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Optimal taxation and labour wedge in models with equilibrium unemployment

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Abstract

In this paper, we develop heterogeneous agent models with equilibrium unemployment to study the optimal taxation and labour wedge. We find that the presence of profits plays an important role in the determination of both optimal tax policy and labour wedge. Judd-Chamley optimal zero capital tax result can still hold in the model without profits. The optimal labour wedge is zero in the long run. This results in welfare gains of all agents and there is no conflict of interests between agents. But the Benthamite government chooses to subsidise the capital income in the long run in the model with profits due to the presence of productive public investment. The resulting labour wedge is non-zero which generates welfare losses of workers despite welfare gains of capitalists. The government also faces a trade-off between efficiency and equity in this model.

Key words: household heterogeneity, equilibrium unemployment, optimal taxation, labour wedge

JEL codes: E13, E22, E62

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1 Introduction

Since the 1980s there has been an extensive literature studying the optimal taxation in macroeconomics. For example, Chamley (1986) studies the optimal taxation using a representative agent model. He shows that the government should use a zero tax rate on capital income in the long run. Chari et al. (1994) and Chari and Kehoe (1999) also conclude that a permanent positive tax rate on capital income is not efficient in a Ramsey-type setup of the government. This family of models, however, is silent on the research question of inequality which has resulted from the conflict of interests between different agents. In this sense, the distributional effect of optimal taxation has been neglected in these papers. In this context, heterogeneous agent models obviously become a good candidate for studying the distributional effect of optimal taxation.

Within the heterogeneous agent framework, the seminal research of Judd (1985) makes a distinction between "capitalists" and "workers" in order to investigate the redistributive potential of capital taxation in his modeled economy. He suggests that the optimal tax policy under commitment is to not tax capital income in the long run and to raise all the required tax revenues by taxing labour income. This result even holds when the government cares only about the workers in the society. This implies that there is no conflict of interests between agents.

All these studies point out that the government should not tax capital income in the long run. However, the robustness of this result has recently been challenged. Whether capital income should be taxed or not in the long run still remains an open question in the literature. Guo and Lansing (1999) introduce imperfect competition and profits in the product market and they show that the optimal zero capital tax rate might not be obtained in the long run assuming that the government has access to a commitment technology. The introduction of profits via firms' monopoly power creates capital market distortions which break down the normative result of optimal zero capital income tax. Koskela and von Thadden (2008) model the non-Walrasian labour market with Nash bargaining between firms and labour unions. They suggest that both capital and labour taxes should be used in the long run. Also the result of non-zero optimal capital income tax can also be obtained in the models without commitment technology for the government (see e.g. Krusell (2002) and Angelopoulos et al. (2011)), or assuming that households are endowed with different skills in the labour markets (see e.g. Conesa et al. (2009)). All these studies have shown the importance of economic structure in determining the optimal taxation of government.

This paper uses a heterogeneous agent general equilibrium model with
unemployment to examine the effects of optimal taxation on unemployment, the distribution of income and welfare of agents in the economy. This paper contributes to the optimal taxation literature by examining the determination and effects of optimal taxation under different market structures. We stay as close as possible to Judd (1985), but two new concepts are introduced into the model: equilibrium unemployment and profits of firms. In addition, this study sheds some light on the determination of optimal labour wedge which captures the gap between the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption, and the marginal product of labour. This concept has never been studied in the optimal policy literature. In the past, it was only used to study the business cycle accounting (see e.g. Chari et al. (2002 and 2007a) and Shimer (2009)). In the competitive labour market, unemployment is generated, following for example, Pissarides (1998), Ardagna (2001) and Ljungqvist and Sargent (2006), as the outcome of optimal choices made by workers. In this paper their models are extended to allow for agent heterogeneity by assuming different economic roles of agents in the economy. Following Judd (1985), Lansing (1999) and Ardagna (2007), we assume that capitalists do not work and workers do not save. In this setup, the government taxes labour income and interest income from capital and profits to finance its public spending. The unemployment benefits in this model mimic the role that they have in a non-competitive labour market. An increase in unemployment benefits tends to decrease the labour supply of workers and then put some pressure on the equilibrium wage rate. Alternatively, unemployment benefits can be considered as another tax rate on the labour income. By separating unemployment benefits from the explicit tax rate on labour income, it is possible to investigate the different effects of these two policy instruments on workers and government’s budget.

Two different heterogeneous agent models are studied in this paper. In the first model which is referred to as the benchmark model, firms earn zero economic profits in equilibrium. The second model extends the benchmark model to allow for productive public investment in the production. This model is referred to as the modified model. Following Lansing (1998) and Malley et al. (2009), we assume that the government can provide individual firms with public capital without asking for rents. In the modified model, the production is constant-returns-to-scale (CRS) in three productive inputs: private capital, labour and public capital. The equilibrium profits are equal to the difference between the value of output and the production costs of

Unemployment can also be generated in the unionised labour market (see e.g. Maffezzoli (2001) and Ardagna (2007)), or in the model with search frictions (see e.g. Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and Pissarides (2001)).
inputs employed in the private sectors. This setup allows us to examine the relevance of profits in determining the optimal taxation of Benthamite (non-partisan) government. Moreover, in both models the case of partisan government is also examined, in the sense that, the government is biased towards one agent and places higher weight to the welfare of that agent in its objective function.

The model with exogenous policy instruments is calibrated so that its steady state can reflect the main empirical characteristics of the current UK economy, with particular focus on its long-run unemployment rate. The UK is chosen for the quantitative analysis since the high and rising unemployment rate has been a feature of the UK economy compared to other European countries.

The main findings can be summarized as follows. First, in the benchmark model with zero profits, we find that the optimal tax rate on capital income is zero in the long run. The government chooses to tax the leisure of workers in the long run. This is equivalent to a subsidy to the labour supply of workers. Meanwhile, the government slightly increases the tax rate on labour income. We also find that the distortions in the labour market caused by the distortionary labour tax can be completely eliminated as a consequence of the equal amount of government subsidies to the workers in the form of taxation on the leisure. In other words, the positive effect of negative replacement rate and the negative effect of increase in labour tax on workers net out in the long run. Therefore, the gap between the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption, and the marginal product of labour totally disappears in the long run. As a result, the labour supply of workers increases which is beneficial to the workers. The income, consumption and welfare of workers improves. In addition, as in Judd (1985), the results further show that the optimal taxation and allocation under commitment are independent of the weight to the welfare of agent in the Ramsey setup of the government. This implies that there is no conflict of interests between agents in the long run.

Second, the result of long-run optimal zero capital tax cannot be obtained in the model with positive economic profits due to the presence of productive public investment. The optimal tax rate on capital income is negative which means the government chooses to subsidise the capital income in the long run. There are two opposing effects in determining the sign of optimal capital income tax: under-investment effect and profit effect (see e.g. Guo and Lansing (1999)). In our model, on one hand, the crowding-out effect of public investment is equivalent to the under-investment effect which motivates a Benthamite government to use a subsidy to the capital income in order to reduce the distortions in the capital market. On the other hand,
the presence of profits motivates the government to use a positive tax rate on capital income as taxing profits is not distortionary. In our case, we show that the under-investment effect outweighs the profit effect. As a result, the government subsidises the capital income in the long run. The optimal capital tax directly increases the investment of capitalists and therefore the income, consumption and welfare of capitalists increase. As in the benchmark model, the government subsidises the labour supply of workers while the tax rate on labour income slightly increases. These two policy instruments have opposing effects on the labour supply of workers. We find that the positive effect of labour subsidy dominates so that the labour supply of workers is higher than it would be in the model with exogenous policy. In this model, there is a gap between the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption, and the marginal product of labour, so that the tax distortion in the labour market cannot be completely eliminated in the long run. The distortion causes welfare losses for workers. In contrast to the benchmark model, the weight to the welfare of agents matters for the optimal taxation in the modified model. The effects are found to be monotonic. This implies that the optimal taxation generates conflict of interests between agents and it has redistributive effects in the long run. As the weight to the welfare of capitalists increases, the capital taxation decreases and it turns into a subsidy after a critical value. The tax rate on labour income increases in order to make up for the losses in government’s tax revenues. In this case, a trade-off between efficiency and equity needs to be taken into account by the government in policy-making decision.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 sets out the benchmark model structure. Section 3 discusses the calibration and steady-state of the model given exogenous policy, and then studies the optimal policy under commitment. Section 4 presents one extension to the benchmark model and provides an analysis of optimal policy. Section 5 finally offers a summary and conclusion.

2 Equilibrium unemployment in a model without profits

2.1 The model

The main features of the economy are summarized as follows. Infinitely lived households, firms and a government populate the economy. There is a large but fixed number of households which can be divided into two types in terms of their different roles in the economy: capitalists and workers. Following
Judd (1985), Lansing (1999) and Ardagna (2007), capitalists by assumption do not work and workers do not save. Capitalists can participate in the capital market and they are owners of firms. Their income includes interest income from private capital and dividends of firms. Employed workers supply labour to the firms and obtain wage incomes. If workers are unemployed, they can receive unemployment benefits from the government. Workers consume all their disposable income in each period. We don’t examine worker heterogeneity in the model so that all the workers get the same average income. Following Pissarides (1998), Ardagna (2001) and Ljungqvist and Sargent (2006), equilibrium unemployment is generated in the competitive labour market as the outcome of optimal choices made by workers. Firms are perfectly competitive and they produce a single product in the goods sector with a constant-returns-to-scale technology. Finally, the government purchases goods and services from the private sector which could enhance the utility of households. It also provides unemployment benefits to unemployed workers. The government finances all its spending requirements by taxing labour income and interest income from capital and profits.

