party i is clustered in a particular country j.

The main analysis utilizes multilevel mixed-effects OLS models. The distinct advantage of this model specification, relative to other possible specifications such as a pooled OLS regression, is that it enables tests for causal heterogeneity (Steenbergen and Jones 2002). The main hypotheses tested in this study are that opposition parties are less nationalized than government parties and that this disadvantage of being in opposition is dependent on structural variables. Such hypotheses can be tested with a multilevel OLS regression that uses cross-level interactions between level-1 variables (for example, government party dummy) and level-2 variables (for example, urbanization and ethnic fractionalization) (Kam and Franzese 2007).

In the most basic models I include random intercepts but not random slopes. Failing to recognize the possibility of significant variation in country intercepts would increase the risk of model misspecification and underestimate the standard errors, thereby increasing the risk of type-I errors. The cross-level interaction models also include random slopes, based on my hypothesis that the slope of the level-1 variable is dependent on the value of higher-level variables.

6 Descriptive Statistics

This study focuses on opposition-party nationalization, but since it is also the first study to collect cross-national data on party nationalization for a larger sample of African countries,6

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5 Financial decentralization is usually measured as the share of government revenues and expenditure received and distributed by subnational levels of government (e.g. Hicken 1999). Reliable data is, however, not generally available for Africa (see the restricted sample of Dalfôn et al. 2012).

6 To the best of my knowledge, the largest cross-national sample of African party nationalization in previous research is found in Elischer (2013). In his book, Elischer compares party nationalization in three countries (Ghana, Kenya, and Namibia) over time.
Figure 1 introduces the descriptive statistics for party system nationalization. The nationalization score is a party system average, weighted by party size (as described in the methods section).

**Figure 1: Party System Nationalization**

Source: Author's data.

As is the case for other characteristics of party systems, such as party system size, institutionalization, and polarization (Kuenzi and Lambright 2001), Figure 1 shows that there is significant variation in party system nationalization between the countries on the African continent. These findings add weight to the general conclusion that generalizing about the state of African party systems is highly problematic (Weghorst and Bernhard 2014).

The numbers above are hard to interpret without any point of reference. The average across-country party system nationalization score for the Americas in the study by Jones and Mainwaring (2003) was .79, with Ecuador at one end (.57) and Jamaica at the other (.93). The nationalization score for the United States was .84. Figure 1 shows that the level of nationalization in Africa is generally lower than that in the Americas, with an average of .68. However,

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7 The way in which the nationalization scores have been calculated in this study makes them roughly comparable with those of Jones and Mainwaring (2003). The only difference is that I include all parties that have received more than 5 percent of the national vote, whereas Jones and Mainwaring use a 10 percent threshold.
seven of the countries in the sample exhibit levels of nationalization higher than the average in Jones’s and Mainwaring’s study. All the countries at the top of Figure 1 utilize multimember constituencies. However, Senegal – one of the countries with the highest level of nationalization – also has several single-member constituencies (with the largest multimember constituencies having five seats).

Three island states, Cape Verde, Mauritius, and Sao Tomé and Principe score high on nationalization. All these countries are relatively urbanized, ethnically homogenous, and geographically small. Some of the countries at the top of the table, including Angola, Rwanda, and Mozambique are highly uncompetitive. One might argue that a high level of party nationalization in these cases is more accurately depicted as one-party dominance. In Angola and Mozambique it is certainly the case that the incumbent party is significantly more nationalized than the opposition. However, the main opposition party in Rwanda, the Parti Libéral (PL), is also highly nationalized, receiving a small but similar proportion of the vote in all constituencies (5.2–10.1 percent). Also, several of the countries with a high level of nationalization, including Cape Verde, Mauritius, and Sao Tomé and Principe, are highly competitive.

