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Peer effects in collaborative content generation: The evidence from German Wikipedia

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Content Generation:
The Evidence from German Wikipedia**

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Peer Effects in Collaborative Content Generation: The Evidence from German Wikipedia

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Abstract

On Wikipedia, the largest online encyclopedia, editors who contribute to the same articles and exchange comments on articles' talk pages work in collaborative manner engaging in communication about their work. Thus they can be considered as peers who are likely to influence each other. In this article, I examine whether the activity of these peers, measured by the average amount of peer contributions or by the number of peers, yields spillovers to the amount of individual contributions. The partially overlapping group structure allows to identify peer effects and to use the number of the indirect peers as an instrument for the activity and the number of direct peers. The results show that, while controlling for observable editor and peer characteristics, an increase in the monthly average peer contribution by 1 per cent increases the amount of individual monthly contributions to Wikipedia (among individuals that contribute to Wikipedia every month) by about 0.44 per cent. Similarly, spillovers coming from the number of peers yield a positive effect of 0.17 per cent per article to 0.05 per cent for overall monthly contributions to Wikipedia.

Keywords: Peer effects; user-generated content; Wikipedia; network of editors; direct and indirect peers.

JEL Classification Numbers: I23, I4, J31, Z13.

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1 Introduction

The emergence of participatory web applications based on digital technology transformed the users of online information into the active producers of knowledge (Lerner and Tirole (2002)). As a result, a significant amount of knowledge and open-source software generated on online platforms is produced by the participants of online communities. Prominent examples of such peer production communities are technical support forums (stackoverflow, quora), open source software, e.g. the operating system Linux,¹ or the online encyclopedia Wikipedia². The volunteer activity of individuals with heterogenous backgrounds results in a socially valuable output. Since Wikipedia appeared it demonstrated a new way to organize knowledge generation processes. The idea of such a platform was adopted by some firms with the aim to to organize internal knowledge accumulation, although this proved to be challenging.

The voluntary provision of public goods on the Internet crucially depends on how effectively the large-scale human interaction systems will be designed in order to motivate voluntary participation. Previous research highlights the importance of social motivation for contributions to Wikipedia (Algan et al. (2013), Zhang and Zhu (2010)). Zhang and Zhu (2010) find that the size of the recipient audience matters for the amount of knowledge contributed to Wikipedia. Algan et al. (2013) focus on the impact of social image and reciprocity for the size of charity donations to Wikipedia. My paper goes further in understanding how social mechanisms work on Wikipedia by analyzing whether the performance of peers has an effect on individual knowledge contributions. The empirical analysis is based on a sample that tracks contributions of more than 520 editors³ on 330 pages in selected article categories during the period from January 2005 to December 2010. The full revision history allows to identify the set of peers for each editor, which varies across articles. I

¹Linux runs on more than 100K machines and 71M Linux users (LinuxCounter web-site)

²Wikipedia has over 1.8M users and 31.2M articles (Stats.wikimedia site). All data on the use of open source platforms are as in May 2014

³Hereafter, I will use the term "editors" or "contributors" for users who contribute voluntarily by editing articles on Wikipedia.

construct the network of peers that are considered to be connected with each other if they contributed to the same article and commented on the talk page of the article. Using the panel structure of the data (editors' monthly contributions) and the structure of the editor network I analyze whether there are spillovers to content generation by an individual from the amount of content generated by her peers or from the number of peers.

For identification of peer effects this study applies econometric techniques based on De Giorgi et al. (2010), which allow disentangling peer effects from exogenous characteristics of peers and correlated effects within groups. This approach takes advantage of a feature of the editor network, namely, the partially overlapping peer group structure. It enables the variation of the group mean across individuals and thereby generates enough observations for the identification of the coefficient on peer effects. Moreover, the network structure gives rise to a set of instruments, concretely, the characteristics of peers of peers (in what follows I label them as indirect peers or the excluded peers). They are correlated with the direct peer performance but uncorrelated with shocks to the peer group of the focal individual and with her performance. To address the endogenous network formation problem, I provide a set of robustness checks for the potential drivers of larger contributions such as external shocks to the content or self-selection into the network.

The results show that, while controlling for observable editor and peer characteristics, an increase in the monthly average peer contribution by 1 per cent increases the amount of individual monthly contributions to Wikipedia (among individuals that contribute to Wikipedia every month) by about 0.44 per cent. Similarly, spillovers coming from the number of peers yield a positive effect of 0.17 per cent per article and 0.05 per cent per overall monthly contributions to Wikipedia. This evidence suggests that even in the absence of explicit "online-friendship" ties between individuals (similar to those established on Facebook and other platforms) peer effects are present. These effects are both observed among individuals that contribute at least monthly to Wikipedia and also have peers during this interval, meaning that they contribute to the articles and engage into discussions on the article talk

pages on a monthly basis. These results suggest that communications between most active community members encourages building-up and promoting new online communities and enhances knowledge generation in the existing on-line communities. In addition, the amount of individual contributions is affected by an interest, or an expertise, in a special category of articles, which suggests the presence of the interest-based motivation for individual online contributions.

This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a review of the relevant literature. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents the econometric model. The main results are discussed in Section 5, and the robustness check are presented in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.

2 Background and hypotheses

2.1 Preferences in contributions

Peer productive knowledge platforms can be distinguished in several important aspects. The specific feature of Wikipedia is the way content is generated. The content in Wikipedia can be very sensitive to the events happening outside it and, therefore, important instruments for enhancing attention spillover are exogenous shocks to the content (Kummer (2013)). The newly created empty articles can be considered as signals to experienced contributors that there is a demand on that type of content (Gorbatai (2011)).