2.2 Population composition

The whole population size of the households is given by $N$. The population sizes of capitalists and workers are assumed to be: $N^k$ and $N^w$. The population shares of capitalists and workers are assumed to be: $N^k/N \equiv n^k$, and $N^w/N \equiv n^w = 1 - n^k$. The population composition is taken as given and fixed over time. The firms are indexed by the superscript $f$. Each capitalist owns one single firm. This implies that the number of firms is equal to the number of capitalists, i.e. $N^f = N^k$.

2.3 Capitalists

The utility function of households is of the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) variety which is defined over a composite good and leisure as follows:

$$U^i_t = \left[ \mu \left( C^i_t + \omega \bar{G}^i_t \right)^{\frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma}} + (1 - \mu) \left( 1 - H^i_t \right)^{\frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma}} \right]^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1}}$$

where $C^i_t$ is household $i$’s private consumption; $\bar{G}^i_t$ represents per capita government consumption, i.e. $\bar{G}^i_t = G^i_t/N$, where $G^i_t$ denotes aggregate government consumption; $H^i_t$ is the labour supply. We fix $H^k_t = 0$ for the capitalists.

---

2Variables for capitalists are indexed by the superscript $k$ and variables for workers are indexed by the superscript $w$ in what follows.
in their utility function as they are assumed to not work in the economy. The parameter \( \sigma > 0 \) measures the elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure; and \( 0 < \mu < 1 \) is the weight given to consumption relative to leisure in the utility.

The utility function differs from the conventional neoclassical utility function by including the term of per capita government consumption, \( G_c \). The private consumption and government consumption are assumed to be substitutes in the utility function. The degree of substitutability is determined by the constant parameter \( \sigma' < 1 \). In this way, the government could affect households via the utility effect of \( G_c \). Barro (1981 and 1989) suggests that government consumption expenditure on goods and services can provide direct utility for the households. This argument is supported by some empirical studies in the literature. Kormendi (1983) and Aschauer (1985) test the parameter which defines the relationship between private and government consumption for the US economy, and Ahmed (1986) for the UK economy. They all support the substitutability relationship. This specification of substitutability between private and government consumption is widely used in the RBC literature.\(^3\)

The objective function of the representative capitalist is to maximise his present discounted value of lifetime utility:

\[
\max \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t U_t^k(C_t^k, G_t c) \tag{2}
\]

where \( 0 < \beta < 1 \) is the constant discount factor and \( U_t^k \) is given by:

\[
U_t^k = \left[ \mu \left( C_t^k + \omega G_t c \right)^{\frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma}} + (1 - \mu) \left( 1 - 0 \right)^{\frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma}} \right]^{\frac{1}{\sigma - 1}}. \tag{3}
\]

The budget constraint of each capitalist at time \( t \) is given by:

\[
C_t^k + I_t^k = r_t K_t^k - \tau_t^k \left( r_t - \delta^p \right) K_t^k + (1 - \tau_t^k) \pi_t^k \tag{4}
\]

where \( K_t^k \) is the private capital stock at the beginning of time \( t \); \( I_t^k \) is the investment; \( r_t \) is the gross return to capital; \( \pi_t^k \) denotes profits; \( 0 < \delta^p < 1 \) is the constant depreciation rate of capital stock; and \( 0 \leq \tau_t^k < 1 \) is the tax rate on capital income and profits.\(^4\)


\(^4\)Following Guo and Lansing (1999), we assume that the government cannot distinguish between returns to capital stock and profits received from firms, so that they are taxed at the same rate. In equilibrium, the firms earn zero economic profits, and hence the capitalists receive zero profits from firms, i.e. \( \pi_t^k = 0 \). Hereafter, the last term involving \( \pi_t^k \) will be dropped from capitalist’s budget constraint in the benchmark model. In addition, the capital taxes are assumed to be net of depreciation (see e.g. Lansing (1998)).
The evolution equation of capital stock is:

\[ K_{t+1}^k = (1 - \delta^p) K_t^k + I_t^k. \]  

(5)

The capitalist chooses \( \{ C_t^k, K_t^k \}_{t=0}^\infty \) to maximize (2) subject to the constraints (3), (4) and (5) by taking market prices \( \{ r_t \}_{t=0}^\infty \), policy variables \( \{ \tau_t^k, G_t \}_{t=0}^\infty \) and an initial condition for the capital stock, \( K_0^k \), as given.

The optimization problem of the capitalist can be expressed mathematically as follows:

\[
\max \left\{ \sum_{t=0}^\infty \beta^t \left[ \mu \left( C_t^k + \omega G_t \right) \frac{\sigma+1}{\sigma} + (1 - \mu) \left( 1 - \frac{\sigma+1}{\sigma} \right) \right]^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}} \right\} 
\]

s.t. \( C_t^k + K_{t+1}^k - (1 - \delta^p) K_t^k = r_t K_t^k - \tau_t^k (r_t - \delta^p) K_t^k \).

The Lagrangian function of the capitalist is then written as:

\[
L^k = \sum_{t=0}^\infty \beta^t \left\{ \frac{\sigma+1}{\sigma} \left[ \mu \left( C_t^k + \omega G_t \right) \frac{\sigma+1}{\sigma} + (1 - \mu) \left( 1 - \frac{\sigma+1}{\sigma} \right) \right]^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}} + \right. \\
+ \left. \xi_t \left[ r_t K_t^k - \tau_t^k (r_t - \delta^p) K_t^k - C_t^k - K_{t+1}^k + (1 - \delta^p) K_t^k \right] \right\}
\]

where \( \xi_t \) is the Lagrangian multiplier on the capitalist’s budget constraint.

The first-order condition (FOC) for \( C_t^k \) is:

\[
\left[ \mu \left( C_t^k + \omega G_t \right) \frac{\sigma+1}{\sigma} + (1 - \mu) \left( 1 - \frac{\sigma+1}{\sigma} \right) \right]^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}} \cdot \mu \left( C_t^k + \omega G_t \right)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} = \xi_t. \]  

(6)

The FOC for \( K_{t+1}^k \) is:

\[
\beta \xi_{t+1} \left[ 1 + (1 - \tau_{t+1}^k) (r_{t+1} - \delta^p) \right] = \xi_t. \]  

(7)

Consolidating these two FOCs yields the following optimality condition of the capitalist:

\[
\left( C_t^k + \omega G_t \right)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} \left[ \mu \left( C_t^k + \omega G_t \right) \frac{\sigma+1}{\sigma} + (1 - \mu) \right]^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}} = \beta \left( C_{t+1}^k + \omega G_{t+1} \right)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} \left[ \mu \left( C_{t+1}^k + \omega G_{t+1} \right) \frac{\sigma+1}{\sigma} + (1 - \mu) \right]^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}}. \]

\[
\cdot \left[ 1 + (1 - \tau_{t+1}^k) (r_{t+1} - \delta^p) \right]. \]  

(8)

This is the consumption Euler equation of capitalists which describes the optimal intertemporal choice made by capitalists in equilibrium. It implies that the marginal utility of foregone consumption at time \( t \) should be equal to the expected marginal benefit of discounted \( t+1 \) returns from investing one more unit at time \( t \) in equilibrium.
2.4 Workers

The workers are assumed to be identical in the labour market. Hence, the labour supply of workers to firms is homogenous. They work and consume all their disposable income in each period. Unemployment is generated in the competitive labour market as the outcome of optimal choices made by the workers. Time off work is then treated as unemployment in the model. If unemployed, workers receive unemployment benefits from the government. The time constraint of workers is crucial in the workers’ setup. It is described as follows. At time $t$, the workers are endowed with the fixed amount of time. The time spent on physiological needs is treated as the exogenous leisure of workers. Apart from this, the workers are expected to work for the firms and obtain wage income from working. This portion of time is taken as potential labour supply of workers which is normalised to unity. In the competitive labour market, both firms and workers are assumed to be price takers. The wage rate is determined when the aggregate labour supply is equal to the aggregate labour demand. The equilibrium labour supply generated by the model is less than the potential labour supply of workers. The difference between these two is then treated as unemployment. In other words, time off work is considered as unemployment in this model. Unemployment by assumption could generate both leisure and unemployment benefits for the workers. The structural parameters is calibrated so that per capita unemployment benefits are always below the net return to labour. In other words, leisure is costly to workers as working can generate higher labour income. The workers do not save so that they do not have to make intertemporal choices. The optimization problem for the workers is thus static.

At time $t$, the objective function of the representative worker is given by:

$$\max U_{w}^{w} (C_{w}^{w}, 1 - H_{w}^{w}, G_{t}^{w})$$  \hspace{1cm} (9)$$

and the utility function is:

$$U_{w}^{w} = \left[ \mu \left( C_{w}^{w} + \omega G_{t}^{w} \right)^{\sigma/\sigma} + (1 - \mu) (1 - H_{w}^{w})^{\sigma/\sigma} \right]^{1/\sigma}. \hspace{1cm} (10)$$

The time constraint of the worker is given by:

$$L_{t}^{w} = 1 - H_{t}^{w} \hspace{1cm} (11)$$

where $L_{t}^{w}$ denotes the leisure of the worker.

