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**Working Paper**

## Does interbank market matter for business cycle fluctuation? An estimated DSGE model with financial frictions for the Euro area

FinMaP-Working Paper, No. 27

**Provided in Cooperation with:**

Collaborative EU Project FinMaP - Financial Distortions and Macroeconomic Performance, Kiel University et al.

*Suggested Citation:* Giri, Federico (2014) : Does interbank market matter for business cycle fluctuation? An estimated DSGE model with financial frictions for the Euro area, FinMaP-Working Paper, No. 27, Kiel University, FinMaP - Financial Distortions and Macroeconomic Performance, Kiel

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This project has received funding from the European Union's Seventh Framework Programme for research, technological development and demonstration under grant agreement no. 612955



FINMAP –

**FINANCIAL DISTORTIONS AND MACROECONOMIC  
PERFORMANCE: EXPECTATIONS, CONSTRAINTS AND  
INTERACTION OF AGENTS**

DATE: 12/22/2014

TITLE

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*Keywords: DSGE model, financial frictions, interbank market, Bayesian estimation.*

*JEL classification codes: E30, E44, E51.*

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# Does interbank market matter for business cycle fluctuation? An estimated DSGE model with financial frictions for the Euro area

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December 17, 2014

## Abstract

The aim of this paper is to assess the impact of the interbank market on the business cycle fluctuations. In order to do that, we build a DSGE model with heterogeneous households and banks.

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
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\*Address: Università Politecnica delle Marche, Piazzale Martelli n 8 Ancona, Italy. E-mail: f.giri@univpm.it. The authors are grateful to seminar participants to the CIDE WEEE 2013 in Perugia for advices and suggestions. In particular we would like to thank Piergiorgio Alessandri (Bank of Italy) for his usefull discussion. The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Union, Seventh Framework Programme FP7, under grant agreement FinMaP n0 : 612955 .The usual disclaimers apply.

# 1 Introduction

The interbank market is the primary source of fundings for banks that need to gather liquidity in order to create new loans. Shocks that interfere with its normal course can have important repercussions both on the entire financial market and on the real economy.

Figure 1a shows the spread between the three month Euribor and the overnight index swap on the EONIA interest rate. The OIS spread is considered the most important indicator to evaluate the overall health of the liquidity market. The higher the spread, the higher is the risk perceived by the financial intermediaries that daily operate on the interbank market.



Source: The OIS spread is taken from Datastream while the statistics of government bonds are from the ECB. OIS is expressed in percentage while government bond are in millions of euro.

After the collapse of Lehman Brothers, banks do not trust each other anymore and the OIS spread at the end of 2008 rose of almost 100 basis point with respect to the beginning of the year. The fear that in the balance sheet of a counterpart could be hidden an unquantifiable amount of toxic assets caused a sudden and extended drainage of liquidity from the interbank market. Banks looked for a “safe heaven” choosing low but safe returns like government bonds (See figure 1b).

Table 1: 3 month Euribor and overnight index swap spread summary

	Full sample 1999:Q2 - 2013:Q2	Pre crisis sample 1999:Q2- 2007:Q2
Euribor OIS spread average	0.48394	0.098436

In the last few years, several empirical papers (See among the others Socio (2011), Beirne (2012) and Filipović and Trolle (2013)) tried to assess the determinants of the rise of the OIS spread during the financial crisis. Socio (2011) found that the credit risk was the main factor determining the rise of the interest rate at the aftermath of the crisis while in a second phase the effect of the liquidity risk prevailed. Similar results were found by Filipović and Trolle (2013). Beirne (2012) contribution arrived to the opposite conclusion. In the pre crisis scenario, both liquidity and credit risk are irrelevant to explain the behavior of the OIS spread. Instead, during the most acute phase of the crisis, liquidity risk is the main driver of the OIS spread. After the massive liquidity injection by the ECB, credit risk became the most important factor to explain the OIS spread.

Other empirical contributions tried to investigate the relation between the interbank market freeze and the decreased of the supply of credit to the firms and the households in the 2008. For instance, Iyer et al. (2013), studying the relation between the European interbank market and the Portuguese firms, finding a close connection between the 2007 interbank freeze and the firm credit crunch.

In order to carry on our analysis, we decide to extend the model proposed by Gerali et al. (2010) including an interbank market like in Dib (2010) in order to analyze the effect of an unexpected turmoil of the interbank lending introducing a counterpart risk on interbank lending.

We find that *a*) an interbank market counterpart shock could generate a decrease of loans provided by the banks to the real economy and, as a consequence, this could generate a fall of the GDP mainly driven by a fall of the investment made by the firms and the impatient households, *b*) a counterpart riskiness shock played a crucial role in the 2008 rise of the interest rates in the credit market, *c*) the counterpart shock seems to crowd out the central bank making the conduction of monetary policy through the adjustment of the short term interest rates less effective.

The paper is organized as follow. Section 2 explains in details the model and the relative equations. Sections 3 and 4 deal with the solution methods and the estimation techniques. Section 5 and 6 focus their attention on the dynamical properties of the model and the contribution of each shocks to the business cycle. Finally, Section 7 summarizes the main findings and the possible extensions.

## 2 Literature review

Despite the growing interest of the empirical literature on the role of interbank market during the last financial crisis, very few papers concentrate their attentions on the macroeconomic and general equilibrium effects of interbank default and/or liquidity shocks on the business cycle. The primary objective of this paper is try to fill this gap in order to better understand the role of the interbank market in the widespread of the financial crisis using a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium framework.

From a theoretical point of view, Heider et al. (2009) proposed a model in which the counterparty risk plays a crucial role in the evolution of the interbank market after the 2007. In particular, the model is able to capture some stylized facts of the interbank crisis such as the accumulation of reserves by the banks, the increased of interest rates and the unsuccessful attempts of the central bank to restore the normal operations on the interbank market.

The paper proposed by Goodhart et al. (2009) is the first attempt to include an active interbank market into a standard macroeconomic model. They place in their model two kinds of banks. A surplus bank which obtains funds from the household and allocates these resources in the deficit bank through the interbank market channel. A deficit bank receives loans from the surplus one to finance the corporate lending to the Yeoman farmer. The central bank is able to influence the interest rate only through the deficit bank. The main findings is that heterogeneity across financial intermediaries matters in order to identify the transmission mechanism of several structural shocks.