The organizational structure of content generation, potential rewards, and the usage of output in Wikipedia also differ significantly from open source software. While the output of open-source projects is often aimed at sophisticated users, an online encyclopedia has a high value for the vast range of users, therefore, representing a public good. Due to the modular structure, little communication between developers of open-source software is needed. On the contrary, for encyclopedic content is sometimes a subject of discussion between contributors with several contradicting opinions. Since any revision can be reverted, contributors have

to agree on the content (explicitly or implicitly) in order that the content remains on the page for a longer time. In contrast to open-source projects where monetary incentives are implicitly present through the future expectations of project participants for better-paid jobs, in Wikipedia social and psychological incentives (reciprocity, socialization) can instead play a very important role (Osterloh and Rota (2007), Algan et al. (2013)).

Contrary to social networks, Wikipedia does not have explicit friendship ties. Individuals become peers in the process of collaborative content generation. Do social effects, nevertheless, matter on Wikipedia provided such a structure? Studies focusing on Wikipedia point out that when the group of individuals is sufficiently large, private benefits dominate free-riding incentives, thus enabling the provision of a public good (Zhang and Zhu (2010)). Voluntary contributions might breed recognition in the community or improve social image of an individual (Lacetera and Macis (2010), Algan et al. (2013)) or contributions might be affected by the feeling of reciprocity. Algan et al. (2013) find that reciprocity matters for donations to Wikipedia, while Shriver et al. (2013) and Harper et al. (2010) find this phenomenon in other social networks, correspondingly, for wind-surfing and movielens. However, to the best of my knowledge there is still no analysis of an impact peers might have on individuals regarding the amount of contributions. Peer effects arise when individuals interact in groups and the average outcomes of peers affect individual outcomes. The present study fills this gap in the literature by showing that the interactions with other editors indeed matter for the core of the most productive contributors.⁴

Theoretical and empirical studies provide confronting views on the mechanisms that underlay the success or the failure of productive online communities. On the one hand, individuals contributing to online communities might have incentives to free-ride, meaning that as a group expands, individual contributions would decline (Andreoni (1988), Bilodeau

⁴In the recent economic literature the influence of peers on individual behaviour has been already addressed in a number of contexts, for instance, in individual decisions on housing area (Hanushek et al. (2003)), schooling or degree (De Giorgi et al. (2010)), health attributes such as obesity or smoking (Fowler and Christakis (2008)). The definition of peers also differs depending on the context. Peers could be individuals that interact in groups while studying (school mates or students), live in the neighborhood or produce together some output (co-authors, colleagues, open-source software developers).

and Slivinski (1996)). In these models a contributor receives utility from the total provision and her private consumption of a public good. With an increase in the group size an average contribution level falls to zero and only individuals with the lowest costs of contributing or the highest income will contribute. In Andreoni (2007) an individual's utility depends also on the number of recipients of the public good. When the recipient group size is sufficiently large, the relative importance of private benefits, as compared to free-riding incentives, dominates and positively affects individual contributions.

In the case studies of successful open source software projects, Lerner and Tirole (2002) stress the importance of a new organizational structure, which requires low capital investments to the projects and relies on the collaboration between individuals. In the project Apache the organizational structure that enables success of the project is represented by the core of responsible editors and a large number of volunteer participants.

The empirical literature on Wikipedia suggests individual interests and/or expertise as one of the main reasons for contributions. Panciera et al. (2009) show that only a small fraction of editors, so-called "Wikipedians", contribute more intensely than others from the moment of their initiation, and all contributors reduce activity over time, with only distinction that "Wikipedians" end up at higher levels of contribution. Nov (2007) surveys Wikipedia contributors and finds that the top motivations were "Fun" and "Ideology" (individuals support open-source). Laniado and Tasso (2011) find the presence of a nucleus of very active contributors that spread their contributions over the whole Wikipedia, and interact with inexperienced users. In this case, individual preferences would affect the amount of contributions to Wikipedia. Together, these findings provide a strong support to the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1. An interest in a specific topic, or an expertise in it, positively affects individual contributions to Wikipedia.

Contributions can also be induced by the characteristics of Wikipedia articles. For instance, Keegan et al. (2012) suggest that pages that appear due to some exogenous shock ("breaking news") initially experience different patterns of contribution with highly clustered and centralized editors' interactions. In their approach, tighter collaborations are rather caused by shocks to pages. To avoid capturing the impact of exogenous shocks to pages, I run robustness checks excluding pages that have breaking news properties as well as pages that experience extremely high attention, measured in clicks on the pages. Aaltonen and Seiler (2014) suggest that page size, which is a measure for accumulated editor activity, triggers further contributions due to knowledge spillovers. Controlling for the page size allows to capture this potential source of spillover. Overall, the above mentioned studies suggest an impact of exogenous editor and page characteristics on contributions to Wikipedia.

2.2 Existence and nature of peer effects

There is a range of studies that examine the existence of potential peer effects in social networks and Q&A forums. Bapna and Umyarov (2012) show that on Spotify an exogenous adoption of a premium subscription by peers increases individual adoption by 50%. Notably, this effect is stronger for users with fewer friends. Hahn et al. (2008) study collaboration ties in open-source software development projects and show that prior collaboration ties and the perceived status of project members in the network matter for developers' choice to join new projects. Shriver et al. (2013) use the variation in wind speeds at surfing locations in Switzerland as an exogenous shifter of content generation about surfing activity onto an online social network. The local network effect in content generation is suggested to cause an increase in content and, as a result, stronger ties between users, which, in turn, breeds more visits and browsing on the web site. Moon and Sproull (2008) highlight the role of feedback in producing and sustaining high-quality contributions: in groups where systematic quality feedback systems are implemented (e.g. rating system) question askers return over a longer duration, answer providers contribute more often.