If we look at the bottom of the table, we find five countries with lower levels of nationalization than Ecuador, the country with the lowest nationalization score in Jones and Mainwaring’s study (2003). Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya, Liberia, and Sierra Leone all have party nationalization scores below .57. For those familiar with the electoral geography of these particular countries, the results are unlikely to come as a surprise. In all these cases earlier country-specific studies have acknowledged the strong regional component of voting. Noteworthy about these cases is that all are examples of countries with a high level of ethnic fractionalization. In three of them – Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya, and Liberia – ethnically motivated violence has also been a prominent feature of the recent history.

To change the focus from the party system level to the analysis of individual parties, Figure 2 plots the party system nationalization score against each country’s ethnic fractionalization score. Incumbent parties are marked with circles; opposition parties with triangles.

A longer discussion about the conditional effect of fractionalization follows in the multivariate analysis section. However, two things are notable. First, the graph provides an initial indication that incumbent parties are indeed more nationalized than their opposition counterparts. Second, whereas incumbent parties are generally located on the higher part of the nationalization scale, regardless of ethnic fractionalization, very few opposition parties are located in the upper-right quadrant of Figure 2 (high level of fractionalization and high level of nationalization).

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8 For Liberia, see Harris and Lewis (2013); for Sierra Leone, see Harris (2011); for Kenya, see Ngau and Musyimi (2010); for Cote d’Ivoire, see Crook (1997); and for Cameroon, see Takougang (2003).
Figure 2: Nationalization Averages and Party Nationalization

![Nationalization Averages and Party Nationalization](image)

Source: Author's data.

7 Multivariate Analysis

To look more closely at the factors shaping nationalization and investigate the hypotheses laid out in the theoretical discussion, tables 1 and 2 present multilevel OLS regressions of party nationalization. In these models, parties, clustered within countries, are the unit of analysis and the data covers 77 parties in 26 countries. Table 1 presents two multilevel models with random intercepts. Table 2 includes cross-level interactions in order to study whether the effect of incumbency varies across different levels of the national structural variables. To allow for the effect of incumbency to vary, these models also include random slopes.

Model 1 in Table 1 introduces the two party-level variables, and Model 2 expands the model with the country-level covariates. In accordance with H1, models 1 and 2 support the claim that incumbent parties are more nationalized than opposition parties. This is not at all surprising; as already acknowledged, the causality between incumbency and nationalization is likely to run both ways, because nationalized parties are more likely to win national contests.
### Table 1: Multilevel Random Intercept Models on Party Nationalization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fixed Part</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level 1 (Party)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent</td>
<td>.251*** (.041)</td>
<td>.251*** (.037)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party age</td>
<td>.000 (.001)</td>
<td>-.000 (.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level 2 (Country)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turnover</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>-.037 (.039)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average district magnitude</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>.004*** (.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanization</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>.003* (.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic fractionalization</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>-.412**** (.132)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP/capita</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>-.000 (.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directly elected president</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>.108 (.089)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political decentralization</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>-.013 (.046)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area (logged)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>-.022* (.012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of democracy</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>.039** (.016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constant</strong></td>
<td>.524*** (.035)</td>
<td>.701*** (.146)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Random Part</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election variance component</td>
<td>.014 (.006)</td>
<td>.000 (.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party variance component</td>
<td>.022 (.004)</td>
<td>.019 (.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interclass correlation (country)</td>
<td>.380 (.123)</td>
<td>.000 (.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td>24.353</td>
<td>38.877</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>-38.706</td>
<td>-58.556</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N (parties)</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N (countries)</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s data.

*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10

Note: Entries are OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. The analysis is estimated as a two-level model with random intercepts (not random slopes) Significance is reported for independent variables.