The worker has the following within-period budget constraint:

$$C_{t}^{w} = (1 - \tau_{t}^{w}) w_{t} H_{t}^{w} + G_{t}^{w} (1 - H_{t}^{w}) \hspace{1cm} (12)$$
where $w_t$ is the wage rate; $0 \leq \tau^w_t < 1$ is the tax rate on labour income; and $\bar{G}^u_t$ is per capita unemployment benefits which are assumed to be proportional to the wage rate, i.e. $\bar{G}^u_t = \tau_t w_t$, where $0 \leq \tau_t < 1$ is the replacement rate measuring the imputed value of leisure. As discussed above, unemployment benefits are less than the net wage rate, i.e. $\tau_t w_t < (1 - \tau^w_t) w_t$, so that unemployment is costly to the worker although it yields leisure.

The value of the free parameter in the utility function, $\mu$, is calibrated, such that the model’s steady-state unemployment is in line with the data average between 1970 and 2009.\footnote{In the UK economy, the date average of unemployment rate was 7% between 1970 and 2009.}

At time $t$, the worker takes the market price, $w_t$, per capita government consumption and unemployment benefits, $\bar{G}^c_t$ and $\bar{G}^u_t$, and the tax rate on labour income, $\tau^w_t$, as given, and chooses $C^w_t$ and $H^w_t$ to maximize (9) subject to the constraints (10), (11) and (12).

The optimization problem for the worker is shown as follows:

$$\max_{C^w_t, H^w_t} \left\{ \left[ \mu \left( C^w_t + \omega \bar{G}^u_t \right)^{\frac{\alpha-1}{\sigma}} + (1 - \mu) (1 - H^w_t)^{\frac{\alpha-1}{\sigma}} \right] \frac{1}{\sigma} \right\}$$

s.t. $C^w_t = (1 - \tau^w_t) w_t H^w_t + \bar{G}^u_t (1 - H^w_t)$.

The Lagrangian function of the worker is written as:

$$L^w = \left[ \mu \left( C^w_t + \omega \bar{G}^u_t \right)^{\frac{\alpha-1}{\sigma}} + (1 - \mu) (1 - H^w_t)^{\frac{\alpha-1}{\sigma}} \right] \frac{1}{\sigma} +$$

$$+ \phi_t \left[ (1 - \tau^w_t) w_t H^w_t + \bar{G}^u_t (1 - H^w_t) - C^w_t \right]$$

where $\phi_t$ is the Lagrangian multiplier on the worker’s budget constraint.

The FOC for $C^w_t$ is:

$$\left[ \mu \left( C^w_t + \omega \bar{G}^u_t \right)^{\frac{\alpha-1}{\sigma}} + (1 - \mu) (1 - H^w_t)^{\frac{\alpha-1}{\sigma}} \right] \frac{1}{\sigma^2} \mu \left( C^w_t + \omega \bar{G}^u_t \right)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} = \phi_t. \quad (14)$$

The FOC for $H^w_t$ is:

$$\left[ \mu \left( C^w_t + \omega \bar{G}^u_t \right)^{\frac{\alpha-1}{\sigma}} + (1 - \mu) (1 - H^w_t)^{\frac{\alpha-1}{\sigma}} \right] \frac{1}{\sigma^2} (\mu - 1) (1 - H^w_t)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} +$$

$$+ \phi_t \left( 1 - \tau^w_t \right) w_t - \phi_t \bar{G}^u_t = 0. \quad (15)$$

These two FOCs are next combined into one equation as follows:

$$(1 - \mu) (1 - H^w_t)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} + \mu \bar{G}^u_t \left( C^w_t + \omega \bar{G}^u_t \right)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} =$$

$$= \mu w_t \left( 1 - \tau^w_t \right) \left( C^w_t + \omega \bar{G}^u_t \right)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} \quad (16)$$
which can be re-written as:

\[
(1 - \mu) (1 - H_t^w)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} + \mu \tau_t w_t (C_t^w + \omega \bar{G}_t^w)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}}
\]

\[
= \mu w_t (1 - \tau_t^w) (C_t^w + \omega \bar{G}_t^w)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}}
\]

(17)

by replacing \( \bar{G}_t^w \) with \( \tau_t w_t \).

The expression above is re-arranged to obtain the following condition:

\[
1 - \tau_t^w - \tau_t = \frac{(1 - \mu)(1 - H_t^w)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}}}{\mu(C_t^w + \omega \bar{G}_t^w)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}}} \tag{18}
\]

where \( \frac{(1 - \mu)(1 - H_t^w)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}}}{\mu(C_t^w + \omega \bar{G}_t^w)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}}} = MRS_{H_t^w, C_t^w} \) is the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption. Therefore, the r.h.s. of the equation reflects the gap between the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption, and the marginal product of labour.\(^6\) Chari et al. (2002 and 2007a) and Shimer (2009) define it as the labour wedge. The labour wedge is interpreted as an indicator of the labour market distortions.

### 2.5 Firms

A representative firm produces its individual output using a technology that exhibits constant-returns-to-scale in capital and labour. The production function of the representative firm is given by:

\[
Y_t^f = A \left( K_t^f \right)^{\alpha_1} \left( H_t^f \right)^{\alpha_2} \tag{19}
\]

where \( Y_t^f \) represents the firm’s output; \( K_t^f \) is the capital stock employed by the firm in the production; \( H_t^f \) is the labour input; \( A \) is the constant technology level; and \( 0 < \alpha_1, \alpha_2 < 1 \) denote the capital’s and labour’s shares of output. The CRTS property implies: \( \alpha_1 + \alpha_2 = 1 \).

The aggregate output denoted by, \( Y_t \), measuring the gross product of the economy, is the sum of individual firm’s output:

\[
Y_t = \sum Y_t^f. \tag{20}
\]

The profits earned by the firm at time \( t \) are given by:\(^7\)

\[
\pi_t^f = Y_t^f - r_t K_t^f - w_t H_t^f. \tag{21}
\]

\(^6\)In equilibrium, the firms hire the workers until the wage rate is equal to the marginal product of labour. This is shown in the profit-maximizing problem of the firm as follows.

\(^7\)The price of goods is fixed to be 1, so that all the variables in the model are written in real terms.
At time $t$, the firm chooses the quantities of capital and labour in order to maximise profits taking the market prices of them as given.

The optimization problem for the firm can be summarized in the following:

$$\max_{K_t^f, N_t^f} \left\{ Y_t^f - r_t K_t^f - w_t H_t^f \right\}$$

$$s.t. \quad Y_t^f = A \left( K_t^f \right)^{\alpha_1} \left( H_t^f \right)^{\alpha_2}.$$ 

The Lagrangian function of the firm is written as:

$$L_t^f = A \left( K_t^f \right)^{\alpha_1} \left( H_t^f \right)^{\alpha_2} - r_t K_t^f - w_t H_t^f.$$  (22)

The FOC for $K_t^f$ is:

$$\alpha_1 A \left( K_t^f \right)^{\alpha_1 - 1} \left( H_t^f \right)^{\alpha_2} - r_t = 0$$  (23)

which can be re-written as:

$$r_t = \alpha_1 A \left( K_t^f \right)^{\alpha_1 - 1} \left( H_t^f \right)^{\alpha_2}.$$  (24)

The FOC for $H_t^f$ is:

$$\alpha_2 A \left( K_t^f \right)^{\alpha_1} \left( H_t^f \right)^{\alpha_2 - 1} - w_t = 0$$

which can be re-written as:

$$w_t = \alpha_2 A \left( K_t^f \right)^{\alpha_1} \left( H_t^f \right)^{\alpha_2 - 1}.$$  (25)

These two optimality conditions of the firm imply that factor rentals are equal to their marginal products in equilibrium.

The firm’s profits in equilibrium are:

$$\pi_t^f = Y_t^f - r_t K_t^f - w_t H_t^f$$
$$= Y_t^f - \alpha_1 A \left( K_t^f \right)^{\alpha_1 - 1} \left( H_t^f \right)^{\alpha_2} K_t^f - \alpha_2 A \left( K_t^f \right)^{\alpha_1} \left( H_t^f \right)^{\alpha_2 - 1} H_t^f$$
$$= 0.$$  (26)

This implies that the firm earns zero profits in equilibrium.
2.6 Government

In the absence of government debt, the government has a balanced budget in each period. The aggregate budget constraint of the government is:

\[ N\bar{G}_t + N^w w_t (1 - H^w_t) = N^k r^k_t (r_t - \delta^p) K^k_t + N^w w_t H^w_t. \] (27)

Government expenditures include unemployment benefits and government consumption which is utility-enhancing. They are financed by the tax revenues from capitalists and workers.

Both sides of the constraint (27) are divided by the total population, \( N \), and we make use of the population relationships, \( N^k/N = n^k \), \( N^w/N = 1 - n^k \) and \( N^f = N^k \), to get the per capita government budget constraint as follows:

\[ \bar{G}_t^c + (1 - n^k) \tau_t w_t (1 - H^w_t) = n^k r^k_t (r_t - \delta^p) K^k_t + (1 - n^k) \tau_t w_t H^w_t. \] (28)

The policy instruments of government include \( \tau^k_t, \tau^w_t, \tau_t \) and \( \bar{G}_t^c \). The per capita government consumption, \( \bar{G}_t^c \), is allowed to be residually determined ensuring that the government budget constraint is balanced at any given period of time.

