

Welsch, Heinz; Biermann, Philipp

Working Paper

Energy Prices, Energy Poverty, and Well-Being: Evidence for European Countries

Oldenburg Discussion Papers in Economics, No. V-369-14

Provided in Cooperation with:

University of Oldenburg, Department of Economics

Suggested Citation: Welsch, Heinz; Biermann, Philipp (2014) : Energy Prices, Energy Poverty, and Well-Being: Evidence for European Countries, Oldenburg Discussion Papers in Economics, No. V-369-14, University of Oldenburg, Department of Economics, Oldenburg

This Version is available at:

<https://hdl.handle.net/10419/105057>

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:

Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.

Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.

Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.

Terms of use:

Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal and scholarly purposes.

You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public.

If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence.



Oldenburg Discussion Papers in Economics

Energy Prices, Energy Poverty, and Well-Being: Evidence for European Countries

Heinz Welsch
Philipp Biermann

V – 369 – 14

September 2014

Department of Economics
University of Oldenburg, D-26111 Oldenburg

Energy Prices, Energy Poverty, and Well-Being: Evidence for European Countries

Heinz Welsch

Philipp Biermann

Department of Economics

University of Oldenburg

26111 Oldenburg, Germany

Abstract

This paper uses data on the life satisfaction of more than 100,000 individuals in 21 European countries, 2002-2011, to study the relationship between subjective well-being and the prices for households of electricity, oil and gas. We find that energy prices have statistically and economically significant effects on subjective well-being. The effect sizes are smaller than but comparable to the effects of important personal factors of well-being. Effects above average are found in individuals from the lowest income quartile. In addition, effects are strongest at times when required energy expenditures can be expected to be high. The empirical results are consistent with the prediction that greater energy poverty implies a greater effect of energy prices on well-being.

Keywords: energy price; energy poverty; fuel poverty, consumer welfare; subjective well-being

JEL classifications: Q41; I31; D12

Acknowledgements: We are grateful for comments from Susana Ferreira, Boris Krey, Peter Martinsson and Andreas Ziegler. Support by the Swiss Federal Office of Energy is gratefully acknowledged.

1. Introduction

The residential consumption of fuel and power is an important component of household consumption. It contributes to well-being through heating and cooling, lighting, cooking, and the operation of appliances. Different from most other consumer goods, fuel and power consumption is often considered a basic need whose satisfaction is necessary for an acceptable quality of life. Since the access to fuel and power crucially depends on the level of their prices, and given the dependence of those prices on policy choices (for instance choices concerning taxation or the energy mix), the relationship between energy prices and well-being is an important issue both from an academic and a public policy point of view.

From a more specific perspective, the character of energy consumption as a basic need has spurred an interest in studying what has come to be known as energy poverty.¹ In a strict sense, it appears natural to refer to a consumer as energy poor if prevailing prices prevent her from satisfying a minimum requirement of energy (Foster et al. 2000). In a wider sense, it is common to speak of energy poverty if the costs of satisfying the minimum energy requirement exceed a certain threshold level, even if those costs stay within the limits of the budget constraint. A rationale for this wider notion of energy poverty is that a high level of required energy costs constrains the consumption of non-energy goods and thus consumer welfare (Brunner et al. 2011).²

Though energy poverty has been discussed for several decades (e.g., Boardman 1991), the issue has recently gained increasing attention in research (e.g., Hills 2012, Moore 2012, Thomson and Snell 2013) and in public policy (EU 2010), not least because of rising energy

1 We use the term “energy poverty” interchangeably with “fuel poverty”.

2 Energy poverty in the strict sense is discussed in particular with respect to developing countries (Foster et al. 2000) whereas the wider notion may be more relevant in developed economies.

prices (Neuhoff et al. 2013). The policy relevance of energy poverty is evidenced by policies in several countries to combat it, such as the UK Winter Fuel Payment and national or municipal funds for subsidizing energy costs for low income households in Belgium and Italy, respectively.³ Energy prices – gas prices in particular – are an increased concern after the recent conflict between Ukraine and Russia.

Measuring and analyzing energy poverty, however, is hampered by ambiguity as to the appropriate definition and measure.⁴ In addition, more basically than ambiguity of measurement, an important issue in the study of energy poverty is its welfare significance, however energy poverty is specified. Though it is intuitive to expect a negative effect of energy poverty on consumer welfare, the nature of the relationship is surrounded by considerable vagueness.

Against the background of those practical and theoretical ambiguities, this paper pursues a different approach to energy prices, energy poverty and welfare, focusing on the implications of energy poverty for consumer welfare directly. Based on the insight (to be derived below) that a higher energy poverty ratio – the ratio of required energy costs to income – implies a greater effect of energy price increases on consumer welfare (utility), we identify the degree of energy poverty with the effect of energy prices on utility. According to this conceptualization, energy poverty is greater if consumers suffer greater welfare losses

³ See European Fuel Poverty and Energy Efficiency Projects: Detailed Report on Different Types of Existing Mechanisms to Tackle Fuel Poverty. Accessible at www.fuel-poverty.org.

⁴ For instance, Moore (2012) and Heindl (2013) have shown that applying different measures of energy poverty discussed in the literature implies a large variation in the number of households identified as energy poor as well as in the population subgroups affected by energy poverty.

from a price increase. We deem this approach to be in line with the idea that the ultimate rationale for the notion of energy poverty rests on its implications for welfare and the quality of life.

The purpose of this paper thus is to measure the relationship between energy prices and individual welfare, taking the strength of that relationship as an indicator of energy poverty. Empirically, we implement this research strategy by using data on subjective well-being (SWB) as a proxy for utility. Based on data for between 100,908 and 117,819 individuals in 21 European countries, 2002-2011, we estimate well-being equations that include the prices to households of electricity, gas and light fuel oil among the explanatory variables while controlling for the usual covariates of well-being as well as for county and time fixed effects.

We find that energy prices have statistically and economically significant effects on SWB. On average, a 1-standard-deviation increase in the prices of electricity and gas reduces well-being – measured on an 11-point scale – by about 0.10 and 0.12 points, respectively. In the lowest income quartile a 1-standard-deviation increase in the prices of electricity, oil and gas reduces well-being by 0.14, 0.16 and 0.15 points, respectively. These magnitudes are smaller than but nevertheless comparable to the well-being effects of important personal life circumstances like being unemployed. In addition, effects are seasonally concentrated at times when required energy expenditures can be expected to be high due to, for instance, heating requirements. The empirical results are consistent with the prediction that greater energy poverty implies a greater effect of energy prices on consumer welfare.

Our approach of using SWB regressions for a welfare assessment of energy prices follows a recent trend in economics of using subjective data for evaluating policies, institutions, and non-market goods. The SWB approach has previously been applied to environmental issues (e.g. Welsch 2002, 2006; Rehdanz and Madison 2005; van Praag and

Barsma 2005; Luechinger 2009; Ferreira and Moro 2010; Levinson 2012) and to various societal phenomena, including inflation and unemployment (Di Tella et al. 2001), crime (Powdthavee 2005), civil conflict (Welsch 2008a), corruption (Welsch 2008b) and terrorism (Frey et al. 2009). With regard to energy, the SWB approach was used by Welsch and Biermann (2014) in an assessment of electricity supply structures in Europe

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the conceptual and section 3 the empirical framework. Section 4 reports and discusses the results. Section 5 concludes.