In a general equilibrium framework, deWalque et al. (2010) built up a RBC model very close to Goodhart's but they specified a complete real business cycle framework for the rest of the agents. The banking sector is divided in two different intermediaries: a deposit bank which collects savings from the households and invests them into the interbank market and a merchant bank that is a net debtor which collect interbank funds and using them to finance the firms. All banks operate in a competitive setting. In the conclusions, they underlined how, a relatively simple model, captures some stylized facts of the interest rate structure and on defaults rate on interbank market. Moreover, the introduction of a capital requirement like the one proposed by the Basel I agreement reduces the long run growth but it improves the resistance of the system to shocks, while the Basel II accords enhances the business cycle fluctuation.

Dib (2010) constructed a model in which the saving bank, financed by households deposits, plays a crucial role in the allocation of the resources between interbank lending and the risk free government bond. The central

bank can alter the composition of the saving bank balance sheet when it intervenes to stem the inflation growth or the output gap. The key result is that under a capital requirement regime the presence of a banking sector attenuates the effects of different shocks. Moreover, many stylized facts of the US business cycle are captured by the model making it particularly suited to be used to analyze the impacts of the financial sector on the rest of the economy.

Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) build a DSGE model with an interbank market in which all banks borrow from and lend to firms. In their model the interbank market arises because banks are subject to an idiosyncratic liquidity shock which has the effect of creating surplus and deficit intermediaries. Limited pledgeability gives place to an endogenous leverage constraint where bankers need to use their own equity in order to attract external creditors both on the retail (deposits) and at the wholesale level (interbank borrowing/lending). Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) use their model to investigate several different credit policies could mitigate the negative effect of a financial crisis.

Carrera and Vega (2012) and Hilberg and Hollmayr (2011) build up a DSGE model with an interbank market in order to analyze some alternative macroprudential policy rule. Carrera and Vega (2012) developed a hierarchical bank system in which the exchanges between the central bank and the retailers are managed by another subject called the narrow bank. The role of the narrow bank is to manage the liquidity provided by the central bank and to allocate these resources into the interbank market. The retail bank has the goal of obtaining savings and issuing loans to the real economy. The authors used the model in order to investigate the behavior of the macroprudential policy in presence of an interbank market finding out that a reserve requirement rule can be used jointly with the standard Taylor rule to avoid large swings of the interest rate.

Similar in spirit, Hilberg and Hollmayr (2011) developed a model in which an investment bank provides the liquidity to the retail banks. The retail bank is subject to a borrowing constraint (See Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Iacoviello (2005)) in the amount of funds it can obtain from the investment bank and it can collateralize only a fraction of its detained assets. In this case, the macroprudential policy rule is related to the haircut that the central bank could apply to the assets of the investment bank in order to provide liquidity. In normal time the central bank accepts only liquid assets like government bonds while during financial stress it can also buy illiquid asset back securities like loans. The authors find that relaxing the haircut is an effective tool to boost the interbank market and growth.

The recent contribution by Boissay et al. (2013) explores a new frontier



in macroeconomic modeling setting up a non linear DSGE model including a non trivial banking sector. Relying on global solution methods, the model is able to generate a banking crisis endogenously. A long accumulation of assets by the households, triggered by a positive and small sequence of supply shock, in anticipation of future negative shocks is the key determinant to generate a banking crisis. The model is also able to capture several stylized factors of systemic banking crisis (see Schularick and Taylor (2012)).

### 3 The model

Our model is an extension of the one proposed by Gerali et al. (2010). The whole economy is made of several representative agents each of them maximizes his objective function under a budget constraint. Two kind of households, Patient and Impatient, live in the model. Patient households have a higher intertemporal discount factor than the Impatients households. Therefore, Patient households are net savers and they decide how much to consume, to work and the amount of deposits to allocate at the surplus bank. Impatient households are net borrowers and they choose how much to consume and to work. They finance part of their spending obtaining loans from the retail branch of the deficit bank. Both Patient and Impatient households sell their work to a union that sells a composite labor factor to the intermediate firm.

The rest of the real economy has a standard setting like in Smets and Wouters (2007) and Christiano et al. (2005). There are two kind of firms, the intermediate producers and the final goods producers. The intermediate firms operate under monopolistic competition and they are able to fix prices. They rent physical capital from the producers of capital goods and sell their intermediate goods to the producers of final goods. Final goods producers operate under perfect competition but with sticky prices. They buy the intermediate products, they pack them into an undifferentiated final good that they sell back to Patient and Impatient households. Intermediate firms could finance a fraction of their investment obtaining loans from the retail branch of the surplus bank.

The bank system of the model is an extension of Gerali et al. (2010) and Dib (2010). The deficit banks is modeled like in Gerali et al. (2010) and it is a net debtor on the interbank market. We have a retail branch that is directly connected with the firms and the households. The retail branches operate under monopolistic competition and they could set the interest rate on loans provided to the impatient households and the firms. A wholesale branch of the deficit banks has to manage the capital position of the holding

choosing the optimal balance sheet of the bank group. Moreover, like in Dib (2010), deficit banks could choose the optimal amount of default over the interbank market inserting the counterpart risk in our model.

The surplus banks collect loans from Patient households and invest part of their deposits either in the interbank market or in government bond. Similar to deWalque et al. (2010), surplus banks are risk adverse and they are subjected to a disutility cost every time they suffer a default on the interbank market above their steady state level. Monetary policy is conducted by the central bank which follows a Taylor rule. We close our model specifying a very stylized government sector that obeys to an intertemporal budget constraint.

### 3.1 Patient households

Patient households choose  $c(i)^P$ ,  $h(i)^P$ , and  $d(i)^P$  (respectively, consumption, house services, and the amount of deposits) in order to maximize their utility function under the budget constraint. The utility function depends positively on consumption and houses services and negatively on the hours worked.

$$E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta_p^t \left[ (1 - a^P) \epsilon_t^z \log(c_t^P(i) - a^P c_{t-1}^P) + \epsilon_t^h \log(h_t^P(i)) - \frac{l_t^P(i)^{1+\phi}}{1+\phi} \right] \quad (1)$$

where  $\beta_p$  is the intertemporal discount factor of Patient households while  $a_p$  represents the external habit formation in consumption with respect to the whole Patient households consumption. The exogenous variables  $\epsilon_t^z$  and  $\epsilon_t^h$  are two stochastic disturbances affecting consumption preferences and the house services demand. The budget constraint for the patient households is described by the following equation

$$c_t^P(i) + q_t^h \Delta h_t^P(i) + d_t(i)^P = w_t(i)^P l_t(i)^P + \frac{(1 + r_{t-1}^d)}{\pi_t} d_{t-1}^P(i) + Tr_t - T_t^P \quad (2)$$

The left hand side is the flow of expenses. It is composed by consumption, variation of the market value of housing services, where  $q^h$  is the real houses price, and the amount of deposit allocated at the surplus bank. The right hand side of equation 2 represents the resource owned by the patient households.  $w^P$  is the hourly wage,  $r^d$  is the net interest rate on deposits,  $\pi$  is the net inflation and  $T$  is a lump sum tax. All variables are expressed in real terms.  $Tr_t$  are the transfers from the economy to the Patient households. We assume that final goods producer firms are completely owned by the Patient households and they transfer to them their profits  $J^r$  while the deficit banks redistribute only a fraction  $(1 - \Omega)$  of their profits to the households.  $T_t^P$  is a

lump sum tax used to finance the government expenditures. Patients households are net savers and they decide to allocate a fraction of their income in bank deposits at the surplus bank.