2.7 Market clearing conditions and resource constraint

In the capital market, the aggregate supply of capital is equal to the aggregate demand of capital. This implies:

\[ N^k K^k_t = N^f K^f_t. \] (29)

It has been assumed that \( N^k = N^f \), so that the above condition implies:

\[ K^k_t = K^f_t. \] (30)

In the labour market, the aggregate supply of labour is equal to the aggregate demand of labour:

\[ N^w H^w_t = N^k H^f_t. \] (31)

The per capita market clearing condition for the labour is:

\[ H^w_t = \frac{n^k}{(1 - n^k)} H^f_t. \] (32)
Finally, in the goods market, the economy’s aggregate resource constraint is given by:

\[ N^f A \left( K^f_t \right)^{\alpha_1} (H^f_t)^{\alpha_2} = N^k C^k + N^w C^w + N^k (K^k_{t+1} - (1 - \delta^v) K^k_t) + N \overline{G}^c \tag{33} \]

which can be re-written in per capita terms:

\[ n^k A \left( K^f_t \right)^{\alpha_1} (H^f_t)^{\alpha_2} = n^k C^k + (1 - n^k) C^w + n^k (K^k_{t+1} - (1 - \delta^v) K^k_t) + \overline{G}^c. \tag{34} \]

### 2.8 Decentralized competitive equilibrium (exogenous policy)

We now summarise the decentralized competitive equilibrium (DCE) conditions in the model. Given the three tax policy instruments \( \{\tau^k_t, \tau^w_t, \tau^l_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty} \) and the initial condition for \( K^k_0 \), the DCE is defined to be a sequence of allocations \( \{C^k_t, K^k_t, C^w_t, H^w_t, K^l_t, H^l_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty} \), prices \( \{r_t, w_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty} \), and one residually determined policy instrument \( \{\overline{G}^c_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty} \), such that (i) capitalists, workers and firms undertake their respective optimisation problems; (ii) all budget constraints are satisfied; and (iii) all markets clear.

Thus the DCE consists of the capitalist’s and worker’s optimality conditions, i.e. \( OC^k \) and \( OC^w \); the firm’s first-order conditions for \( K^l_t \) and \( L^l_t \), \( FO^k \) and \( FO^l \); the budget constraints of capitalist, worker and government, i.e. \( BC^k \), \( BC^w \) and \( BC^g \); and the per capita market clearing conditions in capital and labour markets, i.e. \( MC_k \) and \( MC_l \).

### 3 Optimal policy with commitment

#### 3.1 Ramsey problem

In the commitment framework, the government takes into account that the households and firms will behave in their own best interest by taking all the fiscal policy variables as given. Each applicable fiscal policy implies a feasible equilibrium allocation that fully reflects the optimal behavioral responses of households and firms. If the budget constraints of capitalists and workers and the government budget constraint are satisfied, then the resource constraint is redundant and it can be dropped from the equilibrium.

---

8The full DCE conditions are provided in the Appendix. Relying on the Walras’s law, if the budget constraints of capitalists and workers and the government budget constraint are satisfied, then the resource constraint is redundant and it can be dropped from the equilibrium.
resources. Given a welfare criterion, the optimization problem for the government is to pick the best fiscal policy which can produce an equilibrium allocation giving the highest aggregate welfare. To avoid the general time inconsistency problem in policy making, the government is assumed to commit itself once-and-for-all to one fiscal policy which is announced at initial period and never re-optimises. This problem is usually referred to as the Ramsey problem of government under commitment.

The government now optimally chooses some of its policy instruments. Meanwhile, it also chooses the allocation of private agents. This is called the dual approach to the Ramsey problem. The objective of government is to maximize the present discounted value of a weighted average of capitalists’ and workers’ welfare:

$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left[ \gamma U_t^k + (1 - \gamma) U_t^w \right]$$

where the government is assumed to have the same discount rate as households; and $0 < \gamma, (1 - \gamma) < 1$ are the weights attached to the welfare of capitalists and workers by the government.

The optimal policy approach emphasizes the constraints under which the government must operate. These constraints include the requirement to raise enough tax revenues and the behavioral responses of households and firms. These are summarized in the DCE conditions. In order to simplify the optimization problem of the government - it is necessary to reduce the number of choice variables for the government, we substitute out, $r_t$, $w_t$, $K^f_t$, and $L^f_t$, by making use of DCE conditions, $FO^k$, $FO^l$, $MC_k$ and $MC_l$. The per capita government consumption, $G^c_t$, is assumed to be constant in the Ramsey problem, i.e. $G^c_t = G^c$ for all time periods.

To summarize, in the dual approach of the Ramsey problem, the choice variables for the government are four allocation variables, $\{C^k_t, H^w_t, C^w_t, K^k_{t+1}\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ and three policy variables $\{\tau^k_t, \tau^w_t, \tau_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$. The initial condition for $K^k_0$ is taken as given. The optimization problem can thus be summarized as follows:

$$\max_{\{C^k_t, H^w_t, C^w_t, K^k_{t+1}, \tau^k_t, \tau^w_t, \tau_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left[ \gamma U \left( C^k_t \right) + (1 - \gamma) U \left( C^w_t \right) \right]$$

9The time inconsistency refers to that when the government revises its policy announced initially if it has a chance to do so.

10In contrast to the dual approach, the government only chooses the allocation of private agents and all the policy variables are substituted out using DCE conditions in the primal approach.

11The value is calibrated to get a good steady-state given the exogenous tax policy.
subject to the DCE conditions of

\[
(C_t^k + \omega \overline{G})^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} \left[ \mu \left( C_t^k + \omega \overline{G} \right)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} + (1 - \mu) \right]^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}} = \beta E_t \left\{ (C_{t+1}^k + \omega \overline{G})^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} \left[ \mu \left( C_{t+1}^k + \omega \overline{G} \right)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} + (1 - \mu) \right]^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}} \cdot [1 + (1 - \tau^k_{t+1}) (r_{t+1} - \delta^p)] \right\} \quad (D1)
\]

\[
(1 - \mu) \left( 1 - H_t^w \right)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} + \mu \overline{r}_t w_t \left( C_t^w + \omega \overline{G} \right)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} = \mu w_t \left( 1 - \tau^w_t \right) \left( C_t^w + \omega \overline{G} \right)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} \quad (D2)
\]

\[
C_t^k + K^k_{t+1} - (1 - \delta^p) K^k_t = r_t K^k_t - \tau^k_t (r_t - \delta^p) K^k_t \quad (D3)
\]

\[
C_t^w = (1 - \tau^w_t) w_t H_t^w + \tau_t w_t (1 - H_t^w) \quad (D4)
\]

\[
\overline{G}^c + (1 - n^k) \overline{r}_t w_t (1 - H_t^w) = n^k \tau^k_t (r_t - \delta^p) K^k_t + (1 - n^k) \tau^w_t w_t H_t^w. \quad (D5)
\]

The Lagrangian function of the government can be written as:

\[
L^g = E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left\{ \gamma \left[ \mu \left( C_t^k + \omega \overline{G} \right)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} + (1 - \mu) (1 - 0)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right]^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}} + \right.
\]

\[
+ (1 - \gamma) \left[ \mu \left( C_t^w + \omega \overline{G} \right)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} + (1 - \mu) (1 - H_t^w)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right]^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}} + \right.
\]

\[
+ \lambda^k_t \left[ \beta \left( C_{t+1}^k + \omega \overline{G} \right)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} \left[ \mu \left( C_{t+1}^k + \omega \overline{G} \right)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} + (1 - \mu) \right]^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}} \cdot [1 + (1 - \tau^k_{t+1}) (r_{t+1} - \delta^p)] - 
\]

\[
- \left( C_t^k + \omega \overline{G} \right)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} \left[ \mu \left( C_t^k + \omega \overline{G} \right)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} + (1 - \mu) \right]^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}} \right] + \right.
\]

\[
+ \lambda^k_t \left[ \mu w_t \left( 1 - \tau^w_t \right) \left( C_t^w + \omega \overline{G} \right)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} - \right. \right.
\]

\[
- (1 - \mu) \left( 1 - H_t^w \right)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} - \mu \overline{r}_t w_t \left( C_t^w + \omega \overline{G} \right)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} \right] + \right.
\]

\[
+ \lambda^k_t \left[ r_t K^k_t - \tau^k_t (r_t - \delta^p) K^k_t - C_t^k - K^k_{t+1} + (1 - \delta^p) K^k_t \right] + \right.
\]

\[
+ \lambda^k_t \left[ (1 - \tau^w_t) w_t H_t^w + \tau_t w_t (1 - H_t^w) - C_t^w \right] \right. \]

\[
+ \lambda^k_t \left[ n^k \tau^k_t (r_t - \delta^p) K^k_t + (1 - n^k) \tau^w_t w_t H_t^w - \right. \right.
\]

\[
- \overline{G}^c - (1 - n^k) \overline{r}_t w_t (1 - H_t^w) \right] \right\} \quad (37)
\]

where $\lambda^i_t$, $i = 1, 2, \ldots, 5$, represents the multiplier associated with each constraint in (D1) – (D5). The constraints in the Lagrangian function have been rearranged so that all the multipliers are non-negative at the steady-state.
Some FOCs of the government at time 0 are different from the same rules governing behavior from time 1 on. Specifically, these include the FOCs of $C_t^k$, $H_t^w$ and $\tau_t^F$ and these variables appear in the forward-looking intertemporal optimality condition $(D1)$. To avoid this problem, it is necessary to consider the Ramsey problem in the economy starting from time 1 and assume that time 0 optimality conditions of the government do not alter the results in equilibrium.

In addition, the FOCs of the government should also include the constraints to the Ramsey problem, i.e. $(D1) - (D5)$.