2. Conceptual Framework

2.1 Energy Poverty Measures

Measures of energy poverty typically rely on the energy poverty ratio and apply it in various ways to arrive at an assessment of overall energy poverty in society as well as its incidence across subgroups.

The energy poverty ratio (*EPR*) is the ratio between the costs of “required” energy consumption and income:

$$EPR = p \cdot R / Y, \tag{1}$$

where p , R and Y denote the energy price, required energy consumption and income, respectively.

Definitions of energy poverty usually relate the *EPR* to some threshold level (poverty line) and identify households as energy poor if their *EPR* exceeds that threshold. Examples of poverty lines include the 10-percent threshold and the 2-times median or 2-times average expenditure share thresholds. The high-cost/low-income approach (Hills 2012) defines those households as energy poor whose *EPR* exceeds an energy poverty threshold while their

income falls below a general-poverty threshold. In addition, some energy poverty measures refer to the difference rather than the ratio between income and energy expenditures and identify households as energy poor if their income net of energy costs falls short of a specified level.⁵

There is thus a diverse set of energy poverty measures which differ by whether they refer to ratios or differences between required energy costs and income, by the threshold they apply, and by whether or not they incorporate general poverty (income poverty). In practice, they are typically computed by replacing “required energy expenditures” by actual energy expenditures because the former are unobserved. Following this practice, Moore (2012) and Heindl (2013) found that applying different measures of energy poverty implies a large variation in the number of households identified as energy poor as well as in the population subgroups affected by energy poverty.

2.2 Energy Poverty and Consumer Welfare

Though the notion of energy poverty seems to be rooted in a concern for welfare, the relationship between energy poverty and its constituents – energy prices, energy requirements, and income – on the one hand, and consumer welfare on the other is usually not made explicit. This subsection discusses the channels through which energy poverty – high required energy expenditures relative to income – affect welfare. As it will be seen, the welfare significance of energy poverty rests on the fact that it makes consumers more vulnerable to energy price increases in the sense that an energy price increase has a greater effect on utility if the level of energy poverty is higher. This insight will motivate our empirical analysis of the relationship between energy prices and well-being.

⁵ See Moore (2012) and Heindl (2013) for a discussion of energy poverty measures.

Consider an individual who derives utility from energy E and a non-energy good N according to a monotonically increasing and strictly concave utility function:

$$u = U(E, N), \quad (2)$$

Treating the non-energy good as the numeraire and denoting income and the energy price by Y and p , respectively, the consumer's problem is to maximize utility subject to a budget constraint $p \cdot E + N = Y$. This yields demand functions $E(p, Y)$ and $N(p, Y)$, and substituting these into (2) gives the indirect utility function:

$$u = U(E(p, Y), N(p, Y)) =: V(p, Y),$$

The utility effect of an energy price increase, written in elasticity form, is given by:

$$\eta_{Vp} = \eta_{UE} \eta_{Ep} + \eta_{UN} \eta_{Np}, \quad (3)$$

where $\eta_{XY} := (\partial X / \partial Y) / (X / Y)$ denotes the elasticity of a variable X with respect to Y .

According to (3), the effect of an energy price increase is composed of the changes in energy demand and non-energy demand, each weighted by the corresponding elasticity of utility. Basic microeconomics implies that the total effect is negative. It also implies that the

effect on non-energy demand is negative ($\eta_{Np} < 0$) if and only if energy demand is inelastic ($-1 < \eta_{Ep} < 0$).⁶

Against this background, we now address the welfare significance of a “required” level of energy consumption, R , and of energy poverty. It is convenient to refer in this discussion to the Stone-Geary utility function (which underlies the popular linear expenditure system) because it directly focuses on a minimum required level of energy consumption.⁷ Hence we consider:

$$u = U(E, N) = a(E - R)^\alpha N^{1-\alpha} \quad (4)$$

where the scaling parameter a is positive if $E - R$ is non-negative, and zero otherwise. The demand functions associated with (4) are $E = R + \alpha(Y/p - R)$ and $N = (1 - \alpha)(Y - pR)$, and it is easy to compute that $\eta_{UE}\eta_{Ep} = -\alpha Y / (Y - pR)$ and $\eta_{NE}\eta_{Np} = -(1 - \alpha)pR / (Y - pR)$. Hence, under (4) the utility effect of an energy price increase, equation (3), takes the following form:

$$\eta_{Vp} = \eta_{UE}\eta_{Ep} + \eta_{UN}\eta_{Np} = \frac{-\alpha Y}{Y - pR} + \frac{-(1 - \alpha)pR}{Y - pR} = -\frac{\alpha + (1 - \alpha)EPR}{1 - EPR}, \quad (5)$$

where $EPR = p^*R/Y$ is the energy poverty ratio, see equation (1).

From equation (5) several insights can be gained:

⁶ Intuitively: If energy demand is inelastic, the income effect dominates the substitution effect in the response of non-energy demand to energy price increases.

⁷ To be concise, we consider a consumption minimum for energy only.

Proposition 1. Given the utility function (4) with $0 < R < Y/p$, the following holds:

(a) A greater energy poverty ratio implies greater marginal disutility from a rise in the

energy price: $\partial|\eta_{Vp}|/\partial EPR > 0$.

(b) A rise in the energy price implies a decrease in the consumption of both energy and

non-energy: $\eta_{Ep} < 0, \eta_{Np} < 0$.

(c) A greater energy poverty ratio implies that a greater share of the overall disutility

effect of energy price increases accrues to the reduction in non-energy consumption:

$\partial(\eta_{UN}\eta_{Np} / \eta_{UE}\eta_{Ep}) / \partial EPR > 0$.

Result (a) demonstrates that the welfare effect of energy poverty consists in raising the effect of energy price increases on consumer utility while results (b) and (c) clarify the channels through which this effect operates.

Considering the constituents of energy poverty, a corollary of result (a) is that the disutility from an energy price increase is greater if (i) income is lower, (ii) the energy price is higher, and (iii) the energy requirement is higher.

Against the background of Proposition 1, studying the effect of energy prices on utility is not only important per se; it also permits to shed light on the welfare implications of energy poverty. In addition to its conceptual motivation, a practical advantage of such an approach is that it does not involve a measure of “required energy expenditures” which, in view of their unavailability, are usually replaced with observed energy expenditures in conventional analyses of energy poverty.

3. Empirical Framework

3.1 Data

We use survey data from the first five waves of the European Social Survey (ESS); see www.europeansocialsurvey.org. The ESS is a repeated cross-sectional, multi-country survey covering over 30 nations. Its first wave was fielded in 2002/2003, the fifth in 2010/2011. ESS data are obtained using random (probability) samples, where the sampling strategies are designed to ensure representativeness and comparability across European countries.

