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A Distant Mirror of Debt, Default, and Relief ¹

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Abstract

We take a first pass at quantifying the *magnitudes* of debt relief achieved through default and restructuring in two distinct samples: 1979-2010, focusing on credit events in emerging markets, and 1920-1939, documenting the *official* debt hangover in advanced economies that was created by World War I and its aftermath. We examine the economic performance of debtor countries during and after these overhang episodes, by tracing the evolution of real per capita GDP (levels and growth rates); sovereign credit ratings; debt servicing burdens relative to GDP, fiscal revenues, and exports; as well as the level of government debt (external and total). Across 45 crisis episodes for which data is available we find that debt relief averaged 21 percent of GDP for advanced economies (1932-1939) and 16 percent of GDP for emerging markets (1979-2010), respectively. The economic landscape after a *final* debt reduction is characterized by higher income levels and growth, lower debt servicing burdens and lower government debt. Also ratings recover markedly, albeit only in the modern period.

JEL E6, F3, N0 and H6

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Introduction

“When I was a youngster growing up in South Dakota, we never referred to the national debt, it was always referred to as the war debt because it stemmed from World War I.”

George McGovern²

Before the subprime financial crisis erupted in the summer of 2007, academic and policy discussions on the topic of debt relief were almost exclusively directed toward initiatives for the highly indebted poorest countries (HIPC).³ Advanced economies, apparently, had outgrown volatile business cycles and financial crises. Sovereign debt crises were a distant memory for them.⁴ Emerging markets, having weathered the turbulence of 1994-2003, were also on the mend, helped along by a favorable external environment of low and stable international interest rates and robust commodity prices. The debts of the First World War and the controversial defaults by nearly all advanced economies from 1932 to 1934 were an intellectual curiosity with little relevance to current circumstances.

The global financial crisis and its aftermath (which still lingers) abruptly disrupted that tranquility setting and the accompanying complacency. New restructurings in Greece returned after a hiatus of nearly 80 years (the last Greek default started in 1932 and ended in 1966). The ongoing depression in periphery Europe has already surpassed the economic collapse of the 1930s by some markers, with unemployment rates reaching levels not seen since that era. In most advanced economies, record private debt overhangs are only slowly unwinding, while the steady upward march in public debts continues unabated. The broad subject of sovereign debt crises and the role of debt write-offs in their resolution is no longer a matter solely of academic interest.

Research until now has been mostly devoted to documenting the *incidence* of external and domestic default, various features of their causes, and the macroeconomic panorama surrounding them.

² BrainyQuote.com Web site: <http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/g/georgemcgo462619.html>

³ See, for example, Chauvin and Kraay (2005) for a skeptical view of the benefits of debt forgiveness for low-income countries, as well as the welfare analysis by Dias, Richmond and Wright (2013).

⁴ See Stock and Watson (2002) on the Great Moderation and the reduced volatility of output.

This paper provides a first pass at quantifying the *magnitudes* of debt relief achieved and the subsequent economic performance of the debtors.

We follow two complementary strands of analysis. One focuses on the highly varied credit events in the middle-high income emerging markets in the modern era. Recent work by Cruces and Trebesch (2013, henceforth C&T), which is in line with the approach developed in Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006), provides a comprehensive quantitative analysis of haircuts on sovereign debt for practically the universe of emerging market restructuring episodes from 1978 to 2010.⁵ We look at these haircuts not from their vantage point of the investor, but from our perspective of debt relief to the borrower.

The second strand extends our earlier work, bringing to the dissection table crises episodes that are comparatively understudied. Specifically, we turn our attention to the interwar debt hangover of *official* (government to government) debt created by World War I and its aftermath.⁶ We have quantified and studied the amounts and details of the large network of war-related official debts for 18 advanced economies. This allows us to estimate the extent of debt relief in this episode for the first time.

The war debt rescheduling and relief has many parallels to the developing country debt crisis and debt relief initiatives, in particular the Brady deals of the 1990s. Box 1 provides a thumbnail comparison of three international episodes: the 1920s/1930s, the 1980s/1990s and post-2007. As with bank loans in the 1970s and 1980s, war debts were the dominant type of indebtedness for many advanced countries in the 1920s.⁷ Just as for many emerging markets in the 1980s, much of the 1920s and 1930s were a “lost decade (s)” for European countries. Much of the international policy discourse of that time was an ongoing debate on the need for debt relief. As was the case in the mid-1980s, there were preliminary rescheduling agreements in the early 1920s, which postponed the repayment of war related debts for more than 10 years, but without a reduction in the nominal debt burden (Moulton and Pasvolsky 1932). Finally,

⁵ See also the comprehensive study by Benjamin and Wright (2009).

⁶ The literature on default is primarily about *private creditors* and sovereign borrowers; World War I debt and reparations are about *official creditors* and sovereign borrowers.

⁷ Ahamed (2010) often harks back to the war debt overhang theme.

just as in the early 1990s, the war debt overhang was resolved by widespread and large-scale default and debt relief. This explicit debt reduction was a central way to cope with Fisher's (1933) debt-deflation spiral, thus complementing the devaluation and inflation events importantly.

Box 1. Selected Features of International Debt Overhang Episodes

| | 1920/1930s Defaults | 1980s/1990s Debt Crisis | 2007 Subprime and its Aftermath |
|---|--|--|---|
| <i>Characterisation</i> | Legacy of WWI; "Lost Generation" and economic dislocation | "Lost Decade" in Developing Countries | Recurring parallels of Latin America's and Japan's lost decades. Emerging theme of 'Secular Stagnation' |
| <i>Scope of debt overhang</i> | By the 1930s, following a wave of banking crises, encompassing both advanced and emerging economies | Largely confined to emerging markets and developing countries. Most hard-hitting for Africa and Latin America | Advanced economy crisis most acutely felt in periphery Europe, where the contraction extends 5-6 years |
| <i>Type of debt overhang</i> | | | |
| Advanced Economies: | 1920s: Largely government-to-government war and reconstruction loans (external foreign currency debt) 1930s: Build-up of additional domestic public debt associated with economic depression. | | Pre-crisis surge in private domestic and external borrowing, largely driven by household and financial sector debts. Post-crisis surge in public and publicly-guaranteed debt. |
| Emerging Markets: | Public and private external debts predominantly to private creditors | Public and private borrowers, largely private creditors (predominantly banks). Crisis follows 1970s commodity boom and capital flows | |
| <i>Early policy measures</i> | 1923-1930, war debt settlements with US and UK: maturity extensions of up to 60 years (no debt write-offs) | 1982-1985 repeated debt rollovers and bridge loans, 1986-1989 Baker Plan: maturity extensions of up to 30 years (no debt write-offs) | Large-scale socialization of private debts (bank bailouts). Public debt write-offs confined to Greece. Emergence of significant official lending. Limited private-sector write-offs (except US) |
| <i>Late policy measures (crisis resolution)</i> | Hoover Moratorium /w US 1931 Lausanne Agreement /w UK 1932 Generalized default 1934 (unilateral debt write-offs follow) | Brady debt relief initiative 1990-1997 (negotiated debt reduction) | Rescheduling of official debts: maturity extensions of up to 40 years. Overhang yet to be resolved |

There are also parallels between today's public and private debt overhangs in advanced economies and those of the post WWI era (see Box 1). During the 1930s, concerns about the debt burdens intensified, especially after country after country succumbed to systemic financial crises during 1929-1931 and protracted economic depression. Since the onset of the subprime crisis in 2007, the nature of the debt overhang has also evolved markedly. What were predominantly private debts prior to and at the time of the global financial crisis have now become official or public debts. Both the modern and the 1920-

1930s episodes are synchronous, affecting many advanced economies simultaneously. Moreover, in all three episodes the importance of official debts increased markedly from the beginning of the crisis.

Eichengreen and Portes' (1986) study the interwar years with the aim of explaining the incidence of sovereign default (on private creditors) and characterizing the performance of rates of returns on sovereign bonds. We follow their advice on the direction of future research:

“A further omission especially relevant to our analysis of default is the treatment of war debts and reparations generally and the 1931 Hoover Moratorium in particular.

Another intriguing issue we have not yet begun to address is the relationship of default to the subsequent economic performance of borrowing countries.”

We assess the magnitude, scope and timing of debt relief for the advanced economies in the 1930s (with a primary focus on war debts) and the emerging markets post 1979. Our strategy of studying in parallel events and economic outcomes in advanced and emerging market economies is along the lines of Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012), who examine the antecedents and immediate aftermath of banking, currency, and debt crises. Our time frame of analysis is complementary to theirs, as we are interested in the patterns surrounding the eventual *exit* from debt crises. The indicators analyzed in the post-debt-relief period include: real per capita GDP (levels and growth rates); sovereign credit ratings, including Fitch, Moodys and Institutional Investors; debt servicing burdens (interest and amortization) relative to GDP, GNI, revenues, and exports; external debt (public plus private) for emerging markets; total, external, and domestic central government debt relative to GDP, GNI, and exports.

Our main findings can be summarized as follows:

Across 45 default and restructuring episodes over 1932-1939 and 1979-2010 for which we have the required data, debt relief averaged 21 and 16 percent of GDP for advanced economies and middle-high-income emerging markets, respectively; these estimates represent a lower bound on the true magnitude of debt relief.

The size of the advanced economy debt write-downs (relative to GDP) arising from the 1932-1934 defaults on World War I debt are not dissimilar from the estimates for the post-1970 middle-high income emerging market defaults and restructurings.

The cumulative average increase in per capita GDP over the four years following a decisive restructuring or default is 9 and 16 percent for the emerging markets and advanced economies, respectively. Decisive refers to the default or the last write down in a sequence - “restructuring to end all restructurings.” In the case of World War I Debt, the June 15, 1934 default settled the matter for that episode; for the emerging market cases, it is the last restructuring that marks the exit from default status.⁸

The incidence of a marked pick-up in economic activity following a debt write-down is widespread. Of the 47 combined advanced and emerging market episodes for which we have per capita real GDP data, 39 (83 percent) expanded from T to T+4. In six of the remaining eight cases, real per capita GDP was flat (defined as less than or equal to a one percent change in either direction) post-restructuring; and two episodes out of 47 had a significant decline in real per capita GDP.

On the question of capital market access, we look for patterns in the evolution of sovereign credit ratings post default. Here the interwar experience departs considerably from the emerging market (1979-2010) outcomes.

For the emerging market episodes over 1979-2010, we examine Institutional Investor Sovereign Ratings (IIR) for 30 episodes for which there is full data. The average increases (improvement) in the IIR index are 22 percent after two years and 38 percent after four years.

For 7 of the episodes (23 percent), the cumulative increase in the IIR from T to T+4 is in excess of 60 percent. This pattern of recovery is broadly consistent with the findings in Gelos, Sahay, and

⁸ In a significant number of instances there is only a single restructuring. However, there are numerous default spells where the number of restructurings ranges from two to eight.

Sandleris (2011), who conclude market access following default comes swiftly (well within the four year window examined here).

The single lowest IIR reading at T+4 was Ecuador's (about 10 percent lower than when it exited from default in 1995).⁹ But this negative outcome was not because Ecuador remained shut out of capital markets since its "final" Brady Plan restructuring but rather because it was quick to re-leverage after the restructuring by 1998 (T+4), Ecuador was heading for a *new* debt crisis in 1999-2000.¹⁰

Debt service burdens (amortizations plus interest payments) as a share of: GDP, GNI, central government revenues, or exports decline following a restructuring. For the war debt default episodes, the ratio of debt service to revenues falls from an average of about 34 percent in the late 1920s to about 24 percent a decade later. For the emerging markets (1979-2010), debt servicing declines in advance of the "final restructuring," as often there are multiple debt reduction efforts prior to the exit from default. The decline is most pronounced in debt service-to-exports ratio, which drops from 37 percent in the three years prior to default to 19 percent in the three years after exiting from default. We caution that even in the absence of haircuts, external factors could account for some of the observed reduction in debt servicing. Specifically, there is a sustained trend decline in real international interest rates following the abrupt spike in 1979 through mid-1982.

On the question of whether the debt write-downs actually reduced debt, we focus primarily on external debt and compare the advanced economy and emerging market experience over a nine-year span from four years before default (restructuring) to four years afterwards. For the advanced economies, we examine external (foreign) central government debt/GDP. The selection of external debt is warranted by the fact that the war debts were external debt arrangements among sovereign governments. For the emerging markets, the haircut calculus from Cruces and Trebesch (2013) is also for external credit events.

⁹ There are a total of 3 of the 30 cases (including Ecuador) where the rating was below what it was at the time of the last restructuring.

¹⁰ See Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano (2003) on this phenomenon and the subsection entitled *Did default or restructuring reduce the debt?* this paper.

On average (across 35 advanced economy and emerging market episodes for which we have complete debt data), external debt/ GDP or GNI falls 19 percentage points over the nine-year window. There is a vast range in variation in the debt outcomes, ranging from a cumulative debt reduction of 125 percent of GDP or GNI to a debt build-up of 37 percent.

Two additional observations: First, the number of countries which record deleveraging is considerably higher (27 episodes) than the tally of those ending up with a higher level of external debt (7 episodes).¹¹ Second, the outcomes corresponding to the advanced economies are not clustered in a particular range and, indeed, their experience is distributed similarly to that of emerging markets. As Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012) find, the patterns seen in emerging and advanced economies' crises are qualitatively similar, except that emerging market credit ratings were penalized more heavily at the time of default.¹²

The paper proceeds as follows: In the following section we describe the methodology, data requirements and other conceptual issues while Section III introduces the advanced economies and emerging market restructuring and default episodes that are the centerpiece of the paper. Section IV is devoted to the comparisons of the modern emerging market experiences with the defaults on war debt of the 1930s. Concluding remarks discuss related policy issues and scope for research in this area while appendices present supplementary material.

II. Concepts and Methodology

In the remainder of this section, we provide: (1) definitions for the concepts employed throughout the analysis (be it the type of sovereign crisis, the type of debt, creditor types, etc.); (2) a sketch of our basic methodology to calculate the magnitude of debt relief associated with a default or a restructuring;

¹¹ The US shows no change in external debt, as it did not have any external debt over this sample. Altogether this brings the total number of advanced and emerging market episodes to 35. The 1934 abrogation of the gold clause is the only domestic restructuring episode in our sample.

¹² Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012) cover banking, currency, and debt crises over 1973 to 2010. This offers ample opportunity for the comparison of banking and currency crises in EMs and advanced economies. In this window, however, debt crises are confined to emerging markets; the inclusion of the 1930s defaults in advanced economies extends the comparison in an important dimension.