### 3.2 Impatient Households

Impatient households choose  $c(i)^I$ ,  $h(i)^I$ , and  $b(i)^I$  in order to maximize their utility function under the budget constraint. They behave exactly like Patient households, but instead of being net savers they are net borrowers. Consequently, they finance a fraction of their spending by obtaining loans  $b(i)^I$  from the retail branch of the deficit bank:

$$E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta_I^t \left[ (1 - a^I) \epsilon_t^z \log(c_t^I(i) - a^p c_{t-1}^p) + \epsilon_t^h \log(h_t^I(i)) - \frac{l_t(i)^{I(1+\phi)}}{1 + \phi} \right] \quad (3)$$

Their budget constraint is described by the following expression

$$c_t(i)^I + q_t^h \Delta h_t(i)^I + \frac{(1 + r_{t-1}^{bh})}{\pi_t} b_{t-1}(i)^I = w(i)_t^I l_t(i)^I + b_t^I(i) \quad (4)$$

As in Iacoviello (2005), the amount of funds the Impatient households can receive from the deficit bank is limited by the following borrowing constraint:

$$(1 + r_t^{bh}) b(i)_t^I \leq m_t^I E_t [q_{t+1}^h h_t^I \pi_{t+1}] \quad (5)$$

The total exposure toward the deficit banks of the Impatient households must be less or equal of the expected value of the collaterals (houses) owned by the households.  $m_t^I$  represents the stochastic loan-to-value-ratio<sup>1</sup>(LTV henceforth). Iacoviello (2005) demonstrates that in the neighborhood of the steady state the constraint always binds<sup>2</sup>. This allows us to solve the problem with an equality constraint.

### 3.3 Entrepreneurs

The Entrepreneurs are self employed intermediate goods producers. Entrepreneurs choose  $c(i)^E$ ,  $k(i)^E$ ,  $l(i)^{E,P}$ ,  $l(i)^{E,I}$ ,  $b(i)^E$ ,  $u(i)^E$ , where each variable represents respectively consumption, capital used to produce intermediate goods, labor from patient and impatient household, the amount of

<sup>1</sup>LTV is usually defined as the ratio between the mortgage amount and the value of the property acquired with the mortgage. Higher LTV ratio implies a higher risk for the bank and an higher interest rate on the loan for the household

<sup>2</sup>Solving for occasionally binding constraints introduce some issues in the simulation of the model. See for further reference Holden and Paetz (2012)

loans obtained by the retail branch of the deficit bank and the degree of utilization of capital. Differently from Patient and Impatient households, the utility function depends only on entrepreneur's consumption:

$$E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta_E^t [(1 - a^E) \log(c_t^E(i) - a^E c_{t-1}^E)] \quad (6)$$

The budget constraint of the entrepreneurs is described by the following expression:

$$\begin{aligned} & c_t^E(i) + w_t l_t^{E,P}(i) + w_t l_t^{E,I}(i) + \frac{(1 + r_{t-1}^{be})}{\pi_t} b_{t-1}^E(i) + q_t^k k_t^E + f(u_t(i)) k_t^E(i) \\ & = \frac{y_t^E}{x_t} + b_t^E(i) + q_t^k (1 - \delta) k_{t-1}^E(i) \end{aligned} \quad (7)$$

We specify the functional form of  $f()$  like in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2006):

$$f(u_t(i)) = \xi_1 (u_t(i) - 1) + \frac{\xi_2}{2} (u_t(i) - 1)^2 \quad (8)$$

The production function is a classical Cobb-Douglas where,  $A_t^E$  represents a stochastic total factor productivity shock.

$$y_t^E(i) = A_t^E [k_{t-1}^E(i) u_t(i)]^\alpha l_t^E(i)^{(1-\alpha)} \quad (9)$$

Entrepreneurs use a combination of the labor supplied by the Patient and Impatient households following the expression

$$l_t^E(i) = l_t^{E,P}(i)^\mu l_t^{E,I}(i)^{(1-\mu)} \quad (10)$$

Like the Impatient households, Entrepreneurs are also subject to a borrowing constraint

$$(1 + r_t^{be}) b_t^E(i) \leq m_t^E E_t [q_{t+1}^k k_t^E(i) \pi_{t+1}] \quad (11)$$

While Impatient households use their amount of houses as collateral, entrepreneurs use the expected value of their endowment of physical capital. Substituting equation 10 into equation 9 and then equation 9 and 8 into the budget constraint we maximize the utility function under equations 7 and 11

### 3.4 The real side of the economy

The rest of the real side of the economy is built on Christiano et al. (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2007). Capital producers operate under perfect competition. They buy the undepreciated capital from the intermediate producers and a fraction of final goods from the final goods producer. They combine these two inputs to produce new capital that they sell at the real price  $q_t^k$  to the intermediate firms. Final goods producers operate under perfect competition but sticky prices. They combine the intermediate goods into a final goods. We strictly follow Gerali et al. (2010) to model the labor market. Two agents operate in the labor market, unions and labor packers. Workers provide a differentiated labor factor to unions. Moreover, a continuum  $m$  of labor packers acquire labor from the unions and they sell, through a CES aggregator, an homogeneous labor factor to the intermediate firms.

### 3.5 Bank system

As in Gerali et al. (2010), Deficit banks are composed of Wholesale and Retail branches. Wholesale branches operate under perfect competition and their aim is to choose the optimal balance sheet of the holdings and the optimal amount of defaults like Dib (2010) . Retailers have to provide loans to the households and to the firms. They can exploit their market power to set the interest rates on market loans. Following Dib (2010), we add a Surplus bank that has to decide how many resources to allocate in the interbank or in the government bonds market.