The variable used to capture SWB is life satisfaction. It is based on the answers to the following question: "All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole nowadays?" Respondents were shown a card, where 0 means extremely dissatisfied and 10 means extremely satisfied, and we use the answers on the 11-point scale as our dependent variable. In robustness checks we use 11-point happiness instead of life satisfaction as the dependent variable.⁸

The explanatory variables at the individual level include socio-demographic and socio-economic factors that have been found to be related to SWB (sex, age, marital status, household size, employment status and household income), see, e.g., Dolan et al. (2008).⁹ In addition, our regressions include macroeconomic control variables (quarterly data for GDP per capita and the rates of inflation and unemployment), taken from the OECD online data base (www.oecd.org).

⁸ The happiness question is: "Taking all things together, how happy would you say you are?"

⁹ With respect to household income, the ESS includes a 12-point scale where 1 corresponds to less than 1,800 Euro annually and 12 corresponds to more than 120,000 Euro. For steps 3 to 8 each step corresponds to 6,000 Euro.

Our main variables of interest are the prices of electricity, gas and light fuel oil for households, which we take from the IEA Energy Prices and Taxes database, see www.iea.org. The data for the gas price refer to natural gas, which – similar to oil and unlike electricity - mainly serves heating purposes. The prices of electricity and gas are average unit values, which are obtained either from utilities as average revenue per unit delivered to households or from households as average expenditure per unit purchased. Energy price data are reported by country and quarter and we matched each observation from the ESS with the respective energy price variable (real unit energy prices for households at PPP-corrected USD) on a country-quarter level.

The five-wave cumulative dataset of the ESS includes about 240,000 observations from 33 countries. Because energy price data are unavailable for some countries, our analysis refers to the following 21 countries in the case of electricity: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and the UK. In the case of oil the set of countries includes Luxembourg and Spain in addition whereas Hungary and the Slovak Republic are missing. In the case of gas the set of countries corresponds to the one for electricity plus Spain minus Italy and Norway. Due to missing price data and a small number of non-responses in the ESS the final samples for econometric analysis include observations for 100,908 individuals (electricity), 117,819 individuals (oil) and 101,937 individuals (gas).¹⁰

Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix contain the variable descriptions and the summary statistics of the main variables. The average electricity price is 0.189 USD per kWh and varies

¹⁰ If we were to consider a common sample for all types of electricity the number of observations would be reduced to 80,068.

between 0.064 (minimum) and 0.343 (maximum). The average oil price is 0.856 USD per liter (minimum = 0.260, maximum = 2.767) and the average gas price is 0.068 USD per kWh (minimum = 0.018, maximum = 0.162). Energy prices can thus be considered to exhibit sufficient variation to permit identification of their effect on well-being.

3.2 Discussion of Subjective Well-Being Data

In using SWB data for economic analysis it is important to understand the assumptions to be imposed on the information content of those data. As discussed by Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004), necessary assumptions are (a) a positive monotonic relationship between SWB and the underlying true utility u (if $SWB_{it} > SWB_{is}$, then $u_{it} > u_{is}$ for individual i at times t and s) and (b) ordinal interpersonal comparability (if $SWB_{it} > SWB_{jt}$, then $u_{it} > u_{jt}$ for individuals i and j). Validation research has produced a variety of supporting evidence of those assumptions (see Diener et al. 1999, Frey and Stutzer 2002, Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters 2004). Under ordinal interpersonal comparability SWB can be treated as an ordinal variable. If, more restrictively, cardinal interpersonal comparability is assumed ($SWB_{it} - SWB_{jt}$ is proportional to $u_{it} - u_{jt}$), SWB can be treated as a cardinal variable.¹¹ Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004) and many others found that assuming the data to be ordinal or cardinal and applying the corresponding estimation methods has little effect on qualitative results. In the empirical analysis we will check the robustness of our results to those assumptions.

Another issue with SWB data is that they are bounded from below and from above. This implies that one can neither observe a decline in SWB if it was in the lowest category in the preceding period, nor an increase if it was in the highest category. A way of addressing this

¹¹ Cardinal interpersonal comparability amounts to assuming that the difference between an SWB score of, say, 8 and 9 is the same as the difference between a 4 and a 5 (Ng 1997).

problem is by collapsing the information of SWB variables in two categories (high/low), and we will do so in an additional robustness check.

3.3 Empirical Strategy

We estimated a micro-econometric SWB function in which the self-reported life satisfaction (LS) of individual i , in country c and time t depends on a set of individual socio-demographic and socio-economic indicators ($micro_{ict}$), macroeconomic indicators ($macro_{ct}$), residential energy prices (pen_{ct}), and country and time dummies ($country_c$, $time_t$, respectively). The general form of the estimating equations reads as follows:

$$LS_{ict} = \alpha' micro_{ict} + \beta' macro_{ct} + \gamma pen_{ct} + country_c + time_t + \varepsilon_{ict} . \quad (6)$$

In this specification, time t refers to the quarters 2002.I to 2011.IV; ε_{ict} denotes the error term. The *micro* controls are sex, age, marital status, household size, employment status, and household income. The *macro* controls are quarterly GDP per capita, inflation rates, and unemployment rates. In addition to those controls, we account for unobserved country- and time-invariant factors with country and quarter fixed effects. The *country* fixed effects account for unobserved time-invariant country characteristics (like climate or cultural attitudes) that may affect both the energy prices and well-being whereas the *time* fixed effects (2002.II to 2011.IV) account for unobserved time-specific confounding factors that are common to all countries (e.g. common global shocks). We extend equation (6) to include interactions of the price variables with several factors that may affect the relationship between energy prices and well-being.

Based on the results of Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2005) we treat the dependent variable, 11-point life satisfaction, as a cardinal variable in our main analysis and estimate equation (6) using least squares. As a robustness check we estimate an ordered probit model. We report robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the county-quarter level.

4. Results

4.1 Main Estimation Results

Table 1 presents the main estimation results for equation (6).¹² Panel A refers to energy prices without interactions. The coefficients of the electricity, oil and gas prices are negative, and they are (at least weakly) significant for electricity and gas. Quantitatively, an increase of the electricity price by 1 USD per MWh (0.1 cent per kWh) is associated with a drop in life satisfaction by 0.00155 points (on the 11-point scale). In the case of gas the drop in life satisfaction for a corresponding price increase is 0.00459 points.

¹² More detailed results concerning the micro and macro controls are presented in Table A3 in the Appendix. These results do not qualitatively differ with respect to the various energy prices included. As is common in data sets for developed countries (see Dolan et al. 2008), life satisfaction is higher for females than for males, u-shaped in age, highest for married and lowest for separated persons, lowest if being unemployed than in any other employment status, and increasing in household income. At the macro level, life satisfaction is negatively related to the inflation and the unemployment rate and insignificantly related to GDP per capita, the latter being in line with the so-called happiness-income paradox (Easterlin et al. 2010). As indicated by the estimates for the country dummies, Iceland, Switzerland, Norway and Denmark have the highest “generic” (that is, unexplained) levels of reported well-being, which is also consistent with the literature.