(3) a brief description of data requirements and their respective sources. A Data Appendix completes the task of providing individual sources in greater detail.

1. Default, restructuring spells, and other concepts

Box 2 provides a compact definition and commentary on the main events studied in this paper—specifically, sovereign debt crises. All the episodes (with a single exception) that are introduced in Section III and analyzed in the remainder of the paper fall into the category of sovereign *external* debt crises, as defined in Box 2. The aforementioned exception is a sovereign domestic crisis, which is the category that the United States' January 1934 haircut falls into, as it was confined to debt issued by the United States Treasury under domestic law (it also happened that the debt was held almost exclusively by domestic residents, and denominated in domestic currency, although prior to the haircut, it was linked to gold).

Within the realm of external sovereign debt crisis, we deal with two distinct varieties: The most common variety involves private creditors and sovereign borrowers. This type of credit event, in its many guises, captures the episodes of 1979-2010 in emerging markets. The other variety involves official creditors (specifically sovereign governments) lending to other sovereign governments. The episodes covered in the interwar sample (World War I and reconstruction debts) fall into this category. To be clear, in light of the severe financial crises and economic depression of the 1930s, there were many episodes of default and restructuring involving private creditors as well—but these are not the focal point of our study (we refer to these to the extent that they overlap or interact with the settlement of the war debt).¹³

Box 2 also defines some of the timing conventions used in our analysis. On other conventions, we use the term default and restructuring interchangeably, as the latter is a partial default (a haircut), and, as described in Box 2, a restructuring changes the terms of the original contract to terms less favorable to the

¹³ See, for instance, Eichengreen and Portes, (1986) and (1990), Eichengreen, (1992).

creditor. Rating agencies also treat restructurings in this manner. Before turning to our methodology for estimating the size of debt relief in each default spell, a few more definitions on debt types will clarify our choices of data.

As our debt crises are predominantly external, we focus primarily (but not exclusively) on external debt. In terms of borrowers, external debt can be public, publicly guaranteed, or private (which does not necessarily mean it is not ultimately guaranteed also). As to lenders, these can be official (sovereign governments), multilateral institutions (League of Nations, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, etc.), or private creditors.

The interwar component of our analysis is focused on public debt, more precisely, external (or foreign) public debt (this refers to central government debt in all cases except Italy where general government debt is used). External public debt is where the war debt was housed, unless we note otherwise.¹⁴ Over 1920-1939, we also examine the evolution of central government domestic and total debt, as default on war debt brought about important changes in the composition of the public sector balance sheet.

In the emerging market episodes, we also work with more than one time series. The estimated haircuts are based on public and public guaranteed debt from private creditors (excluding IMF loans, official loans, etc.). To ascertain the larger macroeconomic picture around restructurings, we also trace the evolution of total external debt (the sum of public and private debt from all creditors).

¹⁴ For example, in the case of Italy, since March 1926, the service of the war debt was relegated to the Autonomous Fund of the War debts. Where possible, we keep a track record of how the War debt and its service is integrated in the public sector accounts.

Box 1. Crisis, Default, and Timing Definitions

| Type of Crisis or date | Definition | Comments |
|---|--|--|
| External sovereign debt crisis | <p>A sovereign default is defined as the failure to meet a principal or interest payment on the due date (or within the specified grace period). These episodes also include instances where rescheduled debt is ultimately extinguished in terms less favorable than the original obligation.</p> <p>An external sovereign default involves debt that is classified as external because it was issued under foreign law. Usually (but not always) such debt is denominated in a foreign currency and is predominantly held by nonresidents.</p> | <p>In this study, we have two types of external debt crises: Defaults of debts between governments (this encompasses World War I debt and reparations payments) and private sector lending to official borrowers or to institutions that are publicly guaranteed (the emerging market defaults or restructurings fall into this category).</p> |
| Domestic sovereign debt crisis | <p>The definition given above for external debt applies, except these episodes cover debt issued under domestic law. Such debt may be denominated in domestic or foreign currency and held by either residents or nonresidents. Domestic debt crises have also often involved the freezing of bank deposits and or forcible conversions of such deposits from dollars to local currency.</p> | <p>The US 1934 abrogation of the gold clause is the only domestic debt crisis we examine. In line with the definition above, the delinking from gold meant that the debt was “ultimately extinguished in terms less favorable than the original obligation.”</p> |
| T | <p>In this study we define T as the year of the final restructuring or default; the year of the last debt relief in that default spell.</p> | <p>For WWI defaults, T=1934 for all debtor countries, while debt relief began in 1931 with the Hoover Moratorium, the WWI debt issue was not resolved until the June 15 across the board default. From that date, only Finland made payments on the War debt. 1934 would not be the final date if we were focused on default episodes on private creditors. For example, Germany did not reach its final restructuring until 1952.</p> <p>For emerging market episodes, T is the date of the final restructuring that marks the exit from default. For instance, Mexico defaulted in August 1982 (start of the default spell); it had six restructuring deals between the start date (1982) and 1990 the date of the final restructuring (T=end date=exit from default).</p> |

2. Haircuts and debt relief

It is quite common in our sample to see multiple debt reduction efforts in consecutive years (in some years there may even be more than one restructuring); these are not, in our estimation, separate debt crises but the same lingering unresolved one, which can go on for a decade and longer. Many developing countries went through a series of debt restructurings throughout the 1980s before finally resolving the crisis in the 1990s. Similarly, we find that the war debt and reconstruction loans owed to the US and the UK had been renegotiated in almost all debtor countries prior to the defaults of 1934 (see below, and Moulton and Pasvolsky 1932, for an overview). Also the recent Greek restructuring has been a multi-year ongoing process, as documented in Zettelmeyer, Trebesch, and Gulati (2013). Here, our interest is to quantify the magnitude of debt relief of the entire default spell rather than that of individual deals.

The database on haircuts constructed by C&T (2013) presents, for each restructuring deal, the amount of debt affected as well as two measures of the haircut agreed upon in each deal. Their approach follows a series of papers by Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006, 2007 and 2008), who focus on eight case studies of more recent crises. This information, along with the corresponding US dollar GDP figures for the corresponding years, is shown in Appendix Table B1 for a total of 97 individual restructuring deals in the 30 middle-high income countries we study over 1978-2010. From this information, a *cumulative* haircut measure for the entire default spell is (see C&T, 2013 Appendix p. 3) and synopsis below.^{15 16} The default spell dates are from Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). Thus, the 97 individual restructurings correspond to 35 default spells in 30 countries. Argentina, Dominican Republic, and Uruguay had two separate default episodes or spells; Ecuador had three.

¹⁵ Source: C&T (2013) <https://sites.google.com/site/christophtrebesch/research>.

¹⁶ In effect, in the same spirit of C&T (2013) two cumulative haircut estimates can be derived; the first is based on the “preferred” haircut measure for each successive restructuring and a market cumulative measure, which replaces the preferred haircut measure with the market calculation.

The cumulative effective haircut can be interpreted as the compound losses of a passive investor who held a face value-weighted basket of all the country's securities and whose debts are restructured sequentially in each deal up to and including the final deal. For the final deal i this measure is:

$$(1) \text{ Cumulative Effective } H^i = 1 - \prod_{j=1}^i WCR^{i,j}$$

Where $WCR_{SZ}^{i,j}$ is the wealth conservation ratio in restructuring j , and J^i-1 is the number of non-final deals preceding final deal i . $WCR^{i,j}$ is defined as:

$$(2) WCR^{i,j} = \frac{\text{Debt Affected}^{i,j}}{\text{Total Debt}_{t-1}^i} (1 - H^{i,j}) + \left(1 - \frac{\text{Debt Affected}^{i,j}}{\text{Total Debt}_{t-1}^i}\right) = 1 - \text{Effective } H^{i,j}$$

The wealth conservation ratio is 1 minus the effective haircut and draws on GFD data to private creditors.

To calculate debt relief for a full spell (up to and including the final restructuring), DR_i , we calculate the following two ratios, which we refer to as Method 1 and 2, respectively:

$$(3) DR_{i,METHOD 1} = \text{Cumulative Effective } H^i \frac{\text{Debt Affected}^{i,j}}{\text{Nominal GDP}_i}$$

Method 2, rather than scaling by final period GDP (which could bias downward the relative importance of earlier restructuring deals assuming nominal GDP is rising over the spell), would be:

$$(4) DR_{i,METHOD 2} = \text{Cumulative Effective } H^i \sum_{j=1}^{j=i} \frac{\text{Debt Affected}^j}{\text{Nominal GDP}_j}$$

A sample calculation for Argentina 1982-1993, tracing out the effects of successive cumulative haircuts over a lengthy (but typical of the debt crisis of the 1980s) default episode, is available from the authors upon request.

For the war debt defaults, as the entire stock of debt was written off, we work with the outstanding stock of debt as a share of GDP as our preferred estimate of the haircut. Consistent with C&T (2013) we add unpaid interest and principal arrears to the debt stock. In addition to this face value haircut, we compute present value haircuts on the war debt based on the contractually agreed principal and

interest payments of the restructuring agreements of the 1920s. The exact terms for each country are taken from the original debt agreements, reprinted in the authoritative study on war debts by Moulton and Pasvolsky (1932). Specifically, we use the terms for the reprofiling agreements of US war debt with Austria (May 1930), Belgium (August 1925), Czechoslovakia (October 1925), Estonia (October 1925), Finland (May 1923), France (April 1926), Great Britain (June 1923), Greece (May 1925), Hungary (April 1924), Italy (November 1925), Latvia (September 1925), Lithuania (September 1924), Poland (November 1925), Poland (November 1924), Romania (December 1925), and Yugoslavia (May 1926). For the UK war debt we use the terms of the settlements of Belgium (December 1925), France (July 1926), Greece (April 1927), Italy (January 1926), Portugal (December 1926), Romania (October 1935), and Yugoslavia (1927).¹⁷ For all future payments, we use a 5% annual discount rate, which follows the approach chosen in Moulton and Pasvolsky (1932).

3. Data and sources

Our comparisons involve two distinct eras separated by forty years; 1920-1939 and 1979-2010. The interwar defaults are about wartime official debts rather than peacetime private lending. Studying these two groups of necessarily requires a broad array of databases and an even broader collection of sources. While a Data Appendix provides greater detail, the major data sources are briefly introduced in Box 3.

In addition to the sources associated with the time series used in this study, there are also important sources used to build the chronology of events surrounding the interwar settlement of war debt that are presented in the next section. Annual League of Nations *World Economic Surveys* covering 1931-1940 are invaluable sources. Pick and Sedillot (1971) and United Nations (1948) figure as prominently useful. Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and Reinhart (2010) date the credit events.

¹⁷ We could not yet gather details on the agreements of Australia, New Zealand, and Portugal on their debt owed to the United Kingdom. We are therefore not able to compute present value debt relief estimates for these cases.

Box 3. Variable List and Main Data Sources

Haircuts and Affected debt: For interwar calculations, important (but not exhaustive) sources are Bailey (1950), League of Nations (various issues), Lloyd (1934), Moody's Manuals: Foreign and American Government Securities (various issues), Moulton and Pasvolsky (1932), United Nations (1948) and US Treasury Annual Financial Reports (various issues); For 1979-2010 restructurings Cruces and Trebesch (2013)

<https://sites.google.com/site/christophotrebesch/>

Debt series; For the advanced economies interwar comparisons the time series on total, external, and domestic central government debt government debt are from Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and (2011); the emerging market total external debt, 1970-2011 is from World Bank (2013), *International Debt Statistics*, Washington DC <http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/international-debt-statistics>.

Central government revenues: 1920-1939 from Mitchell (1998) and (2003); World Bank (2013), *International Debt Statistics*, Washington DC <http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/international-debt-statistics> provides 1970-2011 emerging market data.

Real GDP: Maddison <http://www.ggd.net/maddison/> and Conference Board and Total Economy Database <http://www.conference-board.org/data/economydatabase/>

Nominal GDP: Numerous country specific sources, as detailed in the Data Appendix.

Nominal GDP, US dollars: 1980-2011 International Monetary Fund (2013), *World Economic Outlook*.

Nominal Gross National Income (GNI), US dollars: 1970-2011 is from World Bank (2013), *International Debt Statistics*, Washington DC.

Exports, US dollars (BoP): 1970-2011 is from World Bank (2013), *International Debt Statistics*, Washington DC .

Debt servicing: For the interwar, 1920-1939: League of Nations (various issues), and United Nations (1948); *International Debt Statistics*, Washington DC <http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/international-debt-statistics> provides the post 1970 emerging market data.

Sovereign credit ratings: Fitch, Moody's, Gaillard (2012) are used for the 1930s episodes while *Institutional Investor* <http://www.institutionalinvestor.com/Article/3165784/Sovereign-Ratings-Track-Economy-Lower-in-Country-Credit-Survey.html> provides the post 1979 data.

Source: The authors. See Data Appendix for additional details.

III. The Episodes and Debt Relief

In this section, we introduce the restructuring and default episodes that will be the centerpiece of our study; we sketch some of their more salient features. All episodes except the United States' 1934 abrogation of the gold clause involve external debt. The debt in question is predominantly (but not exclusively) issued under foreign law, denominated in a foreign currency, and held by non-residents. In the cases we examine from the 1930s, we largely confine our attention to World War I debt. War debt is

somewhat of a misnomer, as for most borrowers (the exception is the United Kingdom) much of the debt included under this rubric was contracted after the war had ended and had the distinct character of reconstruction and stabilization loans.¹⁸ A distinguishing feature of this debt is that it is almost entirely contained within the official sectors - both the borrower and the lenders are sovereign governments.

We focus, in particular, on official debts owed to the two largest creditor countries of the time, the United States and the United Kingdom (see Moulton and Pasvolsky 1932). The United Kingdom was a major creditor country to most European countries and owed debt only to the United States. The United States was a pure creditor and did not owe official debts to any other country. These two countries are therefore the two main creditor powers of the interwar period.

For the emerging market episodes of 1978-2010 are different in this respect; the typical pattern involves private creditors and official borrowers. Often enough, however, the debts that end up restructured in these episodes under a sovereign umbrella started out as private debt, which the government stepped in to guarantee at a time of crisis.¹⁹

The academic literature on sovereign default and restructuring has been primarily preoccupied with private creditors lending to public borrowers. The study of default on official debt is far more limited. The combination and comparison of these hybrid episodes is a novel feature of this paper.

Before launching into a discussion of the war debts and their demise, the environment of the 1930s has to be placed in historical context. Bordo and Jonung (2001) who examine chronologically monetary and fiscal regimes from 1881 through 1995, provide an encompassing international setting and offer the following observations: (i) WWI not only gave rise to the high debt levels we examine here, but also saw governments become increasingly reliant on the inflation tax.²⁰; (ii) the return of peace brought a

¹⁸ See Bailey (1950), Lloyd (1934), US Treasury (1920) and (1933).