3.2 Calibration and steady-state (exogenous policy)

The structural parameters of the model are calibrated using the annual data of the UK economy over the period 1970-2009. All the data is obtained from International Monetary Fund (IMF), United Nation Statistics Division (UNSD), the Office for National Statistics (ONS), OECD International Sectorial Data Base (ISDB) and OECD Economic Outlook. The IMF data is from the World Economic Outlook (WEO) database. The UNSD databases include: (i) World Bank (WB) database; (ii) National Accounts Statistics (NAS) database; and (iii) International Financial Statistics (IFS) database. The ONS data is from Labour Force Survey (LFS) database. The OECD data is from OECD tax database.

The structural parameters of the model are assigned values so that the model’s steady-state solution can reflect the main empirical characteristics of the current UK economy with particular focus on its unemployment rate. The calibrated values for the structural parameters are reported in Table 1 as follows.

[Table 1 about here]

The labour’s share of output, $\alpha_2 = 0.6$, is obtained directly from the ISDB dataset. The capital’s share of output is therefore: $\alpha_1 = 1 - \alpha_2 = 0.4$. The annual depreciation rate of capital stock is 10%, which is consistent with 2.5% quarterly depreciation rate of capital stock. The degree of substitutability across private and public consumption, $\omega$, is set to 0.4. This is in line with Ahmed (1986, see Tables 1 and 2) who estimated this parameter for the UK economy. The elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure, $\sigma$, is set to 2 which is common in the DGE literature. The steady-state TFP is normalised to 1. The normal distribution parameters are estimated by the TFP process. The steady-state values of exogenous policy instruments,

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12We do not show the FOCs of government in the Ramsey problem to preserve space. But they are available upon request.
\{\tau_0^k, \tau_0^w, \tau_0\}, are set to their respective data averages. All the tax data are obtained from OECD tax database.\(^\text{13}\)

There are two common methods in the literature to calibrate the annual rate of time preference, \(\beta\). It can be calibrated so that, \(1/\beta - 1\), corresponds to the annual \textit{ex-post} real interest rate. Alternatively, the consumption Euler equation of the capitalist can be used to calibrate the value for \(\beta\). In this model, the second method for the calibration of \(\beta\) is applied in order to have the model’s steady-state ratio of \(\frac{K^k}{Y^f}\) to be in line with its data average.\(^\text{14}\) The steady-state version of the consumption Euler equation is now re-arranged for \(\beta\).\(^\text{15}\) It yields:

\[
\beta = \frac{1}{[1 + (1 - \tau^k) (\alpha_1 Y^f/K^k - \delta^p)]}. \tag{38}
\]

Using the values for \(\delta^p\) and \(\alpha_1\) and the data average of \(\frac{K^k}{Y^f}\), the calibrated value for \(\beta\) is 0.97. This is very close to 0.972 which is calibrated by using the first method.

The capitalists do not work in the model economy, but they can save in the form of private capital stock, own firms and receive dividends of firms. Following Ardagna (2007), the self-employed are treated as capitalists in the economy in order to calibrate the population share of capitalists, \(n^k\). The data of self-employment only became available from 1992 for the UK economy in the LFS database. The data average is 0.115, so that \(n^k = 0.115\). Finally, the value for \(\mu\) is calibrated in order to get the steady-state unemployment rate of 7\% which coincides with the data average between 1970 and 2009.

In the long run, the economy converges to a steady state when all the variables remain constant. Table 2 below shows the steady-state ratios of aggregate capital stock, investment and consumption to output, and the steady-state employment generated by the model given the above parameterisation.\(^\text{16}\) The same table also gives their data averages.

[Table 2 about here]

As can be seen from Table 2, the model’s steady solution matches most of the data averages well.

\(^{13}\)The average marginal tax rates on capital and labour income in the data are used for \(\tau^k\) and \(\tau^w\). The replacement rate, \(\tau_0\), is a net rate after the deduction of taxes. The value for \(\tau_0\) is similar to Ardagna (2007).

\(^{14}\)Data of aggregate capital stock is generated using perpetual inventory method.

\(^{15}\)In what follows variables without time subscripts denote their steady-state values.

\(^{16}\)In Table 2, \(C\) is defined as the aggregate consumption of capitalists and workers at steady-state, i.e. \(C = n^k C^k + (1 - n^k) C^w\).
3.3 Benthamite (non-partisan) optimal taxation

We now use the above parameterisation to calculate the steady-state of Ramsey. The first case to be studied is that of a Benthamite government. This implies that the weights attached to the welfare of capitalists and workers in the objective function of government are equal to their respective population shares, i.e. $\gamma = n^k$ and $1 - \gamma = 1 - n^k$. Using the parameters in Table 1, we can get the steady-state solution of optimal policy which is shown in Column (1) of Table 3. It is compared to the steady-state solution with exogenous policy as reported in Column (2) of Table 3.\textsuperscript{17}

Table 3 incorporates the following findings. First, in the absence of profits, the celebrated result of Judd (1985) and Chamley (1986) is verified: the optimal capital tax is zero in the long run. This implies that capitalists are exempted from paying taxes in the long run. All the government expenditures should be financed by the taxes on workers.\textsuperscript{18} This result is silent about the transition to the steady-state. If $\tau^k$ is positive, it reduces the return from today’s savings and therefore makes the consumption of next period more expensive relative to current period. In the model with infinitely-lived households, the long-run positive tax rate on capital income implies that the implicit tax rate on consumption of future periods increases without bound. However, the relevant elasticity of demand for consumption in all periods is constant. Therefore taxing consumption at different rates violates the general public finance principle stating that tax rates should be inversely proportional to the demand elasticities of consumption. The assumption of constant demand elasticity of consumption implies that the capital income tax rate should be zero in the long run. As a result, zero capital income tax stimulates the investment of capitalists (i.e. from 3.79 to 4.833), and this is transformed into higher capital stock (i.e. from 37.895 to 48.332).

Second, the optimal replacement rate turns out to be negative in the long run. It predicts that the government taxes unemployed workers rather than offer unemployment benefits. In this model, the difference between the level of potential labour supply and the level of labour supply chosen by the workers is treated as unemployment. A negative replacement rate implies

\textsuperscript{17}In Table 3, $U$ is defined as the aggregate welfare of capitalists and workers at steady-state, i.e. $U = n^k U^k + (1 - n^k) U^w$.

\textsuperscript{18}In the model with non-zero economic profits, this result does not hold any more. The two opposing effects on the sign of optimal tax rate on capital income will be demonstrated later.

[Table 3 about here]
that the government taxes those workers who do not provide the potential level of labour. In this sense, leisure generates income losses for workers. Alternatively, we can understand the negative replacement rate as a subsidy to the labour supply of workers. Therefore, the negative, \( r \), leads to an increase in the labour supply of workers. The optimal tax rate on labour income, \( \tau^w \), slightly increases relative to the exogenous policy case (i.e. from 0.188 to 0.212). This, in contrast, has a negative effect on the labour supply. Overall, the labour supply increases resulting from the dominant positive effect of negative replacement rate (i.e. from 0.930 to 0.976).

Third, the labour wedge defined by \( 1 - \tau^w - r \) is equal to one at the steady state. This implies that the marginal product of labour is equal to the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption. In other words, in absence of profits, the labour wedge can be completely eliminated by the government in the long run. This happens because, in Ramsey, the government optimally chooses two tax rates on workers, i.e. \( \tau^w \) and \( r_t \). At the steady state, the wedge between the marginal product of labour and the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption created by \( \tau^w \) is exactly canceled out by the negative \( r \). As a result, there is no distortion in the labour market. This result also explains the large increase in labour supply which is consistent with the finding in Prescott (2002 and 2004).

Finally, the output, \( Y_f \), increases substantially at the steady-state (i.e. from 13.940 to 15.820) as two production inputs, capital and labour, both increase in the production. This generates positive welfare effects on private consumption and investment as can be seen in aggregate resource constraint. The consumption of capitalists and workers increases more than it would be in the exogenous policy case. The welfare of all agents improves and the Ramsey solution is Pareto improving in the long run.

### 3.4 Non-Benthamite (partisan) optimal taxation

The next case to be investigated is that of a partisan government. In other words, the weights attached to the welfare of each agent in Ramsey problem are not equal to the population share of each agent so that the government is biased towards one party. Table 4 reports the steady-state solutions of the optimal policy under different values of \( \gamma \). The case of Benthamite

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19 The budget constraint of workers (12) at the steady state can be rewritten as: \( C^w = (1 - \tau^w - r) w H^w + \bar{C}^w \). A negative replacement rate therefore implies that the government subsidizes the labour supply of workers. The last term, \( \bar{C}^w = \tau w < 0 \), can be considered as a lump-sum tax paid by the workers at the steady-state which does not generate any distortion in the economy.

20 The range of \( \gamma \) corresponds to that in the modified model (see Table 7).
government is in bold.

As in Judd (1985), we find that the optimal taxation and allocation under commitment are independent of weights attached to the welfare of agents. This implies that, for all agents, the zero capital tax and elimination of labour wedge are the best option to adopt in the Ramsey set-up of government. This holds even if the government cares only about the workers, so that there is no conflict of interests between agents. In the next section, the relevance of economic profits in determining this result will be investigated, in other words, we examine whether the commonality of interests still holds in a model with strictly positive profits.

### 3.5 Welfare analysis

This section examines the welfare effects of optimal taxation at the steady-state. In particular, the steady-state welfare costs or benefits for all agents are computed when the government chooses the optimal policy relative to the exogenous policy. This has become one popular way to evaluate fiscal policies in recent literature (see e.g. Baier and Glomm (2001) and Ardagna (2007)).