We thus find that the well-being effect of a 1-USD-per MWh increase of the electricity price is considerably smaller than that of the same increase of the gas price. In the light of the framework from subsection 2.2, an explanation for this difference in effect sizes may rely on different cost shares for (required) electricity and gas. For instance, German data reveal that in 2011 the mean expenditure share of electricity was 3.2 percent, whereas the share of expenditures for space heating (which includes gas) was 5.0 percent (Heindl 2013).

Panel B of Table 1 reports results differentiated by household income, where income groups approximately correspond to income quartiles. The coefficients for electricity are negative, but significant only for the lowest income quartile. For this group, the coefficient is considerably greater (in absolute terms) than the coefficients for the other groups and for the average household (as reported in panel A). In the case of oil, coefficients are now significant except for the second lowest group, and the one for the highest group is greater than those for the other. In the case of gas, the coefficients are significant for all income groups and the coefficient for the lowest group is the greatest, whereas the coefficient for the highest income group is the second greatest. Overall, the results for electricity and gas are consistent with the expectation that energy price increases have the largest well-being effect at low levels of income. In the cases of oil and gas we find, in addition, a u-shaped relationship between the price and well-being. A possible explanation for the large coefficient at high income is that high income may be a proxy for larger homes and, hence, greater heating requirements.

While income represents the denominator of the energy poverty ratio, the energy price and required energy consumption represent the numerator and hence are expected to raise the disutility from energy price increases according to the framework of subsection 2.2. Both the price and required consumption can be expected to vary across the quarters of the year. On the one hand, heating requirements imply that the demand for oil is high in autumn when tanks need to be filled for the winter season. On the other hand, high and inelastic seasonal demand

may translate into high seasonal prices. In fact, as some complementary regressions show, the price not only of oil but also of gas is highest in the third quarter (Table A4) Thus, one or both components of required energy expenditures, price and quantity, can be expected to be high in the third quarter. In the case of electricity, prices are highest in the fourth quarter (Table A4) while payment of arrears for the preceding year may drive up electricity expenditures in the first quarter.

To check for seasonal differences in the relationship between well-being and energy prices, we included in the well-being regressions interactions with quarter dummies. Panel C of Table 1 reports the results. In the case of electricity we find a significant negative coefficient in the first and a weakly significant negative coefficient in the fourth quarter, whereas coefficients are insignificant in the second and third quarter. The coefficient in the first quarter is substantially greater than the year-average reported in panel A. The result for the first quarter may arise because of high “involuntary” electricity expenditures due to payments of arrears for the preceding year.

In the cases of oil and gas we get the interesting results that coefficients are significant only in the third quarter but not at other times of the year. This is consistent with the circumstance that both the “required” demand and the price of oil are high before the start of the winter season, implying a high expenditure share of oil. Similarly, high gas prices in the third quarter increase the expenditures for gas and the well-being effect of the price. Indeed, the coefficient for the gas price is substantially greater in the third quarter than the year-average (panel A).

Table 1: SWB and Energy Prices

Prices in PPP Dollar per Unit	Electricity (USD/MWh)	Oil (USD/1000 liter)	Gas (USD/MWh)
Panel A			
Price	-0.00155* (0.000916)	-0.000354 (0.000229)	-0.00459** (0.00196)
Constant	9.494*** (0.705)	7.156*** (0.561)	8.293*** (0.564)
R-squared	0.208	0.182	0.190
Panel B			
Price*Income<6k	-0.00231** (0.000962)	-0.000397* (0.000228)	-0.00590*** (0.00198)
Price*Income6k-24k	-0.00122 (0.000925)	-0.000299 (0.000234)	-0.00397** (0.00201)
Price*Income24k-60k	-0.00114 (0.000913)	-0.000382* (0.000228)	-0.00413** (0.00206)
Price*Income>60k	-0.00118 (0.000933)	-0.000492** (0.000228)	-0.00500** (0.00211)
Constant	9.494*** (0.705)	7.156*** (0.561)	8.293*** (0.564)
R-squared	0.209	0.182	0.191
Panel C			
Price*QI	-0.00207** (0.00104)	-0.000378 (0.000272)	-0.00247 (0.00247)
Price*QII	-0.00190 (0.00176)	-0.000427 (0.000286)	-0.00173 (0.00672)
Price*QIII	-0.00121 (0.00114)	-0.000736** (0.000286)	-0.00717*** (0.00317)
Price*QIV	-0.00158* (0.000933)	-0.000288 (0.000224)	-0.00324 (0.00213)
Constant	6.623*** (0.343)	7.266*** (0.617)	6.268*** (0.273)
R-squared	0.208	0.182	0.190

Dependent variable: life satisfaction (11-point scale). Method: least squares. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Regressions include micro controls (sex, age, marital status, household size, employment status and household income), macro controls (GDP per capita and the rates of unemployment and inflation) and country and quarter fixed effects (2002.II to 2011.IV). $N = 100,908$ (electricity), $N = 117,819$ (oil), $N = 101,937$ (gas).

4.2 Discussion

Our estimation results so far suggest several insights. First, electricity and fuels (oil and gas) differ in that a significant relationship between well-being and the electricity price exists only at low levels of income, whereas well-being is significantly related to the prices of fuel at all income levels except for the second quartile in the case of oil. A likely explanation of the difference between electricity and oil/gas is the lower amount that needs to be spent on required electricity consumption in comparison to expenditures for space heating using oil and gas.

Second, the strength of the relationship between well-being and energy prices depends on household income. As was just mentioned, in the case of electricity the relationship is significant only in individuals with low income. In the case of gas, the sensitivity of well-being to the price is greatest at low income. Both of this is consistent with the idea that the well-being effect of energy prices is increasing in the degree of energy poverty through an income effect, holding required expenditures constant.

Third, though electricity and gas prices affect well-being on average over the year, the effects are actually significant only in those seasons (quarters) in which required expenditures are high. In addition, though the oil price has no significant effect in the average of seasons, a significant negative effect exists at the time when expenditures can be expected to be higher than average. The finding that effects are greater when “forced” expenditures are high is consistent with the idea that the well-being effect of energy prices is increasing in the degree of energy poverty through required expenditures, holding income constant. In general, these

findings yield the insight that the well-being effects of energy poverty are predominantly of a seasonal character.

In quantitative terms, a 1-standard-deviation change in the electricity price is associated with a change in 11-point life satisfaction by 0.096 for the average person and 0.144 for a person from the lowest income group. For a 1-standard-deviation change in the gas price, the effects are 0.119 (average) and 0.153 (low income). For the oil price the effect is 0.157 at low income. To put those figures in perspective, note that one of the strongest negative factors for well-being consists in being unemployed. In our data the well-being difference between an employed and an unemployed person is between 1.0 and 1.1 (see Table A3). The well-being effects of a 1-SD difference in energy prices can thus be considered to be of a non-negligible magnitude.