Several empirical studies on Wikipedia reexamine the existence of social effects for the case of an online encyclopedia where neither explicit friendship ties nor organizational structure are present. In Wikipedia, the size of the potential recipient audience matters. When the group of individuals is sufficiently large, private benefits from contributing to a public good dominate free-riding incentives (Zhang and Zhu (2010)). Another reason is that voluntary contributions bread recognition in the community or improve social image of individuals (Lacetera and Macis (2010), Algan et al. (2013)). Together with the social image, the feeling of reciprocity to peers (expectation that they will also contribute if she does) positively affect individual money donations to Wikipedia (Algan et al. (2013)). These reasons are also supported by psychological literature (Burke et al. (2010); Kittur and Kraut (2010); Faulkner et al. (2012)), documenting that in Wikipedia, numerous direct communications occur on user-talk pages and talk pages of articles. These studies describe socialization strategies of individuals in online communities, including requests of participation or information and expressions of similarity to others. Their findings suggest that personalized moderation is effective in order to increase the number of contributing members and their commitment, while community-level moderation increases only commitment.

There are several studies that are closest to the present study in that they analyze the mechanism underlying collaborations on Wikipedia. Gorbatai and Piskorski (2012) suggest that editors involved in high-density structures in the network of editors are less likely to abandon contributing.⁵ Gorbatai (2011) proposes to consider collective contributions to an online public good in the absence of price mechanisms as the following three-stage process. First, consumers express the demand for the public good by occasional contributions. Then, at the third stage, producers observe the unsatisfied demand for knowledge and become willing to improve these collective goods. In addition to the demand-supply model, social effects in Wikipedia have been addressed in the two articles, Algan et al. (2013) and Zhang and Zhu (2010) mentioned above. However, until now, not much is known about peer effects

⁵The two editors are connected in the networks if they contributed to the same article within 1 week.

in Wikipedia and their role in motivating individual contributions.

In the present paper, I examine another potential factor of social influence on contributions, i.e. the effect of peer performance on individual performance. In sociological literature, Sassenberg (2002) suggests that individuals may feel psychologically connected to a group and hence act according to the norms and the standard behaviour of the group. Moreover, social learning theory argues that individuals follow the behavior of relevant peers if they face uncertainty about norms as this strategy maximizes their expected payoffs given the chosen strategy (Bercovitz and Feldman (2008)). There is also a number of education studies (De Giorgi et al. (2010), Contreras et al. (2012)) that suggest the presence of peer effects on the individual performance. In line with previous studies I expect that individuals involved into contributing to Wikipedia observe their peers' activity and, in response, change their activity. As a result, peer activity is suggested to positively affect individual contributions in Wikipedia.

Hypothesis 2-1. The amount of individuals' contributions is possibly affected by the average amount of peer activity.

Hypothesis 2-2. The amount of individuals' contributions is possibly affected by the number of peers.

This paper adopts the econometric framework for peer effect analysis, which was developed in the empirical studies of academic performance (Contreras et al. (2012)), researcher collaboration with industry (Kacperczyk (2013), Aschhoff and Grimpe (2014)) career choices (De Giorgi et al. (2010)), and health-related attributes, such as obesity, smoking (Fowler and Christakis (2008)). This methodology is based on partially overlapping groups of peers (De Giorgi et al. (2010); Contreras et al. (2012)). De Giorgi et al. (2010) present an em-

empirical analysis of students' choices of major (Economics or Business) as affected by their peers' choices after controlling for individual characteristics of students (age, gender, schooling grade). The characteristics of excluded peers (for an individual, the set of peers that are in the same groups with her direct peers but unconnected directly with her) are used as instruments. A two-stage least squares estimator is used to find the peer effect (the choices of peers) on the outcome (students' own choices of major between Economics and Business). Contreras et al. (2012) study the peer influence on students' grades in the public University College of Business at US. In order to estimate the endogenous peer effect they use the exclusion restriction approach (similar to De Giorgi et al. (2010)). They find that a student's classroom performance has a significant demotivating effect on her peers. Furthermore, they classify excluded peers by ability on 4 groups according to percentiles and examine their effect on low- and high-ability students' performance. The low ability excluded students are shown to have a negative effect on other students. At the same time, high ability excluded students have a negative effect on low ability students, while high ability excluded students have a positive effect on high ability students. Hanushek et al. (2003) also investigate peer effects on student achievements. In order to separate peer effects from other confounding influences and to address the reciprocal nature of peer interactions, they apply past achievement as a measure of peer group quality.

In the case of Wikipedia, I use a definition of peers according to which editors are getting connected by contributing to Wikipedia articles together within a short time period. The composition of peer groups of an individual varies across pages. This gives rise to partially overlapping peer groups, which are the key to solve the "reflection problem" (Manski (1993)). The excluded peers of an editor are those editors that do not collaborate with her directly but work together with her direct peers on other articles.

3 Data

The dataset is obtained from a publicly available dump of the German Wikipedia provided by Wikimedia Deutschland. It is currently the second largest Wikipedia and accounts for about 1500,000 articles. The dump contains meta-information on articles' revisions including the time stamps and the contributors' identifiers. The empirical analysis is based on the sample, which tracks contributions of more than 520 editors on 330 pages in some selected categories of Wikipedia articles during the period from January, 2005 to December, 2010. To reduce the size of the data set, I use the meta revision history only for articles in the following categories: Alcohol, Astrology, China, Druids, Economics, India, Islands, Medicine, Soccer, Reptiles.⁶ The data identify contributors, which edited articles at given moments in time. They enable constructing an editor network where editors are connected due to contributions to the same articles and comments on the articles' talk pages.

Some contributions in Wikipedia are made anonymously and so they are identified in Wikipedia by the IP addresses of the contributors. Since the contributions of the same editor in Wikipedia revision history might have different IP addresses, they provide a misleading information on the activity of contributors and are excluded from the data sample. Bots, e.g. automated scripts, can be identified from the data and are also excluded from the editors' network. Therefore, the final sample contains only registered users. Furthermore, in order to avoid taking into account vandalism and consequent reverts of the pages I exclude from editor activity revisions, for which the revision length varies from some positive value to 0 and back to positive value within the consequential periods. The analysis of contributor and peer activity is performed only for the articles in the main Wikipedia name space.

⁶The meta data dump does not contain the information about article categories. The tree of article categories should be additionally extracted. All categories available in our database are used in this study.