¹⁹ See Diaz Alejandro (1985) for an early discussion of the contingent liabilities problem and Reinhart (2010) for documenting numerous historical examples.

²⁰ See also Bordo (2012) for a discussion of the inflation tax in a broad historical context.

desire for monetary stability but at the same gave rise to the policy dilemma we are interested in. They observe:

“...in several of the belligerent countries a decision had to be made concerning the treatment of public debt, that is over the time path of budget surpluses to amortize outstanding debt. Governments had to choose whether to run contractionary fiscal policies, which would retire outstanding debt, or to default explicitly or implicitly via inflation. Any decision would have profound effects on the distribution of income between debtors and creditors.”

Over the course of the interwar era (which Bordo and Jonung, 2001 apportion into three distinct regimes: the return to gold in the mid-1920s, the relatively short-lived gold standard, and the final collapse of gold), we will see the progression from earlier attempts to tighten fiscal conditions and pay down the war debt to both explicit default and implicit via reflation and the abandonment of the gold anchor.

1. World War I debts

Table 1 lists 18 countries that, as of 1934, owed debt to the United States and the United Kingdom from World War I and its aftermath. Australia, New Zealand and Portugal only owed debt to the United Kingdom. Finland, which was the only country to fully honor its war debt obligations to the United States, drops out of the analysis.²¹ We add to this list of 18 default cases the United States 1934 haircut (Table A1 in the appendix). This brings the total number of 1930s episodes to 19. In the various empirical exercises that follow, these countries are incorporated to the extent that the data permits. The core episodes with the most complete profile are: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, United Kingdom, and United States.

²¹ Finland was fully preoccupied dealing with Russians following its still recent independence and apparently wished to keep in best terms with the United States.

The first column of Table 1 gives the amount of debt outstanding plus interest arrears at the time of the generalized default in June 1934. These amounts owed to the US and the UK vary somewhat across sources. For instance, the unpaid obligations that are recorded in the United Nations 1948 publication, *Public Debt, 1914–1946*, and in Baily (1950, p. 701)²² are not strictly the same as those shown in Table 1, which are taken from the annual financial reports by the US Treasury or in the Moody's Manuals on Foreign Securities (although all numbers are quite close). Discrepancies may also arise from the exchange rate used to convert the debt into local currency, so as to allow one to construct a measure of the debt relief relative to GDP. Our point estimates of debt relief (the last column) are based on the nominal GDP and exchange rates shown. When in doubt, we have opted for the more conservative estimates.

Table A1 in the appendix presents for the United States episode comparable calculations to those shown for the European countries. The debt outstanding as reported by the US Treasury is given for Nov 15, 1934, while nominal GDP are calendar year figures. The adoption of the Gold Reserve Act, which delinked US Treasury debt from gold (among other things) and devalued the dollar against gold, occurs on January 30-31, 1934. To address the lack of synchronicity, we provide the 1933 and 1934 figures to bracket the estimate of debt reduction delivered.

²² See <http://www.u-s-history.com/pages/h1358.html>.

Exhibit 1. Harmony in Europe, 1932, the *Detroit News*, Artist unknown



Table 1. Unpaid Allied Wartime and Postwar Debt Owed to the United States and the United Kingdom:
The 1934 Summer Defaults

| | <i>Owed to US</i> | <i>Owed to UK</i> | <i>Total to US and UK</i> | <i>Debt relief to GDP (in %)</i> | |
|------------------------|--|--|--|----------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| | Debt outstanding in US\$ (w/ arrears) | Debt outstanding in US\$ (w/ arrears) | Debt outstanding in US\$ (w/ arrears) | Face value (upper bound) | Present value (lower bound) |
| United Kingdom | 4,714,345,235 | . | 4,714,345,235 | 24.5 | 19.5 |
| France | 3,980,735,112 | 3,361,387,861 | 7,342,122,972 | 52.2 | 25.1 |
| Italy | 2,009,555,036 | 1,123,494,772 | 3,133,049,808 | 36.4 | 11.5 |
| Belgium | 413,430,000 | 64,631,010 | 478,061,010 | 4.1 | 2.7 |
| Poland | 226,248,308 | 17,107,860 | 243,356,167 | . | . |
| Czechoslovakia | 165,409,455 | 0 | 165,409,455 | . | . |
| Yugoslavia | 61,625,000 | 146,572,822 | 208,197,822 | . | . |
| Romania | 63,883,007 | 140,836,167 | 204,719,173 | . | . |
| Greece | 32,789,344 | 99,384,805 | 132,174,148 | 43.4 | 21.4 |
| Austria | 23,822,492 | 0 | 23,822,492 | 1.7 | 1.6 |
| Estonia | 18,079,383 | 1,432,045 | 19,511,429 | . | . |
| Finland (fully repaid) | 8,711,996 | 0 | 8,711,996 | 0.2 | 0.2 |
| Latvia | 7,435,784 | 6,222,619 | 13,658,403 | . | . |
| Lithuania | 6,650,080 | 0 | 6,650,080 | . | . |
| Hungary | 2,086,096 | 0 | 2,086,096 | . | . |
| <i>Australia</i> | 0 | 337,777,250 | 337,777,250 | 6.2 | . |
| <i>New Zealand</i> | 0 | 110,966,579 | 110,966,579 | 10.5 | . |
| <i>Portugal</i> | 0 | 99,459,373 | 99,459,373 | 10.3 | . |
| Memorandum items: | | | | | |
| | Total owed the US: | US GDP | | Owed/GDP (US) | |
| | 11,734,806,327 | 66,800,000,000 | | 17.6 | |
| | Total owed the UK: | UK GDP | | Owed/GDP (UK) | |
| | 5,509,273,162 | 19,264,825,087 | | 28.6 | |

Sources: Debt amounts owed to the US are from the *Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury on the State of the Finances - For Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1934*, pp. 391. Debt figures are given for Nov 15, 1934. We add to this the amount of arrears, i.e. overdue payments under the debt restructuring agreements of the 1920s. Debt amounts owed to the UK are from the *Moody's Manual of Investments and Securities Rating Service: Foreign and American Government Securities*, 1935, p.1927. Debt figures are given for March 31, 1934, plus arrears. To compute present values (last column) we use the terms shown in the original loan documents, as shown in Moulton and Pasvolsky (1932). We follow their approach and use a 5% annual rate to discount future war debt payments. The amounts of debt outstanding under the broad category of WWI debt includes, especially for Eastern Europe, debts taken on after the war in connection with reconstruction. The breakdown is given for each debtor country in Reinhart and Rogoff (2014).

Exchange rates are from *Historical Statistics of the United States and United Nation* (1948). The sources for nominal GDP for 1934 are as follows: US and UK from Measuring Worth, <http://www.measuringworth.com/datasets/usgdp/result.php>; France, Historical National Accounts Database (HNAD), 1815-1938 <http://www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/historical-national-accounts>; Italy, Francese and Pace (2008) 1861-2006; Belgium, 1835-2005, BNB, Center d'études économiques de la KUL; Greece, Kostelenos (2003), 1830-1939; Austria, 1924-1937. Global Financial Data; Finland GDP, Historical National Accounts Database (HNAD), 1860-2001, <http://rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/historical-national-accounts>; Portugal: Estadísticas Históricas Do Portugal, 1851-1952; New Zealand: Statistics New Zealand, 1900-1947; Australia: GFD, Haig (2001) 1852-1948;

Having introduced both the broader and core sample for the advanced economies defaults and provided some benchmarks for the magnitude of the defaults, we next take up the issue of the timing and sequencing of these credit events.

The estimates of debt relief in Table 1 uses primarily 1934 GDP figures, as it uniformly dates the “de jure” default in that year. While the 1934 default date is appropriate for the United States case, this dating is less clear cut for the others. De facto, default and other irregularities on war debt payments began earlier. As the chronology presented in Table 2 makes plain, the intentionally temporary Hoover Moratorium is set in motion in 1931 (the moratorium also applies to Germany’s reparations payments). However, at the end of the moratorium in 1932, scheduled payments do not resume in uniform and regular fashion. While the United Kingdom, Italy, Czechoslovakia, Finland, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and Yugoslavia make the scheduled December 15 payment on war debt, France, Belgium, Poland, Estonia and Hungary do not pay (see United States entry).²³ For the latter group, the more relevant default date may be 1932 or 1933. Moreover, we know that most European countries suspended their war debt payments to the United Kingdom after the Lausanne war debt conference of 1932. However, no country except Finland, which fully repaid as scheduled, continued to service their war debt to the US or to the UK past June 1934, hence our common dating choice.

²³ League of Nations, *World Economic Survey* (1932/1933), p. 332.

Table 2. Chronology of Events Leading Up to the Defaults of 1934


| International | |
|--|---|
| August 1924 | Dawes Plan laid out German reparations of 1 billion marks a year, rising to 2.5 billion in five years. It was a restructuring of the terms laid out in the 1919 Treaty of Versailles. |
| June 1929 | The Young Plan was designed to ease the terms of the reparation payments made by Germany, making a substantial share of the repayment state contingent. It is a second restructuring. |
| June 20, 1931 | Hoover Moratorium on payments of WWI and other war debts, including interest payments. |
| July 9, 1932 | Lausanne Conference: the European powers including the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, and Italy agree to suspend all war debt payments among themselves subject to a revision of their debts to the United States. The UK is by far the most important creditor country in Europe, and only owes debt to the United States. |
| June 15, 1934 | |
|  | |
| Austria | |
| May 8, 1930 | Agreement to restructure war debt with the United States |
| May 11, 1931 | Kreditanstalt failure: Despite the Austrian government's guaranty to cover the bank's foreign debt, the bank failure quickly spread through Europe and international capital markets. |
| October 9, 1931 | Foreign exchange controls and depreciation. |
| May 1933 | Payments to the Bank of International Settlements, for the service of the League of Nations loan, are suspended. |
| August 1933 | Standstill agreement of Austrian banks prolonged until January 1934. |
| Australia | |
| December 1929 | Suspension of Gold Standard |
| July 1932 | Suspension of war debt payments to the UK following the Lausanne Conference |
| Belgium | |
| August 18, 1925 | Agreement to restructure war debt with the United States |
| December 31, 1925 | Agreement to restructure war debt with the United Kingdom |
| March 18, 1935 | Foreign exchange controls reintroduced; devaluation of 28%. |
| June 1934 | Government notifies US of decision to defer payment on War debt installment June 15. |
| Czechoslovakia | |
| October 1931 | Control on foreign exchanges |
| June 1934 | Government notifies US of decision to defer payment on War debt installment June 15. |
| Estonia | |
| October 28, 1925 | Agreement to restructure war debt with the United States |
| October 1931 | Control on foreign exchanges. |
| Finland | |
| May 1, 1923 | Agreement to restructure war debt with the United States |
| June 1934 | Only country to pay its war debt installment to the US in full and on time. |

Table 2. Chronology of Events Leading Up to the Defaults of 1934 (continued)

| | |
|--------------------|---|
| France | |
| April 29, 1926 | Agreement to restructure war debt with the United States |
| July 12, 1926 | Agreement to restructure war debt with the United Kingdom |
| December 1932 | Chamber rejected the government's proposal to meet the War debt payment to the US scheduled for mid-December. |
| June 1934 | Government notifies US of decision to defer payment on War debt installment June 15 |
| Germany | |
| December 1922 | Reparations Commission declares Germany in default culminating in the French occupation of the Ruhr. |
| July 13, 1931 | Following the Kreditanstalt crisis in Austria, foreign exchange controls are introduced; a variety of blocked Mark accounts are created through mid-1933. |
| February 1932 | Moratoria on external commercial debt payments. |
| August 1932 | Reparation payments under the Young Plan cancelled but other payments continued |
| May 1933 | Unilateral debt default and widespread capital controls |
| July 1, 1934 | General moratorium on transfers abroad. |
| December 1, 1936 | Death penalty for capital flight. |
| Greece | |
| April 9, 1927 | Agreement to restructure war debt with the United Kingdom |
| May 10, 1929 | Agreement to restructure war debt with the United States |
| Sept. 28, 1931 | Control on foreign exchanges; 49% currency depreciation |
| April 1932 | Moratoria on external public debt service. |
| June 1934 | Postpones for six months payment to US of interest on War debt due July 1 st . |
| Hungary | |
| April 25, 1924 | Agreement to restructure war debt with the United States |
| September 1931 | Control on foreign exchanges |
| December 1931 | Moratoria on external public debt service. |
| January 1933 | Standstill agreement renewed. |
| Italy | |
| Nov. 14, 1925 | Agreement to restructure war debt with the United States |
| January 12, 1926 | Agreement to restructure war debt with the United Kingdom |
| September 1931 | Re-introduction of some foreign exchange controls |
| May 26, 1934 | De facto suspension of convertibility; controls on exportation of bank notes |
| July 22, 1935 | Official conversion of convertibility. |
| Latvia | |
| Sept. 24, 1925 | Agreement to restructure war debt with the United States |
| October 1931 | Control on foreign exchanges |
| April 1932 | Moratoria on external public debt service. |
| June 1934 | Government notifies US of decision to defer payment on War debt installment June 15 |
| Lithuania | |
| Sept. 29, 1924 | Agreement to restructure war debt with the United States |
| June 1934 | Government notifies US of decision to defer payment on War debt installment June 15 |
| New Zealand | |
| December 1929 | Currency parity with British Sterling is abandoned |
| July 1932 | Suspension of war debt payments to the UK following the Lausanne Conference |
| January 20, 1933 | Depreciation by 25% vis-à-vis British Sterling |
| Poland | |
| November 14, 1924 | Agreement to restructure war debt with the United States |
| July 1932 | Control on foreign exchanges |
| June 1934 | Government notifies US of decision to defer payment on War debt installment June 15 |