4.3 Robustness

We checked the robustness of our results to a number of factors, including the use of control variables and the treatment of the dependent variable. Results are reported in Table 3.

One factor that may impact on results is inclusion of the inflation rate. When the latter is included, as is the case in the specifications discussed so far, the measured effect of an energy price change is that which goes beyond the effect of a change in the general price level. As panel A of Table 3 shows, the conclusions on the significance of energy prices from panel A of Table 1 stay largely intact when the inflation rate is omitted, except that the significance level of the gas price increases. As for magnitudes, it is seen that, consistent with expectations, the coefficients of the electricity and gas price are greater (in absolute terms) than when the inflation rate is included. The increase in coefficient size amounts to 11.0 percent in the case of electricity and 9.6 percent in the case of gas.

To account for the possible non-cardinality of life satisfaction data, panel B in Table 3 reports the results from estimating the models from panel A of Table 1 using an ordered probit instead of least squares. In this case, the prices of electricity and gas become more significant, whereas the oil price remains insignificant. The coefficient sizes are of course not comparable to those from least squares, but the *ratios* of the significant coefficients are very similar: While under least squares the coefficient of the electricity price is 33.8 percent that of the coefficient of the gas price, it is 39.8 percent in the ordered probit model.

To account for the fact that life satisfaction data are bounded from below and from above (see subsection 3.2) we collapsed them into a “low” and a “high” category (each accounting for about one half of the observations) and estimated a probit model on these data. As panel C in Table 3 shows, the prices of electricity and gas are now more significant than in Table 1 and the oil price is weakly significant. This suggests that the boundedness of the life satisfaction scale tends to mask some of the well-being effects of energy prices

Finally, we replace the dependent variable, 11-point life satisfaction, with 11-point happiness and revert to least squares as the estimation method. The electricity price is now more significant whereas the gas price is less significant than with life satisfaction. The oil price is insignificant as it is in the case of life satisfaction. The magnitude of the electricity price coefficient is practically the same as with life satisfaction whereas the gas price coefficient is now 38 percent smaller.

5 Conclusions

This paper has used data on the life satisfaction of more than 100,000 individuals in 21 European countries, 2002-2011, to study the relationship between subjective well-being and the prices for households of electricity, oil and gas. We find that energy prices have statistically and economically significant effects on subjective well-being. The effect sizes

are smaller than but comparable to the effects of important personal factors of well-being. Effect sizes above average are found in individuals from the lowest income quartile. In addition, effects are strongest at times when required energy expenditures can be expected to be high. The empirical results are consistent with the prediction that greater energy poverty implies a greater effect of energy prices on well-being.

References

- Boardman, B. (1991), *Fuel Poverty: From Cold Homes to Affordable Warmth*, London: Belhaven Press.
- Brunner, K.-M., Christanell, A., Spitzer, M. (2011), Experiencing Fuel Poverty: Coping Strategies of Low-income Households in Vienna/Austria, *Energy Policy*, 1–7.
- Di Tella, R., MacCulloch, R., Oswald, A. (2001), Preferences over Inflation and Unemployment: Evidence from Surveys of Happiness, *American Economic Review* 91, 335-341.
- Diener, E., Suh, E., Lucas, R., Smith, H. (1999), Subjective Well-Being: Three Decades of Progress, *Psychological Bulletin* 125, 276-302.
- Dolan, P., Peasgood, T., White, M. (2008). “Do we really know what makes us happy? A review of the economic literature on the factors associated with subjective well-being”, *Journal of Economic Psychology* 29, 94-122.
- Easterlin, R.A., Angelescu McVey, L., Switek, M., Sawangfa, O., Smith Zweig, J. (2010), The Happiness-Income Paradox Revisited, *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America* 107, 22463-22468.
- EU (2010), *An Energy Policy for Consumers*, European Commission Staff Working Paper No. 1407.
- Ferreira, S., Moro, M. (2010), On the Use of Subjective Well-Being Data for Environmental Valuation, *Environmental and Resource Economics*, 46 249-273.
- Ferrer-i-Carbonell, A., Frijters, P. (2004), How Important is Methodology for the Estimates of the Determinants of Happiness?, *Economic Journal* 114, 641-659.
- Foster, V., Tre, J.P., Wodon, Q. (2000), *Energy Prices, Energy Efficiency, and Fuel Poverty*, World Bank, Mimeo.

- Frey, B.S., Stutzer, A. (2002), What Can Economists Learn from Happiness Research?, *Journal of Economic Literature* 40(2), 402-435.
- Frey, B.S., Luechinger, S., Stutzer, A. (2009), The Life Satisfaction Approach to Valuing Public Goods: The Case of Terrorism, *Public Choice* 138, 317-345.
- Heindl, P. (2013), Measuring Fuel Poverty: General Applications and Application to German Household Data, ZEW Discussion Paper No. 13-046.
- Hills, J. (2012), Getting the Measure of Fuel Poverty: Final report of the Fuel Poverty Review, Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion, London.
- Levinson, A. (2012), Valuing Public Goods Using Happiness Data: The Case of Air Pollution, *Journal of Public Economics* 96, 869-880.
- Luechinger, S. (2009), Valuing Air Quality Using the Life Satisfaction Approach, *Economic Journal* 119, 482-515.
- Moore, R. (2012), Definitions of Fuel Poverty: Implications for Policy, *Energy Policy* 49, 27-32.
- Neuhoff, K., Bach, S., Diekmann, J., Beznoska, M., El-Laboudy, T. (2013), Distributional Effects of Energy Transition: Impacts of Renewable Electricity Support in Germany, *Economics of Energy and Environmental Policy* 2, 41-54
- Ng, Y.K. (1997), A Case for Happiness, Cardinality, and Interpersonal Comparability, *Economic Journal* 107, 1848-1858.
- Powdthavee, N. (2005), Unhappiness and Crime: Evidence from South Africa, *Economica* 72, 547.
- Rehdanz, K., Maddison, D. (2005), Climate and Happiness, *Ecological Economics* 52, 111-125.
- Thomson, H, Snell, C. (2013), Quantifying the Prevalence of Fuel Poverty Across the European Union, *Energy Policy* 52, 563-572.

- Ürge-Vorsatz, D., Tirdo Herrero, S. (2012), Building Synergies between Climate Change Mitigation and Energy Poverty Alleviation, *Energy Policy* 29, 69-75
- Van Praag, B., Baarsma, B. (2005) Using Happiness Surveys to Value Intangibles: The Case of Airport Noise, *Economic Journal* 52, 111-125.
- Welsch, H. (2002), Preferences over Prosperity and Pollution: Environmental Valuation Based on Happiness Surveys, *Kyklos* 55, 473-494.
- Welsch, H. (2006), Environment and Happiness: Valuation of Air Pollution Using Life Satisfaction Data, *Ecological Economics* 58, 801-813.
- Welsch, H. (2008a), The Social Costs of Civil Conflict: Evidence from Surveys of Happiness, *Kyklos* 61, 320-340.
- Welsch, H. (2008b), The Welfare Costs of Corruption, *Applied Economics* 40, 1839-1849.
- Welsch, H., Biermann, P. (2014), Electricity Supply Preferences in Europe: Evidence from Subjective Well-Being Data, *Resource and Energy Economics* 38, 38-60.
- Welsch, H., Kühling, J. (2009), Using Happiness Data for Environmental Valuation: Issues and Applications, *Journal of Economic Surveys* 23, 385-406.