### 3.6 Deficit Banks

#### 3.6.1 The wholesale branch

The problem the wholesale branch has to face is the maximization of the cash flow of the entire holding subject to the bank's balance sheet constraint (See Table 2):

$$\max E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta_I^t \lambda_t^I \left[ (1 + R_t^b) B_t(j) - (1 + r_t^{ib})(1 - \delta_t^d) I B_t(j) - K_t^b(j) - Adj_t^{kb}(j) - Adj_t^\delta(j) \right] \quad (12)$$

where  $\beta_I^t \lambda_t^I$  represents the stochastic discount factor for the Wholesale branch<sup>3</sup>,  $R_t^b$ , and  $r_t^{ib}$  are respectively the (net) interest rate on loans from the wholesale branch to each retailers and the (net) interest rate on the loans obtained on the interbank market.  $B_t$  is the total amount of assets, which includes both loans to impatient households and entrepreneurs.  $IB_t$  are the resources the deficit banks borrow on the interbank market from the surplus ones while  $K_t^b$  represents the bank capital.  $\delta^d$  represents the share of interbank default that the Deficit bank could decide to not pay back. The non repayment option is of course costly for the banks. The term

$$Adj_t^{kb}(j) = \frac{k_{kb}}{2} \left( \frac{K_t^b(j)}{B_t(j)} - v_b \right)^2 K_t^b(j) \quad (13)$$

is the bank capital requirement. The lowest is the ratio between bank capital and the total asset the higher is the penalty cost of providing and additional unit of loans to the retail branch.  $v^b$  is fixed at the 8% in order to replicate the Basel II capital requirement constraint. Following the Basel II agreement the government bonds do not enter into the computation of the risky assets. The default option is of course costly for the banks. Similar to Dib (2010) and deWalque et al. (2010), the term  $Adj_t^\delta$  is a penalty cost the deficit bank have to pay every time it decides to default on interbank lending.

$$Adj_t^\delta(j) = \frac{\chi_{db}}{2} (IB_{t-1}(j) \delta_{t-1}^d(j))^2 \quad (14)$$

Moreover, Deficit bank has to obey in every period to the following balance sheet constraint

Table 2: Deficit bank's balance sheet

Assets	Liabilities
$B_t$	$IB_t(1 - \delta_t^d)$ $K_t^b$

Bank capital evolves according to the following law of motion

$$K_t^b(j) \pi_t = (1 - \delta_b) K_{t-1}^b(j) + \Omega J_{t-1}^{db}(j) \quad (15)$$

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<sup>3</sup>The stochastic discount factor is equal to the marginal utility of consumption of the Impatient households because we are assuming that they are the only owners of the bank

$\delta_b$  and  $\Omega$  are respectively the quarterly depreciation rate of bank capital and the share of profits used to accumulate new bank capital <sup>4</sup> Substituting the balance sheet constraint into the objective function and deriving with respect to  $B_t$  and  $\delta_t^d$  we get the first order conditions for the wholesale branch problem

$$R_t^b = r_t^{ib}(1 - \delta_t^d) - k_{kb} \left( \frac{K_t^b}{B_t} - v^b \right) \left( \frac{K_t^b}{B_t} \right)^2 + \beta^I \chi^{db} E_t \left\{ \delta_t^{d2} I B_t \frac{\lambda_{t+1}^I}{\lambda_t^I} \right\} \quad (16)$$

Equation 16 links the interest rate on loans to interbank market condition and to the adjustment costs the bank have to face. In particular the wholesale interest rate is affected by the capital requirement and by the expected value of defaults. If the bank is undercapitalized the bank have to pay an adjustment cost which is charge by the bank over the wholesale interest rate. Moreover, the share of expected interbank defaults impact positively on the wholesale interest rate. Every time the bank choose to have a default the subsequent cost are charged over the interest rate. Deficit bank could also choose the optimal amount of interbank defaults.

$$\delta_t^d = \left( \frac{\lambda_t^I r_t^{ib}}{\beta^I \lambda_{t+1}^I \chi^{db} I B_t} \right) + \epsilon_t^{\delta^d} \quad (17)$$

Equation 17 describes the evolution of the interbank default over time. Defaults increase when the interest rate over interbank borrowing is higher and they shrink when the total amount of interbank borrowing increase.  $\epsilon_t^{\delta}$  is a stochastic interbank counterpart risk shock. In the simulation section we will study the effect of an increase of such shock and how it will affect the business cycle.

### 3.6.2 The retail branch

The retail branch of the deficit bank has the task of providing loans to the households and the entrepreneurs. The retailer bankers operate under monopolistic competition and they have the power to set the interest rate on their loans. They have to maximize the following profits function

$$\max E_o \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta_t^I \lambda_t^I [r_t^{bh}(j) b_t^I(i) + r_t^{be}(j) b_t^E(i) - R_t^b B_t(j) - Adj_t^{kn}] \quad (18)$$

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<sup>4</sup>Consequently,  $(1 - \Omega)$  is the dividend pay-off ratio that is the quantity of bank profit distributed to the Patient households. Assuming  $\Omega = 1$  bank is following a zero dividends policy and all profits are used to increase the bank capital.

subject to the loans demand of impatient households and entrepreneurs which are

$$b_t^n(i) = \left( \frac{r_t^{bn}(j)}{r_t^{bn}} \right)^{-\epsilon_t^{bn}} b_t^I \quad (19)$$

The adjustment costs are defined as

$$Adj_t^{kn} = \frac{k_{bn}}{2} \left( \frac{r_t^{bn}(j)}{r_{t-1}^{bn}(j)} - 1 \right)^2 r_t^{bn} b_t^n \quad (20)$$

Every time the bank changes the interest rate it has to pay a cost in term of profit. This adjustment cost introduces stickiness in the setting of interest rates on loans. We can look at the first order conditions for the retail branch as a New Keynesian Phillips Curve for loan interest rates (see Aslam and Santoro (2008)). Substituting the loans demand into the objective function and deriving with respect to  $r_t^{bh}$  and  $r_t^{be}$  we obtain

$$1 - \frac{\Lambda_t^{bn}}{\Lambda_t^{bn} - 1} + \frac{R_t^b}{r_t^{bn}} \frac{\Lambda_t^{bn}}{\Lambda_t^{bn} - 1} - k_{bn} \left( \frac{r_t^{bn}}{r_{t-1}^{bn}} - 1 \right) \frac{r_t^{bn}}{r_{t-1}^{bn}} + \beta_I E_t \left[ \frac{\lambda_{t+1}^I}{\lambda_t^I} k_{bn} \left( \frac{r_{t+1}^{bn}}{r_t^{bn}} - 1 \right) \left( \frac{r_{t+1}^{bn}}{r_t^{bn}} \right)^2 \frac{b_{t+1}^n}{b_t^n} \right] = 0 \quad (21)$$

where  $n = h, e$ . We express the elasticity of substitution between loans provided by different retails branches as a function of the mark up  $\Lambda$ <sup>5</sup>. Higher values of  $\epsilon$  (or equivalently lower values of  $\Lambda_t$ ) implies a lower market power and a lower margin of intermediation for the bank.