This is also in line with previous research on similar topics using more restricted samples (e.g. van de Walle 2003 and Cheeseman and Ford 2007). However, the magnitude of the coefficient is rather impressive. The predicted nationalization score for incumbent parties is as
much as .25 (Model 2) higher than that for opposition parties. This finding makes clear that
the lack of nationalization in African party systems is a phenomenon associated with opposition
parties. The average nationalization score for incumbent parties in this paper’s sample is
.78. This average is very close to the across-country average (.79) in the Jones and Mainwar-
ing study. A potential interpretation of the results in relation to incumbency is that incum-
 bent parties have gained their advantageous position through electoral manipulation and
weak democratic institutions. Indeed, we see that more-democratic countries have significa-
cantly more nationalized parties (Model 2). However, Model 7 in Table A1 of the appendix
includes an interaction term between level of democracy and incumbency. The model does
not show any evidence that the difference in nationalization between incumbent and opposi-
tion parties is higher in less democratic countries. Moreover, Model 1 shows no significant
correlation between party age and nationalization. African party systems have shown great
volatility (Kuenzi and Lambright 2001) since the introduction of multipartyism, and the re-
 results indicate that new parties have been as able to mount a national challenge as their more
established rivals.

Model 2 adds to our understanding of national-level characteristics that shape the pro-
spects for nationalization. First of all, the model shows that party institutionalization is sig-
ificantly higher in countries with a high average district magnitude and significantly lower
in countries with a high level of ethnic fractionalization. Both these findings are in accord-
ance with the general knowledge in the party literature. In Africa these two factors are also
intimately related, as electoral demarcation has often followed ethnic lines, thereby creating
ethnically homogenous constituencies with low levels of competition (Fox 1996). The coun-
try-variance component and the interclass correlation in Model 2 show very little unex-
plained country-level variation. This result is strongly affected by the significant explanatory
power of district magnitude and ethnic fractionalization. Model 2 also shows that larger
countries generally have fewer nationalized parties and that countries with more urbaniza-
have more nationalized parties. Using an interaction term between average district magni-
itude and urbanization, Model 6 in the appendix also shows that the effect of district
magnitude is smaller in highly urbanized countries. Whereas small districts in rural areas are
likely to be highly noncompetitive, urban areas are more likely to be competitive and to re-
fect the national vote choice.

In Table 2, I introduce three different models with interactions between incumbency and
country-level characteristics. Model 3 relates to H3 and investigates whether the marginal ef-
effect of incumbency on party nationalization is dependent on ethnic fractionalization, and
Model 4 estimates the effect of territorial size depending on incumbency. Model 5 models the
marginal effect of incumbency for different levels of urbanization. I also plot the predicted

---

9 Level of democracy is measured as the average Freedom House political rights and civil liberties score (1–7).
The scores are inverted so that higher Freedom House scores represent higher levels of democracy.
marginal effects of incumbency for different levels of the interacted variables (ethnic fractionalization, geographical area, and urbanization) in figures 3, 4 and 5.

Table 2: Multilevel Random Intercept and Random Slope Models on Party Nationalization (with Cross-Level Interactions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fixed Part</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 1 (Party)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent</td>
<td>-.000 (.131)</td>
<td>-.126 (.222)</td>
<td>.375*** (.118)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 2 (Country)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Average district magnitude</td>
<td>.003*** (.001)</td>
<td>.004*** (.001)</td>
<td>.003*** (.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic fractionalization</td>
<td>-.523*** (.106)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanization</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.003 (.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area (logged)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-.046*** (.011)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross-Level Interactions</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Incumbent×ethnic fractionalization</td>
<td>.400*** (.188)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Incumbent×area (logged)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.033* (.019)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Incumbent×urbanization</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-.003 (.002)</td>
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<td>Constant</td>
<td>.833*** (.076)</td>
<td>1.023*** (.135)</td>
<td>.357*** (.085)</td>
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<td>Random Part</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Incumbent variance component</td>
<td>.001 (.004)</td>
<td>.002 (.005)</td>
<td>.007 (.007)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Election variance component</td>
<td>.002 (.003)</td>
<td>.003 (.004)</td>
<td>.010 (.005)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Party variance component</td>
<td>.021 (.004)</td>
<td>.022 (.004)</td>
<td>.021 (.004)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Covariance</td>
<td>-.002 (.004)</td>
<td>.022 (.004)</td>
<td>-.009 (.006)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interclass correlation (country)</td>
<td>.082 (.144)</td>
<td>.106 (.168)</td>
<td>.332 (.139)</td>
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<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td>37.696</td>
<td>35.241</td>
<td>38.853</td>
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<td>AIC</td>
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<td>-43.673</td>
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<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N (countries)</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s data.
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10
Note: Entries are OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. The analysis is estimated as a two-level model with random intercepts and random slopes (for the lower-level component of the interaction term). To reduce the complexity of the model, I have only controlled for average district magnitude. Significance is reported for independent variables.
Model 3 clearly supports H3, which proposes that the difference in nationalization between opposition and incumbent parties is significantly larger in countries with high levels of ethnic fractionalization. Figure 3 illustrates the predicted marginal effect of incumbency, going from the lowest observed level of fractionalization in the sample (Lesotho) to the highest observed level (Uganda). Going from the lowest to the highest level of fractionalization increases the marginal effect of incumbency by as much as .3. For the country with the lowest level of fractionalization, incumbency has no significant effect. This finding goes beyond earlier research’s identification of differences in the multiethnic appeal of incumbent and opposition parties and shows that ethnic diversity does not have any significant effect on incumbent parties’ ability to create nationalized party organizations.