Table 2. Chronology of Events Leading Up to the Defaults of 1934 (concluded)

| | |
|-------------------|---|
| | Portugal |
| June 3, 1924 | Introduction of foreign exchange controls |
| December 31, 1926 | Agreement to restructure War debt with the United States |
| January 1, 1932 | Suspension of fixed exchange rate to the British Sterling |
| | Romania |
| October 19, 1925 | Agreement to restructure war debt with the United Kingdom |
| December 4, 1925 | Agreement to restructure war debt with the United States |
| August 1933 | Transfer moratorium declared. |
| September 1933 | Negotiation with bondholders to discuss debt service reduction. |
| July 1934 | Foreign debt agreement reached |
| | United Kingdom |
| June 19, 1923 | Agreement to restructure war debt with the United States |
| Sept. 21, 1931 | Abandonment of gold standard |
| June 1934 | Government notifies US of decision to defer payment on War debt installment June 15 |
| | United States |
| June 20, 1931 | Hoover Moratorium on payments of WWI and other War debts, including interest payments. Approved by Congress in December. |
| November 1932 | The US refuses postponement of war debt payments due December 15. France and the UK had made such a request. |
| December 15, 1932 | UK, Italy, Czechoslovakia, Finland, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and Yugoslavia make the scheduled payment on War debt; France, Belgium, Poland, Estonia and Hungary do not pay. |
| March 6, 1933 | Roosevelt Proclamation resulting in embargo on gold and establishment of foreign exchange controls. Bank holiday. |
| March 9, 1933 | Suspension of gold convertibility |
| April 5, 1933 | Compulsory surrender of gold (more than \$100) held by individuals. |
| June 15, 1933 | The governments of Britain, Czechoslovakia, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, and Romania do not make full war debt payments to the United States and offer symbolic token payments instead. |
| January 30, 1934 | Gold Reserve Act: Abrogation of the gold clause |
| January 31, 1934 | Devaluation of 40.94%: from 1 troy ounce of gold =20.67 US dollars to 1 troy ounce of gold = 35.00US dollars. |
| June 1934 | Places embargo on export of silver. |
| | Yugoslavia |
| May 3, 1926 | Agreement to restructure war debt with the United States |
| August 9, 1927 | Agreement to restructure war debt with the United Kingdom |
| October 1931 | Control on foreign exchanges |
| March 1932 | Moratoria on external commercial debt payments |
| April 1932 | Moratoria on external public debt service |
| October 1932 | Default on two loans |
| June 1934 | Government notifies US of decision to defer payment on war debt installment June 15 |

2. Middle-high income emerging market episodes: 1980s debt crisis to the present

The emerging market default and restructuring episodes covered in this study are a subset of the larger universe of debt crises in developing countries. Specifically, we limit our coverage to episodes in middle-to-high-income emerging markets. It is our contention that the emerging markets of today have much in common with the advanced economies of the 1930s. Unfortunately, in recent years the same can

be said about the advanced economies of today. Most middle-to-high- income emerging markets have access (albeit with much volatility and frequent sudden stops) to international capital markets and attract private capital flows in a manner more closely resembling pre-World War II advanced economies than the low-income countries that rely more heavily on concessional lending and aid.

In earlier work Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) examined the incidence of default. In this paper we also aim to quantify the magnitude of the debt relief achieved in the numerous defaults and restructurings in emerging markets since the late 1970s. Our starting point is the comprehensive database on haircuts recently compiled by Cruces and Trebesch (2013). They provide detailed information on each individual restructuring over 1979-2010 for all emerging and developing countries that have the prerequisite data. We aggregate these individual restructurings into a default spell to the extent that they are sequentially connected. Our dating of default spells is taken from Reinhart and Rogoff (2009).

Table 3 lists the 35 episodes that make up the emerging market sample and column (1) provides the dates of the default spell (or spells, as some countries like Ecuador and Argentina have more than one default or restructuring episode since the late 1970s. The cumulative haircuts shown in column (4) are from Cruces and Trebesch (2013); the final column calculates the debt relief as a percent of GDP in their baseline computation. A companion Appendix Table B1 presents additional detail on the individual building blocks of the cumulative default measure shown here. As was the case with the advanced economies interwar sample, not all episodes can be documented to the same extent. Some of the transition economies have data that only partially covers their default or restructuring episodes, while some of the smaller island nations are excluded from databases, (Institutional Investor Ratings, Total Economy database, etc.)

Table 3. Middle-High Income Emerging Market Episodes of Default or Debt Restructuring, 1978-2010

| Episode number | Country | Full episode | Debt affected | Debt affected/ GDP | Full episode haircut (C&T) | Debt relief/ GDP |
|----------------|---------------------|--------------|---------------|-----------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------|
| | | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | Baseline |
| 1 | Algeria | 1991-1996 | 4,657 | 9.9 | 0.054 | 0.5 |
| 2 | Argentina | 1982-1993 | 67,891 | 28.7 | 0.477 | 24.0 |
| 3 | Argentina | 2001-2005 | 60,572 | 33.4 | 0.425 | 14.2 |
| 4 | Bosnia and H. | 1992-1997 | 1,300 | 24.6 | 0.896 | 22.1 |
| 5 | Brazil | 1983-1994 | 130,493 | 23.9 | 0.375 | 14.3 |
| 6 | Bulgaria | 1990-1994 | 7,910 | 98.7 | 0.563 | 55.6 |
| 7 | Chile | 1983-1990 | 21,731 | 64.8 | 0.379 | 35.6 |
| 8 | Costa Rica | 1983-1990 | 2,433 | 42.6 | 0.791 | 43.4 |
| 9 | Croatia | 1992-1996 | 858 | 3.7 | 0.11 | 0.4 |
| 10 | Dominican Rep. | 1982-1994 | 1,910 | 13.6 | 0.731 | 13.3 |
| 11 | Dominican Rep. | 2005 | 1,280 | 3.8 | 0.016 | 0.1 |
| 12 | Dominica | 2003-2005 | 144 | 39.9 | 0.54 | 21.6 |
| 13 | Ecuador | 1982-1995 | 12,714 | 54.3 | 0.512 | 31.2 |
| 14 | Ecuador | 1999-2000 | 6,700 | 35.9 | 0.334 | 12.0 |
| 15 | Ecuador | 2008-2009 | 3,190 | 5.5 | 0.528 | 2.9 |
| 16 | Gabon | 1986-1994 | 226 | 5.3 | 0.054 | 0.3 |
| 17 | Grenada | 2004-2005 | 210 | 30.2 | 0.339 | 10.2 |
| 18 | Jamaica | 1978-1993 | 1,452 | 31.1 | 0.516 | 24.4 |
| 19 | Jordan | 1989-1993 | 1,289 | 23.3 | 0.227 | 5.3 |
| 20 | Macedonia, FYR | 1992-1997 | 229 | 6.1 | 0.346 | 2.1 |
| 21 | Mexico | 1982-1990 | 177,771 | 61.8 | 0.42 | 36.2 |
| 22 | Panama | 1983-1996 | 4,967 | 53.3 | 0.389 | 22.9 |
| 23 | Peru | 1980-1997 | 11,320 | 19.1 | 0.64 | 13.8 |
| 24 | Poland | 1981-1994 | 30,912 | 29.8 | n.a. | 15.1 |
| 25 | Romania | 1981-1986 | 2,965 | 6.2 | 0.158 | 0.9 |
| 26 | Russia | 1991-2000 | 68,683 | 26.4 | 0.495 | 11.3 |
| 27 | Serbia & Montenegro | 2003-2004 | 2,700 | 11.5 | 0.709 | 8.1 |
| 28 | Seychelles | 2008-2010 | 320 | 32.9 | 0.562 | 18.5 |
| 29 | Slovenia | 1992-1996 | 812 | 3.9 | 0.033 | 0.1 |
| 30 | South Africa | 1985-1993 | 23,400 | 17.9 | 0.377 | 9.2 |
| 31 | Trinidad & Tobago | 1988-1989 | 446 | 10.3 | 0.155 | 1.6 |
| 32 | Turkey | 1978-1982 | 5,067 | 5.8 | 0.316 | 0.9 |
| 33 | Uruguay | 1983-1991 | 5,913 | 47.8 | 0.46 | 34.3 |
| 34 | Uruguay | 2003 | 3,127 | 26.0 | 0.079 | 2.1 |
| 35 | Venezuela | 1983-1990 | 60,230 | 124.5 | 0.387 | 41.6 |
| | Averages | | 20,738 | 30.2 | 0.39 | 15.7 |

Sources: Cruces and Trebesch (2013), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), Table 1, Appendix Table B1, sources cited therein and authors' calculations

3. Debt relief estimates

Subject to the limitations discussed in the preceding section, Figure 1a presents our preferred estimate of the magnitude of debt relief as a share of GDP. The figure shows in ascending order a total 46 individual advanced and emerging market default/restructuring episodes. The corresponding estimate is shown alongside the country and episode date. The red and green bars denote the advanced and emerging market economies, respectively.

Nine of the 18 countries defaulting on war debt to the US and the UK in the 1930s (Australia, Austria, Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, New Zealand, Portugal and United Kingdom) listed in Table 1 are shown in Figure 1a. The remaining 10 default cases are excluded owing to data limitations, mainly because no nominal GDP data is available, although we do have the nominal amounts owed and defaulted upon in June 1934 (see Table 1).²⁴ The haircut associated with the abrogation of the gold clause in the United States in conjunction with the 41 percent devaluation of the dollar in early 1934 (Table A1) is also included in Figure 1a. The average debt relief/GDP for this group of 10 is 20.6 percent.

Figure 1b gives more detailed estimates on the war debt relief of 1934 for main creditor countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, Portugal and the United Kingdom) vis-à-vis the UK and the US. We compare the debt relief in face value terms (nominal write-off) to our debt relief estimates in present value terms, using the interest rate and repayment terms from the original debt agreements of each case and an annual 5% discount rate.²⁵ The war debt restructuring agreement often implied very long maturity extensions, with new maturities reaching as far as the 1980s. For this reason, the present value debt relief estimates are often considerably below the face value estimates, especially for agreements with the United Kingdom. At the same time, the large majority of war loans would have already fallen due by 1934, had this debt not been rescheduled under very generous terms. The present value relief estimates for 1934 are therefore artificially small and should be interpreted as the lower bound, while the face value debt

²⁴ See also *New York Times*, June 15, 1934.

²⁵ The choice of a 5% discount rate follows the literature of the time, see for instance, Molton and Pasvolsky (1932).

reduction is more appropriate assessment on the scope of debt relief in 1934. We are currently working on computing haircuts for the 1920s agreement so that we can eventually compute cumulative haircuts that are fully comparable to the C&T (2013) numbers.

The 35 middle-high income emerging market episodes listed in Table 3 yield an average debt relief estimate of 15.7 percent, about four percentage points lower than on the advanced economy war debt. The range of variation across the emerging markets is much higher than for the 1930 episodes, ranging from a high of around 56 percent for Bulgaria to nil.²⁶ Seven debt restructuring episodes where debt relief amounted to less than one percent of GDP are not shown in Figure 1a but are included in the average cited above and reported in Table 3. The episodes are Algeria 1991-1996, Croatia 1992-1996, Dominican Republic 2005, Gabon 1986-1994, Romania 1981-1986, Slovenia 1992-1996, Turkey 1978-1982.

While our emphasis in this paper is confined to the middle-to high income emerging market restructuring episodes listed in Table 3, we also calculate comparable debt relief estimates for lower income emerging markets included in the Cruces and Trebesch (2013) study. On the whole, debt relief estimates for the poorer countries run lower despite higher haircuts. The share of affected debt is smaller both in absolute dollar amounts and relative to domestic GDP, as private lending is limited and official sources and aid play a more prominent role.

The main conclusions drawn from this exercise is that restructurings averaging 16-21 percent of GDP were not trivial in helping governments resolve past debt overhangs and that, in effect, (for the reasons discussed in Section II) these figures may underestimate the true magnitude of debt relief. Most importantly, the generalized default on war debt was not limited to debt owed the United States and the United Kingdom (which are the only ones we systematically quantify here). Large amounts of

²⁶ In the case of Bulgaria, the haircut is about 56 percent (Cruces and Trebesch, 2013) and the share of affected debt to GDP is almost 100 percent (columns 3 and 4, Table 3).


governmental debt were also owed to France, Italy and Belgium, including the notorious reparation debts by Germany.²⁷

Furthermore, the orders of magnitude of the advanced economy debt write-downs relative to the size of the economy are not dissimilar from the magnitudes seen in the modern vintage EM defaults and restructurings. Of course, our analysis only offers a first pass at quantifying and comparing seemingly disparate credit events. Ongoing work makes further refinements in these comparisons introducing a variety of control groups, which allow for clearer distinctions between episodes that primarily involve official debt versus episodes that are defaults on private creditors, as well as “decisive” versus “intermediate” credit events. Our emphasis here on debt reduction via restructuring and default is not meant to suggest that other forms of debt reduction were not quantitatively important as well. Fiscal retrenchment, structural reform, financial repression, and (in the case of domestic currency denominated debt) inflation often co-existed in these episodes of debt write-offs.

Taking together Table 1 and Table A1 in the Appendix, it is also evident that the magnitude of the US haircut from devaluations and the abrogation of the gold clause relative to GDP is about 16-17 percent, a comparable order of magnitude to the amount it cost the US to forgive European debts. In the end, it appears as a transfer of resources from US holders of domestic debt to the European sovereigns.

²⁷ Belgium, France and Italy were each owed total war debts of more than 1bn 1933 US Dollars, respectively, see Moulton and Pasvolsky (1932).


Figure 1a. Default, Restructuring, and Debt Relief: World War I Debt to the US and the UK, 1934, Emerging Markets, 1978-2010, United States, 1934 (*Debt relief as a percent of GDP*)



Sources: Cruces and Trebesch (2013), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), Table 1a, Appendix Table B1, sources cited therein and authors' calculations.

Notes: Estimates of debt relief correspond to "Method 2". We use the face value estimates for the 1934 events. Seven debt restructuring episodes where debt relief amounted to less than one percent of GDP are not shown in Figure 1 but are included in the reported average. The episodes are Algeria 1991-1996, Croatia 1992-1996, Dominican Republic 2005, Gabon 1986-1994, Romania 1981-1986, Slovenia 1992-1996, Turkey 1978-1982.

Figure 1b. War Debt Relief of Major European Countries as Share of GDP in 1934



Notes: Estimates of war debt relief in % of creditor country GDP. Figures are shown for debt owed to the US and to the UK separately. The sources are the same as in Table 1a. The present value estimates use an annual discount rate of 5% and the contractual debt service streams of the original agreements as in Moulton and Pasvolsky (1932).

IV. Default and Restructuring Comparisons: Before and After, North and South

This section takes the “north-south” comparison of the sovereign default and restructuring experience further by examining the evolution of income levels and growth, credit ratings and market access, debt servicing burdens, and the level and composition of debt around this hybrid cross-country experience of sovereign default and restructuring.

1. Income levels and growth

Our starting point is to examine the performance of per capita GDP (levels and growth rates) episode by episode in and around the date of restructuring that anchors the exercise, denoted in all figures

and tables by T. Our dating of “T” with its limitations was discussed in Section II. Here we define the window (years before and after T) used in our analysis. The emphasis is primarily on what happens at the time (T) and in the aftermath of debt relief, here defined as the “final” or decisive restructuring.