3.1 Dependent variables

In order to measure the activity of individual contributors on Wikipedia this study considers the logarithms of the total number of bytes changed, which is the sum of the absolute values of bytes added and deleted. All measures of individual activity are computed as the activity of individual i on page j in time t for the analysis at the editor-article level, and then aggregated for individual i at time t in the analysis at the editor level.

3.2 Independent variables

3.2.1 Peer effects

Peer effects can arise from interaction with peers. Individuals are likely to observe their peers' activity as measured by the total peer contributions. Consequently, peer effects can be captured by the average amounts of peer contributions measured in bytes or by the number of peers. The definition of peers rests on the collaboration mechanisms provided in Wikipedia. Beyond contributing to the same article, editors can leave messages on the talk page of each article. Therefore, my measure of peers relies on co-authorship of an article in Wikipedia and coordination involving talk pages of each article. More precisely, two editors are connected on the article if they have collaborated on it within a monthly time span (four weeks) *and* left comments on the talk page of the article. In order to bring the definition of links between editors closer to the notions of collaborative content generation, I consider two editors as peers only if they made at least 2 revisions of an article and one revision of the article's talk page each during a month. Once the link is set up, it expires in 4 weeks unless both editors contribute to the article again in the next period. Then, monthly snapshots of the editor network are taken to construct the final data set. This definition of peers is similar to the definition in the study of academic entrepreneurship (Aschhoff and Grimpe (2014)), where co-authors of academic papers are regarded as peers. This definition also considers tighter collaborations between individuals than Gorbatai and Piskorski (2012). The average

amount of peer contributions is a weighted average, where the weights are defined by the intensity of communication, i.e. the product of the number of revisions made by the two connected editors.

The definition of the editor network in Wikipedia ignores occasional contributors, which make revisions once and never come back (less than 2% of the initial sample of contributors), such that only contributors with more than 5 revisions during the years 2007 - 2011 are in the sample. Registered bots (the editor accounts which are registered on Wikipedia as automated programs) as well as editors with suspiciously high number of monthly edits⁷ (which could be unregistered bots) are excluded from the sample to avoid blowing up the human activity on Wikipedia.

3.2.2 Editor characteristics

The independent variables are characteristics of editors and articles that can be extracted from the revision history dump of German Wikipedia.

The editor characteristics are the most important control variables. From the data, I can compute the editor experience measured as the length of the period in months since the individual's first contribution to Wikipedia. It captures the impact of the editor's life cycle on Wikipedia. Further, I can infer to which article category (from available Economics, Medicine, Soccer, Alcohol, Astronomy, China, Druids, India, Reptiles) an individual contributed mostly and what is the share of his contributions to this category in his total contributions to Wikipedia. The share of contributions to the most interesting category indicates how specialized is the interest of an individual in one specific topic, which could explain the size of the contribution to Wikipedia.

Editors connected in the network might share interests, for example, they might be both interested to read and contribute to articles about famous economists. Then, in order to account for the similar interest or expertise, which are due to homophily of interests rather

⁷We assume that a human being cannot contribute to German Wikipedia more than 9000 edits within four weeks (less than 1% of the initial sample of contributors).

than by the activity of peers we compute the share of common preferences with a peer as the share of the editor's articles, to which he contributed together with the peer. Controlling for the amount of shared pages allows to disentangle the effect of peer activity in terms of contribution size from the effect of a productive cluster of individuals that edit several pages together.

Additionally, I control for the potential preference of the editor to contribute only to very popular articles. To account for the behavior according to which an editor usually browses popular articles and sometimes introduces minor changes, I compute the share of popular articles in the articles to which the editor contributed. Five per cent of articles that got the highest accumulated number of clicks in the category are considered to be popular. The share of these articles in the total number of the editor's articles accounts for the preference for popular topics rather than a specific interest or expertise in the topic. Individuals who often browse Wikipedia's most popular pages ⁸ might contribute small pieces of knowledge or correct typos. Then, such a behaviour could be a potential reason for contributions to Wikipedia.

3.2.3 Article characteristics

An important characteristic that could be extracted from the data dump in the absence of the full-text revision history is the average page size in kilobytes during each month. Aaltonen and Seiler (2014) suggest that a page needs to grow to a certain size in order to attract intensive editing activity. According to this finding, I would expect individuals to contribute more to longer articles. Conversely, the size of the article can thwart adding the further information once an article is rather complete. Then, I would expect a negative effect of the article length on individual contributions to this article.

Furthermore, the number of clicks per page indicates if the article got suddenly more attention and, potentially, more edits due to some exogenous news (e.g. the death of a

⁸For instance, the starting page of Wikipedia every day advertises a new article of the day

famous person). Therefore, following the description of individual behaviour on pages that are breaking news in Keegan et al. (2012)⁹ I exclude all activity on breaking news pages or articles receiving a very high attention (i.e. the large number clicks above the 95th percentile) from the sample.

Table ?? displays summary statistics on the editor contribution size, editor and article characteristics for the data used for the analysis at the editor-article level. The logarithms of individual as well as peer contributions have distributions similar to normal distributions.

⁹As in Keegan et al. (2012), I define breaking news pages as recently created articles that attract a higher attention (number of clicks) during the first month since their creation.