The effect of geographical space is significantly smaller for incumbent parties than for opposition parties, which indicates that incumbent parties are more able to cope with the challenge of campaigning in geographically vast areas. Figure 4 shows just a small change in the predicted nationalization score for incumbent parties as the geographical area increases, whereas the predicted nationalization score for opposition parties drops significantly. For those countries in the paper’s sample with the smallest geographical area, there is no significant difference in the predicted nationalization score between incumbent and opposition parties.

Although the interaction between incumbency and urbanization is negative in Model 5, meaning that the predicted difference in nationalization between opposition and incumbent parties is larger in less urbanized countries, the coefficient for the interaction is not significant. However, if we look at the plot of the predicted marginal effect of incumbency we see a large difference going from the lowest observed level of urbanization (Malawi) to the highest observed level (Cape Verde). The predicted difference in nationalization between incumbent and opposition parties at the lowest level of urbanization is .18 higher than at the highest level of urbanization.

All models have included a control for the level of democracy. I prefer this approach to the alternative of excluding countries based on an unavoidably arbitrary threshold. Nevertheless, it could be argued that the reliability of official electoral results is especially low in those countries with the lowest level of electoral freeness and fairness, making it problematic to take these data at face value. As an extra robustness test, all models have also been rerun with all parties from countries classified as “not free” by Freedom House excluded.10 This alteration renders essentially similar results. Although the effects of ethnic fractionalization, territorial size, and urbanization do not remain independently significant, the results still show a significantly positive effect of incumbency for nationalization. Most importantly, we still find significant interaction effects between incumbency and ethnic fractionalization as well as a significant interaction effect between incumbency and urbanization.

---

10 For my sample this applies to Angola, Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Rwanda, Togo, and Zimbabwe.
Figure 3: Predicted Nationalization Score Depending on Ethnic Fractionalization

Source: Author’s data.

Figure 4: Predicted Nationalization Score Depending on Area

Source: Author’s data.
8 Conclusion

Elections in Africa are often divisive events. As identity politics and regionalism are channeled into party politics and reinforced by political competition, elections have often resulted in significant tension (Eifert et al. 2010). Institutional design has been used to support the nationalization of party systems, but parties have often still remained clearly regionalized. Many have argued that the regionalization of party politics has resulted in suboptimal public policy (Franck and Reinert 2012), and scholars of contemporary African politics have argued that ruling parties in the African multiparty state have often relied on narrow political bases (Manning 2005).