For a few emerging markets, the final restructuring may have been the only one in a short-lived credit event that lasted two years or less, as was the case for Uruguay in 2003. More often than not, however, the final exit from default status came after a multi-year stint. The longest cumulative default spells were for Peru and Jamaica and lasted 18 and 16 years, respectively. In a significant number of cases, there were several restructurings before “the restructuring to end all restructurings” materialized (see Appendix Table B1). As Cruces and Trebesch (2013) document, Poland had a total of seven restructurings before their “final” one in 1994; Jamaica had six before reaching closure on that particular 16-year episode; Brazil had a total of six tries, and so on. The average duration of the full default spells for the 35 EM episodes shown in Table 3 is 7.3 years.

Also the default and payment irregularities on World War I debt in the advanced economies were a protracted process, spanning roughly from the debt settlements (which restructured the profile of the debt) of the early 1920s until the generalized default of mid-1934. The same is true for the debt overhang on non-World War I public and private debts, which stretching into the post-World War II era. For example, Austria and Germany were in default through 1952; Italy was in default 1940-1945; Greece and Hungary had even longer stints in default status through 1964 and 1967, respectively.²⁸ In addition, there was the notorious issue with the German Reparation Debt which originated in the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, is declared in default for the first time in 1922 (Table 2), is restructured under the Dawes Plan in 1924, restructured again under the Young Plan in 1929, and ultimately defaulted on during 1932-1934.

We focus on a four-year window around T; the first leg, T-4 to T can provide a sense of the run-up of credit events that bring some closure and debt relief. However, this four-year window does not

²⁸ See Reinhart and Rogoff (2009).

allow us to say much (except for the very short default episodes) about the antecedents of a “*new*” default or restructuring episode. Thus, our analysis and results are not to be comingled and confused with the literature on early warnings of debt crises (see Reinhart, 2002, Manasse, Roubini and Schimmelfennig, 2003 and Manasse and Roubini, 2009), which attempt to characterize the run-up to the first wave of distress.²⁹ Our interest in this paper is aligned more closely with Gelos, Sahay, and Sandleris (2011), who study what factors determine access to international capital markets for a large sample of emerging markets, examine international capital flows following a default, an issue we take up later in this section.³⁰

Figure 2 plots average real per capita GDP level (normalized to equal one at time T) around final restructurings (exit from default).³¹ The average covers 33 of the 35 middle-high income emerging markets (Table 3) for which we have real per capita GDP data.³² The red line shows the comparable average for 12 of the 16 defaulters the 1930s shown in Table 1a plus the United States and Germany. While the lines show the level of per capita GDP, from both the normalization to T=1 and the inset box, Figure 2, also summarizes the growth performance.

For the 1930s average, 1932 marks the trough in per capita GDP with barely any change through 1934. After 1934 there is a sharp rebound (cumulative growth is 16% from T to T+4) following a prolonged collapse of 7 percent. Rebound notwithstanding, it takes six years to recoup the income level recorded in T-4 (as we will show, it takes even longer to surpass the prior economic peak in per capita GDP, which usually predated T-4 and corresponds to 1930). The emerging market countries show a flat per capita GDP path while in the default spell (through T) but a substantial pick up thereafter.

²⁹ In Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) also, T is set as the first year of a default spell and hence asks a different question.


³⁰ Gelos et al. (2011), however, date the beginning of the default spell not its conclusion.

³¹ See Tomz and Wright (2007) for a long-run study on the link between sovereign default and output.

³² The data comes from Maddison <http://www.ggd.net/maddison/> for pre-1950 and the Total Economy Database (TED) subsequently.

Figure 2. Real Per Capita GDP Around Final Restructurings (Exit from Default) in Middle-High Income Emerging Markets, 1978-2010 and Selected 1934 Sovereign Default Episodes (Mostly on World War I Debt to United States)

8-year window around credit event, level of real per capita GDP at $T=1$



Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook, Maddison Database, Reinhart and Rogoff, (2009 and 2013) Total Economy Database and authors' calculations. War debt defaults on debts to the US.

In sum, while the magnitude of recovery in per capita GDP over the four years following a decisive restructuring or default ranges from a cumulative average increase of 9 to 16 percent for the two groups of emerging and advanced economies, the more salient feature of the exercise is finding that there is broad evidence of a marked pick-up in economic activity following debt write-off/debt relief episodes. Of the 47 combined advanced and emerging market episodes, 39 had positive growth over T to $T+4$. Of the remaining eight, six had a flat real per capita GDP profile (defined as less than or equal to a one percent change in either direction) and two out of 47 had negative cumulative growth.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to apportion to what extent the post-debt relief recovery owed to the restructuring per se and what role may have been played by other factors. In the case of the 1930s episodes, Eichengreen (1992) stressed the importance of stimulus provided by exits from the gold standard.³³ However, these exits from the golden fetters were spread over a five-year period, from the early British and Greek exits in 1931 (Table 2) to the French exit five years later in 1936. The defaults and debt write-downs were clustered much more closely in the trough 1932-1934. On the fiscal front, of course public works programs were also initiated in the T to T+4 span during the depression, but as with monetary policy there was considerable dispersion in their timing and magnitudes. For emerging markets, the usually sharp depreciations that accompany debt crises (see Reinhart, 2002) may have been a force behind these recoveries.

2. Capital market access and sovereign credit ratings

We next examine the evolution of credit ratings around the episodes of interest. In several influential models of sovereign default, the reputational damage done by a default lasts forever and access to international capital markets is irrevocably lost.³⁴ In reality, we know that governments who have behaved badly (defaulted on their obligations) ultimately regain their ability to borrow again and, in scores of cases, default again and again. An interesting question is what can be learned about market access from the behavior of sovereign credit ratings in the aftermath of a default or restructuring. We discuss the 1930s sample and the modern emerging market episodes in turn.

In the midst of an environment characterized by profound economic contraction, systemic global banking crisis, trade wars, record unemployment, and a rising incidence of private and sovereign defaults it is hardly surprising that sovereign credit ratings drifted steadily lower through most of the 1930s in Europe and elsewhere. Linking the contribution to this generalized downward trend to the default on war debt of one government on another government is a far more complicated question. Table 4 presents the

³³ See Reinhart and Reinhart (2009).

³⁴ See Bulow and Rogoff (1989) and Eaton and Gersovitz (1981).

sovereign ratings for most of the countries that appear in Table 1. It would be difficult to deduce from the evolution of ratings the fact that France and the UK defaulted on war debt in amounts that exceeded 20 percent of their GDP in 1934. France and Britain retained their AAA status in the Fitch ratings; Moody's notched the UK down to Aa (from Aaa) and France remained at Aa. Also puzzling is how Greece and Germany managed to retain a B rating from Moody's when both had defaulted on all debts in all creditors. The Moody's description of a C rating (Appendix Table B2) read "Obligations rated C are the lowest rated and are typically in default, with little prospect for recovery." Perhaps there was optimism in their recovery of principal or interest.

Table 4. Interwar Defaults and Sovereign Credit Ratings: Moody's and Fitch, 1930-1939

| Country | Default year(s) | 1930 | 1931 | 1932 | 1933 | 1934 | 1935 | 1936 | 1937 | 1938 | 1939 |
|--|----------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| US Dollar Ratings Assigned by Moody's | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Austria | 1932, 1934-1952 | Aa | Aa | A | Baa | Baa | Ba | Ba | Ba | Ba | B |
| Belgium | 1934 | Aa | Aa | Aa | Aa | A | A | A | A | A | A |
| Bulgaria | 1932, 1934-1992 | Baa | Baa | Ba | B | B | B | B | B | B | B |
| Czechoslovakia | 1934, 1938-1946 | A | A | Baa | Baa | Baa | Baa | Baa | Baa | Baa | Baa |
| Estonia | 1934 | Ba | Ba | Ba | Ba | Ba | Baa | Baa | Baa | Baa | Baa |
| Finland | none | A | A | Baa | Baa | Baa | A | A | A | A | A |
| France | 1934 | Aa | Aa | Aa | Aa | Aa | Aa | Aa | A | A | A |
| Germany | 1932, 1939-1952 | Aa | Aa | Baa | Baa | Baa | B | B | B | B | B |
| Greece | 1932, 1934-1964 | Baa | Baa | Baa | B | B | B | B | B | B | B |
| Hungary | 1932, 1934-1937, 1940-1967 | A | A | Ba | Ba | Ba | Ba | Ba | Ba | Ba | Ba |
| Italy | 1934, 1940-1946 | A | A | Baa | Baa | A | A | A | Baa | Baa | Baa |
| Lithuania | 1934 | Ba | Ba | Ba | Ba | Ba | Ba | Ba | Ba | Ba | Ba |
| Poland | 1934, 1936, 1940-1952 | Baa | Baa | Baa | Baa | Baa | Baa | Baa | Ba | Ba | Ba |
| Romania | 1934 | B | Ba | Ba | Ba | B | B | B | B | B | B |
| United Kingdom | 1934 | Aaa | Aaa | Aaa | Aaa | Aa | Aa | Aa | Aa | Aa | Aa |
| Yugoslavia | 1933, 1934-1950 | Ba | Ba | Ba | B | B | B | B | Ba | Ba | Ba |
| US Dollar Ratings Assigned by Fitch | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Austria | 1932, 1934-1952 | AA | AA | A | BBB | BBB | B | B | B | | |
| Belgium | 1934 | AA | AA | A | A | A | A | A | A | A | A |
| Bulgaria | 1932, 1934-1992 | BBB | BB | CCC | CCC | CC | CC | CC | C | C | C |
| Czechoslovakia | 1934, 1938-1946 | A | A | BBB | BBB | BBB | BBB | BBB | BBB | | |
| Estonia | 1934 | BBB | BB | B | B | B | B | B | B | BB | BB |
| Finland | none | A | BBB | BB | BB | BBB | A | A | AA | A | A |
| France | 1934 | AAA | AAA | AAA | AAA | AAA | AAA | AAA | A | A | A |
| Germany | 1932, 1939-1952 | AAA | A | BB | BB | BB | CCC | | | | |
| Greece | 1932, 1934-1964 | BBB | BBB | CCC | CC | CC | CC | CC | CC | CC | CC |
| Hungary | 1932, 1934-1937, 1940-1967 | A | A | CCC | CCC | CC | CC | CC | | | |
| Italy | 1934, 1940-1946 | A | BBB | BBB | BBB | BBB | BBB | B | B | | |
| Poland | 1934, 1936, 1940-1952 | BBB | BBB | BB | BB | BB | BB | BB | | | |
| United Kingdom | 1934 | AAA | AAA | AAA | AAA | AAA | AAA | AAA | AAA | AAA | AAA |
| Yugoslavia | 1933, 1934-1950 | BB | BB | B | CC | CC | CC | CC | CC | CC | CC |

Sources: Fitch (2013), Gaillard (2012), and Moody's (2013). Italics denote year of the war debt default.

Beyond the ratings themselves, the usual important question on capital market access after a default is somewhat moot in the context of the war debt defaults of 1934 or, more generally the Depression. As Obstfeld and Taylor (1998) observe:³⁵

“All evidence points to the latter part of the interwar period, the period of the Great Depression, as the era of weakest financial integration: capital flows were small, countries behaved like closed economies in the capital market, and real and nominal price (interest rate) differentials expanded.”

Turning to emerging markets, the *Institutional Investor* ratings (IIR), which are compiled twice a year, are based on information provided by economists and sovereign risk analysts at leading global banks and securities firms. The ratings grade each country on a scale from 0 to 100, with a rating of 100 given to those countries perceived as having the lowest chance of defaulting on their government debt obligations.³⁶ Hence a transformed variable, $(100 - \text{IIR})$ can be interpreted as a proxy for default risk. The first ratings were published in 1979, and hence provide coverage for the entire sample of emerging market restructurings and defaults (although some of the smaller countries were added to the IIR sample at a later date). In the most recent credit survey (March 2013) the average credit rating for 179 sovereign fell 0.6 point to 43.9; the US credit rating fell 1.1 point to 88.8 its lowest level in the 33-year history of the survey.

In Figure 3, the September rating year T is normalized to 1 and the average (solid line) and plus/minus one standard deviation bounds (dashed line) are plotted for 30 of the 35 episodes for which there is full data.³⁷ The average increases in the IIR index are 22 percent after two years and 38 percent after four years. The box inset to Figure 3 gives the number and share of countries for different ranges of increases. For example, for 7 of the episodes (23 percent), the cumulative increase in the IIR from T to

³⁵ See also Obstfeld and Taylor (2004) for a long view on international capital mobility, which encompasses both of the sample periods covered in this paper.

³⁶ For details of the survey see <http://www.institutionalinvestor.com/Research/4142/Overview.html>. Although not critical to our analysis below, we interpret the ratings reported in each semiannual survey as capturing the near-term risk of default within one to two years.


³⁷ Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Dominica, Macedonia are not rated at all in the period surrounding the final restructuring while the coverage for Seychelles is incomplete.

T+4 is in excess of 60 percent. This solid pattern of recovery is broadly consistent with the findings in Gelos, Sahay, and Sandleris (2011), who define market access, “as public or publicly guaranteed bond issuances or public or publicly guaranteed borrowing through a private syndicated bank loan that results in an increase in the country’s indebtedness.” On the question of how long it takes countries to regain market after an exit from defaults, they suggest that the median number of years it took countries to tap the markets after default fell from four years in the 1980’s to zero in the 1990’s. Thus, re-entry seems to typically occur within the four-year window explored here. The single lowest reading at T+4 was 0.89 for Ecuador in the aftermath of the 1982 -1995 episode (there are 3 of the 30 cases, including Ecuador where the rating was below what it was at the time of the restructuring). But this outcome was not because Ecuador remained shut out of capital markets since its “final” Brady Plan restructuring but rather because it was quick to re-leverage after the Brady restructuring and faced a *new* debt crisis in 1999-2000.³⁸

The panorama presented by the Institutional Investor Ratings is consistent with the return of international capital at the time of the final restructuring or in the four years following the final deal. In effect, sometimes the return of international capital flows returns in a volume that was sufficiently large (relative to the countries historical norm) that it would be considered a “capital inflow bonanza”, as in Reinhart and Reinhart (2009). The dates of the bonanza episodes reported in that paper are available for 31 of the 35 episodes in this study; we found that 9 of 31 countries (29 percent) experienced bonanzas over T to T+4. An additional 2 countries the surge in inflows began at T-1, bringing the share up to 39 percent.