Table 1: Descriptive statistics

	Mean	S.D.	Minimum	25th	50th	75th	90th	Maximum
Bytes contributed per article	5559	20422	0	363	1379	4306	11939	749872
Log contribution per article (bytes)	7	2	0	5.9	7.2	8.4	9.4	14
Peer av. contrib. per article (bytes)	1302	4418	0	290	634	1285	2493	194768
Log Peer av. contrib. per article (bytes)	6.4	1.3	0	5.7	6.5	7.2	7.8	12
Bytes contributed to all articles	9978	31620	0	634	2414	8707	23291	749872
Peer av. contrib.(B) to all articles	24331	53106	16	5205	12298	25171	44888	797752
Log contribution (B) to all articles	7.6	2.1	0	6.5	7.8	9.1	10	14
Log Peer av. contrib. (B) to all articles	9.3	1.3	2.8	8.6	9.4	10	11	14
Interest in the category (%)	15	15	.063	2.9	9	22	37	87
Editor experience (months)	26	20	.059	9.5	22	38	56	102
Pages shared with peers (%)	3	3.8	.059	.77	1.7	3.5	7.1	50
Page size (Kb)	38	37	0	12	26	55	84	227
# editors per page	16	21	2	7	10	17	27	179
# peers per page	4.1	5.1	1	1	3	5	8	48
# peers on all pages	5.9	6.7	1	2	4	7	12	62
Av. # indirect peers per page	4.7	5	1	2	3.5	5.7	8.6	47
Av. # indirect editors per page	17	21	2	7.8	12	18	29	178
Observations	2555							

4 Empirical analysis

4.1 The network of peers

Wikipedia articles have talk pages, which provide the contributors with a mechanism for coordinating their efforts. When a disagreement on an article's content or layout arises, editors can have a discussion on this article's talk page. Therefore, my definition of peers is based on the co-authorship of Wikipedia articles involving communication on the talk pages. Precisely, *individuals are considered to be connected in the network of editors on Wikipedia if they contributed with a given intensity to the same article and commented to the talk page of the same article within a short time span.* This definition is meant to capture the network of contributors to Wikipedia that work collaboratively on new content generation and interact with each other. In order to bring the definition of links closer to the notions of collaborative content generation, two editors are considered peers only if they make at least *2 revisions of an article* and at least *1 revision on an article talk page* each during this time period. The time span taken in this paper is equal to four weeks. Once the link is set up, it expires in four weeks unless both editors contribute to the article in the next period as well.

The network of editors obtained under such a definition is depicted in the two consequent periods in figures 1a and 1b. The nodes represent the contributors and the edges are the pages they edited together. The nodes are coloured according to their degrees with darker nodes standing for larger numbers of collaborators per contributor. The edges between contributors are coloured according to the intensity of collaboration measured by the number of pages they jointly edited. The figures show that there is no evidence of stable productive clusters where the most productive editors every period collaborate with selected counterparts.

The network of editors considered in this study is defined similarly to Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), where the finite set of players $N = 1, 2, \dots, n$ are connected in the network and are represented by the nodes. Their pairwise relations are represented by the arcs of the network. Network G can be expressed by an $N \times N$ adjacent matrix, and $g_{i,j}$ is a link between




Figure 1: The network of editors in Wikipedia from the used sample displayed in two consecutive periods

nodes i and j . It takes the value 1 if nodes i and j are connected, and 0 otherwise.¹⁰ In what follows, the set of links of a node i will be denoted by G_i . The equilibrium in such a network is based on the concept of pairwise stability proposed by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) meaning that the link is formed if both parties involved are consent, while for the link severance unilateral decision is needed.¹¹

The effect of peer contributions on the performance of focal editors could be analyzed on two levels. First, I analyze article-specific peer effects, i.e. the productive pressure experienced by an individual from her peers on a particular article. This peer effect would indicate how an individual activity on this article would change if she met there more active peers. This average "activeness" of the individual's peers on an article, according to the linear-in-means model (Manski (1993)) described below, would be expressed by the average peer contribution across articles other than the focal article. The structure of the peer network on Wikipedia is displayed in Figure 2. Editors are denoted by numbers within the

¹⁰Note that $g_{i,i} = 0$ and $g_{i,j} = g_{j,i}$ by definition.

¹¹See Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) and Bloch and Jackson (2006) for more details on equilibrium stability and efficiency.




Figure 2: The network of editors connected due to collaborations on Wikipedia articles: article-specific peer effects

circles while articles are denoted by letters within the squares. Each editor, say, editor 1, has a set of direct peers with whom she is connected due to collaboration on article A. This set of peers varies across articles for each individual. If there was a peer effect, the activity of 1's peers on article A would be affected by the average activity of editor 2 on article B due to interactions on the same article A.

The peer pressure mechanism might function in a different way. A contributor might observe his most important peers on the set of articles she contributes to. The interaction with more engaged peers might affect this contributor in a way such that she feels also more engaged to Wikipedia and checks more articles in order to add some more content. As opposed to the first mechanism, once the article where the editor is currently working is filled with information, she might find it reasonable to switch effort to other articles. Therefore, beside an analysis of article-specific peer effects, the potential peer effect should be also analyzed as the impact of average peer total contributions on individual total monthly contributions to Wikipedia. Figure 3 displays the corresponding data structure. Here, I consider editors connected due to collaborations on some sets of articles. The overall peer effect then would be expressed as how an individual activity of editor 1 on all articles, which in our example consists of contributions only to article A, would be affected by the average contributions of editor 2 to all her articles except article A, in this example contributions to article B.




Figure 3: The network of editors connected due to collaborations on Wikipedia articles: overall peer effects

4.2 Econometric methodology

To address the research question whether peers' productivity affects contributors' outcomes in Wikipedia I adopt the linear-in-means model introduced by Manski (1993):

$$y_{ijt} = \alpha_{ij} + \beta E(y|G_{it}) + X_{it}\gamma + E(X|G_{it})\delta + Z_{jt}\theta + \epsilon_{ijt} \quad (1)$$

where a contribution of editor i on article j at time t is affected by the average amount of peer contributions ($E(y|G_{it})$) as well as by the vector of her peers' exogenous characteristics ($E(X|G_{it})$), and G_{it} denotes the peer group of an individual i at time t . This can be rewritten as:

$$y_{ijt} = \alpha_{ij} + \beta \frac{\sum_{k \in P_{-ijt}} y_{k-jt}}{N_{P_{-ijt}}} + X_{it}\gamma + \frac{\sum_{k \in P_{-ijt}} X_{kt}}{N_{P_{-ijt}}}\delta + Z_{jt}\theta + \epsilon_{ijt} \quad (2)$$

where y_{ijt} is the logarithm of the contribution length (in bytes) by editor i on article j at time t and X_{it} is the vector of characteristics of editor i . $\beta \frac{\sum_{k \in P_{-ijt}} y_{k-jt}}{N_{P_{-ijt}}}$ is an endogenous effect of peers' productivity (measured as a logarithm of the average amount of peers' contributions), where $k \in P_{-ijt}$ is a member of individual i 's peer group composed of $N_{P_{-ijt}}$ members. $\frac{\sum_{k \in P_{-ijt}} X_{kt}}{N_{P_{-ijt}}}$ is an exogenous or contextual effect of peers characteristics and preferences on the individual outcomes, aimed at capturing a homophily, i.e. the property capturing that the connected individuals can be similar in some observed characteristics such as, for instance, interests or experience. Finally, Z_{jt} is the vector of observable article characteristics (or, in the terminology of education studies, group characteristics).