Following Lucas (1990), Cooley and Hansen (1992) and Ohanian (1997), the additional level of consumption, $\zeta^i$, to give to the agent is calculated so that he is equally well off in two cases of exogenous policy and optimal policy. Mathematically, $\zeta^i$ satisfies the following equation:

$$
U_R^i = U_E^i = \left[ \frac{\mu}{\sigma} \left( C_E^i + \omega G_E^i \right)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} + (1 - \mu) \left( 1 - H_E^i \right)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right]^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}.
$$

The welfare losses and gains for the capitalists and the workers are denoted by $\zeta^k$ and $\zeta^w$, respectively, together with the welfare losses and gains at the aggregate level, $\zeta$. The subscript $E$ denotes the exogenous policy while the subscript $R$ denotes the Ramsey policy. $U_E^i$ is the contingent utility of agent $i$ in the model with exogenous policy in which he would increase the consumption fraction such that he can enjoy the same utility as in the model with optimal policy.

A positive $\zeta^i$ implies that the agent is better off in the optimal policy case while a negative $\zeta^i$ implies that the agent is better off in the exogenous policy case. The agent will be indifferent about two policies if $\zeta^i$ is zero.

The derivation of the formula for $\zeta^i$ is provided in Appendix-2.
As can be seen in Table 5, the optimal taxation in Ramsey can improve the welfare of all agents in all cases of different $\gamma$. There does not exist a conflict of interests between agents. In the benchmark model, the long-run optimal zero capital taxation holds no matter the weight attached to the welfare capitalists, i.e. $\zeta^k = 0.276 > 0$. This is because the long-run optimal zero capital tax increases the private investment and therefore capital stock. The income and consumption of capitalists increases in the long run. Recalling the utility function of capitalists, the welfare of capitalists depends on the private consumption and per capita government consumption because the capitalists do not work in the economy. The increase in private consumption increases the welfare of capitalists.

The welfare of workers improves as well. It has been demonstrated, in the steady-state analysis above, that the long-run optimal negative replacement rate is equivalent to a subsidy to work. This leads to a rise in the labour supply of workers. On one hand, the income, consumption welfare of workers increases as a result of higher labour supply as working can generate higher income for the workers. On the other hand, the welfare of workers decreases because the utility of workers negatively depends on the labour supply. As can be seen in Table 5, the positive effect dominates and the workers are better off in the setup of Ramsey, i.e. $\zeta^w = 0.028 > 0$.

Both capitalists and workers are better off at the steady-state of Ramsey setup no matter whether the government is Benthamite or partisan. The optimal policy is Pareto improving in the long run, but the welfare gains for the capitalists relative to the workers are bigger. This implies that the optimal taxation increases the welfare inequality.

4 Model extension

In this section, one extension to the benchmark model is made by introducing equilibrium profits into the model. Specifically the profits appear in the economy when the public investment appears in the production. Next to be studied is the optimal taxation and its effects on unemployment, the distribution of income and welfare of agents. We intend to investigate the implications of this modification for the results discussed in the benchmark model above.

4.1 Introduction of public capital

It is now assumed that the government can invest in the production of goods. The government provides individual firms with public capital without asking
for rents. Following Lansing (1998) and Malley et al. (2009), the firm produces homogeneous goods with a CRTS technology in labour, private capital and public capital.\footnote{See Aschauer (1989), Munell (1990) and Ai and Cassou (1995). These empirical studies support for the specification of CRTS in these three inputs.} The production function of the representative firm is given by:

\[ Y^f_t = A_t \left( K^f_t \right)^{\alpha_1} \left( H^f_t \right)^{\alpha_2} \left( \bar{K}^p_t \right)^{\alpha_3} \]  

(40)

where \( \bar{K}^p_t \) denotes the per capita public capital which is exogenously provided by the government; and \( 0 < \alpha_3 < 1 \) measures the public capital’s share of output. The CRTS technology implies \( \alpha_1 + \alpha_2 + \alpha_3 = 1 \).

The specification of CRTS in all three inputs implies that the profits of individual firm are non-zero in equilibrium. Profit-maximization of the firm yields:

\[
\pi^f_t = Y^f_t - r_t K^f_t - w_t H^f_t = Y^f_t - \frac{\alpha_1 Y^f_t}{K^f_t} K^f_t - \frac{\alpha_2 Y^f_t}{H^f_t} H^f_t \\
= (1 - \alpha_1 - \alpha_2) Y^f_t
\]

(41)

where the optimality conditions of the firm are the same as in the previous model, i.e. \( r_t = \frac{\alpha_1 Y^f_t}{K^f_t} \) and \( w_t = \frac{\alpha_2 Y^f_t}{H^f_t} \). In equilibrium, the firm earns strictly positive economic profits which are equal to the difference between the value of output and the production costs of inputs employed from the capitalists and workers. The profits are equally distributed to the capitalists. The per capita market clearing condition for dividends is given by:

\[ \pi^f_t = \pi^f_t \]  

(42)

This extension does not alter the optimality conditions of the worker which are described by (17) and (12). The consumption Euler equation of the capitalist still holds but the term involving, \( \pi^p_t \), should be recovered in his budget constraint. The budget constraint of the capitalist is rewritten as:

\[ C^k_t + K^k_{t+1} - (1 - \delta^p) K^k_t = r_t K^k_t - \tau^k_t (r_t - \delta^p) K^k_t + (1 - \tau^k_t) \pi^k_t. \]  

(43)

Finally, the per capita government budget constraint should be rewritten as follows:

\[
\bar{G}^p_t + (1 - n^k) \tau_t w_t (1 - H^w_t) + n^k T^p_t = n^k \left[ \tau^k_t (r_t - \delta^p) K^k_t + \tau^k_t \pi^k_t \right] + (1 - n^k) \tau^w_t w_t H^w_t
\]

(44)
where $\bar{I}_t^g = \frac{I^g_t}{N_f}$ is the per capita public investment where $I^g_t$ is the aggregate public investment.

The aggregate public capital stock, $K^g_t$, evolves according to:

$$K^g_{t+1} = (1 - \delta^g)K^g_t + I^g_t$$

(45)

where $\delta^g$ is the constant depreciation rate of public capital stock. The public capital and private capital are assumed to depreciate at the same rate, so that $\delta^g = 0.1$.\(^{24}\)

### 4.2 Benthamite (non-partisan) optimal taxation

We first analyse the steady-state of Benthamite government. Columns (1) and (2) in Table 6 report the stead-states of the modified model with optimal and exogenous fiscal policy, respectively.\(^{25}\) The case of a Benthamite government is first studied. We intend to examine the relevance of non-zero profits in determining the long-run optimal taxation and therefore the steady-state allocation of resources.

[Table 6 about here]

First, the result of long-run optimal zero capital tax rate cannot be obtained in the modified model. This result is consistent with what has been found by Lansing (1998). He argues that the existence of profits, together with the assumption that the government cannot distinguish between profits and other asset incomes can result in the non-zero optimal capital income tax in the long run. The steady-state optimal tax rate on capital income is negative.\(^{26}\) This implies that it is optimal for the government to subsidize

\(^{23}\)The aggregate public capital stock is the sum of public capital stock that each firm receives from the government, i.e. $K^g_t = N_f \bar{K}_t^g$.

\(^{24}\)Because in what follows, the focus will only be on the steady-state analysis of the model, the ratio of aggregate public investment to aggregate output, $g^i$, is set to the data average. In the Ramsey setup, the government optimally chooses $K^g_{t+1}$, and $I^g_t$ is substituted out using the public capital evolution equation, (45).

\(^{25}\)The results reported in Column (2) are obtained using the parameters in Table 1, except that, $\mu$, is re-calibrated so that the steady-state value of $H^w = 0.930$ can be achieved at the steady-state of the modified model.

\(^{26}\)Judd (1997) shows that the tax rate on capital income is ambiguous if the government does not distinguish between taxing returns on new investment and taxing economic profits. His paper, however, mainly studies on the sub-optimality of a capital income tax. Judd (1999) argues that a tax on capital cannot be optimal as its distortions accumulate over time, a pattern that is inconsistent with the commodity tax principle. Later, Judd (2002) proposes an optimal capital income subsidy referring to the repealed Investment Tax Credit scheme in the US economy.
the interest income from capital and profits in the long run and it is accomplished by increasing the labour income tax. Guo and Lansing (1999) show that in an imperfectly competitive economy, the sign of the steady-state optimal capital income tax is ambiguous and find that this ambiguity mainly results from two opposite effects: under-investment effect and profit effect. The under-investment effect arises when the private agent under-invests relative to the socially optimal level as the interest rate that determines the equilibrium investment is smaller than the social marginal product of capital. Therefore, a negative tax rate on capital income helps to correct the existence of under-investment in the capital market. The profit effect, in contrast, motivates the use of a positive tax rate on capital income, because taxing profits does not affect private agent’s decisions at the margin such that it does not distort incentives of investment. In this case, the government has an incentive to fully confiscate the profits. This motivates a positive tax rate on capital income. In the model with the presence of public investment, the crowding-out of the public investment is equivalent to the under-investment effect and it dominates the profit effect. As a result, the steady-state optimal tax rate on capital income turns out to be negative. The negative capital tax increases the private investment of capitalists (i.e. from 3.089 to 4.047). In turn, the output, \( Y^f \), goes up at the steady-state (i.e. from 12.122 to 13.760).