³⁸ See Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano (2003) on this phenomenon and the subsection entitled *Did default or restructuring reduce the debt?* in this paper.

Figure 3. Institutional Investor Ratings in the Aftermath of “Final” Restructuring, Middle-High Income Emerging Market Episodes, 1979-2010



Sources: Institutional Investor, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and authors’ calculations.

Notes: IIR Ratings are bounded by 0 (least creditworthy) to a perfect score of 100. The ratings are produced twice a year in March and September. We normalize by the September rating in the year of the final restructuring (i.e. the exit from a restructuring or default spell, that may involve more than one restructuring, see Cruces and Trebesch, 2013).


3. Servicing the debt

Another dimension to consider in evaluating the aftermath of debt relief or write-downs is its impact on debt servicing burdens. To this end, we have compiled League of Nations data for the interwar years on central government total debt service (interest payments plus amortizations for both domestic and foreign public debt) for the advanced economies appearing in Table 1a, as well as for Germany and the United States. Figure 4 presents the ratios of total debt service to both GDP (the dashed line plotted

against the right axis) and total central government revenue (solid line, left axis).³⁹ Between 1920 and 1931, both series display considerable volatility and no apparent trend. Beginning in 1931, which marks the start of the Hoover Moratorium on war debt, until 1938 the series become less volatile and persistently trend lower. France, Greece, Italy and the United Kingdom post the most significant declines in debt servicing. While Figure 4 does not show the breakdown of total costs into interest payments and amortization, our appraisal of the underlying data clearly places the lion's share of the decline on significant reductions in amortization. The debt servicing data may indeed be more revealing in these 1930s episodes than the outstanding debt stocks (which we examine next). The reason for this, is that while some countries (Austria, for instance) immediately write the war debt off their books in 1934. France having discontinued servicing war debt in 1932 removes it from its books six years later in 1938. Others, like Belgium and the United Kingdom keep World War I debt in their official debt figures until the end of World War II.

³⁹ Long time series for central government revenues are taken from Mitchell (1998 and 2003), which in most cases start in the 19th century (if not earlier).

Figure 4. Interwar Public Debt Service, 1920-1939:
Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, United Kingdom and United States
(as a percent of central government revenue and as a percent of GDP)




Sources: League of Nations, *Public Finances of Foreign Countries* (1936), Mitchell (1998 and 2003), United Nations (1948) based on the Yearbooks, nominal GDP cited in the Data Appendix, and authors' calculations.

Unlike the common (nearly so) default event in 1932-1934, the default spells, emerging market default restructuring episodes are dispersed throughout 1978-2010. In Figure 5, we plot for the 1970-2011 The average debt service on total external debt (public plus private external debt), which was at the center of the debt crises, especially in the 1980s. The chart shows debt servicing relative to gross national income (GNI) a measure commonly used by the World Bank in their analytical work of debt and relative to exports. The debt service/GNI measure is not plotted but summarized in the box inset, which break the debt service into three sub-periods: three years before the initial year of default, the entire default spell and three years follow T, the final restructuring or exit from default. The picture that emerges from both series (more pronounced in debt service-to-exports ratio, which drops from 37 percent to 19 percent) is one of a diminishing debt service burden relative to the pre-debt-crisis average. Debt servicing is

declining even before the “final restructuring” as in numerous cases (as discussed) there are multiple restructuring efforts in between the start and end of the default spell. Also, there are periods of debt standstills as well. However, this aggregate downward drift in debt servicing in emerging markets also importantly owes to external factors. Specifically, as shown in Figure 5 (solid line, right scale), after an abrupt spike in 1979 through mid-1982, there is a sustained and marked decline in real international interest rates through 2011 importantly driven by developments in US monetary policy. Even in the absence of haircuts, this beneficial trend would account for the observed reduction in debt servicing.

Figure 5. External Debt Servicing, Default and Restructuring, and US Interest Rates: Middle-High Income Emerging Markets, 1970-2011



Sources: Cruces and Trebesch (2013) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) for the episodes, *International Debt Statistics*, World Bank for the debt servicing ratios and *International Financial Statistics*, International Monetary Fund.

Notes: The debt service ratios are the standard ones reported by the World Bank where GNI stands for gross national income. Six of the countries that are part of the sample as shown in Table 3, do not have sufficient data to compute the before-during-after restructuring comparisons. The missing countries are: Croatia, Grenada, Poland, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovenia, and Trinidad and Tobago.

4. Did default or restructuring reduce the debt?

Governments usually get to the stage of debt restructuring and or default during hard times when other policies and measures have been tried and proved inadequate, insufficient, unsustainable, or a combination of these. A successful debt reduction package that marks an exit from a default regime apart from reducing the burden of debt servicing, restoring capital market access and stimulating growth would be expected to also to deliver some form of reduction in debt ratios that define whether the path is a sustainable one or not. In many of the episodes studied here part of the “success” also involved changing the composition of the debt. A common form of restructuring involves exchanges of short-term debt for longer maturities or exchanges of marketable debt for nonmarketable instruments that pose lower rollover risks. Analyzing to what extent these compositional change materialize is beyond the scope of this paper.

A compositional shift that was highly sought after in both the 1930s episodes and the modern EMs is to shift exposure away from external debt. To that end, for the US and European episodes of the 1930s we use the long time series on total, domestic, external central government debt assembled in Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and (2011).⁴⁰ For the emerging markets, we study the evolution of total external debt, which aggregates public, publicly guaranteed, and private debts. As many a crisis episode has shown, private debts before the crises often morph into public debt after the crisis.⁴¹

Table 5 documents changes in the stock of total, external and domestic debt for the period 1930 to 1934 and 1934 to 1937. We also calculate (not included in the table) the debt change over the entire 1930-1937 period. The cumulative reductions in debt as percent of GDP for France, Greece, and Italy are 50, 36, 30 percentage points, respectively. Sharp declines in external debt (where war debt figured prominently) primarily account for this fast deleveraging.

⁴⁰ If general government debt is used in the analysis it is so noted.

⁴¹ See Diaz-Alejandro (1985) for an early discussion of the contingent liabilities problem and Reinhart (2010) for documenting numerous historical examples..

Table 5. Did the Defaults Reduce the Debt? 1920-1939

| Debt/ GDP ratio | Change | | Peak Year | Comments |
|-------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--|
| | 1930 to 1934 | 1934 to 1937 | | |
| Austria | | | | |
| Central government debt | 19.9 | -3.6 | 1935 | Since 1934, the 1923 Reconstruction Loan is excluded from official figures. |
| External | 11.2 | 3.0 | 1937 | |
| Domestic | 8.7 | -6.6 | 1934 | |
| Belgium | | | | |
| Central government debt | 14.7 | -7.7 | 1922 | The December 1945 statement omits for the first time World War I debt. ¹ |
| External | -2.2 | -4.5 | 1926 | |
| Domestic | 17.0 | -3.2 | 1922 | |
| France | | | | |
| Central government debt | 9.2 | -59.0 | 1921 | From 1932 to 1937, no foreign debt numbers were published. Reported here are 1927-1931 and 1931-1938. ² |
| External | 6.4 | -64.2 | 1925 | |
| Domestic | 48.2 | -25.2 | 1921 | |
| Germany | | | | |
| Central government debt | 11.9 | 7.0 | 1922 | Recorded debt numbers significantly underestimate public indebtedness, as off balance sheet funding balloons. ³ |
| External | -3.1 | -1.1 | 1931 | |
| Domestic | 15.0 | 8.1 | 1937 | |
| Greece | | | | |
| Central government debt | -22.7 | -13.7 | 1931 | Total debt reaches 139% in 1931, while external debt exceeds 100%--by far the highest external dependence in this group. |
| External | -18.5 | -10.4 | 1931 | |
| Domestic | -4.2 | -3.3 | 1922 | |
| Italy | | | | |
| General government debt | -7.9 | -21.7 | 1920 | External debt peaks at 85% the historic high (1861 onwards). Amortizations are significant. ⁴ |
| External | -44.2 | -0.4 | 1920 | |
| Domestic | 36.3 | -21.4 | 1934 | |
| United Kingdom | | | | |
| Central government debt | 10.6 | 15.3 | 1937 | UK WWI loans to Allies are also being defaulted on. Since 1931 Australia excludes interest on War debt. ¹ |
| External | -0.2 | -3.6 | 1923 | |
| Domestic | 10.8 | 18.9 | 1937 | |
| United States | | | | |
| Central government debt | 23.2 | -1.4 | 1939 | All debt is domestic. The 1939 peak is 43.9%, lower than all others in this except Austria (which writes off WWI debts in 1934). |
| External | 0.0 | 0.0 | n.a. | |
| Domestic | 23.2 | -1.4 | 1939 | |

Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009, 2011) and sources cited therein., United Nations (1948). WWI debts to the US only.

¹ United Nations (1948) page 24.

² From 1938 WWI debts are excluded from the official data, United Nations (1948).

³ See discussion in Ritschl (2012).

⁴ Francese and Pace (2008).

France in 1936 and Italy in 1935 (along with the Netherlands and Switzerland) exited comparatively late from the gold standard; Italy and France had very limited scope to finance a fiscal expansion through much of the Depression. Relative to the early exits from gold for Germany and the United Kingdom in 1931, debt buildups in the 19 to 26 percent of GDP were recorded in 1930-1937 for the UK, US and Germany. In five of the seven countries, total debt/GDP fell following the 1934 default

For the US the decline is marginal. France and Italy recorded the largest reductions, 59 and 22 percent, respectively. Germany and the United Kingdom recorded increases in total debt that were driven by increases in domestic debt.

Table 6, presents a summary of external debt/exports for emerging market episodes. In the nine-year window we examine around the final restructuring episode, debt to exports falls, on average, by 74 percent. The larger decline occurs in T-4 to T. While this may appear counterintuitive, it is important to remember that by the time that last restructuring is agreed upon, there had often been one or more prior debt reduction efforts. Also, exits from default (T to T+4) are often accompanied or followed by new bouts of borrowing, as capital market re-entry (as evidenced by the sharp improvement in sovereign ratings following T).

Table 6. Did the Defaults Reduce the Debt? Emerging Markets, 1979-2010

| Country | T = Final restructuring | Change in ratio during: | | | Maximum: 1970-2011 | |
|----------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------|----------|------------|--------------------|-------|
| | | T-4 to T | T to T+4 | T-4 to T+4 | year | level |
| Algeria | 1996 | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | 1988 | 319.8 |
| Argentina | 1993 | -201.6 | 41.3 | -160.3 | 1987 | 698.6 |
| Argentina | 2005 | -160.9 | -67.9 | -228.8 | . | . |
| Bosnia & Herzegovina | 1997 | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | 2009 | 178.6 |
| Brazil | 1994 | -32.6 | 81.5 | 48.9 | 1984 | 436.3 |
| Bulgaria | 1994 | 32.2 | -4.9 | 27.4 | 1995 | 280.1 |
| Chile | 1990 | -208.5 | -32.2 | -240.6 | 1985 | 435.6 |
| Costa Rica | 1990 | -142.0 | -68.9 | -210.9 | 1982 | 366.8 |
| Dominica | 2005 | 18.4 | -38.2 | -19.8 | 2003 | 254.8 |
| Dominican Republic | 1994 | -149.9 | -22.8 | -172.6 | 1985 | 265.7 |
| Dominican Republic | 2005 | 8.4 | 35.8 | 44.2 | . | . |
| Ecuador | 1995 | -101.3 | 33.6 | -67.6 | 1989 | 427.3 |
| Ecuador | 2000 | -36.0 | -67.5 | -103.5 | . | . |
| Gabon | 1994 | 15.8 | 42.1 | 57.9 | 1994 | 202.7 |
| Grenada | 2005 | 133.8 | 59.2 | 193.0 | 2004 | 330.5 |
| Jamaica | 1993 | -54.7 | 9.0 | -45.7 | 1985 | 334.1 |
| Jordan | 1993 | -44.5 | 67.3 | 22.8 | 1991 | 373.8 |
| Macedonia, FYR | 1997 | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | 2010 | 178.8 |
| Mexico | 1990 | -155.9 | -14.9 | -170.7 | 1986 | 356.7 |
| Panama | 1996 | -15.2 | 1.6 | -13.6 | 1989 | 133.5 |
| Peru | 1997 | -207.7 | -23.2 | -230.8 | 1988 | 534.2 |
| Romania | 1986 | -13.9 | -48.7 | -62.6 | 2010 | 254.7 |
| Russian Federation | 2000 | 5.0 | -23.5 | -18.5 | 1999 | 203.4 |
| Seychelles | 2010 | 21.2 | n.a. | n.a. | 2009 | 164.8 |
| South Africa | 1993 | 0.0 | -7.6 | -7.6 | 2010 | 98.1 |
| Turkey | 1982 | -277.9 | 52.9 | -225.0 | 2001 | 536.5 |
| Uruguay | 1991 | -81.7 | -36.6 | -118.3 | 2003 | 334.4 |
| Uruguay | 2003 | 148.4 | -180.7 | -32.3 | . | . |
| Venezuela | 1990 | -150.7 | 36.8 | -113.9 | 1984 | 305.2 |
| Average, 29 episodes | | -63.5 | -7.1 | -74.0 | | 320.2 |


In Figure 6 we compare the advanced economy and emerging market experience over T-4 to T+4. For the emerging markets, we scale total external debt by gross national income (GNI). For the advanced economies, we plot external (foreign) central government debt/GDP. T=1934 for the interwar default episodes while T=last year (or exit) from restructuring/default spell for the emerging market entries.

The episodes are arranged from the largest deleveraging experiences to those cases, where debt/GDP (or GNI) is highest four years after the exit from default. Red bars correspond to the advanced economies; emerging markets are shown with green bars and (fewer) yellow bars. The latter are cases where there is debt reduction over the 9-year period, but there is a significant debt buildup in the four years following the final restructuring T to (T+4).

The first impression from Figure 6 is that there is a vast range in variation in the debt outcomes, ranging from a cumulative debt reduction of 125 percent of GNI to a debt build-up of 37 percent of GNI. Second, the number of countries, which experienced deleveraging is considerably higher (27 episodes) than those ending up with a higher level of external debt (7 episodes).⁴² Third, it is evident that the observations corresponding to the advanced economies are not clustered in a particular range and, indeed, their experience is distributed similarly to that of emerging markets. Finally, there are three yellow bars flagging countries where the deleveraging was done between T-4 and T and T to T+4 was a period of considerable debt build. In two of the three cases, Argentina and Ecuador, the swift post crisis deleveraging ended in a new default within less than a decade.

⁴² The US shows no change in external debt, as it does not have any external debt over this sample. Altogether this brings the total number of advanced and emerging market episodes to 35.