If the coefficient β is positive, equation 2 shows the extent, to which an individual editor is willing to contribute more to an article if her peers also contribute more on average. In Wikipedia, it is technically possible to check who are the peers in the revision history of an article, and then one can go further by clicking on any peer in order to check how active she has been. The latter effect is captured by equation 2. However, the former action is less technically sophisticated than the latter. In some specifications of the model I also check this former mechanism. Concretely, I examine whether spillovers due to a higher number of peers affect individual performance. Then, the model estimated is:

$$y_{ijt} = \alpha_{ij} + \beta N_{P_{-ijt}} + X'_{it}\gamma + \frac{\sum_{k \in P_{-ijt}} X_{kt}}{N_{P_{-ijt}}} \delta + Z'_{jt}\theta + \epsilon_{ijt} \quad (3)$$

Peer pressure might also be important for the overall level of the engagement in knowledge generation on the Wikipedia platform. Once the article where the editor is currently working is filled with information, she might find it reasonable to switch effort to other articles. Therefore, beside an analysis at the editor-article level, the potential peer impact on individual contributions is also analyzed at the level of overall individual contributions per time period aggregated across articles. Then, the empirical model is given by:

$$y_{it} = \alpha_i + \beta \frac{\sum_{k \in P_{-it}} y_{k-jt}}{N_{P_{-it}}} + X'_{it}\gamma + \frac{\sum_{k \in P_{-it}} X_{kt}}{N_{P_{-it}}} \delta + \epsilon_{it} \quad (4)$$

The positive peer effect in this model would indicate that there are positive spillovers due to collaboration with other contributors that affect an individual motivation to provide more knowledge to overall Wikipedia. Similarly to the editor-article level, at the editor level peer effects can also be expressed through the number of peers on Wikipedia across all articles, analogically to equation 3.

4.3 Identification issues and instrumental variables

In the linear-in-means model, the "reflection problem" and correlated effects are usually considered the major threats to identification of peer effects (Manski (1993)). Since in Wikipedia, the network structure is based on partially overlapping peer groups, this solves the reflection problem allowing to identify peer effects. Then, correlated effects (the shocks that are common to groups, in the context of Wikipedia to articles) could be addressed by using exogenous characteristics of indirect peers as instruments for endogenous outcomes of direct peers (as discussed in Bramoullé et al. (2009), De Giorgi et al. (2010)). In the case of Wikipedia, these could be shocks of attention to article content. To eliminate the impact of these shocks, I use the number of indirect peers (in some specifications, its second order polynomial) as an instrument for the peer effects coming from direct peers.

The most important concern in the analysis of peer effects is the potential endogeneity of the network formation. This problem arises since individuals choose endogenously counterparts with whom they become peers. In Wikipedia, individuals come to read articles and their decision to contribute is most likely related to the content of an article rather than because of other editors' characteristics. Individuals can hardly observe other contributors' individual characteristics because few contributors have an extensive user profile. What they observe most are contributions of each other. In this case, after observing contributions of others one might choose to remain peers with them. However, learning about "key" productive users takes time. So, I make a robustness check examining the peer impact on individuals during only their very first month on Wikipedia.

Finally, in the case of an online community, such as Wikipedia, individuals might engage in discussions on article talk pages or in "editing wars". This activity is directly caused by the personal appeal and is beyond what the peer effects in performance. Therefore, for the direct peers of an individual the average amount of contributions excludes the page shared with this individual.

5 Results

This section discusses the main results of the analyses of peer effects at the editor-article and editor levels presented in Tables 2 and 3. The first stage regressions for all tables containing IV estimations are in the Appendix (see Tables 5 and 6). All results in the tables include year and month dummies and heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in the parentheses.

The instruments significantly affect the endogenous regressor in the first stage estimation and have large partial F statistics for testing the weakness of instruments (Kleibergen-Paap or Wald rk statistics Kleibergen and Paap (2006)), varying from 18 to 68 for the editor-article level and 60-355 for the editor level. The tables 2 and 3 represent specifications with ordinary least squares (columns 1 and 4) and fixed effects (column 2 and 5) estimations. Columns 3 and 6 in each table represent specifications where peer effects are estimated using the instrumental variable approach. In each specification I examine peer effects using one of the peer activity indicators, the log of average amount of bytes contributed or the number of peers. It turns out that both peer activity indicators should be considered as endogenous, according to the "endogeneity test", also called Sargan-Hansen J -test.¹²

The analysis does not reveal a strongly significant impact of average peer contribution on the individual per article contributions (Table 2). The performance of the instrument in the first stage is rather poor and the endogeneity test rejects the null hypothesis only at 10 per cent level. Therefore, I rely on the OLS and FE estimation results for this model. However, the number of peers on the article yields a positive effect of 0.17 per cent to an individual contribution on the article. The results suggest that the personal interest in the article topic matters for the amount of contributions as well as spillovers coming from the vast number of editors who also edited the article. These editors are not peers, their number is exogenous to the focal individual and might reflect the general level of attention to the article, which is not captured by the number of clicks (readership).

¹²The corresponding χ^2 test statistics ranges from 3.35 to 15.2.