Second, the government increases the tax rate on labour income. As in the benchmark model, the long-run optimal replacement rate is negative. In other words, the government provides a subsidy to the labour supply of workers. The optimal labour income tax and replacement rate generate two opposite effects on the labour supply of workers in the long run. On one hand, higher labour tax implies lower return to work. This tends to reduce the labour supply of workers. On the other hand, the negative replacement rate working as a subsidy to work tends to increase the labour supply of workers. On the whole, the replacement rate effect dominates and labour supply goes up relative to the exogenous policy case (i.e. from 0.930 to 0.976).

Finally, the labour wedge, \( 1 - \tau^w - \tau \), is no longer equal to one at the steady-state in the modified model. This implies that there exists a discrepancy between the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption and the marginal product of labour. The labour market distortion exists in the modified model. The Benthamite optimal taxation, with the presence of profits, generates conflict of interests between agents. It leads to distributional effects in the long run. This is because the under-investment distortion is so large in the capital market that it increases the incentive for the gov-
ernment to impose a subsidy to capital income. In turn, this reduces the incentive for the government to eliminate the distortion in the labour market. Because of labour market distortion, the welfare of workers decreases in the Ramsey setup (i.e. from 0.680 to 0.676). The welfare of capitalists increases (i.e. from 1.191 to 1.592) as the subsidy to capital income together with the profits increases the income and consumption of capitalists. The optimal policy increases the aggregate welfare (from 0.739 to 0.782) despite welfare losses for the workers in the long run.

4.3 Non-Benthamite (partisan) optimal taxation

The steady-state of Ramsey problem is next studied when the government becomes partisan. We solve the model and evaluate the model’s steady-state for different weight attached to the welfare of capitalists in government’s objective function. Figure 1 below plots the steady-state values for the policy instruments, equilibrium allocations and welfare of different agents against the weight attached to the welfare of capitalists, $\gamma$.

![Figure 1 about here]

We also produce Table 7 to compare with the steady-state values in the model with zero profits in Table 4.

![Table 7 about here]

In Table 7, the case of Benthamite government is in bold. Apparently, in contrast to the benchmark model, the value of $\gamma$ matters for the steady-state solution in the modified model. In addition, all the changes of variables are monotonic with the magnitude of $\gamma$. The magnitude of change in capital income tax is very large. The case when the government cares only about the workers is first examined. As can be seen in Column (1), the capital income rate is positive and well below the date average of 34.4%. The incentive for the government to tax labour income is reduced. The labour income tax is below the data average of 18.8%. In this case, the replacement rate is negative which implies the government subsidizes the labour supply in the long run. When $\gamma = 0$, the welfare of workers improves at the steady-state of Ramsey relative to the exogenous policy case. (i.e. from 0.68 to 0.689). As weight for the welfare of capitalists increases, the capital income tax falls very quickly, as can be seen in Figure 1. The steady-state optimal capital tax turns into a subsidy when $\gamma$ reaches 0.110, i.e. $\tau^k = -0.053$. In turn, the labour income tax increases to make up for the tax revenue losses from capital. This optimal policy hurts the workers and the welfare
of workers decreases relative to the exogenous policy case (i.e. from 0.680 to 0.679). This implies that the government redistributes the welfare towards capitalists if \( \gamma \) exceeds 0.110. The replacement rate decreases as \( \gamma \) increases. This implies the government increases the subsidy to labour as \( \gamma \) increases. This policy increases the incentive for the workers to provide labour to firms. As a result, employment goes up (i.e. from 0.974 to 0.978).

As can be seen in Figure 1, as the weight to the capitalists increases, the steady-state welfare of capitalists increases. It is because the capitalists directly benefit from the substantial reductions in capital tax. In contrast, the increase in \( \gamma \) worsens the welfare of workers. However, the workers are slightly hurt by the labour tax increases since the subsidy to labour increases in the meanwhile. The output, \( Y_f \), goes up as a result of increases in three inputs, \( K^k \), \( H^w \) and \( K^g \). Moreover, the aggregate welfare improves as \( \gamma \) increases. This implies that the efficiency of the whole economy has improved as the government becomes biased towards the capitalists.

The above discussion suggests that, in the model with strictly positive profits, when the government cares more about the capitalists, it helps to reduce the inefficiently high capital tax and eventually it turns into a subsidy after a critical level of the weight attached to the capitalists placed by the government. The welfare of capitalists substantially improves as the capital distortion reduces. Meanwhile, the optimal policy hurts the workers as the government has to raise the revenue to the required level by increasing labour income tax. As a result, the welfare of workers worsens. This implies a conflict of interests between the agents and hence a trade-off between efficiency and equity. This result is consistent with Angelopoulos et al. (2011).

### 4.4 Welfare analysis

The welfare gains or losses for agents in the model with profits are next analysed. Table 8 shows different values for \( \zeta^i \) for different values of \( \gamma \). The results are compared with those in Table 7 in order to investigate the distributional effects of optimal taxation.

[Table 8 about here]

Apparently, the commonality of interests no longer holds in the modified model with strictly positive profits. The presence of profits creates the conflict of interests between agents. As can be seen in Table 7 above, when the government cares more about the capitalists, it substantially decreases the capital income tax in order to reduce the distortion in the capital market. The capital income tax turns into a subsidy when \( \gamma \) exceeds 0.110. The capital tax cut is associated with a higher labour income tax. Thus, the welfare of
workers goes down as $\gamma$ increases. When the weight attached to the welfare of capitalists increases above the critical value of 0.110, the steady-state welfare of workers decreases in the optimal policy case compared to the exogenous policy case, i.e. $\zeta^w = -0.003 < 0$.

The above findings show that, with the presence of profits, the government redistributes welfare towards capitalists, when $\gamma$ reaches a critical level. In the modified model with non-zero profits, the government values distortion in the capital market more than labour market distortion. This incentive leads to a decrease in the optimal capital income tax and therefore the long-run welfare gains for capitalists increase while the welfare gains for workers decrease as $\gamma$ increases. Therefore, there is a conflict of interests between agents.

5 Summary and conclusions

This paper used two different heterogeneous agent models with equilibrium unemployment to study the effects of optimal taxation on unemployment, the distribution of income and welfare of agents. The agent heterogeneity lay in the working and saving propensities of households. The capitalists by assumption did not work and the workers did not save. In the first model the firms earned zero economic profits in equilibrium while in the second model the equilibrium profits were non-zero due to the presence of productive public investment. In both models, equilibrium unemployment was generated in the competitive labour market as the outcome of optimal choices made by workers. The main findings can be summarized as follows.

First, in the model with zero economic profits, we show that the optimal tax rate on capital income should be zero in the long run which is consistent with Judd (1985) and Chamley (1986). It is optimal for the government to tax the leisure of workers in the long run. This is equivalent to a subsidy to the labour supply of workers. Meanwhile, the government slightly increases the tax rate on labour income. The distortions in the labour market caused by the distortionary labour tax can be completely eliminated as a consequence of the equal amount of government subsidies to the workers in the form of taxation on the leisure. As a result, the labour supply of workers increases which is beneficial to the workers. The income, consumption and welfare of workers improves in the long run. In addition, as in Judd (1985), The weight to the welfare of agent in the Ramsey setup of the government does not matter for the long-run optimal policy. This implies that there is no conflict of interests between agents in the long run in the benchmark model.

Second, the result of long-run optimal zero capital tax cannot be obtained
in the modified model. The optimal tax rate on capital income is found to be negative in the long run which means the government chooses to subsidize the capital income in the long run. There are two opposing effects in determining the direction of optimal capital taxation: the under-investment effect and the profit effect (see e.g. Guo and Lansing (1999)). In our model, on one hand, the crowding-out effect of public investment is equivalent to the under-investment effect which motivates a Benthamite government to use a subsidy to the capital income to help reduce the distortions in the capital market. On the other hand, the presence of profits motivates the government to use a positive tax rate on capital income as taxing profits is not distortionary. In our case, we show that the under-investment effect outweighs the profit effect. As a result, the government subsidizes the capital income in the long run. The negative capital income tax directly increases the investment of capitalists and therefore the income, consumption and welfare of capitalists increase. As in the benchmark model, the government subsidizes the labour supply of workers while the tax rate on labour income slightly increases. These two policy instruments have opposing effects on the labour supply of workers. We find that the positive effect of labour subsidy dominates so that the labour supply of workers is higher than it would be in the model with given policy. In the presence of profits, the tax distortion in the labour market cannot be completely eliminated in the long run. The distortion causes welfare losses for workers. Finally, in contrast to the benchmark model, the weight to the welfare of agent matters for the optimal taxation under commitment in the modified model. The effects are found to be monotonic. This implies that the optimal taxation generates conflict of interests between agents and it has redistributional effects in the long run. As the weight to the welfare of capitalists increases, the capital taxation decreases and it turns into a subsidy after a critical value. The tax rate on labour income increases in order to make up for the losses in government’s tax revenues. In this case, a trade-off between efficiency and equity needs to be taken into account in the Ramsey setup of government.
Appendix-1: DCE conditions