### 3.6.3 Aggregate activity

The profits of the entire holding are defined as the revenues coming from all the business lines of the bank minus the intra group activities and the adjustment costs. We can define the variable  $J_t^{db}$  as the total profits of the deficit group as

$$J_t^{db} = r_t^{bh} b_t^I + r_t^{be} b_t^E + r_t^g G B_t^{db} - r_t^{ib} I B_t (1 - \delta_t^d) - \sum Adj_t^{db} \quad (23)$$

---

<sup>5</sup>The elasticity of substitution could be express as a function of the mark up

$$\epsilon_t = \frac{\Lambda_t}{\Lambda_t - 1} \quad (22)$$



### 3.7 Surplus banks

The Surplus bank collects deposit from the Patient households and decide to invest these resources either in the interbank market or purchasing government bonds like in Dib (2010). The financial position of the bank is summarized in Table 3.

Table 3: Surplus bank's balance sheet

Assets	Liabilities
$IB_t(1 - \delta_t^d)$	$D_t^P$
$GB_t^{sb}$	

Symmetrically to the deficit banks, the surplus bank is divided into a retails and a wholesale branch.

#### 3.7.1 The retail branch

$$\max E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta_P^t \lambda_t^P \left[ R_t^d d_t^b - r_t^d d_t^P(j) - \frac{k_d}{2} \left( \frac{r_t^d(j)}{r_{t-1}^d(j)} - 1 \right)^2 r_t^d d_t^P \right] \quad (24)$$

subject to

$$d_t^P(j) = \left( \frac{r_t^d(j)}{r_t^d} \right)^{-\epsilon_t^d} d_t^P \quad (25)$$

that is the deposits demand of the Patient households. The resulting first order condition is

$$\begin{aligned} -1 + \frac{\Lambda_t^d}{\Lambda_t^d - 1} - \frac{r_t}{r_t^d} \frac{\Lambda_t^d}{\Lambda_t^d - 1} - k_d \left( \frac{r_t^d}{r_{t-1}^d} - 1 \right) \frac{r_t^d}{r_{t-1}^d} + \\ \beta_P E_t \left[ \frac{\lambda_{t+1}^P}{\lambda_t^P} k_d \left( \frac{r_{t+1}^d}{r_t^d} - 1 \right) \left( \frac{r_{t+1}^d}{r_t^d} \right)^2 \frac{d_{t+1}^P}{d_t^P} \right] = 0 \end{aligned} \quad (26)$$

Equivalent to the expression found in Gerali et al. (2010). Equivalently to the case of the Deficit bank the market power in setting the interest rate of deposits allows us to interpret the derivative of the objective function with respect to  $r_t^d$  as a New Keynesian Phillips curve for deposit interest rate.

### 3.7.2 The Wholesale branch

Like in deWalque et al. (2010) and Aksoy and Basso (2012) the Surplus Bank is risk adverse. It maximizes the following objective function.

$$\max E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta_P^t \lambda_t^P \{ \log(J_t^{sb}) - \Gamma_t \} \quad (27)$$

The term  $J^{sb}$  is the profit of the holding and it could be defined as

$$J_t^{sb} = r_t^{ib} IB_t (1 - \delta_t^d) + r_t^g GB_t^{sb} - r_t^d d_t^P - \frac{\nabla^{sb}}{2} (IB_t - \overline{IB})^2. \quad (28)$$

where  $IB_t$  represents the interbank lending and  $GB_t$  the government bonds detained by the surplus bank. The term

$$\Gamma_t = \Theta \left( (\delta_t^d - \bar{\delta}^d) IB_t \right) \quad (29)$$

is a linear disutility related to the possibility of suffering a default on the interbank market. The disutility term could be interpreted as the cost the deficit bank has to sustained in case of an unexpected level of suffered defaults such as legal or repossession costs. Moreover, the banking activity is subject to the usual balance sheet constraint express by table 3. Deriving the optimality conditions with respect to  $IB_t$  and  $GB_t$ , we obtain the optimal balance sheet of the surplus determined by the following equation

$$IB_t = \overline{IB} + \frac{r_t^{ib}(1 - \delta_t^d) - r_t^g - \Theta(\delta_t^d - \bar{\delta}^d) J_t^{sb}}{\nabla^{sb}} \quad (30)$$

Defaults  $\delta^d$  affect negatively the amount of interbank lending on the interbank market. At the same time monetary policy could divert resources from the interbank market acting on the short term interest rate  $r_t^g$ .

### 3.8 Central Bank

The central bank manages the short term interest rates following a non linear Taylor rule:

$$(1 + r_t) = (1 + \bar{r})^{(1-\phi_R)} (1 + r_{t-1})^{\phi_R} \left\{ \left( \frac{\pi_t}{\pi} \right)^{\phi_\pi} (\Delta y_t)^{\phi_Y} \right\}^{1-\phi_R} (1 + \epsilon_r^R) \quad (31)$$

where  $\bar{r}$  is the steady state value of the interest rate, while  $\phi_R$ ,  $\phi_\pi$  and  $\phi_Y$  are respectively the weights assigned by the central bank to the past short term interest rate, the inflation target and the GDP growth.

### 3.9 The Government

The government sector has to obey to an intertemporal budget constraint

$$G_t + GB_{t-1} \frac{(1 + r_{t-1}^g)}{\pi_t} = GB_t + T_t \quad (32)$$

where  $G_t$  is the exogenous public expenditure and  $T_t$  a lump sum tax. Following Leeper (1991), government fixes taxation according to the following non linear rule

$$T_t = \bar{T} + \rho_{fp} \left( \frac{GB_{t-1}^{sb}}{\pi_t} - \frac{\overline{GB^{sb}}}{\bar{\pi}} \right) \quad (33)$$

In order to close the model, we assume that the interest rate paid by the government bonds are equal to the interest rates set by the central bank  $r_t = r_t^g$ .

### 3.10 Market clearing conditions and autoregressive process

We close our model specifying fifteen exogenous shock that evolve like AR(1) process in the form

$$\log(X_t) = (1 - \rho) \log(\bar{X}) + \rho \log(X_{t-1}) + e_t \quad (34)$$

With respect to the original model we add two additional stochastic disturbances: the public expenditure  $G_t$  and the riskiness of interbank market ( $\delta_d$ ).