Table 2: Peer effects on editor-article level

	Log length of contribution (in bytes)					
	OLS	FE	2SLS	OLS	FE	2SLS
Log Peer av. contrib. per article (bytes)	0.024 (0.035)	0.056 (0.039)	0.426* (0.223)			
# peers per page				0.085*** (0.019)	0.082*** (0.025)	0.169*** (0.046)
Interest in the category (%)	0.018*** (0.004)	0.046*** (0.011)	0.047*** (0.012)	0.019*** (0.004)	0.047*** (0.011)	0.048*** (0.012)
Editor experience (months)	-0.004 (0.003)	0.033 (0.028)	0.788 (0.584)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.013 (0.023)	0.319 (0.599)
Pages shared with peers (%)	-0.017 (0.016)	-0.061** (0.028)	-0.076*** (0.029)	-0.016 (0.016)	-0.055** (0.028)	-0.052** (0.025)
# editors per page	0.011*** (0.002)	0.019*** (0.003)	0.018*** (0.003)	-0.006 (0.004)	0.003 (0.006)	-0.014 (0.009)
Page size (Kb)	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.002* (0.001)	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.004)
Peer interest in the category (%)	-0.004 (0.005)	0.001 (0.006)	-0.003 (0.008)	-0.004 (0.005)	0.003 (0.006)	0.004 (0.007)
Peer experience (months)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.000 (0.004)	0.005 (0.006)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.000 (0.004)
Peer pages shared with peers (%)	0.079** (0.034)	0.002 (0.039)	0.040 (0.047)	0.076** (0.034)	-0.002 (0.039)	0.000 (0.038)
Observations	1983	1983	1983	1983	1983	1983
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic			18.04			68.60

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

NOTES: The table shows the results of the reduced form regressions to estimate peer effects. Columns (1)-(3) show the results for the peer average contribution and Columns (4-6) for the number of peers. Specification (1) and (4) show OLS results; (2) and (5) show FE results. In Columns (3) and (6) I assume that peer effects are endogenous and estimate them in two steps. All regression coefficients are presented with heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. The unit of observations is the contribution of an editor on article on month t . All month and year dummies are included.

As compared to contributions per article, overall individual contributions to Wikipedia seem to experience important peer effects (see Table 3) both in terms of average peer contributions and the number of peers. The results show that, while controlling for observable editor and peer characteristics, an increase in the average peer contribution by 1 per cent has a positive effect of 0.4 per cent on individual contributions. Spillovers from an increase in the number of peers contributing to the articles yield a positive effect on individual contributions of 0.05 per cent. The IV estimates tend to be larger in magnitude than the OLS. This can be the case if some unobserved group shocks act in the opposite direction to the endogenous effects, which yields lower estimates if groups shocks (or correlated effects) are not ruled out by the IV estimation. Overall, any pair of peers would share only a subset of all shocks to articles so that it is difficult to unambiguously predict whether the OLS estimator should be larger than the IV.

Apparently, peer performance indeed affects individual performance and translates to larger total contributions to Wikipedia. Individuals that have active peers seem to redistribute their effort to other articles that need further improvement rather than keeping to improve the quality of the articles they contributed to before.

Other factors that matter for the length of contributions or the number of revisions are the preferences and interests of individuals. The results reveal the importance of an individual interest in a specific topic. Firstly, the interest in a specific topic is positively associated with the size of contributions. A 1% increase in the interest in a concrete topic measured by the share of contributions to the category, leads to a 0.04% increase in the size of a contribution per article or overall within a given period of time.

6 Robustness check

In order to demonstrate to which extent the results are robust to alternative specifications, I perform a robustness check for the analysis at the editor level. To address the potential

Table 3: Peer effects on editor level

	Log length of contribution (in bytes)					
	OLS	FE	2SLS	OLS	FE	2SLS
Log Peer av. contrib. per article (bytes)	0.039** (0.018)	0.039** (0.020)	0.442*** (0.112)			
# peers on all pages				0.070*** (0.006)	0.069*** (0.008)	0.050*** (0.011)
Interest in the category (%)	0.031*** (0.003)	0.042*** (0.008)	0.040*** (0.009)	0.032*** (0.003)	0.040*** (0.007)	0.041*** (0.008)
Editor experience (months)	-0.012*** (0.002)	-0.020* (0.011)	0.190*** (0.070)	-0.012*** (0.002)	0.004 (0.014)	0.123* (0.064)
Pages shared with peers (%)	-0.018* (0.010)	-0.031* (0.016)	-0.045*** (0.017)	-0.007 (0.010)	-0.014 (0.015)	-0.018 (0.014)
Peer interest in the category (%)	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.007 (0.004)	-0.030*** (0.008)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)
Peer experience (months)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)
Peer pages shared with peers (%)	0.058** (0.026)	0.032 (0.026)	0.145*** (0.042)	0.057** (0.025)	0.030 (0.025)	0.028 (0.026)
Observations	4418	4418	4417	4418	4418	4417
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic			60.91			355.50

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

NOTES: The table shows the results of the reduced form regressions to estimate peer effects. Columns (1)-(3) show the results for the peer average contribution and Columns (4-6) for the number of peers. Specification (1) and (4) show OLS results; (2) and (5) show FE results. In Columns (3) and (6) I assume that peer effects are endogenous and estimate them in two steps. All regression coefficients are presented with heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. The unit of observations is the contribution of an editor on Wikipedia on month t . All month and year dummies are included.

endogeneity in network formation problem, I take the subsample of editors during their first month after joining Wikipedia. They recently joined and, hence, had little time to learn about potentially existing stable productive clusters of peers that already recognize each other. I perform the same regression as in equation 2 using the two-stage least squares approach with instrumental variables but now in the cross-section framework.