Appendix

Table A1: Description of Data

VARIABLE	SOURCE	DESCRIPTION
Socio-demographic Indicators		
Subjective Well-Being ("How satisfied with life as a whole?")	ESS	0 (extremely dissatisfied) - 10 (extremely satisfied)
Sex		Dummy: 1= male
Age		Age of respondent in years
Marital Status		4 categories: married or in civil partnership; separated, divorced; widowed; never married nor in civil partnership (reference)
Household Income		Household's total net income (all sources). Discrete: 1 (low income) - 12 (high income)
Employment Status		8 categories: paid work; in education; unemployed and actively looking for job; unemployed and not actively looking for job; permanently sick or disabled; retired; housework; other (reference).
Household size		Number of people living regularly as member of household
Macroeconomic Indicators (quarterly)		
	OECD (http://www.oecd.org)	
GDP per capita		Measured in 2005 PPP\$ per capita
Inflation rate		Measured as the percentage increase of price index compared with the previous year.
Unemployment rate		Measured as the percentage of total civilian labor force
Household Energy Prices (quarterly)		
Electricity Price		Electricity End Use Prices for Households (PPP-adjusted)
Light Fuel Oil Price		Light Fuel Oil End Use Prices for Households (PPP-adjusted)
Gas Price		Gas End Use Prices for Households (PPP-adjusted)

Table A2: Summary Statistics of Main Variables

Variable	Sample Electricity				
	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Minimum	Maximum
Life Satisfaction	100908	7.01979	2.244549	0	10
GDPPC_Q_ppp	100908	7.607159	3.006035	0.3460003	14.61596
Inflat_Q	100908	.4327715	.6313537	-1.43013	3.879408
Unemp_Q	100908	7.447661	3.512062	2.533333	20.26667
Unemp_invol	100908	0.0340607	0.1813861	0	1
NetHousehold Income	100908	5.748831	2.720912	1	12
Elecprice	100908	189.0693	62.1076	64.36095	342.8068

Variable	Sample Light Fuel Oil (LFO)				
	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Minimum	Maximum
Life Satisfaction	117819	7.151368	2.164312	0	10
GDPPC_Q_ppp	117819	8.000223	2.924847	.3460003	17.27039
Inflat_Q	117819	0.4084959	.5947207	-1.650163	3.879408
Unemp_Q	117819	7.634302	3.539856	2.533333	22.03333
OCC_Unemp_invol	117819	0.0350283	.1838521	0	1
Net_HouseholdIncome	117819	5.976956	2.643891	1	12
LFO_Price	117819	856.5338	394.7213	259.7072	2767.4

Variable	Sample Gas				
	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Minimum	Maximum
Life Satisfaction	101937	6.91378	2.25876	0	10
GDPPC_Q_ppp	101937	7.113523	2.381947	.3460003	11.00873
Inflat_Q	101937	0.4378295	0.645011	-1.650163	3.879408
Unemp_Q	101937	8.391749	3.692231	3.033333	22.03333
OCC_Unemp_invol	101937	0.038308	0.1919397	0	1
Net_HouseholdIncome	101937	5.615949	2.626459	1	12
Gas_Price	101937	68.9154	25.98495	18.41632	162.3365

Table A3: Detailed Estimation Results

	(1) LFO	(2) Electricity	(3) Gas
Male	omitted	omitted	omitted
Female	0.122*** (0.0128)	0.120*** (0.0145)	0.120*** (0.0153)
Age	-0.0613*** (0.00439)	-0.0668*** (0.00482)	-0.0659*** (0.00474)
Age^2	0.000606*** (0.0000430)	0.000659*** (0.0000468)	0.000646*** (0.0000464)
Household Size	-0.0140* (0.00732)	-0.0236*** (0.00825)	-0.0229*** (0.00800)
Single	omitted	omitted	omitted
Married	0.360*** (0.0262)	0.339*** (0.0291)	0.346*** (0.0297)
Divorced	-0.160*** (0.0347)	-0.190*** (0.0385)	-0.211*** (0.0390)
Separated	-0.492*** (0.0620)	-0.519*** (0.0662)	-0.512*** (0.0666)
Widowed	-0.179*** (0.0324)	-0.163*** (0.0360)	-0.182*** (0.0358)
Paid Work	omitted	omitted	omitted
In_school	0.185*** (0.0349)	0.190*** (0.0411)	0.243*** (0.0407)
Voluntary_Unempl	-0.794*** (0.0765)	-0.824*** (0.0866)	-0.837*** (0.0828)
Sick_empl	-1.189*** (0.0562)	-1.151*** (0.0527)	-1.156*** (0.0578)
Retired	0.00438 (0.0342)	-0.0394 (0.0361)	-0.0120 (0.0359)
Civil_Military	0.0997 (0.162)	0.131 (0.170)	0.0212 (0.196)
Housework	-0.0740*** (0.0280)	-0.0530* (0.0294)	-0.0716** (0.0289)
Other_empl	-0.242*** (0.0645)	-0.172** (0.0679)	-0.153** (0.0696)
Invol_Unempl	-1.066*** (0.0616)	-1.034*** (0.0551)	-1.080*** (0.0653)
Household_Income	0.132*** (0.00655)	0.133*** (0.00712)	0.145*** (0.00691)
Austria	1.113**	-0.870***	-0.534***

	(0.545)	(0.254)	(0.106)
Belgium	1.186**	-0.769***	-0.582***
	(0.567)	(0.225)	(0.107)
Switzerland	1.635**	-0.188	
	(0.636)	(0.172)	
Czech_Republic	0.337	-1.930***	-1.321***
	(0.354)	(0.422)	(0.287)
Germany	0.719	-0.957***	-0.834***
	(0.545)	(0.232)	(0.0978)
Estonia	omitted	omitted	omitted
Denmark	2.125***	0.251	0.488***
	(0.511)	(0.229)	(0.0969)
Spain	1.340**		-0.231*
	(0.516)		(0.118)
Finland	1.692***	-0.310	-0.0441
	(0.519)	(0.278)	(0.139)
France	0.0682	-1.975***	-1.579***
	(0.511)	(0.288)	(0.131)
United_Kingdom	0.872	-1.007***	-0.800***
	(0.559)	(0.218)	(0.0811)
Greece	0.112	-2.126***	-1.450***
	(0.455)	(0.383)	(0.218)
o.Hungary	0	-2.699***	-2.135***
	(.)	(0.422)	(0.297)
Ireland	1.310**	-0.542***	-0.404***
	(0.591)	(0.208)	(0.0854)
Italy	0.877**	-1.338***	
	(0.419)	(0.322)	
Luxembourg	1.808*		
	(0.923)		
Netherlands	1.327**	-0.546***	-0.361***
	(0.529)	(0.202)	(0.0667)
Norway	1.707**		
	(0.729)		
Poland	0.672**	-1.626***	-0.927***
	(0.317)	(0.413)	(0.291)
Portugal	-0.617	-2.664***	-2.020***
	(0.399)	(0.361)	(0.239)
Sweden	1.779***	-0.250	0.133
	(0.531)	(0.186)	(0.115)
Slovenia	0.540	-1.875***	-1.086***
	(0.380)	(0.433)	(0.300)
Slowak_Republic	omitted	-1.874***	-1.332***
		(0.374)	(0.253)