The DCE consists of the following conditions:

\[
OC^k : \quad (C_t^k + \omega G_t^c)^{\frac{1}{\delta}} \left[ \mu \left( C_t^k + \omega G_t^c \right)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} + (1 - \mu) \right]^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}} \\
= \beta \left( C_{t+1}^k + \omega G_{t+1}^c \right)^{\frac{1}{\delta}} \left[ \mu \left( C_{t+1}^k + \omega G_{t+1}^c \right)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} + (1 - \mu) \right]^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}} \cdot \left[ 1 + (1 - \tau_{t+1}^k) (r_{t+1} - \delta^p) \right]
\]

\[
OC^w : \quad (1 - \mu) \left( 1 - H_t^w \right)^{-\frac{1}{\delta}} + \mu \tau_t w_t \left( C_t^w + \omega G_t^c \right)^{-\frac{1}{\delta}} \\
= \mu w_t \left( 1 - \tau_t^w \right) \left( C_t^w + \omega G_t^c \right)^{-\frac{1}{\delta}}
\]

\[
FO^k : \quad r_t = \alpha_1 A \left( K_t^f \right)^{\alpha_1-1} \left( H_t^f \right)^{\alpha_2} \\
FO^l : \quad w_t = \alpha_2 A \left( K_t^f \right)^{\alpha_1} \left( H_t^f \right)^{\alpha_2-1}
\]

\[
BC^k : \quad C_t^k + K_{t+1}^k - (1 - \delta^p) K_t^k = r_t K_t^k - \tau_t^k \left( r_t - \delta^p \right) K_t^k \\
BC^w : \quad C_t^w = (1 - \tau_t^w) w_t H_t^w + \tau_t w_t \left( 1 - H_t^w \right)
\]

\[
BC^g : \quad G_t^c + (1 - n^k) \tau_t w_t \left( 1 - H_t^w \right) = n^k \tau_t^k \left( r_t - \delta^p \right) K_t^k + (1 - n^k) \tau_t^w w_t H_t^w \\
MC^k : \quad K_t^k = K_t^f \\
MC^l : \quad H_t^w = \frac{n^k}{\left( 1 - n^k \right)} H_t^f
\]
6 Appendix-2: Derivation of $\zeta^i$

$\zeta^i$ satisfies the following equation implying that the agent $i$ is as well off in the exogenous policy model as in the Ramsey model.

$$U_R^i = U_E^i = \mu \left( C_E^i (1 + \zeta^i) + \omega \overline{G}_E^c \right)^{\frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma}} + (1 - \mu) \left( 1 - H_E^i \right)^{\frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma}}.$$

We can solve for $\zeta^i$ in the equation above by taking the following algebra:

$$U_R^i \frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma} = \mu \left( C_E^i (1 + \zeta^i) + \omega \overline{G}_E^c \right)^{\frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma}} + (1 - \mu) \left( 1 - H_E^i \right)^{\frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma}}$$

$$\left( U_R^i \right)^{\frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma}} = \mu \left( C_E^i (1 + \zeta^i) + \omega \overline{G}_E^c \right)^{\frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma}} + (1 - \mu) \left( 1 - H_E^i \right)^{\frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma}}$$

$$\left( U_R^i \right)^{\frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma}} - (1 - \mu) \left( 1 - H_E^i \right)^{\frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma}} = \mu \left( C_E^i (1 + \zeta^i) + \omega \overline{G}_E^c \right)^{\frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma}}$$

$$\left[ \left( U_R^i \right)^{\frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma}} - (1 - \mu) \left( 1 - H_E^i \right)^{\frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma}} \right]^\frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma} = \mu \frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma} \left[ C_E^i (1 + \zeta^i) + \omega \overline{G}_E^c \right]$$

$$\left[ \left( U_R^i \right)^{\frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma}} - (1 - \mu) \left( 1 - H_E^i \right)^{\frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma}} \right]^\frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma} \mu \frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma} = C_E^i (1 + \zeta^i) + \omega \overline{G}_E^c$$

$$\left[ \left( U_R^i \right)^{\frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma}} - (1 - \mu) \left( 1 - H_E^i \right)^{\frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma}} \right]^\frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma} \mu \frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma} - \omega \overline{G}_E^c = C_E^i (1 + \zeta^i)$$

$$\left( U_R^i \right)^{\frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma}} - (1 - \mu) \left( 1 - H_E^i \right)^{\frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma}} \frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma} \mu \frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma} - \omega \overline{G}_E^c = 1 + \zeta^i.$$

$$\Rightarrow \zeta^i = \frac{\left( U_R^i \right)^{\frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma}} - (1 - \mu) \left( 1 - H_E^i \right)^{\frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma}} \frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma} \mu \frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma} - \omega \overline{G}_E^c}{C_E^i} - 1$$
References


Table 1: Calibration in the benchmark model

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Value</th>
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<td>$0 &lt; \beta &lt; 1$</td>
<td>rate of time preference</td>
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Table 2: Data averages and model’s steady-state values

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Table 3: Benthamite government \((\pi^k_t = 0)\)

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Table 4: Non-Benthamite government \((\pi^k_t = 0)\)

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<td>1.487</td>
<td>1.487</td>
<td>1.487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(U^w)</td>
<td>0.794</td>
<td>0.794</td>
<td>0.794</td>
<td>0.794</td>
<td>0.794</td>
<td>0.794</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(U)</td>
<td>0.873</td>
<td>0.873</td>
<td>0.873</td>
<td>0.873</td>
<td>0.873</td>
<td>0.873</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### Table 5: Welfare losses/gains ($\pi^k_t = 0$)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$\gamma$</th>
<th>Capitalist ($\zeta^k$) (1)</th>
<th>Worker ($\zeta^w$) (2)</th>
<th>Aggregate ($\zeta$) (3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.276</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.105</td>
<td>0.276</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.110</td>
<td>0.276</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>0.115</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.276</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.028</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.052</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.120</td>
<td>0.276</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.125</td>
<td>0.276</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.052</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 6: Benthamite government ($\pi^k_t \neq 0$)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Ramsey (1)</th>
<th>Exogenous (2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$C^k$</td>
<td>1.639</td>
<td>1.154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$K^k$</td>
<td>40.472</td>
<td>30.892</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$I^k$</td>
<td>4.047</td>
<td>3.089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$C^w$</td>
<td>0.813</td>
<td>0.782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$H^w$</td>
<td>0.976</td>
<td>0.930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Y^f$</td>
<td>13.760</td>
<td>12.122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$K^k/Y$</td>
<td>2.941</td>
<td>2.549</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$I^k/Y$</td>
<td>0.294</td>
<td>0.255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$K^g/Y$</td>
<td>0.189</td>
<td>0.250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$I^g/Y$</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$C/Y$</td>
<td>0.574</td>
<td>0.592</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$G^c/Y$</td>
<td>0.113</td>
<td>0.129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$r$</td>
<td>0.128</td>
<td>0.147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$w$</td>
<td>1.099</td>
<td>1.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\tau^k$</td>
<td>-0.125</td>
<td>0.344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\tau^w$</td>
<td>0.237</td>
<td>0.188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\bar{\tau}$</td>
<td>-0.226</td>
<td>0.204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$U^k$</td>
<td>1.592</td>
<td>1.191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$U^w$</td>
<td>0.676</td>
<td>0.680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$U$</td>
<td>0.782</td>
<td>0.739</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Table 7: Non-Benthamite government ($\pi^k_t \neq 0$)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>$\gamma = 0$</th>
<th>$\gamma = 0.105$</th>
<th>$\gamma = 0.110$</th>
<th>$\gamma = 0.115$</th>
<th>$\gamma = 0.120$</th>
<th>$\gamma = 0.125$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$C^k$</td>
<td>1.200</td>
<td>1.537</td>
<td>1.581</td>
<td>1.639</td>
<td>1.723</td>
<td>1.929</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$C^w$</td>
<td>0.827</td>
<td>0.819</td>
<td>0.817</td>
<td>0.813</td>
<td>0.807</td>
<td>0.789</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$H^k$</td>
<td>0.974</td>
<td>0.976</td>
<td>0.976</td>
<td>0.977</td>
<td>0.977</td>
<td>0.978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\tau^k$</td>
<td>0.342</td>
<td>2E-04</td>
<td>-0.053</td>
<td>-0.125</td>
<td>-0.236</td>
<td>-0.539</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\tau^w$</td>
<td>0.152</td>
<td>0.218</td>
<td>0.227</td>
<td>0.237</td>
<td>0.252</td>
<td>0.286</td>
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<tr>
<td>$\tau$</td>
<td>-0.189</td>
<td>-0.218</td>
<td>-0.222</td>
<td>-0.226</td>
<td>-0.231</td>
<td>-0.248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$U^k$</td>
<td>1.229</td>
<td>1.508</td>
<td>1.544</td>
<td>1.592</td>
<td>1.660</td>
<td>1.828</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$U^w$</td>
<td>0.689</td>
<td>0.681</td>
<td>0.679</td>
<td>0.676</td>
<td>0.671</td>
<td>0.658</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$U$</td>
<td>0.751</td>
<td>0.776</td>
<td>0.778</td>
<td>0.782</td>
<td>0.785</td>
<td>0.792</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 8: Welfare losses/gains ($\pi^k_t \neq 0$)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$\gamma$</th>
<th>Capitalist ($\zeta^k$)</th>
<th>Worker ($\zeta^w$)</th>
<th>Aggregate ($\zeta$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.105</td>
<td>0.332</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.110</td>
<td>0.370</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>0.039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.115</td>
<td><strong>0.420</strong></td>
<td><strong>-0.008</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.043</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.120</td>
<td>0.492</td>
<td>-0.016</td>
<td>0.050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.125</td>
<td>0.671</td>
<td>-0.038</td>
<td>0.061</td>
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</table>