Figure 6. Default, Restructuring and External Debt: Advanced and Emerging Market Economies
(change in debt ratio from T-4 to T+4)



Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009 and 2011), World Bank (2013), *International Debt Statistics*, Washington D.C.
<http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/international-debt-statistics>. WWI debts to the US only.

V. Concluding Remarks

Elsewhere, we have documented that severe financial crises in advanced economies and emerging markets share many similarities in terms of the severity, the macroeconomic effects and their frequent connection with subsequent sovereign debt crises.⁴³ Here, we have documented that the resolution of debt overhangs in advanced and emerging market economies also have much in common even when they are separated by more than half a century. Advanced economies in the 1930s, like many modern emerging markets, also resorted to default and restructuring as part of their toolkit to deal with a massive debt overhang in economic hard times. The magnitudes of debt relief delivered from the debt write offs are of comparable magnitudes and, in most cases, quantitatively important (even by conservative estimates).

As to the aftermath of restructuring, the general picture that emerges is that, once the restructuring is completed decisively, the economic panorama tends to improve in terms of growth, debt servicing burdens, debt sustainability (higher growth lower debt), and international capital market access. Both the advanced economy and emerging market sample provide evidence in this regard. Of course, the critical modifier above is “*completed decisively*”. Ex post it is straightforward to date that final decisive restructuring deal that ends the debt crisis spell. Ex-ante is another matter, as it is often difficult to ascertain (given that the debt sustainability calculus is crucially driven by assumptions of future growth and how quickly risk premia decline) whether a restructuring proposal will deliver that *decisive* outcome.

The defaults on World War I debt in the summer of 1934 were decisive in the full meaning that it was understood that those debts would not be repaid anytime in the foreseeable future. Many, if not most, of the emerging market episodes, however, had a high count of debt reduction efforts that were not decisive; 97 restructuring deals in 35 defaults spells (a ratio of almost three to one) roughly suggests that prior to a final restructuring there were two “insufficient” efforts. This process of trial and error is typically associated with longer default spells and protracted slumps, as the empirical evidence presented

⁴³ Reinhart and Rogoff (2009).

here shows. These observations are not meant to imply that the restructuring or default process is not fraught with a variety of risks including reputational issues; it is meant to suggest that the “punishment” is neither permanent nor even very persistent. In effect, exit from default has in a few cases been followed by a renewed surge in borrowing culminating in a new debt crisis within a decade of the exit of the previous crisis.

Our emphasis here on debt reduction via restructuring and default is not meant to suggest that other forms of debt reduction were not quantitatively important in dealing with challenging debt overhangs as well. Fiscal retrenchment, structural reform, financial repression, and (in the case of domestic currency denominated debt) inflation often co-existed in these episodes of debt write-offs. However, the magnitude of debt relief is usually sufficiently important to be integrated in an academic autopsy or an ongoing policy discussion on the topic of debt overhang resolution.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to apportion to what extent the post-restructuring (or default exit) improvement in the economy is attributable to debt relief per se and what role other factors may have played. It would seem that this is a fruitful area for further investigation including revisiting the interwar experience following the 1934 defaults and the recovery in six European economies and the US that we studied here. Eichengreen (1992) has stressed the importance of stimulus provided by exits from the gold standard. Yet, the exits from the gold were spread over a five-year period, from the early British and Greek exits in 1931 to the French exit five years later in 1936. On the fiscal front, public works programs were initiated throughout much of the 1930s, but as with monetary policy, there was considerable dispersion in their timing and magnitudes. The defaults and debt write-downs were clustered much more closely in 1932-1934 at the trough.

A parallel question for the emerging markets would involve sorting out to what extent the post restructuring recovery may be linked to the debt write-downs or to other factors—such as the sharp depreciations that accompany debt crises (Reinhart, 2002), as the latter may have been a force for restoring competitiveness and stimulating exports. In any case, controlling for the stimulus from debt

relief seldom forms a part of the growth accounting following debt crisis episodes. Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano (2003) suggested that for emerging markets at least restructurings played a prominent role in historical periods of debt reduction (or debt reversals) in emerging markets. We would now suggest that the preceding statement also accurately depicts the experience of the advanced economies in the interwar years.

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Appendix A: US Abrogation of the Gold Clause

Table A1. United States: Abrogation of the Gold Clause and Devaluation January 30-31, 1934

| Fiscal Year | Debt outstanding | Dollar devaluation | | Nominal GDP | Debt relief (haircut/GDP) | |
|----------------|---------------------|--|-------------------|-------------|------------------------------|------|
| | | relative to gold (haircut, percent) | Amount of haircut | | | |
| 30.06.1934 | 27,053,141,414 | 40.94 | 11,075,556,095 | 1934 | 66,800,000,000 | 16.6 |
| 30.06.1933 | 22,538,672,560 | 40.94 | 9,227,332,546 | 1933 | 57,200,000,000 | 16.1 |

Sources: Debt from http://www.treasurydirect.gov/govt/reports/pd/histdebt/histdebt_histo3.htm

Devaluations details, Pick and Sedillot (1971), pg. 110; Nominal GDP, Measuring Worth, <http://www.measuringworth.com/usgdp/>

Notes: January 1934 devaluation details are: from 1 troy ounce of gold = 20.67 US dollars to 1 troy ounce of gold = 35.00 US dollars.

We provide the debt and nominal GDP figures for 1933 and 1934 to bracket the size of the debt reduction. According to the League of Nations, the United States had no foreign currency debt in 1934, as such, there is no offsetting "cost" from a higher burden of foreign currency debt following the devaluation. See also Kroszner (1999).

Appendix B: Data

Table B1. Middle-High Income External Debt Restructuring Episodes, 1978-2010

| Country / Case | Month/ Year | Debt affected (m US\$) | Preferred haircut (C&T) | GDP in millions US\$ | GDP full episode year (Method 1) | Debt affected/ GDP | Full restructuring episode | Debt affected full episode | Debt affected/ GDP | Full episode haircut (C&T) | Full episode debt relief to GDP | Full episode debt relief to GDP | Full episode debt relief to GDP | Full episode debt relief to GDP |
|------------------------|----------------|------------------------------|-------------------------------|----------------------------|---|--------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------------------|--|--|--|--|
| | | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | Method 1 | Method 2 | Method 3 | Method 4 |
| Algeria | 03 / 1992 | 1,457 | 0.087 | 49,217 | 1996 | 3.0 | 1991-1996 | 4,657 | 9.9 | 0.054 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 2.0 | 2.0 |
| Algeria | 07 / 1996 | 3,200 | 0.235 | 46,941 | | 6.8 | | | | | | | | |
| Argentina | 08 / 1985 | 9,900 | 0.303 | 88,193 | 1993 | 11.2 | 1982-1993 | 67,891 | 28.7 | 0.477 | 13.7 | 24.0 | n.a. | n.a. |
| Argentina | 08 / 1987 | 29,515 | 0.217 | 108,731 | | 27.1 | | | | | | | | |
| Argentina | 04 / 1993 | 28,476 | 0.325 | 236,520 | | 12.0 | | | | | | | | |
| Argentina | 04 / 2005 | 60,572 | 0.768 | 181,357 | 2005 | 33.4 | 2001-2005 | 60,572 | 33.4 | 0.425 | 14.2 | 14.2 | n.a. | n.a. |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina | 12 / 1997 | 1,300 | 0.896 | 5,281 | 1998 | 24.6 | 1992-1997 | 1,300 | 24.6 | 0.896 | 22.1 | 22.1 | n.a. | n.a. |
| Brazil | 02 / 1983 | 4,452 | -0.098 | 146,702 | 1994 | 3.0 | 1983-1994 | 130,493 | 23.9 | 0.375 | 9.0 | 14.3 | 6.7 | 8.3 |
| Brazil | 01 / 1984 | 4,846 | 0.017 | 145,992 | | 3.3 | | | | | | | | |
| Brazil | 09 / 1986 | 6,671 | 0.192 | 268,846 | | 2.5 | | | | | | | | |
| Brazil | 11 / 1988 | 62,100 | 0.184 | 326,902 | | 19.0 | | | | | | | | |
| Brazil | 11 / 1992 | 9,167 | 0.270 | 390,586 | | 2.3 | | | | | | | | |
| Brazil | 04 / 1994 | 43,257 | 0.293 | 546,487 | | 7.9 | | | | | | | | |
| Bulgaria | 06 / 1994 | 7,910 | 0.563 | 8,013 | 1994 | 98.7 | 1990-1994 | 7,910 | 98.7 | 0.563 | 55.6 | 55.6 | 55.6 | 55.6 |
| Chile | 11 / 1983 | 2,169 | 0.007 | 21,016 | 1990 | 10.3 | 1983-1990 | 21,731 | 64.8 | 0.379 | 24.6 | 35.6 | 17.7 | 23.3 |
| Chile | 01 / 1984 | 1,160 | 0.084 | 20,437 | | 5.7 | | | | | | | | |
| Chile | 04 / 1986 | 6,007 | 0.317 | 18,839 | | 31.9 | | | | | | | | |
| Chile | 06 / 1987 | 5,901 | 0.143 | 22,219 | | 26.6 | | | | | | | | |
| Chile | 12 / 1990 | 6,494 | 0.170 | 33,546 | | 19.4 | | | | | | | | |
| Costa Rica | 09 / 1983 | 609 | 0.394 | 3,147 | 1990 | 19.4 | 1983-1990 | 2,433 | 42.6 | 0.791 | 33.7 | 43.4 | 29.0 | 30.8 |
| Costa Rica | 05 / 1985 | 440 | 0.356 | 3,923 | | 11.2 | | | | | | | | |
| Costa Rica | 05 / 1990 | 1,384 | 0.719 | 5,710 | | 24.2 | | | | | | | | |
| Croatia | 07 / 1996 | 858 | 0.110 | 23,380 | 1996 | 3.7 | 1992-1996 | 858 | 3.7 | 0.11 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.7 |
| Dominican Rep. | 02 / 1986 | 823 | 0.499 | 7,883 | 1994 | 10.4 | 1982-1994 | 1,910 | 13.6 | 0.731 | 9.9 | 13.3 | n.a. | n.a. |
| Dominican Rep. | 08 / 1994 | 1,087 | 0.505 | 14,094 | | 7.7 | | | | | | | | |
| Dominican Rep. (Bond) | 05 / 2005 | 1,100 | 0.047 | 33,533 | 2005 | 3.3 | 2005 | 1,280 | 3.8 | 0.016 | 0.1 | 0.1 | n.a. | n.a. |
| Dominican Rep. (Bank) | 10 / 2005 | 180 | 0.113 | 33,533 | | 0.5 | | | | | | | | |
| Dominica | 09 / 2004 | 144 | 0.540 | 361 | 2005 | 39.9 | 2003-2005 | 144 | 39.9 | 0.54 | 21.6 | 21.6 | 21.6 | 21.6 |
| Ecuador | 10 / 1983 | 970 | 0.063 | 15,431 | 1995 | 6.3 | 1982-1995 | 12,714 | 54.3 | 0.512 | 27.8 | 31.2 | n.a. | n.a. |
| Ecuador | 08 / 1984 | 350 | 0.057 | 16,423 | | 2.1 | | | | | | | | |
| Ecuador | 12 / 1985 | 4,224 | 0.154 | 19,206 | | 22.0 | | | | | | | | |
| Ecuador | 02 / 1995 | 7,170 | 0.422 | 23,427 | | 30.6 | | | | | | | | |
| Ecuador | 08 / 2000 | 6,700 | 0.383 | 18,685 | 2000 | 35.9 | 1999-2000 | 6,700 | 35.9 | 0.334 | 12.0 | 12.0 | n.a. | n.a. |
| Ecuador | 06 / 2009 | 3,190 | 0.677 | 57,859 | 2009 | 5.5 | 2008-2009 | 3,190 | 5.5 | 0.528 | 2.9 | 2.9 | n.a. | n.a. |
| Gabon | 12 / 1987 | 39 | 0.079 | 3,535 | 1994 | 1.1 | 1986-1994 | 226 | 5.3 | 0.054 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.8 | 0.8 |
| Gabon | 05 / 1994 | 187 | 0.162 | 4,265 | | 4.4 | | | | | | | | |
| Grenada | 11 / 2005 | 210 | 0.339 | 695 | | 30.2 | 2004-2005 | 210 | 30.2 | 0.339 | 10.2 | 10.2 | | |
| Jamaica | 09 / 1978 | 63 | 0.022 | | 1990 | | 1978-1993 | 1,452 | 31.1 | 0.516 | 16.1 | 24.4 | 14.7 | 17.8 |
| Jamaica | 04 / 1979 | 149 | 0.035 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Jamaica | 06 / 1981 | 89 | 0.152 | 2,817 | | 3.2 | | | | | | | | |
| Jamaica | 06 / 1984 | 165 | 0.181 | 2,119 | | 7.8 | | | | | | | | |
| Jamaica | 09 / 1985 | 369 | 0.317 | 1,993 | | 18.5 | | | | | | | | |
| Jamaica | 05 / 1987 | 285 | 0.328 | 2,672 | | 10.7 | | | | | | | | |
| Jamaica | 06 / 1990 | 332 | 0.440 | 4,663 | | 7.1 | | | | | | | | |
| Jordan | 12 / 1993 | 1,289 | 0.546 | 5,532 | 1993 | 23.3 | 1989-1993 | 1,289 | 23.3 | 0.227 | 5.3 | 5.3 | | |
| Macedonia, FYR | 03 / 1997 | 229 | 0.346 | 3,735 | 1997 | 6.1 | 1992-1997 | 229 | 6.1 | 0.346 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.9 |
| Mexico | 08 / 1983 | 18,800 | -0.002 | 172,160 | 1990 | 10.9 | 1982-1990 | 177,771 | 61.8 | 0.42 | 25.9 | 36.2 | 13.1 | 19.5 |
| Mexico | 03 / 1985 | 28,600 | 0.022 | 215,443 | | 13.3 | | | | | | | | |
| Mexico | 08 / 1985 | 20,100 | 0.054 | 215,443 | | 9.3 | | | | | | | | |
| Mexico | 03 / 1987 | 52,300 | 0.181 | 163,581 | | 32.0 | | | | | | | | |
| Mexico | 03 / 1988 | 3,671 | 0.563 | 200,119 | | 1.8 | | | | | | | | |
| Mexico | 02 / 1990 | 54,300 | 0.305 | 287,803 | | 18.9 | | | | | | | | |
| Panama | 10 / 1985 | 579 | 0.120 | 5,402 | 1996 | 10.7 | 1983-1996 | 4,967 | 53.3 | 0.389 | 20.7 | 22.9 | 16.9 | 19.8 |
| Panama | 08 / 1994 | 452 | 0.151 | 7,734 | | 5.8 | | | | | | | | |
| Panama | 05 / 1996 | 3,936 | 0.349 | 9,322 | | 42.2 | | | | | | | | |
| Peru | 01 / 1980 | 340 | -0.046 | 20,649 | 1997 | 1.6 | 1980-1997 | 11,320 | 19.1 | 0.64 | 12.2 | 13.8 | 11.4 | 11.5 |
| Peru | 07 / 1983 | 380 | 0.063 | 19,291 | | 2.0 | | | | | | | | |
| Peru | 03 / 1997 | 10,600 | 0.639 | 59,214 | | 17.9 | | | | | | | | |