The resource constraint for the economy is described by the following equation

$$y_t = c_t + q_t^k [k_t - (1 - \delta)k_{t-1}] + k_{t-1} \left[ \xi_1(u_t - 1) + \frac{\xi_2}{2}(u_t - 1)^2 \right] + \frac{\delta_b K_{t-1}^b}{\pi_t} + G_t + \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} Adj_t^j \quad (35)$$

where  $c_t$  is defined as

$$c_t = c_t^P + c_t^I + c_t^E \quad (36)$$

and

$$h = h_t^P + h_t^I \quad (37)$$

Without an explicit supply sector for housing, we close the model fixing a positive net supply  $h = 1$  of the real estate sector. Moreover, the term  $\sum_{j=0}^{\infty} Adj_t^j$  includes all the adjustment costs of the models.

## 4 Solution of the model

The log linearized version of the model can be written in the form proposed by Klein (2000)

$$AE_t \{H_{t+1}\} = BH_t + CZ_t \quad (38)$$

where  $H_t$  is a vector containing the endogenous variables of the model and  $Z_t$  the autoregressive process. The matrices  $A, B$  and  $C$  contain all the deep parameters of the model. Through the use of the Schur decomposition we were able to find a solution of the model and to represent it in state space form <sup>6</sup>.

### 4.1 Dataset

We employ fourteen observable variables on the Euro area from 1998 :  $Q1$  to 2014 :  $Q2$  in order to carry on the estimation. We use gross domestic product, investment, consumption, house price, inflation, wage inflation, deposits, loans to households and entrepreneurs, deposits interest rate, central bank interest rate, interbank market interest rate, interest rate on households and firms loans and a measure for the interbank lending. All variables, with the exception of the interest rate, are expressed in real terms. We made stationary all the time series applying the one side HP filter<sup>7</sup> and subtracting their sample mean to the interest rates. The vector of observable variables used to perform the estimation could be represented by

$$\underbrace{\Xi_t^{obs}}_{15*1} = \Xi_t - \bar{\Xi} \quad (39)$$

that is, as deviations of the endogenous variables from the steady state values.

### 4.2 Bayesian estimation

Following Gerali et al. (2010) and DARRACQ PARIES et al. (2011), we use Bayesian techniques in order to estimate only a small subset of the parameters, focusing our attention only on those affecting the dynamic of the

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<sup>6</sup>All the procedure is carried on using DYNARE. We used DYNARE 4.4.3 version Adjemian et al. (2011), a MATLAB and OCTAVE toolbox capable of solving and simulate DSGE model.

<sup>7</sup>Since we used quarterly data we assumed that the smoothness parameters of the HP filter is set equal to 1600. Following Stock and Watson (1999), the use of the one side HP filter allow the data to be fully compatible with the backward looking nature of the Kalman filter used to recover the likelihood function of our model. We adapt the MATLAB code provide by Meyer-Gohde (2010) to obtain the filtered series.

system. The steady state parameters are calibrated in line with the values of Gerali et al. (2010). The complete list of calibrated parameters can be found in table 4. We departed from the original numerical setting imposing a steady state ratio of the Basel II capital requirement equal to 8% , fixing the depreciation rate of bank capital close to 0.05, a slightly lower value then the one proposed in Gerali et al. (2010). We set the deficit bank default cost  $\chi^{db}$  close to 0.99 in order to obtained a steady state value of the default  $\delta^d$  equal to 0.0025 on quarterly base which implies a yearly rate of 1% of inter-bank defaults. We modify the original value of the elasticity of substitution to deposits and households and entrepreneurial loans in order to match the pre crisis mean of the interest rate. From Dib (2010) we took the value of the surplus bank monitoring cost which is set equal to 0.001. Implicitly we are assuming that in normal time the cost of monitoring the interbank market is very low.

Table 4: Calibrated parameters

Parameter	Definition	Value
$\beta^P$	Patient households discount factor	0.99430
$\beta^I$	Impatient households discount factor	0.97500
$\beta^E$	Entrepreneurs discount factor	0.97500
$\alpha$	Capital share	0.25000
$\delta$	Depreciation rate of physical capital	0.02500
$\phi$	Inverse of Frisch elasticity	1.00000
$\mu$	Share of Patient workers	0.80000
$\bar{m}^I$	Steady State value of LTV for impatient households	0.70000
$\bar{m}^E$	Steady State value of LTV for Entrepreneurs	0.35000
$\bar{\pi}$	Net Steady State inflation	1.00000
$\bar{\zeta}^d$	Elasticity of substitution of deposit	-2.2602
$\bar{\zeta}^{bh}$	Elasticity of substitution of households loans	3.39126
$\bar{\zeta}^{be}$	Elasticity of substitution of entrepreneurs loans	3.52017
$\xi_1$	Coefficient associated with the degree of utilization of physical capital	0.04590
$\xi_2$	Coefficient associated with the degree of utilization of physical capital	0.00459
$v_b$	Basel II capital requirement	0.08000
$\delta_b$	Depreciation rate of bank capital	0.05016
$\Omega$	Profits invested in new bank capital	1.00000
$\chi^{db}$	Deficit bank default cost	0.98600
$\nabla^{sb}$	Surplus bank monitoring cost	0.00100

#### 4.2.1 The choice of the Priors

Given the similarity between our model and Gerali et al. (2010) a very natural starting point for the selection of prior distributions is to choose those

proposed in their original work. We choose to bring only slightly modifications with respect to the original setting. We choose an *Inverse Gamma* with mean 0.01 and standard deviation equal to 0.05 for the additional exogenous shocks. In the estimation we also add an exogenous shock to the balance sheet of the surplus bank. The related autoregressive components are set with a mean of 0.8 and the standard deviations equal to 0.1 using a *Beta* prior distribution. We slightly modify the priors related to the technological shock. Evidence from the literature Smets and Wouters (2007) suggest a very high degree of persistence. We include this presample information choosing a very tight prior for technological shock in order to ensure a quite persistent shock. We choose an *Inverse Gamma* prior with mean 0.005 and a standard deviation equal to 0.0025 very similar to the one choose by Iacoviello (2014). For the autoregressive coefficient we set a *Beta* distribution with mean 0.95 and standard deviation equal to 0.025. The parameter related to the disutility cost of the surplus bank ( $\Theta$ ) is the novelty of our estimation. Since we have few prior informations about this parameter we decide to be quite agnostic and setting a wide prior. We only assume a positive support choosing a *Gamma* prior with mean equal to 15 and a standard deviation equal to 10. We also include in the estimation the coefficient related to the fiscal policy rule  $\rho^{fp}$ . We set a *Gamma* distribution with mean 0.3, a value provide by Falagiarda and Saia (2013) in their calibration, and a standard deviation of 0.1. The detailed choice of the priors and their distributions could be find in Table 5.