Turkey	omitted	-2.914*** (0.594)	-1.889*** (0.487)
Q1_02	omitted	omitted	omitted
Q2_02	-0.683*** (0.258)	-0.272*** (0.0333)	-0.298*** (0.0331)
Q3_02	0.387 (0.257)	0.812*** (0.0665)	0.899*** (0.0724)
Q4_02	0.410 (0.257)	0.884*** (0.0590)	0.960*** (0.0587)
Q1_03	0.533** (0.260)	1.071*** (0.108)	1.069*** (0.0735)
Q2_03	0.211 (0.264)	0.672*** (0.121)	0.673*** (0.0722)
Q3_03	0.692** (0.282)	1.371*** (0.108)	1.375*** (0.0860)
Q4_03	0.480 (0.330)	1.205*** (0.0405)	1.233*** (0.0411)
Q3_04	0.503* (0.263)	0.919*** (0.0863)	1.070*** (0.0861)
Q4_04	0.543** (0.256)	0.975*** (0.0679)	1.026*** (0.0708)
Q1_05	0.541** (0.264)	1.049*** (0.109)	1.044*** (0.0906)
Q2_05	0.684** (0.267)	1.204*** (0.0915)	1.195*** (0.0829)
Q4_05	1.392*** (0.283)	1.742*** (0.144)	1.798*** (0.139)
Q1_06	1.418*** (0.274)	1.799*** (0.114)	1.836*** (0.109)
Q2_06	1.422*** (0.287)	1.707*** (0.126)	1.763*** (0.121)
Q3_06	0.514* (0.278)	1.036*** (0.118)	1.066*** (0.125)
Q4_06	0.609** (0.266)	1.065*** (0.102)	1.108*** (0.110)
Q1_07	0.587** (0.268)	1.111*** (0.109)	1.165*** (0.124)
Q2_07	0.732** (0.287)	1.276*** (0.144)	1.356*** (0.174)
Q3_07	0.775*** (0.279)	1.336*** (0.127)	1.288*** (0.125)
Q4_07	0.714** (0.283)	1.243*** (0.123)	1.194*** (0.112)
Q3_08	0.940***	1.333***	1.338***

	(0.302)	(0.105)	(0.124)
Q4_08	0.653**	1.127***	1.176***
	(0.280)	(0.0985)	(0.124)
Q1_09	0.561**	1.051***	1.125***
	(0.279)	(0.108)	(0.134)
Q2_09	0.796***	1.383***	1.481***
	(0.266)	(0.144)	(0.158)
Q3_09	0.569	1.017***	1.276***
	(0.346)	(0.243)	(0.266)
Q4_09	0.828**	1.366***	1.366***
	(0.323)	(0.202)	(0.208)
Q1_10	1.054***	1.603***	1.541***
	(0.326)	(0.196)	(0.204)
Q3_10	0.934***	1.350***	1.435***
	(0.279)	(0.0930)	(0.116)
Q4_10	1.006***	1.494***	1.521***
	(0.285)	(0.108)	(0.120)
Q1_11	0.921***	1.408***	1.453***
	(0.296)	(0.124)	(0.132)
Q2_11	1.576***	1.435***	2.042***
	(0.328)	(0.139)	(0.198)
Q3_11	1.179***		1.633***
	(0.328)		(0.206)
GDPPC_Q_ppp	-0.0717	-0.139***	-0.0499
	(0.0533)	(0.0496)	(0.0518)
Inflat_Q	-0.109***	-0.102***	-0.121***
	(0.0344)	(0.0371)	(0.0348)
Unemp_Q	-0.0484***	-0.0521***	-0.0502***
	(0.00998)	(0.0105)	(0.00979)
LFO_Price	-0.000354		
	(0.000229)		
Electr_Price		-0.00155*	
		(0.000916)	
Gas_Price			-0.00459**
			(0.00196)
Constant	7.207***	9.431***	8.265***
	(0.557)	(0.712)	(0.553)
Observations	117819	100908	101937
R-squared	0.182	0.208	0.190

Dependent variable: life satisfaction (11-point scale). Method: least squares. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

Table A4: Seasonality of Energy Prices

	Electricity (USD/MWh)	Oil (USD/1000 liter)	Gas (USD/MWh)
Quarter 1	Omitted	Omitted	Omitted
Quarter 2	1.15*** (5.89)	-9.55*** (10.03)	3.35*** (31.33)
Quarter 3	0.10 (0.44)	145.66*** (125.97)	12.62*** (94.74)
Quarter 4	2.19*** (9.59)	70.40*** (60.25)	8.85*** (66.27)
Constant	78.42*** (121.32)	1250.45*** (333.22)	29.25*** (77.31)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes

Method: least squares. t-statistics in parentheses. ***p<0.01.

Zuletzt erschienen /previous publications:

- V-313-09 **Heinz Welsch**, Implications of Happiness Research for Environmental Economics
- V-314-09 **Heinz Welsch, Jan Kühling**, Determinants of Pro-Environmental Consumption: The Role of Reference Groups and Routine Behavior
- V-315-09 **Christoph Böhringer and Knut Einar Rosendahl**, Green Serves the Dirtiest: On the Interaction between Black and Green Quotas
- V-316-09 **Christoph Böhringer, Andreas Lange, and Thomas P. Rutherford**, Beggar-thy-neighbour versus global environmental concerns: an investigation of alternative motives for environmental tax differentiation
- V-317-09 **Udo Ebert**, Household willingness to pay and income pooling: A comment
- V-318-09 **Udo Ebert**, Equity-regarding poverty measures: differences in needs and the role of equivalence scales
- V-319-09 **Udo Ebert and Heinz Welsch**, Optimal response functions in global pollution problems can be upward-sloping: Accounting for adaptation
- V-320-10 **Edwin van der Werf**, Unilateral climate policy, asymmetric backstop adoption, and carbon leakage in a two-region Hotelling model
- V-321-10 **Jürgen Bitzer, Ingo Geishecker, and Philipp J.H. Schröder**, Returns to Open Source Software Engagement: An Empirical Test of the Signaling Hypothesis
- V-322-10 **Heinz Welsch, Jan Kühling**, Is Pro-Environmental Consumption Utility-Maximizing? Evidence from Subjective Well-Being Data
- V-323-10 **Heinz Welsch und Jan Kühling**, Nutzenmaxima, Routinen und Referenzpersonen beim nachhaltigen Konsum
- V-324-10 **Udo Ebert**, Inequality reducing taxation reconsidered
- V-325-10 **Udo Ebert**, The decomposition of inequality reconsidered: Weakly decomposable measures
- V-326-10 **Christoph Böhringer and Knut Einar Rosendahl**, Greening Electricity More Than Necessary: On the Excess Cost of Overlapping Regulation in EU Climate Policy
- V-327-10 **Udo Ebert and Patrick Moyes**, Talents, Preferences and Inequality of Well-Being
- V-328-10 **Klaus Eisenack**, The inefficiency of private adaptation to pollution in the presence of endogeneous market structure
- V-329-10 **Heinz Welsch**, Stabilität, Wachstum und Well-Being: Wer sind die Champions der Makroökonomie?
- V-330-11 **Heinz Welsch and Jan Kühling**, How Has the Crisis of 2008-2009 Affected Subjective Well-Being?
- V-331-11 **Udo Ebert**, The redistribution of income when needs differ
- V-332-11 **Udo Ebert and Heinz Welsch**, Adaptation and Mitigation in Global Pollution Problems: Economic Impacts of Productivity, Sensitivity, and Adaptive Capacity
- V-333-11 **Udo Ebert and Patrick Moyes**, Inequality of Well-Being and Isoelastic Equivalence Scales
- V-334-11 **Klaus Eisenack**, Adaptation financing as part of a global climate agreement: is the adaptation levy appropriate?
- V-335-11 **Christoph Böhringer and Andreas Keller**, Energy Security: An Impact Assessment of the EU Climate and Energy Package
- V-336-11 **Carsten Helm and Franz Wirl**, International Environmental Agreements: Incentive Contracts with Multilateral Externalities
- V-337-11 **Christoph Böhringer, Bouwe Dijkstra, and Knut Einar Rosendahl**, Sectoral and Regional Expansion of Emissions Trading
- V-338-11 **Christoph Böhringer and Victoria Alexeeva-Talebi**, Unilateral climate policy and competitiveness: The implications of differential emission pricing
- V-339-11 **Christoph Böhringer, Carolyn Fischer, and Knut Einar Rosendahl**, Cost-Effective Unilateral Climate Policy Design: Size Matters
- V-340-11 **Christoph Böhringer, Jared C. Carbone, Thomas F. Rutherford**, Embodied Carbon Tariffs
- V-341-11 **Carsten Helm and Stefan Pichler**, Climate Policy with Technology Transfers and Permit Trading
- V-342-11 **Heinz Welsch and Jan Kühling**, Comparative Economic Performance and Institutional Change in OECD Countries: Evidence from Subjective Well-Being Data

- V-343-11 **Heinz Welsch and Jan Kühling**, Anti-Inflation Policy Benefits the Poor: Evidence from Subjective Well-Being Data
- V-344-12 **Klaus Eisenack und Leonhard Kähler**, Unilateral emission reductions can lead to Pareto improvements when adaptation to damages is possible
- V-345-12 **Christoph Böhringer, Brita Bye, Taran Fæhn, Knut Einar Rosendahl**
Alternative Designs for Tariffs on Embodied Carbon: A Global Cost-Effectiveness Analysis
- V-346-12 **Christoph Böhringer, Jared C. Carbone, Thomas F. Rutherford**, Efficiency and Equity Implications of Alternative Instruments to Reduce Carbon Leakage
- V-347-12 **Christoph Böhringer, Andreas Lange, Thomas F. Rutherford**, Optimal Emission Pricing in the Presence of International Spillovers: Decomposing Leakage and Terms-of-Trade Motives
- V-348-12 **Carsten Helm, Dominique Demougin**, Incentive Contracts and Efficient Unemployment Benefits in a Globalized World
- V-349-12 **Heinz Welsch**, Organic Food and Human Health: Instrumental Variables Evidence
- V-350-12 **Heinz Welsch, Jan Kühling**, Competitive Altruism and Endogenous Reference Group Selection in Private Provision of Environmental Public Goods
- V-351-13 **Jürgen Bitzer, Erkan Gören**, Measuring Capital Services by Energy Use: An Empirical Comparative Study
- V-352-13 **Erkan Gören**, Economic Effects of Domestic and Neighbouring Countries' Cultural Diversity
- V-353-13 **Erkan Gören**, How Ethnic Diversity affects Economic Development?
- V-354-13 **Christoph Böhringer, Thomas F. Rutherford, Marco Springmann**; Clean-Development Investments: An Incentive-Compatible CGE Modelling Framework
- V-355-13 **Christoph Böhringer, Knut Einar Rosendahl, Jan Schneider**, Unilateral Climate Policy: Can Opec Resolve the Leakage Problem?
- V-356-13 **Heinz Welsch, Jan Kühling**, Income Comparison, Income Formation, and Subjective Well-Being: New Evidence on Envy versus Signaling
- V-357-13 **Anna Pechan, Klaus Eisenack**, The impact of heat waves on electricity spot markets
- V-358-13 **Heinz Welsch, Katrin Rehdanz, Daiju Narita, Toshihiro Okubo**, Well-being effects of a major negative externality: The case of Fukushima
- V-359-13 **Heinz Welsch, Philipp Biermann**, Electricity Supply Preferences in Europe: Evidence from Subjective Well-Being Data
- V-360-14 **Christoph Böhringer, Jared C. Carbone, Thomas F. Rutherford**, The Strategic Value of Carbon Tariffs
- V-361-14 **Christoph Böhringer, André Müller**, Environmental Tax Reforms in Switzerland A Computable General Equilibrium Impact Analysis
- V-362-14 **Christoph Böhringer, Nicholas Rivers, Thomas Rutherford, Randall Wigle**, Sharing the burden for climate change mitigation in the Canadian federation
- V-363-14 **Christoph Böhringer, Alexander Cuntz, Diemtar Harhoff, Emmanuel A. Otoo**, The Impacts of Feed-in Tariffs on Innovation: Empirical Evidence from Germany
- V-364-14 **Christoph Böhringer, André Müller, Jan Schneider**, Carbon Tariffs Revisited
- V-365-14 **Anna Pechan**, Which Incentives Does Regulation Give to Adapt Network Infrastructure to Climate Change? - A German Case Study
- V-366-14 **Erkan Gören**, The Biogeographic Origins of Novelty-Seeking Traits
- V-367-14 **Heinz Welsch, Susana Ferreira**, Environment, Well-Being, and Experienced Preference
- V-368-14 **Marius Paschen**, Dynamic Analysis of the German Day-Ahead Electricity Spot Market
- V-369-14 **Heinz Welsch, Philipp Biermann**, Energy Prices, Energy Poverty, and Well-Being: Evidence for European Countries