This paper has emphasized the distinct difference in nationalization between opposition and incumbent parties on the African continent. Although low party nationalization has often been described as a system-wide problem, this study has shown that incumbent African parties have generally been successful in gaining nationwide support. I have stressed how resource asymmetries have complicated attempts to build national organizations for many opposition parties and argued that parties out of office, especially in countries with high levels of ethnic fractionalization, have capitalized on ethnic cleavages and created parties without national reach. These results add to the emerging realization among African party researchers that political parties differ in their appeal, organization, and structure – not only between African countries but also within the same party systems (Basedau et al. 2011; Elischer 2013).
The study has also challenged earlier research on ethnic favoritism and the negative impact of ethnic heterogeneity on the provision of public goods. Earlier research has shown that African incumbents have rewarded their own ethnic strongholds and that the geographical targeting of state resources is higher in ethnically diverse countries. However, this study has shown that while ethnic fractionalization has an overall negative impact on party nationalization, incumbent parties are as nationalized in ethnically diverse countries as they are in more homogenous contexts. Moreover, the study contributes to the burgeoning literature on urban–rural dynamics in African politics (Koter 2013a). It goes beyond the question of differences in urban and rural vote choice and investigates how aggregate-level urbanization affects African party systems. The analysis shows that low levels of urbanization generally decrease the level of nationalization, and that this is especially true for opposition parties.

The research on African parties and elections has matured significantly in the last decade, but we are still in the early stages of uncovering the functions and meaning of these elections. Much of the research on African elections has been intimately connected with the normatively most important outcomes, such as democratization and conflict (e.g. Lindberg 2006; Collier and Vicente 2012). However, understanding more about the inner workings of these elections and party systems is an essential step in uncovering how elections in Africa shape participation, representation, and contestation. One particular problem in African electoral research is insufficient data. This study shows how new, more disaggregated data can enable novel analyses of cross-country variations in party system development. More generally, there is a need for more research that pays specific attention to intrasystem variations in the appeal, organization, and infrastructure of African political parties.
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**Appendix**

**Table A1: Additional Multilevel Random Intercept Models on Party Nationalization**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fixed Part</th>
<th>(6)</th>
<th>(7)</th>
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<td>Level 1 (Party)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Incumbent</td>
<td>.258*** (.037)</td>
<td>.191 (.123)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Level 2 (Country)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average district magnitude</td>
<td>.012*** (.003)</td>
<td>.004 (.001)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Level of democracy</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.024 (.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average district magnitude* Urbanization</td>
<td>-.0002*** (.00006)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross-Level Interactions</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent*level of democracy</td>
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<td>.015 (.025)</td>
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<td>Constant</td>
<td>.264*** (.071)</td>
<td>.372*** (.095)</td>
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<td>Random Part</td>
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<tr>
<td>Incumbent variance component</td>
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<td>.010 (.009)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Opposition variance component</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Election variance component</td>
<td>.002 (.003)</td>
<td>.012 (.006)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Party variance component</td>
<td>.021 (.004)</td>
<td>.020 (.004)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Covariance</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-.011 (.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interclass correlation (country)</td>
<td>.084 (.107)</td>
<td>.371 (.137)</td>
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<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td>32.491</td>
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<td>AIC</td>
<td>-50.981</td>
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<td>N (parties)</td>
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<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N (countries)</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s data.

*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10

Note: Entries are OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. The analysis is estimated as a two-level model with random intercepts. Model 8 also uses random slopes (for the lower-level component of the interaction term). To reduce the complexity of the model, I have only controlled for average district magnitude. Significance is reported for independent variables.
Table A2: Election Data Sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Source</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>African Election Database</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Independent Electoral Commission of Botswana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Adam Carr’s Election Archive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>CLEA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>African Elections Database</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cote d’Ivoire</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Adam Carr’s Election Archive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Electoral Commission of Ghana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Election Passport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Independent Electoral Commission of Lesotho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>National Electoral Commission of Liberia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>2009</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Private correspondence with Adrienne LeBas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Private correspondence with Ian Cooper</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>INEC Nigeria</td>
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<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>EISA</td>
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<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>National Electoral Commission of Rwanda</td>
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<td>Sao Tomé and Principe</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Private correspondence with Gerhard Seibert</td>
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<td>Senegal</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Private correspondence with Jeffrey Conroy-Krutz</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>National Electoral Commission of Tanzania</td>
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<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Adam Carr’s Election Archive</td>
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<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Sokwanele.com</td>
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</table>

Source: Author’s data.
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