Table B1 (continued). Middle-High Income External Debt Restructuring Episodes, 1978-2010

| Country / Case | Month/ Year | Debt affected (m US\$) | Preferred haircut (C&T) | GDP in millions US\$ | GDP full episode year (Method 1) | Debt affected/ GDP | Full restructuring episode | Debt affected full episode | Debt affected/ GDP | Full episode haircut (C&T) | Full episode debt relief to GDP | Full episode debt relief to GDP | Full episode debt relief to GDP | Full episode debt relief to GDP | |
|---------------------|----------------|------------------------------|-------------------------------|----------------------------|---|--------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------------------|--|--|--|--|------|
| | | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | Method 1 | Method 2 | Method 3 | Method 4 | |
| Poland | 04 / 1982 | 1,957 | 0.406 | 65,187 | 1994 | 3.0 | 1981-1994 | 30,912 | 29.8 | | n.a. | n.a. | 15.1 | 15.1 | 17.7 |
| Poland | 11 / 1982 | 2,225 | 0.629 | 65,187 | | 3.4 | | | | | | | | | |
| Poland | 11 / 1983 | 1,192 | 0.525 | 75,406 | | 1.6 | | | | | | | | | |
| Poland | 07 / 1984 | 1,390 | 0.269 | 75,507 | | 1.8 | | | | | | | | | |
| Poland | 09 / 1986 | 1,970 | 0.375 | 73,677 | | 2.7 | | | | | | | | | |
| Poland | 07 / 1988 | 8,441 | 0.244 | 68,612 | | 12.3 | | | | | | | | | |
| Poland | 07 / 1989 | 206 | 0.120 | 66,895 | | 0.3 | | | | | | | | | |
| Poland | 10 / 1994 | 13,531 | 0.490 | 103,683 | | 13.1 | | | | | | | | | |
| Romania | 12 / 1982 | 1,598 | 0.329 | 54,819 | 1983 | 2.9 | 1981-1986 | 2,965 | 6.2 | 0.158 | 1.0 | 0.9 | 1.5 | 1.6 | |
| Romania | 06 / 1983 | 567 | 0.317 | 47,915 | | 1.2 | | | | | | | | | |
| Romania | 09 / 1986 | 800 | 0.123 | 51,765 | 1986 | 1.5 | | | | | | | | | |
| Russia | 12 / 1997 | 30,500 | 0.262 | 404,938 | 2000 | 7.5 | 1991-2000 | 68,683 | 26.4 | 0.495 | 13.1 | 11.3 | 9.6 | 11.1 | |
| Russia (GKOs) | 03 / 1999 | 4,933 | 0.460 | 195,907 | | 2.5 | | | | | | | | | |
| Russia (MinFin3) | 02 / 2000 | 1,307 | 0.515 | 259,716 | | 0.5 | | | | | | | | | |
| Russia (PRINs/IANs) | 08 / 2000 | 31,943 | 0.508 | 259,716 | | 12.3 | | | | | | | | | |
| Serbia & Montenegro | 07 / 2004 | 2,700 | 0.709 | 23,537 | 2004 | 11.5 | 2003-2004 | 2,700 | 11.5 | 0.709 | 8.1 | 8.1 | 8.1 | 8.4 | |
| Seychelles | 02 / 2010 | 320 | 0.562 | 973 | 2010 | 32.9 | 2008-2010 | 320 | 32.9 | 0.562 | 18.5 | 18.5 | 18.5 | 18.7 | |
| Slovenia | 06 / 1995 | 812 | 0.033 | 20,971 | 1995 | 3.9 | 1992-1996 | 812 | 3.9 | 0.033 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.5 | |
| South Africa | 03 / 1987 | 10,900 | 0.085 | 85,792 | 1993 | 12.7 | 1985-1993 | 23,400 | 17.9 | 0.377 | 6.8 | 9.2 | 2.9 | 2.9 | |
| South Africa | 10 / 1989 | 7,500 | 0.127 | 95,979 | | 7.8 | | | | | | | | | |
| South Africa | 09 / 1993 | 5,000 | 0.220 | 130,448 | | 3.8 | | | | | | | | | |
| Trinidad & Tobago | 12 / 1989 | 446 | 0.155 | 4,323 | 1989 | 10.3 | 1988-1989 | 446 | 10.3 | 0.155 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 2.0 | |
| Turkey | 06 / 1979 | 429 | 0.222 | | 1982 | | 1978-1982 | 5,067 | 5.8 | 0.316 | 1.8 | 0.9 | 1.1 | 1.5 | |
| Turkey | 08 / 1979 | 2,269 | 0.195 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Turkey | 08 / 1981 | 100 | 0.086 | 95,496 | | 0.1 | | | | | | | | | |
| Turkey | 03 / 1982 | 2,269 | 0.170 | 86,766 | | 2.6 | | | | | | | | | |
| Uruguay | 07 / 1983 | 575 | 0.007 | 5,609 | 1991 | 10.3 | 1983-1991 | 5,913 | 47.8 | 0.46 | 22.0 | 34.3 | n.a. | n.a. | |
| Uruguay | 07 / 1986 | 1,958 | 0.243 | 6,470 | | 30.3 | | | | | | | | | |
| Uruguay | 03 / 1988 | 1,770 | 0.203 | 8,375 | | 21.1 | | | | | | | | | |
| Uruguay | 01 / 1991 | 1,610 | 0.263 | 12,376 | | 13.0 | | | | | | | | | |
| Uruguay | 05 / 2003 | 3,127 | 0.098 | 12,046 | 2003 | 26.0 | 2003 | 3,127 | 26.0 | 0.079 | 2.1 | 2.1 | n.a. | n.a. | |
| Venezuela | 02 / 1986 | 20,307 | 0.099 | 60,878 | 1990 | 33.4 | 1983-1990 | 60,230 | 124.5 | 0.387 | 48.2 | 41.6 | 19.6 | 27.9 | |
| Venezuela | 09 / 1988 | 20,338 | 0.043 | 60,379 | | 33.7 | | | | | | | | | |
| Venezuela | 12 / 1990 | 19,585 | 0.367 | 48,393 | | 40.5 | | | | | | | | | |
| Averages | | 7,889 | 0.270 | 79,299 | | 13.8 | | 20,738 | 30.2 | 0.39 | 13.6 | 15.7 | | | |

Sources: Individual episodes dates, debt affected, preferred haircut, full episode haircut from Cruces and Trebesch; full episode haircut not previously published. GDP in US dollars from World Economic Outlook, April 2013; full restructuring episode from Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). Debt relief calculations from the authors.

Table B2. Moody's Global Long-Term Rating Scale

| Rating | Explanation |
|--------|--|
| Aaa | Obligations rated Aaa are judged to be of the highest quality, subject to the lowest level of credit risk. |
| Aa | Obligations rated Aa are judged to be of high quality and are subject to very low credit risk. |
| A | Obligations rated A are judged to be upper-medium grade and are subject to low credit risk. |
| Baa | Baa Obligations rated Baa are judged to be medium-grade and subject to moderate credit risk and as such may possess certain speculative characteristics. |
| Ba | Obligations rated Ba are judged to be speculative and are subject to substantial credit risk. |
| B | B Obligations rated B are considered speculative and are subject to high credit risk. |
| Caa | Obligations rated Caa are judged to be speculative of poor standing and are subject to very high credit risk. |
| Ca | Obligations rated Ca are highly speculative and are likely in, or very near, default, with some prospect of recovery of principal and interest. |
| C | Obligations rated C are the lowest rated and are typically in default, with little prospect for recovery of principal or interest. |

Source: Moodys' (2013).

Note: Moody's appends numerical modifiers 1, 2, and 3 to each generic rating classification from Aa through Caa. The modifier 1 indicates that the obligation ranks in the higher end of its generic rating category; the modifier 2 indicates a mid-range ranking; and the modifier 3 indicates a ranking in the lower end of that generic rating category. Additionally, a "(hyb)" indicator is appended to all ratings of hybrid securities issued by banks, insurers, finance companies, and securities firms.*

* By their terms, hybrid securities allow for the omission of scheduled dividends, interest, or principal payments, which can potentially result in impairment if such an omission occurs. Hybrid securities may also be subject to contractually allowable write-downs of principal that could result in impairment.

Table B3. Fitch's Ratings Symbols and Definitions

| Rating | Explanation |
|--------|--|
| AAA | Highest credit quality. AAA' ratings denote the lowest expectation of default risk. They are assigned only in cases of exceptionally strong capacity for payment of financial commitments. This capacity is highly unlikely to be adversely affected by foreseeable events. |
| AA | Very high credit quality. 'AA' ratings denote expectations of very low default risk. They indicate very strong capacity for payment of financial commitments. This capacity is not significantly vulnerable to foreseeable events. |
| A | High credit quality. 'A' ratings denote expectations of low default risk. The capacity for payment of financial commitments is considered strong. This capacity may, nevertheless, be more vulnerable to adverse business or economic conditions than is the case for higher ratings. |
| BBB | Good credit quality. 'BBB' ratings indicate that expectations of default risk are currently low. The capacity for payment of financial commitments is considered adequate but adverse business or economic conditions are more likely to impair this capacity. |
| BB | Speculative. 'BB' ratings indicate an elevated vulnerability to default risk, particularly in the event of adverse changes in business or economic conditions over time; however, business or financial flexibility exists which supports the servicing of financial commitments. . |
| B | Highly speculative. 'B' ratings indicate that material default risk is present, but a limited margin of safety remains. Financial commitments are currently being met; however, capacity for continued payment is vulnerable to deterioration in the business and economic environment. |
| CCC | Substantial credit risk. Default is a real possibility. |
| CC | Very high levels of credit risk. Default of some kind appears probable. |
| C | Exceptionally high levels of credit risk. Default is imminent or inevitable, or the issuer is in standstill. Conditions that are indicative of a 'C' category rating for an issuer include: a. the issuer has entered into a grace or cure period following non-payment of a material financial obligation; b. the issuer has entered into a temporary negotiated waiver or standstill agreement following a payment default on a material financial obligation; or c. Fitch Ratings otherwise believes a condition of 'RD' or 'D' to be imminent or inevitable, including through the formal announcement of a distressed debt exchange. |
| RD | Restricted default. 'RD' ratings indicate an issuer that in Fitch Ratings' opinion has experienced an uncured payment default on a bond, loan or other material financial obligation but which has not entered into bankruptcy filings, administration, receivership, liquidation or other formal winding-up procedure, and which has not otherwise ceased operating. This would include: a. the selective payment default on a specific class or currency of debt; b. the uncured expiry of any applicable grace period, cure period or default forbearance period following a payment default on a bank loan, capital markets security or other material financial obligation; c. the extension of multiple waivers or forbearance periods upon a payment default on one or more material financial obligations, either in series or in parallel; or d. execution of a distressed debt exchange on one or more material financial obligations. |
| D | Default. 'D' ratings indicate an issuer that in Fitch Ratings' opinion has entered into bankruptcy filings, administration, receivership, liquidation or other formal winding-up procedure, or which has otherwise ceased business. Default ratings are not assigned prospectively to entities or their obligations; within this context, non-payment on an instrument that contains a deferral feature or grace period will generally not be considered a default until after the expiration of the deferral or grace period, unless a default is otherwise driven by bankruptcy or other similar circumstance, or by a distressed debt exchange. "Imminent" default typically refers to the occasion where a payment default has been intimated by the issuer, and is all but inevitable. This may, for example, be where an issuer has missed a scheduled payment, but (as is typical) has a grace period during which it may cure the payment default. Another alternative would be where an issuer has formally announced a distressed debt exchange, but the date of the exchange still lies several days or weeks in the immediate future. In all cases, the assignment of a default rating reflects the agency's opinion as to the most appropriate rating category consistent with the rest of its universe of ratings, and may differ from the definition of default under the terms of an issuer's financial obligations or local commercial practice. |

Source: Fitch Ratings (2013).

Note: The modifiers "+" or "-" may be appended to a rating to denote relative status within major rating categories. Such suffixes are not added to the 'AAA' Long-Term IDR category, or to Long-Term IDR categories below 'B'. http://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/pubsto/quastoeco/QSE_18;internal&action=_setlanguage.action?LANGUA GE=en. For the most recent years data have been updated with the most recent Istat (National Statistical institute) releases.

Table B4. Additional Data Sources

In addition to the sources listed in Box 3 and discussed in the main text, we list below any remaining sources.

| <i>Nominal GDP: Advanced Economies, 1920-1939</i> | |
|---|---|
| Country | Sources |
| Austria | Global Financial Data, 1924-1937 |
| Belgium | BNB, Centre d'études économiques de la KUL, 1835-2005 |
| Finland | Historical National Accounts Database (HNAD), 1860-2001 http://www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/historical-national-accounts |
| France | Historical National Accounts Database (HNAD), 1815-1938 http://www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/historical-national-accounts |
| Germany | Historical National Accounts Database (HNAD), 1850-2006 http://www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/historical-national-accounts |
| Greece | Kostelenos (2003), 1830-1939 |
| Italy | Francese and Pace (2008) 1861-2006 |
| United Kingdom | MeasuringWorth, http://www.measuringworth.com/datasets/usgdp/result.php 1830-2011 |
| United States | MeasuringWorth, http://www.measuringworth.com/datasets/usgdp/result.php 1790-2011 |
| <i>Other</i> | |
| Exchange rates, | <i>Historical Statistics of the United States</i> and United Nations (1948); 1932-1934 |
| WWI debts owed to United States | Bailey (1950), Loyd (1933), United Nations (1948), US Treasury (1920, 1933) and US Treasury Annual Reports (various issues), Moody's Manuals on Foreign and American Government Securities (various issues), Moulton and Pasvolsky 1932 |
| WWI debts owed to France and UK | League of Nations (various issues), United Nations (1948), Moody's Manuals (various issues) |