#### 4.2.2 Posterior distributions

We obtained the posterior distribution applying the classical procedure of Monte Carlo Markov Chain simulation (See for a detailed explanation Fernandez-Villaverde (2010)). We launched four Markov chains each of them composed by 500.000 draws. We choose the scale factor of the variance and covariance matrix of the random walk Metropolis-hastings in order to obtained an acceptance rate slightly above the 26%. We also check the convergence of the chains through both the CUSUM statistic and the Brooks and Gelman (1998) statistics.

The results are in line with Gerali et al. (2010). Some parameters deserve further discussion. The degree of persistence of habit formation in consumption is different among the different type of agents in the model. Patient Households presents a low value  $a^P$  of their persistence in consumption while the Impatient Households and the entrepreneurs presents higher values, 0.7 and 0.78 respectively. This result was previously found in Iacoviello and Neri (2010). The estimated value of the parameter related to the capital require-

ment seems to be lower than the value found by Gerali et al. (2010). Part of its effect seems to be captured by the presence of the interbank market frictions.

The disutility parameter  $\Theta$  is quite high implying a strong negative effect of defaults on the surplus bank confirming the importance of interbank defaults for the surplus bank. Monetary policy parameters are in line with previous findings. The counterpart shock displays a high degree of persistence with an autoregressive coefficient  $\rho_{\delta^d}$  equal to 0.86 while the exogenous shock is quite small and equal to 0.0042. This can be considered evidence that interbank collapses are rare events and they hardly emerge from the data. Comparing the full estimation with the one restricted to the pre crisis scenario, we can notice that the financial frictions played a major role after the 2007. Specifically, the role of the interbank market gained importance. The disutility cost of defaults increase from 9.80 to a value above 12 in the full estimation. Moreover, the persistence of the counterpart shock  $\rho_{\delta}$  increase from 0.76 to a value close 0.86 meaning that after the 2007 the economic system need a longer time to reabsorb a liquidity drainage. The magnitude of the shock  $\epsilon^{\delta}$  remains unaltered.

Table 5: RESULTS FROM BAYESIAN ESTIMATION

parameters	Prior shape	Full estimation 1998:Q1 - 2014:Q2		Pre crisis stimation 1998:Q1- 2007:Q2	
		Post mode	Post mean	Post Mode	Post Mean
$k_p$	$\Gamma[50, 20]$	49.47 17.39	59.58 [28.11,89.77]	58.07 20.05	53.44 [20.79,83.33]
$k_{bh}$	$\Gamma[6, 2.5]$	10.12 1.74	11.11 [7.860,14.19]	6.25 1.66	7.96 [4.65,11.28]
$k_{be}$	$\Gamma[3, 2.5]$	7.021 1.38	7.934 [5.169,10.56]	6.81 1.97	7.89 [4.18,11.41]
$k_d$	$\Gamma[10, 2.5]$	9.134 1.8	10.08 [6.774,13.27]	7.76 1.75	8.56 [5.47,11.62]
$k_i$	$\Gamma[2.5, 1]$	5.877 0.87	6.057 [4.550,7.523]	6.99 1.18	7.09 [5.1,9.0]
$k_w$	$\Gamma[50, 20]$	73.08 15.5	81.91 [53.08,109.6]	72.37 19.20	74.16 [45.10,102.15]
$k_{kb}$	$\Gamma[15, 5]$	5.922 2.08	6.568 [3.152,9.915]	8.42 2.92	8.88 [4.17,13.04]
$\Theta$	$\Gamma[15, 10]$	12.08 3.24	12.15 [7.137,17.07]	9.80 2.94	10.40 [5.40,15.19]
$a^P$	$\mathcal{B}[0.6, 0.1]$	0.484 0.082	0.535 [0.393,0.676]	0.552 0.0708	0.549 [0.429,0.6745]
$a^I$	$\mathcal{B}[0.6, 0.1]$	0.698 0.0937	0.715 [0.572,0.861]	0.675 0.0998	0.669 [0.517,0.825]
$a^E$	$\mathcal{B}[0.6, 0.1]$	0.782 0.0391	0.773 [0.708,0.839]	0.756 0.041	0.742 [0.667,0.817]
$\iota_w$	$\mathcal{B}[0.5, 0.15]$	0.228 0.093	0.260 [0.105,0.409]	0.2073 0.0834	0.229 [0.0881,0.3653]
$\iota_p$	$\mathcal{B}[0.5, 0.15]$	0.034 0.0344	0.087 [0.028,0.146]	0.0699 0.0345	0.0909 [0.0272,0.1508]
$\phi_R$	$\mathcal{B}[0.75, 0.1]$	0.859 0.0157	0.857 [0.831,0.883]	0.873 0.0163	0.869 [0.8418,0.8969]
$\phi_\pi$	$\Gamma [2.3,0.15]$	2.282 0.1377	2.291 [2.062,2.512]	2.28 0.1421	2.314 [2.083,2.5467]
$\phi_y$	$\mathcal{N}[0.1, 0.15]$	0.307 0.08	0.295 [0.160,0.428]	0.353 0.1046	0.332 [0.1589,0.5067]
$\rho_{fp}$	$\Gamma [0.3,0.1]$	0.236 0.0793	0.267 [0.129,0.400]	0.24 0.0963	0.2679 [0.1125,0.4148]

## 5 Quantitative experiment

The impulse response functions are reported in Appendix A.5. We analyzed the responses of several variables focusing our attention especially on the monetary policy and the counterpart risk shock. In order to do that we define the share of interbank lending over the total assets for the surplus



bank as an auxiliary variables <sup>8</sup>.

$$S_t^{ib} = \frac{IB_t}{GB_t + IB_t} \quad (40)$$

All the impulse response functions are calculated using the posterior means of the estimated parameters in percentage deviation from the steady state.

## 5.1 Monetary policy shock


Figure 2 represents the response to an increase of 25 percentage point of the central bank policy rate. The total output, consumption, investment, the stock of physical capital and inflation fall, while the entire structure of the interest rates rises sharply. The increase of the central bank interest rate influence the asset allocation of the surplus bank, diverting resources from the interbank market to government bond purchase. At the same time, the deficit bank reduces the loans provided to the real economy.

The fall of bank capital for the surplus bank is mainly due to the contraction of its own profits which are lowered by the higher cost of external financing. Instead, the profits of the surplus rise above the steady state level. The highest price paid over the liabilities is more than compensated by the higher earnings due to the rise of interest rate on interbank lending and risk free bonds. An increase of the policy rate seems to penalize more the net debtor on the market. The deficit bank suffers more the monetary restriction of the central bank, while the surplus bank could exploit the advantage of interbank lending at a higher price. The introduction of an interbank market seems to penalize more the weakest player on the market in favor of the surplus banks.