Table 4: Robustness check: Peer effects on editor level only for unexperienced editors

	Log length of contribution (in bytes)			
	OLS	2SLS	OLS	2SLS
Log Peer av. contrib. per article (bytes)	0.154*** (0.041)	0.240** (0.105)		
# peers on all pages			0.134*** (0.028)	0.243** (0.109)
Interest in the category (%)	0.031*** (0.003)	0.030*** (0.003)	0.032*** (0.003)	0.032*** (0.003)
Editor experience (months)	0.161* (0.096)	0.154 (0.094)	0.175* (0.094)	0.173* (0.094)
Pages shared with peers (%)	-0.039*** (0.007)	-0.039*** (0.007)	-0.035*** (0.007)	-0.032*** (0.008)
# editors per page	0.000 (0.003)	-0.000 (0.003)	-0.031*** (0.008)	-0.056** (0.025)
Peer interest in the category (%)	-0.005 (0.007)	-0.011 (0.010)	0.002 (0.006)	-0.000 (0.007)
Peer experience (months)	0.001 (0.006)	0.002 (0.006)	0.001 (0.006)	0.003 (0.006)
Peer pages shared with peers (%)	0.052 (0.034)	0.081* (0.048)	-0.002 (0.031)	-0.003 (0.031)
Observations	840	840	840	840
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic		63.87		23.87

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

NOTES: The table shows the results of the reduced form regressions to estimate peer effects. Columns (1)-(2) show the results for the peer average contribution and Columns (3-4) for the number of peers. Specification (1) and (3) show OLS results; In Columns (2) and (4) I estimate peer effects in two steps using instrumental variables. All regression coefficients are presented with heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. The unit of observations is the contribution of an editor on Wikipedia on month t . All month and year dummies are included.

In the results (see Table 4) I consider the activity of exclusively unexperienced editors of Wikipedia, i.e. those who joined Wikipedia for the first month. The measures of peer activity and amount are now suggested to be treated as exogenous by the "endogeneity test".¹³ The preferred results are those obtained by OLS estimations. I find that the effects from the main results are still present and their magnitude is of about 0.15 per cent for the average amount of peers' contributions (lower than the main result) and 0.13 per cent for the number of peers (higher than the main result). This means that if the learning or self-selection takes place to some extent, this would slightly bias upwards the impact of average amount of peers' contributions and downwards the impact of the number of peers. However, the magnitudes of the main results still provide a quantitatively trustworthy indication of the potential of peer effects in Wikipedia.

7 Concluding remarks

The existence and the size of potential peer effects in online communities has been examined by few studies in the context of social networks and open-source software projects. Wikipedia is an online platform for peer knowledge generation that shares some similarities as well as very distinct features with the other kinds of platforms. This study is (to the best of my knowledge) the first to analyze the existence of peer effects in content generation due to contributor interactions on Wikipedia. Moreover, my study addresses the importance of coordination on article talk pages for creating social ties between contributors and, as a consequence, the emergence of multiplicative effects in online content generation.

The results show that, while controlling for observable editor and peer characteristics, an increase in the monthly average peer contribution by 1 per cent increases the amount of individual monthly contributions to Wikipedia (among individuals that contribute to Wikipedia every month) by about 0.44 per cent. Similarly, spillovers coming from the number of peers yield a positive effect of 0.17 per cent per article to 0.05 per cent per overall monthly con-

¹³The corresponding χ^2 statistics ranges from 0.72 to 1.35

tributions to Wikipedia. This evidence suggests that even in the absence of explicit social ties between individuals peer effects are present. These effects are both observed among individuals that contribute monthly to Wikipedia. The other characteristic that matters for the amount of individual contributions is an interest, or an expertise, in a special category of articles. These results suggest that communications between most active community members encourages building-up and promoting new online communities and enhances knowledge generation in the existing online communities.

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8 Appendix

Table 5: First stage equations for log-peer contributions (bytes) on editor-article level

	(1)	(2)
Av. # indirect peers per page		0.365*** (0.044)
Av. # indirect peers on all pages	0.059*** (0.014)	
Interest in the category (%)	-0.002 (0.011)	-0.010 (0.012)
Editor experience (months)	-0.425 (0.594)	0.975 (0.826)
Pages shared with peers (%)	0.042** (0.017)	-0.027 (0.020)
# editors per page	-0.009** (0.004)	0.129*** (0.011)
Page size (Kb)	0.000 (0.003)	-0.006 (0.004)
Peer interest in the category (%)	0.010* (0.005)	-0.010* (0.006)
Peer experience (months)	-0.012*** (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)
Peer pages shared with peers (%)	-0.065 (0.045)	0.058 (0.035)
Observations	1983	1983

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 6: First stage equations for log-peer contributions (bytes) on the editor level

	(1)	(2)
Av. # indirect peers on all pages	0.113*** (0.013)	0.433*** (0.044)
Av. # indirect peers on all pages (sq.)	-0.002*** (0.000)	0.005*** (0.002)
Interest in the category (%)	0.005 (0.008)	0.017 (0.014)
Editor experience (months)	-0.159*** (0.061)	0.032 (0.097)
Pages shared with peers (%)	0.044*** (0.014)	-0.150*** (0.029)
Peer interest in the category (%)	0.054*** (0.004)	-0.031*** (0.007)
Peer experience (months)	-0.012*** (0.003)	0.002 (0.004)
Peer pages shared with peers (%)	-0.235*** (0.025)	0.200*** (0.040)
Observations	4417	4417

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 7: Robustness check: First stage equations for log-peer contributions (bytes) on editor level only for unexperienced editors

	(1)	(2)
Av. # indirect peers on all pages	0.212*** (0.020)	0.157*** (0.032)
Interest in the category (%)	0.003 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.004)
Editor experience (months)	0.125* (0.073)	0.027 (0.128)
Pages shared with peers (%)	0.000 (0.006)	-0.029*** (0.007)
# editors per page	-0.024*** (0.004)	0.196*** (0.012)
Peer interest in the category (%)	0.057*** (0.005)	0.010 (0.007)
Peer experience (months)	-0.003 (0.005)	-0.007 (0.005)
Peer pages shared with peers (%)	-0.247*** (0.033)	0.105*** (0.036)
Observations	840	840

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$