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<sup>8</sup>The share of government bonds detained by the surplus bank is defined as  $S_t^{Gb} = (1 - S_t^{ib})$

Figure 2: Monetary policy shock



In our set up it's not clear which is the effect (amplification or reduction) of the inclusion of the interbank market for the monetary policy<sup>9</sup>. This result seems in contrast with Hilberg and Hollmayr (2011) where the inclusion of an interbank market seems to smooth the effect of a monetary restriction.


## 5.2 Interbank riskiness shock

Figure 3 represents the impulse response functions of the model to a one standard deviation increase of the counterpart risk shock on the interbank market. An increase of counterpart risk on the interbank market modifies the composition of the balance sheet of the surplus bank. The flight to quality mechanism pushes the surplus bank to reallocate resources on the risk free market instead of lending to the deficit bank. As a consequence, the interbank interest rate goes up causing an increase of the interest rate on the credit market. This increase is not fully transmitted to the retail market because of the presence of several adjustment shocks ( $k_{bh}$  and  $k_{be}$ ) and the stickiness in the interest rate set by the retail branch of the deficit bank. The higher

<sup>9</sup>In order to do the comparison we calibrated a GNSS type of model in line with the estimated values of our estimation

interest rates discourage the demand of credit of the households and the firms reducing the amount of loans used to purchase new intermediate capital and housing services causing a credit crunch. At this point the recession spreads to the real economy through a contraction of the investments. As a consequence, the shrinkage of investments cause an erosion of the physical capital owned by the intermediate firms. The less the capital, the less is the value of the collateral the entrepreneurs could use to obtain credit from the bank, exacerbating the crisis on the credit market.

Figure 3: Counterpart risk shock on the interbank market




Coherently, facing the fall of the output, the central bank reacts injecting liquidity and cutting down the policy rate. In this framework the reduction of the interest rate is highly ineffective and it is not sufficient to restore the normal operation on the interbank market. The counterpart shock seems to have the same cross sectional effects of the monetary policy shock. The profits of the surplus bank increase while the profits of the deficit bank are eroded by the higher cost of interbank borrowing and they not compensated by the higher interest rate on credit.

## 6 Historical variance decomposition

In this section we focus our attention on the historical decomposition of the observable variables in order to understand the contribution of each shocks to the business cycle especially the role of the counterpart shock. In Figures 4 and 5 the historical decompositions of six main variables are reported.

Figure 4: Historical decomposition of Interbank interest rate, interest rate on households loans and interest rate on entrepreneurial loans.




The dark blue bar represents the monetary policy shock, the light blue bar represents all the financial shocks, the green bar represents the counterpart shock, the orange bar group together all the real shocks. The historical decomposition are computed at the posterior mode.

As we expected, the interbank market shock seems to explain a significant portion of the rise of the interest rate on the credit market during and after the 2008 financial crisis confirming that the model is able to explained one of the transmission mechanism we described in the introduction. Even after the 2008 the tensions on the interbank market could be explained through the interbank riskiness shock at least until the end of the 2012. After the 2008 what really changes was the role of the attitude of the ECB. The ECB steered down the interest rate on the credit market drastically cutting the policy rate of over 300 basis point after the 2008 pumping a considerable amount of liquidity in the money market in part offsetting the detrimental effect of the counterpart shock.

The role of the interbank shock seems to affect in a different way the credit supply to the households and the firms. The decrease of loans after the 2008 is explained for a significant portion by the adverse macroeconomic conditions and by a smaller fraction by the turbulence on the interbank market. Instead, the drop of entrepreneurial loans seems to be completely explained by several financial factors such as a shrinkage of the loan to value ratio and the interbank market seems to play no role on the amount of credit available for the firms. The counterpart shock seems to work through two different channels. For the households the interbank market shock raises interest rate and decrease the quantity of available loans but on the other hand it seems to have no role in fixing the credit supply for the firms. The only active channel for the firms passes through the increase of interest rates that discourage investment and the acquisition of new capital.

In general, like pointed out by Iacoviello (2014), almost all the variations of the variables are driven by financial shocks after the 2007. This is a very nice feature of the model since it is quite implausible that the recent financial crisis could be explained in term of a negative total factor productivity shock.

Figure 5: Historical decomposition of households loans, entrepreneurial loans and investments



The dark blue bar represents the monetary policy shock, the light blue bar represents all the financial shocks, the green bar represents the counterpart shock, the orange bar group together all the real shocks. The historical decomposition are computed at the posterior mode.

## 7 Concluding remarks

In this paper we highlighted the role of the interbank market as an important component of the business cycle. We extended the model proposed by Gerali et al. (2010) including an interbank market like in Dib (2010) and we took it to the data of the Euro area using Bayesian estimation. The results suggest

that our model could be able to replicate a turmoil on the interbank market replicating some features of the 2007 financial crisis. A liquidity crisis could divert resources from the risky interbank lending to a safer government bond holding, ending up with higher interest rate on entrepreneurial loans, less credit provided by the bank to the real economy, causing a recession driven by a fall of the investment. The historical decomposition we presented shows how part of the rise of interest rates during the financial crisis could be explained by the introduction of an interbank riskiness shock. We also investigate the role of monetary policy and we find out that in normal times the interbank market does not interfere with the transmission of the monetary policy. The interbank market interest rate absorbs almost completely the increase of the policy rate and it is spread to the economy through the banking channel. In case of an interbank market freeze, the effectiveness of the central bank came out to be narrowed. The central bank reduces the policy rate but at the same time the increase of the interbank market rate dampen the effects of the accommodating monetary policy. Moreover, the historical decomposition shows the different effects of the interbank market on households and firms. While the increase of interest rates seem to affect both the households and the entrepreneurs, the effect of the interbank shock seems to shrink only the amount of credit available to the households.

Some critical questions remain unresolved. Our log-linearized framework is not the most adapt to capture a proper portfolio choice. In order to do that we need to solve the model relying on higher order approximations making estimation a real challenge. Moreover, as reporting in Benes et al. (2014), financial shocks affecting the balance sheet of the banks are linked in a non linear way to the real economy. Even in this case, our set up it is not able to fully capture the role of the financial shocks and also of the interbank market.

Nevertheless, the story told by our model seems to be plausible and coherent with the 2007 financial crisis even with all the limitations of a linear model: the interbank market suddenly collapse and the contagion spreads to the real economy.

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